./0000755000000000000000000000000013776116123007720 5ustar rootrootinstall/0000755000000000000000000000000013776116123011231 5ustar rootrootinstall/doinst.sh0000644000000000000000000000116613776116123013071 0ustar rootroot( cd usr/lib64 ; rm -rf libmbedcrypto.so ) ( cd usr/lib64 ; ln -sf libmbedcrypto.so.6 libmbedcrypto.so ) ( cd usr/lib64 ; rm -rf libmbedcrypto.so.6 ) ( cd usr/lib64 ; ln -sf libmbedcrypto.so.2.25.0 libmbedcrypto.so.6 ) ( cd usr/lib64 ; rm -rf libmbedtls.so ) ( cd usr/lib64 ; ln -sf libmbedtls.so.13 libmbedtls.so ) ( cd usr/lib64 ; rm -rf libmbedtls.so.13 ) ( cd usr/lib64 ; ln -sf libmbedtls.so.2.25.0 libmbedtls.so.13 ) ( cd usr/lib64 ; rm -rf libmbedx509.so ) ( cd usr/lib64 ; ln -sf libmbedx509.so.1 libmbedx509.so ) ( cd usr/lib64 ; rm -rf libmbedx509.so.1 ) ( cd usr/lib64 ; ln -sf libmbedx509.so.2.25.0 libmbedx509.so.1 ) install/slack-desc0000644000000000000000000000160513776116123013167 0ustar rootroot# HOW TO EDIT THIS FILE: # The "handy ruler" below makes it easier to edit a package description. Line # up the first '|' above the ':' following the base package name, and the '|' # on the right side marks the last column you can put a character in. You must # make exactly 11 lines for the formatting to be correct. It's also # customary to leave one space after the ':' except on otherwise blank lines. |-----handy-ruler------------------------------------------------------| mbedtls: mbedtls (cryptographic C library with small footprint) mbedtls: mbedtls: Mbed TLS is a C library implementing cryptographic primitives, mbedtls: X.509 certificate manipulation and the SSL/TLS and DTLS protocols. mbedtls: Its small code footprint makes it suitable for embedded systems. mbedtls: mbedtls: mbedtls: mbedtls: mbedtls: See also: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/projects/mbed-tls/ mbedtls: usr/0000755000000000000000000000000013776116122010373 5ustar rootrootusr/bin/0000755000000000000000000000000013776116123011144 5ustar rootrootusr/bin/mbedtls-aescrypt20000755000000000000000000005434013776116123014444 0ustar rootrootELF>p-@@`R@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@ @ @@@@@@XXM]@]@M]@]@@@ PtdCC@C@QtdRtdM]@]@88/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU,@| i&A,-.03569:<=>?k|$06ϟqXB7K|j Cֳ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 4'D2cz .5C<14 CU e `F'{,  P "@ B p/@Y `.@ Xa@ P.@ 3@@`a@Ha@ 0@3j /@Xa@ 01@z 1@| 2@Z 2@] p-@+ /@K Ha@ 0@; p.@ 1@_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable__gmon_start___ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_md_info_from_typembedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_md_hmac_startsmbedtls_aes_initmbedtls_md_startsmbedtls_aes_setkey_encmbedtls_md_hmac_finishmbedtls_md_hmac_updatembedtls_md_initmbedtls_aes_freembedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_md_finishmbedtls_md_updatembedtls_md_freembedtls_aes_crypt_ecbmbedtls_platform_zeroizembedtls_aes_setkey_decmbedtls_md_setupexitfopenperror__isoc99_sscanfputsstrtolcallocstrlenmemsetfseeklseekmemcpyfclosestderrfilenofwritefreadfprintfstrcmp__libc_start_mainlibmbedcrypto.so.6libz.so.1libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randGLIBC_2.7GLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5rii ui _@_@ _@_@'_@*`@ `@(`@0`@8`@@`@H`@P`@ X`@ ``@ h`@ p`@x`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@ a@!a@"a@#a@$ a@%(a@&0a@(8a@)@a@+HH?HtH5?%?@%?h%?h%?h%?h%?h%?h%?h%?hp%?h`%?h P%?h @%?h 0%?h %z?h %r?h%j?h%b?h%Z?h%R?h%J?h%B?h%:?h%2?h%*?hp%"?h`%?hP%?h@% ?h0%?h %>h%>h%>h%>h %>h!%>h"%>h#%>h$%>h%AWIAVAUATUSHH$H$HH$HHHAƅaH=9H:'H=YHHD$pD$ HD$HG:H=HvHD$pD$ HD$Mo A}hex:~IHD$lHl$1LL$IHt(D$lHHA1LH5HSHl$Ht$@H|$1 HHHHuHMoHt$HLLHH{LHPHL$0H$H$HT$pT$@HD$xH8 кD$HD$pHHD$AH$od$pfLt$A $$fH LHLHHLHAuH<$LL HHD$@L|$ Lt$(L|$Ld$8IILL)I9&IHLILLT$ltI‹D$lHI9-HT$LH$  0HHH9uH<$LLI6LHHL$0LHo$L$p>L HH=HG؉؃*,AUHL$ATHL$fTH='HD$pD$ HD$JH7IWH5H81HD$pD$ HD$}L|$ Ld$8H5H6H81D$ H6IWH5NH81H|$(HD$pD$ HD$ H|$@/HD$@HD$HHL$(H|$HffLt$H$A H$$HHD$xH8HT$pH$L$8H$H LHLHHLHAuHD$@H<$LHXL HDl$8HD$pLd$PLd$(Lt$HHD$Dl$\Ll$L|$HII9LL{HSo$LH$H<$LL1O1ATA2ATHHuo$|$8\$ptHL$@HQL9DD$\HL$0¾LD$lI‹D$lHI9I1Hk4H=:HHD$pD$ HD$}H|$LITHTCHLd$8HL|$ L*HL$0 L3H L|$ Ld$8H5L|$HLd$PH3H5H81H3 H=HHn3 H=eHLd$PHL|$HLcHL$(H|$ z H \Ht$11A2H H u(H21H=.H H2H5L|$HLd$PH81AUHL$ATTa1I^HHPTI2@H2@Hǐ"@F2DH=3H3H9tH2Ht H=3H5z3H)HH?HHHtH1HtfD=A3uUH~/3]Dff.@f.@H=3@H=2D@AUIATIUHHSHHu{HI$L9v,qBKHQЀ v Qw5QH ЈEt/B< vˍB<vB<w+BDQwQ1H[]A\A]I$AI1Et=A4D@0W@AFq0 WAWFƈDWHL9uDHHHEVHtHH]0LHH5H81QgAUATIUSHHHHtCHƿHIHtqHL$LHHXu%HL[]A\A]fDH1[]A\A]/LH/HH5NH81Lff.9ut(1 fHH9t 8 t1f.Ht3UH,SHHfDsHCH9uH1[]fD1DHH11Hff.AUIATIUSHHt5HoIHH9LFMu5L9rH1[]A\A]LK4(L)H1[]A\A]EDH7LLL+L)kIfDIIHATUSL\$Hf.IIڋW@ODMF1DÃA,D1-Ga1 W@AԃA,D11OD= 7uD։T$Et1ƒA A 9rIM)f[1]A\Jf.AWL=/+AVIAUIATAUH- +SL)HCHt1LLDAHH9uH[]A\A]A^A_HH ! mbedtls_md_setup() returned -0x%04x aescrypt2 : 0 = encrypt, 1 = decrypt example: aescrypt2 0 file file.aes hex:E76B2413958B00E193 input and output filenames must differ File too short to be encrypted. File size not a multiple of 16. HMAC check failed: wrong key, or file corrupted. invalide operation mode rbfopen(%s,rb) failed wb+fopen(%s,wb+) failed %02Xlseekfseek(0,SEEK_SET) failed fwrite(%d bytes) failed fread(%u bytes) failed fread(%d bytes) failed fwrite(%u bytes) failed p != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;hH8XLh`h0\(t8zRx +zRx $8pFJ w?;*3$"4D BEB B(A0A8I|  8BED G(G0} (A ABBA tKYD_ A LBBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE `d3(t;FEG [CAGDPHzBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,QAA CBAD4]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBB|@.@.@Uhr @ 2@]@]@o@ @@ J `@@@@x o@oo@]@6 @F @V @f @v @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @!@!@&!@6!@F!@V!@f!@v!@!@!@!@!@!@!@!@!@"@"@&"@6"@F"@V"@f"@v"@"@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @3 @ J;o@Ho@@W@xaB@@@k @ f @ pq"@"aw2@2 }@@@C@CC@C]@M]@M]@M_@O(`@PHHa@HQXa@XQ0XQ#{Qusr/bin/mbedtls-benchmark0000755000000000000000000011546013776116123014463 0ustar rootrootELF> p@@@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@((00@0@FF@@  @@0 ȍȝ@ȝ@@@ Ptd@@QtdRtd@@HH/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNUx@|L i&Axyz|k|$06ϟqXB7K|j Cֳ:2Cc BEJZL ➋73b[S : 4'D2cSWf uf\_ i. 3.09bp@ FPvv  C  POz#?*G9 9&, hwr3$ _ Q)  07@8$  s@Y  r@ @n  q@  @h @ @  0t@3L  ps@m @ @  t@z  t@^  v@q  q@k<  0v@]  p@+  r@K @  pt@;  r@  Pu@_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable__gmon_start___ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_sha1_retmbedtls_mpi_copymbedtls_mpi_read_binarymbedtls_des_initmbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tagmbedtls_md_info_from_typembedtls_rsa_freembedtls_blowfish_crypt_cbcmbedtls_des_freembedtls_ecp_point_freembedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_ecdh_can_dombedtls_blowfish_setkeymbedtls_ecp_group_loadmbedtls_des3_crypt_cbcmbedtls_camellia_setkey_encmbedtls_des_crypt_cbcmbedtls_ctr_drbg_seedmbedtls_hmac_drbg_randommbedtls_rsa_gen_keymbedtls_ccm_initmbedtls_mpi_initmbedtls_poly1305_macmbedtls_hmac_drbg_seedmbedtls_des3_set3key_encmbedtls_dhm_initmbedtls_ecdsa_genkeymbedtls_des3_initmbedtls_arc4_initmbedtls_ecdsa_write_signaturembedtls_aes_initmbedtls_dhm_calc_secretmbedtls_ecdh_read_publicmbedtls_ccm_setkeymbedtls_gcm_setkeymbedtls_blowfish_initmbedtls_aes_setkey_encmbedtls_ccm_freembedtls_mpi_freembedtls_timing_alarmedmbedtls_chacha20_cryptmbedtls_dhm_freembedtls_ecp_copymbedtls_des3_freembedtls_arc4_freembedtls_dhm_make_publicmbedtls_aes_crypt_cbcmbedtls_aes_xts_initmbedtls_ecdh_initmbedtls_aes_freembedtls_ecdh_setupmbedtls_ecdsa_can_dombedtls_chachapoly_initmbedtls_ecdh_read_paramsmbedtls_rsa_privatembedtls_ecdh_calc_secretmbedtls_ecdsa_initmbedtls_set_alarmmbedtls_aes_crypt_xtsmbedtls_blowfish_freembedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_ctr_drbg_initmbedtls_ecdh_make_publicmbedtls_hmac_drbg_initmbedtls_aes_xts_freembedtls_arc4_setupmbedtls_chachapoly_encrypt_and_tagmbedtls_ctr_drbg_randommbedtls_strerrormbedtls_arc4_cryptmbedtls_mpi_sizembedtls_ecdh_freembedtls_sha512_retmbedtls_ecdsa_read_signaturembedtls_ecdh_compute_sharedmbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbcmbedtls_timing_hardclockmbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistancembedtls_chachapoly_freembedtls_chachapoly_setkeymbedtls_sha256_retmbedtls_ecdsa_freembedtls_ecdh_make_paramsmbedtls_ctr_drbg_freembedtls_ripemd160_retmbedtls_camellia_initmbedtls_hmac_drbg_freembedtls_md5_retmbedtls_gcm_initmbedtls_des_setkey_encmbedtls_rsa_publicmbedtls_ecdh_gen_publicmbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_encmbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistancembedtls_ecp_curve_listmbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tagmbedtls_camellia_freembedtls_rsa_initmbedtls_gcm_freefflushexitputsputcharcallocstrlenmemsetstdoutmemcpystderrfprintfstrcmp__libc_start_mainsnprintflibmbedcrypto.so.6libz.so.1libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_endbufecp_clear_precomputed__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5T 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-@ 1@_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable__gmon_start___ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_x509_crt_freembedtls_x509_crt_infombedtls_x509_crt_initmbedtls_ssl_freembedtls_net_initmbedtls_ssl_config_freembedtls_net_recvmbedtls_ssl_get_peer_certmbedtls_net_freembedtls_net_sendmbedtls_ssl_conf_authmodembedtls_net_connectmbedtls_ssl_conf_dbgmbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chainmbedtls_ssl_set_hostnamembedtls_ssl_set_biombedtls_ssl_config_defaultsmbedtls_ssl_setupmbedtls_ssl_conf_rngmbedtls_debug_set_thresholdmbedtls_ssl_handshakembedtls_ssl_close_notifymbedtls_ssl_initmbedtls_ssl_config_initmbedtls_ssl_conf_verifymbedtls_x509_crl_initmbedtls_x509_crl_parse_filembedtls_x509_crl_freembedtls_x509_crt_verifymbedtls_x509_crt_parse_filembedtls_x509_crt_verify_infombedtls_x509_crt_parse_pathmbedtls_entropy_funcmbedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_entropy_initmbedtls_ctr_drbg_seedmbedtls_entropy_freembedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_ctr_drbg_initmbedtls_ctr_drbg_randommbedtls_ctr_drbg_freefflushexitputsstrtolcallocstrlenmemsetstdoutmemcpystderrstrchrfprintfstrcmp__libc_start_mainlibz.so.1libmbedtls.so.13libmbedx509.so.1libmbedcrypto.so.6libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randoptGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5ui _@_@_@_@_@_@_@#_@%_@7_@<`@ `@(`@0`@8`@@`@H`@ P`@ X`@ ``@ h`@ p`@x`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@ `@!`@"`@$a@&a@'a@(a@) a@*(a@+0a@,8a@-@a@.Ha@/Pa@0Xa@1`a@2ha@3pa@4xa@5a@6a@8a@9a@:a@;HH?HtH5?%?@%?h%?h%?h%?h%?h%?h%?h%?hp%?h`%?h P%?h @%?h 0%?h %z?h %r?h%j?h%b?h%Z?h%R?h%J?h%B?h%:?h%2?h%*?hp%"?h`%?hP%?h@% ?h0%?h %>h%>h%>h%>h %>h!%>h"%>h#%>h$%>h%%>h&%>h'p%>h(`%>h)P%>h*@%>h+0%>h, %z>h-%r>h.%j>h/%b>h0%Z>h1AWAVAUATIUSHHD$HHHD$(H$HHD$ H$HHD$0>HD$PHHD$8H$HHD$'H$`HHD$bHa@H"HCH5#HCHCHC H"HC(H"HC0HC8EMt$MdH-}"Ld$L-z"M&=LHLxM9s+L1L)IHr@w HH9uLHH="LIL9t$cH=1L5:I>Hs > Hs>E11H=!Hs>D#AJA#H=1H$`|I>HH5M:HH|$ AH !kƅH=o!{8HS0Hs(1H=I>?Hs(HS01H|$({ƅ\H|$8111ƅEL|$8LHt$1L}1H5L\L|$8HT$ H5[9L#IH5LH|$0LƅZHs(H|$0|ƅfH 9H8E1Ht$(H|$0$=H|$0'ƅuH=/ L$` }H=vqH|$0H LH`L?H|$0 LLu:L{oH=BLELH=uL{D LH=u L{H=Lu L{ H5LH5LlH5LU2H5L>u 1LkC<]H=1A[H$`H|$(H|$H|$H|$ HDL{(L{0H|$Aƅ+H=V1AH$`yH|$A,ƅH=1AH$`\HsHƅ{<uXH=6HL$` L=zLrHپLH kLJH`HuEHE1BH=.1H|$0E1H|$8 1LLC8=... acceptable parameters: mode=file|ssl default: none filename=%%s default: cert.crt ca_file=%%s The single file containing the top-level CA(s) you fully trust default: "" (none) crl_file=%%s The single CRL file you want to use default: "" (none) ca_path=%%s The path containing the top-level CA(s) you fully trust default: "" (none) (overrides ca_file) server_name=%%s default: localhost server_port=%%d default: 4433 debug_level=%%d default: 0 (disabled) permissive=%%d default: 0 (disabled) . Loading the CA root certificate ... failed ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path returned -0x%x failed ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file returned -0x%x failed ! mbedtls_x509_crl_parse returned -0x%x . Loading the certificate(s) ... failed ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file returned %d failed ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse failed to parse %d certificates . Peer certificate information ... failed ! mbedtls_x509_crt_info returned %d . Verifying X.509 certificate... . Seeding the random number generator... failed ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned %d . SSL connection to tcp/%s/%s... failed ! mbedtls_net_connect returned %d failed ! mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults returned %d failed ! mbedtls_ssl_setup returned %d failed ! mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname returned %d failed ! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned %d ! %s:%04d: %scert.crtlocalhost4433modesslfilenameca_filecrl_fileca_pathserver_nameserver_portdebug_levelpermissive ok (%d skipped) ok failedcert_appp != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0; Pl P0@L@ @p`zRx `+zRx $00FJ w?;*3$"<DBMC JI  CABE c CABHAUHBBB B(D0C8G' 'B'U'A'  8BED G(G0} (A ABBA PlKdYD_ A LBBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE \3(;FEG [CAGDPH(zBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,tQAA CBAD]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBB,@,@Q[l} @ d2@]@]@o@p @@ b `@@@ ox@oo@]@6 @F @V @f @v @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @!@!@&!@6!@F!@V!@f!@v!@!@!@!@!@!@!@!@!@"@"@&"@6"@F"@V"@f"@v"@"@"@"@"@"@"@"@"@#@#@&#@6#@F#@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @3p @p b;o@Hox@x0W@aB@k @ f @ 0qP#@P#wd2@d2 }@@@H@HH@H0]@M]@M]@M _@OP`@Pa@Qa@Qh 0Q#Qusr/bin/mbedtls-cert_req0000755000000000000000000005433013776116123014333 0ustar rootrootELF>)@@XR@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@88 @ @--@@@@@ M]@]@(M]@]@@@ Ptd0I0I@0I@QtdRtdM]@]@``/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU.@|  i&A.01379:=>@ABCj|Q]B$06ϟqXB7K| j Cֳ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 4'D2c u!VL Wd6}<l,<  "@j *@ ,@Y +@ PPa@Q +@ @@Ka@a@@@a@ -@3/ -@Pa@\ `.@zy @.@A 0@ /@] )@+ P,@K @a@m .@; +@ .@_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable__gmon_start__mbedtls_pk_free_ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_x509write_csr_set_subject_namembedtls_x509write_csr_pemmbedtls_x509write_csr_set_keymbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key_usagembedtls_x509write_csr_set_md_algmbedtls_x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_typembedtls_x509write_csr_initmbedtls_x509write_csr_freembedtls_entropy_funcmbedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_entropy_initmbedtls_pk_parse_keyfilembedtls_ctr_drbg_seedmbedtls_entropy_freembedtls_md_get_typembedtls_md_info_from_stringmbedtls_pk_initmbedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_ctr_drbg_initmbedtls_ctr_drbg_randommbedtls_strerrormbedtls_ctr_drbg_freefflushexitfopenputsstrtolcallocstrlenmemsetstdoutmemcpyfclosestderrfwritestrchrfprintfstrcmp__libc_start_mainlibmbedx509.so.1libz.so.1libmbedcrypto.so.6libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randwrite_certificate_requestoptGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.57ui _@_@_@_@_@_@_@+_@-`@ `@(`@0`@8`@@`@H`@ P`@ X`@ ``@ h`@ p`@x`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@ `@!`@"`@#a@$a@%a@&a@' a@((a@)0a@*8a@,HH?HtH5?%?@%?h%?h%?h%?h%?h%?h%?h%?hp%?h`%?h P%?h @%?h 0%?h %z?h %r?h%j?h%b?h%Z?h%R?h%J?h%B?h%:?h%2?h%*?hp%"?h`%?hP%?h@% ?h0%?h %>h%>h%>h%>h %>h!%>h"%>h#%>h$AWAVAUATUHSH( HD$0HH$H|$ H|$*HD$PHHD$H$1H|$HIƀa@HIHIFHIF HIFAFAF(AF,AF0IF4CLmL|H@M&IM9tbIm=H#H HHL`t HH=IMfM9uAv8H<$eAF(A~,AF0~A~4sH=&#1H$H;H;pHH5;HH|$AH 7AąQH=H=12H;Iv H<$-AąH=H='#1H;IVI6H|$AąL<$Ht$LH=`WH=0#1H;IvHL$LH:AąlH=kD H=HuMfD H=H H=HuMf }mH5H?H5H(H5@HUH5#HuL1 L*u0AF4 D 1LAF=H=1A6H$H\$DAHHH=1H<$H|$/H|$HmDuDAN(HuI,L1HtHhLH=OtLH=GAN(@AN0H I,L15HtHh LH=^tH5WLpAN0@례}d }LUHH$AF8~H5Lu AN( H5LtUH5LAN(H5Lt+H5LAN0AN(qAN0 H<$|H<$%SH=1H=11 LW|AF,lH5L t}H5LEAN(H5Lt?H5LubAN0AF4H=18AN0AN(TAF,H=1H5eLNAN0|HH=:1|fD1I^HHPTI 0@H/@Hǀ"@5DH=)7H"7H9tH5Ht H=6H56H)HH?HHHtHu5HtfD=6uUH~6]Dff.@f.@ATI1IUISHHHHHHLϺyxDH}LH5HIHt?HHHھ LH9u#1H[]A\D f.H=96t@H=)64@AUIATIUHHSHHu{HI$L9v,qBKHQЀ v Qw5QH ЈEt/B< vˍB<vB<w+BDQwQ1H[]A\A]I$AI1Et=A4D@0W@AFq0 WAWFƈDWHL9uDHHHE6HtHH-3LHH5H811WAUATIUSHH{HHtCHƿHIHtqHL$LHHXu%HL[]A\A]fDH1[]A\A]/LHt2H H5FH81Lff.9ut(1 fHH9t 8 t1f.Ht3UH,SHHfDSHCH9uH1[]fD1DHH11Hff.AUIATIUSHHt5HoIHH9LFMu5L9rH1[]A\A]LK4(L)H1[]A\A]EDH7LLrL+L)kIfDIIHATUSL\$Hf.IIڋW@ODMF1DÃA,D1-Ga1 W@AԃA,D11OD= 7uD։T$Et1ƒA A 9rIM)f[1]A\Jf.AWL=-AVIAUIATAUH--SL)HHt1LLDAHH9uH[]A\A]A^A_HHwkeyfile.keycert.reqCN=Cert,O=mbed TLS,C=UKfilenamepasswordoutput_filedebug_levelsubject_namedigital_signaturenon_repudiationkey_enciphermentdata_enciphermentkey_agreementkey_cert_signcrl_signforce_key_usagessl_clientssl_serveremailobject_signingssl_caemail_caobject_signing_caforce_ns_cert_typecsr example app ok . Checking subject name... - %s usage: cert_req param=<>... acceptable parameters: filename=%%s default: keyfile.key password=%%s default: NULL debug_level=%%d default: 0 (disabled) output_file=%%s default: cert.req subject_name=%%s default: CN=Cert,O=mbed TLS,C=UK key_usage=%%s default: (empty) Comma-separated-list of values: digital_signature non_repudiation key_encipherment data_encipherment key_agreement key_cert_sign crl_sign force_key_usage=0/1 default: off Add KeyUsage even if it is empty ns_cert_type=%%s default: (empty) Comma-separated-list of values: ssl_client ssl_server email object_signing ssl_ca email_ca object_signing_ca force_ns_cert_type=0/1 default: off Add NsCertType even if it is empty md=%%s default: SHA256 possible values: MD2, MD4, MD5, RIPEMD160, SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512 Invalid argument for option %s . Seeding the random number generator... failed ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned %d failed ! mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_subject_name returned %d . Loading the private key ... failed ! mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile returned %d . Writing the certificate request ... failed ! write_certifcate_request %dp != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;P<Pp`p pTh0(pzRx +zRx $`FJ w?;*3$"0DBII G k  AABF 0x jBBB B(A0D8I  8BED G(G0} (A ABBA DK$YD_ A L@BBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE 43(`;FEG [CAGtDPH|zBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,4QAA CBADd`]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBBx*@*@ $7 @ $0@]@]@o@ @@ # `@x@@ o@ooD@]@6 @F @V @f @v @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @!@!@&!@6!@F!@V!@f!@v!@!@!@!@!@!@!@!@!@"@"@&"@6"@F"@V"@f"@v"@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @x3 @ #;oD@DHo@0W@aB@xk @ f @ `q"@" w$0@$0 }@@@. 0I@0II@I]@M]@M]@M_@O@`@P@@a@@Q`a@PQh 0PQ#sQusr/bin/mbedtls-cert_write0000755000000000000000000006457013776116123014705 0ustar rootrootELF>P5@@b@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@`` @ @@@@@@]m@m@P]m@m@@@ Ptd U U@ U@QtdRtd]m@m@``/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNUB@| i&ABCDEGKMNQRTUVWk|$06ϟqXB7K| j Cֳ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 4'D2c ag6'/ =6.*. } tFqxE5P;=] M g 06@J #@M 8@Y 6@ q@ 6@ >@@r@  r@q@* 9@3u `8@q@ 9@z 9@ ;@e ;@]# P5@+ 7@K q@ `9@; 7@ @:@_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTablembedtls_mpi_init__gmon_start__mbedtls_pk_free_ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_mpi_freembedtls_x509write_crt_set_versionmbedtls_x509write_crt_set_md_algmbedtls_x509write_crt_pemmbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_usagembedtls_x509_csr_parse_filembedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_namembedtls_x509_dn_getsmbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serialmbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_keymbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_keymbedtls_x509_crt_initmbedtls_x509write_crt_set_ns_cert_typembedtls_x509write_crt_initmbedtls_x509_crt_freembedtls_x509_crt_parse_filembedtls_x509write_crt_freembedtls_x509write_crt_set_validitymbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_namembedtls_x509write_crt_set_basic_constraintsmbedtls_x509_csr_initmbedtls_x509write_crt_set_authority_key_identifiermbedtls_x509_csr_freembedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key_identifiermbedtls_pk_check_pairmbedtls_entropy_funcmbedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_entropy_initmbedtls_pk_parse_keyfilembedtls_ctr_drbg_seedmbedtls_entropy_freembedtls_md_get_typembedtls_md_info_from_stringmbedtls_pk_initmbedtls_mpi_read_stringmbedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_ctr_drbg_initmbedtls_ctr_drbg_randommbedtls_strerrormbedtls_ctr_drbg_freefflushexitfopenputsputcharstrtolcallocstrlenmemsetstdoutmemcpyfclosestderrfwritestrchrfprintfstrcmp__libc_start_mainlibmbedx509.so.1libz.so.1libmbedcrypto.so.6libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randwrite_certificatembedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randoptGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5} ui o@o@o@o@o@ o@"o@<o@Ap@ p@(p@0p@8p@@p@Hp@ Pp@ Xp@ `p@ hp@ pp@xp@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@!p@#q@$q@%q@&q@' q@((q@)0q@*8q@+@q@,Hq@-Pq@.Xq@/`q@0hq@1pq@2xq@3q@4q@5q@6q@7q@8q@9q@:q@;q@=q@>q@?q@@HHOHtH5O%O@%Oh%Oh%Oh%Oh%Oh%Oh%Oh%Ohp%Oh`%Oh P%Oh @%Oh 0%Oh %zOh %rOh%jOh%bOh%ZOh%ROh%JOh%BOh%:Oh%2Oh%*Ohp%"Oh`%OhP%Oh@% Oh0%Oh %Nh%Nh%Nh%Nh %Nh!%Nh"%Nh#%Nh$%Nh%%Nh&%Nh'p%Nh(`%Nh)P%Nh*@%Nh+0%Nh, %zNh-%rNh.%jNh/%bNh0%ZNh1%RNh2%JNh3%BNh4%:Nh5%2Nh6%*Nh7p%"Nh8`AWAVAUATUHSH8H$HHD$UH|$`H|$ HD$pHHD$(H$HHD$?H$HH$H$ HHD$H$HHD$0!H$HHD$8H$1H|$@H&I r@HH^IIFIF IF(H[IF0HYIF8HfIF@HqIFHHuIFPHyIFXHIFhHIFpHIVHIFx1IVIF`fACL}LlL%LH@MNHI9t^L}=LH" LLLHt LH"HMNI9u kH='1=HIH;NHT$H<$AH5IH  ŅwH=VH=1H;IVXH|$ -ŅH=A~`I8FIF8sHl$(H=(1H;IV IvH|$(6AąH=Ydf. LH=uMNaD LH=muMN 9D H=TLu MN(H5ALLL$H)LL$HM 1LEAFpLH=%1wH=1dH|$0H|$8`H|$VH|$(H|$ H|$xH<$H|$U.H5LLL$HjLL$Ht*H5|LLL$HMLL$HhMN8 MN0H\$@ǺHH1H=R%'H\$@ǺHWH1H=$_H=K%1LH;dI6H|$8Ņ'L$H$`LŅH=Mf@VA~`KHl$(H=W&1H;IV(IvH|$ Aą^I8tHt$ H$IH=A~`YL|$HLHt$ LIv8LŅIv@H|$9Ņ)H=&1!H;9L|$AvxLHAv|LLHt$LŅyIVPIvHH|$CŅH=A~xH=)1H;Iv0H $H-EH|$ Ņ6H=wH5LLL$HLL$HtH\$@HH1H=}! H\$@ǺHH1H=!oH\$@ǺHH1H=#@@1@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@ @@-- @ @((-=@=@-=@=@@@ Ptd!!@!@QtdRtd-=@=@PP/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU@| i&A "#&')*+,k|$06ϟqXB7K| j Cֳ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 4'D2c \x F,  , @@[/ @Y @ x@@y @  @s@@@@@@  @3W @@@ `@z @@i @G @] @+ P@K @@ @; @ @_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable__gmon_start___ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_x509_crl_initmbedtls_x509_crl_parse_filembedtls_x509_crl_freembedtls_x509_crl_infombedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_platform_setupfflushexitputscallocstrlenmemsetstdoutmemcpystderrstrchrfprintf__libc_start_mainlibmbedx509.so.1libz.so.1libmbedcrypto.so.6libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randoptGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5_ui ?@?@?@ ?@ ?@?@@@ @@(@@0@@8@@@@@H@@ P@@ X@@ `@@h@@p@@x@@@@@@@@@@HH/HtH5/%/@%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/hp%/h`%/h P%/h @%/h 0%/h %z/h %r/h%j/h%b/hAWAVAUATIUSHHILtqHø@@HfH~}EM|$H-WMd0 LHHPu!IHM9t7M7=LHuH=+1LH=1jH-H8H3L H=IʼnƅuSH=L$H=L龟LHt LqH=&1LND1I^HHPTI @H@H@@-DH=-H-H9tH,Ht H=-H5-H)HH?HHHtH,HtfD=i-uUH~W-]Dff.@f.@H=9-t@H=)-T@AUIATIUHHSHHu{HI$L9v,qBKHQЀ v Qw5QH ЈEt/B< vˍB<vB<w+BDQwQ1H[]A\A]I$AI1Et=A4D@0W@AFq0 WAWFƈDWHL9uDHHHEHtHH-+LW Hb H5 H81AUATIUSHH;HHtCHƿHsIHtqHL$LHHXu%HL[]A\A]fDH1[]A\A]/L( Ht*H H5 H81jL ff.9ut(1 fHH9t 8 t1f.Ht3UH,SHHfDHCH9uH1[]fD1DHH121Hff.AUIATIUSHHt5HoIHH9LFMu5L9rH1[]A\A]LK4(L)H1[]A\A]EDH7LLL+L)kIfDIIHATUSL\$Hf.IIڋW@ODMF1DÃA,D1-Ga1 W@AԃA,D11OD= 7uD։T$Et1ƒA A 9rIM)f[1]A\Jf.AWL=%AVIAUIATAUH-%SL)HHt1LLDAHH9uH[]A\A]A^A_HH usage: crl_app param=<>... acceptable parameters: filename=%%s default: crl.pem failed ! mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_file returned %d failed ! mbedtls_x509_crl_info returned %d crl.pemfilename . Loading the CRL ... ok . CRL information ... p != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;Hh8L`x((0h\tH8zRx +zRx $h FJ w?;*3$"4D`[BBB B(D0C8G|h d 8`BED G(G0} (A ABBA KYD_ A LTBBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE `3(t;FEG [CAGDPH zBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,@QAA CBAD4]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBB|p@@@1BL_ @ $@=@=@o@@@ 1 @@H @ @ o @oo* @=@6@F@V@f@v@@@@@@@@@@@&@6@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @P3@1;o* @* \Ho @ 0W @ aBH @H k@f @  q@@@w$@$ } @ !@!h"@h"=@-=@-=@-?@/0@@0@@0@@000#0usr/bin/mbedtls-crypt_and_hash0000755000000000000000000005446013776116123015521 0ustar rootrootELF>@4@@R@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@ @ @@@@@@M]@]@M]@]@@@ PtdDD@D@QtdRtdM]@]@88/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU6@| i&A678:=?@CDFGHIk|$06ϟqXB7K|j Cֳ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 4'D2c R;-&  3` awtF$H, r: 0#@, @6@Y 05@ ua@v 5@ @@pa@a@  `7@3T 6@a@ 8@z 7@f 9@D `9@] @4@+ 5@K a@ 7@; @5@ 8@_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable__gmon_start___ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_md_info_from_typembedtls_md_get_namembedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_md_hmac_startsmbedtls_cipher_initmbedtls_md_info_from_stringmbedtls_cipher_listmbedtls_md_startsmbedtls_cipher_resetmbedtls_cipher_freembedtls_md_hmac_finishmbedtls_md_hmac_updatembedtls_cipher_info_from_stringmbedtls_md_initmbedtls_cipher_finishmbedtls_cipher_updatembedtls_md_get_sizembedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_md_finishmbedtls_md_updatembedtls_md_listmbedtls_md_freembedtls_cipher_setkeymbedtls_cipher_setupmbedtls_platform_zeroizembedtls_cipher_set_ivmbedtls_cipher_info_from_typembedtls_md_setupexitfopenperror__isoc99_sscanfputsstrtolcallocstrlenmemsetfseeklseekmemcpyfclosestderrfilenofwritefreadfprintfstrcmp__libc_start_mainlibmbedcrypto.so.6libz.so.1libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randGLIBC_2.7GLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5\ii ui _@_@_@_@1_@5`@ `@(`@0`@8`@@`@H`@P`@ X`@ ``@ h`@ p`@ x`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@ a@!a@"a@#a@$ a@%(a@&0a@'8a@(@a@)Ha@*Pa@+Xa@,`a@-ha@.pa@/xa@0a@2a@3a@4HH?HtH5?%?@%?h%?h%?h%?h%?h%?h%?h%?hp%?h`%?h P%?h @%?h 0%?h %z?h %r?h%j?h%b?h%Z?h%R?h%J?h%B?h%:?h%2?h%*?hp%"?h`%?hP%?h@% ?h0%?h %>h%>h%>h%>h %>h!%>h"%>h#%>h$%>h%%>h&%>h'p%>h(`%>h)P%>h*@%>h+0%>h, %z>h-%r>h.%j>h/AWAVAUATUSHHH H$L$HH$L>H=H=p8IŅt&L5{ILHp1 A}uH=08Iƅt,L-kIHLH1A>uH$@D$L$HD$(H$@HD$HD$pHD$ H$@HD$H|$ H|$(H|$uH|$f@LYH<$pL|$H{ 1IŃXLsHsLSH5LHD$0H#H{H5nHD$8HFH{ WHD$HZHt$H<$kH{(ZHD$@HHt$@L/Hs:H=HBH$@D$HD$(H$@HD$HD$pL$HD$ H$@HD$H|$0H|$8E1f.N : 0 = encrypt, 1 = decrypt example: crypt_and_hash 0 file file.aes AES-128-CBC SHA1 hex:E76B2413958B00E193 input and output filenames must differ Message Digest '%s' not found mbedtls_cipher_setkey() returned error mbedtls_cipher_set_iv() returned error mbedtls_cipher_reset() returned error mbedtls_cipher_update() returned error mbedtls_cipher_finish() returned error File too short to be encrypted. Invalid cipher block size: 0. File content not a multiple of the block size (%u). HMAC check failed: wrong key, or file corrupted. Available ciphers: %s Available message digests:invalid operation mode rbfopen(%s,rb) failed wb+fopen(%s,wb+) failed Cipher '%s' not found mbedtls_cipher_setup failed mbedtls_md_setup failed %02Xlseekfseek(0,SEEK_SET) failed fwrite(%d bytes) failed fread(%ld bytes) failed fwrite(%ld bytes) failed fread(%d bytes) failed fread(%u bytes) failed p != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;`p`8pL`00 \@t8zRx +zRx $FJ w?;*3$"4DhBBB B(A0C8J|  8BED G(G0} (A ABBA KYD_ A L BBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE `|3(t;FEG [CAGDPHzBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,QAA CBAD4]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBB|5@4@?R\ @ 9@]@]@o@ @@ 4 `@0@@x ox@oo@]@6 @F @V @f @v @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @!@!@&!@6!@F!@V!@f!@v!@!@!@!@!@!@!@!@!@"@"@&"@6"@F"@V"@f"@v"@"@"@"@"@"@"@"@"@#@#@&#@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @3 @ 4;o@Hox@x@W@xaB0@0k @ f @ q0#@0#w9@9 }@@@D@DPE@PE]@M]@M]@M_@O(`@Pa@Qa@Q0Q#Qusr/bin/mbedtls-crypto_examples0000755000000000000000000004417013776116123015746 0ustar rootrootELF>P@@A@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@@@}}00@0@=M@M@(0=M@M@@@ Ptd(2(2@(2@QtdRtd=M@M@88/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU@| i&A !#&(),-/012k|$06ϟqXB7K|j Cֳ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 4'D2cY@ . l FZ}i, 8 @ @YX @ P@ @ 0@P@P@ @3 P@QP@ @z/ @ p!@ !@] P@+= @K P@# P@;w @J 0 @_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable__gmon_start___ITM_registerTMCloneTablepsa_generate_randompsa_cipher_set_ivpsa_generate_keymbedtls_platform_teardownpsa_cipher_abortpsa_set_key_domain_parameterspsa_cipher_generate_ivmbedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_psa_crypto_freepsa_crypto_initpsa_cipher_finishpsa_cipher_updatepsa_cipher_encrypt_setuppsa_destroy_keypsa_cipher_decrypt_setupexitputscallocstrlenmemsetmemcmpmemcpystderrfprintf__libc_start_mainlibmbedcrypto.so.6libz.so.1libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5gui rO@O@ O@O@O@P@ P@(P@0P@8P@@P@HP@PP@ XP@ `P@ hP@ pP@xP@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@HH?HtH5?%?@%?h%?h%?h%?h%?h%?h%?h%?hp%?h`%?h P%?h @%?h 0%?h %z?h %r?h%j?h%b?h%Z?h%R?h%J?h%B?h%:?h%2?h%*?hp%"?h`AVAUATUSHĀyHl$PLd$ H=o HLD$HD$H@@H|$pHD$\11Ҿ$HaHt$HfD$R]*Ll$RAALL@@H\$SjLt$HAV|$$H 7PALLS@@jHl$XULD$(|$$H #HL,|$.H=bRH=FtdH=1\u;H=,-fD$P$H /DH51H=B-H1[]A\A]A^H=뎉E11H5`H=|$sLE11H53H=tщE11H5H=S밉E11H5H=2}돉E11H5H=\k1I^HHPTIp!@H!@H@f;DH=i<Hb<H9tH>;Ht H=9<H52<H)HH?HHHtH;HtfD=;uUH~;]Dff.@f.@AWAVAUIATUSH8Ld$pHt$L|$(HL$L$LL$HD$(I$HE1LH1MIDHD$(II$I$L9tsH|$HH $ML)Ht$LD$H9HGHLI)LHt$E1RH5H=U1D$H8D[]A\A]A^A_MHT$H4$LLI+$I4$9AÅu HD$(I$뽉$E1ZAWA1AVMAUMATUH͹ SHӉDHhHIHLHL~AąuLPLLH$L$LL$NZYAąu_LHhD[]A\A]A^A_ÉE11H5H=1|AĉE1H5H=1X롉E11H5H=7DAWA1AVMAUMATUH͹ SHӉDHxHD$L|$LHLHL$HLnAąuLPLLH$L$LL$.ZYAąu_L}HxD[]A\A]A^A_ÉE11uH5H=\AĉE1rH5H=18롉E11yH5H=DAWfdAVAUATUSHHl$PD$HD$ HD$D$0D$@9AHH|$@HD$,Ld$ 11Ҿ$LLHt$fL$"AąLl$RA AdHLH\$SjdL$AV|$$H AąPA LLSjdL$HAWLD$(|$$H AądLHAą|$WHĨD[]A\A]A^A_fD$ $Ld$ E11H5H=7AĉE1H5H=1^댉E11H5H==hE11$H5H=DE11'H5iH= AWfdAVAUATUSHHl$PD$HD$ HD$D$0D$@AHA@H|$@HD$,Ld$ 11Ҿ$LLHt$fL$"yAąLl$RA AdHLA@H\$SjtL$AV|$$H AąPA LLSA@jtL$XAWLD$(|$$H AądLHAą|$7HD[]A\A]A^A_fD$ $Ld$ E11H5H=bAĉE1H5H=1>댉E11H5H=hE11H5mH=DE11H5IH= H=4@H= 4d@AUIATIUHHSHHru{HI$L9v,qBKHQЀ v Qw5QH ЈEt/B< vˍB<vB<w+BDQwQ1H[]A\A]I$AI1Et=A4D@0W@AFq0 WAWFƈDWHL9uDHHHEHtHH1LTHbH5H817AUATIUSHHHHtCHƿHsIHtqHL$LHHXu%HL[]A\A]fDH1[]A\A]/L(H$1HH5H81Lff.9ut(1 fHH9t 8 t1f.Ht3UH,SHHfD3HCH9uH1[]fD1DHH121Hff.AUIATIUSHHt5HoIHH9LFMu5L9rH1[]A\A]LK4(L)H1[]A\A]EDH7LLL+L)kIfDIIHATUSL\$Hf.IIڋW@ODMF1DÃA,D1-Ga1 W@AԃA,D11OD= 7uD։T$Et1ƒA A 9rIM)f[1]A\Jf.AWL=,AVIAUIATAUH-,SL)HHt1LLDAHH9uH[]A\A]A^A_HH/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/programs/psa/crypto_examples.c assertion failed at %s:%d - actual:%d expected:%d psa_crypto_init( ) == PSA_SUCCESS assertion failed at %s:%d - '%s' cipher encrypt/decrypt AES CBC no padding: cipher encrypt/decrypt AES CBC PKCS7 multipart: cipher encrypt/decrypt AES CTR multipart: success! p != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;((8tHh,x(l(h@HzRx P+zRx $FJ w?;*3$"HD(BBB E(A0A8Dp 8D0A(B BBBA X BGE E(A0I8LqPYAS 8D0A(B BBBA XpBGE E(A0I8LAPYAS 8D0A(B BBBA pH4 BKB B(A0A8G]BJMLMGJRv 8D0A(B BBBA p BKB B(A0A8G]BJMLMGJRv 8D0A(B BBBA p0|BBB A(A0D]BGMIMGFR 0C(A BBBA   8BED G(G0} (A ABBA KYD_ A L8BBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE t3(;FEG [CAGDPHzBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,,QAA CBAD\]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBB @@ @ t!@M@M@o@@@  P@XP @ @x o @oo< @M@6@F@V@f@v@@@@@@@@@@@&@6@F@V@f@v@@@@@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @3@;o< @< hHo @ 0W @ xaBP @P Xk@f @ q@wt!@t! }0@0&(2@(22@2M@=M@=M@=O@?(P@@P@@P@@0@#Ausr/bin/mbedtls-dh_client0000755000000000000000000004435013776116123014461 0ustar rootrootELF>p)@@hB@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@@@ @ @00@0@pp=M@M@=M@M@  @@ Ptd55@5@QtdRtd=M@M@pp/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU0@| i&A012479:=>@ABCk|$06ϟqXB7K|j Cֳ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 4'D2cY nX*. =*BU?m n "@ p+@Y `*@ P`Q@Q P*@ 0@KhQ@PQ@ ,@3/ +@`Q@\ 0-@zy -@A .@ .@] p)@+ +@K PQ@m ,@; p*@ -@_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTablembedtls_dhm_init__gmon_start__mbedtls_dhm_make_publicmbedtls_dhm_calc_secretmbedtls_dhm_read_paramsmbedtls_dhm_free_ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_net_initmbedtls_net_recvmbedtls_net_freembedtls_net_sendmbedtls_net_connectmbedtls_sha1_retmbedtls_rsa_freembedtls_entropy_funcmbedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_entropy_initmbedtls_mpi_bitlenmbedtls_ctr_drbg_seedmbedtls_entropy_freembedtls_aes_initmbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verifymbedtls_aes_freembedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_ctr_drbg_initmbedtls_mpi_read_filembedtls_ctr_drbg_randommbedtls_aes_crypt_ecbmbedtls_ctr_drbg_freembedtls_aes_setkey_decmbedtls_rsa_initfflushexitfopenputscallocstrlenmemsetstdoutmemcpyfclosestderrfprintf__libc_start_mainlibmbedtls.so.13libmbedx509.so.1libmbedcrypto.so.6libz.so.1libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.57ui O@O@O@O@O@O@O@+O@.P@ P@(P@0P@8P@@P@HP@ PP@ XP@ `P@ hP@ pP@xP@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@ P@!P@"P@#Q@$Q@%Q@&Q@' Q@((Q@)0Q@*8Q@,@Q@-HQ@/HH/HtH5/%/@%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/hp%/h`%/h P%/h @%/h 0%/h %z/h %r/h%j/h%b/h%Z/h%R/h%J/h%B/h%:/h%2/h%*/hp%"/h`%/hP%/h@% /h0%/h %.h%.h%.h%.h %.h!%.h"%.h#%.h$%.h%%.h&AWAVAUATUSHLt$L$pLL|$PH$P1LLH$L$HHH= 1H,H8LH5,LHA H bH= 1\H],H8]H5xH=tH$H11LaH$H$HHD$ƅuH$H$gƅtuH= 1H<$ALD$HLL0HXL D$D$H= 1tAH|$H<$HHH$xHH51H=-H.+H8.1HVLH5RflH=w 1H*H8L$ 1LLֺL$HLL$M$ fHBHT$ H=DL1LHLHT$L$;D$ L$HT$IHt$(LL$HLT$(HD$L$HD$PH@H=H=w 1L$H)H8HT$(HD$L$HJH)H;$xHL$(HD$ H=Y TAH=z =AH= 1AH= 1iAH= 1NAH= AhH=m AQL)HL$0LL$HcHHL$fL$HL$L$1E11t$(ALQ15ZYL$H= 1L$H(H8Ht$PILL$L(HHt$ LL$HT$ LLL$n;D$ L$tjH= 14AeH=0 1AJH= 1A/H= 1AH=? 1L$H'H8L$ILL'HL$ LL$AHD$ 1 H= 1LT$D$[HD$ D$LT$HHHD$ vH=/ 1DD$L$'H('H8(L$HLL$1LLHL#L$DD$XLL1HDD$L$vL$1H=1 Ƅ$ LDD$H= 1AH=- 1fAf.1I^HHPTI.@H.@HǠ"@>&DH='H'H9tH&Ht H='H5'H)HH?HHHtH%HtfD=I'uUH~7']Dff.@f.@H= '@H=&@AUIATIUHHSHHu{HI$L9v,qBKHQЀ v Qw5QH ЈEt/B< vˍB<vB<w+BDQwQ1H[]A\A]I$AI1Et=A4D@0W@AFq0 WAWFƈDWHL9uDHHHEHtHH]$LHH5 H81AUATIUSHHHHtCHƿHCIHtqHL$LHHXu%HL[]A\A]fDH1[]A\A]/LH#HH5VH81Lff.9ut(1 fHH9t 8 t1f.Ht3UH,SHHfDHCH9uH1[]fD1DHH11Hff.AUIATIUSHHt5HoIHH9LFMu5L9rH1[]A\A]LK4(L)H1[]A\A]EDH7LLL+L)kIfDIIHATUSL\$Hf.IIڋW@ODMF1DÃA,D1-Ga1 W@AԃA,D11OD= 7uD։T$Et1ƒA A 9rIM)f[1]A\Jf.AWL=AVIAUIATAUH-SL)HCHt1LLDAHH9uH[]A\A]A^A_HH . Seeding the random number generator failed ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned %d . Reading public key from rsa_pub.txt failed ! Could not open rsa_pub.txt ! Please run rsa_genkey first failed ! mbedtls_mpi_read_file returned %d failed ! mbedtls_net_connect returned %d . Receiving the server's DH parameters failed ! mbedtls_net_recv returned %d failed ! Got an invalid buffer length failed ! mbedtls_dhm_read_params returned %d failed ! Invalid DHM modulus size . Verifying the server's RSA signature failed ! Invalid RSA signature size failed ! mbedtls_sha1_ret returned %d failed ! mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify returned %d . Sending own public value to server failed ! mbedtls_dhm_make_public returned %d failed ! mbedtls_net_send returned %d failed ! mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret returned %d ... . Receiving and decrypting the ciphertextdh_clientrbrsa_pub.txt11999localhost . Connecting to tcp/%s/%s . Shared secret: %02x . Plaintext is "%s" p != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;`@HP\`p`,@l HzRx +zRx $0FJ w?;*3$"DDBBB B(A0A8G$9$J$H$A$  8BED G(G0} (A ABBA \KYD_ A L BBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE pL3(x;FEG [CAGDPHzBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,QAA CBADDx]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBB@*@*@ -7 @ .@M@M@o@ @@  P@@@ o@oo@M@6 @F @V @f @v @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @!@!@&!@6!@F!@V!@f!@v!@!@!@!@!@!@!@!@!@"@"@&"@6"@F"@V"@f"@v"@"@"@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @x3 @ ;o@Ho@0W@aB@k @ f @ q"@"Q w.@. }0@05@55@5M@=M@=M@= O@?@P@@PPQ@PA`Q@`A0`A#Ausr/bin/mbedtls-dh_genprime0000755000000000000000000004423013776116123015006 0ustar rootrootELF>%@@B@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@`` @ @M M 00@0@=M@M@`h=M@M@@@ Ptd33@3@QtdRtd=M@M@PP/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU&@| i&A&'(*-/0346789k|$06ϟqXB7K|j Cֳ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 4'D2cu F] ]1Gr, # "@ '@Y &@ ^Q@_ &@ 0@YQ@Q@ (@3= (@Q@j )@z `)@O @+@- *@] %@+ p'@K Q@{ )@; &@ *@_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable__gmon_start___ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_mpi_write_filembedtls_entropy_funcmbedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_entropy_initmbedtls_ctr_drbg_seedmbedtls_mpi_initmbedtls_entropy_freembedtls_mpi_sub_intmbedtls_mpi_freembedtls_mpi_read_stringmbedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_mpi_gen_primembedtls_ctr_drbg_initmbedtls_ctr_drbg_randommbedtls_mpi_is_prime_extmbedtls_ctr_drbg_freembedtls_mpi_div_intfflushexitfopenputsstrtolcallocstrlenmemsetstdoutmemcpyfclosestderrstrchrfprintf__libc_start_mainlibmbedcrypto.so.6libz.so.1libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5Eui O@O@O@O@O@O@O@"O@%P@ P@(P@0P@8P@@P@HP@ PP@ XP@ `P@ hP@ pP@xP@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@ P@!P@#P@$HH/HtH5/%/@%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/hp%/h`%/h P%/h @%/h 0%/h %z/h %r/h%j/h%b/h%Z/h%R/h%J/h%B/h%:/h%2/h%*/hp%"/h`%/hP%/h@% /h0%/h AWAVAUATIUSHXLt$ L$LHD$@HHD$HD$`HHD$L H$HHD$tyEI\$H-TMd@@LHLHu41 Ll= wHL9t]L;=LHuH= 1LH|$H|$LpH|$&H LIH=J H=n 1gH-X,H}HT$LH5`,A H SpH= 1 H}H|$HcMH ,{OH= 1H}Ht$H|$xHT$1HH+H|$L28H= 1uH}H5H=IIHHt$HH=nLLH=TŅH=CLH= 1H= 1H= 1H=+ 1H= 1uH=D 1XL wH= 16]H= Gf.1I^HHPTI@+@H*@H"@)DH=+H+H9tH)Ht H=*H5*H)HH?HHHtH)HtfD=*uUH~*]Dff.@f.@H=j*@H=Z*@AUIATIUHHSHHu{HI$L9v,qBKHQЀ v Qw5QH ЈEt/B< vˍB<vB<w+BDQwQ1H[]A\A]I$AI1Et=A4D@0W@AFq0 WAWFƈDWHL9uDHHHE6HtHH (L" H2 H5k H81AUATIUSHH{HHtCHƿHIHtqHL$LHHXu%HL[]A\A]fDH1[]A\A]/L HT'H H5 H81d LQ ff.9ut(1 fHH9t 8 t1f.Ht3UH,SHHfDHCH9uH1[]fD1DHH1r1Hff.AUIATIUSHHt5HoIHH9LFMu5L9rH1[]A\A]LK4(L)H1[]A\A]EDH7LLRL+L)kIfDIIHATUSL\$Hf.IIڋW@ODMF1DÃA,D1-Ga1 W@AԃA,D11OD= 7uD։T$Et1ƒA A 9rIM)f[1]A\Jf.AWL="AVIAUIATAUH-"SL)HHt1LLDAHH9uH[]A\A]A^A_HH usage: dh_genprime param=<>... acceprable parameters: bits=%%d default: 2048 failed ! mbedtls_mpi_read_string returned %d ! Generating large primes may take minutes! . Seeding the random number generator... failed ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned %d ok . Generating the modulus, please wait... failed ! mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime returned %d ok . Verifying that Q = (P-1)/2 is prime... failed ! mbedtls_mpi_sub_int returned %d failed ! mbedtls_mpi_div_int returned %d failed ! mbedtls_mpi_is_prime returned %d ok . Exporting the value in dh_prime.txt... failed ! Could not create dh_prime.txt failed ! mbedtls_mpi_write_file returned %d bits4dh_genprimewb+dh_prime.txtP = G = ok p != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;X88L`XX0\t8x8zRx H+zRx $xFJ w?;*3$"4D0BBB B(D0C8G |  8BED G(G0} (A ABBA K@YD_ A LBBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE `3(t ;FEG [CAG4DPH*@@R@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@ @ @}}@@@@@  M]@]@M]@]@  @@ PtdEE@E@QtdRtdM]@]@pp/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU5@| i&A5679<>?BCEFGHk|$06ϟqXB7K|j Cֳ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 4'D2c & 5.:k<K4? ?oN(f~U\ '-I "@] ,@Y +@ a@ +@ N@@a@-xa@: .@3 P-@a@ .@z .@ p0@u 0@]3 *@+ ,@K/ xa@ P.@; +@ 0/@_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTablembedtls_mpi_sizembedtls_dhm_init__gmon_start__mbedtls_dhm_calc_secretmbedtls_dhm_make_paramsmbedtls_dhm_read_publicmbedtls_dhm_free_ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_mpi_freembedtls_net_initmbedtls_net_recvmbedtls_net_freembedtls_net_bindmbedtls_net_sendmbedtls_net_acceptmbedtls_mpi_initmbedtls_sha1_retmbedtls_rsa_importmbedtls_rsa_freembedtls_entropy_funcmbedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_entropy_initmbedtls_ctr_drbg_seedmbedtls_entropy_freembedtls_aes_initmbedtls_aes_setkey_encmbedtls_aes_freembedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_ctr_drbg_initmbedtls_mpi_read_filembedtls_ctr_drbg_randommbedtls_rsa_completembedtls_aes_crypt_ecbmbedtls_ctr_drbg_freembedtls_rsa_pkcs1_signmbedtls_rsa_initfflushexitfopenputscallocstrlenmemsetstdoutmemcpyfclosestderrfprintf__libc_start_mainlibmbedtls.so.13libmbedx509.so.1libmbedcrypto.so.6libz.so.1libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5ui _@_@_@_@_@_@_@._@2`@ `@(`@0`@8`@@`@H`@ P`@ X`@ ``@ h`@ p`@x`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@ `@!`@"`@#a@$a@%a@&a@' a@((a@)0a@*8a@+@a@,Ha@-Pa@/Xa@0`a@1ha@3pa@4HH?HtH5?%?@%?h%?h%?h%?h%?h%?h%?h%?hp%?h`%?h P%?h @%?h 0%?h %z?h %r?h%j?h%b?h%Z?h%R?h%J?h%B?h%:?h%2?h%*?hp%"?h`%?hP%?h@% ?h0%?h %>h%>h%>h%>h %>h!%>h"%>h#%>h$%>h%%>h&%>h'p%>h(`%>h)P%>h*@%>h+0AWAVAUATUSHHD$`L$PHHD$0L$L|$pHD$dH$HHD$ L$`v1LH$0HHD$(rH$0HHD$8LL}H$HHD$hH$HHD$SH$HHD$>H6H='1H;H8L1H5;LLA H H=;1|H;H8H5^ H=Z HH11LHLƅuHHƅH=C1HLH|$H|$H|$HH|$ H|$0H|$8LH|$(YLALbH=1mqH|$Hƅ:H|$HƅH|$HƅHLD$ILHL$HT$LnLH=1H9H8H5H=GHHtH$8HHHD$H.H$PHHH=1CHT9H8dH|$011H9ƅHt$ H|$0E111ƅH=1Hl$hH8H8H$ 1H|$@HH|$HHT$@MHL8H|$(HƅHt$hH|$@H$HT$HHT$HH$XHD$hE1LA HHL$@H@ HD1PR1EXZ@HL$hH|$ Ht$^H$XHHL$HffD$^ƃu&HL$HHt$@H|$ HHL$H9H=`1H=pH=1dhH=HJH=1,0H=H=1H=1H=1H=J1H=1H=1H6H8H|$@1H$0Ht$@HH|$ HT$h;D$htH=b16:Ht$@H$0H|$(ƅH=$1H6H8#Ht$@HML6H|$(ŅHD$h1H H1HD$hHHHHD$hvH=B1{H5H8Ht$@H|$8xHL$@H|$8foH$ Ht$@H|$ =ƃkH=@ H=J1H=h1f.D1I^HHPTIp0@H0@H"@4DH=a6HZ6H9tH4Ht H=16H5*6H)HH?HHHtHu4HtfD=5uUH~5]Dff.@f.@H=5D@H=5@AUIATIUHHSHHu{HI$L9v,qBKHQЀ v Qw5QH ЈEt/B< vˍB<vB<w+BDQwQ1H[]A\A]I$AI1Et=A4D@0W@AFq0 WAWFƈDWHL9uDHHHE6HtHH2LHH5#H81GAUATIUSHH+HHtCHƿHIHtqHL$LHHXu%HL[]A\A]fDH1[]A\A]/LH$2H=H5vH81dL ff.9ut(1 fHH9t 8 t1f.Ht3UH,SHHfDSHCH9uH1[]fD1DHH1b1Hff.AUIATIUSHHt5HoIHH9LFMu5L9rH1[]A\A]LK4(L)H1[]A\A]EDH7LLBL+L)kIfDIIHATUSL\$Hf.IIڋW@ODMF1DÃA,D1-Ga1 W@AԃA,D11OD= 7uD։T$Et1ƒA A 9rIM)f[1]A\Jf.AWL=w-AVIAUIATAUH-h-SL)HHt1LLDAHH9uH[]A\A]A^A_HH . Seeding the random number generator failed ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned %d . Reading private key from rsa_priv.txt failed ! Could not open rsa_priv.txt ! Please run rsa_genkey first failed ! mbedtls_mpi_read_file returned %d failed ! mbedtls_rsa_import returned %d failed ! mbedtls_rsa_complete returned %d . Reading DH parameters from dh_prime.txt failed ! Could not open dh_prime.txt ! Please run dh_genprime first failed ! Invalid DH parameter file . Waiting for a remote connection failed ! mbedtls_net_bind returned %d failed ! mbedtls_net_accept returned %d . Sending the server's DH parameters failed ! mbedtls_dhm_make_params returned %d failed ! mbedtls_sha1_ret returned %d failed ! mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign returned %d failed ! mbedtls_net_send returned %d . Receiving the client's public value failed ! mbedtls_net_recv returned %d failed ! mbedtls_dhm_read_public returned %d failed ! mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret returned %d ... . Encrypting and sending the ciphertextdh_serverrbrsa_priv.txtdh_prime.txt11999 . Shared secret: %02x ==Hello there!==p != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;p@@ H0\@p@`,@l`HzRx +zRx $FJ w?;*3$"DD8BBB B(A0A8G%%A%J%A%  8BED G(G0} (A ABBA )@@B@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@ @ @00@0@X=XM@XM@08h=hM@hM@  @@ Ptd44@4@QtdRtdX=XM@XM@/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU<@| i&A<=>@CEFIJLMNOk|$06ϟqXB7K|j Cֳ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 4'D2cJ=h ($l>3!hE=J /R }9"Y o 4S$6R "@f ,@Y *@ Q@ *@ W0@Q@6xQ@C -@3 `,@Q@ -@z -@ /@~ /@]< )@+ +@K8 xQ@ `-@;  +@ @.@mbedtls_x509_crt_free_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTablembedtls_x509_crt_parse__gmon_start__mbedtls_x509_crt_init_ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_ssl_freembedtls_net_initmbedtls_ssl_config_freembedtls_net_recvmbedtls_net_freembedtls_net_sendmbedtls_ssl_conf_authmodembedtls_net_connectmbedtls_ssl_conf_dbgmbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chainmbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cbmbedtls_net_recv_timeoutmbedtls_ssl_readmbedtls_ssl_set_hostnamembedtls_ssl_set_biombedtls_ssl_config_defaultsmbedtls_ssl_setupmbedtls_ssl_conf_rngmbedtls_debug_set_thresholdmbedtls_ssl_writembedtls_ssl_handshakembedtls_ssl_get_verify_resultmbedtls_ssl_close_notifymbedtls_ssl_initmbedtls_ssl_config_initmbedtls_test_cas_pem_lenmbedtls_test_cas_pemmbedtls_x509_crt_verify_infombedtls_entropy_funcmbedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_timing_set_delaymbedtls_entropy_initmbedtls_ctr_drbg_seedmbedtls_entropy_freembedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_ctr_drbg_initmbedtls_ctr_drbg_randommbedtls_strerrormbedtls_ctr_drbg_freembedtls_timing_get_delayfflushexitputscallocstrlenmemsetstdoutmemcpystderrfprintf__libc_start_mainlibmbedtls.so.13libz.so.1libmbedx509.so.1libmbedcrypto.so.6libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5ui O@O@O@ O@O@O@O@O@O@O@O@!O@"O@2O@5O@;P@ P@(P@0P@8P@@P@HP@ PP@ XP@ `P@ hP@pP@xP@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@ P@#P@$P@%P@&P@'P@(P@)Q@*Q@+Q@,Q@- Q@.(Q@/0Q@08Q@1@Q@3HQ@4PQ@6XQ@7`Q@8hQ@9pQ@:HH/HtH5/%/@%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/hp%/h`%/h P%/h @%/h 0%/h %z/h %r/h%j/h%b/h%Z/h%R/h%J/h%B/h%:/h%2/h%*/hp%"/h`%/hP%/h@% /h0%/h %.h%.h%.h%.h %.h!%.h"%.h#%.h$%.h%%.h&%.h'p%.h(`%.h)P%.h*@%.h+0AW1AVAUATUSHHD$,H$HHD$L$L$HL$PL$@ 6LL&LNH= 1`H,H8QLH5R,LLA H o 9H=g H= 1H+H8H+H5+LHƅrH= 1H# H5! 1H= He+H8H|$H H5 ÅH= *H= 1\H+H8M1ɺ1L|ÅLE1LLH5 +LLvH*H5LHLHrÅH58 H9ÅL*H *HH*Ht$mH *Ht$0HHW*rH= 6H=w 1hH!*H8YfH($=tGH=z H= 1HsD$jH=L D$H=n 1H)H8fD H5[ H\A$=tE H7 DH=7 1H=A 1H:)H8rL$@1LHDLֺHLT$SLT$A$=tEAEAH= DL$l$DL$ÉH=> 1LL$`dLLL$LL$1H= LH|$LH\LL\L$y$D$H= 1PDL$H\$`DϺdDL$HDL$H1H=2 DH|$9LHLQLLqH=s 1H= 1H= 1H= QL$H$@HH|$H|$%eDH=> 1DL$HDL$EH|$`LHLxLLH= 1H= 1H= H=1H%=tH=bcLDH=i1DH= 1DL$qDL$LD$`DϺdDL$LLD$LD$DL$1H=GLD*H|$PLHLhLL1I^HHPTI/@H /@H"@%DH=q'Hj'H9tH^%Ht H=A'H5:'H)HH?HHHtH%HtfD='uUH~&]Dff.@f.@UH5<H1H]DH=&d@H=&@AUIATIUHHSHHu{HI$L9v,qBKHQЀ v Qw5QH ЈEt/B< vˍB<vB<w+BDQwQ1H[]A\A]I$AI1Et=A4D@0W@AFq0 WAWFƈDWHL9uDHHHEFHtHH#LHH5H81!7AUATIUSHHKHHtCHƿHIHtqHL$LHHXu%HL[]A\A]fDH1[]A\A]/LH#H H5FH81tLff.9ut(1 fHH9t 8 t1f.Ht3UH,SHHfDcHCH9uH1[]fD1DHH11Hff.AUIATIUSHHt5HoIHH9LFMu5L9rH1[]A\A]LK4(L)H1[]A\A]EDH7LLbL+L)kIfDIIHATUSL\$Hf.IIڋW@ODMF1DÃA,D1-Ga1 W@AԃA,D11OD= 7uD։T$Et1ƒA A 9rIM)f[1]A\Jf.AWL=/AVIAUIATAUH- SL)HHt1LLDAHH9uH[]A\A]A^A_HH%s:%04d: %sdtls_client ok ok (%d skipped) 4433localhost::1 failed ! > Write to server:Echo this %d bytes written %s < Read from server: timeout %d bytes read %s . Closing the connection... doneLast error was: %d - %s . Seeding the random number generator... failed ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned %d . Loading the CA root certificate ... failed ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse returned -0x%x . Connecting to udp/%s/%s... failed ! mbedtls_net_connect returned %d . Setting up the DTLS structure... failed ! mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults returned %d failed ! mbedtls_ssl_setup returned %d failed ! mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname returned %d . Performing the DTLS handshake... failed ! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned -0x%x . Verifying peer X.509 certificate... failed ! mbedtls_ssl_write returned %d connection was closed gracefully mbedtls_ssl_read returned -0x%x p != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;`$P0PX`lp p<P|0XzRx +zRx $FJ w?;*3$"D AU0`4BDB B(A0A8G!  8BED G(G0} (A ABBA \K YD_ A L(BBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE xL3(x;FEG [CAGDPHzBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,QAA CBADLx]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBB*@*@Whr @ /@XM@`M@o@8 @@ d P@ @p@h o@@oo@hM@6 @F @V @f @v @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @!@!@&!@6!@F!@V!@f!@v!@!@!@!@!@!@!@!@!@"@"@&"@6"@F"@V"@f"@v"@"@"@"@"@"@"@"@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @38 @8 d;o@Ho@@@0Wp@phaB@ k @ f @ q"@" w/@/ }0@04@4(5@(5XM@X=`M@`=hM@h= O@?xP@@xxQ@xAQ@A0A#Ausr/bin/mbedtls-dtls_server0000755000000000000000000005454013776116123015066 0ustar rootrootELF> ,@@R@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@ @ @@@@@@M]@]@(M(]@(]@  @@ PtdXEXE@XE@QtdRtdM]@]@/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNUN@| i&ANOPRUWX[\^_`ak|$06ϟqXB7K|j Cֳ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 4'D2c? *<gI[T#3{W2gJ mJhV'2Yo q ~8 #@ @.@Y 0-@ La@M -@ @@Ga@a@ `/@3+ .@a@X 0@zu /@= 1@ `1@] ,@+ -@K a@i /@; @-@ 0@mbedtls_x509_crt_free_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTablembedtls_x509_crt_parse__gmon_start__mbedtls_x509_crt_init_ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_ssl_cache_getmbedtls_ssl_freembedtls_net_initmbedtls_ssl_config_freembedtls_ssl_cookie_checkmbedtls_net_recvmbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_idmbedtls_net_freembedtls_ssl_conf_session_cachembedtls_net_bindmbedtls_ssl_cookie_setupmbedtls_net_sendmbedtls_ssl_cookie_writembedtls_ssl_conf_dbgmbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chainmbedtls_ssl_cache_setmbedtls_ssl_session_resetmbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cbmbedtls_net_recv_timeoutmbedtls_ssl_conf_own_certmbedtls_ssl_readmbedtls_ssl_set_biombedtls_ssl_config_defaultsmbedtls_ssl_setupmbedtls_ssl_cookie_initmbedtls_ssl_conf_rngmbedtls_debug_set_thresholdmbedtls_ssl_writembedtls_ssl_handshakembedtls_ssl_cookie_freembedtls_ssl_cache_initmbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_cookiesmbedtls_ssl_close_notifymbedtls_ssl_cache_freembedtls_net_acceptmbedtls_ssl_initmbedtls_ssl_config_initmbedtls_pk_freembedtls_test_srv_keymbedtls_test_srv_crt_lenmbedtls_test_cas_pem_lenmbedtls_test_cas_pemmbedtls_test_srv_crtmbedtls_test_srv_key_lenmbedtls_entropy_funcmbedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_timing_set_delaymbedtls_entropy_initmbedtls_ctr_drbg_seedmbedtls_entropy_freembedtls_pk_initmbedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_ctr_drbg_initmbedtls_ctr_drbg_randommbedtls_strerrormbedtls_ctr_drbg_freembedtls_pk_parse_keymbedtls_timing_get_delayfflushexitputscallocstrlenmemsetstdoutmemcpystderrfprintf__libc_start_mainlibmbedtls.so.13libz.so.1libmbedx509.so.1libmbedcrypto.so.6libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.53ui H_@P_@X_@`_@h_@ p_@ x_@ _@_@_@_@_@_@ _@!_@#_@'_@(_@2_@7_@?_@C_@E_@L`@ `@(`@0`@8`@ @`@ H`@P`@X`@``@h`@p`@x`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@"`@$`@%`@&`@)`@*`@+`@,`@-`@.a@/a@0a@1a@3 a@4(a@50a@68a@8@a@9Ha@:Pa@;Xa@<`a@=ha@>pa@@xa@Aa@Ba@Da@Fa@Ga@Ha@Ia@Ja@Ka@MHH?HtH5?%?@%?h%?h%?h%?h%?h%?h%?h%?hp%?h`%?h P%?h @%?h 0%?h %z?h %r?h%j?h%b?h%Z?h%R?h%J?h%B?h%:?h%2?h%*?hp%"?h`%?hP%?h@% ?h0%?h %>h%>h%>h%>h %>h!%>h"%>h#%>h$%>h%%>h&%>h'p%>h(`%>h)P%>h*@%>h+0%>h, %z>h-%r>h.%j>h/%b>h0%Z>h1%R>h2%J>h3%B>h4%:>h5AWfAVAUATUSHhL|$PLt$TD$`LH$L$$LHH$HHD$/H$HHD$8H$HHD$0LHD$pHHD$+H$ HHD$ H$0HHD$q1H=1lH:H8mH:LHH:H0aÅH:H5:LH>ÅH:H|$E11HH:H0AÅqH=kH=1HF:H8HLH5ÅH=H=v1H9H8HT$ H|$A H5A:H MÅH=lH=1)H9H8*H|$1ɺ4ÅH\$L%9HT$HL~HW9HH5HEH 9Ht$0HH9JH$ H1xHT$HL8ÅfHT$H|$8LÅ0H\$HL$8H8H5Z9HHHÅ7H &9H8HH$L$ wH=0H$@Ll$HHD$(HD$XHD$@HD$`ILHH=1H28H8LD$@LLLHT$XLHL8H $8LHH8H={H='18H7H89fHx€t=\H=zH=~1HU7H81LHLH€tHc؅%'H=*Ht$(ߺdCHT$(1H=NrH=19H$@HD$(Ld$(ߺdLL1H=mLMLEL=H|$H H|$aH|$8H|$0]H|$H|$ )۸H؉H=O1H$@HD$(JH=1fH$@HD$((H=k1DH$@HD$(H= 1"H$@HD$(LH=1H=1Hh5H8HLH€tƅ8LH=1H=1@H=tH= H=H=믉1H=GhH=1*H$@HD$(H=1H$@HD$(H=1H$@HD$(ÉH=91Ll$HƉH=M1Ll$HnH=1D$@H=1Ll$HlH\$(DD$@dHDDD$(-DD$(H1H=D/LwLoLgH|$H5H|$H|$8AH|$0H|$H|$ S/f.@1I^HHPTI1@H`1@Hǐ#@n3DH=5Hz5H9tH2Ht H=Q5H5J5H)HH?HHHtH=3HtfD=5uUH~4]Dff.@f.@UH5H1nH]DH=4t@H=4@AUIATIUHHSHHru{HI$L9v,qBKHQЀ v Qw5QH ЈEt/B< vˍB<vB<w+BDQwQ1H[]A\A]I$AI1Et=A4D@0W@AFq0 WAWFƈDWHL9uDHHHEHtHH1L2HBH5{H81gAUATIUSHHHHtCHƿHIHtqHL$LHHXu%HL[]A\A]fDH1[]A\A]/LH0HH5H81DLaff.9ut(1 fHH9t 8 t1f.Ht3UH,SHHfDHCH9uH1[]fD1DHH1R1Hff.AUIATIUSHHt5HoIHH9LFMu5L9rH1[]A\A]LK4(L)H1[]A\A]EDH7LL2L+L)kIfDIIHATUSL\$Hf.IIڋW@ODMF1DÃA,D1-Ga1 W@AԃA,D11OD= 7uD։T$Et1ƒA A 9rIM)f[1]A\Jf.AWL=+AVIAUIATAUH-+SL)HsHt1LLDAHH9uH[]A\A]A^A_HH%s:%04d: %s ok . Bind on udp/*/4433 ...4433::dtls_serverLast error was: %d - %s hello verification requested < Read from client: timeout %d bytes read %s > Write to client: %d bytes written %s . Closing the connection... done . Loading the server cert. and key... failed ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse returned %d failed ! mbedtls_pk_parse_key returned %d failed ! mbedtls_net_bind returned %d . Seeding the random number generator... failed ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned %d . Setting up the DTLS data... failed ! mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults returned %d failed ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert returned %d failed ! mbedtls_ssl_cookie_setup returned %d failed ! mbedtls_ssl_setup returned %d . Waiting for a remote connection ... failed ! mbedtls_net_accept returned %d failed ! mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id() returned -0x%x . Performing the DTLS handshake... failed ! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned -0x%x connection was closed gracefully mbedtls_ssl_read returned -0x%x failed ! mbedtls_ssl_write returned %d p != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;8$XlH<HP|(hXzRx +zRx $pFJ w?;*3$"DAU0` BFB B(A0A8G#h d 8`BED G(G0} (A ABBA K YD_ A L(TBBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE x3(;FEG [CAGDPH zBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,@QAA CBADL]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBB,@,@ 3 @ 1@]@ ]@o@ @@  `@@@( o@oo@(]@6 @F @V @f @v @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @!@!@&!@6!@F!@V!@f!@v!@!@!@!@!@!@!@!@!@"@"@&"@6"@F"@V"@f"@v"@"@"@"@"@"@"@"@"@#@#@&#@6#@F#@V#@f#@v#@#@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @H 3 @ ;o@Ho@0W@(aB@k @ f @ pq#@#1w1@1 }@@@VXE@XEE@E]@M ]@ M(]@(M H_@HO`@Pa@Qa@Q0Q#Qusr/bin/mbedtls-ecdh_curve255190000755000000000000000000004420013776116123015237 0ustar rootrootELF>&@@B@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@ @ @ 00@0@=M@M@HP=M@M@@@ PtdP3P3@P3@QtdRtd=M@M@PP/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU#@| i&A#$%'*,-013456k|$06ϟqXB7K|j Cֳ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 4'D2c `rH ^2s, F % !@@ (@Y '@ `P@a &@ 0@[Q@P@ 0)@3? p(@P@l )@z )@Q +@/ 0+@] &@+ '@K P@} p)@; '@ P*@_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable__gmon_start___ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_mpi_read_binarymbedtls_entropy_funcmbedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_entropy_initmbedtls_ecp_group_loadmbedtls_ctr_drbg_seedmbedtls_entropy_freembedtls_mpi_lsetmbedtls_ecdh_initmbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpimbedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_ctr_drbg_initmbedtls_ctr_drbg_randommbedtls_ecdh_freembedtls_ecdh_compute_sharedmbedtls_mpi_write_binarymbedtls_ctr_drbg_freembedtls_ecdh_gen_publicfflushexitputscallocstrlenmemsetstdoutmemcpystderrfprintf__libc_start_mainlibmbedcrypto.so.6libz.so.1libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5Gui O@O@O@O@O@O@O@O@"P@ P@(P@0P@8P@@P@HP@ PP@ XP@ `P@ hP@ pP@xP@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@ P@!HH/HtH5/%/@%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/hp%/h`%/h P%/h @%/h 0%/h %z/h %r/h%j/h%b/h%Z/h%R/h%J/h%B/h%:/h%2/h%*/hp%"/h`%/hPAWAVAUATUSH( L$L$pD$+ecdhLHl$pD$/L$MLEHH= 1oH-H;LHL$+LHH5-AH='H= 1H; LzL$H -ILL$LLL$LLL$HD$0 LHHD$tH=TH=1H;. LaL$H ,ILH$hLLL$Ht$LL$HD$P LHHD$#H=H= 1H;H$wL$Ht$ LLT$LT$L+ILLH$HL$HHD$H=e%H= 1WH;H$9L$XHt$ LLT$<$(L2+ILLL$LLL\$!L\$H= L\$H= 1H;]L\$Ht$LKADžH= DH=i 1AlLL|H$LDDH= 1A.H={ 1A먉H=+ 1A됉H= 1AuH= 1AZH= 1A?H= 1A$1I^HHPTI+@H0+@H!@)DH=*H*H9tHf)Ht H=*H5z*H)HH?HHHtHU)HtfD=A*uUH~/*]Dff.@f.@H=*@H=)d@AUIATIUHHSHHRu{HI$L9v,qBKHQЀ v Qw5QH ЈEt/B< vˍB<vB<w+BDQwQ1H[]A\A]I$AI1Et=A4D@0W@AFq0 WAWFƈDWHL9uDHHHEHtHH'L] Hj H5 H817AUATIUSHHHHtCHƿHSIHtqHL$LHHXu%HL[]A\A]fDH1[]A\A]/L0 H'H H5 H81L ff.9ut(1 fHH9t 8 t1f.Ht3UH,SHHfD3HCH9uH1[]fD1DHH11Hff.AUIATIUSHHt5HoIHH9LFMu5L9rH1[]A\A]LK4(L)H1[]A\A]EDH7LLL+L)kIfDIIHATUSL\$Hf.IIڋW@ODMF1DÃA,D1-Ga1 W@AԃA,D11OD= 7uD։T$Et1ƒA A 9rIM)f[1]A\Jf.AWL=w"AVIAUIATAUH-h"SL)HHt1LLDAHH9uH[]A\A]A^A_HH . Seeding the random number generator... failed ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned %d . Setting up client context... failed ! mbedtls_ecp_group_load returned %d failed ! mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public returned %d failed ! mbedtls_mpi_write_binary returned %d . Setting up server context... . Server reading client key and computing secret... failed ! mbedtls_mpi_lset returned %d failed ! mbedtls_mpi_read_binary returned %d failed ! mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared returned %d . Client reading server key and computing secret... . Checking if both computed secrets are equal... okp != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;8L`p  0`\t@8zRx +zRx $FJ w?;*3$"4Dx@BBB B(A0A8G|` \ 8XBED G(G0} (A ABBA KYD_ A LLBBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE `3(t;FEG [CAGDPHzBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,8QAA CBAD4]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBB|&@&@*=G @ +@M@M@o@@@  P@pX@ @ oh @oo @M@6 @F @V @f @v @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @!@!@&!@6!@F!@V!@f!@v!@!@!@!@!@!@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @@3@;o @ pHoh @h 0W @ aBX@Xpk @ f @ q!@! w+@+ }0@0NP3@P33@3M@=M@=M@=O@?@P@@P@@P@@0@#Ausr/bin/mbedtls-ecdsa0000755000000000000000000004421013776116123013602 0ustar rootrootELF>%@@B@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@ @ @ 00@0@@@=M@M@PX=M@M@@@ Ptd33@3@QtdRtd=M@M@PP/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU$@| i&A$%&(+-.124567k|$06ϟqXB7K|j Cֳ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 4'D2cu $o+# FY[:#, 8 !@* `(@Y P'@ sQ@t @'@ 0@nQ@P@ )@3R (@Q@ *@z *@d +@B +@] %@+ (@K P@ )@; `'@ *@_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable__gmon_start___ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_entropy_funcmbedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_entropy_initmbedtls_ctr_drbg_seedmbedtls_ecdsa_genkeymbedtls_entropy_freembedtls_ecdsa_write_signaturembedtls_ecp_group_copymbedtls_ecp_copymbedtls_ecdsa_initmbedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_ecp_point_write_binarymbedtls_ctr_drbg_initmbedtls_ctr_drbg_randommbedtls_ecdsa_read_signaturembedtls_sha256_retmbedtls_ecdsa_freembedtls_ctr_drbg_freefflushexitputsputcharcallocstrlenmemsetstdoutmemcpystderrfprintf__libc_start_mainlibmbedcrypto.so.6libz.so.1libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5Zui O@O@O@O@O@O@O@!O@#P@ P@(P@0P@8P@@P@HP@ PP@ XP@ `P@ hP@ pP@xP@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@ P@"HH/HtH5/%/@%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/hp%/h`%/h P%/h @%/h 0%/h %z/h %r/h%j/h%b/h%Z/h%R/h%J/h%B/h%:/h%2/h%*/hp%"/h`%/hP%/h@AWAVAUATUSH L$`L$LL$ L$uLmL1LH1foDŽ$%%%%D$0D$@D$PD$`f7GD$p$t@H= H$LEL=LHH=1H$H,H8HiH5,HLAH # JH=+1H,H85LLH,.$H= 1aHL$(1LH$pA,HL$L$0HLD$HD$ HT$(Ht$H= H= 1H+H8HT$1H|$0dmH= Ht$ H=y H=x 1H+H82AT M5+LL$ LHT$ZY't$(H=B 1OHT$(LH=I +H=l 1-H.+H8LLsHt$H$IH= 1H*H8tLD$(LLHt$ *H=l 1drH= 1]H= >mH= 1i7H=+ 1T"H= 1? H=1 1*H=| 1H= 1f.1I^HHPTI+@H+@H!@)DH=*H*H9tH)Ht H=*H5*H)HH?HHHtH)HtfD=*uUH~w*]Dff.@f.@AU1ATUHSHHH=< HHtHHL-, L% fLHHAtAT1H9uH []A\A]f.@H=)d@H=)$@AUIATIUHHSHH2u{HI$L9v,qBKHQЀ v Qw5QH ЈEt/B< vˍB<vB<w+BDQwQ1H[]A\A]I$AI1Et=A4D@0W@AFq0 WAWFƈDWHL9uDHHHEvHtHHm'L^ Hj H5 H81QAUATIUSHHHHtCHƿHIHtqHL$LHHXu%HL[]A\A]fDH1[]A\A]/L0 H&H H5 H81ZL ff.9ut(1 fHH9t 8 t1f.Ht3UH,SHHfDHCH9uH1[]fD1DHH11Hff.AUIATIUSHHt5HoIHH9LFMu5L9rH1[]A\A]LK4(L)H1[]A\A]EDH7LLL+L)kIfDIIHATUSL\$Hf.IIڋW@ODMF1DÃA,D1-Ga1 W@AԃA,D11OD= 7uD։T$Et1ƒA A 9rIM)f[1]A\Jf.AWL='"AVIAUIATAUH-"SL)HSHt1LLDAHH9uH[]A\A]A^A_HH%s%c%c0123456789ABCDEFusage: ecdsa ok (key size: %d bits) internal error + Public key: . Computing message hash... ok + Hash: . Signing message hash... ok (signature length = %u) + Signature: . Seeding the random number generator... failed ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned %d ok . Generating key pair... failed ! mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey returned %d failed ! mbedtls_sha256_ret returned %d failed ! mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature returned %d . Preparing verification context... failed ! mbedtls_ecp_group_copy returned %d failed ! mbedtls_ecp_copy returned %d ok . Verifying signature... failed ! mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature returned %d %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%p != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;@@0p l `@@zRx x+zRx $FJ w?;*3$"4DBDA D(Q0V(F ABBD|BBB B(A0C8G=NXA  8BED G(G0} (A ABBA (|K<YD_ A LXBBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE l3(;FEG [CAGDPHzBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,LQAA CBAD|]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBB&@p&@=PZ @ +@M@M@o@@@ ( P@@ @ o @oo @M@6 @F @V @f @v @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @!@!@&!@6!@F!@V!@f!@v!@!@!@!@!@!@!@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @X3@(;o @ rHo @ 0W @ aB@k @ f @ q!@! w+@+ }0@03@384@84M@=M@=M@=O@?@P@@P@@Q@A0A##Ausr/bin/mbedtls-gen_entropy0000755000000000000000000003410013776116123015051 0ustar rootrootELF>@@1@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@ @@-- @ @-=@=@-=@=@@@ Ptdx!x!@x!@QtdRtd-=@=@@@/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU@| i&A "#&')*+,k|$06ϟqXB7K|j Cֳ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 4'D2cu   F[,  P@G @Y @ X@@Y @  @S@@@@ @37 @@@d `@z @@I @' @] @+ P@K @@u @; @ @_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable__gmon_start___ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_entropy_funcmbedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_entropy_initmbedtls_entropy_freembedtls_platform_setupfflushexitfopenputcharcallocstrlenmemsetstdoutmemcpyfclosestderrfwritefprintf__libc_start_mainlibmbedcrypto.so.6libz.so.1libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5?ui ?@?@?@ ?@ ?@?@@@ @@(@@0@@8@@@@@H@@ P@@ X@@ `@@h@@p@@x@@@@@@@@@@@@HH/HtH5/%/@%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/hp%/h`%/h P%/h @%/h 0%/h %z/h %r/h%j/h%b/h%Z/hAWAVAUATIUSHH~H5IHLt$@1HLiL@H{fIT$*þ0H=Y^ZH-H8t-@HLADžtH=*1AM LLDH-HH5 H81@It$H= 1f1I^HHPTI @H@HP@-DH=-H-H9tH,Ht H=-H5-H)HH?HHHtH,HtfD=q-uUH~_-]Dff.@f.@H=2-t@H="-T@AUIATIUHHSHHu{HI$L9v,qBKHQЀ v Qw5QH ЈEt/B< vˍB<vB<w+BDQwQ1H[]A\A]I$AI1Et=A4D@0W@AFq0 WAWFƈDWHL9uDHHHEHtHH-+L H H5; H81'AUATIUSHH[HHtCHƿHsIHtqHL$LHHXu%HL[]A\A]fDH1[]A\A]/L Ht*HU H5 H81zL% ff.9ut(1 fHH9t 8 t1f.Ht3UH,SHHfD#HCH9uH1[]fD1DHH1B1Hff.AUIATIUSHHt5HoIHH9LFMu5L9rH1[]A\A]LK4(L)H1[]A\A]EDH7LLL+L)kIfDIIHATUSL\$Hf.IIڋW@ODMF1DÃA,D1-Ga1 W@AԃA,D11OD= 7uD։T$Et1ƒA A 9rIM)f[1]A\Jf.AWL=%AVIAUIATAUH-%SL)HHt1LLDAHH9uH[]A\A]A^A_HHusage: %s wb+failed to open '%s' for writing. failed ! mbedtls_entropy_func returned -%04X Generating %ldkb of data in file '%s'... %04.1f%% done B@Dp != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;(8L(`(H0\thH8zRx x+zRx $0FJ w?;*3$"4DGBBB B(D0A8G |  8BED G(G0} (A ABBA 4KpYD_ A LBBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE `$3(tP;FEG [CAGdDPHlzBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,QAA CBAD4P]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBB|hp@@@"5? @ $@=@=@o@@@  @@ @ @ o` @oo @=@6@F@V@f@v@@@@@@@@@@@&@6@F@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @P3@ ;o @ \Ho` @` 0W @ aB @ k@f @ 0qP@Pw$@$ } @ vx!@x!"@"=@-=@-=@-?@/0@@0@@0@@000#0usr/bin/mbedtls-gen_key0000755000000000000000000005442013776116123014150 0ustar rootrootELF>,@@R@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@ @ @mm@@@@@M]@]@8M]@]@@@ Ptd0E0E@0E@QtdRtdM]@]@PP/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU5@| i&A5679=?@CDFHIJk|$06ϟqXB7K| j Cֳ:2BEJZL 3bZS+> : 4'D2c 6 W[j"$. q: aFK, wH1 "@ B .@Y -@ a@t -@ 3@@a@a@ xa@ 0@3j @/@a@ 0@z 0@d `2@Z 2@] ,@+ .@K ,@ xa@ @0@; -@ 1@_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable__gmon_start___ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_pk_setupmbedtls_rsa_exportmbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_namembedtls_mpi_write_filembedtls_entropy_add_sourcembedtls_pk_get_typembedtls_pk_write_key_dermbedtls_entropy_funcmbedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_entropy_initmbedtls_pk_info_from_typembedtls_pk_write_key_pemmbedtls_ctr_drbg_seedmbedtls_rsa_gen_keymbedtls_mpi_initmbedtls_entropy_freembedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_idmbedtls_mpi_freembedtls_pk_initmbedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_ctr_drbg_initmbedtls_ctr_drbg_randommbedtls_strerrormbedtls_pk_freembedtls_ctr_drbg_freembedtls_rsa_export_crtmbedtls_ecp_gen_keymbedtls_ecp_curve_listfflushexitfopenputsstrtolcallocstrlenmemsetstdoutmemcpyfclosestderrfwritefreadstrchrfprintfsleep__libc_start_mainferrorlibmbedcrypto.so.6libz.so.1libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatadev_random_entropy_pollmbedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randoptGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5Zui _@_@_@_@_@_@_@-_@4`@ `@(`@0`@8`@@`@H`@ P`@ X`@ ``@ h`@ p`@x`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@ `@!`@"`@#a@$a@%a@&a@' a@((a@)0a@*8a@+@a@,Ha@.Pa@/Xa@0`a@1ha@2pa@3HH?HtH5?%?@%?h%?h%?h%?h%?h%?h%?h%?hp%?h`%?h P%?h @%?h 0%?h %z?h %r?h%j?h%b?h%Z?h%R?h%J?h%B?h%:?h%2?h%*?hp%"?h`%?hP%?h@% ?h0%?h %>h%>h%>h%>h %>h!%>h"%>h#%>h$%>h%%>h&%>h'p%>h(`%>h)P%>h*@%>h+0AWAVAUATIUSHIHD$pL$HHD$0H$HHD$@H$HHD$HH$HHD$PH$HHD$H$HHD$ H$0HHD$(H$PHHD$8}H|$`H|$NH$pHHD$1LHHa@HHHCCH0HCEMl$H- Md6@H=L€IM9M}=LmH~LHL@€tLH=XH=LICM9xH=1H$L%:I<$H{t>A 1HH,@AŅ>H=1I<$tH5u:H|$AHH 3AŅH=1ZI<$1;H|$H AŅ{HL$H9Ht$h%AąH=>H|$$H|$H= H=1L$@ 1>LL{{H|$L満>7ÅSL%MHH5LLD$XLD$XHI9LHHھLH9H=FZDxe~H=?1H=,H=HpH1HkHsHHtfDH1HHuHuAH$DLA LH=1\H|$0H|$@H|$HH|$PH|$H|$ H|$(H|$8H|$2H|$H0DX LH=> LH=, H=LLCDAxcwAxlH=LI)M{H|$hLL$LD$PHL$HHT$@Ht$0H|$X2AąHL$8HT$(Ht$ H|$XAąHt$01ɺH=+Ht$1ɺH=Ht$P1ɺH=Ht$@1ɺH=Ht$H1ɺH=Ht$ 1ɺH=Ht$(1ɺH=kHt$81ɺH=SH=E'Ld$hA<$lH=pHp1I$1ɺH=ZI$(1ɺH=GI$1ɺH=4xH=1EAH=K[Af.1I^HHPTI`2@H2@H"@3DH=A5H:5H9tHf3Ht H=5H5 5H)HH?HHHtHU3HtfD=4uUH~4]Dff.@f.@AWH=IAVIAUATIH5USHH?HIMtBLLHL%HHu Lu1H)ݿI1HuL4M71H[]A\A]A^A_LH[]A\A]A^A_øf.H=4@H= 4$@AUIATIUHHSHHu{HI$L9v,qBKHQЀ v Qw5QH ЈEt/B< vˍB<vB<w+BDQwQ1H[]A\A]I$AI1Et=A4D@0W@AFq0 WAWFƈDWHL9uDHHHEVHtHH0LkHzH5H8117AUATIUSHHkHHtCHƿHIHtqHL$LHHXu%HL[]A\A]fDH1[]A\A]/L@H40HH5H81Lff.9ut(1 fHH9t 8 t1f.Ht3UH,SHHfDsHCH9uH1[]fD1DHH11Hff.AUIATIUSHHt5HoIHH9LFMu5L9rH1[]A\A]LK4(L)H1[]A\A]EDH7LLL+L)kIfDIIHATUSL\$Hf.IIڋW@ODMF1DÃA,D1-Ga1 W@AԃA,D11OD= 7uD։T$Et1ƒA A 9rIM)f[1]A\Jf.AWL=+AVIAUIATAUH-+SL)HHt1LLDAHH9uH[]A\A]A^A_HHrb/dev/random available ec_curve values: %s (default) %s keyfile.keytypersaformatpemderrsa_keysizeec_curvefilenameuse_dev_randomgen_key ok . Key information:N: E: D: DP: DQ: QP: curve: %s X_Q: Y_Q: D: ! key type not supported . Writing key to file...wb ok failed - %s usage: gen_key param=<>... acceptable parameters: type=rsa|ec default: rsa rsa_keysize=%%d default: 4096 ec_curve=%%s see below filename=%%s default: keyfile.key format=pem|der default: pem use_dev_random=0|1 default: 0 . Seeding the random number generator... failed ! mbedtls_entropy_add_source returned -0x%04x Using /dev/random, so can take a long time! failed ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned -0x%04x . Generating the private key ... failed ! mbedtls_pk_setup returned -0x%04x failed ! mbedtls_rsa_gen_key returned -0x%04x failed ! mbedtls_ecp_gen_key returned -0x%04x failed ! key type not supported failed ! could not export RSA parameters p != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;l`4Pp(X0zRx (+zRx $FJ w?;*3$"`DBLE B(K0A8D@p 8A0A(B BBBA L 8F0A(B BBBA 0L BBB B(D0C8G  8BED G(G0} (A ABBA @TKTYD_ A LpBBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE D3(p;FEG [CAGDPHzBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,dQAA CBADp]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBB,@,@=PZ @ d2@]@]@o@ @@ D `@ @@ o@oo @]@6 @F @V @f @v @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @!@!@&!@6!@F!@V!@f!@v!@!@!@!@!@!@!@!@!@"@"@&"@6"@F"@V"@f"@v"@"@"@"@"@"@"@"@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @ 3 @ D;o @ Ho@0W@aB@ k @ f @ q"@"qwd2@d2 }@@@.0E@0EE@E ]@M]@M]@M_@O@`@Pxxa@xQa@QH 0Q#Qusr/bin/mbedtls-gen_random_ctr_drbg0000755000000000000000000004417013776116123016507 0ustar rootrootELF>#@@A@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@(( @ @} } 00@0@pp=M@M@8@=M@M@@@ Ptd 2 2@ 2@QtdRtd=M@M@HH/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU!@| i&A!"#%(*+./1234k|$06ϟqXB7K|j Cֳ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 4'D2cu F\ F~[, W !@/ %@Yw $@ %P@& $@ 0@ P@P@ '@3 P&@pP@1 '@zN '@ p)@ )@] #@+\ %@K P@B P'@; $@i 0(@_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable__gmon_start___ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_entropy_funcmbedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_entropy_initmbedtls_ctr_drbg_seedmbedtls_entropy_freembedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_filembedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_ctr_drbg_initmbedtls_ctr_drbg_randommbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistancembedtls_ctr_drbg_freembedtls_ctr_drbg_update_seed_filefflushexitfopenputsputcharcallocstrlenmemsetstdoutmemcpyfclosestderrfwritefprintf__libc_start_mainlibmbedcrypto.so.6libz.so.1libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5 ui O@O@O@O@O@O@O@ P@ P@(P@0P@8P@@P@HP@ PP@ XP@ `P@ hP@ pP@xP@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@HH/HtH5/%/@%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/hp%/h`%/h P%/h @%/h 0%/h %z/h %r/h%j/h%b/h%Z/h%R/h%J/h%B/h%:/h%2/h%*/hp%"/h`AWAVAUATUSHH Ld$L=NH{H5*IHWH$HIHD$ H5-LLA H Ņ21LH5 Ln+aL$hLL HSf*žH=Y^ZH,H8ct)LLADžtH=6 AR LpLXH|$DVH,HH5 H811HsH= 1?H= 1AxH= H5 LH= 1A:H= 1A1I^HHPTIp)@H)@H!@+DH=,H,H9tH+Ht H=,H5,H)HH?HHHtHu+HtfD=Y,uUH~G,]Dff.@f.@H=,@H= ,t@AUIATIUHHSHHu{HI$L9v,qBKHQЀ v Qw5QH ЈEt/B< vˍB<vB<w+BDQwQ1H[]A\A]I$AI1Et=A4D@0W@AFq0 WAWFƈDWHL9uDHHHEHtHH)LN HZ H5 H81GAUATIUSHH;HHtCHƿHsIHtqHL$LHHXu%HL[]A\A]fDH1[]A\A]/L H$)H H5 H81L} ff.9ut(1 fHH9t 8 t1f.Ht3UH,SHHfDCHCH9uH1[]fD1DHH1"1Hff.AUIATIUSHHt5HoIHH9LFMu5L9rH1[]A\A]LK4(L)H1[]A\A]EDH7LLL+L)kIfDIIHATUSL\$Hf.IIڋW@ODMF1DÃA,D1-Ga1 W@AԃA,D11OD= 7uD։T$Et1ƒA A 9rIM)f[1]A\Jf.AWL=$AVIAUIATAUH-$SL)HHt1LLDAHH9uH[]A\A]A^A_HHusage: %s wb+RANDOM_GENseedfilefailed!failed to open '%s' for writing. failed in mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed: %d Failed to open seedfile. Generating one.failed in mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file: %d failed in mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_seed_file: %d Generating %ldkb of data in file '%s'... %04.1f%% done B@Dp != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;8L`000p\tP8zRx  +zRx $ FJ w?;*3$"4D/BBB B(A0C8J|p l 8hBED G(G0} (A ABBA KYD_ A L\BBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE `3(t;FEG [CAG DPHzBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,HQAA CBAD4]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBB|$@$@  @ t)@M@M@o@@@  P@X @( @ o @oo @M@6 @F @V @f @v @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @!@!@&!@6!@F!@V!@f!@v!@!@!@!@!@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @3@;o @ lHo @ 0W( @( aB @ Xk @ f @ q!@!wt)@t) }0@0 2@ 22@2M@=M@=M@=O@?8P@@P@@P@@0@#Ausr/bin/mbedtls-gen_random_havege0000755000000000000000000003400013776116123016147 0ustar rootrootELF>@@1@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@ @@}} @ @-=@=@-=@=@@@ Ptd @ @QtdRtd-=@=@88/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU@| i&A !"#k|$06ϟqXB7K|j Cֳ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 4'D2c | F`w, & @ @YF @ x@@ @  @@@{h@@ @3 P@?x@@ @z @ p@ @] @++ @K} h@@ P@;e @8 0@_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable__gmon_start___ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_platform_setupexitputscallocstrlenmemsetmemcpystderrfprintf__libc_start_mainlibmbedcrypto.so.6libz.so.1libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5Uui `?@?@?@?@ ?@@@ @@(@@0@@8@@@@@ H@@ P@@ X@@ `@@HH/HtH5/%/@%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/hp%/h`%/h PH=-HP1f1I^HHPTIp@H@H@.DH=Q/HJ/H9tH.Ht H=!/H5/H)HH?HHHtHu.HtfD=.uUH~.]Dff.@f.@H=.@H=.@AUIATIUHHSHH2u{HI$L9v,qBKHQЀ v Qw5QH ЈEt/B< vˍB<vB<w+BDQwQ1H[]A\A]I$AI1Et=A4D@0W@AFq0 WAWFƈDWHL9uDHHHEVHtHH,L H H5K H811gAUATIUSHHHHtCHƿHIHtqHL$LHHXu%HL[]A\A]fDH1[]A\A]/L H$,He H5 H81L/ ff.9ut(1 fHH9t 8 t1f.Ht3UH,SHHfDSHCH9uH1[]fD1DHH11Hff.AUIATIUSHHt5HoIHH9LFMu5L9rH1[]A\A]LK4(L)H1[]A\A]EDH7LLbL+L)kIfDIIHATUSL\$Hf.IIڋW@ODMF1DÃA,D1-Ga1 W@AԃA,D11OD= 7uD։T$Et1ƒA A 9rIM)f[1]A\Jf.AWL='AVIAUIATAUH-'SL)HHt1LLDAHH9uH[]A\A]A^A_HHMBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C not defined.p != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;H,@|x8x<TX8zRx h+zRx $hFJ w?;*3$"DK\ p 8BED G(G0} (A ABBA DKYD_ A LBBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE @43(T`;FEG [CAGtDPH|zBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,QAA CBAD`]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBB\x@@ @ t@=@=@o@@@  @@ @@ @x o @oo @=@6@F@V@f@v@@@@@@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @x3@;o @ JHo @ 0W@ @@ xaB @ k@f @ q@wt@t } @  @ h!@h!=@-=@-=@-?@/(@@0hh@@h0x@@x00x0#0usr/bin/mbedtls-generic_sum0000755000000000000000000003420013776116123015021 0ustar rootrootELF>0@@2@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@@@  @ @((-=@=@08-=@=@@@ Ptdp"p"@p"@QtdRtd-=@=@88/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU @| i&A !"$')*-.0123k|$06ϟqXB7K|j Cֳ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 4'D2c 9`KvR>D}u Y`tF3+&n, g @` @Y @ @@ @ t @A@S@@` @@3 @@@ @z @ @ @@]Y 0@+ @KU @@ @;= @ `@_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable__gmon_start___ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_md_info_from_typembedtls_md_get_namembedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_md_filembedtls_md_info_from_stringmbedtls_md_initmbedtls_md_get_sizembedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_md_listmbedtls_md_freembedtls_md_setupexitsprintffopenputsfgetscallocstrlenmemsetmemcpyfclosestderrfwritefprintfstrcmp__libc_start_mainlibmbedcrypto.so.6libz.so.1libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5-ui 8?@?@?@ ?@?@@@ @@(@@0@@8@@@@@H@@ P@@ X@@ `@@ h@@p@@x@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@HH/HtH5/%/@%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/hp%/h`%/h P%/h @%/h 0%/h %z/h %r/h%j/h%b/h%Z/h%R/h%J/h%B/h%:/h%2/h%*/hp%"/h`%/hPAWAVAUATUSH|$H|$ Ht$H|$HD$HxNHHpH|$1H|$|$fD$ALd$@L- HD$LHNHC uHKƄHHȀ u ƄHHD$HT$HMtDLDD$1"HD$I<_H5 1HH91E1AB2;HA Hh9߻EH)H$2D$H5G H81wH(LH5H81D$RfHH=H12fT$u:D$uLH[]A\A]A^A_ËT$t$H=/ 1΋T$t$H=H9(LH5oH81\HLH=1[]A\A]A^A_vfDH=(4@H=(@AUIATIUHHSHH"u{HI$L9v,qBKHQЀ v Qw5QH ЈEt/B< vˍB<vB<w+BDQwQ1H[]A\A]I$AI1Et=A4D@0W@AFq0 WAWFƈDWHL9uDHHHEfHtHH&LmHzH5H81QAUATIUSHHHHtCHƿHIHtqHL$LHHXu%HL[]A\A]fDH1[]A\A]/L@H%HH5H81ZLff.9ut(1 fHH9t 8 t1f.Ht3UH,SHHfDHCH9uH1[]fD1DHH11Hff.AUIATIUSHHt5HoIHH9LFMu5L9rH1[]A\A]LK4(L)H1[]A\A]EDH7LLL+L)kIfDIIHATUSL\$Hf.IIڋW@ODMF1DÃA,D1-Ga1 W@AԃA,D11OD= 7uD։T$Et1ƒA A 9rIM)f[1]A\Jf.AWL=!AVIAUIATAUH-p!SL)HHt1LLDAHH9uH[]A\A]A^A_HHrbfailed to open: %s No '%s' hash found on line. failed to read: %s %02xwrong checksum: %s Available message digests: %s -cWARNING: %d (out of %d) input files could not be read WARNING: %d (out of %d) computed checksums did not match print mode: generic_sum ...check mode: generic_sum -c Message Digest '%s' not found Failed to initialize context. p != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;`l`4Pp(X0zRx +zRx $FJ w?;*3$"`DBBB B(K0G8G N 8A0A(B BBBA U8M0A(B BBB0`BBB B(A0A8I  8BED G(G0} (A ABBA @TKTYD_ A LpBBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE D3(p;FEG [CAGDPHzBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,dQAA CBADp]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBB@@ @ @=@=@o@@@  @@p0 @ @x o @oo @=@6@F@V@f@v@@@@@@@@@@@&@6@F@V@f@v@@@@@@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @3@;o @ jHo @ 0W @ xaB0 @0 pk@f @ q@ w@ } @ np"@p"#@# =@-=@-=@-?@/(@@0@@0@@000#1usr/bin/mbedtls-hello0000755000000000000000000003402013776116123013624 0ustar rootrootELF>@@1@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@  @@ @ @-=@=@-=@=@@@ Ptd @ @QtdRtd-=@=@88/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU@| i&A "#$%k|$06ϟqXB7K|j Cֳ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 4'D2c w F`, 6 @ @YV @ @@ p@  @@@x@@ @3 @O@@ P@z- 0@ @ @] @+; @@K x@@! @;u @H @_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable__gmon_start___ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_md5_retexitputscallocstrlenmemsetmemcpystderrfprintf__libc_start_mainlibmbedcrypto.so.6libz.so.1libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5eui p?@?@?@ ?@?@@@ @@(@@0@@8@@@@@H@@ P@@ X@@ `@@ h@@p@@HH/HtH5/%/@%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/hp%/h`%/h P%/h @%/h 0ATH= HHello, wUSH Hl$HD$!H\$HfD$1Ld$ D$ orldHHھ 7H-u-@3H1HL9uH=1OED1I^HHPTI@H@H@&.DH=.H.H9tH-Ht H=.H5.H)HH?HHHtH-HtfD=Q.uUH~?.]Dff.@f.@H=.D@H=.$@AUIATIUHHSHHu{HI$L9v,qBKHQЀ v Qw5QH ЈEt/B< vˍB<vB<w+BDQwQ1H[]A\A]I$AI1Et=A4D@0W@AFq0 WAWFƈDWHL9uDHHHEHtHH=,LY Hj H5 H81AUATIUSHH;HHtCHƿHSIHtqHL$LHHXu%HL[]A\A]fDH1[]A\A]/L0 H+H H5 H81:L ff.9ut(1 fHH9t 8 t1f.Ht3UH,SHHfDHCH9uH1[]fD1DHH1"1Hff.AUIATIUSHHt5HoIHH9LFMu5L9rH1[]A\A]LK4(L)H1[]A\A]EDH7LLL+L)kIfDIIHATUSL\$Hf.IIڋW@ODMF1DÃA,D1-Ga1 W@AԃA,D11OD= 7uD։T$Et1ƒA A 9rIM)f[1]A\Jf.AWL='AVIAUIATAUH-'SL)H#Ht1LLDAHH9uH[]A\A]A^A_HH MD5('%s') = %02x p != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;P (<Pp   `Ld@(zRx +zRx $pFJ w?;*3$"$DBRA D@lp l 8hBED G(G0} (A ABBA KYD_ A L\BBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE P3(d;FEG [CAG DPHzBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,HQAA CBAD$]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBBl`@0@ @ @=@=@o@H@@  @@  @ @x oP @oo @=@6@F@V@f@v@@@@@@@@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @3H@H;o @ NHoP @P 0W @ xaB @ k@f @ q@!w@ } @  @ `!@`!=@-=@-=@-?@/(@@0xx@@x0@@000#0usr/bin/mbedtls-key_app0000755000000000000000000004421013776116123014153 0ustar rootrootELF>)@@B@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@XX @ @mm00@0@xx=M@M@@=M@M@@@ Ptd(4(4@(4@QtdRtd=M@M@@@/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU"@| i&A"#$&*,-013456k|$06ϟqXB7K| j Cֳ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 4'D2c jFY|o8u !Xpd_, / !@ +@YO *@ Q@ *@ 0@HQ@^ Q@ P@ -@3 @,@HQ@  -@z& -@ `/@ /@] )@+4 +@K P@ @-@;n *@A .@_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable__gmon_start___ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_rsa_exportmbedtls_mpi_write_filembedtls_pk_get_typembedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_pk_parse_keyfilembedtls_mpi_initmbedtls_mpi_freembedtls_pk_initmbedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_strerrormbedtls_pk_freembedtls_rsa_export_crtmbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfilefflushexitfopenputsfgetscallocstrlenmemsetstdoutmemcpyfclosestderrstrchrfprintf__libc_start_mainlibmbedcrypto.so.6libz.so.1libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randoptGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5bui mO@O@O@ O@O@O@!P@ P@(P@0P@8P@@P@HP@ PP@ XP@ `P@ hP@pP@xP@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@ HH/HtH5/%/@%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/hp%/h`%/h P%/h @%/h 0%/h %z/h %r/h%j/h%b/h%Z/h%R/h%J/h%B/h%:/h%2/h%*/hp%"/h`%/hP%/h@AWAVAUATIUSHhH|$PL$`H|$S1LHHD$`HHD$H$HHD$0oH$HHD$@ZH$HHD$HEH$HHD$0H$HHD$ H$ HHD$(H$@HHD$8H Q@HHCHHCHCEMl$H-Md0HH="IM9t^M}=L2Ht]LHHPt LH=`IHSM9u+ H=Q 1LYLH=|1H|$~H|$H|$0H|$@H|$HH|$H|$ H|$(H|$8~gHH=yB LH=YuHSDLH=:HSeH= 1H*H8THsH|$ŅxH= H= H|$Z)H|$GH\$X1ɺH= HŅXH(1ɺH= Ņ4H@1ɺH= Ņ1.HCHC8%H= 1H)H8MHSHsH|$Ņ!H= H= H|$OYH|$<H\$X1ɺH= HŅMH(1ɺH= Ņ)H@1ɺH= ŅH1ɺH= xŅ1H= 1H{H5 IHLH¾LH$L,PHcҀ` uƄ`H` uƄ`LsZH= 10Ld$XLL$LD$HHL$@HT$0Ht$LŅHL$8HT$(LHt$ &ŅcHt$1ɺH=* TŅHt$1ɺH= 2ŅHt$H1ɺH= ŅyHt$01ɺH= ŅWHt$@1ɺH= Ņ5Ht$ 1ɺH= ŅHt$(1ɺH=r ŅHt$81ɺH=V fŅ1H=)H=-H= 1H=1N|H=kLL$Ht$E11H|$X1ŅuHt$1ɺH= Ņ(Ht$1ɺH=x Ņ1$H=[fD1I^HHPTI`/@H/@H!@%DH=&H&H9tH%Ht H=&H5&H)HH?HHHtH%HtfD=y&uUH~g&]Dff.@f.@H=y&@H=i&t@AUIATIUHHSHHru{HI$L9v,qBKHQЀ v Qw5QH ЈEt/B< vˍB<vB<w+BDQwQ1H[]A\A]I$AI1Et=A4D@0W@AFq0 WAWFƈDWHL9uDHHHEHtHH#LdHrH5H81wAUATIUSHHHHtCHƿHsIHtqHL$LHHXu%HL[]A\A]fDH1[]A\A]/L8H4#HH5H81Lff.9ut(1 fHH9t 8 t1f.Ht3UH,SHHfDsHCH9uH1[]fD1DHH11Hff.AUIATIUSHHt5HoIHH9LFMu5L9rH1[]A\A]LK4(L)H1[]A\A]EDH7LLL+L)kIfDIIHATUSL\$Hf.IIڋW@ODMF1DÃA,D1-Ga1 W@AԃA,D11OD= 7uD։T$Et1ƒA A 9rIM)f[1]A\Jf.AWL=AVIAUIATAUH-SL)HHt1LLDAHH9uH[]A\A]A^A_HH usage: key_app param=<>... acceptable parameters: mode=private|public default: none filename=%%s default: keyfile.key password=%%s default: "" password_file=%%s default: "" Error: cannot have both password and password_file . Loading the password file ... failed ! fopen returned NULLError: fgets() failed to retrieve password . Loading the private key ... failed ! mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile returned -0x%04x failed ! could not export RSA parameters Do not know how to print key information for this type . Loading the public key ... failed ! mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile returned -0x%04x keyfile.keymodeprivatepublicfilenamepasswordpassword_filerb ok . Key information ...N: E: D: DP: DQ: QP: Q(X): Q(Y): Q(Z): D : ! Last error was: %s p != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;8L`h0X\xt88zRx +zRx $FJ w?;*3$"4DBBB B(D0C8G |X T 8PBED G(G0} (A ABBA KYD_ A LDBBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE `3(t;FEG [CAGDPHzBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,0QAA CBAD4]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBB|*@*@ @ d/@M@M@o@@@  P@ @@ @ o @oo @M@6 @F @V @f @v @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @!@!@&!@6!@F!@V!@f!@v!@!@!@!@!@!@!@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @@3@;o @ pHo @ 0W@ @@ aB @ k @ f @ q!@! wd/@d/ }0@0&(4@(44@4M@=M@=M@=O@?0P@@P@@Q@AH 0A##Ausr/bin/mbedtls-key_app_writer0000755000000000000000000005425013776116123015554 0ustar rootrootELF>)@@(R@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@ @ @@@@@@M]@]@`M]@]@@@ PtdDD@D@QtdRtdM]@]@@@/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU&@| i&A&'(*.0145789:k|$06ϟqXB7K| j Cֳ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 4'D2c FYo  2 Cp , S- "@ @-@Y 0,@ h a@i ,@ @@cpa@@a@(a@ `.@3G -@ a@t /@z .@Y 0@7 `0@] )@+ ,@K a@ .@; @,@ /@_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable__gmon_start___ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_rsa_exportmbedtls_mpi_write_filembedtls_pk_get_typembedtls_pk_write_key_dermbedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_pk_write_key_pemmbedtls_pk_parse_keyfilembedtls_mpi_initmbedtls_mpi_freembedtls_pk_initmbedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_strerrormbedtls_pk_freembedtls_pk_write_pubkey_dermbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_pemmbedtls_rsa_export_crtmbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfilefflushexitfopenputscallocstrlenmemsetstdoutmemcpyfclosestderrfwritestrchrfprintf__libc_start_mainlibmbedcrypto.so.6libz.so.1libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randoptGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5Oui _@_@_@ _@_@ _@%`@ `@(`@0`@8`@@`@H`@ P`@ X`@ ``@ h`@p`@x`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@!`@"a@#a@$HH?HtH5?%?@%?h%?h%?h%?h%?h%?h%?h%?hp%?h`%?h P%?h @%?h 0%?h %z?h %r?h%j?h%b?h%Z?h%R?h%J?h%B?h%:?h%2?h%*?hp%"?h`%?hP%?h@% ?h0%?h %>h%>hAWAVAUATIUSHhH|$PH<$,1H$`H|$HHHD$`HHD$CH$HHD$@.H$HHD$ H$HHD$(H$HHD$H$HHD$0H$ HHD$8H$@HHD$H@a@HHCHCHCC EM|$H-MdL-*HLVIM9t~M7=LHNLHHPt LH=_#HLIICM9uskQH=1\H;H8HsH<$Ņ6H=H=H<$lH<$H={1{uHsH<$cfDHH=GLH=*uVHH=udC @HH=CfD LH=u6HSDHH=u>C f LH=uHS{H=1H\$HHHH=1cH|$H|$@H|$ H|$(H|$H|$0H|$8}H|$sH<$3ZH=1H-9H8HsH<$1^ŅH=XH=LH<$sH<$Hl$X1ɺH=H)H(1ɺH=jH@1ɺH=WH1ɺH=D(H=sH\$HǺHHH=h؉1CH\$HǺH\HH=؉1LL$Ht$E11H|$X15ŅuGHt$1ɺH='Ht$1ɺH=\HsH<$TH=iLd$XLL$LD$(HL$ HT$@Ht$LŅuHL$HT$8LHt$0TŅuHt$1ɺH=Ht$1ɺH=nHt$(1ɺH=VHt$@1ɺH=>Ht$ 1ɺH=o&Ht$01ɺH=QHt$81ɺH=>Ht$1ɺH=,+H={Hl$X1ɺH=HH(1ɺH=H@1ɺH=u1I^HHPTI0@H`0@H "@5DH= 7H7H9tH5Ht H=6H56H)HH?HHHtH5HtfD=6uUH~6]Dff.@f.@AU>IATI1USH>HH>HLH@a@@ uuVHaH7x@Hcظ>H)HLH5vIHtHHHھ{LHĈ>[]A\A]DAU>IATI1USH>HH >HLH@a@@ u uVHHx@Hcظ>H)HLH5IHtHHHھLSHĈ>[]A\A]DH=A5t@H=15$@AUIATIUHHSHHu{HI$L9v,qBKHQЀ v Qw5QH ЈEt/B< vˍB<vB<w+BDQwQ1H[]A\A]I$AI1Et=A4D@0W@AFq0 WAWFƈDWHL9uDHHHEHtHH2LHH5+H81a'AUATIUSHHHHtCHƿHIHtqHL$LHHXu%HL[]A\A]fDH1[]A\A]/LH1HEH5~H81zLff.9ut(1 fHH9t 8 t1f.Ht3UH,SHHfDSHCH9uH1[]fD1DHH11Hff.AUIATIUSHHt5HoIHH9LFMu5L9rH1[]A\A]LK4(L)H1[]A\A]EDH7LLL+L)kIfDIIHATUSL\$Hf.IIڋW@ODMF1DÃA,D1-Ga1 W@AԃA,D11OD= 7uD։T$Et1ƒA A 9rIM)f[1]A\Jf.AWL=W-AVIAUIATAUH-H-SL)HsHt1LLDAHH9uH[]A\A]A^A_HHwkeyfile.keykeyfile.pemprivatepublicoutput_modeoutput_formatderfilenameoutput_file ok . Key information ...N: E: D: DP: DQ: QP: Q(X): Q(Y): Q(Z): D : key type not supported yetN: E: - %s usage: key_app_writer param=<>... acceptable parameters: mode=private|public default: none filename=%%s default: keyfile.key output_mode=private|public default: none output_file=%%s default: keyfile.pem output_format=pem|der default: pem Cannot output a key without reading one. Cannot output a private key from a public key. . Loading the private key ... failed ! mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile returned -0x%04x - %s failed ! could not export RSA parameters . Loading the public key ... failed ! mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key returned -0x%04x - %s p != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;hL(8$88TXxHXxzRx +zRx $(FJ w?;*3$"8DBJF A(G}(A ABB8BJF A(G}(A ABB4BBB B(D0C8G P L 8HBED G(G0} (A ABBA XKlYD_ A L<BBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE 3(;FEG [CAGDPH0zBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,|(QAA CBAD]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBB*@*@2EO @ 0@]@]@o@H @@ ! `@@@ o @ooj @]@6 @F @V @f @v @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @!@!@&!@6!@F!@V!@f!@v!@!@!@!@!@!@!@!@!@"@"@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @3H @H !;oj @j xHo @ 0W@aB@k @ f @ q "@ "w0@0 }@@@D@DD@D8]@M]@M]@M_@O0`@Pa@Q a@ QP 0 Q#CQusr/bin/mbedtls-key_ladder_demo0000755000000000000000000006435013776116123015641 0ustar rootrootELF>1@@hb@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@ @ @@@@@@]m@m@]m@m@@@ Ptd@R@R@@R@QtdRtd]m@m@88/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU-@| i&A-./1467:;=>?@k|$06ϟqXB7K|j Cֳ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 4'D2cP :%@HUZ eVOG F=$k 3v, ,c "@OU `7@Y P6@ `q@ @6@ F@@hq@%Pq@2 8@3} 7@`q@ 9@z 9@ :@m :@]+ 1@+ 7@K' Pq@ 8@; `6@ 9@_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable__gmon_start___ITM_registerTMCloneTablepsa_generate_randompsa_generate_keymbedtls_platform_teardownpsa_aead_encryptpsa_set_key_domain_parameterspsa_key_derivation_output_keypsa_key_derivation_input_keypsa_import_keypsa_export_keymbedtls_platform_setuppsa_key_derivation_setupmbedtls_psa_crypto_freepsa_crypto_initpsa_aead_decryptmbedtls_platform_zeroizepsa_key_derivation_abortpsa_key_derivation_input_bytespsa_destroy_keyexitfopenperrorftellputsputcharcallocstrlenmemsetfseekmemcmpmemcpyfclosestderrfwritefreadstrchrfprintfstrcmp__libc_start_mainlibmbedcrypto.so.6libz.so.1libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5ui  o@o@o@o@(o@+p@ p@(p@0p@8p@@p@Hp@Pp@ Xp@ `p@ hp@ pp@ xp@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@ q@!q@"q@#q@$ q@%(q@&0q@'8q@)@q@*Hq@,HHOHtH5O%O@%Oh%Oh%Oh%Oh%Oh%Oh%Oh%Ohp%Oh`%Oh P%Oh @%Oh 0%Oh %zOh %rOh%jOh%bOh%ZOh%ROh%JOh%BOh%:Oh%2Oh%*Ohp%"Oh`%OhP%Oh@% Oh0%Oh %Nh%Nh%Nh%Nh %Nh!%Nh"%Nh#%Nh$%Nh%%Nh&AWAVAUATUSHLnIH=-LH5-L@H5v-L);CLd$Il$1MtH7-HD$E1HD$L-1-ALH=#-H HTpHHI9Le=LHLeLHPLuIf1H[]A\A]A^A_LH=,t+H5~,LHT$HT$HT$LHT$BLH=!r]zLd$L|$ Ml$H57,LH5),LJH5,LH5+LpD$, H|$ W H|$D$8D$<ADžAL$1 LH5+H|$IHLt$@H(LHHD$HD$7LHHD$(LD$HImLLD$LD$ H@ H$H$11ҾLLD$LD$HD$8LLLHHD$~ADž L(H-*?1CLHD LD$A@H@ HD$L Ll2HL?T$8LVN|pLLLHp|$8]>HT$LLD$8 L=II9?L D$Qt$8HT$<7 ADžD$D$ʾ H=FH &D1H=%ZH=LAx (L|$8D1H $H=^%D$8UD$LH=%1fH=lx(H=1aH=AxLt$@SH 1H=$r{H%1HD$HD$ HD$fDŽ$`Ht$|$8;ADžzH )1H=Z$Yt$8HT$<ADžjH|$ H5$D|$<+HHH0LZH0kH5$LH$0H$HNH޿IH$HHھHH9~H|$(HHHH$QDA0AVM PSAUSAUH0ADžHD$@H9$H|$H5#HHEHT$@HLH;D$@H;ADž)LHLEH /D1H=}"'|Alj1&H H=Y"L{|$8b#D1H a!H=+"D$8"Alj15H 5H=!Alj12H "H=!Alj1-H {H=!g_Alj1*H H=!C;Alj1'H cH=u!Alj17H H=Q!H=\!ZH 1H=!LH=!1H=`H="H=!HAxf1H=%WH=eH=(뽉H 1H=E|H= HAx]H=H= w^H=SfH=AxzH 1H=YH=tH=Q cH=PAxH w1H=dH=XH=AxH=H=_H=vH=eH=WH=F1I^HHPTI:@H:@HǠ"@=DH=9?H2?H9tH=Ht H= ?H5?H)HH?HHHtHu=HtfD=>uUH~>]Dff.@f.@AU(ATUHH@Ll$HL$L}ukHH5)HHtuHT$HL-H;D$tH=O HAxLHBAąuBH@D]A\A]Aĉ1H H=?H= AxH=ff.HH= H=! zH=h~H=7 rH=S fH=o ZH= N 4H=)8H= ,H= H=)H=]H=H=H=HAV1CfAUA IATUSHPH|$0Hl$0$HHD$D$ HqHAąDHAą11ҾHAąH|$ \$ D$PI11Ҿ$L1LLHfD$Aąt:H a1H=)H >R1H=a HHPD[]A\A]A^Aĉ1QH H='f$$I`H XU1H=똉H X1H=wfH=;@H= ;@AUIATIUHHSHH"u{HI$L9v,qBKHQЀ v Qw5QH ЈEt/B< vˍB<vB<w+BDQwQ1H[]A\A]I$AI1Et=A4D@0W@AFq0 WAWFƈDWHL9uDHHHEHtHHm8LH H5CH81AUATIUSHHHHtCHƿH3IHtqHL$LHHXu%HL[]A\A]fDH1[]A\A]/LH7H]H5H81L-ff.9ut(1 fHH9t 8 t1f.Ht3UH,SHHfDHCH9uH1[]fD1DHH11Hff.AUIATIUSHHt5HoIHH9LFMu5L9rH1[]A\A]LK4(L)H1[]A\A]EDH7LLL+L)kIfDIIHATUSL\$Hf.IIڋW@ODMF1DÃA,D1-Ga1 W@AԃA,D11OD= 7uD։T$Et1ƒA A 9rIM)f[1]A\Jf.AWL=?3AVIAUIATAUH-03SL)HSHt1LLDAHH9uH[]A\A]A^A_HHpsa_export_key( key, key_data, sizeof( key_data ), &key_size )( key_file = fopen( output_file_name, "wb" ) ) != NULLfwrite( key_data, 1, key_size, key_file ) == key_sizeUsage: key_ladder_demo MODE [OPTION=VALUE]...Demonstrate the usage of a key derivation ladder. generate Generate the master key save Save the derived key unwrap Unwrap (decrypt) input with the derived key wrap Wrap (encrypt) input with the derived key input=FILENAME Input file (required for wrap/unwrap) master=FILENAME File containing the master key (default: master.key) output=FILENAME Output file (required for save/wrap/unwrap) label=TEXT Label for the key derivation. This may be repeated multiple times. To get the same key, you must use the same master key and the same sequence of labels.psa_key_derivation_setup( &operation, KDF_ALG )psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( &operation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT, WRAPPING_KEY_SALT, WRAPPING_KEY_SALT_LENGTH )psa_key_derivation_input_key( &operation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, derived_key )psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( &operation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO, NULL, 0 )psa_key_derivation_output_key( &attributes, &operation, wrapping_key )Missing argument to option %s Maximum ladder depth %u exceeded. Required argument missing: outputpsa_generate_key( &attributes, &key )save_key( key, key_file_name )( key_file = fopen( key_file_name, "rb" ) ) != NULL( key_size = fread( key_data, 1, sizeof( key_data ), key_file ) ) != 0Key file too large (max: %u). psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data, key_size, master_key )psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( &operation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT, DERIVE_KEY_SALT, DERIVE_KEY_SALT_LENGTH )psa_key_derivation_input_key( &operation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, *key )psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( &operation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO, (uint8_t*) ladder[i], strlen( ladder[i] ) )psa_key_derivation_output_key( &attributes, &operation, key )psa_key_derivation_abort( &operation )save_key( derivation_key, output_file_name )derive_wrapping_key( PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT, derivation_key, &wrapping_key )( input_file = fopen( input_file_name, "rb" ) ) != NULLfread( &header, 1, sizeof( header ), input_file ) == sizeof( header )The input does not start with a valid magic header.The header size is not correct.( buffer = calloc( 1, ciphertext_size ) ) != NULLfread( buffer, 1, ciphertext_size, input_file ) == ciphertext_sizeExtra garbage after ciphertextpsa_aead_decrypt( wrapping_key, WRAPPING_ALG, header.iv, WRAPPING_IV_SIZE, (uint8_t *) &header, sizeof( header ), buffer, ciphertext_size, buffer, ciphertext_size, &plaintext_size )Incorrect payload size in the header.( output_file = fopen( output_file_name, "wb" ) ) != NULLfwrite( buffer, 1, plaintext_size, output_file ) == plaintext_sizeunwrap_data( input_file_name, output_file_name, wrapping_key )derive_wrapping_key( PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT, derivation_key, &wrapping_key )fseek( input_file, 0, SEEK_END ) == 0( input_position = ftell( input_file ) ) != -1fseek( input_file, 0, SEEK_SET ) == 0( buffer = calloc( 1, buffer_size ) ) != NULLfread( buffer, 1, input_size, input_file ) == input_sizepsa_generate_random( header.iv, WRAPPING_IV_SIZE )psa_aead_encrypt( wrapping_key, WRAPPING_ALG, header.iv, WRAPPING_IV_SIZE, (uint8_t *) &header, sizeof( header ), buffer, input_size, buffer, buffer_size, &ciphertext_size )fwrite( &header, 1, sizeof( header ), output_file ) == sizeof( header )fwrite( buffer, 1, ciphertext_size, output_file ) == ciphertext_sizewrap_data( input_file_name, output_file_name, wrapping_key )derive_key_ladder( ladder, ladder_depth, &derivation_key )import_key_from_file( PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT, KDF_ALG, key_file_name, &derivation_key )Required argument missing: inputError %d at line %d: %s wbfclose( key_file ) == 0Modes:Options:key_ladder_demo.wrapmaster.key--helpinputlabelmasteroutputUnknown option: %s generatesaveunwrapUnknown action: %s psa_crypto_init( )rbkey_ladder_demo.derivepsa_destroy_key( *key )key_ladder_demoInput file too large.fclose( input_file ) == 0fclose( output_file ) == 0key_ladder_demop != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;`pL@d8L ` @0\t`@8zRx +zRx $FJ w?;*3$"0DpBGA G`x  DBBA xDDBMM A(A0I 0D(A BBBA OBBB B(A0A8G- 8A0A(B BBBH dPLBABMIKNBABId x 8BED G(G0} (A ABBA ,KhYD_ A LBBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE H3(\H;FEG [CAG\DPHdzBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,QAA CBADH]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBBd`2@2@h{ @ :@m@m@o@ @@ S p@P@@x o@oo$@m@6 @F @V @f @v @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @!@!@&!@6!@F!@V!@f!@v!@!@!@!@!@!@!@!@!@"@"@&"@6"@F"@V"@f"@v"@"@"@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @03 @ S;o$@$Ho@0W@xaBP@Pk @ f @ q"@"Aw:@: }@@@>@R@@RR@Rm@]m@]m@]o@_(p@`PPq@Pa`q@`a0`a#ausr/bin/mbedtls-key_ladder_demo.sh0000755000000000000000000000442113764415275016252 0ustar rootroot#!/bin/sh # # Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors # SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 # # Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may # not use this file except in compliance with the License. # You may obtain a copy of the License at # # http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 # # Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software # distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT # WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. # See the License for the specific language governing permissions and # limitations under the License. set -e -u program="${0%/*}"/key_ladder_demo files_to_clean= run () { echo echo "# $1" shift echo "+ $*" "$@" } if [ -e master.key ]; then echo "# Reusing the existing master.key file." else files_to_clean="$files_to_clean master.key" run "Generate a master key." \ "$program" generate master=master.key fi files_to_clean="$files_to_clean input.txt hello_world.wrap" echo "Here is some input. See it wrapped." >input.txt run "Derive a key and wrap some data with it." \ "$program" wrap master=master.key label=hello label=world \ input=input.txt output=hello_world.wrap files_to_clean="$files_to_clean hello_world.txt" run "Derive the same key again and unwrap the data." \ "$program" unwrap master=master.key label=hello label=world \ input=hello_world.wrap output=hello_world.txt run "Compare the unwrapped data with the original input." \ cmp input.txt hello_world.txt files_to_clean="$files_to_clean hellow_orld.txt" ! run "Derive a different key and attempt to unwrap the data. This must fail." \ "$program" unwrap master=master.key input=hello_world.wrap output=hellow_orld.txt label=hellow label=orld files_to_clean="$files_to_clean hello.key" run "Save the first step of the key ladder, then load it as a master key and construct the rest of the ladder." \ "$program" save master=master.key label=hello \ input=hello_world.wrap output=hello.key run "Check that we get the same key by unwrapping data made by the other key." \ "$program" unwrap master=hello.key label=world \ input=hello_world.wrap output=hello_world.txt # Cleanup rm -f $files_to_clean usr/bin/mbedtls-mini_client0000755000000000000000000004433013776116123015020 0ustar rootrootELF>$@@XB@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@ @ @} } 00@0@=M@M@=M@M@  @@ Ptdp3p3@p3@QtdRtd=M@M@xx/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU.D(0 hHH!@./02578;=?ABCDEk|$06ϟqXB7K|j Cֳ:2BEJZL ➿~3bZS : 74'6|D2cCLw \p &3 a.2B]s 3 p"@O &@Y %@ PQ@ %@ @0@XQ@8Q@, (@3w P'@PQ@ (@z (@ p*@2@g *@]% $@+ &@K?2@! 8Q@@0@V P(@;HQ@  %@ 0)@mbedtls_x509_crt_free_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable__gmon_start__mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_dermbedtls_x509_crt_init_ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_ssl_freembedtls_net_initmbedtls_ssl_config_freembedtls_net_recvmbedtls_net_freembedtls_net_sendmbedtls_ssl_conf_authmodembedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chainmbedtls_ssl_conf_pskmbedtls_ssl_set_hostnamembedtls_ssl_set_biombedtls_ssl_config_defaultsmbedtls_ssl_setupmbedtls_ssl_conf_rngmbedtls_ssl_writembedtls_ssl_handshakembedtls_ssl_close_notifymbedtls_ssl_initmbedtls_ssl_config_initmbedtls_entropy_funcmbedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_entropy_initmbedtls_ctr_drbg_seedmbedtls_entropy_freembedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_ctr_drbg_initmbedtls_ctr_drbg_randommbedtls_ctr_drbg_freesocketexitconnectcallocstrlenmemsetmemcpystderrfprintf__libc_start_mainlibmbedtls.so.13libz.so.1libmbedx509.so.1libmbedcrypto.so.6libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edataca_certmbedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startpsk_idmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randpersGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5wui O@O@ O@ O@O@O@O@O@(O@,P@ P@(P@0P@8P@@P@HP@PP@ XP@ `P@ hP@pP@xP@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@ P@!P@"P@#P@$Q@%Q@&Q@'Q@) Q@*(Q@+0Q@-HH/HtH5/%/@%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/hp%/h`%/h P%/h @%/h 0%/h %z/h %r/h%j/h%b/h%Z/h%R/h%J/h%B/h%:/h%2/h%*/hp%"/h`%/hP%/h@% /h0%/h %.h%.h%.h%.h %.h!%.h"%.h#AWAVAUATUSH L$L$@LHl$0L$0LL$L$LL $LYHL)LHHQ@HHHLLH5,IBL $t7LbL HLZL2L111HuL $uH5a,LHAH2@AHHư2@H@0@VLL $V1LHHHLfL $ H5 L&L $HD$ 1ҿHD$HQHD$(HD$ L $D$Ht$L $H A+E1LLH)+LL $u-H5T L.L $~LL $;1 '1I^HHPTIp*@H*@Hp"@*DH=),H",H9tH~*Ht H=+H5+H)HH?HHHtHu*HtfD=+uUH~+]Dff.@f.@H=z+@H=j+@AUIATIUHHSHHu{HI$L9v,qBKHQЀ v Qw5QH ЈEt/B< vˍB<vB<w+BDQwQ1H[]A\A]I$AI1Et=A4D@0W@AFq0 WAWFƈDWHL9uDHHHEHtHH(L H H5 H81AUATIUSHH;HHtCHƿHIHtqHL$LHHXu%HL[]A\A]fDH1[]A\A]/Lp H$(H H56 H81$L ff.9ut(1 fHH9t 8 t1f.Ht3UH,SHHfDHCH9uH1[]fD1DHH1B1Hff.AUIATIUSHHt5HoIHH9LFMu5L9rH1[]A\A]LK4(L)H1[]A\A]EDH7LLL+L)kIfDIIHATUSL\$Hf.IIڋW@ODMF1DÃA,D1-Ga1 W@AԃA,D11OD= 7uD։T$Et1ƒA A 9rIM)f[1]A\Jf.AWL=o#AVIAUIATAUH-`#SL)HHt1LLDAHH9uH[]A\A]A^A_HHlocalhostGET / HTTP/1.0 mini_client0R0נ C~bC0 *H=0>1 0 UNL10U PolarSSL10UPolarssl Test EC CA0 130924154948Z 230922154948Z0>1 0 UNL10U PolarSSL10UPolarssl Test EC CA0v0*H=+"b+4A7X/V)CKNnWS39XR9 #_$bH),-ˆRj!ݸnXiA)ô_uGo)UiS; f`300Um $I?+x~$6|0nU#g0em $I?+x~$6|B@0>1 0 UNL10U PolarSSL10UPolarssl Test EC CA C~bC0 U00 *H=i0f1ôbsV(}x&q{>3yzt<+i gw621g#gVK31,کu#/(:@\ t0C Client_identity p != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;`8pL`00 \@t8zRx +zRx $PFJ w?;*3$"4DBBB B(A0A8G|  8BED G(G0} (A ABBA KYD_ A L BBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE `|3(t;FEG [CAGDPHzBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,QAA CBAD4]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBB|%@%@8ISdw @ t*@M@M@o@h @@ Y P@`X@@ oP@oo@M@6 @F @V @f @v @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @!@!@&!@6!@F!@V!@f!@v!@!@!@!@!@!@!@!@!@"@"@&"@6"@F"@V"@f"@!0@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @3h @h Y;o@HoP@P0W@aBX@X`k @ f @ Pqp"@p"wt*@t* }0@0n p3@p34@4M@=M@=M@= O@?HP@@88Q@8APQ@PA0PA#sAusr/bin/mbedtls-mpi_demo0000755000000000000000000003411013776116123014312 0ustar rootrootELF>`@@1@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@@@  @ @-=@=@-=@=@@@ Ptd!!@!@QtdRtd-=@=@88/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU@| i&A "#&')*+,k|$06ϟqXB7K|j Cֳ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 4'D2c" Z18U*M ?qF, Fb `@T `@Y P@ @@ @@ E @@@$@@1 @3| @@@ @z @ @l @]* `@+ @K& @@ @; `@ @_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable__gmon_start___ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_mpi_inv_modmbedtls_mpi_write_filembedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_mpi_initmbedtls_mpi_sub_intmbedtls_mpi_freembedtls_mpi_read_stringmbedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_mpi_mul_mpimbedtls_mpi_exp_modexitputsputcharcallocstrlenmemsetmemcpystderrfprintf__libc_start_mainlibmbedcrypto.so.6libz.so.1libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5ui  ?@?@ ?@ ?@?@@@ @@(@@0@@8@@@@@H@@P@@ X@@ `@@ h@@p@@x@@@@@@@@@@@@@@HH/HtH5/%/@%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/hp%/h`%/h P%/h @%/h 0%/h %z/h %r/h%j/h%b/h%Z/h%R/hAWAVAUATUSHHLL$ Hl$@LLL$Ld$`L$HH$L$LL$LH$HH$HLLH$ HHL$H HLL$teLH LLH<$HLLH|$H=%ADHz LDLL$zLH[ #LL$YLHL(LL$>H=& O1ɺ LH= ILL$1Lκ H= &LL$H= 1ɺ HH= LL$1ɺ LH= LL$HHLL$}LLLL$`H<$LH.LL$DH$LH2LL$(1ɺ HH=C ?HU LLL$E1LLLLLL$H|$E1LHLgLL$H= 1ɺ LH= LL$~1ɺ LH= LL$[Ht$1ɺ H= pLL$D$2 5LL$L8H0L(L H<$HLLH|$DD$+f.1I^HHPTI@H@H`@V*DH=)+H"+H9tH.*Ht H=*H5*H)HH?HHHtH*HtfD=*uUH~*]Dff.@f.@H=z*@H=j*@AUIATIUHHSHHu{HI$L9v,qBKHQЀ v Qw5QH ЈEt/B< vˍB<vB<w+BDQwQ1H[]A\A]I$AI1Et=A4D@0W@AFq0 WAWFƈDWHL9uDHHHE&HtHHm(L^ Hj H5 H81wAUATIUSHHHHtCHƿHIHtqHL$LHHXu%HL[]A\A]fDH1[]A\A]/L0 H'HH5H81TLff.9ut(1 fHH9t 8 t1f.Ht3UH,SHHfDsHCH9uH1[]fD1DHH1r1Hff.AUIATIUSHHt5HoIHH9LFMu5L9rH1[]A\A]LK4(L)H1[]A\A]EDH7LL2L+L)kIfDIIHATUSL\$Hf.IIڋW@ODMF1DÃA,D1-Ga1 W@AԃA,D11OD= 7uD։T$Et1ƒA A 9rIM)f[1]A\Jf.AWL=?#AVIAUIATAUH-0#SL)HSHt1LLDAHH9uH[]A\A]A^A_HH27893203257 Public key: N = E = Private key: P = Q = D = E^-1 mod (P-1)*(Q-1) = 55555 RSA operation: X (plaintext) = An error occurred. Y (ciphertext) = X^E mod N = Z (decrypted) = Y^D mod N = p != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;8L`p  0`\t@8zRx +zRx $@FJ w?;*3$"4DBBB B(A0A8G|` \ 8XBED G(G0} (A ABBA KYD_ A LLBBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE `3(t;FEG [CAGDPHzBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,8QAA CBAD4]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBB|0@@gz @ @=@=@o@@@ R @@H @ @x o @ooB @=@6@F@V@f@v@@@@@@@@@@@&@6@F@V@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @P3@R;oB @B \Ho @ 0W @ xaBH @H k@f @ @q`@` w@ } @ !@!0"@0"=@-=@-=@-?@/(@@0@@0@@000#0usr/bin/mbedtls-pem2der0000755000000000000000000003415013776116123014063 0ustar rootrootELF>@@1@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@  @@  @ @-=@=@ H-=@=@@@ Ptd""@"@QtdRtd-=@=@@@/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU@| i&A !#')*-.0123" k|$06ϟqXB7K| j Cֳ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 4'D2c'   wF`,  @" @D, @Y @ u@@c @  @pA@@@@@  0@3T p@@@ @z @S @D 0@] @+ @K @@ p@; @ P@_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable__gmon_start___ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_strerrormbedtls_base64_decodefflushexitfopenftellputscallocstrlenmemsetstrstrfseekstdoutmemcpyfclosestderrfwritefreadstrchrfprintf__libc_start_mainfreelibmbedcrypto.so.6libz.so.1libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexifyconvert_pem_to_der_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randoptGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5Iui ?@?@?@ ?@?@?@@@ @@(@@0@@8@@@@@H@@ P@@ X@@ `@@ h@@p@@x@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@HH/HtH5/%/@%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/hp%/h`%/h P%/h @%/h 0%/h %z/h %r/h%j/h%b/h%Z/h%R/h%J/h%B/h%:/h%2/hAW1AAVAUATUSH(HD$H|$ H|$HH$ H<$HEH@@HHHHCAA@LvLdH-L-IL M9t]M>=L,H LHLHt LLtILKM9uH= 1L5"-I>BH;H5 IHb1H(LIH11LIt$HHHLLLI9BD%H= H= 1(I>H$LHHL$LAąH= H= 1I>OH{Ll$H5 HHH<$HLHI9iH=b =H=y 11ArH D2-HH\$1AHHڃ1H=9 $H\$ǺHnDH1H= AH\$AH2Hڃ1H= GLWf.f1I^HHPTI@H0@HǠ@*DH=+H+H9tH*Ht H=+H5+H)HH?HHHtHu*HtfD=I+uUH~7+]Dff.@f.@AVAUIATIUHSH7H5 HHD$HH5 LIgIHMf AF L9w-IA$L9t<-uL9v,IA$L9t<-t< u AD$I< IM9s]L9rXLLt$11L)LLIt)Ht$H9ur+ILLLmu HT$HUH[]A\A]A^øf.fH= *D@H=)@AUIATIUHHSHHBu{HI$L9v,qBKHQЀ v Qw5QH ЈEt/B< vˍB<vB<w+BDQwQ1H[]A\A]I$AI1Et=A4D@0W@AFq0 WAWFƈDWHL9uDHHHEHtHH'L H H5 H81aAUATIUSHHHHtCHƿHIHtqHL$LHHXu%HL[]A\A]fDH1[]A\A]/L` H'HH5& H81JLff.9ut(1 fHH9t 8 t1f.Ht3UH,SHHfDHCH9uH1[]fD1DHH11Hff.AUIATIUSHHt5HoIHH9LFMu5L9rH1[]A\A]LK4(L)H1[]A\A]EDH7LLL+L)kIfDIIHATUSL\$Hf.IIڋW@ODMF1DÃA,D1-Ga1 W@AԃA,D11OD= 7uD։T$Et1ƒA A 9rIM)f[1]A\Jf.AWL="AVIAUIATAUH-x"SL)HHt1LLDAHH9uH[]A\A]A^A_HH-----BEGIN-----ENDfile.pemfile.derfilenameoutput_file . Loading the PEM file ...rb ok . Writing the DER file ...wb usage: pem2der param=<>... acceptable parameters: filename=%%s default: file.pem output_file=%%s default: file.der . Converting from PEM to DER ... failed ! convert_pem_to_der %d - %s failed ! write_file returned %d - %s failed ! load_file returned %d - %s p != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0; LpPp@dx0P8zRx +zRx $FJ w?;*3$"@D@BBE D(D0O@ 0A(A BBBA 0DBLB B(A0A8G(  8BED G(G0} (A ABBA  TK4YD_ A LPBBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE D3(p;FEG [CAGDPHzBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,DQAA CBADtp]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBB@@,?I @ @=@=@o@@@ . @@( @h @ o8 @oo @=@6@F@V@f@v@@@@@@@@@@@&@6@F@V@f@v@@@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @3@.;o @ jHo8 @8 0Wh @h aB @ (k@f @ q@ w@ } @ ~"@"#@#=@-=@-=@-?@/0@@0@@0@@0(00#1usr/bin/mbedtls-pk_decrypt0000755000000000000000000004417013776116123014674 0ustar rootrootELF>$@@A@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@hh @ @= = 00@0@=M@M@@H=M@M@@@ Ptd22@2@QtdRtd=M@M@PP/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU"@| i&A"#$&)+,/02345k|$06ϟqXB7K|j Cֳ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 4'D2cu W F6m[Gyt, G !@ &@Yg %@ P@ %@ 0@P@P@ '@3 '@`P@! p(@z> P(@ 0*@ )@] $@+L `&@K P@2 (@; %@Y (@_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable__gmon_start___ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_entropy_funcmbedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_entropy_initmbedtls_pk_parse_keyfilembedtls_ctr_drbg_seedmbedtls_entropy_freembedtls_pk_decryptmbedtls_pk_initmbedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_ctr_drbg_initmbedtls_ctr_drbg_randommbedtls_strerrormbedtls_pk_freembedtls_ctr_drbg_freefflushexitfopenputscallocstrlenmemsetstdout__isoc99_fscanfmemcpyfclosestderrfprintf__libc_start_mainlibmbedcrypto.so.6libz.so.1libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.7GLIBC_2.2.5vii ui O@O@O@ O@ O@O@O@O@!P@ P@(P@0P@8P@@P@HP@ PP@ XP@ `P@hP@pP@xP@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@ HH/HtH5/%/@%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/hp%/h`%/h P%/h @%/h 0%/h %z/h %r/h%j/h%b/h%Z/h%R/h%J/h%B/h%:/h%2/h%*/hp%"/h`AWAAVAUATUSHH Ld$ L$HD$LHl$0fL.HH$1H|$HAtaH= -LAH$'LHDHAHH=K1 DH= 1 H+-H8H5<-LHAH lADž^HsH= 1H,H8PHsHLADžVH5vH=rE1lH\$IH$H$Mu . Seeding the random number generator... failed ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned -0x%04x . Reading private key from '%s' failed ! mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile returned -0x%04x . Decrypting the encrypted data failed ! mbedtls_pk_decrypt returned -0x%04x The decrypted result is: '%s' mbedtls_pk_decryptrbresult-enc.txt ! Could not open %s %02X . OK ! Last error was: %s p != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;0 H\ p @,@l`@HzRx p+zRx $FJ w?;*3$"DD(BEB B(A0A8JOYA  8BED G(G0} (A ABBA KXYD_ A L BBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE p 3(8;FEG [CAGLDPHTzBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,QAA CBADD8]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBBP%@P%@ @ 4*@M@M@o@@@  P@X@P @ o @oo @M@6 @F @V @f @v @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @!@!@&!@6!@F!@V!@f!@v!@!@!@!@!@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @(3@;o @ nHo @ @WP @P aB@Xk @ f @ q!@!qw4*@4* }0@02@2 3@ 3M@=M@=M@=O@?@P@@P@@P@@0@#Ausr/bin/mbedtls-pk_encrypt0000755000000000000000000004416013776116123014705 0ustar rootrootELF>$@@A@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@ @ @} } 00@0@PP=M@M@8@=M@M@@@ Ptd22@2@QtdRtd=M@M@PP/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU!@| i&A!"#%(*+./1234k|$06ϟqXB7K|j Cֳ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 4'D2cu +aA F t[{, > !@7 &@Y^ %@ P@  %@ 0@P@P@ (@3 P'@WP@ (@z5 (@ p*@ *@] $@+C &@K P@) P(@;} %@P 0)@_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable__gmon_start___ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_entropy_funcmbedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_entropy_initmbedtls_ctr_drbg_seedmbedtls_entropy_freembedtls_pk_initmbedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_ctr_drbg_initmbedtls_ctr_drbg_randommbedtls_strerrormbedtls_pk_freembedtls_ctr_drbg_freembedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfilembedtls_pk_encryptfflushexitfopenputscallocstrlenmemsetstdoutmemcpyfclosestderrfprintf__libc_start_mainlibmbedcrypto.so.6libz.so.1libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5mui xO@O@O@ O@ O@O@O@O@ P@ P@(P@0P@8P@@P@HP@ PP@ XP@ `P@hP@pP@xP@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@HH/HtH5/%/@%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/hp%/h`%/h P%/h @%/h 0%/h %z/h %r/h%j/h%b/h%Z/h%R/h%J/h%B/h%:/h%2/h%*/hpAWAVAAUATUSHH Hl$0L$HD$HLd$ &L>LVAtaH=iAL$6L>LH.DLALH= 17D/H=P1!L5R-I>H5c-LHAH q ADž~HsH=m1I>nHsLADžHsHHt$Ht$HdHaL$LH=1vI>L$H{MULA5,HLLLD$(JAXZEH5 H= HH,H|$taH$AH g HD$#fIH L HB AHDHD$H5t HB01L9t$wH|H5% H=- 1LOL'H?3H= 1XLL$LHH=$ ͉H= 1DH=W 1LLHH5j H=[ 1ALLfH~Kf1I^HHPTIp*@H*@Hǰ!@*DH=+H+H9tH*Ht H=+H5+H)HH?HHHtHu*HtfD=Q+uUH~?+]Dff.@f.@H=+@H=+T@AUIATIUHHSHHru{HI$L9v,qBKHQЀ v Qw5QH ЈEt/B< vˍB<vB<w+BDQwQ1H[]A\A]I$AI1Et=A4D@0W@AFq0 WAWFƈDWHL9uDHHHEHtHH(L H* H5c H81GAUATIUSHHHHtCHƿHSIHtqHL$LHHXu%HL[]A\A]fDH1[]A\A]/L H$(H} H5 H81LG ff.9ut(1 fHH9t 8 t1f.Ht3UH,SHHfD3HCH9uH1[]fD1DHH11Hff.AUIATIUSHHt5HoIHH9LFMu5L9rH1[]A\A]LK4(L)H1[]A\A]EDH7LLL+L)kIfDIIHATUSL\$Hf.IIڋW@ODMF1DÃA,D1-Ga1 W@AԃA,D11OD= 7uD։T$Et1ƒA A 9rIM)f[1]A\Jf.AWL=#AVIAUIATAUH-#SL)HHt1LLDAHH9uH[]A\A]A^A_HH mbedtls_pk_encryptwb+result-enc.txt . Done (created "%s") %02X%s ! Last error was: %s usage: mbedtls_pk_encrypt . Seeding the random number generator... failed ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned -0x%04x . Reading public key from '%s' failed ! mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile returned -0x%04x Input data larger than 100 characters. . Generating the encrypted value failed ! mbedtls_pk_encrypt returned -0x%04x failed ! Could not create %s p != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;0H\p` ,`@l@ HzRx P+zRx $PFJ w?;*3$"DD7BBE B(A0A8JmOWA  8BED G(G0} (A ABBA K8YD_ A L |BBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE p3(;FEG [CAG,DPH4zBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,hQAA CBADD]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBB0%@%@ @ t*@M@M@o@@@  P@@ @ @ o @oor @M@6 @F @V @f @v @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @!@!@&!@6!@F!@V!@f!@v!@!@!@!@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @3@;or @r lHo @ 0W @ aB @ @k @ f @ q!@!wt*@t* }0@02@23@3M@=M@=M@=O@?@P@@P@@P@@0@# Ausr/bin/mbedtls-pk_sign0000755000000000000000000004422013776116123014156 0ustar rootrootELF>$@@B@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@ @ @} } 00@0@=M@M@X`=M@M@@@ Ptd22@2@QtdRtd=M@M@PP/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU%@| i&A%&'),./235678k|$06ϟqXB7K|j Cֳ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 4'D2c n~5 `MuF^, n !@ &@Y %@ <Q@= %@ 0@7Q@P@ (@3 P'@Q@H (@ze (@- p*@  *@] $@+s &@K P@Y P(@; %@ 0)@_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable__gmon_start___ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_md_info_from_typembedtls_entropy_funcmbedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_entropy_initmbedtls_pk_parse_keyfilembedtls_ctr_drbg_seedmbedtls_md_filembedtls_entropy_freembedtls_pk_initmbedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_ctr_drbg_initmbedtls_ctr_drbg_randommbedtls_strerrormbedtls_pk_freembedtls_pk_signmbedtls_ctr_drbg_freefflushexitfopenputscallocstrlenmemsetstdoutmemcpyfclosestderrfwritefprintf__libc_start_mainsnprintflibmbedcrypto.so.6libz.so.1libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5#ui O@O@O@ O@O@O@O@"O@$P@ P@(P@0P@8P@@P@HP@ PP@ XP@ `P@ hP@pP@xP@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@ P@!P@#HH/HtH5/%/@%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/hp%/h`%/h P%/h @%/h 0%/h %z/h %r/h%j/h%b/h%Z/h%R/h%J/h%B/h%:/h%2/h%*/hp%"/h`%/hP%/h@% /h0AWAVAUATUSHH( L$Ld$PHD$LLt$ LL't]H= L$L1L LLLH=U1 %H= 1L=-I?H5)-LLAH YŅLHsH= 1I?EHsHLŅ`H= 1zI?HkDHT$0HHHT$HT$L$AT1ɾ5Y,MLLL$(XZ(HK1H$HH H5 HHHT$HLHD$H;D$LD$H= MLD$LpLxLPLBH=2 1aLL$ALL HsH= 1*HsH=E LHH=0 1LLLH=| 1>HH= 1(1I^HHPTIp*@H*@H!@*DH=+H+H9tH*Ht H=+H5+H)HH?HHHtHu*HtfD=q+uUH~_+]Dff.@f.@H=2+@H="+d@AUIATIUHHSHHu{HI$L9v,qBKHQЀ v Qw5QH ЈEt/B< vˍB<vB<w+BDQwQ1H[]A\A]I$AI1Et=A4D@0W@AFq0 WAWFƈDWHL9uDHHHEHtHH(L H H5# H81wAUATIUSHH+HHtCHƿHSIHtqHL$LHHXu%HL[]A\A]fDH1[]A\A]/L H$(H= H5v H81L ff.9ut(1 fHH9t 8 t1f.Ht3UH,SHHfDsHCH9uH1[]fD1DHH1"1Hff.AUIATIUSHHt5HoIHH9LFMu5L9rH1[]A\A]LK4(L)H1[]A\A]EDH7LLL+L)kIfDIIHATUSL\$Hf.IIڋW@ODMF1DÃA,D1-Ga1 W@AԃA,D11OD= 7uD։T$Et1ƒA A 9rIM)f[1]A\Jf.AWL=#AVIAUIATAUH-#SL)HHt1LLDAHH9uH[]A\A]A^A_HHusage: mbedtls_pk_sign . Seeding the random number generator... failed ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned -0x%04x . Reading private key from '%s' failed ! Could not parse '%s' . Generating the SHA-256 signature failed ! Could not open or read %s failed ! mbedtls_pk_sign returned -0x%04x failed ! Could not create %s mbedtls_pk_sign%s.sigwb+failed ! fwrite failed . Done (created "%s") ! Last error was: %s p != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;p@@ H0\@p@`,@l`HzRx +zRx $FJ w?;*3$"DD8BBB B(A0C8JdMSA  8BED G(G0} (A ABBA @@1@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@@@M M  @ @-=@=@ (-=@=@@@ Ptd0"0"@0"@QtdRtd-=@=@@@/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU@| i&A "%'(+,./01k|$06ϟqXB7K|j Cֳ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 4'D2c 0LF>"Sl)ZR 7rX , Eg @b @Y @ @@ @ S @@@2@@? @3 @@@ @z `@ @@z @]8 @+ p@K4 @@ @; @ @_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable__gmon_start___ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_pk_verifymbedtls_md_info_from_typembedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_md_filembedtls_pk_initmbedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_strerrormbedtls_pk_freembedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfilefflushexitfopenputscallocstrlenmemsetstdoutmemcpyfclosestderrfreadfprintf__libc_start_mainsnprintflibmbedcrypto.so.6libz.so.1libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5 ui ?@?@?@ ?@?@?@@@ @@(@@0@@8@@@@@H@@ P@@ X@@ `@@ h@@p@@x@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@HH/HtH5/%/@%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/hp%/h`%/h P%/h @%/h 0%/h %z/h %r/h%j/h%b/h%Z/h%R/h%J/h%B/h%:/h%2/hAWAVAUATUSHH8IL_tMH=;L$0QLiLLH=`1tmHsH=1[H-H8HsLpŅHKL|$01HL'H5LIHL$0HLLLl$IH= 1H-H82HkdLHHFŅu^MM1LLHŅu_H= L.H=0 1L$0?LHsH=o 1 LzH=z 1L[LH= 1LL$05f.@1I^HHPTI@@H@HǠ@+DH=,H,H9tH+Ht H=,H5,H)HH?HHHtH+HtfD=y,uUH~g,]Dff.@f.@H=:,@H=*,T@AUIATIUHHSHHu{HI$L9v,qBKHQЀ v Qw5QH ЈEt/B< vˍB<vB<w+BDQwQ1H[]A\A]I$AI1Et=A4D@0W@AFq0 WAWFƈDWHL9uDHHHEHtHH *L H H5 H81gAUATIUSHH;HHtCHƿHsIHtqHL$LHHXu%HL[]A\A]fDH1[]A\A]/L` HT)H H5& H81L ff.9ut(1 fHH9t 8 t1f.Ht3UH,SHHfDSHCH9uH1[]fD1DHH121Hff.AUIATIUSHHt5HoIHH9LFMu5L9rH1[]A\A]LK4(L)H1[]A\A]EDH7LLL+L)kIfDIIHATUSL\$Hf.IIڋW@ODMF1DÃA,D1-Ga1 W@AԃA,D11OD= 7uD։T$Et1ƒA A 9rIM)f[1]A\Jf.AWL=$AVIAUIATAUH-$SL)HHt1LLDAHH9uH[]A\A]A^A_HHusage: mbedtls_pk_verify . Reading public key from '%s' failed ! mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile returned -0x%04x . Verifying the SHA-256 signature failed ! Could not open or read %s failed ! mbedtls_pk_verify returned -0x%04x . OK (the signature is valid) %s.sigrb ! Could not open %s ! Last error was: %s p != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;pp8L`@00\Pt8zRx +zRx $FJ w?;*3$"4DhBBB B(A0C8J |0 , 8(BED G(G0} (A ABBA KYD_ A LBBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE `3(t;FEG [CAGDPHzBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,QAA CBAD4]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBB|@`@u @ D@=@=@o@h@@ ` @@( @` @ o0 @oo @=@6@F@V@f@v@@@@@@@@@@@&@6@F@V@f@v@@@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @3h@h`;o @ fHo0 @0 0W` @` aB @ (k@f @ q@wD@D } @ .0"@0""@"=@-=@-=@-?@/0@@0@@0@@000#1usr/bin/mbedtls-psa_constant_names0000755000000000000000000010406013776116123016402 0ustar rootrootELF>@@@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@` ` @@}D}D``@`@88}ȍ@ȍ@}؍@؍@@@ Ptdpp@p@QtdRtd}ȍ@ȍ@88/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU`|  i&A!$%'()*+k|$06ϟqXB7K|j Cֳ:ܙ2BEJZL 3b[S : !4'D2c | F`w, V 0@ P@Y O@ D@% O@ `@?@@ R@3 @# PQ@@P R@zm R@ pT@ T@] @+[ P@K @o @1A PR@; O@ 0S@_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable__gmon_start___ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_platform_setupexitputsstrtolcallocstrlenmemset__errno_locationmemcpystrtoulstderrfprintfstrcmp__libc_start_mainsnprintflibmbedcrypto.so.6libz.so.1libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexifyprocess_unsigned_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexifyprocess_signed__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5 ui ؏@@@ @@@ @(@0@8@@@H@ P@ X@ `@ h@p@x@@@@HHHtH5%@%h%h%h%h%h%h%h%hp%h`%h P%h @%h 0%h %zh %rh%jhUSHH_HnH=4TH=H5TH-&H5 THH5SHH5SHH5SHlH5SHH5SHiH5SH;H5SHu$H5SH^;H5hSHG$H5^SH0tH5GSHYHS[]? H3HtwH=W1H=W}H=&XqH=JXeH=vXYH=XMH=XAH="Y5H=NY)Z[]H5JRHK[H[1]A[HS[1] AYHS[]r AZHS[][ AXHS[]D HH=&R1ef.@1I^HHPTIpT@HT@H0@{DH=|H|H9tH{Ht H=|H5z|H)HH?HHHtH{HtfD=A|uUH~/|]Dff.@f.@@/wH0Q@HcH1DHjKHKKHiKHKH`KH~KHJHuKw(v@w5H>QHcHDHJLHEf1DHKH5KH1KH-KH)KHoKHmKHmKHmKHmKHmKHqKHJHJHJH?JUHSHHH?,H+H[]fAUIATAUSHHHtTHHyIHLHH=vH[]A\A]f.I}LHMeH[]A\A]fI}D1HHJH+30HHH)H9sIEHHH[]A\A]ff.AUATUHASHHHH HIHEHH|H|Hx1HH)H)ȃAуNN9rHHMHMHHH=vGMtOLZIHLHH=HHH=veH[]A\A](HEMuAH}A1LHIH+3HHI)L9sHEHHHH=wHE)HEH[]A\A]H}LL!LmHSDAUATUHSHHHAA~YHH2LHIH0H|2H|0L)1H)ȃL:M99rHHMHMHHHH=AHHALH)1HHI)L9sHEHHHH=HE)HEH[]A\A]ÐHH2L@IH0H|2H|0L)1H)ȃL :M 89rHHML-HHMHHH=LHIHLHH=HHH=UH[]A\A]fHH2L@IH0H|2H|0L)1H)ȃL :M 89rHHMHMHHH=v;AL-`GdfH}LLLeHUDL-+G(HE(HHEH}KAWAVAUAATUSHH9H IHLt$H)I9lH|$ EH{HH1L]IHD$8M98"uMHHNI9~H3H=DH1H[]A\A]A^A_A=wH KHcHfH|$ IcϾ1HGH|$`H|$)fDH3H=G1/|f.1pfH3H=iG1LH5MfDHTH|$ HTP1LL9rH5 FŸH5F뷸H5F멸H5MM뛸H5F델H5E|H5/EkH57EZH5FIH5E8H5EF'H5FH54E H5DH5EH5EH5DH5TD H5tLAWAVAUL-cKATAUSHH(H:H4$L|$8Hl$PH`1LIHD$88L;4$# 8" ADIcDLfDHl$@HD$HfA0 fA ffA#fA$fA$&foOEAHD$eEELLIEkAH=BA~AHBH1>,@AΉ]IHtHH=YHHH;H1H([]A\A]A^A_@DHl$@HD$H%==t=  AA@ (nAAAtHYIHcH@DE\AAHfo%OGTHGCRYPG@=A |G HHfDwAGTHHfoOGCRYPAGTA |G HHfD_foNDHHGPORTGAA |G HHfDWASAGHHfo`NGGN_HAfOG A |G HHfDOfoNGHHHRIFY_HASHOGA A |G HfwH)DH@1fA )fA s#foLE0HD$eECHA2E@fAfAfA$#AIVEEHD$cfowLfDuEffApfA@fAAfAB#foLLLH)17HT$HMHI)L9qLT$@HHHD$HH=lAE1AD0ҁw!}#H L\$ LT$@ DL$H5{=HD$HLLT$DL$HD$HAHD$OLT$L\$ H;&HLT$(HD$:Ht$DL$HHD$L\$ LT$(HH=HD$H[$HHD$HH=d"LT$@H3H=<1DE1AAA?t?C(EfoDHD$HED_MAAfEHD$fA?HD$@EAA@wwAAxAhH AHcHDD@@ E1AA^A^zA eA H LT$@HD$HHPSA_ALG_ABFFDHA IHD$@LP LT$@fDAFAPA@@KHHT$@HD$HfoCNGBADDIA@@fBHD$@LPLT$@A H LT$@HD$HHPSA_ALG_ABECDHA IHD$@LP LT$@GA;HLT$@HD$HfomDSEABF_BAAfArAHD$@LPLT$@fDAuAhHHT$@HD$HforCBEAB_BASHD$@LPLT$@AH HT$@HD$HHPSA_ALG_BCMACAHHD$@LP LT$@@AAHHT$@HD$HASfo5BBEABAC_BfBHD$@LPLT$@f.AvAA HHT$@HD$HfogBBBASEAHD$@LPLT$@d@AHHT$@HD$HIOfoAH_KEY_DERBIVATHBAfJBNHD$@LPLT$@A~HLT$@HD$Hfo5BABBASEHK_TO_MS_AIBAHD$@LPLT$@fACHHT$@HD$HfoM@AHD$@LPLT$@aAAH&HT$@HD$Hfo@AONB YPTIAfDB$fo?BHD$@LP<$@fDAAHHT$@HD$Hfo?BNAB_SIGHD$@LPLT$@AHHT$@HD$Hfo?AHD$@LPLT$@QAHHT$@HD$Hfo ?B_MACAHD$@LPLT$@ f.A{A8H HT$@HD$HACTB RAHPSA_ALG_fDRHHD$@LP LT$@DAHHT$@HD$Hfo>BYAHD$@LPLT$@UDAP=H HT$@HD$HHPSA_ALG_B MAPHCCfBHD$@LP LT$@@A~HHT$@HD$Hfo=BDAB_AEAHD$@LPLT$@fDA.H HT$@HD$HHPSA_ALG_B BAHCFfBHD$@LP LT$@Zf.AD@uHHT$@HD$Hfo=ANGBADDIAD@fDBHD$@LPLT$@APHD$HLT$@H HD$HH=@A@NH HT$@HD$HXTB SA@HPSA_ALG_HfJHD$@LP LT$@zf.A0fDD$P ADH AU|ATfTjf.AjAA@@HD$HAH@AuAA A A HD$H IAfDAHD$H AH@AvaA|HD$HAHDAAFHD$HAIAAHD$HAH:AbAAHD$HAH@AAvnAAHD$HAHXDAAHD$H&AH_A|AHD$HAHfAvYA AHD$H AHAHD$HAHo@AD@+ A@VHD$H AH 2APuIHD$H HA[f.AHD$HAH@APAHD$H LT$@ DLT$@ILT$@fDA)HD$@LPfDH3H=.1_sf.AA %EisA@QH3fD0@ |D$d *H|$eft$bf.HLILHLHH@, fAHD$@LPHD$HLT$@0E1AA A uyH LT$@HD$HH=A A )DAPEHD$mHAH5.HD$@A?HD$H"A JH LT$@HD$HH= A Au'HLT$@HD$HH=dAfAHLT$@HD$HH=0AfDAP EHT$mHAH5-HT$@A?HD$H(HfoH7HD$`EZHEGORY_FLfo6EAG_PHEAIfEHD$oERE"ffo6HD$`E f.foX7fo87EAHD$eE_DATEfo`6EY_PAHEGORY_KEHEIRfEHD$nE@fo6DA%=q&=r LT$@Ht$HEƹHl,L 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fDHD$HHD$@A$H" qA$ H"ZHD$HAH`fHD$H AHHD$HAHHPSA_ALG_BCAHMABCBC_fB HD$@LPLT$@-DHD$HAIHD$HAHtHD$HAHH1V15_CRYfo+AHBPTfBHD$@LPLT$@@HD$HAHHD$H AHHPSA_ALG_B BAHOFfBHD$@LP LT$@LHD$HAHfo+BWAH1V15_SIGHBBN_RAHD$@LPLT$@DHD$HAHRHD$HAIHD$HAIfo)NTH_KEY_AGRABEEMEIBA fArAHD$@LPLT$@sHD$H AI%fHD$HAHfo)BEAHD$@LPLT$@fDHD$HAHHEfo(BRAB_CIPfzHD$@LPLT$@fDHD$H AHfo(Afo(BHD$@LP LT$@~HD$HAHfo)BRABIPHEHD$@LPLT$@=HHT$@HD$Hfo7(B7AA@HD$@LPLT$@HD$HHA8HD$HAHfo(ASEHISTIC_DSBA_BAfDJAHBHD$@LPLT$@AHH1HHT$@HD$HDHHT$@HD$HH HT$@HD$Hf.HHT$@HD$HHHT$@HD$H,HLT$@HD$HHLT$@HD$H%HHT$@HD$Hf.H HT$@HD$HHHT$@HD$H3f.HHT$@HD$HDA%=Au,LT$@Ht$HEƹH\LHD$@>=BLT$@Ht$HEƹHZLHD$@E1AD0ҁHfo&A(HISTIC_DSHD$HHD$@HHAfPHD$@LPHD$HLT$@HD$H-HL\$(DL$ LT$HD$Ht$LT$HHD$DL$ L\$(HH=HD$HHHHL$HH$A)HD$@LPLT$@ HD$HHDHD$HAHHfo%HISTIC_ECHD$HHD$@HHA@DSA(HD$@LPHD$HLT$@HD$HH?HL\$(DL$ LT$Ht$Ht$LT$HHD$DL$ L\$(HH=HD$H(HHD$HH=!HHT$@HD$HQDA0ҁDɁh HLT$@HD$HH=0ALHt$HL\$HDL$LT$HD$HLT$DL$L\$HH=HD$HL\$DL$L׺H5oLT$@DL$L\$HLT$@HD$HH=A ?OHL\$ LT$@DL$H5HD$HrLL\$ DL$HT$HD$bHT$HT$@HT$@HL$IDL$L\$ "A1LL\$LH/H+t$DL$HT$HADL$HcLL\$H)H9sHL$@LT$@HHP HT$HHAHT$"HT$HHL\$ DL$HT$HD$HT$Ht$HDL$L\$ HH=HD$HHD$HHHD$HH=L\$LT$@DL$(H|$@LT$ L\$DL$HT$HT$HD$HHT$@DL$L\$LT$ dLL\$DL$HT$HT$HT$@HT$@HD$HIDL$L\$AHLT$@HD$HH=%L\$H5DL$LLT$)L\$DL$LT$H LT$@HD$HH=L\$ H5DL$A1LL\$LHH+t$DL$HL$HADL$LHL\$H)H9sHD$@LT$@HHLT$@HD$HH=EL\$H5QDL$AH|$@H1LH+t$LT$ L\$DL$HL$HADL$LHL\$LT$ H)H9sHD$@HLT$@ L\$H5LDL$HT$HL\$DL$.AH|$@1L\$LDL$H)HmHT$HADL$HL\$I)L9sHD$@HHD$H?HLT$@HD$HH=L\$H5BDL$H|$@HL\$DL$HL$KHL$DL$HL$@L\$At1HAAE1HAH|$@DHLL\$H)1DL$tHT$HADL$HL\$I)L9sHD$@HHD$H.HLT$@HD$HH="L\$H5ZDL$HAEA )HL\$H5DL$DEAA@H=@@H=@@AUIATIUHHSHHBu{HI$L9v,qBKHQЀ v Qw5QH ЈEt/B< vˍB<vB<w+BDQwQ1H[]A\A]I$AI1Et=A4D@0W@AFq0 WAWFƈDWHL9uDHHHE膿HtHH>LHH5H81qǿAUATIUSHHHHtCHƿHIHtqHL$LHHXu%HL[]A\A]fDH1[]A\A]/LH$>H H5FH81ľLff.9ut(1 fHH9t 8 t1f.Ht3UH,SHHfD賾HCH9uH1[]fD1DHH11Hff.AUIATIUSHHt5HoIHH9LFMu5L9rH1[]A\A]LK4(L)H1[]A\A]EDH7LL貽L+L)kIfDIIHATUSL\$Hf.IIڋW@ODMF1DÃA,D1-Ga1 W@AԃA,D11OD= 7uD։T$Et1ƒA A 9rIM)f[1]A\Jf.AWL=9AVIAUIATAUH-9SL)HûHt1LLDAHH9uH[]A\A]A^A_HHPSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERYPSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASHPSA_ALG_MD2PSA_ALG_MD4PSA_ALG_MD5PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160PSA_ALG_SHA3_224PSA_ALG_SHA3_256PSA_ALG_SHA3_384PSA_ALG_SHA3_512PSA_ALG_SHA_1PSA_ALG_SHA_224PSA_ALG_SHA_256PSA_ALG_SHA_384PSA_ALG_SHA_512PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH0x%08lx0x%02xPSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOMPSA_ERROR_BAD_STATEPSA_SUCCESSPSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTSPSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALLPSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTEDPSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXISTPSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERRORPSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILUREPSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATAPSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORYPSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTPSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLEPSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDINGPSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATUREPSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTEDPSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTEDPSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURENon-numeric value: %s Value too small: %s Value too large: %s %ldPSA_ALG_ECDHPSA_ALG_FFDHValue out of range: %s PSA_ALG_DSA()PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(%luPSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIRPSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEYPSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIRPSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY0x%04xPSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_TAG_LENGTH(psa_constant_names--helperrorstatusalgalgorithmecc_curvedh_groupkey_typekey_usageUnknown type: %s  0@P 0@P`pЯvõضѵߵ Ƕ.?Par@ ȶ,CZqZ?uϼϼDϼϼ6hPSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPYPSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGEPSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILUREPSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENTUsage: %s TYPE VALUE [VALUE...] Print the symbolic name whose numerical value is VALUE in TYPE.Supported types (with = between aliases): alg=algorithm Algorithm (psa_algorithm_t) curve=ecc_curve Elliptic curve identifier (psa_ecc_family_t) group=dh_group Diffie-Hellman group identifier (psa_dh_family_t) type=key_type Key type (psa_key_type_t) usage=key_usage Key usage (psa_key_usage_t) error=status Status code (psa_status_t)PSA_ALG_TRUNCATEPSA_ALG_KEY_AGREPSA_ALG_ANY_HASHPSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRPSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PPSA_ALG_CBC_PKCSPSA_ALG_CHACHA20PSA_ALG_CIPHER_MPSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA_BASEPSA_ALG_DSA_BASEPSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PPSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANPSA_ALG_HKDF_BASPSA_ALG_HMAC_BASPSA_ALG_RIPEMD16PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEPPSA_ALG_RSA_PKCSPSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_PSA_ALG_SHA3_224PSA_ALG_SHA3_256PSA_ALG_SHA3_384PSA_ALG_SHA3_512PSA_ALG_SHA_512_PSA_ALG_STREAM_CPSA_ALG_TLS12_PRPSA_ALG_TLS12_PSPSA_KEY_TYPE_AESPSA_KEY_TYPE_ARCPSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMPSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_PUBLIC_KEYPSA_KEY_TYPE_CHAPSA_KEY_TYPE_DERPSA_KEY_TYPE_DESPSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSAPSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASEPSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAPSA_KEY_TYPE_NONPSA_KEY_TYPE_RAWPSA_KEY_TYPE_RSAPSA_KEY_USAGE_COPSA_KEY_USAGE_DEPSA_KEY_USAGE_VEPSA_KEY_USAGE_SIPSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPSA_KEY_USAGE_ENPSA_ALG_AEAD_WITp != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;(@ @Th0@<`P`p p40(XzRx P+zRx $FJ w?;*3$"DآXdH$lADG OAAXBGD A(G0j (A ABBK W (A ABBC {(A ABBLKBBA H(J0 (A ABBI b (A ABBH L@8BBA D(G0 (A ABBB  (A ABBC HBBB E(A0A8G 8A0A(B BBBH L1BBB I(D0A8J 8A0A(B BBBE t,AAG S JFE w FAA S HCE B JCE B JFE B JFE B JFE   8BED G(G0} (A ABBA KPYD_ A L8BBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE 3(0;FEG [CAGDDPHLzBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,,QAA CBAD\0]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBBH@`@  @ tT@ȍ@Ѝ@o@@@  @ @h @x o8 @oo @؍@6@F@V@f@v@@@@@@@@@@@&@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @83@;o @ ZHo8 @8 0Wh @h xaB @ k@f @ q0@0ACwtT@tT }`@`~p@pPq@Pqȍ@}Ѝ@}؍@}؏@(@@@0#ˀusr/bin/mbedtls-query_compile_time_config0000755000000000000000000005402013776116123017743 0ustar rootrootELF> @@Q@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@@ @ @@mm00@0@M]@]@M]@]@@@ PtdFF@F@QtdRtdM]@]@88/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU@} i&A "#$%&k|$06ϟqXB7K|j Cֳ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 14'D2c | F`w, - @' (@YM '@ `@ '@ 0@`@x`@ *@3 @)@F`@ *@z$ *@ `,@ ,@] @+2 (@K x`@\ @ @*@;l '@? +@_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable__gmon_start___ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_platform_setupexitputscallocstrlenmemsetmemcpystderrfprintfstrcmp__libc_start_mainlibmbedcrypto.so.6libz.so.1libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randquery_configGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5iui t_@_@_@ _@_@`@ `@(`@0`@8`@@`@H`@ P`@ X`@ ``@ h`@p`@HHOHtH5O%O@%Oh%Oh%Oh%Oh%Oh%Oh%Oh%Ohp%Oh`%Oh P%Oh @%Oh 0u H~PH6H=1@Zf1I^HHPTI`,@H,@H@NDH=1OH*OH9tHnNHt H=OH5NH)HH?HHHtHENHtfD=NuUH~N]Dff.@f.@ATH5XUHHAAEEkH5>HAAEEEH5*HAAEEH5HAAEEH5 HAAEEH5HAAEEH5HAAEEH5HAAEEaH5HAAEE;%H5)HAAEE%H5)HAAEEH5HAAEE!H5)HAAEE!H5)HAAEE}!H5)HAAEEW!H5)HAAEE1!H5)HAAEE HH=)AąHH=)AąHH=)AąHH=)AąHH=)|AąHH=)bAąoHH=*HAąUHH= *.Aą;HH=*Aą!HH=*AąHH=AąHH=AąHH=AąHH=)AąHH=)xAąHH=)^AąkHH=*DAąQHH=**Aą7HH=*AąHH=+*AąHH=9*AąHH=O*AąHH=]*AąHH=AąHH=tAąHH=ZAągHH=@AąMHH=&Aą3HH= AąHH=Aą HH=Aą HH=)Aą HH=tAą HH=)Aą HH=\pAą} HH={)VAąc HH=EAąKHH=8$Aą1HH=. AąHH=%AąHH=AąHH=AąHH=AąHH=AąHH=nAą{HH= TAąaHH=:AąGHH= Aą-HH=AąHH=AąHH=AąHH=AąHH=AąHH=AąHH=jAąwHH=PAą]HH=6AąCHH=Aą)HH=AąHH=AąHH=AąHH=AąHH=AąHH=AąHH=fAąsHH=LAąYHH=2MHH=7HH=Aą HH=?!HH=HH=HH="!tHH=+!HH=bwZHH=g`|HH=!IHH=W2AąHH=V3HH=WHH=^AąHH=cAąUHH=h*HH=qAąHH=uAąHH=~kAąHH=QAą~HH=7AąSHH=Aą(HH=AąHH=AąHH=AąHH=_HH=AąeHH= Aą:HH=G jAąHH=U PHH=f 9AąHH= HH=zHH=eHH=NHH= Aą$HH=& SHH=HH= {AąHH=& aHH=JHH=3Aąt|HH= AątXHH= Aąt4HH=& E1AHD]A\H=2E1~H=wpH=bbH=XTH=FH=8H=E1'H=R|H=;E1hH=WH=FH=5H=$H=H=}H=kH=8}H=lH=[H=JH=9H=GE1%H=wH=fH=~E1RH=hAH='E1-H=E1H=E1H=H=TE1}H=8@H=8@AUIATIUHHSHHBu{HI$L9v,qBKHQЀ v Qw5QH ЈEt/B< vˍB<vB<w+BDQwQ1H[]A\A]I$AI1Et=A4D@0W@AFq0 WAWFƈDWHL9uDHHHEvHtHH6LHH5H81aAUATIUSHHHHtCHƿHIHtqHL$LHHXu%HL[]A\A]fDH1[]A\A]/LH46H-H5fH81Lff.9ut(1 fHH9t 8 t1f.Ht3UH,SHHfDHCH9uH1[]fD1DHH11Hff.AUIATIUSHHt5HoIHH9LFMu5L9rH1[]A\A]LK4(L)H1[]A\A]EDH7LLL+L)kIfDIIHATUSL\$Hf.IIڋW@ODMF1DÃA,D1-Ga1 W@AԃA,D11OD= 7uD։T$Et1ƒA A 9rIM)f[1]A\Jf.AWL=1AVIAUIATAUH-1SL)HHt1LLDAHH9uH[]A\A]A^A_HHusage: %s This program takes one command line argument which corresponds to the string representation of a Mbed TLS compile time configuration. The value 0 will be returned if this configuration is defined in the Mbed TLS build and the macro expansion of that configuration will be printed (if any). Otherwise, 1 will be returned. MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASMMBEDTLS_HAVE_TIMEMBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATEMBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBCMBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFBMBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTRMBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFBMBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTSMBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROSMBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIMMBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXTMBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTICMBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDEDMBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMYMBEDTLS_GENPRIMEMBEDTLS_FS_IOMBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORTMBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21MBEDTLS_SELF_TESTMBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKINGMBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MACMBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSVMBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATIONMBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLSMBEDTLS_SSL_ALPNMBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAYMBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFYMBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMITMBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETSMBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYSMBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMACMBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREADMBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURESMBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGEMBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORTMBEDTLS_AESNI_CMBEDTLS_AES_CMBEDTLS_ARC4_CMBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_CMBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_CMBEDTLS_BASE64_CMBEDTLS_BIGNUM_CMBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_CMBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_CMBEDTLS_CCM_CMBEDTLS_CERTS_CMBEDTLS_CHACHA20_CMBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_CMBEDTLS_CIPHER_CMBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_CMBEDTLS_DEBUG_CMBEDTLS_DES_CMBEDTLS_DHM_CMBEDTLS_ECDH_CMBEDTLS_ECDSA_CMBEDTLS_ECP_CMBEDTLS_ENTROPY_CMBEDTLS_ERROR_CMBEDTLS_GCM_CMBEDTLS_HKDF_CMBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_CMBEDTLS_MD_CMBEDTLS_MD5_CMBEDTLS_NET_CMBEDTLS_OID_CMBEDTLS_PADLOCK_CMBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_CMBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_CMBEDTLS_PK_CMBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_CMBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_CMBEDTLS_PKCS5_CMBEDTLS_PKCS12_CMBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CMBEDTLS_POLY1305_CMBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CMBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_CMBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_CMBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_CMBEDTLS_RSA_CMBEDTLS_SHA1_CMBEDTLS_SHA256_CMBEDTLS_SHA512_CMBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_CMBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_CMBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_CMBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_CMBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CMBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_CMBEDTLS_THREADING_CMBEDTLS_TIMING_CMBEDTLS_VERSION_CMBEDTLS_X509_USE_CMBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_CMBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_CMBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_CMBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_CMBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_CMBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_CMBEDTLS_XTEA_CMBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZEMBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE1024MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN4810000MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT256MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUESTMBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUTMBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUESTMBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS521MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZEMBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIMMBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES20MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER128MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE32MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLEMBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOCcallocMBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREEfreeMBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXITexitMBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIMEtimeMBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTFfprintfMBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTFMBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTFsnprintf"seedfile"8640050MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN16384MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LENMBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAXMBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX16MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN32768MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LENMBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT60512MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROSMBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LENMBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITESMBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITESMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGESMBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATIONMBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRETMBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATEMBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTINGMBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTHMBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSEMBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATIONMBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGEMBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORTMBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVALMBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUTMBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVALMBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUTMBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_SUCCESSMBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_FAILUREMBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READmbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_readMBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITEmbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_writeMBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILEMBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUTMBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIESMBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITYMBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITYMBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERINGMBEDTLS_SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIMEMBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CAMBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LENMBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_KEY_EXCHANGEp != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;`p 0P@dPxPp4HtpPzRx +zRx $FJ w?;*3$"DP'OW,\HBMG  DBA   8BED G(G0} (A ABBA DKYD_ A L BBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE p43(`;FEG [CAGtDPH|zBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,QAA CBADD`]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBBx@@ @ d,@]@]@o@h@@  `@  @ @x ox @oo& @]@6@F@V@f@v@@@@@@@@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @3h@h;o& @& PHox @x 0W @ xaB @ k@f @ q@qwd,@d, }0@0F@F(G@(G]@M]@M]@M_@O(`@Pxx`@xP`@P0P#Pusr/bin/mbedtls-req_app0000755000000000000000000003407013776116123014155 0ustar rootrootELF>@@1@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@ @@-- @ @00-=@=@-=@=@@@ Ptd!!@!@QtdRtd-=@=@PP/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU@| i&A "#&')*+,k|$06ϟqXB7K| j Cֳ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 4'D2c bF x,  , @@[/ @Y @ x@@y @  @s@@@@@@  @3W @@@ `@z @@i @G @] @+ P@K @@ @; @ @_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable__gmon_start___ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_x509_csr_parse_filembedtls_x509_csr_infombedtls_x509_csr_initmbedtls_x509_csr_freembedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_platform_setupfflushexitputscallocstrlenmemsetstdoutmemcpystderrstrchrfprintf__libc_start_mainlibmbedx509.so.1libz.so.1libmbedcrypto.so.6libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randoptGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5_ui ?@?@?@ ?@?@?@@@ @@(@@0@@8@@@@@H@@ P@@ X@@ `@@ h@@p@@x@@@@@@@@@@HH/HtH5/%/@%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/hp%/h`%/h P%/h @%/h 0%/h %z/h %r/h%j/h%b/hAWAVAUATIUSH숇ILtqHø@@HfH~}EM|$H-XMd0 LHHPu!IHM9t7M7=LHuH=+1wL(H=1ZH-H8H3LH=IʼnƅuSH=L$H=L龟LH t LqH=&1LND1I^HHPTI @H@H@@-DH=-H-H9tH,Ht H=-H5-H)HH?HHHtH,HtfD=i-uUH~W-]Dff.@f.@H=9-@H=)-d@AUIATIUHHSHHu{HI$L9v,qBKHQЀ v Qw5QH ЈEt/B< vˍB<vB<w+BDQwQ1H[]A\A]I$AI1Et=A4D@0W@AFq0 WAWFƈDWHL9uDHHHEHtHH-+LX Hj H5 H81'AUATIUSHH+HHtCHƿHsIHtqHL$LHHXu%HL[]A\A]fDH1[]A\A]/L0 Ht*H H5 H81$zL ff.9ut(1 fHH9t 8 t1f.Ht3UH,SHHfDHCH9uH1[]fD1DHH121Hff.AUIATIUSHHt5HoIHH9LFMu5L9rH1[]A\A]LK4(L)H1[]A\A]EDH7LLL+L)kIfDIIHATUSL\$Hf.IIڋW@ODMF1DÃA,D1-Ga1 W@AԃA,D11OD= 7uD։T$Et1ƒA A 9rIM)f[1]A\Jf.AWL=%AVIAUIATAUH-%SL)HHt1LLDAHH9uH[]A\A]A^A_HH usage: req_app param=<>... acceptable parameters: filename=%%s default: cert.req failed ! mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file returned %d failed ! mbedtls_x509_csr_info returned %d cert.reqfilename . Loading the CSR ... ok . CSR information ... p != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;@`8L`p  0`\t@8zRx +zRx $` FJ w?;*3$"4DX[BBB B(D0C8G|` \ 8XBED G(G0} (A ABBA KYD_ A LLBBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE `3(t;FEG [CAGDPHzBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,8QAA CBAD4]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBB|p@@@1BL_ @ $@=@=@o@@@ 1 @@H @ @ o @oo* @=@6@F@V@f@v@@@@@@@@@@@&@6@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @P3@1;o* @* \Ho @ 0W @ aBH @H k@f @  q@@@w$@$ } @ !@!p"@p"=@-=@-=@-?@/0@@0@@0@@000#0usr/bin/mbedtls-rsa_decrypt0000755000000000000000000004422013776116123015043 0ustar rootrootELF>'@@B@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@88 @ @ 00@0@=M@M@X`=M@M@@@ Ptd(3(3@(3@QtdRtd=M@M@PP/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU%@| i&A%&'),./235678k|$06ϟqXB7K|j Cֳ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 4'D2c X  j,YpBF,  !@  )@Y '@ TQ@U '@ 0@OQ@P@ *@33 `)@Q@` *@z} *@E ,@# ,@] '@+ (@K P@q `*@; (@ @+@_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable__gmon_start___ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_rsa_importmbedtls_rsa_freembedtls_entropy_funcmbedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_entropy_initmbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decryptmbedtls_ctr_drbg_seedmbedtls_mpi_initmbedtls_entropy_freembedtls_mpi_freembedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_ctr_drbg_initmbedtls_mpi_read_filembedtls_ctr_drbg_randommbedtls_rsa_completembedtls_ctr_drbg_freembedtls_rsa_initfflushexitfopenputscallocstrlenmemsetstdout__isoc99_fscanfmemcpyfclosestderrfprintf__libc_start_mainlibmbedcrypto.so.6libz.so.1libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.7GLIBC_2.2.5;ii ui O@O@O@ O@O@O@O@!O@$P@ P@(P@0P@8P@@P@HP@ PP@ XP@ `P@ hP@pP@xP@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@ P@"P@#HH/HtH5/%/@%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/hp%/h`%/h P%/h @%/h 0%/h %z/h %r/h%j/h%b/h%Z/h%R/h%J/h%B/h%:/h%2/h%*/hp%"/h`%/hP%/h@% /h0AW1AVAUATUSHL$pLHtH= 7H=&1L$WHx-L$p L|$`H$H8H$`11HHD$(LrLL"H$HHD$ H$HHD$H$HHD$HH$HHD$ H$ HHD$0H$@HHD$8H5,LLA H "H=n 1GHh,H8H5 H= HHLHD$@LD$@uP%@@B@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@ @ @ 00@0@=M@M@HP=M@M@@@ Ptd8383@83@QtdRtd=M@M@PP/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU#@| i&A#$%'*,-013456k|$06ϟqXB7K|j Cֳ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 4'D2c pX j,YBF, a !@z P'@Y @&@ /P@0 0&@ 0@*Q@P@ p(@3 '@zP@; )@zX (@  *@ p*@] P%@+f '@K P@L (@; P&@s )@_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable__gmon_start___ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_rsa_importmbedtls_rsa_freembedtls_entropy_funcmbedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_entropy_initmbedtls_ctr_drbg_seedmbedtls_mpi_initmbedtls_entropy_freembedtls_mpi_freembedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encryptmbedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_ctr_drbg_initmbedtls_mpi_read_filembedtls_ctr_drbg_randommbedtls_ctr_drbg_freembedtls_rsa_initfflushexitfopenputscallocstrlenmemsetstdoutmemcpyfclosestderrfprintf__libc_start_mainlibmbedcrypto.so.6libz.so.1libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5ui O@O@O@ O@ O@O@O@O@"P@ P@(P@0P@8P@@P@HP@ PP@ XP@ `P@hP@pP@xP@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@ P@!HH/HtH5/%/@%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/hp%/h`%/h P%/h @%/h 0%/h %z/h %r/h%j/h%b/h%Z/h%R/h%J/h%B/h%:/h%2/h%*/hp%"/h`%/hPAWAVAUATUSH tH=s^1Ll$ Lt$@HH=L|$`tH-H$L$p H8LmLe11LHLH5z-LHA H ,H=c1H%-H8uH5c H=_ H HLHD$LD${L¾LLD$\L^E111MLLiHsHHt$@Ht$HdHL$pLLL$yH=1HL,H8H{1HLIPH50,H$xPLL$ZYÅRH=b H5W E1HH$oHB\$HLt$IHl$L0HH H@H A.H5 HD1H9l$hwHLt$\$Hl$!H5 H= 1,%H= 1LD$LD$LLLHLLMH= 1H=P n막H= 1H= DzH= 1j`H5 H=' 1KAfD1I^HHPTI*@Hp*@H!@^*DH=q+Hj+H9tH&*Ht H=A+H5:+H)HH?HHHtH*HtfD=+uUH~*]Dff.@f.@H=*$@H=*@AUIATIUHHSHHu{HI$L9v,qBKHQЀ v Qw5QH ЈEt/B< vˍB<vB<w+BDQwQ1H[]A\A]I$AI1Et=A4D@0W@AFq0 WAWFƈDWHL9uDHHHEVHtHH}(L H H5K H811AUATIUSHHHHtCHƿHIHtqHL$LHHXu%HL[]A\A]fDH1[]A\A]/L H'He H5 H81JL/ ff.9ut(1 fHH9t 8 t1f.Ht3UH,SHHfDHCH9uH1[]fD1DHH11Hff.AUIATIUSHHt5HoIHH9LFMu5L9rH1[]A\A]LK4(L)H1[]A\A]EDH7LLbL+L)kIfDIIHATUSL\$Hf.IIڋW@ODMF1DÃA,D1-Ga1 W@AԃA,D11OD= 7uD։T$Et1ƒA A 9rIM)f[1]A\Jf.AWL=7#AVIAUIATAUH-(#SL)HcHt1LLDAHH9uH[]A\A]A^A_HH rsa_encryptrbrsa_pub.txtwb+result-enc.txt%02X%s . Done (created "%s") usage: rsa_encrypt . Seeding the random number generator... failed ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned %d . Reading public key from rsa_pub.txt failed ! Could not open rsa_pub.txt ! Please run rsa_genkey first failed ! mbedtls_mpi_read_file returned %d failed ! mbedtls_rsa_import returned %d Input data larger than 100 characters. . Generating the RSA encrypted value failed ! mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt returned %d failed ! Could not create %s p != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;H\px8,x@lX8HzRx h+zRx $FJ w?;*3$"DDzBBB B(A0A8GPKA  8BED G(G0} (A ABBA KPYD_ A L BBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE p3(0;FEG [CAGDDPHLzBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,QAA CBADD0]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBBH &@%@  @ *@M@M@o@@@  P@p(@h @ o8 @oo @M@6 @F @V @f @v @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @!@!@&!@6!@F!@V!@f!@v!@!@!@!@!@!@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @@3@;o @ pHo8 @8 0Wh @h aB(@(pk @ f @ q!@! w*@* }0@0683@833@3M@=M@=M@=O@?@P@@P@@P@@0@#Ausr/bin/mbedtls-rsa_genkey0000755000000000000000000004421013776116123014652 0ustar rootrootELF>'@@B@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@ @ @ 00@0@``=M@M@PX=M@M@@@ Ptd33@3@QtdRtd=M@M@PP/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU$@| i&A$%&(+-.124567k|$06ϟqXB7K|j Cֳ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 4'D2c FjkS =Y&, s !@% )@Y (@ AQ@B '@ 0@<Q@P@ 0*@3  p)@Q@M *@zj *@2 ,@ 0,@] '@+x (@K P@^ p*@; (@ P+@_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable__gmon_start___ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_rsa_exportmbedtls_rsa_freembedtls_mpi_write_filembedtls_entropy_funcmbedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_entropy_initmbedtls_ctr_drbg_seedmbedtls_rsa_gen_keymbedtls_mpi_initmbedtls_entropy_freembedtls_mpi_freembedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_ctr_drbg_initmbedtls_ctr_drbg_randommbedtls_ctr_drbg_freembedtls_rsa_export_crtmbedtls_rsa_initfflushexitfopenputscallocstrlenmemsetstdoutmemcpyfclosestderrfprintf__libc_start_mainlibmbedcrypto.so.6libz.so.1libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5(ui O@O@O@O@O@O@O@O@#P@ P@(P@0P@8P@@P@HP@ PP@ XP@ `P@ hP@ pP@xP@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@ P@!P@"HH/HtH5/%/@%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/hp%/h`%/h P%/h @%/h 0%/h %z/h %r/h%j/h%b/h%Z/h%R/h%J/h%B/h%:/h%2/h%*/hp%"/h`%/hP%/h@AWAVAUATUSHH$L$@HLt$@H$ 11LNLL$L$PHD$`HH$H$HHD$pHhL`H$HHD$ KH$HHD$6H$ HHD$!H=R 1H-H8L\H5 -LHA H M?H=a 1H,H83HLH5,AupH= 1dHu,H8HL$MIH$LLuHL$HT$LHt$ pH=a D$("H= 1D$(f.LH<$H|$HLH|$ H|$H|$LHWL|$(fH= 1fD$(yH5 H= &HcLHHD$(H= LD$(u"LLH= LD$(t-H= 1LD$(LD$(LD$(H= 1LD$(H*H8EH5 H= rLD$(HHD$0HL$0LH= LD$8!LD$8D$(PHL$0LH= LD$8D$(&HL$0HH= LD$8D$(HL$0H4$H={ LD$8D$(HL$0Ht$H=U vLD$8D$(HL$0Ht$ H=" JLD$8D$(u}HL$0Ht$H= "LD$8D$(uUHL$0Ht$H= LD$8D$(u-H= LD$8LD$8LH|$0 t$(H= 1LD$8D$(LD$8H=S nD$(H= ULD$(f.1I^HHPTI,@H0,@H!@(DH=)H)H9tHf(Ht H=)H5)H)HH?HHHtHU(HtfD=I)uUH~7)]Dff.@f.@H= )@H=(T@AUIATIUHHSHHru{HI$L9v,qBKHQЀ v Qw5QH ЈEt/B< vˍB<vB<w+BDQwQ1H[]A\A]I$AI1Et=A4D@0W@AFq0 WAWFƈDWHL9uDHHHEHtHH&L H* H5c H817AUATIUSHHHHtCHƿHCIHtqHL$LHHXu%HL[]A\A]fDH1[]A\A]/LH&H}H5H81LGff.9ut(1 fHH9t 8 t1f.Ht3UH,SHHfDCHCH9uH1[]fD1DHH11Hff.AUIATIUSHHt5HoIHH9LFMu5L9rH1[]A\A]LK4(L)H1[]A\A]EDH7LLL+L)kIfDIIHATUSL\$Hf.IIڋW@ODMF1DÃA,D1-Ga1 W@AԃA,D11OD= 7uD։T$Et1ƒA A 9rIM)f[1]A\Jf.AWL=w!AVIAUIATAUH-h!SL)HHt1LLDAHH9uH[]A\A]A^A_HH . Seeding the random number generator... failed ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned %d ok . Generating the RSA key [ %d-bit ]... failed ! mbedtls_rsa_gen_key returned %d ok . Exporting the public key in rsa_pub.txt.... failed ! could not export RSA parameters failed ! could not open rsa_pub.txt for writing failed ! mbedtls_mpi_write_file returned %d ok . Exporting the private key in rsa_priv.txt... failed ! could not open rsa_priv.txt for writingrsa_genkeywb+rsa_pub.txtN = E = rsa_priv.txtD = DP = DQ = QP = ok p != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;8L`` `0\t@ 8zRx P+zRx $0FJ w?;*3$"4D%BBB B(A0A8G|  8BED G(G0} (A ABBA  KHYD_ A LBBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE `3(t(;FEG [CAG<DPHDzBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,xQAA CBAD4(]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBB|@'@'@ ( @ ,@M@M@o@@@  P@P@ @ o` @oo @M@6 @F @V @f @v @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @!@!@&!@6!@F!@V!@f!@v!@!@!@!@!@!@!@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @X3@;o @ rHo` @` 0W @ aBP@Pk @ f @ q!@! w,@, }0@03@33@3M@=M@=M@=O@?@P@@P@@Q@A0A##Ausr/bin/mbedtls-rsa_sign0000755000000000000000000003420013776116123014326 0ustar rootrootELF>@@2@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@@@= =  @ @-=@=@8@-=@=@@@ Ptd8#8#@8#@QtdRtd-=@=@@@/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU!@| i&A!"#%(*+./1234k|$06ϟqXB7K|j Cֳ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 4'D2c fryk sTCF``[, ', @ @YG @ @@ @  @A@|@@ @3 @@@@ p@z P@ 0@ @] @+, `@K~ @@ @;f @9 @_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable__gmon_start___ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_md_info_from_typembedtls_rsa_importmbedtls_rsa_freembedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_mpi_initmbedtls_md_filembedtls_mpi_freembedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_mpi_read_filembedtls_rsa_completembedtls_rsa_check_privkeymbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_signmbedtls_rsa_initfflushexitfopenputscallocstrlenmemsetstdoutmemcpyfclosestderrfprintf__libc_start_mainsnprintflibmbedcrypto.so.6libz.so.1libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5Vui a?@?@?@ ?@ ?@?@@@ @@(@@0@@8@@@@@H@@ P@@ X@@ `@@h@@p@@x@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ HH/HtH5/%/@%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/hp%/h`%/h P%/h @%/h 0%/h %z/h %r/h%j/h%b/h%Z/h%R/h%J/h%B/h%:/h%2/h%*/hp%"/h`%/hPAW1AVAUATUSHHt$ H$`1Hl$@HHD$Lt$`L$ HL$L$eL]LULMLEH$HH$1H$HHD$H$ HHD$tgH=t H|$'HLLLLH<$H|$H|$H= 1]H,H8H5 H= ;HHHH/ƅuHLƅt H= 1H߻"HLƅuʾHLƅuHLƅuH<$HƅuH|$HƅkH|$HlƅOH*H|$HMMLLQƅH|$ƅH= 1Hv+H8H|$H=M 1H$@H?+H8OHD$ HpHt$(wHt$(HHGv1AA1H$PSH|$ XZbHD$ H@ HHH$HHD$(1>H|$(H5 E1L$HH*Lt$ MILLd$0AL6HH H H|$8TH5 HD1 H|$8H9$hwDLLd$0MLt$ sHt$(H= 1H= :H=. 1RH=F 1:tH=\ 1XHD$ H= Hp17H= 1޻HD$ H= Hp1f.1I^HHPTI0@H@H@)DH=*H *H9tH(Ht H=)H5)H)HH?HHHtH(HtfD=)uUH~)]Dff.@f.@H=b)@H=R)T@AUIATIUHHSHHu{HI$L9v,qBKHQЀ v Qw5QH ЈEt/B< vˍB<vB<w+BDQwQ1H[]A\A]I$AI1Et=A4D@0W@AFq0 WAWFƈDWHL9uDHHHEHtHH'L H H5 H81AUATIUSHH+HHtCHƿHcIHtqHL$LHHXu%HL[]A\A]fDH1[]A\A]/Lx Hd&H H5> H81Lff.9ut(1 fHH9t 8 t1f.Ht3UH,SHHfDHCH9uH1[]fD1DHH1"1Hff.AUIATIUSHHt5HoIHH9LFMu5L9rH1[]A\A]LK4(L)H1[]A\A]EDH7LLL+L)kIfDIIHATUSL\$Hf.IIڋW@ODMF1DÃA,D1-Ga1 W@AԃA,D11OD= 7uD։T$Et1ƒA A 9rIM)f[1]A\Jf.AWL=!AVIAUIATAUH-!SL)HHt1LLDAHH9uH[]A\A]A^A_HH usage: rsa_sign rbrsa_priv.txt . Checking the private key%s.sigwb+%02X%s . Done (created "%s") . Reading private key from rsa_priv.txt failed ! Could not open rsa_priv.txt ! Please run rsa_genkey first failed ! mbedtls_mpi_read_file returned %d failed ! mbedtls_rsa_import returned %d failed ! mbedtls_rsa_complete returned %d failed ! mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey failed with -0x%0x . Generating the RSA/SHA-256 signature failed ! Could not open or read %s failed ! mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign returned -0x%0x failed ! Could not create %s p != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;xXHh\xp(x,@l8HzRx +zRx $FJ w?;*3$"DDBDB B(A0A8I AMA  8BED G(G0} (A ABBA tKYD_ A L BBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE pd3(;FEG [CAGDPHzBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,QAA CBADD]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBB@P@ @ 4@=@=@o@@@  @@p @ @ o @ooZ @=@6@F@V@f@v@@@@@@@@@@@&@6@F@V@f@v@@@@@@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @3@;oZ @Z lHo @ 0W @ aB @ pk@f @ q@a w4@4 } @ 68#@8##@#=@-=@-=@-?@/0@@0@@0@@000#1usr/bin/mbedtls-rsa_sign_pss0000755000000000000000000004423013776116123015217 0ustar rootrootELF>$@@B@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@PP @ @} } 00@0@XX=M@M@`h=M@M@@@ Ptd22@2@QtdRtd=M@M@PP/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU&@| i&A&'(*-/0346789k|$06ϟqXB7K|j Cֳ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 4'D2c `M x7eFw ,  "@  &@Y %@ UQ@V %@ 0@PQ@Q@ (@34 P'@Q@a (@z~ (@F p*@$ *@] $@+ &@K Q@r P(@; %@ 0)@_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable__gmon_start___ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_md_info_from_typembedtls_rsa_set_paddingmbedtls_entropy_funcmbedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_entropy_initmbedtls_pk_parse_keyfilembedtls_ctr_drbg_seedmbedtls_md_filembedtls_entropy_freembedtls_pk_initmbedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_ctr_drbg_initmbedtls_ctr_drbg_randommbedtls_pk_can_dombedtls_pk_freembedtls_pk_signmbedtls_ctr_drbg_freefflushexitfopenputscallocstrlenmemsetstdoutmemcpyfclosestderrfwritefprintf__libc_start_mainsnprintflibmbedcrypto.so.6libz.so.1libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5<ui O@O@O@O@O@O@O@#O@%P@ P@(P@0P@8P@@P@HP@ PP@ XP@ `P@ hP@ pP@xP@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@ P@!P@"P@$HH/HtH5/%/@%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/hp%/h`%/h P%/h @%/h 0%/h %z/h %r/h%j/h%b/h%Z/h%R/h%J/h%B/h%:/h%2/h%*/hp%"/h`%/hP%/h@% /h0%/h AWAVAUATUSHH( L$Ld$ HD$LLl$PL/Lt0H= L9LLRH= 1H-5-H}H5E-LLA H Du`HsH= 1H}bHsH]LADžWLG,H|$(L|$0H=1hH}HkALHH#9L$AU1L5V,LLL$(LD$XZLD$HK1LD$H$HFHH5>HLD$HIHT$HLH;D$t{H=:Lb . Seeding the random number generator... failed ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned %d . Reading private key from '%s' failed ! Could not read key from '%s' ! mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile returned %d failed ! Key is not an RSA key . Generating the RSA/SHA-256 signature failed ! Could not open or read %s failed ! mbedtls_pk_sign returned %d failed ! Could not create %s rsa_sign_pss%s.sigwb+failed ! fwrite failed . Done (created "%s") p != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;(H\pX,X@l8xHzRx H+zRx $HFJ w?;*3$"DDBBB B(A0C8JYKZA  8BED G(G0} (A ABBA K0YD_ A L tBBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE p3(;FEG [CAG$DPH,zBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,`QAA CBADD]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBB(%@%@2< @ t*@M@M@o@( @@  P@@ @ o @oo2 @M@6 @F @V @f @v @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @!@!@&!@6!@F!@V!@f!@v!@!@!@!@!@!@!@!@!@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @3( @( ;o2 @2 vHo @ 0W @ aB@k @ f @ q"@"qwt*@t* }0@02@23@3M@=M@=M@=O@?@P@@Q@AQ@A0A#3Ausr/bin/mbedtls-rsa_verify0000755000000000000000000003415013776116123014676 0ustar rootrootELF>@@@1@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@@@@@  @ @-=@=@ (-=@=@@@ Ptd""@"@QtdRtd-=@=@@@/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU@| i&A "%'(+,./01k|$06ϟqXB7K|j Cֳ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 4'D2c 18O#^w*e] H`qF , Vr @m @@Y 0@ @@ @ ^ @@@=@@J `@3 @@@ @z @ @ `@]C @@+ @K? @@ @;' @@ @_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable__gmon_start___ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_md_info_from_typembedtls_rsa_freembedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_mpi_bitlenmbedtls_md_filembedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verifymbedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_mpi_read_filembedtls_rsa_initfflushexitfopenputscallocstrlenmemsetstdout__isoc99_fscanfmemcpyfclosestderrfprintf__libc_start_mainsnprintflibmbedcrypto.so.6libz.so.1libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.7GLIBC_2.2.5ii "ui ,?@?@?@ ?@?@?@@@ @@(@@0@@8@@@@@H@@ P@@ X@@ `@@ h@@p@@x@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@HH/HtH5/%/@%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/hp%/h`%/h P%/h @%/h 0%/h %z/h %r/h%j/h%b/h%Z/h%R/h%J/h%B/h%:/h%2/hAW1AVAUATUH1SHLd$@LYt H=1sLH=e1H-H8H5H= 4IH"Lt$PHL#ƅuH|$hL ƅt H=n1LbL1L$LLl$HHHD$HHM1L$Ho LLD$LD$H5G LnLD$HIu#@Ht$D$HA1LH57 LL3H;\$Ht,H=  H=7 }H= 1H\$ H^,H8nLmHHLru=H$111PAALSjXZu-H= vHuH=n 1H=| 1nLH= 1Sf.@1I^HHPTI@H`@HǠ@v+DH=i,Hb,H9tHF+Ht H=9,H52,H)HH?HHHtH%+HtfD=+uUH~+]Dff.@f.@H=+@H=+@AUIATIUHHSHHu{HI$L9v,qBKHQЀ v Qw5QH ЈEt/B< vˍB<vB<w+BDQwQ1H[]A\A]I$AI1Et=A4D@0W@AFq0 WAWFƈDWHL9uDHHHEVHtHH)Lh Hz H5 H811AUATIUSHHHHtCHƿHIHtqHL$LHHXu%HL[]A\A]fDH1[]A\A]/L@ H(H H5 H81*L ff.9ut(1 fHH9t 8 t1f.Ht3UH,SHHfDHCH9uH1[]fD1DHH11Hff.AUIATIUSHHt5HoIHH9LFMu5L9rH1[]A\A]LK4(L)H1[]A\A]EDH7LLbL+L)kIfDIIHATUSL\$Hf.IIڋW@ODMF1DÃA,D1-Ga1 W@AԃA,D11OD= 7uD։T$Et1ƒA A 9rIM)f[1]A\Jf.AWL=W$AVIAUIATAUH-H$SL)HsHt1LLDAHH9uH[]A\A]A^A_HHusage: rsa_verify rbrsa_pub.txt%s.sig ! Could not open %s %02X . Reading public key from rsa_pub.txt failed ! Could not open rsa_pub.txt ! Please run rsa_genkey first failed ! mbedtls_mpi_read_file returned %d ! Invalid RSA signature format . Verifying the RSA/SHA-256 signature failed ! Could not open or read %s failed ! mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify returned -0x%0x . OK (the signature is valid) p != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;H\p`,@Plp0HzRx +zRx $FJ w?;*3$"DDBDB B(A0F8IPHA@ < 88BED G(G0} (A ABBA KYD_ A L ,BBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE p3(;FEG [CAGDPHzBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,QAA CBADD]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBB@@ @ @=@=@o@h@@ u @@( @ @ oH @oo @=@6@F@V@f@v@@@@@@@@@@@&@6@F@V@f@v@@@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @3h@hu;o @ fHoH @H @W @ aB @ (k@f @ q@!w@ } @ "@" #@ #=@-=@-=@-?@/0@@0@@0@@000#1usr/bin/mbedtls-rsa_verify_pss0000755000000000000000000003416013776116123015564 0ustar rootrootELF>@@1@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@hh@@M M  @ @-=@=@(0-=@=@@@ Ptdp"p"@p"@QtdRtd-=@=@@@/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU@| i&A !#&(),-/012k|$06ϟqXB7K|j Cֳ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 4'D2c I/eFW;lrBs4k PX)$, ^ @ { @Y @ @@ @ l @@@K@@X @3 @@@ @z `@ @@ @]Q @+ p@KM @@ @;5 @ @_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable__gmon_start___ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_pk_verifymbedtls_md_info_from_typembedtls_rsa_set_paddingmbedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_md_filembedtls_pk_initmbedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_pk_can_dombedtls_pk_freembedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfilefflushexitfopenputscallocstrlenmemsetstdoutmemcpyfclosestderrfreadfprintf__libc_start_mainsnprintflibmbedcrypto.so.6libz.so.1libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5%ui 0?@?@?@ ?@?@?@@@ @@(@@0@@8@@@@@H@@ P@@ X@@ `@@ h@@p@@x@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@HH/HtH5/%/@%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/hp%/h`%/h P%/h @%/h 0%/h %z/h %r/h%j/h%b/h%Z/h%R/h%J/h%B/h%:/h%2/h%*/hpAWAVAUATUSHH8IL_t H=+ILqHsH=71xL--I}HsLŅLH|$Lt$0DHK1H,LH5$LHHL$0HLHIH=01I}Ll$+HkmLHHOuuMM1LLCŅH=Z HsH=- 1FH=M 16H=m }HsH= 1aLH=1FH= 1,D1I^HHPTI@@H@Hǰ@+DH=,H,H9tH+Ht H=,H5,H)HH?HHHtH+HtfD=,uUH~o,]Dff.@f.@H=B,@H=2,d@AUIATIUHHSHHu{HI$L9v,qBKHQЀ v Qw5QH ЈEt/B< vˍB<vB<w+BDQwQ1H[]A\A]I$AI1Et=A4D@0W@AFq0 WAWFƈDWHL9uDHHHEHtHH *L H H5 H81wAUATIUSHH;HHtCHƿHIHtqHL$LHHXu%HL[]A\A]fDH1[]A\A]/L HT)H- H5f H81$L ff.9ut(1 fHH9t 8 t1f.Ht3UH,SHHfDcHCH9uH1[]fD1DHH1B1Hff.AUIATIUSHHt5HoIHH9LFMu5L9rH1[]A\A]LK4(L)H1[]A\A]EDH7LLL+L)kIfDIIHATUSL\$Hf.IIڋW@ODMF1DÃA,D1-Ga1 W@AԃA,D11OD= 7uD։T$Et1ƒA A 9rIM)f[1]A\Jf.AWL=$AVIAUIATAUH-$SL)HHt1LLDAHH9uH[]A\A]A^A_HHusage: rsa_verify_pss . Reading public key from '%s' failed ! Could not read key from '%s' ! mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile returned %d failed ! Key is not an RSA key . Verifying the RSA/SHA-256 signature failed ! Could not open or read %s failed ! mbedtls_pk_verify returned %d . OK (the signature is valid) %s.sigrb ! Could not open %s p != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;@P08@LP`Pp0\tp8zRx +zRx $FJ w?;*3$"4D8 BBB B(A0C8J |  8BED G(G0} (A ABBA \KYD_ A LBBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE `L3(tx;FEG [CAGDPHzBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,QAA CBAD4x]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBB|@`@ @ D@=@=@o@@@ y @@@( @ @ oh @oo @=@6@F@V@f@v@@@@@@@@@@@&@6@F@V@f@v@@@@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @3@y;o @ hHoh @h 0W @ aB( @( @k@f @ q@wD@D } @ np"@p"#@#=@-=@-=@-?@/0@@0@@0@@000# 1usr/bin/mbedtls-selftest0000755000000000000000000004421013776116123014354 0ustar rootrootELF>$@@A@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@HH @ @ 00@0@;K@K@=M@M@  @@ Ptd33@3@QtdRtd;K@K@00/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU1@|  ifA12358:;?@BCDFk|$06ϟqXB7K|j Cֳ:2‘BEJZL 3b[S : 4'IwD2csy^ c45@UC < 4 F&y]J\, *-P P!@X *@Y9 (@ P@ (@ 0@P@nP@{ +@3 `*@(K@2P@ +@z +@ -@ -@]t $@+ )@Kp P@ `+@; %@X )@+ @,@_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable__gmon_start___ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_x509_self_testmbedtls_hmac_drbg_self_testmbedtls_aes_self_testmbedtls_dhm_self_testmbedtls_sha512_self_testmbedtls_chacha20_self_testmbedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_entropy_self_testmbedtls_chachapoly_self_testmbedtls_gcm_self_testmbedtls_ripemd160_self_testmbedtls_sha1_self_testmbedtls_rsa_self_testmbedtls_camellia_self_testmbedtls_sha256_self_testmbedtls_ctr_drbg_self_testmbedtls_md5_self_testmbedtls_pkcs5_self_testmbedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_xtea_self_testmbedtls_ecp_self_testmbedtls_base64_self_testmbedtls_ccm_self_testmbedtls_timing_self_testmbedtls_arc4_self_testmbedtls_des_self_testmbedtls_poly1305_self_testmbedtls_mpi_self_testexitstrncmpputsputcharcallocstrlenmemsetmemcmpmemcpystderrfprintfstrcmp__libc_start_mainsnprintffreelibmbedtls.so.13libz.so.1libmbedx509.so.1libmbedcrypto.so.6libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexifymbedtls_entropy_self_test_wrapperselftests_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5Hui SK@ L@L@%(L@*8L@.HL@XL@+hL@xL@,L@L@L@L@L@$L@L@L@M@/M@(M@ 8M@"HM@XM@xM@#M@ O@O@O@O@)O@0P@ P@(P@0P@ 8P@ @P@ HP@PP@XP@`P@hP@pP@xP@P@!P@&P@'P@(P@-HH/HtH5/%/@%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/hp%/h`%/h P%/h @%/h 0%/h %z/h %r/h%j/h%b/h%Z/hAWAVAUATU1SHH5HtH=H5*|u҃H5:duH5/LuH5y2uH5_AŅgHcźHHOHHH*D$AL,L -*fDxqu=xu7@HCHE1HHL€t-t HL-E|$H+HD$ L=v fIK@L@IvIH HuDAVAD$ I>HkHHuE+ExxRxHfHCHD$HED$ HK@L= )fDDUAD$ L}HMdD$tH;HtII~IHtLuEtLH=_ 1QH3H=e1A:H=s 1D$ AMt$ 1H= EtDH= 11I^HHPTI-@H -@HP!@*DH=+H+H9tH*Ht H=+H5+H)HH?HHHtH*HtfD=a+uUH~O+]Dff.@f.@ff.AWAVAUATUS1H1HIIHHMIL {E1L9=MtMt M9LAdIHtAM9H H5 LD$HEH= 1LD$ LD$LD$HLD$vLnLD$LaLYHD[]A\A]A^A_H= dMMM9u&H= 9LuIHVAE1JH=f 냅tH= AE1AH= HE1oH=M,H=W`H=asL;IH\hff.AVxHxxxxxxxxAUIHATUպxSHH Lt$ HD$ fT$LHHD$1fL$H HLLE AA9utH []A\A]A^ú HtI<H)f.@H='$@H='@AUIATIUHHSHHRu{HI$L9v,qBKHQЀ v Qw5QH ЈEt/B< vˍB<vB<w+BDQwQ1H[]A\A]I$AI1Et=A4D@0W@AFq0 WAWFƈDWHL9uDHHHEHtHH%LHH5H81AUATIUSHHHHtCHƿH3IHtqHL$LHHXu%HL[]A\A]fDH1[]A\A]/LpH$HH56H81*Lff.9ut(1 fHH9t 8 t1f.Ht3UH,SHHfDHCH9uH1[]fD1DHH11Hff.AUIATIUSHHt5HoIHH9LFMu5L9rH1[]A\A]LK4(L)H1[]A\A]EDH7LLL+L)kIfDIIHATUSL\$Hf.IIڋW@ODMF1DÃA,D1-Ga1 W@AԃA,D11OD= 7uD։T$Et1ƒA A 9rIM)f[1]A\Jf.AWL=AVIAUIATAUH-SL)HHt1LLDAHH9uH[]A\A]A^A_HHsamedifferent CALLOC(0): passed (NULL) CALLOC(1): failed (NULL) CALLOC(1): passed123%scallocxxxxxxxxx--quiet--exclude Skip: %s Executed %d test suites [ %d tests FAIL ] [ All tests PASS ] md5ripemd160sha1sha256sha512arc4desaesgcmccmchacha20chacha20-poly1305base64mpirsax509xteacamelliactr_drbghmac_drbgecpdhmentropypkcs5timing CALLOC(0): failed (mix of NULL and non-NULL) CALLOC(0): passed (same non-null) CALLOC(0): passed (distinct non-null) CALLOC(1): failed (same buffer twice) CALLOC(1 again): passed (%s address) CALLOC(1 again): failed (NULL)the snprintf implementation is broken Test suite %s not available -> failed p != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;0 ,x`p0Th @,xzRx h+zRx $0FJ w?;*3$"DHXuBGB B(A0A8HP$ 8D0A(B BBBH @ BQH A(H0GP^ 0A(A BBBA 0 XBGB B(A0E8NPh 0d 8D`BED G(G0} (A ABBA KYD_ A LTBBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE 3(;FEG [CAG@DPHX zBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,@QAA CBAD]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBB%@P%@d0@%@0@0@0@0@0@0@1@1@ 1@ 1@1@#1@1@,1@31@71@;1@@1@E1@N1@W1@a1@e1@i1@%@q1@w1@ct~ @ -@K@K@o@h @@  P@@@ o@oo@M@6 @F @V @f @v @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @!@!@&!@6!@F!@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.data.rel.ro.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @3h @h ;o@Ho@0W@aB@k @ f @ 0qP!@P!1 w-@- }0@0~3@3(4@(4`K@;K@;K@; M@= O@?(P@@P@@P@@0@#@usr/bin/mbedtls-ssl_client10000755000000000000000000004441013776116123014745 0ustar rootrootELF>)@@B@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@ @ @00@0@p=pM@pM@=M@M@  @@ PtdH4H4@H4@QtdRtdp=pM@pM@/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU8@| i&A89:<?ABEFHIJKk|$06ϟqXB7K|j Cֳ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 4'D2cd }3x_6OJ wIS`29Yo $} "@ +@Y *@ KQ@L *@ 0@FQ@pQ@ @,@3* +@Q@W ,@zt ,@< .@ @.@] )@+ *@K pQ@h ,@; *@ `-@mbedtls_x509_crt_free_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTablembedtls_x509_crt_parse__gmon_start__mbedtls_x509_crt_init_ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_ssl_freembedtls_net_initmbedtls_ssl_config_freembedtls_net_recvmbedtls_net_freembedtls_net_sendmbedtls_ssl_conf_authmodembedtls_net_connectmbedtls_ssl_conf_dbgmbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chainmbedtls_ssl_readmbedtls_ssl_set_hostnamembedtls_ssl_set_biombedtls_ssl_config_defaultsmbedtls_ssl_setupmbedtls_ssl_conf_rngmbedtls_debug_set_thresholdmbedtls_ssl_writembedtls_ssl_handshakembedtls_ssl_get_verify_resultmbedtls_ssl_close_notifymbedtls_ssl_initmbedtls_ssl_config_initmbedtls_test_cas_pem_lenmbedtls_test_cas_pemmbedtls_x509_crt_verify_infombedtls_entropy_funcmbedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_entropy_initmbedtls_ctr_drbg_seedmbedtls_entropy_freembedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_ctr_drbg_initmbedtls_ctr_drbg_randommbedtls_strerrormbedtls_ctr_drbg_freefflushexitputscallocstrlenmemsetstdoutmemcpystderrfprintf__libc_start_mainlibmbedtls.so.13libz.so.1libmbedx509.so.1libmbedcrypto.so.6libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.52ui O@O@O@ O@O@O@O@O@O@O@ O@2O@7P@ P@(P@0P@8P@@P@HP@ PP@ XP@ `P@ hP@pP@xP@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@!P@"P@#P@$P@%P@&P@'Q@(Q@)Q@*Q@+ Q@,(Q@-0Q@.8Q@/@Q@0HQ@1PQ@3XQ@4`Q@5hQ@6HH/HtH5/%/@%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/hp%/h`%/h P%/h @%/h 0%/h %z/h %r/h%j/h%b/h%Z/h%R/h%J/h%B/h%:/h%2/h%*/hp%"/h`%/hP%/h@% /h0%/h %.h%.h%.h%.h %.h!%.h"%.h#%.h$%.h%%.h&%.h'p%.h(`%.h)P%.h*@AWAVAUATUSHXH\$,H$HL$L$HL$ L$ HLL8L`H= 1rHC,H8cLH5l,LLA H ,}H=y H= 1H+H8 H+H5+LH"ƅH=1 1H5 H53 1H= H+H81H HH5 H= CH= 1uHF+H8f111LH= LW1LLH5#+LLH*H5LHLHH5L HM4H *E1HHH*H= 1H|*H8f.D$=HXAuH= D$!H= 1SHDL$D$ H= DL$L$L$LH LT$TLT$LLT$DL$H=d 1LT$DL$H)H8LT$H5H DL$LD$=LֺHDL$LT$LT$DL$A~L҉H= 1[H= 1MH)H8>DL$LT$L1LHHDL$LT$LT$DL$$=tāLH= 1DL$LT$LT$DL$냉D$H= 1DD$LL$0DǺdDD$LLL$OLL$DD$1H=X LDaAHDL$~LHLLLDL$DD$H= 1DD$]D$H=f 1DD$?D$H= 1DD$!D$H= 1DD$D$H=< 1DD$DH= 1DL$kDL$EH= 1DL$KDL$HDL$DL$H=tDL$DL$L$DH=j 1DD$DD$NH=DL$DL$@1I^HHPTI.@H@.@H"@&DH=I(HB(H9tHV&Ht H=(H5(H)HH?HHHtHe&HtfD='uUH~']Dff.@f.@UH5H1~H]DH=z'D@H=j'@AUIATIUHHSHHu{HI$L9v,qBKHQЀ v Qw5QH ЈEt/B< vˍB<vB<w+BDQwQ1H[]A\A]I$AI1Et=A4D@0W@AFq0 WAWFƈDWHL9uDHHHE&HtHH$L@HRH5H81AUATIUSHH+HHtCHƿHIHtqHL$LHHXu%HL[]A\A]fDH1[]A\A]/LH#HH5H81TjLoff.9ut(1 fHH9t 8 t1f.Ht3UH,SHHfD3HCH9uH1[]fD1DHH1b1Hff.AUIATIUSHHt5HoIHH9LFMu5L9rH1[]A\A]LK4(L)H1[]A\A]EDH7LLBL+L)kIfDIIHATUSL\$Hf.IIڋW@ODMF1DÃA,D1-Ga1 W@AԃA,D11OD= 7uD։T$Et1ƒA A 9rIM)f[1]A\Jf.AWL='AVIAUIATAUH-SL)HHt1LLDAHH9uH[]A\A]A^A_HH%s:%04d: %sssl_client1 ok ok (%d skipped) 4433localhost failed ! > Write to server:GET / HTTP/1.0 %d bytes written %s < Read from server: EOF %d bytes read %sLast error was: %d - %s . Seeding the random number generator... failed ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned %d . Loading the CA root certificate ... failed ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse returned -0x%x . Connecting to tcp/%s/%s... failed ! mbedtls_net_connect returned %d . Setting up the SSL/TLS structure... failed ! mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults returned %d failed ! mbedtls_ssl_setup returned %d failed ! mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname returned %d . Performing the SSL/TLS handshake... failed ! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned -0x%x . Verifying peer X.509 certificate... failed ! mbedtls_ssl_write returned %d failed ! mbedtls_ssl_read returned %d p != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;$Xl8<8Px|XXzRx +zRx $FJ w?;*3$"DAU0`lBGB B(A0A8G!X T 8PBED G(G0} (A ABBA K YD_ A L(DBBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE x3(;FEG [CAGDPHzBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,0QAA CBADL]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBB)@)@2 @ .@pM@xM@o@ @@  P@@@  ox@oo@M@6 @F @V @f @v @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @!@!@&!@6!@F!@V!@f!@v!@!@!@!@!@!@!@!@!@"@"@&"@6"@F"@V"@f"@v"@"@"@"@"@"@"@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @83 @ ;o@Hox@x0W@ aB@k @ f @ q"@" w.@. }0@0FH4@H44@4pM@p=xM@x=M@= O@?`P@@ppQ@pAQ@A0A#Ausr/bin/mbedtls-ssl_client20000755000000000000000000017576013776116123014763 0ustar rootrootELF>{@@0@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@11@@@@@^^@@pEpE @ @ 00@0@  @@ Ptd@@QtdRtd @ @/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU E80 ` )@!`.Hk|$06ϟ%C|qXB7K| Hj Cֳ:2BEJZL 3bZS Rq : *ꉟ1[|4'-hE D2c\       m 3Iy.MK    s 0 8 AS# jUcX H  M  "  F   ? f7  l K v   :  '   *~}a DY k ?R8   S*7k   )  0  a jB3   " S  H@3u  0@Y  @  Ѓ@ (A  @ f @  AN`Ap.E AR  P@3  @ (A  @z  М@  @  P@]K  {@+  @K3 |@9G AD A P@@  @n  @;v *  0@ p@mbedtls_x509_crt_free_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTablembedtls_x509_crt_infombedtls_x509_crt_profile_defaultmbedtls_x509_crt_parse__gmon_start__mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_dermbedtls_x509_crt_initmbedtls_platform_zeroize_ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_ssl_conf_arc4_supportmbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuitesmbedtls_ssl_freembedtls_net_initmbedtls_ssl_config_freembedtls_ssl_conf_dhm_min_bitlenmbedtls_ssl_session_freembedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_idmbedtls_net_recvmbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuitesmbedtls_ssl_renegotiatembedtls_ssl_conf_session_ticketsmbedtls_ssl_conf_fallbackmbedtls_net_freembedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_ext_cbmbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profilembedtls_ssl_conf_handshake_timeoutmbedtls_net_set_blockmbedtls_ssl_conf_extended_master_secretmbedtls_ssl_tls_prfmbedtls_ssl_conf_encrypt_then_macmbedtls_net_sendmbedtls_ssl_set_mtumbedtls_ssl_conf_authmodembedtls_ssl_set_datagram_packingmbedtls_net_connectmbedtls_ssl_conf_dbgmbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocolsmbedtls_ssl_session_loadmbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chainmbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_idmbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansionmbedtls_ssl_get_session_pointermbedtls_ssl_session_resetmbedtls_ssl_session_savembedtls_net_set_nonblockmbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_lenmbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cbmbedtls_ssl_conf_truncated_hmacmbedtls_net_recv_timeoutmbedtls_ssl_conf_cbc_record_splittingmbedtls_ssl_context_loadmbedtls_ssl_get_versionmbedtls_ssl_conf_pskmbedtls_ssl_conf_own_certmbedtls_ssl_conf_curvesmbedtls_ssl_readmbedtls_ssl_set_hostnamembedtls_ssl_conf_legacy_renegotiationmbedtls_ssl_context_savembedtls_ssl_set_biombedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_namembedtls_ssl_config_defaultsmbedtls_net_usleepmbedtls_ssl_conf_max_versionmbedtls_ssl_set_sessionmbedtls_ssl_setupmbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_lenmbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiationmbedtls_ssl_conf_min_versionmbedtls_ssl_conf_rngmbedtls_ssl_get_alpn_protocolmbedtls_debug_set_thresholdmbedtls_ssl_writembedtls_ssl_handshakembedtls_ssl_get_verify_resultmbedtls_ssl_set_verifymbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuitembedtls_ssl_conf_read_timeoutmbedtls_ssl_close_notifymbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashesmbedtls_ssl_check_recordmbedtls_ssl_initmbedtls_ssl_config_initmbedtls_ssl_get_sessionmbedtls_ssl_conf_verifymbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_lenmbedtls_net_pollmbedtls_pk_freembedtls_pk_get_namembedtls_test_cli_crtmbedtls_test_cli_keymbedtls_test_cli_crt_lenmbedtls_test_cas_dermbedtls_test_casmbedtls_test_cas_der_lenmbedtls_x509_crt_parse_filembedtls_test_cli_key_lenmbedtls_test_cas_lenmbedtls_x509_crt_verify_infombedtls_x509_crt_parse_pathmbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_namembedtls_entropy_funcmbedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_timing_set_delaymbedtls_entropy_initmbedtls_pk_parse_keyfilembedtls_ctr_drbg_seedmbedtls_entropy_freembedtls_pk_initmbedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_ctr_drbg_initmbedtls_ctr_drbg_randommbedtls_strerrormbedtls_ctr_drbg_freembedtls_pk_parse_keymbedtls_timing_get_delaymbedtls_ecp_curve_listmbedtls_base64_encodefflushexitsprintfsrandfopenstrncpyputsputcharstrtolcallocstrlenmemsetstdoutmemcpyfclosestderrfwritestrchrfprintfstrcmp__libc_start_mainsnprintflibmbedtls.so.13libz.so.1libmbedx509.so.1libmbedcrypto.so.6libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexifyidle__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initdummy_constant_timembedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randdummy_entropyquery_configoptGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5 Rui ]P@X@`@h@p@x@@@*@1@7@A@@E@G@O@T@a@@x@{@@A A(A0A8A@AHAPAXA `A hA pA xA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA A!A"A#A$A% A&(A'0A(8A)@A+HA,PA-XA.`A/hA0pA2xA3A4A5A6A8A9A:A;A<A=A>A?A@ABACADAFAHAIAJAK AL(AM0AN8AP@AQHARPASXAU`AVhAWpAXxAYAZA[A\A]A^A_A`AbAcAdAeAfAgAhAiAjAkAlAmAn Ao(Ap0Aq8Ar@AsHAtPAuXAv`AwhAypAzxA|A}A~AAAAAAAAAAAHHHtH5%@%h%ڿh%ҿh%ʿh%¿h%h%h%hp%h`%h P%h @%h 0%h %zh %rh%jh%bh%Zh%Rh%Jh%Bh%:h%2h%*hp%"h`%hP%h@% h0%h %h%h%h%h %ھh!%Ҿh"%ʾh#%¾h$%h%%h&%h'p%h(`%h)P%h*@%h+0%h, %zh-%rh.%jh/%bh0%Zh1%Rh2%Jh3%Bh4%:h5%2h6%*h7p%"h8`%h9P%h:@% h;0%h< %h=%h>%h?%h@%ڽhA%ҽhB%ʽhC%½hD%hE%hF%hGp%hH`%hIP%hJ@%hK0%hL %zhM%rhN%jhO%bhP%ZhQ%RhR%JhS%BhT%:hU%2hV%*hWp%"hX`%hYP%hZ@% h[0%h\ %h]%h^%h_%h`%ڼha%Ҽhb%ʼhc%¼hd%he%hf%hgp%hh`%hiP%hj@%hk0%hl %zhm%rhn%jho%bhp%Zhq%Rhr%Jhs%Bht%:hu%2hv%*hwp%"hx`%hyP%f%f%f%f%fAWAVAUATIUSH_HCHDŽ$HDŽ$oH$HHD$$H$HHD$(EH$pHHD$ H$1H|$@HH$HHD$dH$pHHD$0H$ HHD$8zH$HHD$ fH`A$@$P$`$p$yH{H{HCHS0H{HSxHH{HHHHHHCHHHHHHH0HCHC C(C8HC@HCHHCPHCXC`HChHCpHǃǃHǃHǃƃǃ8H@HǃHǃHǃHǃHHHǃHǃǃHǃ H(HǃHHǃPHǃXǃ`HhEMl$H-*zMdfDL3IM9tbM}=LHy LHLpt LH=yILsM9ut { {JHSp:& LMH5{LH5|LE1A$IcL<,uDbEH<,uEHLHBIIIfD LH=xuLsDLH=x H=xLbH=xLH=sxL_H5_xLap H5NxLJ0H5DxL3 H58xLLs01 LIuǃpH=^iH=%T1L-Aw7H=Y1)H=]1H=d1 8Iąu)BDSIH=zH1A<$t1LH1A|$uÿ E1E1KL$P L$dLL1H=zwH|$-H|$8H|$0H|$ H|$@H|$(H|$aH|$LMtH$LLMt Ht$HLLE1uH苃Xu)j 1LC=WD@ǃ 1LRC 1L2fDŽ$HHtVH$@H$8t:H,u PH,u u,h HH9uH=g1L$P H,H8 LPq H5XA H wLH|$Ņb H=wH=g1bHîH8HkHH5?vHLc@H5$vL} A<$ L%L-Hl$0IUHII/ I4$HuL-L%L|$0I$LIIŅ IuHu1H=v1H=Yg1rHӭH8HkPH5OuHt!}Q H|$8HŅ HkXH5uHt%} HShH|$ HŅw H|$ eH=6vH1H{ HrH5rHKHEHSH= v1HH81HSHsH|$Ņ {H|$W Ņ H=uyH=f1+HH8l11H|$xŅ C  1H=H t H|$H|$Ņ   h t1H|$@Jt H|$UHtH|$H$@ŅP L|$HT$H5aLHH5*LH s$L5Lgz t H|$t H|$ H|$H{HH5)rtH{@H5reH{PH5qtH{XH5qmOHHtH5rM L$Mh tH|$*tH|$t H|$Ht$H|$( ŅH3H|$(Ņ8CHD$L|$(L(H${H ,H-H$LLEL$_t LHl$(H$H H&HHD$`HH=qH=+e1HH8"€t =z { * HYuL|$(L8LILH=eH1L1ƅ H=f1L|$(LH=MfH1L3H=dfH1Ht"L`HHH=ef1 t H=f1nHϧH8Ht$@H|$(E1ŅH=qpjH=6g1H|$(eAŅ H=p.H$DHlIHǾlLH=gH=C(Lt$XLt$(Ld$PD$lH$IH=[p1pHѦH8HK0 N1HgLDk8A DxE9 Hc NH5pH)I<,E9 ED$HMc { OLLL€tۉŅAD$HA9HcŋT$HLƄH=1g1E C8`;P |t`;H(~[H=]{lHƐ|@A LH Kn 1LC( ;P(_P 9~u ǃx*~ ǃbt 9H(AP(H<, 1L*C a{H=\sCH$H$ M?H=lE16H|$1H|$8`H|$0VH|$ 8bH=Y1H$LLuŅLcH=^H$Ht$PH|$@ŅH=Y1Ld$PLt$XE1vHD$HH=LM1E1RWD1E1H=S4H=S1E1rHt$`H|$H=iN1Ld$PLt$XE1HD$H*H=X1Ld$PLt$X2H=X1LnLFHt$L)Ņu}CtUE1uLݓH HדLHt$H #HLHt$`GH=b\[Ht$E1LH $Hx봉H=%O1Ld$PLt$X$H=W Ld$PLt$XE1HD$HH=T1Ld$PLt$XE1HD$HH=S1Ld$PLt$XE1_HD$HH5&YLLsxDLd$PLt$XE1HD$HH=gU111LL$H$HT$xH$Ht$p Ht$pHT$xHIWL$LHŅH@H5X*HHLHD$pH$H$LD$pH9uLLLD$pLD$pLH=tZlH=S1Ld$PLt$X UH='U1Ld$PLt$XL|$PMLL$PLiLUH@H=T1Ld$PLt$XL|$PLL$PL+H=MT1Ld$PL|$PLt$XuLL$PLH=SLd$PLt$XH=YS1Ld$PLt$X0HD$HH=R1Ld$PLt$XE1HD$HDH=,J1Ld$PLt$XE1HD$H%H=U1Ld$PLt$XE1HD$HH=Q1Ld$PLt$XE1|HD$HH5PVLu LbH5,ǃH5lQLǃ[ǃLH5PLu%HH#ǃH5PLrHǃHH5PL;ƃH5PLvH5PL-L\IH 1L I19/H5OLHH~H5PL[ƃH5PL8H5OL!]H5OL #H5OLH5OLH5OLFH5OLlL@-1 L~ǃH5 OL\ƃ 1LU 1Lg3 1LEy 1L"W 1L41 Ltot[ǃ1 LLt-ǃǃǃ5 1LBw 1L T 1L1 1L 1L8ǃXL" AH5=ML+tgH52MLuǃPǃH5MLH5MLu/L S 1L5H5LLH5LLwtsH5LLdtFH5LLQxLh 1L~I 1L[` 1LA\y 1L'T[1I^HHPTI@HP@HH@DH=AH:H9tHVHt H=H5 H)HH?HHHtHHtfD=uUH~ׇ]Dff.@f.@ATUHSHIAHtHfDHCH9uD[]A\*u&H=t  HËu&H=t ІHAVIAUIHATIUSH1HLLHXLHL:=tYLLH3LHL9}9tYu-H`Axd@H1[]A\A]A^DtH="1[]A\A]A^@H`Ax~H=!DH=!"f.H`AxwH=0"fH=o!ZPff.ATUHSHHAąxH`AtD[]A\fDH;IcHJ[]DEDA\UHMI҄u"DtH default: all enabled query_config= return 0 if the specified configuration macro is defined and 1 otherwise. The expansion of the macro is printed if it is defined serialize=%%d default: 0 (do not serialize/deserialize) options: 1 (serialize) 2 (serialize with re-initialization) context_file=%%s The file path to write a serialized connection in the form of base64 code (serialize option must be set) default: "" (do nothing) option: a file path acceptable ciphersuite names: Error: eap_tls and nss_keylog options cannot be used together.Warning: event-driven IO mandates nbio=1 - overwriteforced ciphersuite not allowed with this protocol versionforced RC4 ciphersuite with RC4 disabledcurves list too long, maximum %d . Seeding the random number generator... failed ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned -0x%x . Loading the CA root certificate ... failed ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse returned -0x%x . Loading the client cert. and key... failed ! mbedtls_pk_parse_key returned -0x%x failed ! mbedtls_net_connect returned -0x%x failed ! net_set_(non)block() returned -0x%x . Setting up the SSL/TLS structure... failed ! mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults returned -0x%x failed ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len returned %d failed ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols returned %d Warning: reproducible option used without constant time failed ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert returned %d failed ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk returned %d failed ! mbedtls_ssl_setup returned -0x%x failed ! mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname returned %d . Performing the SSL/TLS handshake... failed ! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned -0x%x Unable to verify the server's certificate. Either it is invalid, or you didn't set ca_file or ca_path to an appropriate value. Alternatively, you may want to use auth_mode=optional for testing purposes. ok [ Protocol is %s ] [ Ciphersuite is %s ] [ Record expansion is %d ] [ Record expansion is unknown (compression) ] [ Maximum input fragment length is %u ] [ Maximum output fragment length is %u ] [ Application Layer Protocol is %s ] failed ! mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf returned -0x%x . Saving session for reuse... failed ! alloc %u bytes for session data failed ! mbedtls_ssl_session_saved returned -0x%04x failed ! mbedtls_ssl_get_session returned -0x%x [ Saved %u bytes of session data] . Verifying peer X.509 certificate... . Peer certificate information ... . Performing renegotiation... failed ! mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate returned %d GET %s HTTP/1.0 Extra-header: failed ! mbedtls_ssl_write returned -0x%x failed ! mbedtls_ssl_write returned %d warning ! request didn't fit into single datagram and was truncated to size %u %d bytes written in %d fragments %s connection was closed gracefully mbedtls_ssl_read returned -0x%x . Restarting connection from same port... failed ! mbedtls_ssl_session_reset returned -0x%x failed ! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned -0x%x . Serializing live connection... failed ! mbedtls_ssl_context_save returned -0x%x failed ! Couldn't allocate buffer for serialized context . Save serialized context to a file... failed ! Couldn't allocate buffer for the base64 codefailed ! mbedtls_base64_encode returned -0x%x failed ! Cannot open '%s' for writing. failed ! fwrite(%ld bytes) failed . Context has been reset... ok . Freeing and reinitializing context... . Deserializing connection...failed ! mbedtls_ssl_context_load returned -0x%x . Reconnecting with saved session... failed ! mbedtls_ssl_session_load returned -0x%x failed ! mbedtls_ssl_set_session returned -0x%x %s:%04d: |%d| %s%02xa ! exported maclen is %u exported keylen is %u exported ivlen is %u tcpudp(none) %-42slocalhost4433/Client_identityserver_nameserver_addrserver_portdtlsdebug_levelcontext_crt_cbnbioeventread_timeoutmax_resendrequest_pagerequest_sizeca_fileca_pathcrt_filekey_filekey_pwdpskpsk_identityecjpake_pwec_max_opsforce_ciphersuiterenegotiationallow_legacyrenegotiateexchangesreconnectreco_delayreco_modereconnect_hardticketsalpnfallbackextended_mscurvesetmmin_versionssl3tls1_1dtls1dtls1_2max_versionarc4allow_sha1force_versionauth_modenoneoptionalrequiredmax_frag_len512102420484096trunc_hmachs_timeoutmtudgram_packingrecsplitdhmlenquery_configserializecontext_fileeap_tlsreproduciblenss_keylognss_keylog_fileskip_close_notifyuse_srtpsrtp_force_profilemkipre-shared key not validdefaultunknown curve %s supported curves: %s ssl_client2 ok ok (%d skipped) ok (key type: %s) . Connecting to %s/%s/%s...client EAP encryption EAP-TLS key material is: %02x EAP-TLS IV is: failed > Write to server: < Read from server: connection was reset by peer %d bytes read %s timeout . Closing the connection... doneLast error was: -0x%X - %s Number of curves: %d MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASMMBEDTLS_HAVE_TIMEMBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATEMBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBCMBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFBMBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTRMBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFBMBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTSMBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROSMBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIMMBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXTMBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTICMBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDEDMBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMYMBEDTLS_GENPRIMEMBEDTLS_FS_IOMBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORTMBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21MBEDTLS_SELF_TESTMBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKINGMBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MACMBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSVMBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATIONMBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLSMBEDTLS_SSL_ALPNMBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAYMBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFYMBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMITMBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETSMBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYSMBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMACMBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREADMBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURESMBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGEMBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORTMBEDTLS_AESNI_CMBEDTLS_AES_CMBEDTLS_ARC4_CMBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_CMBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_CMBEDTLS_BASE64_CMBEDTLS_BIGNUM_CMBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_CMBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_CMBEDTLS_CCM_CMBEDTLS_CERTS_CMBEDTLS_CHACHA20_CMBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_CMBEDTLS_CIPHER_CMBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_CMBEDTLS_DEBUG_CMBEDTLS_DES_CMBEDTLS_DHM_CMBEDTLS_ECDH_CMBEDTLS_ECDSA_CMBEDTLS_ECP_CMBEDTLS_ENTROPY_CMBEDTLS_ERROR_CMBEDTLS_GCM_CMBEDTLS_HKDF_CMBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_CMBEDTLS_MD_CMBEDTLS_MD5_CMBEDTLS_NET_CMBEDTLS_OID_CMBEDTLS_PADLOCK_CMBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_CMBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_CMBEDTLS_PK_CMBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_CMBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_CMBEDTLS_PKCS5_CMBEDTLS_PKCS12_CMBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CMBEDTLS_POLY1305_CMBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CMBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_CMBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_CMBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_CMBEDTLS_RSA_CMBEDTLS_SHA1_CMBEDTLS_SHA256_CMBEDTLS_SHA512_CMBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_CMBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_CMBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_CMBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_CMBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CMBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_CMBEDTLS_THREADING_CMBEDTLS_TIMING_CMBEDTLS_VERSION_CMBEDTLS_X509_USE_CMBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_CMBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_CMBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_CMBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_CMBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_CMBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_CMBEDTLS_XTEA_CMBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZEMBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZEMBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN10000MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT256MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUESTMBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUTMBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUESTMBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS521MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZEMBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIMMBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES20MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER128MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE32MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLEMBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOCcallocMBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREEfreeMBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXITexitMBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIMEtimeMBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTFfprintfMBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTFMBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTFsnprintf"seedfile"8640050MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN16384MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LENMBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAXMBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX16MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN32768MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LENMBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT60MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROSMBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LENMBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITESMBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITESMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGESMBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATIONMBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRETMBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATEMBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTINGMBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTHMBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSEMBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATIONMBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGEMBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORTMBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVALMBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUTMBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVALMBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUTMBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_SUCCESSMBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_FAILUREMBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READmbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_readMBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITEmbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_writeMBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILEMBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUTMBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIESMBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITYMBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITYMBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERINGMBEDTLS_SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIMEMBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CAMBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LENMBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_KEY_EXCHANGEp != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;haPixHi ؝X<htȠhH0d(pXhx(xؼ4ؽ8(XzRx Л+zRx $`FJ w?;*3$"Dg((\@9BAD nABT@NZ|@NZLbBEH I(A0 (A BBBF W (F BBBE 4ĝYBAD g ABG OAP@UAOL\0LBI B(G0A8GH 8D0A(B BBBA LBAJ Rv  CABE z  CABH c CAB0ADD ] CAF zCAL0BBA D(G0m (D ABBJ E (A AEBA YnZD,@nBDF G ABJ \0e3BBB B(D0C8G'_MAi]MA,< BMG  DBA l  8BED G(G0} (A ABBA KXYD_ A LBBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE P 3(d8;FEG [CAGLDPHTzBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,QAA CBAD$8]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBBlP|@P|@a r |   @@ @ @(@o@@@  Ap  &@$@ o#@oo"@0@6@@F@@V@@f@@v@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@A@A@&A@6A@FA@VA@fA@vA@A@A@A@A@A@A@A@A@B@B@&B@6B@FB@VB@fB@vB@B@B@B@B@B@B@B@B@C@C@&C@6C@FC@VC@fC@vC@C@C@C@C@C@C@C@C@D@D@&D@6D@FD@VD@fD@vD@D@D@D@D@D@D@D@D@E@E@&E@6E@FE@VE@fE@vE@E@E@E@E@E@E@E@E@F@F@&F@6F@FF@VF@fF@vF@F@F@F@F@F@F@F@F@G@G@&G@6G@FG@VG@fG@vG@G@G@G@G@G@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.plt.got.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @3@;o"@"VHo#@#0W$@$aB &@ &p k@@@f @@ @qG@G(zH@HV@ @>@@ @ (@(0@0 uP@PAA8@A( 0(#Kusr/bin/mbedtls-ssl_context_info0000755000000000000000000006426013776116123016112 0ustar rootrootELF>$@@0b@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@ @ @@@@@@]m@m@]m@m@  @@ PtdNN@N@  QtdRtd]m@m@``/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU%'y vp1 `PNH!@w '*-./123589<>?ABDEGILMNOQ: |@%@ZS5SٸDX$0vɑFA=Qj CcJ 2 : F'c4':B7k|!,I'#qX|KL6ϟ2bJZD2CE[]F4@Z =@; `=@39@q@> ;@  0"@p P*@8q@ %@':*q@ 0.@3"Pq@@@ =@ 0;@  $@+F >@z  @;@*q@ +@pX p/@ `+@M@:mbedtls_x509_crt_free_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTablembedtls_x509_crt_info__gmon_start__mbedtls_cipher_info_from_typembedtls_x509_crt_parse_dermbedtls_md_info_from_typembedtls_x509_crt_init_ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_idmbedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_strerrormbedtls_base64_decodefflushfopenputsputcharreallocstrftimegmtimefgetccallocstrlenmemsetstdoutmemcpyfclosemallocstderrfwrite__libc_start_mainvfprintflibmbedtls.so.13libz.so.1libmbedx509.so.1libmbedcrypto.so.6libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexifyget_mfl_strprint_deserialized_ssl_context_edataprint_versionprint_deserialized_ssl_certdebugmbedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexifyprint_b64get_enabled_strb64_fileprintf_errerror_exitprint_deserialized_ssl_sessionparse_arguments__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedprint_if_bitmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initprint_hexconf_dtls_protombedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_endread_next_b64_code__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randprint_timeprintf_dbgconf_keep_peer_certificatembedtls_test_rnd_zero_randalloc_errmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randbuf_ln_errprint_usageGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5$ui o@o@o@o@o@$o@&p@ p@(p@0p@8p@@p@Hp@ Pp@ Xp@ `p@ hp@ pp@xp@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@ p@!q@"q@#q@%HHOHtH5O%O@%Oh%Oh%Oh%Oh%Oh%Oh%Oh%Ohp%Oh`%Oh P%Oh @%Oh 0%Oh %zOh %rOh%jOh%bOh%ZOh%ROh%JOh%BOh%:Oh%2Oh%*Ohp%"Oh`%OhP%Oh@% Oh0%Oh %Nh%Nh%NhAWAVAUATUSH8HD$HD$ HD$(bH@q@H(HHD$IHMHHD$(AE1H$L|$ Lt$DH@HHL9v$HHHT$wHT$HIHAH= "1DH="RH|$HHL$ILH$H>H8q@8Ht$(HH@q@H8t4LLHH=H@q@H8H@q@HH|$HEDH=+)1H81[]A\A]A^A_H=M!1Ht$(HH AF@Ht$HT$ Ht$H=(1t&HN@1aH@q@H82H@q@HH|$HH=(EHN@1I^HHPTI?@H`?@H0"@KDH=YLHRLH9tHJHt H=)LH5"LH)HH?HHHtHJHtfD=KuUH~K]Dff.@f.@1H5v1H=~@H1H=H=r HfUHSHHt$(HT$0HL$8LD$@LL$Ht7)D$P)L$`)T$p)$)$)$)$)$H8q@8uH[]f.H$H=D$HD$HD$ HD$1D$ 0+HLIHT$HH;DH;H[]fUHSHHt$(HT$0HL$8LD$@LL$Ht7)D$P)L$`)T$p)$)$)$)$)$H$D$HD$HD$ HD$HHD$ 0H8HHH=H H;HT$HjH;H[]HH@q@H8HtNff.AWAVAUATUSHAIH-rL%~fDH8q@DA9~yHcIH4 ȃ-u BduBDkt-t[HHHL7H(q@DA9H[]A\A]A^A_fDzhtr-uzvt-uzfuzuE9Ml7H5I}H@q@HHIuH=K1fDzu1Dzw1DDH)q@DfDH=1Ht$=1Ht$?@1H1[]A\A]A^A_@1D1GfAUL-EATL$7USH HiL9s4@;HTI9tHHLuL11 &HEH8H[]A\A]ff.fAWHAVIAUATL$7USHHLDL9sXHI1L=!3H1H= I9t&HL9vLL1f vHDH8H[]A\A]A^A_9fUH Ht1HHHH|"gH?H ]fH H=?]ff.@uH1H=7HHHDff.wcH!HcHfHHHHHHAWE1AVIAUIATU1S1HI@q@=@=u{@uu=IEL9IB8II<$V@u߃AvBу v+t=N-U_V@Mt/ISvzIE$L9At5H==11$tlE1qH=1E1HL[]A\A]A^A_DH=ʯvHI/H=q1$1}$uDH=1E1?DH=˟˟I>T$ HGHHH $H $T$ HtfIIMB8IfDLH=1H)1$ f.SfD+C/9HN@E1AWIH=AVAAUATL%USHxIH$pLLLLLf.HHLDžx/HH=1H`Ht< fDH+HH=1H`HuL&Hx[]A\A]A^A_@HH1H=pH=1bLLLff.fAVAUAATUSIHHH=HAt1AHH=pHHHD$1H|$3HH)HD#H=K1LsfAEDDYIHHpH=G1At$,H=I1wA|$HHpH=W1RA|$8HH0H=I1.HL)H/{H=9H1HSHH)H sH=&1Lc$H=+1H{H ' SH=)1HL)H/H 0LHSTHH)HxsT1H=LcXQAt{H)q@IM)8I;DsXsY1Lc[H=AA sZA DEt'HDL)H9LDIWAI9At2HL)HA<$I\$IH=H1At2HL)HA<$I\$I.H=H1MA t.HL)H~LA<$I\$IH=H1I9HHH=1[L)]A\A]A^HM@HH= 1[]A\A]A^H=X1DH=qH=v5H[]A\A]A^1H=)bMi{X LcYCXHHcHH=+HL)H)DsY1H=.LcZDE&H=-1HL)L9LH "LM_H=nH=`sH=zObH=d>QH=O-@H=:/H=% H== H=0@H=HL)HA$AD$IIH=\ AD$M) 1uH81Lff.9ut(1 fHH9t 8 t1f.Ht3UH,SHHfDcHCH9uH1[]fD1DHH11Hff.AUIATIUSHHt5HoIHH9LFMu5L9rH1[]A\A]LK4(L)H1[]A\A]EDH7LLL+L)kIfDIIHATUSL\$Hf.IIڋW@ODMF1DÃA,D1-Ga1 W@AԃA,D11OD= 7uD։T$Et1ƒA A 9rIM)f[1]A\Jf.AWL=7.AVIAUIATAUH-(.SL)HsHt1LLDAHH9uH[]A\A]A^A_HHssl_context_info%s v%d.%d debug: ERROR: File path is empty Cannot find file "%s" --keep-peer-cert=0--dtls-protocol=0 %s%02X unknown %s enableddisablederrornone102420484096End of file Certificate:Invalid format of X.509 - %s Cannot deserialize: Session info: start time : Ciphersuite ID: %d Cannot find ciphersuite info ciphersuite : %s cipher flags : 0x%02X Cannot find cipher info cipher : %s Message-Digest : %s compression : %s Session id length: %u session ID : master secret : verify result : 0x%08X Certificate length: %u Peer digest : MD2MD4MD5SHA1SHA224SHA256SHA384SHA512RIPEMD160undefined or erroneousMessage-Digest length: %u Peer digest cert : Ticket:Ticket length: %u lifetime : %u sec. Session others: Mbed TLS version: major %u minor %u path %u Session config flags 0x%04X Context config flags 0x%06X MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIMEMBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_CMBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMACMBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MACMBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETSMBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMITMBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAYMBEDTLS_SSL_ALPNSession length %u Random bytes: Context others:In CID length %u Out CID length %u ALPN length %u not selected Deserializing number %u: Base64 code: Decoded data in hex: This program is used to deserialize an Mbed TLS SSL session from the base64 code provided in the text file. The program can deserialize many codes from one file, but they must be separated, e.g. by a newline. Usage: -f path - Path to the file with base64 code -v - Show version -h - Show this usage -d - Print more information --keep-peer-cert=0 - Use this option if you know that the Mbed TLS library has been compiled with the MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE flag. You can also use it if there are some problems with reading the information about certificate --dtls-protocol=0 - Use this option if you know that the Mbed TLS library has been compiled without the MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS flag The code found is too small to be a SSL context. The code found is too large by %u bytes. The length of the base64 code found should be a multiple of 4. Too many bad symbols detected. File check aborted. Cannot write to the output - %s Cannot find Message-Digest info MFL : %s negotiate truncated HMAC : %s Encrypt-then-MAC : %s %i bytes left to analyze from session Enabled session and context configuration:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTHMBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS and clientMBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID in CID : out CID : bad MAC seen number : %u last validated record sequence no. : bitmask for replay detection : DTLS datagram packing : %s outgoing record sequence no. : MTU : %u ALPN negotiation : ALPN negotiation is incorrect %i bytes left to analyze from context base64 code cannot be decoded - %s Finished. Found %u base64 codes Finished. No valid base64 code foundp`%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%SBuffer does not have enough data to complete the parsing Cannot allocate memory p != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;  XXh($80DXHlhtX(h<xP(x  L8d(zRx +zRx $FJ w?;*3$"D0X<'D^4pTADGg AAK [AA(ADGAA"D`BBB B(A0A8DP 8A0A(B BBBG  8C0A(B BBBI 4LhBIE F(L0V(A ABBDBIE B(E0A8D@|8A0A(B BBB$(QAD0p AJ DH`lxpH0BEE E(A0C8FP 8D0A(B BBBF H|3BLE B(H0A8G% 8A0A(B BBBE lBBE A(C0T@ 0M(D BBBE K 0J(A BBBL L 0A(A BBBD `8<BBB E(A0A8N@ 8F0A(B BBBL K 8J0A(B BBBJ LpBBB B(A0A8Dp 8C0A(B BBBD ( $ 8 BED G(G0} (A ABBA PKdYD_ A LBBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE 3(;FEG [CAGDPH(zBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,tQAA CBAD]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBBp%@@%@$ @ ?@m@m@o@ @X@ A p@@ @ o@ooJ@m@6 @F @V @f @v @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @!@!@&!@6!@F!@V!@f!@v!@!@!@!@!@!@!@!@!@"@"@&"@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@p+ X@X3 @ A;oJ@JHo@0W @ aB@k @ f @ q0"@0"w?@? }@@@ N@N O@O0m@]m@]m@] o@_0p@`q@a0q@*a 0*a#Mausr/bin/mbedtls-ssl_fork_server0000755000000000000000000005450013776116123015736 0ustar rootrootELF>*@@R@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@ @ @]]@@@@@8 8 PMP]@P]@hp`M`]@`]@  @@ PtdFF@F@QtdRtdPMP]@P]@/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNUC@| i&ACDEGJLMPQSTUVk|$06ϟqXB7K|j Cֳ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 4'D2c?j X2Hs<Jn3Q!uC+mMJ _Tb^%v.Y#o :7f P#@X ,@Y1 +@ a@ +@ @@a@fa@s -@3 0-@*a@ .@z p.@ P0@ /@]l *@+ ,@Kh a@ 0.@;P +@# /@mbedtls_x509_crt_free_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTablembedtls_x509_crt_parse__gmon_start__mbedtls_x509_crt_init_ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_ssl_freembedtls_net_initmbedtls_ssl_config_freembedtls_net_recvmbedtls_net_freembedtls_net_bindmbedtls_net_closembedtls_net_sendmbedtls_ssl_conf_dbgmbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chainmbedtls_ssl_conf_own_certmbedtls_ssl_readmbedtls_ssl_set_biombedtls_ssl_config_defaultsmbedtls_net_usleepmbedtls_ssl_setupmbedtls_ssl_conf_rngmbedtls_ssl_writembedtls_ssl_handshakembedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuitembedtls_ssl_close_notifymbedtls_net_acceptmbedtls_ssl_initmbedtls_ssl_config_initmbedtls_pk_freembedtls_test_srv_keymbedtls_test_srv_crt_lenmbedtls_test_cas_pem_lenmbedtls_test_cas_pemmbedtls_test_srv_crtmbedtls_test_srv_key_lenmbedtls_entropy_funcmbedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_entropy_initmbedtls_ctr_drbg_seedmbedtls_entropy_freembedtls_pk_initmbedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_ctr_drbg_initmbedtls_ctr_drbg_randommbedtls_ctr_drbg_freembedtls_pk_parse_keymbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseedfflushexitsprintfsignalputsforkgetpidcallocstrlenmemsetstdoutmemcpystderrfprintf__libc_start_mainlibmbedtls.so.13libz.so.1libmbedx509.so.1libmbedcrypto.so.6libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5@ui K_@_@_@_@_@ _@_@_@_@_@_@_@#_@$_@+_@:_@B`@ `@(`@0`@8`@ @`@ H`@ P`@ X`@``@h`@p`@x`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@`@ `@!`@"`@%`@&`@'`@(`@)`@*a@,a@-a@.a@/ a@0(a@10a@28a@3@a@4Ha@5Pa@6Xa@7`a@8ha@9pa@;xa@<a@=a@>a@?a@@a@AHH?HtH5?%?@%?h%?h%?h%?h%?h%?h%?h%?hp%?h`%?h P%?h @%?h 0%?h %z?h %r?h%j?h%b?h%Z?h%R?h%J?h%B?h%:?h%2?h%*?hp%"?h`%?hP%?h@% ?h0%?h %>h%>h%>h%>h %>h!%>h"%>h#%>h$%>h%%>h&%>h'p%>h(`%>h)P%>h*@%>h+0%>h, %z>h-%r>h.%j>h/%b>h0%Z>h1AWAVAUATUSHHD$8H\$;H8vH?;LHH;H0zH;;H5 ;LHYH;E11LHH0;H0@)H=QH=I1H:H811ҾLH5:HL$Hm:H5fLHH$1LILLL+H=H=1YH:H8JH<$11HH=wLd$Ld$Ll$L,$HLH=H9H8E111HL<H=1Hu9H81JH=.HH5H[H=1Ld$Ll$PH=1>HfH<$]LLH|$#LkHLH= 1롉H=1돉H=1zH=1eH="1PH=e1Ld$Ll$t1H=1Ld$Ll$UH<$Ld$Ll$H=ƉD$1$H7H8H5HH|$L\…H 7H7E1HH|$t$H=S1t$H=1HY7H8Lt$Lt$€Lut$H= Lt$St$H=1AH6H82H$HD$H|$1Ht$HH|$$=t҅nut$H=1t$H=1Ho6H8H|$MH|$H5H1wD$,HHD$ $=HT$ Ht$H|$…~HL$t$D$ 1H=)@BoL$,T$ dAD$,HcHD$ 럋t$H=1t$H=1t$1H=Lt$qt$H=1Zt$H=e1CHL$t$H=;1jt$H=B1St$H=1mbed TLS Test Server

Successful connection using: %s

pid %d: Write failed! peer closed the connection pid %d: Write failed! mbedtls_ssl_write returned %d p != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;X$Xlh(<hP|H(XzRx 0+zRx $p0FJ w?;*3$"DAU0`\XBBB B(A0A8G   8BED G(G0} (A ABBA K 0YD_ A L(tBBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE x3(;FEG [CAG$DPH,zBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,`QAA CBADL]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBB(+@P+@ @ T0@P]@X]@o@ @@  `@@X@ o(@oot@`]@6 @F @V @f @v @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @!@!@&!@6!@F!@V!@f!@v!@!@!@!@!@!@!@!@!@"@"@&"@6"@F"@V"@f"@v"@"@"@"@"@"@"@"@"@#@#@&#@6#@F#@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @@3 @ ;ot@tHo(@(0WX@XaB@k @ f @ 0qP#@P# wT0@T0 }@@@F@F`G@`GP]@PMX]@XM`]@`M _@O`@Pa@Qa@Q0Q#Qusr/bin/mbedtls-ssl_mail_client0000755000000000000000000006474013776116123015676 0ustar rootrootELF> 2@@ c@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@`` @ @mm@@@@@hhP]Pm@Pm@X`]`m@`m@  @@ PtdJJ@J@QtdRtdP]Pm@Pm@/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNUMD(0 `!@!@MOPRVYZ]^`abc.Hk|$06ϟqXB7K| Hj Cֳ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 4'D2c Ys@ }T3"oIWxv'h` aUn@&_&>NEoLG *6cP $@  8@Yp 7@ r@ 7@ @@r@@r@`pr@ :@3 @9@ir@* :@zG :@ `<@ <@] 2@+U 8@K r@; @:@; 7@b ;@mbedtls_x509_crt_free_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTablembedtls_x509_crt_infombedtls_x509_crt_parse__gmon_start__mbedtls_x509_crt_init_ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuitesmbedtls_ssl_freembedtls_net_initmbedtls_ssl_config_freembedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_idmbedtls_net_recvmbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuitesmbedtls_ssl_get_peer_certmbedtls_net_freembedtls_net_sendmbedtls_ssl_conf_authmodembedtls_net_connectmbedtls_ssl_conf_dbgmbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chainmbedtls_ssl_conf_own_certmbedtls_ssl_readmbedtls_ssl_set_hostnamembedtls_ssl_set_biombedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_namembedtls_ssl_config_defaultsmbedtls_ssl_setupmbedtls_ssl_conf_rngmbedtls_ssl_writembedtls_ssl_handshakembedtls_ssl_get_verify_resultmbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuitembedtls_ssl_close_notifymbedtls_ssl_initmbedtls_ssl_config_initmbedtls_pk_freembedtls_test_cli_crtmbedtls_test_cli_keymbedtls_test_cli_crt_lenmbedtls_test_cas_pem_lenmbedtls_x509_crt_parse_filembedtls_test_cli_key_lenmbedtls_test_cas_pemmbedtls_x509_crt_verify_infombedtls_entropy_funcmbedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_entropy_initmbedtls_pk_parse_keyfilembedtls_ctr_drbg_seedmbedtls_entropy_freembedtls_pk_initmbedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_ctr_drbg_initmbedtls_ctr_drbg_randommbedtls_strerrormbedtls_ctr_drbg_freembedtls_pk_parse_keymbedtls_base64_encodefflushexitsprintfputsputcharstrtolcallocstrlenmemsetstdoutmemcpystderrgethostnamestrchrfprintfstrcmp__libc_start_mainlibmbedtls.so.13libz.so.1libmbedx509.so.1libmbedcrypto.so.6libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randoptGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5ui o@o@ o@ o@Vo@Mo@o@o@o@!o@'o@)o@,o@9o@Co@Io@Lp@ p@(p@0p@8p@@p@Hp@Pp@ Xp@ `p@ hp@pp@xp@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@ p@"p@#p@$q@%q@&q@(q@* q@+(q@-0q@.8q@/@q@0Hq@1Pq@2Xq@3`q@4hq@5pq@6xq@7q@8q@:q@;q@<q@=q@>q@?q@@q@Aq@Bq@Dq@Eq@Fq@Gq@Hq@Jr@KHHOHtH5O%O@%Oh%Oh%Oh%Oh%Oh%Oh%Oh%Ohp%Oh`%Oh P%Oh @%Oh 0%Oh %zOh %rOh%jOh%bOh%ZOh%ROh%JOh%BOh%:Oh%2Oh%*Ohp%"Oh`%OhP%Oh@% Oh0%Oh %Nh%Nh%Nh%Nh %Nh!%Nh"%Nh#%Nh$%Nh%%Nh&%Nh'p%Nh(`%Nh)P%Nh*@%Nh+0%Nh, %zNh-%rNh.%jNh/%bNh0%ZNh1%RNh2%JNh3%BNh4%:Nh5%2Nh6%*Nh7p%"Nh8`%Nh9P%Nh:@% Nh;0%Nh< %Mh=%Kf%KfAWAVAUATIUSHHD$THHD$ H$HHD$H$HHD$(.1H$pH|$8H1fH$HHD$H$HHD$HD$`HHD$0H$HH$H@r@H@HH@HCH9HC H3HC(HbHCCHC0HC8HC@HCHHCPCXEM|$H-MdL- LIM9t]M7=LH@ LHL@t LLlILCM9uH=X 1H$AL%II<$HyH5IH<$AH HI6H=H=V 1I<$.Hs@>H|$ƅH=o1H=p 1I<$HsH>H|$QHsP>AH|$0HktH==HSH31H=W 2I<$yHSH31H|$ JH=H=k 1I<$;H|$(111L|$(LH$H5>HLnI$H5s L[{X'L|$(Ht$1L}Ht$HT$0LƅHt$(H|$ƅQH3H|$KAŅ L|$H GE1HGHt$ LH={Lo H=1I<$ Ht$8H=1H|$ ƍ8cH=Lt$p!H=q1I<$ LL|$8L1H5]LH|$LHcdƍ8c#{H=1I<$bH|$8 H55Ht$8H|$ ƍ8=H=L$p THs H=q1I<$HK HHL$HxHL$HHT$XLIHT$@ƅL|$8LH5f1LH|$LHcf ƍc%H=Hs(H=.1I<$^HK(HHL$HHL$HHT$@LIcƅEL|$8LH51LH|$LHc ƍ8=H=!H=1I<$L|$8HS01H5LH|$LHcp ƍ8c/H=)H=~1%I<$lL|$8HS81H5yLRH|$LHc ƍ8cH=eH=L1I<$H|$8H5EHt$8H|$ ƍcvH=p H=1lI<$L|$8HS01H5LLH=Hc15+Ht$8H|$H1ƅ$=HufD LH=!tfLH= H=LE H=LLC  1LYC=H=1M8HŅt,H4HHH1}u AH$+H|$ qH|$H|$H|$0H|$9H|$(oH<$HDfD 1LC% H=Lu)LC( 1L>CH5LLD$@LD$@t*H5LLD$@LD$@LC89LC00HfAH5?AH|$HH=1AH=71AHAH|$HH/AH0H5LLD$@LD$@tRH5LLD$@LD$@LCHnH@H|$0E11HH@H0LC@=H=1AH=1AH=1AH50LLD$@ELD$@u5LCPH=L1AooH|$(HsXH5LLD$@LD$@CXLCXC\SH=y1AH=1AH=1I<$Ht$8H|$ 1ƍ8cwH=Lt$p(H=x1I<$ LL|$8L1H5dLH|$ LHc;ƍ8c*H=$H=21 I<$g L:H|$8 H5"Ht$8H|$ ƍ8cH=VH|$<H=1AH=m1AH=1mHt$8H|$DŽ$p . fDŽ$t dƍ8c#H=H|$1I^HHPTI`<@H<@H $@v=DH=?H?H9tH=Ht H=?H5?H)HH?HHHtH==HtfD=Y?uUH~G?]Dff.@f.@UH5 H1H]eDAV1AUATIUHSHH= HM4E1Lt$E1fDLLHLHŅLH=~ 1Ƅ$Hc1IvzHH9vT uIuT$ /~/9 |$ HH9vNT u$E1HH9s/T tDA1T4 fLIE1H= 1HĐ[]A\A]A^H|$ 1D$HLHƅH=N 1fAW1AVAUATUHHL$LHH=q LH:H8D$=HAąuHH= H1H= 1HAƅuSH= gH= [HLH HLL4HD]A\A]A^A_IH=j LDH[ LDLpDL1H= A8fDAVAUE1ATE1USHHLt$LLHLHR$=tׁLH= 1Hc1IHH9vT uIu=T$ /~ 9|$ t^HH9v:T tA1T4 fDHH9sA uHH9rE1$HĐ[]A\A]A^H|$ 1D$؉H= 1LIff.AT1IH=UHSH"HHL€uHu[L]A\`H= 1[]A\H=:D@H=:@AUIATIUHHSHHu{HI$L9v,qBKHQЀ v Qw5QH ЈEt/B< vˍB<vB<w+BDQwQ1H[]A\A]I$AI1Et=A4D@0W@AFq0 WAWFƈDWHL9uDHHHEHtHH6LHH53H81WAUATIUSHHHHtCHƿHcIHtqHL$LHHXu%HL[]A\A]fDH1[]A\A]/LH46HMH5H81Lff.9ut(1 fHH9t 8 t1f.Ht3UH,SHHfDHCH9uH1[]fD1DHH11Hff.AUIATIUSHHt5HoIHH9LFMu5L9rH1[]A\A]LK4(L)H1[]A\A]EDH7LL"L+L)kIfDIIHATUSL\$Hf.IIڋW@ODMF1DÃA,D1-Ga1 W@AԃA,D11OD= 7uD։T$Et1ƒA A 9rIM)f[1]A\Jf.AWL=G1AVIAUIATAUH-81SL)HHt1LLDAHH9uH[]A\A]A^A_HH%s:%04d: %s %s failed ! ok %s localhost465userpasswordserver_nameserver_portdebug_levelauthenticationmodeuser_nameuser_pwdmail_frommail_toca_filecrt_filekey_fileforce_ciphersuitessl_mail_client ok (%d skipped) > Get header from server: > Write EHLO to server:EHLO %s > Write STARTTLS to server:STARTTLS AUTH LOGIN MAIL FROM:<%s> > Write RCPT TO to server:RCPT TO:<%s> > Write DATA to server:DATA > Write content to server: failed ! mbedtls_net_send returned %d failed ! mbedtls_net_recv returned %d . Performing the SSL/TLS handshake... failed ! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned %d: %s ok [ Ciphersuite is %s ] . Verifying peer X.509 certificate... . Peer certificate information ...failed ! mbedtls_ssl_read returned %d failed ! mbedtls_ssl_write returned %d usage: ssl_mail_client param=<>... acceptable parameters: server_name=%%s default: localhost server_port=%%d default: 465 debug_level=%%d default: 0 (disabled) mode=%%d default: 0 (SSL/TLS) (1 for STARTTLS) authentication=%%d default: 0 (disabled) user_name=%%s default: "user" user_pwd=%%s default: "password" mail_from=%%s default: "" mail_to=%%s default: "" ca_file=%%s default: "" (pre-loaded) crt_file=%%s default: "" (pre-loaded) key_file=%%s default: "" (pre-loaded) force_ciphersuite= default: all enabled acceptable ciphersuite names: . Seeding the random number generator... failed ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned %d . Loading the CA root certificate ... failed ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse returned %d . Loading the client cert. and key... failed ! mbedtls_pk_parse_key returned %d . Connecting to tcp/%s/%s... failed ! mbedtls_net_connect returned %d . Setting up the SSL/TLS structure... failed ! mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults returned %d failed ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert returned %d failed ! mbedtls_ssl_setup returned %d failed ! mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname returned %d failed ! server responded with %d > Write AUTH LOGIN to server: > Write username to server: %s failed ! mbedtls_base64_encode returned %d > Write password to server: %s > Write MAIL FROM to server:From: %s Subject: mbed TLS Test mail This is a simple test mail from the mbed TLS mail client example. Enjoy!p != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;p`0plpPHpdP4 004Pp(PXzRx +zRx $`FJ w?;*3$"D(\AUDxBDB D(D0Q! 0A(A BBBA @LJBIB B(A0J  0D(B BBBA @XEBBE D(A0J 0A(A BBBA 4HdhBMD r DBE QDB0 BBB B(D0C8G.h d 8`BED G(G0} (A ABBA K,YD_ A LHTBBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE 3(;FEG [CAGDPH zBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,<@QAA CBADl]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBB2@2@ @ d<@Pm@Xm@o@8 @@  p@@@ o@oo@`m@6 @F @V @f @v @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @!@!@&!@6!@F!@V!@f!@v!@!@!@!@!@!@!@!@!@"@"@&"@6"@F"@V"@f"@v"@"@"@"@"@"@"@"@"@#@#@&#@6#@F#@V#@f#@v#@#@#@#@#@#@#@#@#@$@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.plt.got.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @x 38 @8 ;o@Ho@0W@aB@k @ f @ q$@$z $@ $Ad<@d< @@@ J@JpK@pKPm@P]Xm@X]`m@`] uo@_p@`r@b r@b 0b#;busr/bin/mbedtls-ssl_pthread_server0000755000000000000000000005451013776116123016425 0ustar rootrootELF>(@@R@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@ @ @@@@@@x x M]@]@ M ]@ ]@00@@ PtdGG@G@QtdRtdM]@]@/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNUJ@|  i&AJKLNRTUXY[\]^k|$06ϟqXB7K| |j Cֳ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 4'D2c%*( 3Yy'H_hrz&r dD8=<4MyQ c I3 `#@W @.@Y 0-@ a@ -@ H@@oa@0b@'a@4 `/@3 .@a@ 0@z /@ 1@{ `1@]- (@+ -@K) a@ /@; @-@ 0@mbedtls_x509_crt_free_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTablembedtls_mutex_unlockmbedtls_x509_crt_parsembedtls_mutex_lockmbedtls_mutex_freembedtls_mutex_init__gmon_start__mbedtls_x509_crt_init_ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_ssl_cache_getmbedtls_ssl_freembedtls_net_initmbedtls_ssl_config_freembedtls_net_recvmbedtls_net_freembedtls_ssl_conf_session_cachembedtls_net_bindmbedtls_net_sendmbedtls_ssl_conf_dbgmbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chainmbedtls_ssl_cache_setmbedtls_ssl_conf_own_certmbedtls_ssl_readmbedtls_ssl_set_biombedtls_ssl_config_defaultsmbedtls_ssl_setupmbedtls_ssl_conf_rngmbedtls_ssl_writembedtls_ssl_handshakembedtls_ssl_cache_initmbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuitembedtls_ssl_close_notifymbedtls_ssl_cache_freembedtls_net_acceptmbedtls_ssl_initmbedtls_ssl_config_initpthread_joinpthread_creatembedtls_pk_freembedtls_test_srv_keymbedtls_test_srv_crt_lenmbedtls_test_cas_pem_lenmbedtls_test_cas_pemmbedtls_test_srv_crtmbedtls_test_srv_key_lenmbedtls_entropy_funcmbedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_entropy_initmbedtls_ctr_drbg_seedmbedtls_entropy_freembedtls_pk_initmbedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_ctr_drbg_initmbedtls_ctr_drbg_randommbedtls_strerrormbedtls_ctr_drbg_freembedtls_pk_parse_keyfflushexitsprintfputscallocstrlenmemsetstdoutmemcpystderrfprintfpthread_self__libc_start_mainlibmbedtls.so.13libz.so.1libpthread.so.0libmbedx509.so.1libmbedcrypto.so.6libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_allocdebug_mutex__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.50 ui Sui P_@X_@`_@h_@ p_@ x_@ _@ _@_@_@_@_@_@_@ _@!_@"_@&_@'_@/_@3_@A_@H`@ `@(`@0`@8`@@`@ H`@P`@X`@``@h`@p`@x`@`@`@`@`@`@`@#`@$`@%`@(`@)`@*`@+`@,`@-`@.`@0a@1a@2a@4a@5 a@6(a@70a@88a@9@a@:Ha@;Pa@<Xa@=`a@>ha@?pa@@xa@Ba@Ca@Da@Ea@Fa@Ga@IHH?HtH5?%?@%?h%?h%?h%?h%?h%?h%?h%?hp%?h`%?h P%?h @%?h 0%?h %z?h %r?h%j?h%b?h%Z?h%R?h%J?h%B?h%:?h%2?h%*?hp%"?h`%?hP%?h@% ?h0%?h %>h%>h%>h%>h %>h!%>h"%>h#%>h$%>h%%>h&%>h'p%>h(`%>h)P%>h*@%>h+0%>h, %z>h-%r>h.%j>h/%b>h0%Z>h1%R>h2AWerAVAUATUSHX foB#HD$pfL$`L$0H)D$PH$ L$HD$Ll$8L$ D$bLH$HHD$HL1H=!>HLHD$%H=v1H;H8hH!;LHH:H0ÅoH#;H5:H|$HgÅJH\$@HH\$[HE11H:HH;H0:ÅH=RH\$PH=X1HHLLH5:IÅ1H= KH=|111ҾHÅ"H5K:LHH9H5HHH X:Ht$HH9Ht$1HHT$LHÅwH=eH=h1Hz9H81H*1L'ÅH=aHl$(H\$ H=iDE111HLŅH=H=H;+x nH uH=16H>L$dLLD$LD$1H=LCH=1HD$@HD$L!H|$'H|$mLL=HLHv8Ha@H=1t뙉H=1b뇉H=O1NpH=19[HcHH5f:fo :D$L$`LLHLL$=tׅLH=1tTAA#AƉL1AH=<DIdLJLDLH=21HLC1Hh[]A\A]A^A_ALH=31AD6@LL1H=LH= 1 LH5*LH1Lc $=LLLŅ~ԉLL1H=LH=1$=LŅxH=f.LH=1AP9@LH=v1AxhLH=1APLLH=1LH=<1AAfH=54@H=5@AUIATIUHHSHHru{HI$L9v,qBKHQЀ v Qw5QH ЈEt/B< vˍB<vB<w+BDQwQ1H[]A\A]I$AI1Et=A4D@0W@AFq0 WAWFƈDWHL9uDHHHEHtHH1L^HjH5H81GAUATIUSHHHHtCHƿHIHtqHL$LHHXu%HL[]A\A]fDH1[]A\A]/L0H0HH5H81$Lff.9ut(1 fHH9t 8 t1f.Ht3UH,SHHfDHCH9uH1[]fD1DHH121Hff.AUIATIUSHHt5HoIHH9LFMu5L9rH1[]A\A]LK4(L)H1[]A\A]EDH7LLL+L)kIfDIIHATUSL\$Hf.IIڋW@ODMF1DÃA,D1-Ga1 W@AԃA,D11OD= 7uD։T$Et1ƒA A 9rIM)f[1]A\Jf.AWL=+AVIAUIATAUH-+SL)HsHt1LLDAHH9uH[]A\A]A^A_HH%s:%04d: [ #%ld ] %s [ #%ld ] ok 4433 [ main ] ok [ #%ld ] Setting up SSL/TLS data [ #%ld ] failed: mbedtls_ssl_setup returned -0x%04x [ #%ld ] Performing the SSL/TLS handshake [ #%ld ] failed: mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned -0x%04x [ #%ld ] < Read from client [ #%ld ] connection was closed gracefully [ #%ld ] connection was reset by peer [ #%ld ] mbedtls_ssl_read returned -0x%04x [ #%ld ] %d bytes read ===== %s ===== [ #%ld ] > Write to client: HTTP/1.0 200 OK Content-Type: text/html

mbed TLS Test Server

Successful connection using: %s

[ #%ld ] failed: peer closed the connection [ #%ld ] failed: mbedtls_ssl_write returned -0x%04x [ #%ld ] %d bytes written ===== %s ===== [ #%ld ] . Closing the connection... [ #%ld ] failed: mbedtls_ssl_close_notify returned -0x%04x [ #%ld ] Last error was: -0x%04x - %s . Loading the server cert. and key... failed ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse returned %d failed ! mbedtls_pk_parse_key returned %d . Seeding the random number generator... failed: mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned -0x%04x . Setting up the SSL data.... failed: mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults returned -0x%04x failed ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert returned %d . Bind on https://localhost:4433/ ... failed ! mbedtls_net_bind returned %d [ main ] Waiting for a remote connection [ main ] failed: mbedtls_net_accept returned -0x%04x [ main ] Creating a new thread [ main ] Cleaning up thread %d [ main ] failed: thread_create returned %d [ main ] Last error was: -0x%04x - %s ssl_pthread_servp != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;`XpDX t `h@zRx @+zRx $@FJ w?;*3$"DDwBBE E(D0D8D@Q8A0A(B BBBL>BBB B(A0A8J  8A0A(B BBBI 40BGB B(A0A8G ( 8<BED G(G0} (A ABBA x$K`YD_ A LBBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE 3( @;FEG [CAG8TDPHP\zBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,QAA CBAD@]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBBXP)@ )@8ISct @ 1@]@]@o@ @@ a `@0@ @ o@oo @ ]@6 @F @V @f @v @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @!@!@&!@6!@F!@V!@f!@v!@!@!@!@!@!@!@!@!@"@"@&"@6"@F"@V"@f"@v"@"@"@"@"@"@"@"@"@#@#@&#@6#@F#@V#@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @ 3 @ a;o @ Ho@PW @ aB0@0k @ f @ @q`#@`#aw1@1 }@@@~G@G H@ HX]@M]@M ]@ M0P_@PO`@Pa@Qa@Q 0Q#Qusr/bin/mbedtls-ssl_server0000755000000000000000000004450013776116123014714 0ustar rootrootELF>@*@@B@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@XX @ @00@0@  @=@M@@M@xP=PM@PM@  @@ Ptd55@5@QtdRtd@=@M@@M@/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNUE@| i&AEFGILNORSUVWXk|$06ϟqXB7K|j Cֳ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 4'D2cl W%o+3>FJ ^0 kaxQ9Yo K< P#@ `,@Y P+@ OQ@P @+@ 0@JQ@Q@ -@3. ,@Q@[ .@zx .@@ /@ /@] @*@+ ,@K Q@l -@; `+@ .@mbedtls_x509_crt_free_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTablembedtls_x509_crt_parse__gmon_start__mbedtls_x509_crt_init_ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_ssl_cache_getmbedtls_ssl_freembedtls_net_initmbedtls_ssl_config_freembedtls_net_recvmbedtls_net_freembedtls_ssl_conf_session_cachembedtls_net_bindmbedtls_net_sendmbedtls_ssl_conf_dbgmbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chainmbedtls_ssl_cache_setmbedtls_ssl_session_resetmbedtls_ssl_conf_own_certmbedtls_ssl_readmbedtls_ssl_set_biombedtls_ssl_config_defaultsmbedtls_ssl_setupmbedtls_ssl_conf_rngmbedtls_debug_set_thresholdmbedtls_ssl_writembedtls_ssl_handshakembedtls_ssl_cache_initmbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuitembedtls_ssl_close_notifymbedtls_ssl_cache_freembedtls_net_acceptmbedtls_ssl_initmbedtls_ssl_config_initmbedtls_pk_freembedtls_test_srv_keymbedtls_test_srv_crt_lenmbedtls_test_cas_pem_lenmbedtls_test_cas_pemmbedtls_test_srv_crtmbedtls_test_srv_key_lenmbedtls_entropy_funcmbedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_entropy_initmbedtls_ctr_drbg_seedmbedtls_entropy_freembedtls_pk_initmbedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_ctr_drbg_initmbedtls_ctr_drbg_randommbedtls_strerrormbedtls_ctr_drbg_freembedtls_pk_parse_keyfflushexitsprintfputscallocstrlenmemsetstdoutmemcpystderrfprintf__libc_start_mainlibmbedtls.so.13libz.so.1libmbedx509.so.1libmbedcrypto.so.6libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.56ui pO@xO@O@O@O@ O@ O@O@O@O@O@O@O@!O@"O@*O@/O@<O@CP@ P@(P@0P@8P@ @P@ HP@ PP@XP@`P@hP@pP@xP@P@P@P@P@P@P@P@ P@#P@$P@%P@&P@'P@(P@)P@+P@,Q@-Q@.Q@0Q@1 Q@2(Q@30Q@48Q@5@Q@6HQ@7PQ@8XQ@9`Q@:hQ@;pQ@=xQ@>Q@?Q@@Q@AQ@BQ@DHH/HtH5/%/@%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/hp%/h`%/h P%/h @%/h 0%/h %z/h %r/h%j/h%b/h%Z/h%R/h%J/h%B/h%:/h%2/h%*/hp%"/h`%/hP%/h@% /h0%/h %.h%.h%.h%.h %.h!%.h"%.h#%.h$%.h%%.h&%.h'p%.h(`%.h)P%.h*@%.h+0%.h, %z.h-%r.h.%j.h/%b.h0%Z.h1AWAVAUATUSHL|$8Lt$ Write to client: %d bytes written %s . Closing the connection... . Loading the server cert. and key... failed ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse returned %d failed ! mbedtls_pk_parse_key returned %d . Bind on https://localhost:4433/ ... failed ! mbedtls_net_bind returned %d . Seeding the random number generator... failed ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned %d . Setting up the SSL data.... failed ! mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults returned %d failed ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert returned %d failed ! mbedtls_ssl_setup returned %d . Waiting for a remote connection ... failed ! mbedtls_net_accept returned %d . Performing the SSL/TLS handshake... failed ! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned %d connection was closed gracefully mbedtls_ssl_read returned -0x%x HTTP/1.0 200 OK Content-Type: text/html

mbed TLS Test Server

Successful connection using: %s

failed ! peer closed the connection failed ! mbedtls_ssl_write returned %d failed ! mbedtls_ssl_close_notify returned %d p != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;$Xlx(<(Ph|HXzRx +zRx $0FJ w?;*3$"DxAU0`BBB B(A0A8G!H D 8@BED G(G0} (A ABBA K YD_ A L(4BBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE x3(;FEG [CAGDPHzBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ , QAA CBADL]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBB+@*@#6 @ /@@M@HM@o@ @@  P@@@ o@oo@PM@6 @F @V @f @v @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @!@!@&!@6!@F!@V!@f!@v!@!@!@!@!@!@!@!@!@"@"@&"@6"@F"@V"@f"@v"@"@"@"@"@"@"@"@"@#@#@&#@6#@F#@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @p3 @ ;o@Ho@0W@aB@k @ f @ 0qP#@P# w/@/ }0@05@506@06@M@@=HM@H=PM@P= pO@p?P@@Q@AQ@A0A#Ausr/bin/mbedtls-ssl_server20000755000000000000000000020624013776116123014777 0ustar rootrootELF>@@@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@==@@@@@oo@@LL A A  A A  @@ Ptd@@<<QtdRtd A A00/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU% E8L0 ` )@!aZS[f$0[|%C|j C2 : Hf" ➅cs4': B-h+ꉟB7k|UrmqX|𨪬KL6ϟ.H2bJZD2E CE[H\1 Rq  s 1R 4 dq n3  I  r,Q] y y j {-9 Y3 Y  7&o FP rK g{  Q  {,  * m7KW  -  b b\   w F D Uz  V,Q 8 A   7 C 'C> h!P%   x~l  ZiA s ~x @K Ј@*0 @Y @nH @]X @Al `@ A P@|A2 @ @@ Г@^ `@;  @3 @q B @  pI@= @+AA @q!@ @ @ & @+ @z @A @  @ 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*tcpudp(none) %-42s4433-Client_identityserver_portserver_addrdtlsdebug_levelnbioeventread_timeoutbuffer_sizeresponse_sizeca_fileca_pathcrt_filekey_filekey_pwdcrt_file2key_file2key_pwd2dhm_filepskpsk_identitypsk_listecjpake_pwforce_ciphersuitecurvesversion_suitesrenegotiationallow_legacyrenegotiaterenego_delayrenego_period%luexchangesmin_versionssl3tls1_1dtls1dtls1_2max_versionarc4allow_sha1force_versionauth_modecert_req_ca_listmax_frag_len512102420484096alpntrunc_hmacextended_msetmticketsticket_timeoutcache_maxcache_timeoutcookiesanti_replaybadmac_limiths_timeoutmtudgram_packingsniquery_configserializecontext_fileeap_tlsreproduciblenss_keylognss_keylog_fileuse_srtpsrtp_force_profilesupport_mkiCould not allocate %u bytes unknown ciphersuite: '%s' pre-shared key not valid hexpsk_list invaliddefaultunknown curve %s supported curves: %s ssl_server2 ok ok (%d skipped) . Loading DHM parameters... . Bind on %s://%s:%s/ ...Last error was: %d - %s hello verification requested ! client EAP encryption EAP-TLS key material is: %02x EAP-TLS IV is: < Read from client: connection was reset by peer %d bytes read %s ! memory allocation failed %d bytes read (%d + %d) %s %d bytes read %s > Write to client: . Closing the connection... doneLast error was: -0x%X - %s . Cleaning up... done.Number of curves: %d ---------------- NSS KEYLOG --------------------------------------------------------------mbedtls_ssl_check_record() returned inconsistent results.mbedtls_ssl_check_record() detected invalid record.mbedtls_ssl_check_record() detected unauthentic record.mbedtls_ssl_check_record() detected unexpected record.mbedtls_ssl_check_record() failed fatally with -%#04x. usage: ssl_server2 param=<>... acceptable parameters: server_addr=%%s default: (all interfaces) server_port=%%d default: 4433 debug_level=%%d default: 0 (disabled) buffer_size=%%d default: 200 (minimum: 1, max: 16385) response_size=%%d default: about 152 (basic response) (minimum: 0, max: 16384) increases buffer_size if bigger nbio=%%d default: 0 (blocking I/O) options: 1 (non-blocking), 2 (added delays) event=%%d default: 0 (loop) options: 1 (level-triggered, implies nbio=1), read_timeout=%%d default: 0 ms (no timeout) dtls=%%d default: 0 (TLS) hs_timeout=%%d-%%d default: (library default: 1000-60000) range of DTLS handshake timeouts in millisecs mtu=%%d default: (library default: unlimited) dgram_packing=%%d default: 1 (allowed) allow or forbid packing of multiple records within a single datgram. cookies=0/1/-1 default: 1 (enabled) 0: disabled, -1: library default (broken) anti_replay=0/1 default: (library default: enabled) badmac_limit=%%d default: (library default: disabled) auth_mode=%%s default: (library default: none) options: none, optional, required cert_req_ca_list=%%d default: 1 (send ca list) options: 1 (send ca list), 0 (don't send) ca_file=%%s The single file containing the top-level CA(s) you fully trust default: "" (pre-loaded) use "none" to skip loading any top-level CAs. ca_path=%%s The path containing the top-level CA(s) you fully trust default: "" (pre-loaded) (overrides ca_file) use "none" to skip loading any top-level CAs. crt_file=%%s Your own cert and chain (in bottom to top order, top may be omitted) default: see note after key_file2 key_file=%%s default: see note after key_file2 key_pwd=%%s Password for key specified by key_file argument default: none crt_file2=%%s Your second cert and chain (in bottom to top order, top may be omitted) default: see note after key_file2 key_file2=%%s default: see note below note: if neither crt_file/key_file nor crt_file2/key_file2 are used, preloaded certificate(s) and key(s) are used if available key_pwd2=%%s Password for key specified by key_file2 argument default: none dhm_file=%%s File containing Diffie-Hellman parameters default: preloaded parameters psk=%%s default: "" (disabled) The PSK values are in hex, without 0x. psk_list=%%s default: "" A list of (PSK identity, PSK value) pairs. The PSK values are in hex, without 0x. id1,psk1[,id2,psk2[,...]] psk_identity=%%s default: "Client_identity" allow_legacy=%%d default: (library default: no) renegotiation=%%d default: 0 (disabled) renegotiate=%%d default: 0 (disabled) renego_delay=%%d default: -2 (library default) renego_period=%%d default: (2^64 - 1 for TLS, 2^48 - 1 for DTLS) exchanges=%%d default: 1 tickets=%%d default: 1 (enabled) ticket_timeout=%%d default: 86400 (one day) eap_tls=%%d default: 0 (disabled) reproducible=0/1 default: 0 (disabled) nss_keylog=%%d default: 0 (disabled) This cannot be used with eap_tls=1 nss_keylog_file=%%s cache_max=%%d default: cache default (50) cache_timeout=%%d default: cache default (1d) max_frag_len=%%d default: 16384 (tls default) options: 512, 1024, 2048, 4096 trunc_hmac=%%d default: library default alpn=%%s default: "" (disabled) example: spdy/1,http/1.1 extended_ms=0/1 default: (library default: on) etm=0/1 default: (library default: on) curves=a,b,c,d default: "default" (library default) example: "secp521r1,brainpoolP512r1" - use "none" for empty list - see mbedtls_ecp_curve_list() for acceptable curve names sni=%%s name1,cert1,key1,ca1,crl,auth1[,...] default: disabled arc4=%%d default: (library default: 0) allow_sha1=%%d default: 0 min_version=%%s default: (library default: tls1) max_version=%%s default: (library default: tls1_2) force_version=%%s default: "" (none) options: ssl3, tls1, tls1_1, tls1_2, dtls1, dtls1_2 version_suites=a,b,c,d per-version ciphersuites in order from ssl3 to tls1_2 default: all enabled force_ciphersuite= default: all enabled query_config= return 0 if the specified configuration macro is defined and 1 otherwise. The expansion of the macro is printed if it is defined serialize=%%d default: 0 (do not serialize/deserialize) options: 1 (serialize) 2 (serialize with re-initialization) context_file=%%s The file path to write a serialized connection in the form of base64 code (serialize option must be set) default: "" (do nothing) option: a file path acceptable ciphersuite names: Error: eap_tls and nss_keylog options cannot be used together.Warning: event-driven IO mandates nbio=1 - overwriteforced ciphersuite not allowed with this protocol versionforced RC4 ciphersuite with RC4 disabledcurves list too long, maximum %d . Seeding the random number generator... failed ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned -0x%x . Loading the CA root certificate ... failed ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse returned -0x%x . Loading the server cert. and key... failed ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file returned -0x%x failed ! mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile returned -0x%x failed ! crt_file without key_file or vice-versa failed ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file(2) returned -0x%x failed ! mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile(2) returned -0x%x failed ! crt_file2 without key_file2 or vice-versa failed ! mbedtls_pk_parse_key returned -0x%x failed ! x509_crt_parse2 returned -0x%x failed ! pk_parse_key2 returned -0x%x failed ! mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhmfile returned -0x%04X . Setting up SNI information... failed ! mbedtls_net_bind returned -0x%x . Setting up the SSL/TLS structure... failed ! mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults returned -0x%x failed ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len returned %d failed ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols returned %d Warning: reproducible option used without constant time failed ! mbedtls_ssl_ticket_setup returned %d failed ! mbedtls_ssl_cookie_setup returned %d failed ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert returned %d failed mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk returned -0x%04X failed mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param returned -0x%04X failed ! mbedtls_ssl_setup returned -0x%x interrupted by SIGTERM (not in net_accept()) ! Client initiated reconnection from same port . Waiting for a remote connection ... interrupted by SIGTERM (in net_accept()) failed ! mbedtls_net_accept returned -0x%x failed ! net_set_(non)block() returned -0x%x failed ! mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id() returned -0x%x . Performing the SSL/TLS handshake... failed ! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned -0x%x ok [ Protocol is %s ] [ Ciphersuite is %s ] [ Record expansion is %d ] [ Record expansion is unknown (compression) ] [ Maximum input fragment length is %u ] [ Maximum output fragment length is %u ] [ Application Layer Protocol is %s ] . Verifying peer X.509 certificate... . Peer certificate information ... failed ! mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf returned -0x%x connection was closed gracefully mbedtls_ssl_read returned -0x%x ! mbedtls_ssl_read failed on cached data . Requestion renegotiation... failed ! mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate returned %d HTTP/1.0 200 OK Content-Type: text/html

mbed TLS Test Server

Successful connection using: %s

failed ! peer closed the connection failed ! mbedtls_ssl_write returned %d %d bytes written in %d fragments %s . Serializing live connection... failed ! mbedtls_ssl_context_save returned -0x%x failed ! Couldn't allocate buffer for serialized context . Save serialized context to a file... failed ! Couldn't allocate buffer for the base64 codefailed ! mbedtls_base64_encode returned -0x%x failed ! Cannot open '%s' for writing. failed ! fwrite(%ld bytes) failed . Context has been reset... ok . Freeing and reinitializing context... . Deserializing connection...failed ! mbedtls_ssl_context_load returned -0x%x Failed to list of opaque PSKs - error was %d too few values for version_suitesMBEDTLS_HAVE_ASMMBEDTLS_HAVE_TIMEMBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATEMBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBCMBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFBMBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTRMBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFBMBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTSMBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROSMBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIMMBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXTMBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTICMBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDEDMBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMYMBEDTLS_GENPRIMEMBEDTLS_FS_IOMBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORTMBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21MBEDTLS_SELF_TESTMBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKINGMBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MACMBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSVMBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATIONMBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLSMBEDTLS_SSL_ALPNMBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAYMBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFYMBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMITMBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETSMBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYSMBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMACMBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREADMBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURESMBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGEMBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORTMBEDTLS_AESNI_CMBEDTLS_AES_CMBEDTLS_ARC4_CMBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_CMBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_CMBEDTLS_BASE64_CMBEDTLS_BIGNUM_CMBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_CMBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_CMBEDTLS_CCM_CMBEDTLS_CERTS_CMBEDTLS_CHACHA20_CMBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_CMBEDTLS_CIPHER_CMBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_CMBEDTLS_DEBUG_CMBEDTLS_DES_CMBEDTLS_DHM_CMBEDTLS_ECDH_CMBEDTLS_ECDSA_CMBEDTLS_ECP_CMBEDTLS_ENTROPY_CMBEDTLS_ERROR_CMBEDTLS_GCM_CMBEDTLS_HKDF_CMBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_CMBEDTLS_MD_CMBEDTLS_MD5_CMBEDTLS_NET_CMBEDTLS_OID_CMBEDTLS_PADLOCK_CMBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_CMBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_CMBEDTLS_PK_CMBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_CMBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_CMBEDTLS_PKCS5_CMBEDTLS_PKCS12_CMBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CMBEDTLS_POLY1305_CMBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CMBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_CMBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_CMBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_CMBEDTLS_RSA_CMBEDTLS_SHA1_CMBEDTLS_SHA256_CMBEDTLS_SHA512_CMBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_CMBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_CMBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_CMBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_CMBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CMBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_CMBEDTLS_THREADING_CMBEDTLS_TIMING_CMBEDTLS_VERSION_CMBEDTLS_X509_USE_CMBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_CMBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_CMBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_CMBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_CMBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_CMBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_CMBEDTLS_XTEA_CMBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZEMBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZEMBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN10000MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT256MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUESTMBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUTMBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUESTMBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS521MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZEMBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIMMBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES20MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER128MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE32MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLEMBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOCcallocMBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREEfreeMBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXITexitMBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIMEtimeMBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTFfprintfMBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTFMBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTFsnprintf"seedfile"8640050MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN16384MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LENMBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAXMBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX16MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN32768MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LENMBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT60MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROSMBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LENMBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITESMBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITESMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGESMBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATIONMBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRETMBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATEMBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTINGMBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTHMBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSEMBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATIONMBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGEMBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORTMBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVALMBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUTMBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVALMBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUTMBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_SUCCESSMBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_FAILUREMBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READmbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_readMBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITEmbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_writeMBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILEMBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUTMBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIESMBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITYMBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITYMBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERINGMBEDTLS_SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIMEMBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CAMBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LENMBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_KEY_EXCHANGEp != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;<&HLhUUXؓxP(hH@x,X|țHȟ,ؠhH 4(Hط(HȹD\hH zRx X+zRx $J FJ w?;*3$"DS((\ȑ9BAD nABXܑKEE D(A0Z (A BBBE A (F BBBA JT |GEE D(A0A (A BBBJ A(F BBBA<H*DaT`@NZl@NZLLBI B(G0A8GH 8D0A(B BBBA LbBEH I(A0 (A BBBF W (F BBBE 4$ YBAD g ABG OAP\HUAOxe0ADD ] CAF zCALdBBA D(G0m (D ABBJ E (A AEBA ԖYnZ(<qFdFHX|qBBB B(A0D8Gp 8D0A(B BBBA +F^D8ĚBBE D(A0(D BBB,hnBDF G ABJ T,O=BFB B(A0D8P010^0M0B00]0M0A0,PBMG  DBA  ܰ 8ذBED G(G0} (A ABBA LK,YD_ A LH̱BBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE <3(h;FEG [CAG|DPHzBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,<QAA CBADlh]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBB`@0@( @@ @ A Ao@@H@  A /@,@ o@,@oo*@ A6@@F@@V@@f@@v@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@A@A@&A@6A@FA@VA@fA@vA@A@A@A@A@A@A@A@A@B@B@&B@6B@FB@VB@fB@vB@B@B@B@B@B@B@B@B@C@C@&C@6C@FC@VC@fC@vC@C@C@C@C@C@C@C@C@D@D@&D@6D@FD@VD@fD@vD@D@D@D@D@D@D@D@D@E@E@&E@6E@FE@VE@fE@vE@E@E@E@E@E@E@E@E@F@F@&F@6F@FF@VF@fF@vF@F@F@F@F@F@F@F@F@G@G@&G@6G@FG@VG@fG@vG@G@G@G@G@G@G@G@G@H@H@&H@6H@FH@VH@fH@vH@H@H@H@H@H@H@H@H@I@I@&I@6I@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.plt.got.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@\+ H@H3@;o*@*Ho@,@@,@W,@,aB/@/ k@@@f @@ @ q@I@@I(zpI@pIf@ @C@<@ A A A uAAA8A 0#usr/bin/mbedtls-strerror0000755000000000000000000003403013776116123014404 0ustar rootrootELF>@@1@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@X X @@]] @ @-=@=@-=@=@@@ PtdH!H!@H!@QtdRtd-=@=@88/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU@| i&A !#$%&k|$06ϟqXB7K|j Cֳ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 4'D2c  wF`, > @ @Y^ @ @@  @  @@@@@ @3 0@W@@ @z5 p@ P@ @] @+C @K @@) 0@;} @P @_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable__gmon_start___ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_strerrorexitputsstrtolcallocstrlenmemsetmemcpystderrfprintf__libc_start_mainlibmbedcrypto.so.6libz.so.1libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5mui x?@?@?@ ?@?@@@ @@(@@0@@8@@@@@H@@ P@@ X@@ `@@ h@@p@@x@@HH/HtH5/%/@%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/hp%/h`%/h P%/h @%/h 0%/h ATAUSHH~H|$AtH=1Ld$H LKHHD$8t8H{L-HHD$8tH=H1[]A\H~3HLd$L L1H=tf.1I^HHPTIP@H@H@-DH=.H.H9tH-Ht H=Y.H5R.H)HH?HHHtH-HtfD=.uUH~.]Dff.@f.@H=-@H=-@AUIATIUHHSHHRu{HI$L9v,qBKHQЀ v Qw5QH ЈEt/B< vˍB<vB<w+BDQwQ1H[]A\A]I$AI1Et=A4D@0W@AFq0 WAWFƈDWHL9uDHHHEHtHH+L H H5 H81aAUATIUSHHHHtCHƿHIHtqHL$LHHXu%HL[]A\A]fDH1[]A\A]/Lh HD+H H5. H81 L ff.9ut(1 fHH9t 8 t1f.Ht3UH,SHHfDHCH9uH1[]fD1DHH11Hff.AUIATIUSHHt5HoIHH9LFMu5L9rH1[]A\A]LK4(L)H1[]A\A]EDH7LLL+L)kIfDIIHATUSL\$Hf.IIڋW@ODMF1DÃA,D1-Ga1 W@AԃA,D11OD= 7uD։T$Et1ƒA A 9rIM)f[1]A\Jf.AWL=&AVIAUIATAUH-&SL)HHt1LLDAHH9uH[]A\A]A^A_HH usage: strerror where can be a decimal or hexadecimal (starts with 0x or -0x)Last error was: -0x%04x - %s p != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;h8xL`80(\Ht8zRx +zRx $FJ w?;*3$"4DBDA Gu  CABA |( $ 8 BED G(G0} (A ABBA KYD_ A LBBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE `3(t;FEG [CAGDPHzBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,QAA CBAD4]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBB|@p@ @ T@=@=@o@`@@  @@8 @ @x ox @oo" @=@6@F@V@f@v@@@@@@@@@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @3`@`;o" @" PHox @x 0W @ xaB @ 8k@f @ q@QwT@T } @ FH!@H!!@!=@-=@-=@-?@/(@@0@@0@@000#0usr/bin/mbedtls-udp_proxy0000755000000000000000000006423013776116123014560 0ustar rootrootELF>.@@b@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@ @ @@@@@@]m@m@p(N]m@m@  @@ PtdOO@O@QtdRtd]m@m@``/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU$@D(  p a@()@ $&(*-/14589:;<=j|#25$0`6ϟqXB7K|j Cֳ:2BEJZL P3b[S : u4'uZbD2c8t c6UxFW\y)N Gj;@h/$, *q "@  5@A <@Y= 2@X :@ 1q@ :@ @@,ȻBq@ =@3/ 5@' `<@Qq@I =@zf =@ ?@ ?@] 6@d .@+= ;@K q@ 6@ `=@; 6@4w ;@ @>@ 1@_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable__gmon_start___ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_net_initmbedtls_net_recvmbedtls_net_freembedtls_net_bindmbedtls_net_sendmbedtls_net_connectmbedtls_net_acceptmbedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_strerrormbedtls_timing_get_timerfflushexitsrandperrorputstimeselectstrtolcallocstrlenmemsetstdoutmemcpystderrstrchrfprintfstrcmp__libc_start_mainlibmbedtls.so.13libz.so.1libmbedx509.so.1libmbedcrypto.so.6libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randclear_pendingmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexifyhandle_message__data_startupdate_droppedmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initsend_delayedmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startsend_packetmbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randdelay_packetprint_packetGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5ui o@o@o@o@o@o@#p@ p@(p@0p@8p@@p@Hp@ Pp@ Xp@ `p@ hp@ pp@xp@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@p@ p@!p@"HHOHtH5O%O@%Oh%Oh%Oh%Oh%Oh%Oh%Oh%Ohp%Oh`%Oh P%Oh @%Oh 0%Oh %zOh %rOh%jOh%bOh%ZOh%ROh%JOh%BOh%:Oh%2Oh%*Ohp%"Oh`%OhP%Oh@% Oh0%Oh AWAVAUATUSHHHHD$4Ll$8HHD$Lt$H,+fH5++HeHnH+H5XHa7 )Z)c)l)u)~ELcLl$HlLt$H*L5II9teM,$=L?H4 LHLpt LH=?*3IL5XI9uLl$Lt$D6E ='FH'H51H=/'HLH8HLH5H=h*LHݖH5Ζ1H=P*`HKH8QH|$HH5H= *E1H$LH=&1H`KH8H|$E111L<CH=)1\$8H=L9\$<M\$1H=@CHA'@H=1@H=?o1?뱐AWHD1AH=&6@AUATUSHoLoLg?HtpHtI1H=`?IALLH=F1oH=H8H[]A\A]VfDH=?1#?먐t,1H=>ALL1H=H=>_1>ŐAWAVIAUATUSHHHH/=t5 LktHsH=.atHsH=#LHSLHAątHsH=kD%HEtE1='HHD[]A\A]A^A_f.Hs H=I HHH=r]fDSILLI4A H5/H߀D$ SLHAąDDH=1'3f15KSILLH5H߀t$ &SLHAąLHsH=tDEthE1=H5[HSLH/AąY'H=I1JDH5H=mH5 HÅ~H=1Aff.Hh1H=C HnHfHH=VHt0HG HHi HH9HCH:f.ff.@H=ATUStJE11H-VCH)DAAH;=٫sHi HHH5t[]A\@#[1]A\ff.GH:%ff.AVAUATUHSHH׺HH HHt$Aą~*D$D$<~HHcHH=1hH HD[]A\A]A^DHI1HD$LH\$H,$nH޹H=>H€u ΃HXt:Hl$LtfDH;HtH`AąHL9u܋T$9LE1*fH;@H5+@H@HAT$* T$/HU T$2|$)D$)HJHcHDH3@LHH;H|@5ӁLD$H=WLtkH=[LtQ ǂtH= Lt-HcH9t!Hj8<w=t=HT$H=HtnH=HtT"tH=eHt0T$HcH9t H7<w&=tSH5LAą1AHt$H=LE1H#HWHeHHHHHHsHTwH<kH6_HSf.fH=ـ@H=ɀ@AUIATIUHHSHH2u{HI$L9v,qBKHQЀ v Qw5QH ЈEt/B< vˍB<vB<w+BDQwQ1H[]A\A]I$AI1Et=A4D@0W@AFq0 WAWFƈDWHL9uDHHHEHtHH3LHH5H81gAUATIUSHHHHtCHƿHcIHtqHL$LHHXu%HL[]A\A]fDH1[]A\A]/LH3HH5VH81Lff.9ut(1 fHH9t 8 t1f.Ht3UH,SHHfDsHCH9uH1[]fD1DHH11Hff.AUIATIUSHHt5HoIHH9LFMu5L9rH1[]A\A]LK4(L)H1[]A\A]EDH7LLL+L)kIfDIIHATUSL\$Hf.IIڋW@ODMF1DÃA,D1-Ga1 W@AԃA,D11OD= 7uD։T$Et1ƒA A 9rIM)f[1]A\Jf.AWL=w.AVIAUIATAUH-h.SL)HHt1LLDAHH9uH[]A\A]A^A_HH unknown option or missing value: %s option %s: illegal value: %s usage: udp_proxy param=<>... acceptable parameters: server_addr=%%s default: localhost server_port=%%d default: 4433 listen_addr=%%s default: localhost listen_port=%%d default: 4433 duplicate=%%d default: 0 (no duplication) duplicate about 1:N packets randomly delay=%%d default: 0 (no delayed packets) delay about 1:N packets randomly delay_ccs=0/1 default: 0 (don't delay ChangeCipherSpec) delay_cli=%%s Handshake message from client that should be delayed. Possible values are 'ClientHello', 'Certificate', 'CertificateVerify', and 'ClientKeyExchange'. May be used multiple times, even for the same message, in which case the respective message gets delayed multiple times. delay_srv=%%s Handshake message from server that should be delayed. Possible values are 'HelloRequest', 'ServerHello', 'ServerHelloDone', 'Certificate' 'ServerKeyExchange', 'NewSessionTicket', 'HelloVerifyRequest' and ''CertificateRequest'. May be used multiple times, even for the same message, in which case the respective message gets delayed multiple times. drop=%%d default: 0 (no dropped packets) drop about 1:N packets randomly mtu=%%d default: 0 (unlimited) drop packets larger than N bytes bad_ad=0/1 default: 0 (don't add bad ApplicationData) bad_cid=%%d default: 0 (don't corrupt Connection IDs) duplicate 1:N packets containing a CID, modifying CID in first instance of the packet. protect_hvr=0/1 default: 0 (don't protect HelloVerifyRequest) protect_len=%%d default: (don't protect packets of this size) inject_clihlo=0/1 default: 0 (don't inject fake ClientHello) seed=%%d default: (use current time) pack=%%d default: 0 (don't pack) options: t > 0 (pack for t milliseconds) %05u flush %s: %u bytes, %u datagrams, last %u ms ! buffer size %u too large (max %u) ctx_buffer_flush failed with -%#04x %05u dispatch %s %s (%u bytes) %05u dispatch %s %s (%u bytes): %s ! can't corrupt empty AD record ! mbedtls_net_recv returned %d too many uses of %s: only %d allowed . Connect to server on UDP/%s/%s ... failed ! mbedtls_net_connect returned %d failed ! mbedtls_net_bind returned %d . Waiting for a remote connection ... failed ! mbedtls_net_accept returned %d Last error was: -0x%04X - %s net_send returned -%#04x ClientHellomodified CID ! dispatch returned %d ApplicationDatacorruptedduplicatedinjecteddelayedUnknown handshakeCertificateVerifyEncrypted handshakeUnknownFinishedChangeCipherSpecClientKeyExchangeHelloRequestInvalid handshakeAlertServerHelloHelloVerifyRequestNewSessionTicketCertificateServerKeyExchangeCertificateRequestServerHelloDoneS <- Cforwardedlocalhost44335556server_addrserver_portlisten_addrlisten_portduplicatedelaydelay_ccsdelay_clidelay_srv Allocation failuredroppackmtubad_adprotect_hvrprotect_leninject_clihloseed . Pseudo-random seed: %u ok . Bind on UDP/%s/%s ...S -> Cselect\l|, p != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0;(` pPPd` xp@XPl``<P| XzRx p+zRx $PFJ w?;*3$"DHD8X4HBB A(A0(A BBB0|BBD D0  DBBB 84BBA A(D0U (A ABBK LBBE B(A0A8J 8D0A(B BBBK T'DblA4dJAA D ABE FCBD 4BBB A(D0RАR 0D(A BBBF 48 BBB B(A0C8JL ` 8tBED G(G0} (A ABBA LKYD_ A LBBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE 0<3(Dh;FEG [CAGp|DPHzBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,QAA CBADh]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBBL.@.@ @ ?@m@m@o@ @@  p@ @@ o`@oo @m@6 @F @V @f @v @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @!@!@&!@6!@F!@V!@f!@v!@!@!@!@!@!@!@!@!@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @3 @ ;o @ Ho`@`0W@aB @ k @ f @ q"@"w?@? }@@@O@OP@Pm@]m@]m@] o@_0p@`q@a q@aJ 0a#3ausr/bin/mbedtls-zeroize0000755000000000000000000003405013776116123014213 0ustar rootrootELF>@@1@8 @@@@@@hh@@@@ @@ @ @hh-=@=@-=@=@@@ Ptd""@"@QtdRtd-=@=@88/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2GNU@|i&E #$&'()k|$06ϟqXB7K|j Cֲ:2BEJZL 3b[S : 4'D2c  F`w, R @ P@Yr @@ @@! 0@  @@@@@ p@3, @K @k@@2 @zO @ @ p@] @+W @K @@= @; P@j @_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable__gmon_start___ITM_registerTMCloneTablembedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_platform_setupmbedtls_platform_zeroizeexitfopenputsfgetccallocstrlenmemsetmemcpyfclosestderrfprintf__libc_start_mainlibmbedcrypto.so.6libz.so.1libc.so.6__libc_csu_finimbedtls_test_platform_setupmbedtls_test_rnd_std_randmbedtls_test_hexify_edatambedtls_test_platform_teardownmbedtls_test_unhexify__data_startmbedtls_test_hexcmp_IO_stdin_usedmbedtls_test_zero_alloc__libc_csu_initmbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc_end__bss_startusagembedtls_test_rnd_buffer_randmbedtls_test_rnd_zero_randmbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_randGLIBC_2.14GLIBC_2.2.5ui ?@?@?@ ?@?@@@ @@(@@0@@8@@@@@H@@ P@@ X@@ `@@ h@@p@@x@@@@@@HH/HtH5/%/@%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/h%/hp%/h`%/h P%/h @%/h 0%/h %z/h %r/hAUATUSHtH=H~HH5HHttIL$LtHHL9rL9t(LE1HL@D(H=hAVHsH=61r1I^HHPTI@Hp@H @-DH=i.Hb.H9tH-Ht H=9.H52.H)HH?HHHtHe-HtfD=-uUH~-]Dff.@f.@HH= @H=I 4H=u (H= 1EH= HDH=j-@H=Z-t@AUIATIUHHSHHu{HI$L9v,qBKHQЀ v Qw5QH ЈEt/B< vˍB<vB<w+BDQwQ1H[]A\A]I$AI1Et=A4D@0W@AFq0 WAWFƈDWHL9uDHHHE&HtHH}+L H H5 H81GAUATIUSHHHHtCHƿHIHtqHL$LHHXu%HL[]A\A]fDH1[]A\A]/L H*H- H5f H81TL ff.9ut(1 fHH9t 8 t1f.Ht3UH,SHHfDCHCH9uH1[]fD1DHH1r1Hff.AUIATIUSHHt5HoIHH9LFMu5L9rH1[]A\A]LK4(L)H1[]A\A]EDH7LL2L+L)kIfDIIHATUSL\$Hf.IIڋW@ODMF1DÃA,D1-Ga1 W@AԃA,D11OD= 7uD։T$Et1ƒA A 9rIM)f[1]A\Jf.AWL=O&AVIAUIATAUH-@&SL)HcHt1LLDAHH9uH[]A\A]A^A_HHZeroize is a simple program to assist with testingthe mbedtls_platform_zeroize() function by using thedebugger. This program takes a file as input andprints the first %d characters. Usage: This program takes exactly 1 agument zeroize rCould not open file '%s' The file is empty!p != NULLobuf != NULL/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/tests/src/helpers.cAssertion Failed at %s:%d - %s mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0; 0P@dPxPp4HtpPzRx H+zRx $8FJ w?;*3$"DKDB,\BBA A(G  8BED G(G0} (A ABBA DKYD_ A L BBD A(G@@ (D ABBG D (C ABBE p43(`;FEG [CAGtDPH|zBED A(D0d (C ABBD N (C ABBJ ,QAA CBADD`]BIE E(D0H8G@j8A0A(B BBBx@@ @ @=@=@o@@@  @@h @ @x o @oo @=@6@F@V@f@v@@@@@@@@@@@GCC: (GNU) 9.3.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.interp.note.ABI-tag.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.dynamic.got.got.plt.data.bss.comment @@ !o@+ @3@;o @ VHo @ 0W @ xaB @ hk@f @ q @ w@ } @ "@""@"=@-=@-=@-?@/(@@0@@0@@000#0usr/doc/0000755000000000000000000000000013776116122011140 5ustar rootrootusr/doc/mbedtls-2.25.0/0000755000000000000000000000000013776116122013314 5ustar rootrootusr/doc/mbedtls-2.25.0/CONTRIBUTING.md0000644000000000000000000002113613764415275015560 0ustar rootrootContributing ============ We gratefully accept bug reports and contributions from the community. There are some requirements we need to fulfill in order to be able to integrate contributions: - As with any open source project, contributions will be reviewed by the project team and community and may need some modifications to be accepted. - The contribution should not break API or ABI, unless there is a real justification for that. If there is an API change, the contribution, if accepted, will be merged only when there will be a major release. Coding Standards ---------------- - We would ask that contributions conform to [our coding standards](https://tls.mbed.org/kb/development/mbedtls-coding-standards), and that contributions are fully tested before submission, as mentioned in the [Tests](#tests) and [Continuous Integration](#continuous-integration-tests) sections. - The code should be written in a clean and readable style. - The code should be written in a portable generic way, that will benefit the whole community, and not only your own needs. - The code should be secure, and will be reviewed from a security point of view as well. Making a Contribution --------------------- 1. [Check for open issues](https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues) or [start a discussion](https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/mbed-tls) around a feature idea or a bug. 1. Fork the [Mbed TLS repository on GitHub](https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls) to start making your changes. As a general rule, you should use the ["development" branch](https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/tree/development) as a basis. 1. Write a test which shows that the bug was fixed or that the feature works as expected. 1. Send a pull request (PR) and work with us until it gets merged and published. Contributions may need some modifications, so a few rounds of review and fixing may be necessary. We will include your name in the ChangeLog :) 1. For quick merging, the contribution should be short, and concentrated on a single feature or topic. The larger the contribution is, the longer it would take to review it and merge it. 1. All new files should include the [Apache-2.0](https://spdx.org/licenses/Apache-2.0.html) standard license header where possible. 1. Ensure that each commit has at least one `Signed-off-by:` line from the committer. If anyone else contributes to the commit, they should also add their own `Signed-off-by:` line. By adding this line, contributor(s) certify that the contribution is made under the terms of the [Developer Certificate of Origin](dco.txt). The contribution licensing is described in the [License section of the README](README.md#License). API/ABI Compatibility --------------------- The project aims to minimise the impact on users upgrading to newer versions of the library and it should not be necessary for a user to make any changes to their own code to work with a newer version of the library. Unless the user has made an active decision to use newer features, a newer generation of the library or a change has been necessary due to a security issue or other significant software defect, no modifications to their own code should be necessary. To achieve this, API compatibility is maintained between different versions of Mbed TLS on the main development branch and in LTS (Long Term Support) branches. To minimise such disruption to users, where a change to the interface is required, all changes to the ABI or API, even on the main development branch where new features are added, need to be justifiable by either being a significant enhancement, new feature or bug fix which is best resolved by an interface change. Where changes to an existing interface are necessary, functions in the public interface which need to be changed, are marked as 'deprecated'. This is done with the preprocessor symbols `MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING` and `MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED`. Then, a new function with a new name but similar if not identical behaviour to the original function containing the necessary changes should be created alongside the existing deprecated function. When a build is made with the deprecation preprocessor symbols defined, a compiler warning will be generated to warn a user that the function will be removed at some point in the future, notifying users that they should change from the older deprecated function to the newer function at their own convenience. Therefore, no changes are permitted to the definition of functions in the public interface which will change the API. Instead the interface can only be changed by its extension. As described above, if a function needs to be changed, a new function needs to be created alongside it, with a new name, and whatever change is necessary, such as a new parameter or the addition of a return value. Periodically, the library will remove deprecated functions from the library which will be a breaking change in the API, but such changes will be made only in a planned, structured way that gives sufficient notice to users of the library. Long Term Support Branches -------------------------- Mbed TLS maintains several LTS (Long Term Support) branches, which are maintained continuously for a given period. The LTS branches are provided to allow users of the library to have a maintained, stable version of the library which contains only security fixes and fixes for other defects, without encountering additional features or API extensions which may introduce issues or change the code size or RAM usage, which can be significant considerations on some platforms. To allow users to take advantage of the LTS branches, these branches maintain backwards compatibility for both the public API and ABI. When backporting to these branches please observe the following rules: 1. Any change to the library which changes the API or ABI cannot be backported. 1. All bug fixes that correct a defect that is also present in an LTS branch must be backported to that LTS branch. If a bug fix introduces a change to the API such as a new function, the fix should be reworked to avoid the API change. API changes without very strong justification are unlikely to be accepted. 1. If a contribution is a new feature or enhancement, no backporting is required. Exceptions to this may be additional test cases or quality improvements such as changes to build or test scripts. It would be highly appreciated if contributions are backported to LTS branches in addition to the [development branch](https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/tree/development) by contributors. Currently maintained LTS branches are: 1. [mbedtls-2.7](https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/tree/mbedtls-2.7) 1. [mbedtls-2.16](https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/tree/mbedtls-2.16) Tests ----- As mentioned, tests that show the correctness of the feature or bug fix should be added to the pull request, if no such tests exist. Mbed TLS includes a comprehensive set of test suites in the `tests/` directory that are dynamically generated to produce the actual test source files (e.g. `test_suite_mpi.c`). These files are generated from a `function file` (e.g. `suites/test_suite_mpi.function`) and a `data file` (e.g. `suites/test_suite_mpi.data`). The function file contains the test functions. The data file contains the test cases, specified as parameters that will be passed to the test function. [A Knowledge Base article describing how to add additional tests is available on the Mbed TLS website](https://tls.mbed.org/kb/development/test_suites). A test script `tests/scripts/basic-build-test.sh` is available to show test coverage of the library. New code contributions should provide a similar level of code coverage to that which already exists for the library. Sample applications, if needed, should be modified as well. Continuous Integration Tests ---------------------------- Once a PR has been made, the Continuous Integration (CI) tests are triggered and run. You should follow the result of the CI tests, and fix failures. It is advised to enable the [githooks scripts](https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/tree/development/tests/git-scripts) prior to pushing your changes, for catching some of the issues as early as possible. Documentation ------------- Mbed TLS is well documented, but if you think documentation is needed, speak out! 1. All interfaces should be documented through Doxygen. New APIs should introduce Doxygen documentation. 1. Complex parts in the code should include comments. 1. If needed, a Readme file is advised. 1. If a [Knowledge Base (KB)](https://tls.mbed.org/kb) article should be added, write this as a comment in the PR description. 1. A [ChangeLog](https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/blob/development/ChangeLog.d/00README.md) entry should be added for this contribution. usr/doc/mbedtls-2.25.0/ChangeLog0000644000000000000000000064407013764415275015111 0ustar rootrootmbed TLS ChangeLog (Sorted per branch, date) = mbed TLS 2.25.0 branch released 2020-12-11 API changes * The numerical values of the PSA Crypto API macros have been updated to conform to version 1.0.0 of the specification. * PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER replaces PSA_ALG_CHACHA20 and PSA_ALG_ARC4. The underlying stream cipher is determined by the key type (PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 or PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4). * The functions mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt() and mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt() no longer accept NIST_KW contexts, as they have no way to check if the output buffer is large enough. Please use mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext() and mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext() instead. Credit to OSS-Fuzz and Cryptofuzz. Fixes #3665. Requirement changes * Update the minimum required CMake version to 2.8.12. This silences a warning on CMake 3.19.0. #3801 New deprecations * PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 and PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 have been deprecated. Use PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER instead. * The functions mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt() and mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt() are deprecated in favour of the new functions mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext() and mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext(). Please note that with AEAD ciphers, these new functions always append the tag to the ciphertext, and include the tag in the ciphertext length. Features * Partial implementation of the new PSA Crypto accelerator APIs. (Symmetric ciphers, asymmetric signing/verification and key generation, validate_key entry point, and export_public_key interface.) * Add support for ECB to the PSA cipher API. * In PSA, allow using a key declared with a base key agreement algorithm in combined key agreement and derivation operations, as long as the key agreement algorithm in use matches the algorithm the key was declared with. This is currently non-standard behaviour, but expected to make it into a future revision of the PSA Crypto standard. * Add MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX CMake variable, which is prefixed to the mbedtls, mbedcrypto, mbedx509 and apidoc CMake target names. This can be used by external CMake projects that include this one to avoid CMake target name clashes. The default value of this variable is "", so default target names are unchanged. * Add support for DTLS-SRTP as defined in RFC 5764. Contributed by Johan Pascal, improved by Ron Eldor. * In the PSA API, it is no longer necessary to open persistent keys: operations now accept the key identifier. The type psa_key_handle_t is now identical to psa_key_id_t instead of being platform-defined. This bridges the last major gap to compliance with the PSA Cryptography specification version 1.0.0. Opening persistent keys is still supported for backward compatibility, but will be deprecated and later removed in future releases. * PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH, PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE, PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH and PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE macros have been added as defined in version 1.0.0 of the PSA Crypto API specification. Security * The functions mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt() and mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt() would write past the minimum documented size of the output buffer when used with NIST_KW. As a result, code using those functions as documented with NIST_KW could have a buffer overwrite of up to 15 bytes, with consequences ranging up to arbitrary code execution depending on the location of the output buffer. * Limit the size of calculations performed by mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod to MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE to prevent a potential denial of service when generating Diffie-Hellman key pairs. Credit to OSS-Fuzz. * A failure of the random generator was ignored in mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(), which is how most uses of randomization in asymmetric cryptography (including key generation, intermediate value randomization and blinding) are implemented. This could cause failures or the silent use of non-random values. A random generator can fail if it needs reseeding and cannot not obtain entropy, or due to an internal failure (which, for Mbed TLS's own CTR_DRBG or HMAC_DRBG, can only happen due to a misconfiguration). * Fix a compliance issue whereby we were not checking the tag on the algorithm parameters (only the size) when comparing the signature in the description part of the cert to the real signature. This meant that a NULL algorithm parameters entry would look identical to an array of REAL (size zero) to the library and thus the certificate would be considered valid. However, if the parameters do not match in *any* way then the certificate should be considered invalid, and indeed OpenSSL marks these certs as invalid when mbedtls did not. Many thanks to guidovranken who found this issue via differential fuzzing and reported it in #3629. * Zeroising of local buffers and variables which are used for calculations in mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac(), mbedtls_internal_sha*_process(), mbedtls_internal_md*_process() and mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process() functions to erase sensitive data from memory. Reported by Johan Malmgren and Johan Uppman Bruce from Sectra. Bugfix * Fix an invalid (but nonzero) return code from mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey() when the input has trailing garbage. Fixes #2512. * Fix build failure in configurations where MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled but ECDSA is disabled. Contributed by jdurkop. Fixes #3294. * Include the psa_constant_names generated source code in the source tree instead of generating it at build time. Fixes #3524. * Fix rsa_prepare_blinding() to retry when the blinding value is not invertible (mod N), instead of returning MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED. This addresses a regression but is rare in practice (approx. 1 in 2/sqrt(N)). Found by Synopsys Coverity, fix contributed by Peter Kolbus (Garmin). Fixes #3647. * Use socklen_t on Android and other POSIX-compliant system * Fix the build when the macro _GNU_SOURCE is defined to a non-empty value. Fix #3432. * Consistently return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT on invalid cipher input sizes (instead of PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE in some cases) to make the psa_cipher_* functions compliant with the PSA Crypto API specification. * mbedtls_ecp_curve_list() now lists Curve25519 and Curve448 under the names "x25519" and "x448". These curves support ECDH but not ECDSA. If you need only the curves that support ECDSA, filter the list with mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do(). * Fix psa_generate_key() returning an error when asked to generate an ECC key pair on Curve25519 or secp244k1. * Fix psa_key_derivation_output_key() to allow the output of a combined key agreement and subsequent key derivation operation to be used as a key inside of the PSA Crypto core. * Fix handling of EOF against 0xff bytes and on platforms with unsigned chars. Fixes a build failure on platforms where char is unsigned. Fixes #3794. * Fix an off-by-one error in the additional data length check for CCM, which allowed encryption with a non-standard length field. Fixes #3719. * Correct the default IV size for mbedtls_cipher_info_t structures using MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB to 0, since ECB mode ciphers don't use IVs. * Make arc4random_buf available on NetBSD and OpenBSD when _POSIX_C_SOURCE is defined. Fix contributed in #3571. * Fix conditions for including string.h in error.c. Fixes #3866. * psa_set_key_id() now also sets the lifetime to persistent for keys located in a secure element. * Attempting to create a volatile key with a non-zero key identifier now fails. Previously the key identifier was just ignored when creating a volatile key. * Attempting to create or register a key with a key identifier in the vendor range now fails. * Fix build failures on GCC 11. Fixes #3782. * Add missing arguments of debug message in mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf. * Fix a memory leak in mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs() when the result was negative (an error condition) and the second operand was aliased to the result. * Fix a case in elliptic curve arithmetic where an out-of-memory condition could go undetected, resulting in an incorrect result. * In CTR_DRBG and HMAC_DRBG, don't reset the reseed interval in seed(). Fixes #2927. * In PEM writing functions, fill the trailing part of the buffer with null bytes. This guarantees that the corresponding parsing function can read the buffer back, which was the case for mbedtls_x509write_{crt,csr}_pem until this property was inadvertently broken in Mbed TLS 2.19.0. Fixes #3682. * Fix a build failure that occurred with the MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT option on. In this configuration key management methods that are required for MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS were excluded from the build and made it fail. Fixes #3818. Reported by John Stroebel. Changes * Reduce stack usage significantly during sliding window exponentiation. Reported in #3591 and fix contributed in #3592 by Daniel Otte. * The PSA persistent storage format is updated to always store the key bits attribute. No automatic upgrade path is provided. Previously stored keys must be erased, or manually upgraded based on the key storage format specification (docs/architecture/mbed-crypto-storage-specification.md). Fixes #3740. * Remove the zeroization of a pointer variable in AES rounds. It was valid but spurious and misleading since it looked like a mistaken attempt to zeroize the pointed-to buffer. Reported by Antonio de la Piedra, CEA Leti, France. = mbed TLS 2.24.0 branch released 2020-09-01 API changes * In the PSA API, rename the types of elliptic curve and Diffie-Hellman group families to psa_ecc_family_t and psa_dh_family_t, in line with the PSA Crypto API specification version 1.0.0. Rename associated macros as well: PSA_ECC_CURVE_xxx renamed to PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx PSA_DH_GROUP_xxx renamed to PSA_DH_FAMILY_xxx PSA_KEY_TYPE_GET_CURVE renamed to to PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY PSA_KEY_TYPE_GET_GROUP renamed to PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GET_FAMILY Default behavior changes * Stop storing persistent information about externally stored keys created through PSA Crypto with a volatile lifetime. Reported in #3288 and contributed by Steven Cooreman in #3382. Features * The new function mbedtls_ecp_write_key() exports private ECC keys back to a byte buffer. It is the inverse of the existing mbedtls_ecp_read_key(). * Support building on e2k (Elbrus) architecture: correctly enable -Wformat-signedness, and fix the code that causes signed-one-bit-field and sign-compare warnings. Contributed by makise-homura (Igor Molchanov) . Security * Fix a vulnerability in the verification of X.509 certificates when matching the expected common name (the cn argument of mbedtls_x509_crt_verify()) with the actual certificate name: when the subjecAltName extension is present, the expected name was compared to any name in that extension regardless of its type. This means that an attacker could for example impersonate a 4-bytes or 16-byte domain by getting a certificate for the corresponding IPv4 or IPv6 (this would require the attacker to control that IP address, though). Similar attacks using other subjectAltName name types might be possible. Found and reported by kFYatek in #3498. * When checking X.509 CRLs, a certificate was only considered as revoked if its revocationDate was in the past according to the local clock if available. In particular, on builds without MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE, certificates were never considered as revoked. On builds with MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE, an attacker able to control the local clock (for example, an untrusted OS attacking a secure enclave) could prevent revocation of certificates via CRLs. Fixed by no longer checking the revocationDate field, in accordance with RFC 5280. Reported by yuemonangong in #3340. Reported independently and fixed by Raoul Strackx and Jethro Beekman in #3433. * In (D)TLS record decryption, when using a CBC ciphersuites without the Encrypt-then-Mac extension, use constant code flow memory access patterns to extract and check the MAC. This is an improvement to the existing countermeasure against Lucky 13 attacks. The previous countermeasure was effective against network-based attackers, but less so against local attackers. The new countermeasure defends against local attackers, even if they have access to fine-grained measurements. In particular, this fixes a local Lucky 13 cache attack found and reported by Tuba Yavuz, Farhaan Fowze, Ken (Yihan) Bai, Grant Hernandez, and Kevin Butler (University of Florida) and Dave Tian (Purdue University). * Fix side channel in RSA private key operations and static (finite-field) Diffie-Hellman. An adversary with precise enough timing and memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave) could bypass an existing counter-measure (base blinding) and potentially fully recover the private key. * Fix a 1-byte buffer overread in mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der(). Credit to OSS-Fuzz for detecting the problem and to Philippe Antoine for pinpointing the problematic code. * Zeroising of plaintext buffers in mbedtls_ssl_read() to erase unused application data from memory. Reported in #689 by Johan Uppman Bruce of Sectra. Bugfix * Library files installed after a CMake build no longer have execute permission. * Use local labels in mbedtls_padlock_has_support() to fix an invalid symbol redefinition if the function is inlined. Reported in #3451 and fix contributed in #3452 by okhowang. * Fix the endianness of Curve25519 keys imported/exported through the PSA APIs. psa_import_key and psa_export_key will now correctly expect/output Montgomery keys in little-endian as defined by RFC7748. Contributed by Steven Cooreman in #3425. * Fix build errors when the only enabled elliptic curves are Montgomery curves. Raised by signpainter in #941 and by Taiki-San in #1412. This also fixes missing declarations reported by Steven Cooreman in #1147. * Fix self-test failure when the only enabled short Weierstrass elliptic curve is secp192k1. Fixes #2017. * PSA key import will now correctly import a Curve25519/Curve448 public key instead of erroring out. Contributed by Steven Cooreman in #3492. * Use arc4random_buf on NetBSD instead of rand implementation with cyclical lower bits. Fix contributed in #3540. * Fix a memory leak in mbedtls_md_setup() when using HMAC under low memory conditions. Reported and fix suggested by Guido Vranken in #3486. * Fix bug in redirection of unit test outputs on platforms where stdout is defined as a macro. First reported in #2311 and fix contributed in #3528. Changes * Only pass -Wformat-signedness to versions of GCC that support it. Reported in #3478 and fix contributed in #3479 by okhowang. * Reduce the stack consumption of mbedtls_x509write_csr_der() which previously could lead to stack overflow on constrained devices. Contributed by Doru Gucea and Simon Leet in #3464. * Undefine the ASSERT macro before defining it locally, in case it is defined in a platform header. Contributed by Abdelatif Guettouche in #3557. * Update copyright notices to use Linux Foundation guidance. As a result, the copyright of contributors other than Arm is now acknowledged, and the years of publishing are no longer tracked in the source files. This also eliminates the need for the lines declaring the files to be part of MbedTLS. Fixes #3457. * Add the command line parameter key_pwd to the ssl_client2 and ssl_server2 example applications which allows to provide a password for the key file specified through the existing key_file argument. This allows the use of these applications with password-protected key files. Analogously but for ssl_server2 only, add the command line parameter key_pwd2 which allows to set a password for the key file provided through the existing key_file2 argument. = mbed TLS 2.23.0 branch released 2020-07-01 Default behavior changes * In the experimental PSA secure element interface, change the encoding of key lifetimes to encode a persistence level and the location. Although C prototypes do not effectively change, code calling psa_register_se_driver() must be modified to pass the driver's location instead of the keys' lifetime. If the library is upgraded on an existing device, keys created with the old lifetime value will not be readable or removable through Mbed TLS after the upgrade. Features * New functions in the error module return constant strings for high- and low-level error codes, complementing mbedtls_strerror() which constructs a string for any error code, including compound ones, but requires a writable buffer. Contributed by Gaurav Aggarwal in #3176. * The new utility programs/ssl/ssl_context_info prints a human-readable dump of an SSL context saved with mbedtls_ssl_context_save(). * Add support for midipix, a POSIX layer for Microsoft Windows. * Add new mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb() routine which allows parsing unsupported certificate extensions via user provided callback. Contributed by Nicola Di Lieto in #3243 as a solution to #3241. * Pass the "certificate policies" extension to the callback supplied to mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb() if it contains unsupported policies (#3419). * Added support to entropy_poll for the kern.arandom syscall supported on some BSD systems. Contributed by Nia Alarie in #3423. * Add support for Windows 2000 in net_sockets. Contributed by opatomic. #3239 Security * Fix a side channel vulnerability in modular exponentiation that could reveal an RSA private key used in a secure enclave. Noticed by Sangho Lee, Ming-Wei Shih, Prasun Gera, Taesoo Kim and Hyesoon Kim (Georgia Institute of Technology); and Marcus Peinado (Microsoft Research). Reported by Raoul Strackx (Fortanix) in #3394. * Fix side channel in mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() and mbedtls_pk_parse_key() / mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile() (when loading a private key that didn't include the uncompressed public key), as well as mbedtls_ecp_mul() / mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable() when called with a NULL f_rng argument. An attacker with access to precise enough timing and memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave) could fully recover the ECC private key. Found and reported by Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya and Billy Brumley. * Fix issue in Lucky 13 counter-measure that could make it ineffective when hardware accelerators were used (using one of the MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_ALT macros). This would cause the original Lucky 13 attack to be possible in those configurations, allowing an active network attacker to recover plaintext after repeated timing measurements under some conditions. Reported and fix suggested by Luc Perneel in #3246. Bugfix * Fix the Visual Studio Release x64 build configuration for mbedtls itself. Completes a previous fix in Mbed TLS 2.19 that only fixed the build for the example programs. Reported in #1430 and fix contributed by irwir. * Fix undefined behavior in X.509 certificate parsing if the pathLenConstraint basic constraint value is equal to INT_MAX. The actual effect with almost every compiler is the intended behavior, so this is unlikely to be exploitable anywhere. #3192 * Fix issue with a detected HW accelerated record error not being exposed due to shadowed variable. Contributed by Sander Visser in #3310. * Avoid NULL pointer dereferencing if mbedtls_ssl_free() is called with a NULL pointer argument. Contributed by Sander Visser in #3312. * Fix potential linker errors on dual world platforms by inlining mbedtls_gcc_group_to_psa(). This allows the pk.c module to link separately from psa_crypto.c. Fixes #3300. * Remove dead code in X.509 certificate parsing. Contributed by irwir in #2855. * Include asn1.h in error.c. Fixes #3328 reported by David Hu. * Fix potential memory leaks in ecp_randomize_jac() and ecp_randomize_mxz() when PRNG function fails. Contributed by Jonas Lejeune in #3318. * Remove unused macros from MSVC projects. Reported in #3297 and fix submitted in #3333 by irwir. * Add additional bounds checks in ssl_write_client_hello() preventing output buffer overflow if the configuration declared a buffer that was too small. * Set _POSIX_C_SOURCE to at least 200112L in C99 code. Reported in #3420 and fix submitted in #3421 by Nia Alarie. * Fix building library/net_sockets.c and the ssl_mail_client program on NetBSD. Contributed by Nia Alarie in #3422. * Fix false positive uninitialised variable reported by cpp-check. Contributed by Sander Visser in #3311. * Update iv and len context pointers manually when reallocating buffers using the MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH feature. This caused issues when receiving a connection with CID, when these fields were shifted in ssl_parse_record_header(). Changes * Fix warnings about signedness issues in format strings. The build is now clean of -Wformat-signedness warnings. Contributed by Kenneth Soerensen in #3153. * Fix minor performance issue in operations on Curve25519 caused by using a suboptimal modular reduction in one place. Found and fix contributed by Aurelien Jarno in #3209. * Combine identical cases in switch statements in md.c. Contributed by irwir in #3208. * Simplify a bounds check in ssl_write_certificate_request(). Contributed by irwir in #3150. * Unify the example programs termination to call mbedtls_exit() instead of using a return command. This has been done to enable customization of the behavior in bare metal environments. * Fix mbedtls_x509_dn_gets to escape non-ASCII characters as "?". Contributed by Koh M. Nakagawa in #3326. * Use FindPython3 when cmake version >= 3.15.0 * Abort the ClientHello writing function as soon as some extension doesn't fit into the record buffer. Previously, such extensions were silently dropped. As a consequence, the TLS handshake now fails when the output buffer is not large enough to hold the ClientHello. * The unit tests now rely on header files in tests/include/test and source files in tests/src. When building with make or cmake, the files in tests/src are compiled and the resulting object linked into each test executable. * The ECP module, enabled by `MBEDTLS_ECP_C`, now depends on `MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C` or `MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C` for some side-channel coutermeasures. If side channels are not a concern, this dependency can be avoided by enabling the new option `MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG`. * Align MSVC error flag with GCC and Clang. Contributed by Carlos Gomes Martinho. #3147 * Remove superfluous assignment in mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate(). Reported in #3182 and fix submitted by irwir. #3217 * Fix typo in XTS tests. Reported and fix submitted by Kxuan. #3319 = mbed TLS 2.22.0 branch released 2020-04-14 New deprecations * Deprecate MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL that enables function hooks in the SSL module for hardware acceleration of individual records. * Deprecate mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len() in favour of mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len() and mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len() to be more precise about which max fragment length is desired. Security * Fix issue in DTLS handling of new associations with the same parameters (RFC 6347 section 4.2.8): an attacker able to send forged UDP packets to the server could cause it to drop established associations with legitimate clients, resulting in a Denial of Service. This could only happen when MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE was enabled in config.h (which it is by default). * Fix side channel in ECC code that allowed an adversary with access to precise enough timing and memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave) to fully recover an ECDSA private key. Found and reported by Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya, Billy Brumley and Cesar Pereida Garcia. CVE-2020-10932 * Fix a potentially remotely exploitable buffer overread in a DTLS client when parsing the Hello Verify Request message. Features * The new build option MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH automatically resizes the I/O buffers before and after handshakes, reducing the memory consumption during application data transfer. Bugfix * Fix compilation failure when both MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS and MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL are enabled. * Remove a spurious check in ssl_parse_client_psk_identity that triggered a warning with some compilers. Fix contributed by irwir in #2856. * Fix a function name in a debug message. Contributed by Ercan Ozturk in #3013. Changes * Mbed Crypto is no longer a Git submodule. The crypto part of the library is back directly in the present repository. * Split mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len() into mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len() and mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len() to ensure that a sufficient input buffer is allocated by the server (if MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH is defined), regardless of what MFL was configured for it. = mbed TLS 2.21.0 branch released 2020-02-20 New deprecations * Deprecate MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO that enables parsing SSLv2 ClientHello messages. * Deprecate MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 that enables support for SSLv3. * Deprecate for MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C, the wrapper around the pkcs11-helper library which allows TLS authentication to use keys stored in a PKCS#11 token such as a smartcard. Security * Fix potential memory overread when performing an ECDSA signature operation. The overread only happens with cryptographically low probability (of the order of 2^-n where n is the bitsize of the curve) unless the RNG is broken, and could result in information disclosure or denial of service (application crash or extra resource consumption). Found by Auke Zeilstra and Peter Schwabe, using static analysis. * To avoid a side channel vulnerability when parsing an RSA private key, read all the CRT parameters from the DER structure rather than reconstructing them. Found by Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya and Billy Bob Brumley. Reported and fix contributed by Jack Lloyd. ARMmbed/mbed-crypto#352 Features * The new build option MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 allows building SHA-512 support without SHA-384. API changes * Change the encoding of key types and curves in the PSA API. The new values are aligned with the upcoming release of the PSA Crypto API specification version 1.0.0. The main change which may break some existing code is that elliptic curve key types no longer encode the exact curve: a psa_ecc_curve_t or psa_key_type_t value only encodes a curve family and the key size determines the exact curve (for example, PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP_R1 with 256 bits is P256R1). ARMmbed/mbed-crypto#330 Bugfix * Fix an unchecked call to mbedtls_md() in the x509write module. * Fix build failure with MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT enabled. Reported by Jack Lloyd in #2859. Fix submitted by jiblime in #2963. * Fix some false-positive uninitialized variable warnings in X.509. Fix contributed by apple-ihack-geek in #2663. * Fix a possible error code mangling in psa_mac_verify_finish() when a cryptographic accelerator fails. ARMmbed/mbed-crypto#345 * Fix a bug in mbedtls_pk_parse_key() that would cause it to accept some RSA keys that would later be rejected by functions expecting private keys. Found by Catena cyber using oss-fuzz (issue 20467). * Fix a bug in mbedtls_pk_parse_key() that would cause it to accept some RSA keys with invalid values by silently fixing those values. = mbed TLS 2.20.0 branch released 2020-01-15 Default behavior changes * The initial seeding of a CTR_DRBG instance makes a second call to the entropy function to obtain entropy for a nonce if the entropy size is less than 3/2 times the key size. In case you want to disable the extra call to grab entropy, you can call mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len() to force the nonce length to 0. Security * Enforce that mbedtls_entropy_func() gathers a total of MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE bytes or more from strong sources. In the default configuration, on a platform with a single entropy source, the entropy module formerly only grabbed 32 bytes, which is good enough for security if the source is genuinely strong, but less than the expected 64 bytes (size of the entropy accumulator). * Zeroize local variables in mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt() and mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt() before exiting the function. The value of these variables can be used to recover the last round key. To follow best practice and to limit the impact of buffer overread vulnerabilities (like Heartbleed) we need to zeroize them before exiting the function. Issue reported by Tuba Yavuz, Farhaan Fowze, Ken (Yihang) Bai, Grant Hernandez, and Kevin Butler (University of Florida) and Dave Tian (Purdue University). * Fix side channel vulnerability in ECDSA. Our bignum implementation is not constant time/constant trace, so side channel attacks can retrieve the blinded value, factor it (as it is smaller than RSA keys and not guaranteed to have only large prime factors), and then, by brute force, recover the key. Reported by Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya and Billy Brumley. * Fix side channel vulnerability in ECDSA key generation. Obtaining precise timings on the comparison in the key generation enabled the attacker to learn leading bits of the ephemeral key used during ECDSA signatures and to recover the private key. Reported by Jeremy Dubeuf. * Catch failure of AES functions in mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random(). Uncaught failures could happen with alternative implementations of AES. Bug reported and fix proposed by Johan Uppman Bruce and Christoffer Lauri, Sectra. Features * Key derivation inputs in the PSA API can now either come from a key object or from a buffer regardless of the step type. * The CTR_DRBG module can grab a nonce from the entropy source during the initial seeding. The default nonce length is chosen based on the key size to achieve the security strength defined by NIST SP 800-90A. You can change it with mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len(). * Add ENUMERATED tag support to the ASN.1 module. Contributed by msopiha-linaro in ARMmbed/mbed-crypto#307. API changes * In the PSA API, forbid zero-length keys. To pass a zero-length input to a key derivation function, use a buffer instead (this is now always possible). * Rename psa_asymmetric_sign() to psa_sign_hash() and psa_asymmetric_verify() to psa_verify_hash(). Bugfix * Fix an incorrect size in a debugging message. Reported and fix submitted by irwir. Fixes #2717. * Fix an unused variable warning when compiling without DTLS. Reported and fix submitted by irwir. Fixes #2800. * Remove a useless assignment. Reported and fix submitted by irwir. Fixes #2801. * Fix a buffer overflow in the PSA HMAC code when using a long key with an unsupported algorithm. Fixes ARMmbed/mbed-crypto#254. * Fix mbedtls_asn1_get_int to support any number of leading zeros. Credit to OSS-Fuzz for finding a bug in an intermediate version of the fix. * Fix mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null to correctly parse bitstrings of at most 2 bytes. * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len() and mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len() now work if you call them before mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() or mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed(). Changes * Remove the technical possibility to define custom mbedtls_md_info structures, which was exposed only in an internal header. * psa_close_key(0) and psa_destroy_key(0) now succeed (doing nothing, as before). * Variables containing error codes are now initialized to an error code rather than success, so that coding mistakes or memory corruption tends to cause functions to return this error code rather than a success. There are no known instances where this changes the behavior of the library: this is merely a robustness improvement. ARMmbed/mbed-crypto#323 * Remove a useless call to mbedtls_ecp_group_free(). Contributed by Alexander Krizhanovsky in ARMmbed/mbed-crypto#210. * Speed up PBKDF2 by caching the digest calculation. Contributed by Jack Lloyd and Fortanix Inc in ARMmbed/mbed-crypto#277. * Small performance improvement of mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi(). Contributed by Alexander Krizhanovsky in ARMmbed/mbed-crypto#308. = mbed TLS 2.19.1 branch released 2019-09-16 Features * Declare include headers as PUBLIC to propagate to CMake project consumers Contributed by Zachary J. Fields in PR #2949. * Add nss_keylog to ssl_client2 and ssl_server2, enabling easier analysis of TLS sessions with tools like Wireshark. API Changes * Make client_random and server_random const in mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_ext_t, so that the key exporter is discouraged from modifying the client/server hello. Bugfix * Fix some false-positive uninitialized variable warnings in crypto. Fix contributed by apple-ihack-geek in #2663. = mbed TLS 2.19.0 branch released 2019-09-06 Security * Fix a missing error detection in ECJPAKE. This could have caused a predictable shared secret if a hardware accelerator failed and the other side of the key exchange had a similar bug. * When writing a private EC key, use a constant size for the private value, as specified in RFC 5915. Previously, the value was written as an ASN.1 INTEGER, which caused the size of the key to leak about 1 bit of information on average and could cause the value to be 1 byte too large for the output buffer. * The deterministic ECDSA calculation reused the scheme's HMAC-DRBG to implement blinding. Because of this for the same key and message the same blinding value was generated. This reduced the effectiveness of the countermeasure and leaked information about the private key through side channels. Reported by Jack Lloyd. Features * Add new API functions mbedtls_ssl_session_save() and mbedtls_ssl_session_load() to allow serializing a session, for example to store it in non-volatile storage, and later using it for TLS session resumption. * Add a new API function mbedtls_ssl_check_record() to allow checking that an incoming record is valid, authentic and has not been seen before. This feature can be used alongside Connection ID and SSL context serialisation. The feature is enabled at compile-time by MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING option. * New implementation of X25519 (ECDH using Curve25519) from Project Everest (https://project-everest.github.io/). It can be enabled at compile time with MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED. This implementation is formally verified and significantly faster, but is only supported on x86 platforms (32-bit and 64-bit) using GCC, Clang or Visual Studio. Contributed by Christoph Wintersteiger from Microsoft Research. * Add mbedtls_net_close(), enabling the building of forking servers where the parent process closes the client socket and continue accepting, and the child process closes the listening socket and handles the client socket. Contributed by Robert Larsen in #2803. API Changes * Add DER-encoded test CRTs to library/certs.c, allowing the example programs ssl_server2 and ssl_client2 to be run if MBEDTLS_FS_IO and MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C are unset. Fixes #2254. * The HAVEGE state type now uses uint32_t elements instead of int. * The functions mbedtls_ecp_curve_list() and mbedtls_ecp_grp_id_list() now list all curves for which at least one of ECDH or ECDSA is supported, not just curves for which both are supported. Call mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do() or mbedtls_ecdh_can_do() on each result to check whether each algorithm is supported. * The new function mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext() is similar to mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() but allows passing an external RNG for the purpose of blinding. New deprecations * Deprecate mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() in favor of a functions that can take an RNG function as an input. * Calling mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature() with NULL as the f_rng argument is now deprecated. Bugfix * Fix missing bounds checks in X.509 parsing functions that could lead to successful parsing of ill-formed X.509 CRTs. Fixes #2437. * Fix multiple X.509 functions previously returning ASN.1 low-level error codes to always wrap these codes into X.509 high level error codes before returning. Fixes #2431. * Fix to allow building test suites with any warning that detects unused functions. Fixes #1628. * Fix typo in net_would_block(). Fixes #528 reported by github-monoculture. * Remove redundant include file in timing.c. Fixes #2640 reported by irwir. * Fix build failure when building with mingw on Windows by including stdarg.h where needed. Fixes #2656. * Fix Visual Studio Release x64 build configuration by inheriting PlatformToolset from the project configuration. Fixes #1430 reported by irwir. * Enable Suite B with subset of ECP curves. Make sure the code compiles even if some curves are not defined. Fixes #1591 reported by dbedev. * Fix misuse of signed arithmetic in the HAVEGE module. #2598 * Avoid use of statically sized stack buffers for certificate writing. This previously limited the maximum size of DER encoded certificates in mbedtls_x509write_crt_der() to 2Kb. Reported by soccerGB in #2631. * Fix partial zeroing in x509_get_other_name. Found and fixed by ekse, #2716. * Update test certificates that were about to expire. Reported by Bernhard M. Wiedemann in #2357. * Fix the build on ARMv5TE in ARM mode to not use assembly instructions that are only available in Thumb mode. Fix contributed by Aurelien Jarno in #2169. * Fix propagation of restart contexts in restartable EC operations. This could previously lead to segmentation faults in builds using an address-sanitizer and enabling but not using MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE. * Fix memory leak in in mpi_miller_rabin(). Contributed by Jens Wiklander in #2363 * Improve code clarity in x509_crt module, removing false-positive uninitialized variable warnings on some recent toolchains (GCC8, etc). Discovered and fixed by Andy Gross (Linaro), #2392. * Fix bug in endianness conversion in bignum module. This lead to functionally incorrect code on bigendian systems which don't have __BYTE_ORDER__ defined. Reported by Brendan Shanks. Fixes #2622. Changes * Replace multiple uses of MD2 by SHA-256 in X.509 test suite. Fixes #821. * Make it easier to define MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED as assert (which config.h suggests). #2671 * Make `make clean` clean all programs always. Fixes #1862. * Add a Dockerfile and helper scripts (all-in-docker.sh, basic-in-docker.sh, docker-env.sh) to simplify running test suites on a Linux host. Contributed by Peter Kolbus (Garmin). * Add `reproducible` option to `ssl_client2` and `ssl_server2` to enable test runs without variability. Contributed by Philippe Antoine (Catena cyber) in #2681. * Extended .gitignore to ignore Visual Studio artifacts. Fixed by ConfusedSushi. * Adds fuzz targets, especially for continuous fuzzing with OSS-Fuzz. Contributed by Philippe Antoine (Catena cyber). * Remove the crypto part of the library from Mbed TLS. The crypto code and tests are now only available via Mbed Crypto, which Mbed TLS references as a Git submodule. = mbed TLS 2.18.1 branch released 2019-07-12 Bugfix * Fix build failure when building with mingw on Windows by including stdarg.h where needed. Fixes #2656. Changes * Enable building of Mbed TLS as a CMake subproject. Suggested and fixed by Ashley Duncan in #2609. = mbed TLS 2.18.0 branch released 2019-06-11 Features * Add the Any Policy certificate policy oid, as defined in rfc 5280 section 4.2.1.4. * It is now possible to use NIST key wrap mode via the mbedtls_cipher API. Contributed by Jack Lloyd and Fortanix Inc. * Add the Wi-SUN Field Area Network (FAN) device extended key usage. * Add the oid certificate policy x509 extension. * It is now possible to perform RSA PKCS v1.5 signatures with RIPEMD-160 digest. Contributed by Jack Lloyd and Fortanix Inc. * Extend the MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS to export the handshake randbytes, and the used tls-prf. * Add public API for tls-prf function, according to requested enum. * Add support for parsing otherName entries in the Subject Alternative Name X.509 certificate extension, specifically type hardware module name, as defined in RFC 4108 section 5. * Add support for parsing certificate policies extension, as defined in RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.4. Currently, only the "Any Policy" policy is supported. * List all SAN types in the subject_alt_names field of the certificate. Resolves #459. * Add support for draft-05 of the Connection ID extension, as specified in https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05. The Connection ID extension allows to keep DTLS connections beyond the lifetime of the underlying transport by adding a connection identifier to the DTLS record header. This identifier can be used to associated an incoming record with the correct connection data even after the peer has changed its IP or port. The feature is enabled at compile-time by setting MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID (disabled by default), and at run-time through the new APIs mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid() and mbedtls_ssl_set_cid(). API Changes * Extend the MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS to export the handshake randbytes, and the used tls-prf. * Add public API for tls-prf function, according to requested enum. Bugfix * Fix private key DER output in the key_app_writer example. File contents were shifted by one byte, creating an invalid ASN.1 tag. Fixed by Christian Walther in #2239. * Fix potential memory leak in X.509 self test. Found and fixed by Junhwan Park, #2106. * Reduce stack usage of hkdf tests. Fixes #2195. * Fix 1-byte buffer overflow in mbedtls_mpi_write_string() when used with negative inputs. Found by Guido Vranken in #2404. Credit to OSS-Fuzz. * Fix bugs in the AEAD test suite which would be exposed by ciphers which either used both encrypt and decrypt key schedules, or which perform padding. GCM and CCM were not affected. Fixed by Jack Lloyd. * Fix incorrect default port number in ssl_mail_client example's usage. Found and fixed by irwir. #2337 * Add psa_util.h to test/cpp_dummy_build to fix build_default_make_gcc_and_cxx. Fixed by Peter Kolbus (Garmin). #2579 * Add missing parentheses around parameters in the definition of the public macro MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG. This could lead to invalid evaluation in case operators binding less strongly than subtraction were used for the parameter. * Add a check for MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C in ssl_server2, guarding the crl sni entry parameter. Reported by inestlerode in #560. * Set the next sequence of the subject_alt_name to NULL when deleting sequence on failure. Found and fix suggested by Philippe Antoine. Credit to OSS-Fuzz. Changes * Server's RSA certificate in certs.c was SHA-1 signed. In the default mbedTLS configuration only SHA-2 signed certificates are accepted. This certificate is used in the demo server programs, which lead the client programs to fail at the peer's certificate verification due to an unacceptable hash signature. The certificate has been updated to one that is SHA-256 signed. Fix contributed by Illya Gerasymchuk. * Return from various debugging routines immediately if the provided SSL context is unset. * Remove dead code from bignum.c in the default configuration. Found by Coverity, reported and fixed by Peter Kolbus (Garmin). Fixes #2309. * Add test for minimal value of MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE to all.sh. Contributed by Peter Kolbus (Garmin). * Change wording in the `mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len()`'s documentation to improve clarity. Fixes #2258. = mbed TLS 2.17.0 branch released 2019-03-19 Features * Add a new X.509 API call `mbedtls_x509_parse_der_nocopy()` which allows copy-less parsing of DER encoded X.509 CRTs, at the cost of additional lifetime constraints on the input buffer, but at the benefit of reduced RAM consumption. * Add a new function mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring() to write ASN.1 named bitstring in DER as required by RFC 5280 Appendix B. * Add MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES to allow removing 3DES ciphersuites from the default list (enabled by default). See https://sweet32.info/SWEET32_CCS16.pdf. API Changes * Add a new X.509 API call `mbedtls_x509_parse_der_nocopy()`. See the Features section for more information. * Allow to opt in to the removal the API mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert() for the benefit of saving RAM, by disabling the new compile-time option MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE (enabled by default for API stability). Disabling this option makes mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert() always return NULL, and removes the peer_cert field from the mbedtls_ssl_session structure which otherwise stores the peer's certificate. Security * Make mbedtls_ecdh_get_params return an error if the second key belongs to a different group from the first. Before, if an application passed keys that belonged to different group, the first key's data was interpreted according to the second group, which could lead to either an error or a meaningless output from mbedtls_ecdh_get_params. In the latter case, this could expose at most 5 bits of the private key. Bugfix * Fix a compilation issue with mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx not being defined when MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT is defined. Reported by jwhui. Fixes #2242. * Run the AD too long test only if MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT is not defined. Raised as a comment in #1996. * Reduce the stack consumption of mbedtls_mpi_fill_random() which could previously lead to a stack overflow on constrained targets. * Add `MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST` for the mbedtls_self_test functions in the header files, which missed the precompilation check. #971 * Fix returning the value 1 when mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey failed. * Remove a duplicate #include in a sample program. Fixed by Masashi Honma #2326. * Remove the mbedtls namespacing from the header file, to fix a "file not found" build error. Fixed by Haijun Gu #2319. * Fix signed-to-unsigned integer conversion warning in X.509 module. Fixes #2212. * Reduce stack usage of `mpi_write_hlp()` by eliminating recursion. Fixes #2190. * Fix false failure in all.sh when backup files exist in include/mbedtls (e.g. config.h.bak). Fixed by Peter Kolbus (Garmin) #2407. * Ensure that unused bits are zero when writing ASN.1 bitstrings when using mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring(). * Fix issue when writing the named bitstrings in KeyUsage and NsCertType extensions in CSRs and CRTs that caused these bitstrings to not be encoded correctly as trailing zeroes were not accounted for as unused bits in the leading content octet. Fixes #1610. Changes * Reduce RAM consumption during session renegotiation by not storing the peer CRT chain and session ticket twice. * Include configuration file in all header files that use configuration, instead of relying on other header files that they include. Inserted as an enhancement for #1371 * Add support for alternative CSR headers, as used by Microsoft and defined in RFC 7468. Found by Michael Ernst. Fixes #767. * Correct many misspellings. Fixed by MisterDA #2371. * Provide an abstraction of vsnprintf to allow alternative implementations for platforms that don't provide it. Based on contributions by Joris Aerts and Nathaniel Wesley Filardo. * Fix clobber list in MIPS assembly for large integer multiplication. Previously, this could lead to functionally incorrect assembly being produced by some optimizing compilers, showing up as failures in e.g. RSA or ECC signature operations. Reported in #1722, fix suggested by Aurelien Jarno and submitted by Jeffrey Martin. * Reduce the complexity of the timing tests. They were assuming more than the underlying OS actually guarantees. * Fix configuration queries in ssl-opt.h. #2030 * Ensure that ssl-opt.h can be run in OS X. #2029 * Re-enable certain interoperability tests in ssl-opt.sh which had previously been disabled for lack of a sufficiently recent version of GnuTLS on the CI. * Ciphersuites based on 3DES now have the lowest priority by default when they are enabled. = mbed TLS 2.16.0 branch released 2018-12-21 Features * Add a new config.h option of MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS that enables validation of parameters in the API. This allows detection of obvious misuses of the API, such as passing NULL pointers. The API of existing functions hasn't changed, but requirements on parameters have been made more explicit in the documentation. See the corresponding API documentation for each function to see for which parameter values it is defined. This feature is disabled by default. See its API documentation in config.h for additional steps you have to take when enabling it. API Changes * The following functions in the random generator modules have been deprecated and replaced as shown below. The new functions change the return type from void to int to allow returning error codes when using MBEDTLS__ALT for the underlying AES or message digest primitive. Fixes #1798. mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update() -> mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret() mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update() -> mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret() * Extend ECDH interface to enable alternative implementations. * Deprecate error codes of the form MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH for ARIA, CAMELLIA and Blowfish. These error codes will be replaced by the more generic per-module error codes MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx_BAD_INPUT_DATA. * Additional parameter validation checks have been added for the following modules - AES, ARIA, Blowfish, CAMELLIA, CCM, GCM, DHM, ECP, ECDSA, ECDH, ECJPAKE, SHA, Chacha20 and Poly1305, cipher, pk, RSA, and MPI. Where modules have had parameter validation added, existing parameter checks may have changed. Some modules, such as Chacha20 had existing parameter validation whereas other modules had little. This has now been changed so that the same level of validation is present in all modules, and that it is now optional with the MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS flag which by default is off. That means that checks which were previously present by default will no longer be. New deprecations * Deprecate mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update and mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update in favor of functions that can return an error code. Bugfix * Fix for Clang, which was reporting a warning for the bignum.c inline assembly for AMD64 targets creating string literals greater than those permitted by the ISO C99 standard. Found by Aaron Jones. Fixes #482. * Fix runtime error in `mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll()` when run through qemu user emulation. Reported and fix suggested by randombit in #1212. Fixes #1212. * Fix an unsafe bounds check when restoring an SSL session from a ticket. This could lead to a buffer overflow, but only in case ticket authentication was broken. Reported and fix suggested by Guido Vranken in #659. * Add explicit integer to enumeration type casts to example program programs/pkey/gen_key which previously led to compilation failure on some toolchains. Reported by phoenixmcallister. Fixes #2170. * Fix double initialization of ECC hardware that made some accelerators hang. * Clarify documentation of mbedtls_ssl_set_own_cert() regarding the absence of check for certificate/key matching. Reported by Attila Molnar, #507. = mbed TLS 2.15.1 branch released 2018-11-30 Changes * Update the Mbed Crypto submodule to version 0.1.0b2. = mbed TLS 2.15.0 branch released 2018-11-23 Features * Add an experimental build option, USE_CRYPTO_SUBMODULE, to enable use of Mbed Crypto as the source of the cryptography implementation. * Add an experimental configuration option, MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C, to enable the PSA Crypto API from Mbed Crypto when additionally used with the USE_CRYPTO_SUBMODULE build option. Changes * Add unit tests for AES-GCM when called through mbedtls_cipher_auth_xxx() from the cipher abstraction layer. Fixes #2198. = mbed TLS 2.14.1 branch released 2018-11-30 Security * Fix timing variations and memory access variations in RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption that could lead to a Bleichenbacher-style padding oracle attack. In TLS, this affects servers that accept ciphersuites based on RSA decryption (i.e. ciphersuites whose name contains RSA but not (EC)DH(E)). Discovered by Eyal Ronen (Weizmann Institute), Robert Gillham (University of Adelaide), Daniel Genkin (University of Michigan), Adi Shamir (Weizmann Institute), David Wong (NCC Group), and Yuval Yarom (University of Adelaide, Data61). The attack is described in more detail in the paper available here: http://cat.eyalro.net/cat.pdf CVE-2018-19608 * In mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(), don't leak the exact size of the number via branching and memory access patterns. An attacker who could submit a plaintext for RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption but only observe the timing of the decryption and not its result could nonetheless decrypt RSA plaintexts and forge RSA signatures. Other asymmetric algorithms may have been similarly vulnerable. Reported by Eyal Ronen, Robert Gillham, Daniel Genkin, Adi Shamir, David Wong and Yuval Yarom. * Wipe sensitive buffers on the stack in the CTR_DRBG and HMAC_DRBG modules. API Changes * The new functions mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret() and mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret() are similar to mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update() and mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update() respectively, but the new functions report errors whereas the old functions return void. We recommend that applications use the new functions. = mbed TLS 2.14.0 branch released 2018-11-19 Security * Fix overly strict DN comparison when looking for CRLs belonging to a particular CA. This previously led to ignoring CRLs when the CRL's issuer name and the CA's subject name differed in their string encoding (e.g., one using PrintableString and the other UTF8String) or in the choice of upper and lower case. Reported by Henrik Andersson of Bosch GmbH in issue #1784. * Fix a flawed bounds check in server PSK hint parsing. In case the incoming message buffer was placed within the first 64KiB of address space and a PSK-(EC)DHE ciphersuite was used, this allowed an attacker to trigger a memory access up to 64KiB beyond the incoming message buffer, potentially leading to an application crash or information disclosure. * Fix mbedtls_mpi_is_prime() to use more rounds of probabilistic testing. The previous settings for the number of rounds made it practical for an adversary to construct non-primes that would be erroneously accepted as primes with high probability. This does not have an impact on the security of TLS, but can matter in other contexts with numbers chosen potentially by an adversary that should be prime and can be validated. For example, the number of rounds was enough to securely generate RSA key pairs or Diffie-Hellman parameters, but was insufficient to validate Diffie-Hellman parameters properly. See "Prime and Prejudice" by by Martin R. Albrecht and Jake Massimo and Kenneth G. Paterson and Juraj Somorovsky. Features * Add support for temporarily suspending expensive ECC computations after some configurable amount of operations. This is intended to be used in constrained, single-threaded systems where ECC is time consuming and can block other operations until they complete. This is disabled by default, but can be enabled by MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE at compile time and configured by mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() at runtime. It applies to the new xxx_restartable functions in ECP, ECDSA, PK and X.509 (CRL not supported yet), and to existing functions in ECDH and SSL (currently only implemented client-side, for ECDHE-ECDSA ciphersuites in TLS 1.2, including client authentication). * Add support for Arm CPU DSP extensions to accelerate asymmetric key operations. On CPUs where the extensions are available, they can accelerate MPI multiplications used in ECC and RSA cryptography. Contributed by Aurelien Jarno. * Extend RSASSA-PSS signature to allow a smaller salt size. Previously, PSS signature always used a salt with the same length as the hash, and returned an error if this was not possible. Now the salt size may be up to two bytes shorter. This allows the library to support all hash and signature sizes that comply with FIPS 186-4, including SHA-512 with a 1024-bit key. * Add support for 128-bit keys in CTR_DRBG. Note that using keys shorter than 256 bits limits the security of generated material to 128 bits. API Changes * Add a common error code of `MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED` for a feature that is not supported by underlying alternative implementations implementing cryptographic primitives. This is useful for hardware accelerators that don't implement all options or features. New deprecations * All module specific errors following the form MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE that indicate a feature is not supported are deprecated and are now replaced by the new equivalent platform error. * All module specific generic hardware acceleration errors following the form MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX_HW_ACCEL_FAILED that are deprecated and are replaced by the equivalent plaform error. * Deprecate the function mbedtls_mpi_is_prime() in favor of mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext() which allows specifying the number of Miller-Rabin rounds. Bugfix * Fix wrong order of freeing in programs/ssl/ssl_server2 example application leading to a memory leak in case both MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C and MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE are set. Fixes #2069. * Fix a bug in the update function for SSL ticket keys which previously invalidated keys of a lifetime of less than a 1s. Fixes #1968. * Fix failure in hmac_drbg in the benchmark sample application, when MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is defined. Found by TrinityTonic, #1095 * Fix a bug in the record decryption routine ssl_decrypt_buf() which lead to accepting properly authenticated but improperly padded records in case of CBC ciphersuites using Encrypt-then-MAC. * Fix memory leak and freeing without initialization in the example program programs/x509/cert_write. Fixes #1422. * Ignore IV in mbedtls_cipher_set_iv() when the cipher mode is MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB. Found by ezdevelop. Fixes #1091. * Zeroize memory used for buffering or reassembling handshake messages after use. * Use `mbedtls_platform_zeroize()` instead of `memset()` for zeroization of sensitive data in the example programs aescrypt2 and crypt_and_hash. * Change the default string format used for various X.509 DN attributes to UTF8String. Previously, the use of the PrintableString format led to wildcards and non-ASCII characters being unusable in some DN attributes. Reported by raprepo in #1860 and by kevinpt in #468. Fix contributed by Thomas-Dee. * Fix compilation failure for configurations which use compile time replacements of standard calloc/free functions through the macros MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO. Reported by ole-de and ddhome2006. Fixes #882, #1642 and #1706. Changes * Removed support for Yotta as a build tool. * Add tests for session resumption in DTLS. * Close a test gap in (D)TLS between the client side and the server side: test the handling of large packets and small packets on the client side in the same way as on the server side. * Change the dtls_client and dtls_server samples to work by default over IPv6 and optionally by a build option over IPv4. * Change the use of Windows threading to use Microsoft Visual C++ runtime calls, rather than Win32 API calls directly. This is necessary to avoid conflict with C runtime usage. Found and fixed by irwir. * Remember the string format of X.509 DN attributes when replicating X.509 DNs. Previously, DN attributes were always written in their default string format (mostly PrintableString), which could lead to CRTs being created which used PrintableStrings in the issuer field even though the signing CA used UTF8Strings in its subject field; while X.509 compliant, such CRTs were rejected in some applications, e.g. some versions of Firefox, curl and GnuTLS. Reported in #1033 by Moschn. Fix contributed by Thomas-Dee. * Improve documentation of mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result(). Fixes #517 reported by github-monoculture. * Add MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_LOW_ERR flag to mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime() and use it to reduce error probability in RSA key generation to levels mandated by FIPS-186-4. = mbed TLS 2.13.1 branch released 2018-09-06 API Changes * Extend the platform module with an abstraction mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() whose implementation should behave as a thread-safe version of gmtime(). This allows users to configure such an implementation at compile time when the target system cannot be deduced automatically, by setting the option MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT. At this stage Mbed TLS is only able to automatically select implementations for Windows and POSIX C libraries. Bugfix * Fix build failures on platforms where only gmtime() is available but neither gmtime_r() nor gmtime_s() are present. Fixes #1907. = mbed TLS 2.13.0 branch released 2018-08-31 Security * Fix an issue in the X.509 module which could lead to a buffer overread during certificate extensions parsing. In case of receiving malformed input (extensions length field equal to 0), an illegal read of one byte beyond the input buffer is made. Found and analyzed by Nathan Crandall. Features * Add support for fragmentation of outgoing DTLS handshake messages. This is controlled by the maximum fragment length as set locally or negotiated with the peer, as well as by a new per-connection MTU option, set using mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu(). * Add support for auto-adjustment of MTU to a safe value during the handshake when flights do not get through (RFC 6347, section 4.1.1.1, last paragraph). * Add support for packing multiple records within a single datagram, enabled by default. * Add support for buffering out-of-order handshake messages in DTLS. The maximum amount of RAM used for this can be controlled by the compile-time constant MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING defined in mbedtls/config.h. API Changes * Add function mbedtls_ssl_set_datagram_packing() to configure the use of datagram packing (enabled by default). Bugfix * Fix a potential memory leak in mbedtls_ssl_setup() function. An allocation failure in the function could lead to other buffers being leaked. * Fixes an issue with MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C which would not compile if MBEDTLS_ARC4_C and MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER weren't also defined. #1890 * Fix a memory leak in ecp_mul_comb() if ecp_precompute_comb() fails. Fix contributed by Espressif Systems. * Add ecc extensions only if an ecc based ciphersuite is used. This improves compliance to RFC 4492, and as a result, solves interoperability issues with BouncyCastle. Raised by milenamil in #1157. * Replace printf with mbedtls_printf in the ARIA module. Found by TrinityTonic in #1908. * Fix potential use-after-free in mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len() and mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion() after a session reset. Fixes #1941. * Fix a bug that caused SSL/TLS clients to incorrectly abort the handshake with TLS versions 1.1 and earlier when the server requested authentication without providing a list of CAs. This was due to an overly strict bounds check in parsing the CertificateRequest message, introduced in Mbed TLS 2.12.0. Fixes #1954. * Fix a miscalculation of the maximum record expansion in mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion() in case of ChachaPoly ciphersuites, or CBC ciphersuites in (D)TLS versions 1.1 or higher. Fixes #1913, #1914. * Fix undefined shifts with negative values in certificates parsing (found by Catena cyber using oss-fuzz) * Fix memory leak and free without initialization in pk_encrypt and pk_decrypt example programs. Reported by Brace Stout. Fixes #1128. * Remove redundant else statement. Raised by irwir. Fixes #1776. Changes * Copy headers preserving timestamps when doing a "make install". Contributed by xueruini. * Allow the forward declaration of public structs. Contributed by Dawid Drozd. Fixes #1215 raised by randombit. * Improve compatibility with some alternative CCM implementations by using CCM test vectors from RAM. * Add support for buffering of out-of-order handshake messages. * Add warnings to the documentation of the HKDF module to reduce the risk of misusing the mbedtls_hkdf_extract() and mbedtls_hkdf_expand() functions. Fixes #1775. Reported by Brian J. Murray. = mbed TLS 2.12.0 branch released 2018-07-25 Security * Fix a vulnerability in TLS ciphersuites based on CBC and using SHA-384, in (D)TLS 1.0 to 1.2, that allowed an active network attacker to partially recover the plaintext of messages under some conditions by exploiting timing measurements. With DTLS, the attacker could perform this recovery by sending many messages in the same connection. With TLS or if mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit() was used, the attack only worked if the same secret (for example a HTTP Cookie) has been repeatedly sent over connections manipulated by the attacker. Connections using GCM or CCM instead of CBC, using hash sizes other than SHA-384, or using Encrypt-then-Mac (RFC 7366) were not affected. The vulnerability was caused by a miscalculation (for SHA-384) in a countermeasure to the original Lucky 13 attack. Found by Kenny Paterson, Eyal Ronen and Adi Shamir. * Fix a vulnerability in TLS ciphersuites based on CBC, in (D)TLS 1.0 to 1.2, that allowed a local attacker, able to execute code on the local machine as well as manipulate network packets, to partially recover the plaintext of messages under some conditions by using a cache attack targeting an internal MD/SHA buffer. With TLS or if mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit() was used, the attack only worked if the same secret (for example a HTTP Cookie) has been repeatedly sent over connections manipulated by the attacker. Connections using GCM or CCM instead of CBC or using Encrypt-then-Mac (RFC 7366) were not affected. Found by Kenny Paterson, Eyal Ronen and Adi Shamir. * Add a counter-measure against a vulnerability in TLS ciphersuites based on CBC, in (D)TLS 1.0 to 1.2, that allowed a local attacker, able to execute code on the local machine as well as manipulate network packets, to partially recover the plaintext of messages under some conditions (see previous entry) by using a cache attack targeting the SSL input record buffer. Connections using GCM or CCM instead of CBC or using Encrypt-then-Mac (RFC 7366) were not affected. Found by Kenny Paterson, Eyal Ronen and Adi Shamir. Features * Add new crypto primitives from RFC 7539: stream cipher Chacha20, one-time authenticator Poly1305 and AEAD construct Chacha20-Poly1305. Contributed by Daniel King. * Add support for CHACHA20-POLY1305 ciphersuites from RFC 7905. * Add platform support for the Haiku OS. (https://www.haiku-os.org). Contributed by Augustin Cavalier. * Make the receive and transmit buffers independent sizes, for situations where the outgoing buffer can be fixed at a smaller size than the incoming buffer, which can save some RAM. If buffer lengths are kept equal, there is no functional difference. Contributed by Angus Gratton, and also independently contributed again by Paul Sokolovsky. * Add support for key wrapping modes based on AES as defined by NIST SP 800-38F algorithms KW and KWP and by RFC 3394 and RFC 5649. Bugfix * Fix the key_app_writer example which was writing a leading zero byte which was creating an invalid ASN.1 tag. Found by Aryeh R. Fixes #1257. * Fix compilation error on C++, because of a variable named new. Found and fixed by Hirotaka Niisato in #1783. * Fix "no symbols" warning issued by ranlib when building on Mac OS X. Fix contributed by tabascoeye. * Clarify documentation for mbedtls_ssl_write() to include 0 as a valid return value. Found by @davidwu2000. #839 * Fix a memory leak in mbedtls_x509_csr_parse(), found by catenacyber, Philippe Antoine. Fixes #1623. * Remove unused headers included in x509.c. Found by Chris Hanson and fixed by Brendan Shanks. Part of a fix for #992. * Fix compilation error when MBEDTLS_ARC4_C is disabled and MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER is enabled. Found by TrinityTonic in #1719. * Added length checks to some TLS parsing functions. Found and fixed by Philippe Antoine from Catena cyber. #1663. * Fix the inline assembly for the MPI multiply helper function for i386 and i386 with SSE2. Found by László Langó. Fixes #1550 * Fix namespacing in header files. Remove the `mbedtls` namespacing in the `#include` in the header files. Resolves #857 * Fix compiler warning of 'use before initialisation' in mbedtls_pk_parse_key(). Found by Martin Boye Petersen and fixed by Dawid Drozd. #1098 * Fix decryption for zero length messages (which contain all padding) when a CBC based ciphersuite is used together with Encrypt-then-MAC. Previously, such a message was wrongly reported as an invalid record and therefore lead to the connection being terminated. Seen most often with OpenSSL using TLS 1.0. Reported by @kFYatek and by Conor Murphy on the forum. Fix contributed by Espressif Systems. Fixes #1632 * Fix ssl_client2 example to send application data with 0-length content when the request_size argument is set to 0 as stated in the documentation. Fixes #1833. * Correct the documentation for `mbedtls_ssl_get_session()`. This API has deep copy of the session, and the peer certificate is not lost. Fixes #926. * Fix build using -std=c99. Fixed by Nick Wilson. Changes * Fail when receiving a TLS alert message with an invalid length, or invalid zero-length messages when using TLS 1.2. Contributed by Espressif Systems. * Change the default behaviour of mbedtls_hkdf_extract() to return an error when calling with a NULL salt and non-zero salt_len. Contributed by Brian J Murray * Change the shebang line in Perl scripts to look up perl in the PATH. Contributed by fbrosson. * Allow overriding the time on Windows via the platform-time abstraction. Fixed by Nick Wilson. * Use gmtime_r/gmtime_s for thread-safety. Fixed by Nick Wilson. = mbed TLS 2.11.0 branch released 2018-06-18 Features * Add additional block mode, OFB (Output Feedback), to the AES module and cipher abstraction module. * Implement the HMAC-based extract-and-expand key derivation function (HKDF) per RFC 5869. Contributed by Thomas Fossati. * Add support for the CCM* block cipher mode as defined in IEEE Std. 802.15.4. * Add support for the XTS block cipher mode with AES (AES-XTS). Contributed by Aorimn in pull request #414. * In TLS servers, support offloading private key operations to an external cryptoprocessor. Private key operations can be asynchronous to allow non-blocking operation of the TLS server stack. Bugfix * Fix the cert_write example to handle certificates signed with elliptic curves as well as RSA. Fixes #777 found by dbedev. * Fix for redefinition of _WIN32_WINNT to avoid overriding a definition used by user applications. Found and fixed by Fabio Alessandrelli. * Fix compilation warnings with IAR toolchain, on 32 bit platform. Reported by rahmanih in #683 * Fix braces in mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_status(). Found by sbranden, #552. Changes * Changed CMake defaults for IAR to treat all compiler warnings as errors. * Changed the Clang parameters used in the CMake build files to work for versions later than 3.6. Versions of Clang earlier than this may no longer work. Fixes #1072 = mbed TLS 2.10.0 branch released 2018-06-06 Features * Add support for ARIA cipher (RFC 5794) and associated TLS ciphersuites (RFC 6209). Disabled by default, see MBEDTLS_ARIA_C in config.h API Changes * Extend the platform module with a util component that contains functionality shared by multiple Mbed TLS modules. At this stage platform_util.h (and its associated platform_util.c) only contain mbedtls_platform_zeroize(), which is a critical function from a security point of view. mbedtls_platform_zeroize() needs to be regularly tested against compilers to ensure that calls to it are not removed from the output binary as part of redundant code elimination optimizations. Therefore, mbedtls_platform_zeroize() is moved to the platform module to facilitate testing and maintenance. Bugfix * Fix an issue with MicroBlaze support in bn_mul.h which was causing the build to fail. Found by zv-io. Fixes #1651. Changes * Support TLS testing in out-of-source builds using cmake. Fixes #1193. * Fix redundant declaration of mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites. Raised by TrinityTonic. #1359. = mbed TLS 2.9.0 branch released 2018-04-30 Security * Fix an issue in the X.509 module which could lead to a buffer overread during certificate validation. Additionally, the issue could also lead to unnecessary callback checks being made or to some validation checks to be omitted. The overread could be triggered remotely, while the other issues would require a non DER-compliant certificate to be correctly signed by a trusted CA, or a trusted CA with a non DER-compliant certificate. Found by luocm. Fixes #825. * Fix the buffer length assertion in the ssl_parse_certificate_request() function which led to an arbitrary overread of the message buffer. The overreads could be caused by receiving a malformed message at the point where an optional signature algorithms list is expected when the signature algorithms section is too short. In builds with debug output, the overread data is output with the debug data. * Fix a client-side bug in the validation of the server's ciphersuite choice which could potentially lead to the client accepting a ciphersuite it didn't offer or a ciphersuite that cannot be used with the TLS or DTLS version chosen by the server. This could lead to corruption of internal data structures for some configurations. Features * Add an option, MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES, to dynamically compute smaller AES tables during runtime, thereby reducing the RAM/ROM footprint by ~6KiB. Suggested and contributed by jkivilin in pull request #394. * Add initial support for Curve448 (RFC 7748). Only mbedtls_ecp_mul() and ECDH primitive functions (mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public(), mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared()) are supported for now. Contributed by Nicholas Wilson in pull request #348. API Changes * Extend the public API with the function of mbedtls_net_poll() to allow user applications to wait for a network context to become ready before reading or writing. * Add function mbedtls_ssl_check_pending() to the public API to allow a check for whether more more data is pending to be processed in the internal message buffers. This function is necessary to determine when it is safe to idle on the underlying transport in case event-driven IO is used. Bugfix * Fix a spurious uninitialized variable warning in cmac.c. Fix independently contributed by Brian J Murray and David Brown. * Add missing dependencies in test suites that led to build failures in configurations that omit certain hashes or public-key algorithms. Fixes #1040. * Fix C89 incompatibility in benchmark.c. Contributed by Brendan Shanks. #1353 * Add missing dependencies for MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE and MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES in some test suites. Contributed by Deomid Ryabkov. Fixes #1299, #1475. * Fix the Makefile build process for building shared libraries on Mac OS X. Fixed by mnacamura. * Fix parsing of PKCS#8 encoded Elliptic Curve keys. Previously Mbed TLS was unable to parse keys which had only the optional parameters field of the ECPrivateKey structure. Found by Jethro Beekman, fixed in #1379. * Return the plaintext data more quickly on unpadded CBC decryption, as stated in the mbedtls_cipher_update() documentation. Contributed by Andy Leiserson. * Fix overriding and ignoring return values when parsing and writing to a file in pk_sign program. Found by kevlut in #1142. * Restrict usage of error code MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ to situations where data needs to be fetched from the underlying transport in order to make progress. Previously, this error code was also occasionally returned when unexpected messages were being discarded, ignoring that further messages could potentially already be pending to be processed in the internal buffers; these cases led to deadlocks when event-driven I/O was used. Found and reported by Hubert Mis in #772. * Fix buffer length assertions in the ssl_parse_certificate_request() function which leads to a potential one byte overread of the message buffer. * Fix invalid buffer sizes passed to zlib during record compression and decompression. * Fix the soversion of libmbedcrypto to match the soversion of the maintained 2.7 branch. The soversion was increased in Mbed TLS version 2.7.1 to reflect breaking changes in that release, but the increment was missed in 2.8.0 and later releases outside of the 2.7 branch. Changes * Remove some redundant code in bignum.c. Contributed by Alexey Skalozub. * Support cmake builds where Mbed TLS is a subproject. Fix contributed independently by Matthieu Volat and Arne Schwabe. * Improve testing in configurations that omit certain hashes or public-key algorithms. Includes contributions by Gert van Dijk. * Improve negative testing of X.509 parsing. * Do not define global mutexes around readdir() and gmtime() in configurations where the feature is disabled. Found and fixed by Gergely Budai. * Harden the function mbedtls_ssl_config_free() against misuse, so that it doesn't leak memory if the user doesn't use mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() and instead incorrectly manipulates the configuration structure directly. Found and fix submitted by junyeonLEE in #1220. * Provide an empty implementation of mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2() when MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C is not enabled. This allows the use of PBKDF2 without PBES2. Fixed by Marcos Del Sol Vives. * Add the order of the base point as N in the mbedtls_ecp_group structure for Curve25519 (other curves had it already). Contributed by Nicholas Wilson #481 * Improve the documentation of mbedtls_net_accept(). Contributed by Ivan Krylov. * Improve the documentation of mbedtls_ssl_write(). Suggested by Paul Sokolovsky in #1356. * Add an option in the Makefile to support ar utilities where the operation letter must not be prefixed by '-', such as LLVM. Found and fixed by Alex Hixon. * Allow configuring the shared library extension by setting the DLEXT environment variable when using the project makefiles. * Optimize unnecessary zeroing in mbedtls_mpi_copy. Based on a contribution by Alexey Skalozub in #405. * In the SSL module, when f_send, f_recv or f_recv_timeout report transmitting more than the required length, return an error. Raised by Sam O'Connor in #1245. * Improve robustness of mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys against the use of HMAC functions with non-HMAC ciphersuites. Independently contributed by Jiayuan Chen in #1377. Fixes #1437. * Improve security of RSA key generation by including criteria from FIPS 186-4. Contributed by Jethro Beekman. #1380 * Declare functions in header files even when an alternative implementation of the corresponding module is activated by defining the corresponding MBEDTLS_XXX_ALT macro. This means that alternative implementations do not need to copy the declarations, and ensures that they will have the same API. * Add platform setup and teardown calls in test suites. = mbed TLS 2.8.0 branch released 2018-03-16 Default behavior changes * The truncated HMAC extension now conforms to RFC 6066. This means that when both sides of a TLS connection negotiate the truncated HMAC extension, Mbed TLS can now interoperate with other compliant implementations, but this breaks interoperability with prior versions of Mbed TLS. To restore the old behavior, enable the (deprecated) option MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT in config.h. Found by Andreas Walz (ivESK, Offenburg University of Applied Sciences). Security * Fix implementation of the truncated HMAC extension. The previous implementation allowed an offline 2^80 brute force attack on the HMAC key of a single, uninterrupted connection (with no resumption of the session). * Verify results of RSA private key operations to defend against Bellcore glitch attack. * Fix a buffer overread in ssl_parse_server_key_exchange() that could cause a crash on invalid input. * Fix a buffer overread in ssl_parse_server_psk_hint() that could cause a crash on invalid input. * Fix CRL parsing to reject CRLs containing unsupported critical extensions. Found by Falko Strenzke and Evangelos Karatsiolis. Features * Extend PKCS#8 interface by introducing support for the entire SHA algorithms family when encrypting private keys using PKCS#5 v2.0. This allows reading encrypted PEM files produced by software that uses PBKDF2-SHA2, such as OpenSSL 1.1. Submitted by Antonio Quartulli, OpenVPN Inc. Fixes #1339 * Add support for public keys encoded in PKCS#1 format. #1122 New deprecations * Deprecate support for record compression (configuration option MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT). Bugfix * Fix the name of a DHE parameter that was accidentally changed in 2.7.0. Fixes #1358. * Fix test_suite_pk to work on 64-bit ILP32 systems. #849 * Fix mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suiteb, which used to reject all certificates with flag MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK even when the key type was correct. In the context of SSL, this resulted in handshake failure. Reported by daniel in the Mbed TLS forum. #1351 * Fix Windows x64 builds with the included mbedTLS.sln file. #1347 * Fix setting version TLSv1 as minimal version, even if TLS 1 is not enabled. Set MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION and MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION instead of MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 and MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1. #664 * Fix compilation error on Mingw32 when _TRUNCATE is defined. Use _TRUNCATE only if __MINGW32__ not defined. Fix suggested by Thomas Glanzmann and Nick Wilson on issue #355 * In test_suite_pk, pass valid parameters when testing for hash length overflow. #1179 * Fix memory allocation corner cases in memory_buffer_alloc.c module. Found by Guido Vranken. #639 * Log correct number of ciphersuites used in Client Hello message. #918 * Fix X509 CRT parsing that would potentially accept an invalid tag when parsing the subject alternative names. * Fix a possible arithmetic overflow in ssl_parse_server_key_exchange() that could cause a key exchange to fail on valid data. * Fix a possible arithmetic overflow in ssl_parse_server_psk_hint() that could cause a key exchange to fail on valid data. * Don't define mbedtls_aes_decrypt and mbedtls_aes_encrypt under MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED. #1388 * Fix a 1-byte heap buffer overflow (read-only) during private key parsing. Found through fuzz testing. Changes * Fix tag lengths and value ranges in the documentation of CCM encryption. Contributed by Mathieu Briand. * Fix typo in a comment ctr_drbg.c. Contributed by Paul Sokolovsky. * Remove support for the library reference configuration for picocoin. * MD functions deprecated in 2.7.0 are no longer inline, to provide a migration path for those depending on the library's ABI. * Clarify the documentation of mbedtls_ssl_setup. * Use (void) when defining functions with no parameters. Contributed by Joris Aerts. #678 = mbed TLS 2.7.0 branch released 2018-02-03 Security * Fix a heap corruption issue in the implementation of the truncated HMAC extension. When the truncated HMAC extension is enabled and CBC is used, sending a malicious application packet could be used to selectively corrupt 6 bytes on the peer's heap, which could potentially lead to crash or remote code execution. The issue could be triggered remotely from either side in both TLS and DTLS. CVE-2018-0488 * Fix a buffer overflow in RSA-PSS verification when the hash was too large for the key size, which could potentially lead to crash or remote code execution. Found by Seth Terashima, Qualcomm Product Security Initiative, Qualcomm Technologies Inc. CVE-2018-0487 * Fix buffer overflow in RSA-PSS verification when the unmasked data is all zeros. * Fix an unsafe bounds check in ssl_parse_client_psk_identity() when adding 64 KiB to the address of the SSL buffer and causing a wrap around. * Fix a potential heap buffer overflow in mbedtls_ssl_write(). When the (by default enabled) maximum fragment length extension is disabled in the config and the application data buffer passed to mbedtls_ssl_write is larger than the internal message buffer (16384 bytes by default), the latter overflows. The exploitability of this issue depends on whether the application layer can be forced into sending such large packets. The issue was independently reported by Tim Nordell via e-mail and by Florin Petriuc and sjorsdewit on GitHub. Fix proposed by Florin Petriuc in #1022. Fixes #707. * Add a provision to prevent compiler optimizations breaking the time constancy of mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp(). * Ensure that buffers are cleared after use if they contain sensitive data. Changes were introduced in multiple places in the library. * Set PEM buffer to zero before freeing it, to avoid decoded private keys being leaked to memory after release. * Fix dhm_check_range() failing to detect trivial subgroups and potentially leaking 1 bit of the private key. Reported by prashantkspatil. * Make mbedtls_mpi_read_binary() constant-time with respect to the input data. Previously, trailing zero bytes were detected and omitted for the sake of saving memory, but potentially leading to slight timing differences. Reported by Marco Macchetti, Kudelski Group. * Wipe stack buffer temporarily holding EC private exponent after keypair generation. * Fix a potential heap buffer over-read in ALPN extension parsing (server-side). Could result in application crash, but only if an ALPN name larger than 16 bytes had been configured on the server. * Change default choice of DHE parameters from untrustworthy RFC 5114 to RFC 3526 containing parameters generated in a nothing-up-my-sleeve manner. Features * Allow comments in test data files. * The selftest program can execute a subset of the tests based on command line arguments. * New unit tests for timing. Improve the self-test to be more robust when run on a heavily-loaded machine. * Add alternative implementation support for CCM and CMAC (MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT, MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT). Submitted by Steven Cooreman, Silicon Labs. * Add support for alternative implementations of GCM, selected by the configuration flag MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT. * Add support for alternative implementations for ECDSA, controlled by new configuration flags MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT and MBEDTLS_ECDSDA_GENKEY_AT in config.h. The following functions from the ECDSA module can be replaced with alternative implementation: mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(), mbedtls_ecdsa_verify() and mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey(). * Add support for alternative implementation of ECDH, controlled by the new configuration flags MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT and MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT in config.h. The following functions from the ECDH module can be replaced with an alternative implementation: mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public() and mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared(). * Add support for alternative implementation of ECJPAKE, controlled by the new configuration flag MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT. * Add mechanism to provide alternative implementation of the DHM module. API Changes * Extend RSA interface by multiple functions allowing structure- independent setup and export of RSA contexts. Most notably, mbedtls_rsa_import() and mbedtls_rsa_complete() are introduced for setting up RSA contexts from partial key material and having them completed to the needs of the implementation automatically. This allows to setup private RSA contexts from keys consisting of N,D,E only, even if P,Q are needed for the purpose or CRT and/or blinding. * The configuration option MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT can be used to define alternative implementations of the RSA interface declared in rsa.h. * The following functions in the message digest modules (MD2, MD4, MD5, SHA1, SHA256, SHA512) have been deprecated and replaced as shown below. The new functions change the return type from void to int to allow returning error codes when using MBEDTLS__ALT. mbedtls__starts() -> mbedtls__starts_ret() mbedtls__update() -> mbedtls__update_ret() mbedtls__finish() -> mbedtls__finish_ret() mbedtls__process() -> mbedtls_internal__process() New deprecations * Deprecate usage of RSA primitives with non-matching key-type (e.g. signing with a public key). * Direct manipulation of structure fields of RSA contexts is deprecated. Users are advised to use the extended RSA API instead. * Deprecate usage of message digest functions that return void (mbedtls__starts, mbedtls__update, mbedtls__finish and mbedtls__process where is any of MD2, MD4, MD5, SHA1, SHA256, SHA512) in favor of functions that can return an error code. * Deprecate untrustworthy DHE parameters from RFC 5114. Superseded by parameters from RFC 3526 or the newly added parameters from RFC 7919. * Deprecate hex string DHE constants MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P etc. Supserseded by binary encoded constants MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P_BIN etc. * Deprecate mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param() for setting default DHE parameters from hex strings. Superseded by mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_bin() accepting DHM parameters in binary form, matching the new constants. Bugfix * Fix ssl_parse_record_header() to silently discard invalid DTLS records as recommended in RFC 6347 Section 4.1.2.7. * Fix memory leak in mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() when called multiple times. Found by projectgus and Jethro Beekman, #836. * Fix usage help in ssl_server2 example. Found and fixed by Bei Lin. * Parse signature algorithm extension when renegotiating. Previously, renegotiated handshakes would only accept signatures using SHA-1 regardless of the peer's preferences, or fail if SHA-1 was disabled. * Fix leap year calculation in x509_date_is_valid() to ensure that invalid dates on leap years with 100 and 400 intervals are handled correctly. Found by Nicholas Wilson. #694 * Fix some invalid RSA-PSS signatures with keys of size 8N+1 that were accepted. Generating these signatures required the private key. * Fix out-of-memory problem when parsing 4096-bit PKCS8-encrypted RSA keys. Found independently by Florian in the mbed TLS forum and by Mishamax. #878, #1019. * Fix variable used before assignment compilation warnings with IAR toolchain. Found by gkerrien38. * Fix unchecked return codes from AES, DES and 3DES functions in pem_aes_decrypt(), pem_des_decrypt() and pem_des3_decrypt() respectively. If a call to one of the functions of the cryptographic primitive modules failed, the error may not be noticed by the function mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() causing it to return invalid values. Found by Guido Vranken. #756 * Include configuration file in md.h, to fix compilation warnings. Reported by aaronmdjones in #1001 * Correct extraction of signature-type from PK instance in X.509 CRT and CSR writing routines that prevented these functions to work with alternative RSA implementations. Raised by J.B. in the Mbed TLS forum. Fixes #1011. * Don't print X.509 version tag for v1 CRT's, and omit extensions for non-v3 CRT's. * Fix bugs in RSA test suite under MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY. #1023 #1024 * Fix net_would_block() to avoid modification by errno through fcntl() call. Found by nkolban. Fixes #845. * Fix handling of handshake messages in mbedtls_ssl_read() in case MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION is disabled. Found by erja-gp. * Add a check for invalid private parameters in mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(). Reported by Yolan Romailler. * Fix word size check in in pk.c to not depend on MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64. * Fix incorrect unit in benchmark output. #850 * Add size-checks for record and handshake message content, securing fragile yet non-exploitable code-paths. * Fix crash when calling mbedtls_ssl_cache_free() twice. Found by MilenkoMitrovic, #1104 * Fix mbedtls_timing_alarm(0) on Unix and MinGW. * Fix use of uninitialized memory in mbedtls_timing_get_timer() when reset=1. * Fix possible memory leaks in mbedtls_gcm_self_test(). * Added missing return code checks in mbedtls_aes_self_test(). * Fix issues in RSA key generation program programs/x509/rsa_genkey and the RSA test suite where the failure of CTR DRBG initialization lead to freeing an RSA context and several MPI's without proper initialization beforehand. * Fix error message in programs/pkey/gen_key.c. Found and fixed by Chris Xue. * Fix programs/pkey/dh_server.c so that it actually works with dh_client.c. Found and fixed by Martijn de Milliano. * Fix an issue in the cipher decryption with the mode MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS that sometimes accepted invalid padding. Note, this padding mode is not used by the TLS protocol. Found and fixed by Micha Kraus. * Fix the entropy.c module to not call mbedtls_sha256_starts() or mbedtls_sha512_starts() in the mbedtls_entropy_init() function. * Fix the entropy.c module to ensure that mbedtls_sha256_init() or mbedtls_sha512_init() is called before operating on the relevant context structure. Do not assume that zeroizing a context is a correct way to reset it. Found independently by ccli8 on Github. * In mbedtls_entropy_free(), properly free the message digest context. * Fix status handshake status message in programs/ssl/dtls_client.c. Found and fixed by muddog. Changes * Extend cert_write example program by options to set the certificate version and the message digest. Further, allow enabling/disabling of authority identifier, subject identifier and basic constraints extensions. * Only check for necessary RSA structure fields in `mbedtls_rsa_private`. In particular, don't require P,Q if neither CRT nor blinding are used. Reported and fix proposed independently by satur9nine and sliai on GitHub. * Only run AES-192 self-test if AES-192 is available. Fixes #963. * Tighten the RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature verification code and remove the undeclared dependency of the RSA module on the ASN.1 module. * Update all internal usage of deprecated message digest functions to the new ones with return codes. In particular, this modifies the mbedtls_md_info_t structure. Propagate errors from these functions everywhere except some locations in the ssl_tls.c module. * Improve CTR_DRBG error handling by propagating underlying AES errors. * Add MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX_HW_ACCEL_FAILED error codes for all cryptography modules where the software implementation can be replaced by a hardware implementation. * Add explicit warnings for the use of MD2, MD4, MD5, SHA-1, DES and ARC4 throughout the library. = mbed TLS 2.6.0 branch released 2017-08-10 Security * Fix authentication bypass in SSL/TLS: when authmode is set to optional, mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result() would incorrectly return 0 when the peer's X.509 certificate chain had more than MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA (default: 8) intermediates, even when it was not trusted. This could be triggered remotely from either side. (With authmode set to 'required' (the default), the handshake was correctly aborted). * Reliably wipe sensitive data after use in the AES example applications programs/aes/aescrypt2 and programs/aes/crypt_and_hash. Found by Laurent Simon. Features * Add the functions mbedtls_platform_setup() and mbedtls_platform_teardown() and the context struct mbedtls_platform_context to perform platform-specific setup and teardown operations. The macro MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT allows the functions to be overridden by the user in a platform_alt.h file. These new functions are required in some embedded environments to provide a means of initialising underlying cryptographic acceleration hardware. API Changes * Reverted API/ABI breaking changes introduced in mbed TLS 2.5.1, to make the API consistent with mbed TLS 2.5.0. Specifically removed the inline qualifier from the functions mbedtls_aes_decrypt, mbedtls_aes_encrypt, mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec and mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk. Found by James Cowgill. #978 * Certificate verification functions now set flags to -1 in case the full chain was not verified due to an internal error (including in the verify callback) or chain length limitations. * With authmode set to optional, the TLS handshake is now aborted if the verification of the peer's certificate failed due to an overlong chain or a fatal error in the verify callback. Bugfix * Add a check if iv_len is zero in GCM, and return an error if it is zero. Reported by roberto. #716 * Replace preprocessor condition from #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD) to #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) as the library cannot assume they will always be implemented by pthread support. #696 * Fix a resource leak on Windows platforms in mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path(), in the case of an error. Found by redplait. #590 * Add MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK to check for error value of mbedtls_mpi_fill_random. Reported and fix suggested by guidovranken. #740 * Fix conditional preprocessor directives in bignum.h to enable 64-bit compilation when using ARM Compiler 6. * Fix a potential integer overflow in the version verification for DER encoded X.509 CRLs. The overflow could enable maliciously constructed CRLs to bypass the version verification check. Found by Peng Li/Yueh-Hsun Lin, KNOX Security, Samsung Research America * Fix potential integer overflow in the version verification for DER encoded X.509 CSRs. The overflow could enable maliciously constructed CSRs to bypass the version verification check. Found by Peng Li/Yueh-Hsun Lin, KNOX Security, Samsung Research America * Fix a potential integer overflow in the version verification for DER encoded X.509 certificates. The overflow could enable maliciously constructed certificates to bypass the certificate verification check. * Fix a call to the libc function time() to call the platform abstraction function mbedtls_time() instead. Found by wairua. #666 * Avoid shadowing of time and index functions through mbed TLS function arguments. Found by inestlerode. #557. Changes * Added config.h option MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION, to prevent the use of 64-bit division. This is useful on embedded platforms where 64-bit division created a dependency on external libraries. #708 * Removed mutexes from ECP hardware accelerator code. Now all hardware accelerator code in the library leaves concurrency handling to the platform. Reported by Steven Cooreman. #863 * Define the macro MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES in the configuration file config-no-entropy.h to reduce the RAM footprint. * Added a test script that can be hooked into git that verifies commits before they are pushed. * Improve documentation of PKCS1 decryption functions. = mbed TLS 2.5.1 released 2017-06-21 Security * Fixed unlimited overread of heap-based buffer in mbedtls_ssl_read(). The issue could only happen client-side with renegotiation enabled. Could result in DoS (application crash) or information leak (if the application layer sent data read from mbedtls_ssl_read() back to the server or to a third party). Can be triggered remotely. * Removed SHA-1 and RIPEMD-160 from the default hash algorithms for certificate verification. SHA-1 can be turned back on with a compile-time option if needed. * Fixed offset in FALLBACK_SCSV parsing that caused TLS server to fail to detect it sometimes. Reported by Hugo Leisink. #810 * Tighten parsing of RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures, to avoid a potential Bleichenbacher/BERserk-style attack. Bugfix * Remove size zero arrays from ECJPAKE test suite. Size zero arrays are not valid C and they prevented the test from compiling in Visual Studio 2015 and with GCC using the -Wpedantic compilation option. * Fix insufficient support for signature-hash-algorithm extension, resulting in compatibility problems with Chrome. Found by hfloyrd. #823 * Fix behaviour that hid the original cause of fatal alerts in some cases when sending the alert failed. The fix makes sure not to hide the error that triggered the alert. * Fix SSLv3 renegotiation behaviour and stop processing data received from peer after sending a fatal alert to refuse a renegotiation attempt. Previous behaviour was to keep processing data even after the alert has been sent. * Accept empty trusted CA chain in authentication mode MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL. Found by Jethro Beekman. #864 * Fix implementation of mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate() to not annihilate fatal errors in authentication mode MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL and to reflect bad EC curves within verification result. * Fix bug that caused the modular inversion function to accept the invalid modulus 1 and therefore to hang. Found by blaufish. #641. * Fix incorrect sign computation in modular exponentiation when the base is a negative MPI. Previously the result was always negative. Found by Guido Vranken. * Fix a numerical underflow leading to stack overflow in mpi_read_file() that was triggered uppon reading an empty line. Found by Guido Vranken. Changes * Send fatal alerts in more cases. The previous behaviour was to skip sending the fatal alert and just drop the connection. * Clarify ECDSA documentation and improve the sample code to avoid misunderstanding and potentially dangerous use of the API. Pointed out by Jean-Philippe Aumasson. = mbed TLS 2.5.0 branch released 2017-05-17 Security * Wipe stack buffers in RSA private key operations (rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt(), rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt). Found by Laurent Simon. * Add exponent blinding to RSA private operations as a countermeasure against side-channel attacks like the cache attack described in https://arxiv.org/abs/1702.08719v2. Found and fix proposed by Michael Schwarz, Samuel Weiser, Daniel Gruss, Clémentine Maurice and Stefan Mangard. Features * Add hardware acceleration support for the Elliptic Curve Point module. This involved exposing parts of the internal interface to enable replacing the core functions and adding and alternative, module level replacement support for enabling the extension of the interface. * Add a new configuration option to 'mbedtls_ssl_config' to enable suppressing the CA list in Certificate Request messages. The default behaviour has not changed, namely every configured CAs name is included. API Changes * The following functions in the AES module have been deprecated and replaced by the functions shown below. The new functions change the return type from void to int to allow returning error codes when using MBEDTLS_AES_ALT, MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT or MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT. mbedtls_aes_decrypt() -> mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt() mbedtls_aes_encrypt() -> mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt() Bugfix * Remove macros from compat-1.3.h that correspond to deleted items from most recent versions of the library. Found by Kyle Keen. * Fixed issue in the Threading module that prevented mutexes from initialising. Found by sznaider. #667 #843 * Add checks in the PK module for the RSA functions on 64-bit systems. The PK and RSA modules use different types for passing hash length and without these checks the type cast could lead to data loss. Found by Guido Vranken. = mbed TLS 2.4.2 branch released 2017-03-08 Security * Add checks to prevent signature forgeries for very large messages while using RSA through the PK module in 64-bit systems. The issue was caused by some data loss when casting a size_t to an unsigned int value in the functions rsa_verify_wrap(), rsa_sign_wrap(), rsa_alt_sign_wrap() and mbedtls_pk_sign(). Found by Jean-Philippe Aumasson. * Fixed potential livelock during the parsing of a CRL in PEM format in mbedtls_x509_crl_parse(). A string containing a CRL followed by trailing characters after the footer could result in the execution of an infinite loop. The issue can be triggered remotely. Found by Greg Zaverucha, Microsoft. * Removed MD5 from the allowed hash algorithms for CertificateRequest and CertificateVerify messages, to prevent SLOTH attacks against TLS 1.2. Introduced by interoperability fix for #513. * Fixed a bug that caused freeing a buffer that was allocated on the stack, when verifying the validity of a key on secp224k1. This could be triggered remotely for example with a maliciously constructed certificate and potentially could lead to remote code execution on some platforms. Reported independently by rongsaws and Aleksandar Nikolic, Cisco Talos team. #569 CVE-2017-2784 Bugfix * Fix output certificate verification flags set by x509_crt_verify_top() when traversing a chain of trusted CA. The issue would cause both flags, MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED and MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED, to be set when the verification conditions are not met regardless of the cause. Found by Harm Verhagen and inestlerode. #665 #561 * Fix the redefinition of macro ssl_set_bio to an undefined symbol mbedtls_ssl_set_bio_timeout in compat-1.3.h, by removing it. Found by omlib-lin. #673 * Fix unused variable/function compilation warnings in pem.c, x509_crt.c and x509_csr.c that are reported when building mbed TLS with a config.h that does not define MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C. Found by omnium21. #562 * Fix incorrect renegotiation condition in ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate() that would compare 64 bits of the record counter instead of 48 bits as indicated in RFC 6347 Section 4.3.1. This could cause the execution of the renegotiation routines at unexpected times when the protocol is DTLS. Found by wariua. #687 * Fixed multiple buffer overreads in mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() when parsing the input string in PEM format to extract the different components. Found by Eyal Itkin. * Fixed potential arithmetic overflow in mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed() that could cause buffer bound checks to be bypassed. Found by Eyal Itkin. * Fixed potential arithmetic overflows in mbedtls_cipher_update() that could cause buffer bound checks to be bypassed. Found by Eyal Itkin. * Fixed potential arithmetic overflow in mbedtls_md2_update() that could cause buffer bound checks to be bypassed. Found by Eyal Itkin. * Fixed potential arithmetic overflow in mbedtls_base64_decode() that could cause buffer bound checks to be bypassed. Found by Eyal Itkin. * Fixed heap overreads in mbedtls_x509_get_time(). Found by Peng Li/Yueh-Hsun Lin, KNOX Security, Samsung Research America. * Fix potential memory leak in mbedtls_x509_crl_parse(). The leak was caused by missing calls to mbedtls_pem_free() in cases when a MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT error was encountered. Found and fix proposed by Guido Vranken. #722 * Fixed the templates used to generate project and solution files for Visual Studio 2015 as well as the files themselves, to remove a build warning generated in Visual Studio 2015. Reported by Steve Valliere. #742 * Fix a resource leak in ssl_cookie, when using MBEDTLS_THREADING_C. Raised and fix suggested by Alan Gillingham in the mbed TLS forum. #771 * Fix 1 byte buffer overflow in mbedtls_mpi_write_string() when the MPI number to write in hexadecimal is negative and requires an odd number of digits. Found and fixed by Guido Vranken. * Fix unlisted DES configuration dependency in some pkparse test cases. Found by inestlerode. #555 = mbed TLS 2.4.1 branch released 2016-12-13 Changes * Update to CMAC test data, taken from - NIST Special Publication 800-38B - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication – October 2016 = mbed TLS 2.4.0 branch released 2016-10-17 Security * Removed the MBEDTLS_SSL_AEAD_RANDOM_IV option, because it was not compliant with RFC-5116 and could lead to session key recovery in very long TLS sessions. "Nonce-Disrespecting Adversaries Practical Forgery Attacks on GCM in TLS" - H. Bock, A. Zauner, S. Devlin, J. Somorovsky, P. Jovanovic. https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/475.pdf * Fixed potential stack corruption in mbedtls_x509write_crt_der() and mbedtls_x509write_csr_der() when the signature is copied to the buffer without checking whether there is enough space in the destination. The issue cannot be triggered remotely. Found by Jethro Beekman. Features * Added support for CMAC for AES and 3DES and AES-CMAC-PRF-128, as defined by NIST SP 800-38B, RFC-4493 and RFC-4615. * Added hardware entropy selftest to verify that the hardware entropy source is functioning correctly. * Added a script to print build environment info for diagnostic use in test scripts, which is also now called by all.sh. * Added the macro MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN that enables the user to configure the maximum length of a file path that can be buffered when calling mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path(). * Added a configuration file config-no-entropy.h that configures the subset of library features that do not require an entropy source. * Added the macro MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE in config.h. This allows users to configure the minimum number of bytes for entropy sources using the mbedtls_hardware_poll() function. Bugfix * Fix for platform time abstraction to avoid dependency issues where a build may need time but not the standard C library abstraction, and added configuration consistency checks to check_config.h * Fix dependency issue in Makefile to allow parallel builds. * Fix incorrect handling of block lengths in crypt_and_hash.c sample program, when GCM is used. Found by udf2457. #441 * Fix for key exchanges based on ECDH-RSA or ECDH-ECDSA which weren't enabled unless others were also present. Found by David Fernandez. #428 * Fix for out-of-tree builds using CMake. Found by jwurzer, and fix based on a contribution from Tobias Tangemann. #541 * Fixed cert_app.c sample program for debug output and for use when no root certificates are provided. * Fix conditional statement that would cause a 1 byte overread in mbedtls_asn1_get_int(). Found and fixed by Guido Vranken. #599 * Fixed pthread implementation to avoid unintended double initialisations and double frees. Found by Niklas Amnebratt. * Fixed the sample applications gen_key.c, cert_req.c and cert_write.c for builds where the configuration MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C is not defined. Found by inestlerode. #559. * Fix mbedtls_x509_get_sig() to update the ASN1 type in the mbedtls_x509_buf data structure until after error checks are successful. Found by subramanyam-c. #622 * Fix documentation and implementation missmatch for function arguments of mbedtls_gcm_finish(). Found by cmiatpaar. #602 * Guarantee that P>Q at RSA key generation. Found by inestlerode. #558 * Fix potential byte overread when verifying malformed SERVER_HELLO in ssl_parse_hello_verify_request() for DTLS. Found by Guido Vranken. * Fix check for validity of date when parsing in mbedtls_x509_get_time(). Found by subramanyam-c. #626 * Fix compatibility issue with Internet Explorer client authentication, where the limited hash choices prevented the client from sending its certificate. Found by teumas. #513 * Fix compilation without MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST enabled. Changes * Extended test coverage of special cases, and added new timing test suite. * Removed self-tests from the basic-built-test.sh script, and added all missing self-tests to the test suites, to ensure self-tests are only executed once. * Added support for 3 and 4 byte lengths to mbedtls_asn1_write_len(). * Added support for a Yotta specific configuration file - through the symbol YOTTA_CFG_MBEDTLS_TARGET_CONFIG_FILE. * Added optimization for code space for X.509/OID based on configured features. Contributed by Aviv Palivoda. * Renamed source file library/net.c to library/net_sockets.c to avoid naming collision in projects which also have files with the common name net.c. For consistency, the corresponding header file, net.h, is marked as deprecated, and its contents moved to net_sockets.h. * Changed the strategy for X.509 certificate parsing and validation, to no longer disregard certificates with unrecognised fields. = mbed TLS 2.3.0 branch released 2016-06-28 Security * Fix missing padding length check in mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt required by PKCS1 v2.2 * Fix potential integer overflow to buffer overflow in mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt and mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt (not triggerable remotely in (D)TLS). * Fix a potential integer underflow to buffer overread in mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt. It is not triggerable remotely in SSL/TLS. Features * Support for platform abstraction of the standard C library time() function. Bugfix * Fix bug in mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi() that caused wrong results when the three arguments where the same (in-place doubling). Found and fixed by Janos Follath. #309 * Fix potential build failures related to the 'apidoc' target, introduced in the previous patch release. Found by Robert Scheck. #390 #391 * Fix issue in Makefile that prevented building using armar. #386 * Fix memory leak that occurred only when ECJPAKE was enabled and ECDHE and ECDSA was disabled in config.h . The leak didn't occur by default. * Fix an issue that caused valid certificates to be rejected whenever an expired or not yet valid certificate was parsed before a valid certificate in the trusted certificate list. * Fix bug in mbedtls_x509_crt_parse that caused trailing extra data in the buffer after DER certificates to be included in the raw representation. * Fix issue that caused a hang when generating RSA keys of odd bitlength * Fix bug in mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt that made null pointer dereference possible. * Fix issue that caused a crash if invalid curves were passed to mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves. #373 * Fix issue in ssl_fork_server which was preventing it from functioning. #429 * Fix memory leaks in test framework * Fix test in ssl-opt.sh that does not run properly with valgrind * Fix unchecked calls to mmbedtls_md_setup(). Fix by Brian Murray. #502 Changes * On ARM platforms, when compiling with -O0 with GCC, Clang or armcc5, don't use the optimized assembly for bignum multiplication. This removes the need to pass -fomit-frame-pointer to avoid a build error with -O0. * Disabled SSLv3 in the default configuration. * Optimized mbedtls_mpi_zeroize() for MPI integer size. (Fix by Alexey Skalozub). * Fix non-compliance server extension handling. Extensions for SSLv3 are now ignored, as required by RFC6101. = mbed TLS 2.2.1 released 2016-01-05 Security * Fix potential double free when mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data() fails to allocate memory. Only used for certificate generation, not triggerable remotely in SSL/TLS. Found by Rafał Przywara. #367 * Disable MD5 handshake signatures in TLS 1.2 by default to prevent the SLOTH attack on TLS 1.2 server authentication (other attacks from the SLOTH paper do not apply to any version of mbed TLS or PolarSSL). https://www.mitls.org/pages/attacks/SLOTH Bugfix * Fix over-restrictive length limit in GCM. Found by Andreas-N. #362 * Fix bug in certificate validation that caused valid chains to be rejected when the first intermediate certificate has pathLenConstraint=0. Found by Nicholas Wilson. Introduced in mbed TLS 2.2.0. #280 * Removed potential leak in mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(), found by JayaraghavendranK. #372 * Fix suboptimal handling of unexpected records that caused interop issues with some peers over unreliable links. Avoid dropping an entire DTLS datagram if a single record in a datagram is unexpected, instead only drop the record and look at subsequent records (if any are present) in the same datagram. Found by jeannotlapin. #345 = mbed TLS 2.2.0 released 2015-11-04 Security * Fix potential double free if mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() is called more than once and some allocation fails. Cannot be forced remotely. Found by Guido Vranken, Intelworks. * Fix potential heap corruption on Windows when mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path() is passed a path longer than 2GB. Cannot be triggered remotely. Found by Guido Vranken, Intelworks. * Fix potential buffer overflow in some asn1_write_xxx() functions. Cannot be triggered remotely unless you create X.509 certificates based on untrusted input or write keys of untrusted origin. Found by Guido Vranken, Intelworks. * The X509 max_pathlen constraint was not enforced on intermediate certificates. Found by Nicholas Wilson, fix and tests provided by Janos Follath. #280 and #319 Features * Experimental support for EC J-PAKE as defined in Thread 1.0.0. Disabled by default as the specification might still change. * Added a key extraction callback to accees the master secret and key block. (Potential uses include EAP-TLS and Thread.) Bugfix * Self-signed certificates were not excluded from pathlen counting, resulting in some valid X.509 being incorrectly rejected. Found and fix provided by Janos Follath. #319 * Fix build error with configurations where ECDHE-PSK is the only key exchange. Found and fix provided by Chris Hammond. #270 * Fix build error with configurations where RSA, RSA-PSK, ECDH-RSA or ECHD-ECDSA if the only key exchange. Multiple reports. #310 * Fixed a bug causing some handshakes to fail due to some non-fatal alerts not being properly ignored. Found by mancha and Kasom Koht-arsa, #308 * mbedtls_x509_crt_verify(_with_profile)() now also checks the key type and size/curve against the profile. Before that, there was no way to set a minimum key size for end-entity certificates with RSA keys. Found by Matthew Page of Scannex Electronics Ltd. * Fix failures in MPI on Sparc(64) due to use of bad assembly code. Found by Kurt Danielson. #292 * Fix typo in name of the extKeyUsage OID. Found by inestlerode, #314 * Fix bug in ASN.1 encoding of booleans that caused generated CA certificates to be rejected by some applications, including OS X Keychain. Found and fixed by Jonathan Leroy, Inikup. Changes * Improved performance of mbedtls_ecp_muladd() when one of the scalars is 1 or -1. = mbed TLS 2.1.2 released 2015-10-06 Security * Added fix for CVE-2015-5291 to prevent heap corruption due to buffer overflow of the hostname or session ticket. Found by Guido Vranken, Intelworks. * Fix potential double-free if mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() is called more than once in the same handhake and mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() was used. Found and patch provided by Guido Vranken, Intelworks. Cannot be forced remotely. * Fix stack buffer overflow in pkcs12 decryption (used by mbedtls_pk_parse_key(file)() when the password is > 129 bytes. Found by Guido Vranken, Intelworks. Not triggerable remotely. * Fix potential buffer overflow in mbedtls_mpi_read_string(). Found by Guido Vranken, Intelworks. Not exploitable remotely in the context of TLS, but might be in other uses. On 32 bit machines, requires reading a string of close to or larger than 1GB to exploit; on 64 bit machines, would require reading a string of close to or larger than 2^62 bytes. * Fix potential random memory allocation in mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on crafted PEM input data. Found and fix provided by Guido Vranken, Intelworks. Not triggerable remotely in TLS. Triggerable remotely if you accept PEM data from an untrusted source. * Fix possible heap buffer overflow in base64_encoded() when the input buffer is 512MB or larger on 32-bit platforms. Found by Guido Vranken, Intelworks. Not trigerrable remotely in TLS. * Fix potential double-free if mbedtls_conf_psk() is called repeatedly on the same mbedtls_ssl_config object and memory allocation fails. Found by Guido Vranken, Intelworks. Cannot be forced remotely. * Fix potential heap buffer overflow in servers that perform client authentication against a crafted CA cert. Cannot be triggered remotely unless you allow third parties to pick trust CAs for client auth. Found by Guido Vranken, Intelworks. Bugfix * Fix compile error in net.c with musl libc. Found and patch provided by zhasha (#278). * Fix macroization of 'inline' keyword when building as C++. (#279) Changes * Added checking of hostname length in mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() to ensure domain names are compliant with RFC 1035. * Fixed paths for check_config.h in example config files. (Found by bachp) (#291) = mbed TLS 2.1.1 released 2015-09-17 Security * Add countermeasure against Lenstra's RSA-CRT attack for PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures. (Found by Florian Weimer, Red Hat.) https://securityblog.redhat.com/2015/09/02/factoring-rsa-keys-with-tls-perfect-forward-secrecy/ * Fix possible client-side NULL pointer dereference (read) when the client tries to continue the handshake after it failed (a misuse of the API). (Found and patch provided by Fabian Foerg, Gotham Digital Science using afl-fuzz.) Bugfix * Fix warning when using a 64bit platform. (found by embedthis) (#275) * Fix off-by-one error in parsing Supported Point Format extension that caused some handshakes to fail. Changes * Made X509 profile pointer const in mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile() to allow use of mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_next. (found by NWilson) * When a client initiates a reconnect from the same port as a live connection, if cookie verification is available (MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY defined in config.h, and usable cookie callbacks set with mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_cookies()), this will be detected and mbedtls_ssl_read() will return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT - it is then possible to start a new handshake with the same context. (See RFC 6347 section 4.2.8.) = mbed TLS 2.1.0 released 2015-09-04 Features * Added support for yotta as a build system. * Primary open source license changed to Apache 2.0 license. Bugfix * Fix segfault in the benchmark program when benchmarking DHM. * Fix build error with CMake and pre-4.5 versions of GCC (found by Hugo Leisink). * Fix bug when parsing a ServerHello without extensions (found by David Sears). * Fix bug in CMake lists that caused libmbedcrypto.a not to be installed (found by Benoit Lecocq). * Fix bug in Makefile that caused libmbedcrypto and libmbedx509 not to be installed (found by Rawi666). * Fix compile error with armcc 5 with --gnu option. * Fix bug in Makefile that caused programs not to be installed correctly (found by robotanarchy) (#232). * Fix bug in Makefile that prevented from installing without building the tests (found by robotanarchy) (#232). * Fix missing -static-libgcc when building shared libraries for Windows with make. * Fix link error when building shared libraries for Windows with make. * Fix error when loading libmbedtls.so. * Fix bug in mbedtls_ssl_conf_default() that caused the default preset to be always used (found by dcb314) (#235) * Fix bug in mbedtls_rsa_public() and mbedtls_rsa_private() that could result trying to unlock an unlocked mutex on invalid input (found by Fredrik Axelsson) (#257) * Fix -Wshadow warnings (found by hnrkp) (#240) * Fix memory corruption on client with overlong PSK identity, around SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN or higher - not triggerrable remotely (found by Aleksandrs Saveljevs) (#238) * Fix unused function warning when using MBEDTLS_MDx_ALT or MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_ALT (found by Henrik) (#239) * Fix memory corruption in pkey programs (found by yankuncheng) (#210) Changes * The PEM parser now accepts a trailing space at end of lines (#226). * It is now possible to #include a user-provided configuration file at the end of the default config.h by defining MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE on the compiler's command line. * When verifying a certificate chain, if an intermediate certificate is trusted, no later cert is checked. (suggested by hannes-landeholm) (#220). * Prepend a "thread identifier" to debug messages (issue pointed out by Hugo Leisink) (#210). * Add mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len() to query the current maximum fragment length. = mbed TLS 2.0.0 released 2015-07-13 Features * Support for DTLS 1.0 and 1.2 (RFC 6347). * Ability to override core functions from MDx, SHAx, AES and DES modules with custom implementation (eg hardware accelerated), complementing the ability to override the whole module. * New server-side implementation of session tickets that rotate keys to preserve forward secrecy, and allows sharing across multiple contexts. * Added a concept of X.509 cerificate verification profile that controls which algorithms and key sizes (curves for ECDSA) are acceptable. * Expanded configurability of security parameters in the SSL module with mbedtls_ssl_conf_dhm_min_bitlen() and mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes(). * Introduced a concept of presets for SSL security-relevant configuration parameters. API Changes * The library has been split into libmbedcrypto, libmbedx509, libmbedtls. You now need to link to all of them if you use TLS for example. * All public identifiers moved to the mbedtls_* or MBEDTLS_* namespace. Some names have been further changed to make them more consistent. Migration helpers scripts/rename.pl and include/mbedtls/compat-1.3.h are provided. Full list of renamings in scripts/data_files/rename-1.3-2.0.txt * Renamings of fields inside structures, not covered by the previous list: mbedtls_cipher_info_t.key_length -> key_bitlen mbedtls_cipher_context_t.key_length -> key_bitlen mbedtls_ecp_curve_info.size -> bit_size * Headers are now found in the 'mbedtls' directory (previously 'polarssl'). * The following _init() functions that could return errors have been split into an _init() that returns void and another function that should generally be the first function called on this context after init: mbedtls_ssl_init() -> mbedtls_ssl_setup() mbedtls_ccm_init() -> mbedtls_ccm_setkey() mbedtls_gcm_init() -> mbedtls_gcm_setkey() mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init() -> mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed(_buf)() mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init() -> mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() Note that for mbedtls_ssl_setup(), you need to be done setting up the ssl_config structure before calling it. * Most ssl_set_xxx() functions (all except ssl_set_bio(), ssl_set_hostname(), ssl_set_session() and ssl_set_client_transport_id(), plus ssl_legacy_renegotiation()) have been renamed to mbedtls_ssl_conf_xxx() (see rename.pl and compat-1.3.h above) and their first argument's type changed from ssl_context to ssl_config. * ssl_set_bio() changed signature (contexts merged, order switched, one additional callback for read-with-timeout). * The following functions have been introduced and must be used in callback implementations (SNI, PSK) instead of their *conf counterparts: mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_own_cert() mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain() mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() * mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain() lost its last argument (peer_cn), now set using mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname(). * mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache() changed prototype (only one context pointer, parameters reordered). * On server, mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb() must now be used in place of mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets() to enable session tickets. * The SSL debug callback gained two new arguments (file name, line number). * Debug modes were removed. * mbedtls_ssl_conf_truncated_hmac() now returns void. * mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init() now returns void. * X.509 verification flags are now an uint32_t. Affect the signature of: mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result() mbedtls_x509_ctr_verify_info() mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() (flags, f_vrfy -> needs to be updated) mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify() (f_vrfy -> needs to be updated) * The following functions changed prototype to avoid an in-out length parameter: mbedtls_base64_encode() mbedtls_base64_decode() mbedtls_mpi_write_string() mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret() * In the NET module, all "int" and "int *" arguments for file descriptors changed type to "mbedtls_net_context *". * net_accept() gained new arguments for the size of the client_ip buffer. * In the threading layer, mbedtls_mutex_init() and mbedtls_mutex_free() now return void. * ecdsa_write_signature() gained an additional md_alg argument and ecdsa_write_signature_det() was deprecated. * pk_sign() no longer accepts md_alg == POLARSSL_MD_NONE with ECDSA. * Last argument of x509_crt_check_key_usage() and mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_usage() changed from int to unsigned. * test_ca_list (from certs.h) is renamed to test_cas_pem and is only available if POLARSSL_PEM_PARSE_C is defined (it never worked without). * Test certificates in certs.c are no longer guaranteed to be nul-terminated strings; use the new *_len variables instead of strlen(). * Functions mbedtls_x509_xxx_parse(), mbedtls_pk_parse_key(), mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key() and mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm() now expect the length parameter to include the terminating null byte for PEM input. * Signature of mpi_mul_mpi() changed to make the last argument unsigned * calloc() is now used instead of malloc() everywhere. API of platform layer and the memory_buffer_alloc module changed accordingly. (Thanks to Mansour Moufid for helping with the replacement.) * Change SSL_DISABLE_RENEGOTIATION config.h flag to SSL_RENEGOTIATION (support for renegotiation now needs explicit enabling in config.h). * Split MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME into MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME and MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE in config.h * net_connect() and net_bind() have a new 'proto' argument to choose between TCP and UDP, using the macros NET_PROTO_TCP or NET_PROTO_UDP. Their 'port' argument type is changed to a string. * Some constness fixes Removals * Removed mbedtls_ecp_group_read_string(). Only named groups are supported. * Removed mbedtls_ecp_sub() and mbedtls_ecp_add(), use mbedtls_ecp_muladd(). * Removed individual mdX_hmac, shaX_hmac, mdX_file and shaX_file functions (use generic functions from md.h) * Removed mbedtls_timing_msleep(). Use mbedtls_net_usleep() or a custom waiting function. * Removed test DHM parameters from the test certs module. * Removed the PBKDF2 module (use PKCS5). * Removed POLARSSL_ERROR_STRERROR_BC (use mbedtls_strerror()). * Removed compat-1.2.h (helper for migrating from 1.2 to 1.3). * Removed openssl.h (very partial OpenSSL compatibility layer). * Configuration options POLARSSL_HAVE_LONGLONG was removed (now always on). * Configuration options POLARSSL_HAVE_INT8 and POLARSSL_HAVE_INT16 have been removed (compiler is required to support 32-bit operations). * Configuration option POLARSSL_HAVE_IPV6 was removed (always enabled). * Removed test program o_p_test, the script compat.sh does more. * Removed test program ssl_test, superseded by ssl-opt.sh. * Removed helper script active-config.pl New deprecations * md_init_ctx() is deprecated in favour of md_setup(), that adds a third argument (allowing memory savings if HMAC is not used) Semi-API changes (technically public, morally private) * Renamed a few headers to include _internal in the name. Those headers are not supposed to be included by users. * Changed md_info_t into an opaque structure (use md_get_xxx() accessors). * Changed pk_info_t into an opaque structure. * Changed cipher_base_t into an opaque structure. * Removed sig_oid2 and rename sig_oid1 to sig_oid in x509_crt and x509_crl. * x509_crt.key_usage changed from unsigned char to unsigned int. * Removed r and s from ecdsa_context * Removed mode from des_context and des3_context Default behavior changes * The default minimum TLS version is now TLS 1.0. * RC4 is now blacklisted by default in the SSL/TLS layer, and excluded from the default ciphersuite list returned by ssl_list_ciphersuites() * Support for receiving SSLv2 ClientHello is now disabled by default at compile time. * The default authmode for SSL/TLS clients is now REQUIRED. * Support for RSA_ALT contexts in the PK layer is now optional. Since is is enabled in the default configuration, this is only noticeable if using a custom config.h * Default DHM parameters server-side upgraded from 1024 to 2048 bits. * A minimum RSA key size of 2048 bits is now enforced during ceritificate chain verification. * Negotiation of truncated HMAC is now disabled by default on server too. * The following functions are now case-sensitive: mbedtls_cipher_info_from_string() mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_name() mbedtls_md_info_from_string() mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_string() mbedtls_version_check_feature() Requirement changes * The minimum MSVC version required is now 2010 (better C99 support). * The NET layer now unconditionnaly relies on getaddrinfo() and select(). * Compiler is required to support C99 types such as long long and uint32_t. API changes from the 1.4 preview branch * ssl_set_bio_timeout() was removed, split into mbedtls_ssl_set_bio() with new prototype, and mbedtls_ssl_set_read_timeout(). * The following functions now return void: mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport() mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version() mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version() * DTLS no longer hard-depends on TIMING_C, but uses a callback interface instead, see mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb(), with the Timing module providing an example implementation, see mbedtls_timing_delay_context and mbedtls_timing_set/get_delay(). * With UDP sockets, it is no longer necessary to call net_bind() again after a successful net_accept(). Changes * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random() and mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random() are now thread-safe if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled. * Reduced ROM fooprint of SHA-256 and added an option to reduce it even more (at the expense of performance) MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER. = mbed TLS 1.3 branch Security * With authmode set to SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL, verification of keyUsage and extendedKeyUsage on the leaf certificate was lost (results not accessible via ssl_get_verify_results()). * Add countermeasure against "Lucky 13 strikes back" cache-based attack, https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2714625 Features * Improve ECC performance by using more efficient doubling formulas (contributed by Peter Dettman). * Add x509_crt_verify_info() to display certificate verification results. * Add support for reading DH parameters with privateValueLength included (contributed by Daniel Kahn Gillmor). * Add support for bit strings in X.509 names (request by Fredrik Axelsson). * Add support for id-at-uniqueIdentifier in X.509 names. * Add support for overriding snprintf() (except on Windows) and exit() in the platform layer. * Add an option to use macros instead of function pointers in the platform layer (helps get rid of unwanted references). * Improved Makefiles for Windows targets by fixing library targets and making cross-compilation easier (thanks to Alon Bar-Lev). * The benchmark program also prints heap usage for public-key primitives if POLARSSL_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C and POLARSSL_MEMORY_DEBUG are defined. * New script ecc-heap.sh helps measuring the impact of ECC parameters on speed and RAM (heap only for now) usage. * New script memory.sh helps measuring the ROM and RAM requirements of two reduced configurations (PSK-CCM and NSA suite B). * Add config flag POLARSSL_DEPRECATED_WARNING (off by default) to produce warnings on use of deprecated functions (with GCC and Clang only). * Add config flag POLARSSL_DEPRECATED_REMOVED (off by default) to produce errors on use of deprecated functions. Bugfix * Fix compile errors with PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS. * Fix compile error with PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT (thanks to Rafał Przywara). * Fix bug in entropy.c when THREADING_C is also enabled that caused entropy_free() to crash (thanks to Rafał Przywara). * Fix memory leak when gcm_setkey() and ccm_setkey() are used more than once on the same context. * Fix bug in ssl_mail_client when password is longer that username (found by Bruno Pape). * Fix undefined behaviour (memcmp( NULL, NULL, 0 );) in X.509 modules (detected by Clang's 3.6 UBSan). * mpi_size() and mpi_msb() would segfault when called on an mpi that is initialized but not set (found by pravic). * Fix detection of support for getrandom() on Linux (reported by syzzer) by doing it at runtime (using uname) rather that compile time. * Fix handling of symlinks by "make install" (found by Gaël PORTAY). * Fix potential NULL pointer dereference (not trigerrable remotely) when ssl_write() is called before the handshake is finished (introduced in 1.3.10) (first reported by Martin Blumenstingl). * Fix bug in pk_parse_key() that caused some valid private EC keys to be rejected. * Fix bug in Via Padlock support (found by Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos). * Fix thread safety bug in RSA operations (found by Fredrik Axelsson). * Fix hardclock() (only used in the benchmarking program) with some versions of mingw64 (found by kxjhlele). * Fix warnings from mingw64 in timing.c (found by kxjklele). * Fix potential unintended sign extension in asn1_get_len() on 64-bit platforms. * Fix potential memory leak in ssl_set_psk() (found by Mansour Moufid). * Fix compile error when POLARSSL_SSL_DISABLE_RENEGOTATION and POLARSSL_SSL_SSESSION_TICKETS where both enabled in config.h (introduced in 1.3.10). * Add missing extern "C" guard in aesni.h (reported by amir zamani). * Add missing dependency on SHA-256 in some x509 programs (reported by Gergely Budai). * Fix bug related to ssl_set_curves(): the client didn't check that the curve picked by the server was actually allowed. Changes * Remove bias in mpi_gen_prime (contributed by Pascal Junod). * Remove potential sources of timing variations (some contributed by Pascal Junod). * Options POLARSSL_HAVE_INT8 and POLARSSL_HAVE_INT16 are deprecated. * Enabling POLARSSL_NET_C without POLARSSL_HAVE_IPV6 is deprecated. * compat-1.2.h and openssl.h are deprecated. * Adjusting/overriding CFLAGS and LDFLAGS with the make build system is now more flexible (warning: OFLAGS is not used any more) (see the README) (contributed by Alon Bar-Lev). * ssl_set_own_cert() no longer calls pk_check_pair() since the performance impact was bad for some users (this was introduced in 1.3.10). * Move from SHA-1 to SHA-256 in example programs using signatures (suggested by Thorsten Mühlfelder). * Remove some unneeded inclusions of header files from the standard library "minimize" others (eg use stddef.h if only size_t is needed). * Change #include lines in test files to use double quotes instead of angle brackets for uniformity with the rest of the code. * Remove dependency on sscanf() in X.509 parsing modules. = mbed TLS 1.3.10 released 2015-02-09 Security * NULL pointer dereference in the buffer-based allocator when the buffer is full and polarssl_free() is called (found by Mark Hasemeyer) (only possible if POLARSSL_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C is enabled, which it is not by default). * Fix remotely-triggerable uninitialised pointer dereference caused by crafted X.509 certificate (TLS server is not affected if it doesn't ask for a client certificate) (found using Codenomicon Defensics). * Fix remotely-triggerable memory leak caused by crafted X.509 certificates (TLS server is not affected if it doesn't ask for a client certificate) (found using Codenomicon Defensics). * Fix potential stack overflow while parsing crafted X.509 certificates (TLS server is not affected if it doesn't ask for a client certificate) (found using Codenomicon Defensics). * Fix timing difference that could theoretically lead to a Bleichenbacher-style attack in the RSA and RSA-PSK key exchanges (reported by Sebastian Schinzel). Features * Add support for FALLBACK_SCSV (draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv). * Add support for Extended Master Secret (draft-ietf-tls-session-hash). * Add support for Encrypt-then-MAC (RFC 7366). * Add function pk_check_pair() to test if public and private keys match. * Add x509_crl_parse_der(). * Add compile-time option POLARSSL_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA to limit the length of an X.509 verification chain. * Support for renegotiation can now be disabled at compile-time * Support for 1/n-1 record splitting, a countermeasure against BEAST. * Certificate selection based on signature hash, preferring SHA-1 over SHA-2 for pre-1.2 clients when multiple certificates are available. * Add support for getrandom() syscall on recent Linux kernels with Glibc or a compatible enough libc (eg uClibc). * Add ssl_set_arc4_support() to make it easier to disable RC4 at runtime while using the default ciphersuite list. * Added new error codes and debug messages about selection of ciphersuite/certificate. Bugfix * Stack buffer overflow if ctr_drbg_update() is called with too large add_len (found by Jean-Philippe Aumasson) (not triggerable remotely). * Possible buffer overflow of length at most POLARSSL_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE if memory_buffer_alloc_init() was called with buf not aligned and len not a multiple of POLARSSL_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE (not triggerable remotely). * User set CFLAGS were ignored by Cmake with gcc (introduced in 1.3.9, found by Julian Ospald). * Fix potential undefined behaviour in Camellia. * Fix potential failure in ECDSA signatures when POLARSSL_ECP_MAX_BITS is a multiple of 8 (found by Gergely Budai). * Fix unchecked return code in x509_crt_parse_path() on Windows (found by Peter Vaskovic). * Fix assembly selection for MIPS64 (thanks to James Cowgill). * ssl_get_verify_result() now works even if the handshake was aborted due to a failed verification (found by Fredrik Axelsson). * Skip writing and parsing signature_algorithm extension if none of the key exchanges enabled needs certificates. This fixes a possible interop issue with some servers when a zero-length extension was sent. (Reported by Peter Dettman.) * On a 0-length input, base64_encode() did not correctly set output length (found by Hendrik van den Boogaard). Changes * Use deterministic nonces for AEAD ciphers in TLS by default (possible to switch back to random with POLARSSL_SSL_AEAD_RANDOM_IV in config.h). * Blind RSA private operations even when POLARSSL_RSA_NO_CRT is defined. * ssl_set_own_cert() now returns an error on key-certificate mismatch. * Forbid repeated extensions in X.509 certificates. * debug_print_buf() now prints a text view in addition to hexadecimal. * A specific error is now returned when there are ciphersuites in common but none of them is usable due to external factors such as no certificate with a suitable (extended)KeyUsage or curve or no PSK set. * It is now possible to disable negotiation of truncated HMAC server-side at runtime with ssl_set_truncated_hmac(). * Example programs for SSL client and server now disable SSLv3 by default. * Example programs for SSL client and server now disable RC4 by default. * Use platform.h in all test suites and programs. = PolarSSL 1.3.9 released 2014-10-20 Security * Lowest common hash was selected from signature_algorithms extension in TLS 1.2 (found by Darren Bane) (introduced in 1.3.8). * Remotely-triggerable memory leak when parsing some X.509 certificates (server is not affected if it doesn't ask for a client certificate) (found using Codenomicon Defensics). * Remotely-triggerable memory leak when parsing crafted ClientHello (not affected if ECC support was compiled out) (found using Codenomicon Defensics). Bugfix * Support escaping of commas in x509_string_to_names() * Fix compile error in ssl_pthread_server (found by Julian Ospald). * Fix net_accept() regarding non-blocking sockets (found by Luca Pesce). * Don't print uninitialised buffer in ssl_mail_client (found by Marc Abel). * Fix warnings from Clang's scan-build (contributed by Alfred Klomp). * Fix compile error in timing.c when POLARSSL_NET_C and POLARSSL_SELFTEST are defined but not POLARSSL_HAVE_TIME (found by Stephane Di Vito). * Remove non-existent file from VS projects (found by Peter Vaskovic). * ssl_read() could return non-application data records on server while renegotation was pending, and on client when a HelloRequest was received. * Server-initiated renegotiation would fail with non-blocking I/O if the write callback returned WANT_WRITE when requesting renegotiation. * ssl_close_notify() could send more than one message in some circumstances with non-blocking I/O. * Fix compiler warnings on iOS (found by Sander Niemeijer). * x509_crt_parse() did not increase total_failed on PEM error * Fix compile error with armcc in mpi_is_prime() * Fix potential bad read in parsing ServerHello (found by Adrien Vialletelle). Changes * Ciphersuites using SHA-256 or SHA-384 now require TLS 1.x (there is no standard defining how to use SHA-2 with SSL 3.0). * Ciphersuites using RSA-PSK key exchange new require TLS 1.x (the spec is ambiguous on how to encode some packets with SSL 3.0). * Made buffer size in pk_write_(pub)key_pem() more dynamic, eg smaller if RSA is disabled, larger if POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_SIZE is larger. * ssl_read() now returns POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_READ rather than POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE on harmless alerts. * POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_SIZE now defaults to 1024 in order to allow 8192 bits RSA keys. * Accept spaces at end of line or end of buffer in base64_decode(). * X.509 certificates with more than one AttributeTypeAndValue per RelativeDistinguishedName are not accepted any more. = PolarSSL 1.3.8 released 2014-07-11 Security * Fix length checking for AEAD ciphersuites (found by Codenomicon). It was possible to crash the server (and client) using crafted messages when a GCM suite was chosen. Features * Add CCM module and cipher mode to Cipher Layer * Support for CCM and CCM_8 ciphersuites * Support for parsing and verifying RSASSA-PSS signatures in the X.509 modules (certificates, CRLs and CSRs). * Blowfish in the cipher layer now supports variable length keys. * Add example config.h for PSK with CCM, optimized for low RAM usage. * Optimize for RAM usage in example config.h for NSA Suite B profile. * Add POLARSSL_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES to allow removing RC4 ciphersuites from the default list (inactive by default). * Add server-side enforcement of sent renegotiation requests (ssl_set_renegotiation_enforced()) * Add SSL_CIPHERSUITES config.h flag to allow specifying a list of ciphersuites to use and save some memory if the list is small. Changes * Add LINK_WITH_PTHREAD option in CMake for explicit linking that is required on some platforms (e.g. OpenBSD) * Migrate zeroizing of data to polarssl_zeroize() instead of memset() against unwanted compiler optimizations * md_list() now returns hashes strongest first * Selection of hash for signing ServerKeyExchange in TLS 1.2 now picks strongest offered by client. * All public contexts have _init() and _free() functions now for simpler usage pattern Bugfix * Fix in debug_print_msg() * Enforce alignment in the buffer allocator even if buffer is not aligned * Remove less-than-zero checks on unsigned numbers * Stricter check on SSL ClientHello internal sizes compared to actual packet size (found by TrustInSoft) * Fix WSAStartup() return value check (found by Peter Vaskovic) * Other minor issues (found by Peter Vaskovic) * Fix symlink command for cross compiling with CMake (found by Andre Heinecke) * Fix DER output of gen_key app (found by Gergely Budai) * Very small records were incorrectly rejected when truncated HMAC was in use with some ciphersuites and versions (RC4 in all versions, CBC with versions < TLS 1.1). * Very large records using more than 224 bytes of padding were incorrectly rejected with CBC-based ciphersuites and TLS >= 1.1 * Very large records using less padding could cause a buffer overread of up to 32 bytes with CBC-based ciphersuites and TLS >= 1.1 * Restore ability to use a v1 cert as a CA if trusted locally. (This had been removed in 1.3.6.) * Restore ability to locally trust a self-signed cert that is not a proper CA for use as an end entity certificate. (This had been removed in 1.3.6.) * Fix preprocessor checks for bn_mul PPC asm (found by Barry K. Nathan). * Use \n\t rather than semicolons for bn_mul asm, since some assemblers interpret semicolons as comment delimiters (found by Barry K. Nathan). * Fix off-by-one error in parsing Supported Point Format extension that caused some handshakes to fail. * Fix possible miscomputation of the premaster secret with DHE-PSK key exchange that caused some handshakes to fail with other implementations. (Failure rate <= 1/255 with common DHM moduli.) * Disable broken Sparc64 bn_mul assembly (found by Florian Obser). * Fix base64_decode() to return and check length correctly (in case of tight buffers) * Fix mpi_write_string() to write "00" as hex output for empty MPI (found by Hui Dong) = PolarSSL 1.3.7 released on 2014-05-02 Features * debug_set_log_mode() added to determine raw or full logging * debug_set_threshold() added to ignore messages over threshold level * version_check_feature() added to check for compile-time options at run-time Changes * POLARSSL_CONFIG_OPTIONS has been removed. All values are individually checked and filled in the relevant module headers * Debug module only outputs full lines instead of parts * Better support for the different Attribute Types from IETF PKIX (RFC 5280) * AES-NI now compiles with "old" assemblers too * Ciphersuites based on RC4 now have the lowest priority by default Bugfix * Only iterate over actual certificates in ssl_write_certificate_request() (found by Matthew Page) * Typos in platform.c and pkcs11.c (found by Daniel Phillips and Steffan Karger) * cert_write app should use subject of issuer certificate as issuer of cert * Fix false reject in padding check in ssl_decrypt_buf() for CBC ciphersuites, for full SSL frames of data. * Improve interoperability by not writing extension length in ClientHello / ServerHello when no extensions are present (found by Matthew Page) * rsa_check_pubkey() now allows an E up to N * On OpenBSD, use arc4random_buf() instead of rand() to prevent warnings * mpi_fill_random() was creating numbers larger than requested on big-endian platform when size was not an integer number of limbs * Fix dependencies issues in X.509 test suite. * Some parts of ssl_tls.c were compiled even when the module was disabled. * Fix detection of DragonflyBSD in net.c (found by Markus Pfeiffer) * Fix detection of Clang on some Apple platforms with CMake (found by Barry K. Nathan) = PolarSSL 1.3.6 released on 2014-04-11 Features * Support for the ALPN SSL extension * Add option 'use_dev_random' to gen_key application * Enable verification of the keyUsage extension for CA and leaf certificates (POLARSSL_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) * Enable verification of the extendedKeyUsage extension (POLARSSL_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) Changes * x509_crt_info() now prints information about parsed extensions as well * pk_verify() now returns a specific error code when the signature is valid but shorter than the supplied length. * Use UTC time to check certificate validity. * Reject certificates with times not in UTC, per RFC 5280. Security * Avoid potential timing leak in ecdsa_sign() by blinding modular division. (Found by Watson Ladd.) * The notAfter date of some certificates was no longer checked since 1.3.5. This affects certificates in the user-supplied chain except the top certificate. If the user-supplied chain contains only one certificates, it is not affected (ie, its notAfter date is properly checked). * Prevent potential NULL pointer dereference in ssl_read_record() (found by TrustInSoft) Bugfix * The length of various ClientKeyExchange messages was not properly checked. * Some example server programs were not sending the close_notify alert. * Potential memory leak in mpi_exp_mod() when error occurs during calculation of RR. * Fixed malloc/free default #define in platform.c (found by Gergely Budai). * Fixed type which made POLARSSL_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 uneffective (found by Gergely Budai). * Fix #include path in ecdsa.h which wasn't accepted by some compilers. (found by Gergely Budai) * Fix compile errors when POLARSSL_ERROR_STRERROR_BC is undefined (found by Shuo Chen). * oid_get_numeric_string() used to truncate the output without returning an error if the output buffer was just 1 byte too small. * dhm_parse_dhm() (hence dhm_parse_dhmfile()) did not set dhm->len. * Calling pk_debug() on an RSA-alt key would segfault. * pk_get_size() and pk_get_len() were off by a factor 8 for RSA-alt keys. * Potential buffer overwrite in pem_write_buffer() because of low length indication (found by Thijs Alkemade) * EC curves constants, which should be only in ROM since 1.3.3, were also stored in RAM due to missing 'const's (found by Gergely Budai). = PolarSSL 1.3.5 released on 2014-03-26 Features * HMAC-DRBG as a separate module * Option to set the Curve preference order (disabled by default) * Single Platform compatilibity layer (for memory / printf / fprintf) * Ability to provide alternate timing implementation * Ability to force the entropy module to use SHA-256 as its basis (POLARSSL_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) * Testing script ssl-opt.sh added for testing 'live' ssl option interoperability against OpenSSL and PolarSSL * Support for reading EC keys that use SpecifiedECDomain in some cases. * Entropy module now supports seed writing and reading Changes * Deprecated the Memory layer * entropy_add_source(), entropy_update_manual() and entropy_gather() now thread-safe if POLARSSL_THREADING_C defined * Improvements to the CMake build system, contributed by Julian Ospald. * Work around a bug of the version of Clang shipped by Apple with Mavericks that prevented bignum.c from compiling. (Reported by Rafael Baptista.) * Revamped the compat.sh interoperatibility script to include support for testing against GnuTLS * Deprecated ssl_set_own_cert_rsa() and ssl_set_own_cert_rsa_alt() * Improvements to tests/Makefile, contributed by Oden Eriksson. Security * Forbid change of server certificate during renegotiation to prevent "triple handshake" attack when authentication mode is 'optional' (the attack was already impossible when authentication is required). * Check notBefore timestamp of certificates and CRLs from the future. * Forbid sequence number wrapping * Fixed possible buffer overflow with overlong PSK * Possible remotely-triggered out-of-bounds memory access fixed (found by TrustInSoft) Bugfix * ecp_gen_keypair() does more tries to prevent failure because of statistics * Fixed bug in RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 "reversed" operations * Fixed testing with out-of-source builds using cmake * Fixed version-major intolerance in server * Fixed CMake symlinking on out-of-source builds * Fixed dependency issues in test suite * Programs rsa_sign_pss and rsa_verify_pss were not using PSS since 1.3.0 * Bignum's MIPS-32 assembly was used on MIPS-64, causing chaos. (Found by Alex Wilson.) * ssl_cache was creating entries when max_entries=0 if TIMING_C was enabled. * m_sleep() was sleeping twice too long on most Unix platforms. * Fixed bug with session tickets and non-blocking I/O in the unlikely case send() would return an EAGAIN error when sending the ticket. * ssl_cache was leaking memory when reusing a timed out entry containing a client certificate. * ssl_srv was leaking memory when client presented a timed out ticket containing a client certificate * ssl_init() was leaving a dirty pointer in ssl_context if malloc of out_ctr failed * ssl_handshake_init() was leaving dirty pointers in subcontexts if malloc of one of them failed * Fix typo in rsa_copy() that impacted PKCS#1 v2 contexts * x509_get_current_time() uses localtime_r() to prevent thread issues = PolarSSL 1.3.4 released on 2014-01-27 Features * Support for the Koblitz curves: secp192k1, secp224k1, secp256k1 * Support for RIPEMD-160 * Support for AES CFB8 mode * Support for deterministic ECDSA (RFC 6979) Bugfix * Potential memory leak in bignum_selftest() * Replaced expired test certificate * ssl_mail_client now terminates lines with CRLF, instead of LF * net module handles timeouts on blocking sockets better (found by Tilman Sauerbeck) * Assembly format fixes in bn_mul.h Security * Missing MPI_CHK calls added around unguarded mpi calls (found by TrustInSoft) = PolarSSL 1.3.3 released on 2013-12-31 Features * EC key generation support in gen_key app * Support for adhering to client ciphersuite order preference (POLARSSL_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE) * Support for Curve25519 * Support for ECDH-RSA and ECDH-ECDSA key exchanges and ciphersuites * Support for IPv6 in the NET module * AES-NI support for AES, AES-GCM and AES key scheduling * SSL Pthread-based server example added (ssl_pthread_server) Changes * gen_prime() speedup * Speedup of ECP multiplication operation * Relaxed some SHA2 ciphersuite's version requirements * Dropped use of readdir_r() instead of readdir() with threading support * More constant-time checks in the RSA module * Split off curves from ecp.c into ecp_curves.c * Curves are now stored fully in ROM * Memory usage optimizations in ECP module * Removed POLARSSL_THREADING_DUMMY Bugfix * Fixed bug in mpi_set_bit() on platforms where t_uint is wider than int * Fixed X.509 hostname comparison (with non-regular characters) * SSL now gracefully handles missing RNG * Missing defines / cases for RSA_PSK key exchange * crypt_and_hash app checks MAC before final decryption * Potential memory leak in ssl_ticket_keys_init() * Memory leak in benchmark application * Fixed x509_crt_parse_path() bug on Windows platforms * Added missing MPI_CHK() around some statements in mpi_div_mpi() (found by TrustInSoft) * Fixed potential overflow in certificate size verification in ssl_write_certificate() (found by TrustInSoft) Security * Possible remotely-triggered out-of-bounds memory access fixed (found by TrustInSoft) = PolarSSL 1.3.2 released on 2013-11-04 Features * PK tests added to test framework * Added optional optimization for NIST MODP curves (POLARSSL_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) * Support for Camellia-GCM mode and ciphersuites Changes * Padding checks in cipher layer are now constant-time * Value comparisons in SSL layer are now constant-time * Support for serialNumber, postalAddress and postalCode in X509 names * SSL Renegotiation was refactored Bugfix * More stringent checks in cipher layer * Server does not send out extensions not advertised by client * Prevent possible alignment warnings on casting from char * to 'aligned *' * Misc fixes and additions to dependency checks * Const correctness * cert_write with selfsign should use issuer_name as subject_name * Fix ECDSA corner case: missing reduction mod N (found by DualTachyon) * Defines to handle UEFI environment under MSVC * Server-side initiated renegotiations send HelloRequest = PolarSSL 1.3.1 released on 2013-10-15 Features * Support for Brainpool curves and TLS ciphersuites (RFC 7027) * Support for ECDHE-PSK key-exchange and ciphersuites * Support for RSA-PSK key-exchange and ciphersuites Changes * RSA blinding locks for a smaller amount of time * TLS compression only allocates working buffer once * Introduced POLARSSL_HAVE_READDIR_R for systems without it * config.h is more script-friendly Bugfix * Missing MSVC defines added * Compile errors with POLARSSL_RSA_NO_CRT * Header files with 'polarssl/' * Const correctness * Possible naming collision in dhm_context * Better support for MSVC * threading_set_alt() name * Added missing x509write_crt_set_version() = PolarSSL 1.3.0 released on 2013-10-01 Features * Elliptic Curve Cryptography module added * Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman module added * Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman support for SSL/TLS (ECDHE-based ciphersuites) * Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm support for SSL/TLS (ECDSA-based ciphersuites) * Ability to specify allowed ciphersuites based on the protocol version. * PSK and DHE-PSK based ciphersuites added * Memory allocation abstraction layer added * Buffer-based memory allocator added (no malloc() / free() / HEAP usage) * Threading abstraction layer added (dummy / pthread / alternate) * Public Key abstraction layer added * Parsing Elliptic Curve keys * Parsing Elliptic Curve certificates * Support for max_fragment_length extension (RFC 6066) * Support for truncated_hmac extension (RFC 6066) * Support for zeros-and-length (ANSI X.923) padding, one-and-zeros (ISO/IEC 7816-4) padding and zero padding in the cipher layer * Support for session tickets (RFC 5077) * Certificate Request (CSR) generation with extensions (key_usage, ns_cert_type) * X509 Certificate writing with extensions (basic_constraints, issuer_key_identifier, etc) * Optional blinding for RSA, DHM and EC * Support for multiple active certificate / key pairs in SSL servers for the same host (Not to be confused with SNI!) Changes * Ability to enable / disable SSL v3 / TLS 1.0 / TLS 1.1 / TLS 1.2 individually * Introduced separate SSL Ciphersuites module that is based on Cipher and MD information * Internals for SSL module adapted to have separate IV pointer that is dynamically set (Better support for hardware acceleration) * Moved all OID functionality to a separate module. RSA function prototypes for the RSA sign and verify functions changed as a result * Split up the GCM module into a starts/update/finish cycle * Client and server now filter sent and accepted ciphersuites on minimum and maximum protocol version * Ability to disable server_name extension (RFC 6066) * Renamed error_strerror() to the less conflicting polarssl_strerror() (Ability to keep old as well with POLARSSL_ERROR_STRERROR_BC) * SHA2 renamed to SHA256, SHA4 renamed to SHA512 and functions accordingly * All RSA operations require a random generator for blinding purposes * X509 core refactored * x509_crt_verify() now case insensitive for cn (RFC 6125 6.4) * Also compiles / runs without time-based functions (!POLARSSL_HAVE_TIME) * Support faulty X509 v1 certificates with extensions (POLARSSL_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3) Bugfix * Fixed parse error in ssl_parse_certificate_request() * zlib compression/decompression skipped on empty blocks * Support for AIX header locations in net.c module * Fixed file descriptor leaks Security * RSA blinding on CRT operations to counter timing attacks (found by Cyril Arnaud and Pierre-Alain Fouque) = Version 1.2.14 released 2015-05-?? Security * Fix potential invalid memory read in the server, that allows a client to crash it remotely (found by Caj Larsson). * Fix potential invalid memory read in certificate parsing, that allows a client to crash the server remotely if client authentication is enabled (found using Codenomicon Defensics). * Add countermeasure against "Lucky 13 strikes back" cache-based attack, https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2714625 Bugfix * Fix bug in Via Padlock support (found by Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos). * Fix hardclock() (only used in the benchmarking program) with some versions of mingw64 (found by kxjhlele). * Fix warnings from mingw64 in timing.c (found by kxjklele). * Fix potential unintended sign extension in asn1_get_len() on 64-bit platforms (found with Coverity Scan). = Version 1.2.13 released 2015-02-16 Note: Although PolarSSL has been renamed to mbed TLS, no changes reflecting this will be made in the 1.2 branch at this point. Security * Fix remotely-triggerable uninitialised pointer dereference caused by crafted X.509 certificate (TLS server is not affected if it doesn't ask for a client certificate) (found using Codenomicon Defensics). * Fix remotely-triggerable memory leak caused by crafted X.509 certificates (TLS server is not affected if it doesn't ask for a client certificate) (found using Codenomicon Defensics). * Fix potential stack overflow while parsing crafted X.509 certificates (TLS server is not affected if it doesn't ask for a client certificate) found using Codenomicon Defensics). * Fix buffer overread of size 1 when parsing crafted X.509 certificates (TLS server is not affected if it doesn't ask for a client certificate). Bugfix * Fix potential undefined behaviour in Camellia. * Fix memory leaks in PKCS#5 and PKCS#12. * Stack buffer overflow if ctr_drbg_update() is called with too large add_len (found by Jean-Philippe Aumasson) (not triggerable remotely). * Fix bug in MPI/bignum on s390/s390x (reported by Dan Horák) (introduced in 1.2.12). * Fix unchecked return code in x509_crt_parse_path() on Windows (found by Peter Vaskovic). * Fix assembly selection for MIPS64 (thanks to James Cowgill). * ssl_get_verify_result() now works even if the handshake was aborted due to a failed verification (found by Fredrik Axelsson). * Skip writing and parsing signature_algorithm extension if none of the key exchanges enabled needs certificates. This fixes a possible interop issue with some servers when a zero-length extension was sent. (Reported by Peter Dettman.) * On a 0-length input, base64_encode() did not correctly set output length (found by Hendrik van den Boogaard). Changes * Blind RSA private operations even when POLARSSL_RSA_NO_CRT is defined. * Forbid repeated extensions in X.509 certificates. * Add compile-time option POLARSSL_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA to limit the length of an X.509 verification chain (default = 8). = Version 1.2.12 released 2014-10-24 Security * Remotely-triggerable memory leak when parsing some X.509 certificates (server is not affected if it doesn't ask for a client certificate). (Found using Codenomicon Defensics.) Bugfix * Fix potential bad read in parsing ServerHello (found by Adrien Vialletelle). * ssl_close_notify() could send more than one message in some circumstances with non-blocking I/O. * x509_crt_parse() did not increase total_failed on PEM error * Fix compiler warnings on iOS (found by Sander Niemeijer). * Don't print uninitialised buffer in ssl_mail_client (found by Marc Abel). * Fix net_accept() regarding non-blocking sockets (found by Luca Pesce). * ssl_read() could return non-application data records on server while renegotation was pending, and on client when a HelloRequest was received. * Fix warnings from Clang's scan-build (contributed by Alfred Klomp). Changes * X.509 certificates with more than one AttributeTypeAndValue per RelativeDistinguishedName are not accepted any more. * ssl_read() now returns POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_READ rather than POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE on harmless alerts. * Accept spaces at end of line or end of buffer in base64_decode(). = Version 1.2.11 released 2014-07-11 Features * Entropy module now supports seed writing and reading Changes * Introduced POLARSSL_HAVE_READDIR_R for systems without it * Improvements to the CMake build system, contributed by Julian Ospald. * Work around a bug of the version of Clang shipped by Apple with Mavericks that prevented bignum.c from compiling. (Reported by Rafael Baptista.) * Improvements to tests/Makefile, contributed by Oden Eriksson. * Use UTC time to check certificate validity. * Reject certificates with times not in UTC, per RFC 5280. * Migrate zeroizing of data to polarssl_zeroize() instead of memset() against unwanted compiler optimizations Security * Forbid change of server certificate during renegotiation to prevent "triple handshake" attack when authentication mode is optional (the attack was already impossible when authentication is required). * Check notBefore timestamp of certificates and CRLs from the future. * Forbid sequence number wrapping * Prevent potential NULL pointer dereference in ssl_read_record() (found by TrustInSoft) * Fix length checking for AEAD ciphersuites (found by Codenomicon). It was possible to crash the server (and client) using crafted messages when a GCM suite was chosen. Bugfix * Fixed X.509 hostname comparison (with non-regular characters) * SSL now gracefully handles missing RNG * crypt_and_hash app checks MAC before final decryption * Fixed x509_crt_parse_path() bug on Windows platforms * Added missing MPI_CHK() around some statements in mpi_div_mpi() (found by TrustInSoft) * Fixed potential overflow in certificate size verification in ssl_write_certificate() (found by TrustInSoft) * Fix ASM format in bn_mul.h * Potential memory leak in bignum_selftest() * Replaced expired test certificate * ssl_mail_client now terminates lines with CRLF, instead of LF * Fix bug in RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 "reversed" operations * Fixed testing with out-of-source builds using cmake * Fixed version-major intolerance in server * Fixed CMake symlinking on out-of-source builds * Bignum's MIPS-32 assembly was used on MIPS-64, causing chaos. (Found by Alex Wilson.) * ssl_init() was leaving a dirty pointer in ssl_context if malloc of out_ctr failed * ssl_handshake_init() was leaving dirty pointers in subcontexts if malloc of one of them failed * x509_get_current_time() uses localtime_r() to prevent thread issues * Some example server programs were not sending the close_notify alert. * Potential memory leak in mpi_exp_mod() when error occurs during calculation of RR. * Improve interoperability by not writing extension length in ClientHello when no extensions are present (found by Matthew Page) * rsa_check_pubkey() now allows an E up to N * On OpenBSD, use arc4random_buf() instead of rand() to prevent warnings * mpi_fill_random() was creating numbers larger than requested on big-endian platform when size was not an integer number of limbs * Fix detection of DragonflyBSD in net.c (found by Markus Pfeiffer) * Stricter check on SSL ClientHello internal sizes compared to actual packet size (found by TrustInSoft) * Fix preprocessor checks for bn_mul PPC asm (found by Barry K. Nathan). * Use \n\t rather than semicolons for bn_mul asm, since some assemblers interpret semicolons as comment delimiters (found by Barry K. Nathan). * Disable broken Sparc64 bn_mul assembly (found by Florian Obser). * Fix base64_decode() to return and check length correctly (in case of tight buffers) = Version 1.2.10 released 2013-10-07 Changes * Changed RSA blinding to a slower but thread-safe version Bugfix * Fixed memory leak in RSA as a result of introduction of blinding * Fixed ssl_pkcs11_decrypt() prototype * Fixed MSVC project files = Version 1.2.9 released 2013-10-01 Changes * x509_verify() now case insensitive for cn (RFC 6125 6.4) Bugfix * Fixed potential memory leak when failing to resume a session * Fixed potential file descriptor leaks (found by Remi Gacogne) * Minor fixes Security * Fixed potential heap buffer overflow on large hostname setting * Fixed potential negative value misinterpretation in load_file() * RSA blinding on CRT operations to counter timing attacks (found by Cyril Arnaud and Pierre-Alain Fouque) = Version 1.2.8 released 2013-06-19 Features * Parsing of PKCS#8 encrypted private key files * PKCS#12 PBE and derivation functions * Centralized module option values in config.h to allow user-defined settings without editing header files by using POLARSSL_CONFIG_OPTIONS Changes * HAVEGE random generator disabled by default * Internally split up x509parse_key() into a (PEM) handler function and specific DER parser functions for the PKCS#1 and unencrypted PKCS#8 private key formats * Added mechanism to provide alternative implementations for all symmetric cipher and hash algorithms (e.g. POLARSSL_AES_ALT in config.h) * PKCS#5 module added. Moved PBKDF2 functionality inside and deprecated old PBKDF2 module Bugfix * Secure renegotiation extension should only be sent in case client supports secure renegotiation * Fixed offset for cert_type list in ssl_parse_certificate_request() * Fixed const correctness issues that have no impact on the ABI * x509parse_crt() now better handles PEM error situations * ssl_parse_certificate() now calls x509parse_crt_der() directly instead of the x509parse_crt() wrapper that can also parse PEM certificates * x509parse_crtpath() is now reentrant and uses more portable stat() * Fixed bignum.c and bn_mul.h to support Thumb2 and LLVM compiler * Fixed values for 2-key Triple DES in cipher layer * ssl_write_certificate_request() can handle empty ca_chain Security * A possible DoS during the SSL Handshake, due to faulty parsing of PEM-encoded certificates has been fixed (found by Jack Lloyd) = Version 1.2.7 released 2013-04-13 Features * Ability to specify allowed ciphersuites based on the protocol version. Changes * Default Blowfish keysize is now 128-bits * Test suites made smaller to accommodate Raspberry Pi Bugfix * Fix for MPI assembly for ARM * GCM adapted to support sizes > 2^29 = Version 1.2.6 released 2013-03-11 Bugfix * Fixed memory leak in ssl_free() and ssl_reset() for active session * Corrected GCM counter incrementation to use only 32-bits instead of 128-bits (found by Yawning Angel) * Fixes for 64-bit compilation with MS Visual Studio * Fixed net_bind() for specified IP addresses on little endian systems * Fixed assembly code for ARM (Thumb and regular) for some compilers Changes * Internally split up rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(), rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(), rsa_pkcs1_sign() and rsa_pkcs1_verify() to separate PKCS#1 v1.5 and PKCS#1 v2.1 functions * Added support for custom labels when using rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt() or rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt() * Re-added handling for SSLv2 Client Hello when the define POLARSSL_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO is set * The SSL session cache module (ssl_cache) now also retains peer_cert information (not the entire chain) Security * Removed further timing differences during SSL message decryption in ssl_decrypt_buf() * Removed timing differences due to bad padding from rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt() and rsa_pkcs1_decrypt() for PKCS#1 v1.5 operations = Version 1.2.5 released 2013-02-02 Changes * Allow enabling of dummy error_strerror() to support some use-cases * Debug messages about padding errors during SSL message decryption are disabled by default and can be enabled with POLARSSL_SSL_DEBUG_ALL * Sending of security-relevant alert messages that do not break interoperability can be switched on/off with the flag POLARSSL_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES Security * Removed timing differences during SSL message decryption in ssl_decrypt_buf() due to badly formatted padding = Version 1.2.4 released 2013-01-25 Changes * More advanced SSL ciphersuite representation and moved to more dynamic SSL core * Added ssl_handshake_step() to allow single stepping the handshake process Bugfix * Memory leak when using RSA_PKCS_V21 operations fixed * Handle future version properly in ssl_write_certificate_request() * Correctly handle CertificateRequest message in client for <= TLS 1.1 without DN list = Version 1.2.3 released 2012-11-26 Bugfix * Server not always sending correct CertificateRequest message = Version 1.2.2 released 2012-11-24 Changes * Added p_hw_data to ssl_context for context specific hardware acceleration data * During verify trust-CA is only checked for expiration and CRL presence Bugfixes * Fixed client authentication compatibility * Fixed dependency on POLARSSL_SHA4_C in SSL modules = Version 1.2.1 released 2012-11-20 Changes * Depth that the certificate verify callback receives is now numbered bottom-up (Peer cert depth is 0) Bugfixes * Fixes for MSVC6 * Moved mpi_inv_mod() outside POLARSSL_GENPRIME * Allow R and A to point to same mpi in mpi_div_mpi (found by Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard) * Fixed possible segfault in mpi_shift_r() (found by Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard) * Added max length check for rsa_pkcs1_sign with PKCS#1 v2.1 = Version 1.2.0 released 2012-10-31 Features * Added support for NULL cipher (POLARSSL_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) and weak ciphersuites (POLARSSL_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES). They are disabled by default! * Added support for wildcard certificates * Added support for multi-domain certificates through the X509 Subject Alternative Name extension * Added preliminary ASN.1 buffer writing support * Added preliminary X509 Certificate Request writing support * Added key_app_writer example application * Added cert_req example application * Added base Galois Counter Mode (GCM) for AES * Added TLS 1.2 support (RFC 5246) * Added GCM suites to TLS 1.2 (RFC 5288) * Added commandline error code convertor (util/strerror) * Added support for Hardware Acceleration hooking in SSL/TLS * Added OpenSSL / PolarSSL compatibility script (tests/compat.sh) and example application (programs/ssl/o_p_test) (requires OpenSSL) * Added X509 CA Path support * Added Thumb assembly optimizations * Added DEFLATE compression support as per RFC3749 (requires zlib) * Added blowfish algorithm (Generic and cipher layer) * Added PKCS#5 PBKDF2 key derivation function * Added Secure Renegotiation (RFC 5746) * Added predefined DHM groups from RFC 5114 * Added simple SSL session cache implementation * Added ServerName extension parsing (SNI) at server side * Added option to add minimum accepted SSL/TLS protocol version Changes * Removed redundant POLARSSL_DEBUG_MSG define * AES code only check for Padlock once * Fixed const-correctness mpi_get_bit() * Documentation for mpi_lsb() and mpi_msb() * Moved out_msg to out_hdr + 32 to support hardware acceleration * Changed certificate verify behaviour to comply with RFC 6125 section 6.3 to not match CN if subjectAltName extension is present (Closes ticket #56) * Cipher layer cipher_mode_t POLARSSL_MODE_CFB128 is renamed to POLARSSL_MODE_CFB, to also handle different block size CFB modes. * Removed handling for SSLv2 Client Hello (as per RFC 5246 recommendation) * Revamped session resumption handling * Generalized external private key implementation handling (like PKCS#11) in SSL/TLS * Revamped x509_verify() and the SSL f_vrfy callback implementations * Moved from unsigned long to fixed width uint32_t types throughout code * Renamed ciphersuites naming scheme to IANA reserved names Bugfix * Fixed handling error in mpi_cmp_mpi() on longer B values (found by Hui Dong) * Fixed potential heap corruption in x509_name allocation * Fixed single RSA test that failed on Big Endian systems (Closes ticket #54) * mpi_exp_mod() now correctly handles negative base numbers (Closes ticket #52) * Handle encryption with private key and decryption with public key as per RFC 2313 * Handle empty certificate subject names * Prevent reading over buffer boundaries on X509 certificate parsing * mpi_add_abs() now correctly handles adding short numbers to long numbers with carry rollover (found by Ruslan Yushchenko) * Handle existence of OpenSSL Trust Extensions at end of X.509 DER blob * Fixed MPI assembly for SPARC64 platform Security * Fixed potential memory zeroization on miscrafted RSA key (found by Eloi Vanderbeken) = Version 1.1.8 released on 2013-10-01 Bugfix * Fixed potential memory leak when failing to resume a session * Fixed potential file descriptor leaks Security * Potential buffer-overflow for ssl_read_record() (independently found by both TrustInSoft and Paul Brodeur of Leviathan Security Group) * Potential negative value misinterpretation in load_file() * Potential heap buffer overflow on large hostname setting = Version 1.1.7 released on 2013-06-19 Changes * HAVEGE random generator disabled by default Bugfix * x509parse_crt() now better handles PEM error situations * ssl_parse_certificate() now calls x509parse_crt_der() directly instead of the x509parse_crt() wrapper that can also parse PEM certificates * Fixed values for 2-key Triple DES in cipher layer * ssl_write_certificate_request() can handle empty ca_chain Security * A possible DoS during the SSL Handshake, due to faulty parsing of PEM-encoded certificates has been fixed (found by Jack Lloyd) = Version 1.1.6 released on 2013-03-11 Bugfix * Fixed net_bind() for specified IP addresses on little endian systems Changes * Allow enabling of dummy error_strerror() to support some use-cases * Debug messages about padding errors during SSL message decryption are disabled by default and can be enabled with POLARSSL_SSL_DEBUG_ALL Security * Removed timing differences during SSL message decryption in ssl_decrypt_buf() * Removed timing differences due to bad padding from rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt() and rsa_pkcs1_decrypt() for PKCS#1 v1.5 operations = Version 1.1.5 released on 2013-01-16 Bugfix * Fixed MPI assembly for SPARC64 platform * Handle existence of OpenSSL Trust Extensions at end of X.509 DER blob * mpi_add_abs() now correctly handles adding short numbers to long numbers with carry rollover * Moved mpi_inv_mod() outside POLARSSL_GENPRIME * Prevent reading over buffer boundaries on X509 certificate parsing * mpi_exp_mod() now correctly handles negative base numbers (Closes ticket #52) * Fixed possible segfault in mpi_shift_r() (found by Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard) * Allow R and A to point to same mpi in mpi_div_mpi (found by Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard) * Added max length check for rsa_pkcs1_sign with PKCS#1 v2.1 * Memory leak when using RSA_PKCS_V21 operations fixed * Handle encryption with private key and decryption with public key as per RFC 2313 * Fixes for MSVC6 Security * Fixed potential memory zeroization on miscrafted RSA key (found by Eloi Vanderbeken) = Version 1.1.4 released on 2012-05-31 Bugfix * Correctly handle empty SSL/TLS packets (Found by James Yonan) * Fixed potential heap corruption in x509_name allocation * Fixed single RSA test that failed on Big Endian systems (Closes ticket #54) = Version 1.1.3 released on 2012-04-29 Bugfix * Fixed random MPI generation to not generate more size than requested. = Version 1.1.2 released on 2012-04-26 Bugfix * Fixed handling error in mpi_cmp_mpi() on longer B values (found by Hui Dong) Security * Fixed potential memory corruption on miscrafted client messages (found by Frama-C team at CEA LIST) * Fixed generation of DHM parameters to correct length (found by Ruslan Yushchenko) = Version 1.1.1 released on 2012-01-23 Bugfix * Check for failed malloc() in ssl_set_hostname() and x509_get_entries() (Closes ticket #47, found by Hugo Leisink) * Fixed issues with Intel compiler on 64-bit systems (Closes ticket #50) * Fixed multiple compiler warnings for VS6 and armcc * Fixed bug in CTR_CRBG selftest = Version 1.1.0 released on 2011-12-22 Features * Added ssl_session_reset() to allow better multi-connection pools of SSL contexts without needing to set all non-connection-specific data and pointers again. Adapted ssl_server to use this functionality. * Added ssl_set_max_version() to allow clients to offer a lower maximum supported version to a server to help buggy server implementations. (Closes ticket #36) * Added cipher_get_cipher_mode() and cipher_get_cipher_operation() introspection functions (Closes ticket #40) * Added CTR_DRBG based on AES-256-CTR (NIST SP 800-90) random generator * Added a generic entropy accumulator that provides support for adding custom entropy sources and added some generic and platform dependent entropy sources Changes * Documentation for AES and Camellia in modes CTR and CFB128 clarified. * Fixed rsa_encrypt and rsa_decrypt examples to use public key for encryption and private key for decryption. (Closes ticket #34) * Inceased maximum size of ASN1 length reads to 32-bits. * Added an EXPLICIT tag number parameter to x509_get_ext() * Added a separate CRL entry extension parsing function * Separated the ASN.1 parsing code from the X.509 specific parsing code. So now there is a module that is controlled with POLARSSL_ASN1_PARSE_C. * Changed the defined key-length of DES ciphers in cipher.h to include the parity bits, to prevent mistakes in copying data. (Closes ticket #33) * Loads of minimal changes to better support WINCE as a build target (Credits go to Marco Lizza) * Added POLARSSL_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE definition to allow easier time to memory trade-off * Introduced POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_SIZE and POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_BITS for MPI size management (Closes ticket #44) * Changed the used random function pointer to more flexible format. Renamed havege_rand() to havege_random() to prevent mistakes. Lots of changes as a consequence in library code and programs * Moved all examples programs to use the new entropy and CTR_DRBG * Added permissive certificate parsing to x509parse_crt() and x509parse_crtfile(). With permissive parsing the parsing does not stop on encountering a parse-error. Beware that the meaning of return values has changed! * All error codes are now negative. Even on mermory failures and IO errors. Bugfix * Fixed faulty HMAC-MD2 implementation. Found by dibac. (Closes ticket #37) * Fixed a bug where the CRL parser expected an EXPLICIT ASN.1 tag before version numbers * Allowed X509 key usage parsing to accept 4 byte values instead of the standard 1 byte version sometimes used by Microsoft. (Closes ticket #38) * Fixed incorrect behaviour in case of RSASSA-PSS with a salt length smaller than the hash length. (Closes ticket #41) * If certificate serial is longer than 32 octets, serial number is now appended with '....' after first 28 octets * Improved build support for s390x and sparc64 in bignum.h * Fixed MS Visual C++ name clash with int64 in sha4.h * Corrected removal of leading "00:" in printing serial numbers in certificates and CRLs = Version 1.0.0 released on 2011-07-27 Features * Expanded cipher layer with support for CFB128 and CTR mode * Added rsa_encrypt and rsa_decrypt simple example programs. Changes * The generic cipher and message digest layer now have normal error codes instead of integers Bugfix * Undid faulty bug fix in ssl_write() when flushing old data (Ticket #18) = Version 0.99-pre5 released on 2011-05-26 Features * Added additional Cipher Block Modes to symmetric ciphers (AES CTR, Camellia CTR, XTEA CBC) including the option to enable and disable individual modes when needed * Functions requiring File System functions can now be disabled by undefining POLARSSL_FS_IO * A error_strerror function() has been added to translate between error codes and their description. * Added mpi_get_bit() and mpi_set_bit() individual bit setter/getter functions. * Added ssl_mail_client and ssl_fork_server as example programs. Changes * Major argument / variable rewrite. Introduced use of size_t instead of int for buffer lengths and loop variables for better unsigned / signed use. Renamed internal bigint types t_int and t_dbl to t_uint and t_udbl in the process * mpi_init() and mpi_free() now only accept a single MPI argument and do not accept variable argument lists anymore. * The error codes have been remapped and combining error codes is now done with a PLUS instead of an OR as error codes used are negative. * Changed behaviour of net_read(), ssl_fetch_input() and ssl_recv(). net_recv() now returns 0 on EOF instead of POLARSSL_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET. ssl_fetch_input() returns POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF on an EOF from its f_recv() function. ssl_read() returns 0 if a POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF is received after the handshake. * Network functions now return POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_READ or POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_WRITE instead of the ambiguous POLARSSL_ERR_NET_TRY_AGAIN = Version 0.99-pre4 released on 2011-04-01 Features * Added support for PKCS#1 v2.1 encoding and thus support for the RSAES-OAEP and RSASSA-PSS operations. * Reading of Public Key files incorporated into default x509 functionality as well. * Added mpi_fill_random() for centralized filling of big numbers with random data (Fixed ticket #10) Changes * Debug print of MPI now removes leading zero octets and displays actual bit size of the value. * x509parse_key() (and as a consequence x509parse_keyfile()) does not zeroize memory in advance anymore. Use rsa_init() before parsing a key or keyfile! Bugfix * Debug output of MPI's now the same independent of underlying platform (32-bit / 64-bit) (Fixes ticket #19, found by Mads Kiilerich and Mihai Militaru) * Fixed bug in ssl_write() when flushing old data (Fixed ticket #18, found by Nikolay Epifanov) * Fixed proper handling of RSASSA-PSS verification with variable length salt lengths = Version 0.99-pre3 released on 2011-02-28 This release replaces version 0.99-pre2 which had possible copyright issues. Features * Parsing PEM private keys encrypted with DES and AES are now supported as well (Fixes ticket #5) * Added crl_app program to allow easy reading and printing of X509 CRLs from file Changes * Parsing of PEM files moved to separate module (Fixes ticket #13). Also possible to remove PEM support for systems only using DER encoding Bugfixes * Corrected parsing of UTCTime dates before 1990 and after 1950 * Support more exotic OID's when parsing certificates (found by Mads Kiilerich) * Support more exotic name representations when parsing certificates (found by Mads Kiilerich) * Replaced the expired test certificates * Do not bail out if no client certificate specified. Try to negotiate anonymous connection (Fixes ticket #12, found by Boris Krasnovskiy) Security fixes * Fixed a possible Man-in-the-Middle attack on the Diffie Hellman key exchange (thanks to Larry Highsmith, Subreption LLC) = Version 0.99-pre1 released on 2011-01-30 Features Note: Most of these features have been donated by Fox-IT * Added Doxygen source code documentation parts * Added reading of DHM context from memory and file * Improved X509 certificate parsing to include extended certificate fields, including Key Usage * Improved certificate verification and verification against the available CRLs * Detection for DES weak keys and parity bits added * Improvements to support integration in other applications: + Added generic message digest and cipher wrapper + Improved information about current capabilities, status, objects and configuration + Added verification callback on certificate chain verification to allow external blacklisting + Additional example programs to show usage * Added support for PKCS#11 through the use of the libpkcs11-helper library Changes * x509parse_time_expired() checks time in addition to the existing date check * The ciphers member of ssl_context and the cipher member of ssl_session have been renamed to ciphersuites and ciphersuite respectively. This clarifies the difference with the generic cipher layer and is better naming altogether = Version 0.14.0 released on 2010-08-16 Features * Added support for SSL_EDH_RSA_AES_128_SHA and SSL_EDH_RSA_CAMELLIA_128_SHA ciphersuites * Added compile-time and run-time version information * Expanded ssl_client2 arguments for more flexibility * Added support for TLS v1.1 Changes * Made Makefile cleaner * Removed dependency on rand() in rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(). Now using random fuction provided to function and changed the prototype of rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(), rsa_init() and rsa_gen_key(). * Some SSL defines were renamed in order to avoid future confusion Bug fixes * Fixed CMake out of source build for tests (found by kkert) * rsa_check_private() now supports PKCS1v2 keys as well * Fixed deadlock in rsa_pkcs1_encrypt() on failing random generator = Version 0.13.1 released on 2010-03-24 Bug fixes * Fixed Makefile in library that was mistakenly merged * Added missing const string fixes = Version 0.13.0 released on 2010-03-21 Features * Added option parsing for host and port selection to ssl_client2 * Added support for GeneralizedTime in X509 parsing * Added cert_app program to allow easy reading and printing of X509 certificates from file or SSL connection. Changes * Added const correctness for main code base * X509 signature algorithm determination is now in a function to allow easy future expansion * Changed symmetric cipher functions to identical interface (returning int result values) * Changed ARC4 to use separate input/output buffer * Added reset function for HMAC context as speed-up for specific use-cases Bug fixes * Fixed bug resulting in failure to send the last certificate in the chain in ssl_write_certificate() and ssl_write_certificate_request() (found by fatbob) * Added small fixes for compiler warnings on a Mac (found by Frank de Brabander) * Fixed algorithmic bug in mpi_is_prime() (found by Smbat Tonoyan) = Version 0.12.1 released on 2009-10-04 Changes * Coverage test definitions now support 'depends_on' tagging system. * Tests requiring specific hashing algorithms now honor the defines. Bug fixes * Changed typo in #ifdef in x509parse.c (found by Eduardo) = Version 0.12.0 released on 2009-07-28 Features * Added CMake makefiles as alternative to regular Makefiles. * Added preliminary Code Coverage tests for AES, ARC4, Base64, MPI, SHA-family, MD-family, HMAC-SHA-family, Camellia, DES, 3-DES, RSA PKCS#1, XTEA, Diffie-Hellman and X509parse. Changes * Error codes are not (necessarily) negative. Keep this is mind when checking for errors. * RSA_RAW renamed to SIG_RSA_RAW for consistency. * Fixed typo in name of POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE. * Changed interface for AES and Camellia setkey functions to indicate invalid key lengths. Bug fixes * Fixed include location of endian.h on FreeBSD (found by Gabriel) * Fixed include location of endian.h and name clash on Apples (found by Martin van Hensbergen) * Fixed HMAC-MD2 by modifying md2_starts(), so that the required HMAC ipad and opad variables are not cleared. (found by code coverage tests) * Prevented use of long long in bignum if POLARSSL_HAVE_LONGLONG not defined (found by Giles Bathgate). * Fixed incorrect handling of negative strings in mpi_read_string() (found by code coverage tests). * Fixed segfault on handling empty rsa_context in rsa_check_pubkey() and rsa_check_privkey() (found by code coverage tests). * Fixed incorrect handling of one single negative input value in mpi_add_abs() (found by code coverage tests). * Fixed incorrect handling of negative first input value in mpi_sub_abs() (found by code coverage tests). * Fixed incorrect handling of negative first input value in mpi_mod_mpi() and mpi_mod_int(). Resulting change also affects mpi_write_string() (found by code coverage tests). * Corrected is_prime() results for 0, 1 and 2 (found by code coverage tests). * Fixed Camellia and XTEA for 64-bit Windows systems. = Version 0.11.1 released on 2009-05-17 * Fixed missing functionality for SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA384, SHA-512 in rsa_pkcs1_sign() = Version 0.11.0 released on 2009-05-03 * Fixed a bug in mpi_gcd() so that it also works when both input numbers are even and added testcases to check (found by Pierre Habouzit). * Added support for SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 one way hash functions with the PKCS#1 v1.5 signing and verification. * Fixed minor bug regarding mpi_gcd located within the POLARSSL_GENPRIME block. * Fixed minor memory leak in x509parse_crt() and added better handling of 'full' certificate chains (found by Mathias Olsson). * Centralized file opening and reading for x509 files into load_file() * Made definition of net_htons() endian-clean for big endian systems (Found by Gernot). * Undefining POLARSSL_HAVE_ASM now also handles prevents asm in padlock and timing code. * Fixed an off-by-one buffer allocation in ssl_set_hostname() responsible for crashes and unwanted behaviour. * Added support for Certificate Revocation List (CRL) parsing. * Added support for CRL revocation to x509parse_verify() and SSL/TLS code. * Fixed compatibility of XTEA and Camellia on a 64-bit system (found by Felix von Leitner). = Version 0.10.0 released on 2009-01-12 * Migrated XySSL to PolarSSL * Added XTEA symmetric cipher * Added Camellia symmetric cipher * Added support for ciphersuites: SSL_RSA_CAMELLIA_128_SHA, SSL_RSA_CAMELLIA_256_SHA and SSL_EDH_RSA_CAMELLIA_256_SHA * Fixed dangerous bug that can cause a heap overflow in rsa_pkcs1_decrypt (found by Christophe Devine) ================================================================ XySSL ChangeLog = Version 0.9 released on 2008-03-16 * Added support for ciphersuite: SSL_RSA_AES_128_SHA * Enabled support for large files by default in aescrypt2.c * Preliminary openssl wrapper contributed by David Barrett * Fixed a bug in ssl_write() that caused the same payload to be sent twice in non-blocking mode when send returns EAGAIN * Fixed ssl_parse_client_hello(): session id and challenge must not be swapped in the SSLv2 ClientHello (found by Greg Robson) * Added user-defined callback debug function (Krystian Kolodziej) * Before freeing a certificate, properly zero out all cert. data * Fixed the "mode" parameter so that encryption/decryption are not swapped on PadLock; also fixed compilation on older versions of gcc (bug reported by David Barrett) * Correctly handle the case in padlock_xcryptcbc() when input or output data is non-aligned by falling back to the software implementation, as VIA Nehemiah cannot handle non-aligned buffers * Fixed a memory leak in x509parse_crt() which was reported by Greg Robson-Garth; some x509write.c fixes by Pascal Vizeli, thanks to Matthew Page who reported several bugs * Fixed x509_get_ext() to accept some rare certificates which have an INTEGER instead of a BOOLEAN for BasicConstraints::cA. * Added support on the client side for the TLS "hostname" extension (patch contributed by David Patino) * Make x509parse_verify() return BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH when an empty string is passed as the CN (bug reported by spoofy) * Added an option to enable/disable the BN assembly code * Updated rsa_check_privkey() to verify that (D*E) = 1 % (P-1)*(Q-1) * Disabled obsolete hash functions by default (MD2, MD4); updated selftest and benchmark to not test ciphers that have been disabled * Updated x509parse_cert_info() to correctly display byte 0 of the serial number, setup correct server port in the ssl client example * Fixed a critical denial-of-service with X.509 cert. verification: peer may cause xyssl to loop indefinitely by sending a certificate for which the RSA signature check fails (bug reported by Benoit) * Added test vectors for: AES-CBC, AES-CFB, DES-CBC and 3DES-CBC, HMAC-MD5, HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 * Fixed HMAC-SHA-384 and HMAC-SHA-512 (thanks to Josh Sinykin) * Modified ssl_parse_client_key_exchange() to protect against Daniel Bleichenbacher attack on PKCS#1 v1.5 padding, as well as the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack * Updated rsa_gen_key() so that ctx->N is always nbits in size * Fixed assembly PPC compilation errors on Mac OS X, thanks to David Barrett and Dusan Semen = Version 0.8 released on 2007-10-20 * Modified the HMAC functions to handle keys larger than 64 bytes, thanks to Stephane Desneux and gary ng * Fixed ssl_read_record() to properly update the handshake message digests, which fixes IE6/IE7 client authentication * Cleaned up the XYSSL* #defines, suggested by Azriel Fasten * Fixed net_recv(), thanks to Lorenz Schori and Egon Kocjan * Added user-defined callbacks for handling I/O and sessions * Added lots of debugging output in the SSL/TLS functions * Added preliminary X.509 cert. writing by Pascal Vizeli * Added preliminary support for the VIA PadLock routines * Added AES-CFB mode of operation, contributed by chmike * Added an SSL/TLS stress testing program (ssl_test.c) * Updated the RSA PKCS#1 code to allow choosing between RSA_PUBLIC and RSA_PRIVATE, as suggested by David Barrett * Updated ssl_read() to skip 0-length records from OpenSSL * Fixed the make install target to comply with *BSD make * Fixed a bug in mpi_read_binary() on 64-bit platforms * mpi_is_prime() speedups, thanks to Kevin McLaughlin * Fixed a long standing memory leak in mpi_is_prime() * Replaced realloc with malloc in mpi_grow(), and set the sign of zero as positive in mpi_init() (reported by Jonathan M. McCune) = Version 0.7 released on 2007-07-07 * Added support for the MicroBlaze soft-core processor * Fixed a bug in ssl_tls.c which sometimes prevented SSL connections from being established with non-blocking I/O * Fixed a couple bugs in the VS6 and UNIX Makefiles * Fixed the "PIC register ebx clobbered in asm" bug * Added HMAC starts/update/finish support functions * Added the SHA-224, SHA-384 and SHA-512 hash functions * Fixed the net_set_*block routines, thanks to Andreas * Added a few demonstration programs: md5sum, sha1sum, dh_client, dh_server, rsa_genkey, rsa_sign, rsa_verify * Added new bignum import and export helper functions * Rewrote README.txt in program/ssl/ca to better explain how to create a test PKI = Version 0.6 released on 2007-04-01 * Ciphers used in SSL/TLS can now be disabled at compile time, to reduce the memory footprint on embedded systems * Added multiply assembly code for the TriCore and modified havege_struct for this processor, thanks to David Patiño * Added multiply assembly code for 64-bit PowerPCs, thanks to Peking University and the OSU Open Source Lab * Added experimental support of Quantum Cryptography * Added support for autoconf, contributed by Arnaud Cornet * Fixed "long long" compilation issues on IA-64 and PPC64 * Fixed a bug introduced in xyssl-0.5/timing.c: hardclock was not being correctly defined on ARM and MIPS = Version 0.5 released on 2007-03-01 * Added multiply assembly code for SPARC and Alpha * Added (beta) support for non-blocking I/O operations * Implemented session resuming and client authentication * Fixed some portability issues on WinCE, MINIX 3, Plan9 (thanks to Benjamin Newman), HP-UX, FreeBSD and Solaris * Improved the performance of the EDH key exchange * Fixed a bug that caused valid packets with a payload size of 16384 bytes to be rejected = Version 0.4 released on 2007-02-01 * Added support for Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange * Added multiply asm code for SSE2, ARM, PPC, MIPS and M68K * Various improvement to the modular exponentiation code * Rewrote the headers to generate the API docs with doxygen * Fixed a bug in ssl_encrypt_buf (incorrect padding was generated) and in ssl_parse_client_hello (max. client version was not properly set), thanks to Didier Rebeix * Fixed another bug in ssl_parse_client_hello: clients with cipherlists larger than 96 bytes were incorrectly rejected * Fixed a couple memory leak in x509_read.c = Version 0.3 released on 2007-01-01 * Added server-side SSLv3 and TLSv1.0 support * Multiple fixes to enhance the compatibility with g++, thanks to Xosé Antón Otero Ferreira * Fixed a bug in the CBC code, thanks to dowst; also, the bignum code is no longer dependent on long long * Updated rsa_pkcs1_sign to handle arbitrary large inputs * Updated timing.c for improved compatibility with i386 and 486 processors, thanks to Arnaud Cornet = Version 0.2 released on 2006-12-01 * Updated timing.c to support ARM and MIPS arch * Updated the MPI code to support 8086 on MSVC 1.5 * Added the copyright notice at the top of havege.h * Fixed a bug in sha2_hmac, thanks to newsoft/Wenfang Zhang * Fixed a bug reported by Adrian Rüegsegger in x509_read_key * Fixed a bug reported by Torsten Lauter in ssl_read_record * Fixed a bug in rsa_check_privkey that would wrongly cause valid RSA keys to be dismissed (thanks to oldwolf) * Fixed a bug in mpi_is_prime that caused some primes to fail the Miller-Rabin primality test I'd also like to thank Younès Hafri for the CRUX linux port, Khalil Petit who added XySSL into pkgsrc and Arnaud Cornet who maintains the Debian package :-) = Version 0.1 released on 2006-11-01 usr/doc/mbedtls-2.25.0/LICENSE0000644000000000000000000002613613764415275014341 0ustar rootroot Apache License Version 2.0, January 2004 http://www.apache.org/licenses/ TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR USE, REPRODUCTION, AND DISTRIBUTION 1. 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See the License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations under the License. usr/doc/mbedtls-2.25.0/README.md0000644000000000000000000003740413764415275014613 0ustar rootrootREADME for Mbed TLS =================== Mbed TLS is a C library that implements cryptographic primitives, X.509 certificate manipulation and the SSL/TLS and DTLS protocols. Its small code footprint makes it suitable for embedded systems. Mbed TLS includes a reference implementation of the [PSA Cryptography API](#psa-cryptography-api). This is currently a preview for evaluation purposes only. Configuration ------------- Mbed TLS should build out of the box on most systems. Some platform specific options are available in the fully documented configuration file `include/mbedtls/config.h`, which is also the place where features can be selected. This file can be edited manually, or in a more programmatic way using the Python 3 script `scripts/config.py` (use `--help` for usage instructions). Compiler options can be set using conventional environment variables such as `CC` and `CFLAGS` when using the Make and CMake build system (see below). We provide some non-standard configurations focused on specific use cases in the `configs/` directory. You can read more about those in `configs/README.txt` Documentation ------------- Documentation for the Mbed TLS interfaces in the default library configuration is available as part of the [Mbed TLS documentation](https://tls.mbed.org/api/). To generate a local copy of the library documentation in HTML format, tailored to your compile-time configuration: 1. Make sure that [Doxygen](http://www.doxygen.nl/) is installed. We use version 1.8.11 but slightly older or more recent versions should work. 1. Run `make apidoc`. 1. Browse `apidoc/index.html` or `apidoc/modules.html`. Compiling --------- There are currently three active build systems used within Mbed TLS releases: - GNU Make - CMake - Microsoft Visual Studio (Microsoft Visual Studio 2013 or later) The main systems used for development are CMake and GNU Make. Those systems are always complete and up-to-date. The others should reflect all changes present in the CMake and Make build system, although features may not be ported there automatically. The Make and CMake build systems create three libraries: libmbedcrypto, libmbedx509, and libmbedtls. Note that libmbedtls depends on libmbedx509 and libmbedcrypto, and libmbedx509 depends on libmbedcrypto. As a result, some linkers will expect flags to be in a specific order, for example the GNU linker wants `-lmbedtls -lmbedx509 -lmbedcrypto`. Also, when loading shared libraries using dlopen(), you'll need to load libmbedcrypto first, then libmbedx509, before you can load libmbedtls. ### Tool versions You need the following tools to build the library with the provided makefiles: * GNU Make or a build tool that CMake supports. * A C99 toolchain (compiler, linker, archiver). We actively test with GCC 5.4, Clang 3.8, IAR8 and Visual Studio 2013. More recent versions should work. Slightly older versions may work. * Python 3 to generate the test code. * Perl to run the tests. ### Make We require GNU Make. To build the library and the sample programs, GNU Make and a C compiler are sufficient. Some of the more advanced build targets require some Unix/Linux tools. We intentionally only use a minimum of functionality in the makefiles in order to keep them as simple and independent of different toolchains as possible, to allow users to more easily move between different platforms. Users who need more features are recommended to use CMake. In order to build from the source code using GNU Make, just enter at the command line: make In order to run the tests, enter: make check The tests need Python to be built and Perl to be run. If you don't have one of them installed, you can skip building the tests with: make no_test You'll still be able to run a much smaller set of tests with: programs/test/selftest In order to build for a Windows platform, you should use `WINDOWS_BUILD=1` if the target is Windows but the build environment is Unix-like (for instance when cross-compiling, or compiling from an MSYS shell), and `WINDOWS=1` if the build environment is a Windows shell (for instance using mingw32-make) (in that case some targets will not be available). Setting the variable `SHARED` in your environment will build shared libraries in addition to the static libraries. Setting `DEBUG` gives you a debug build. You can override `CFLAGS` and `LDFLAGS` by setting them in your environment or on the make command line; compiler warning options may be overridden separately using `WARNING_CFLAGS`. Some directory-specific options (for example, `-I` directives) are still preserved. Please note that setting `CFLAGS` overrides its default value of `-O2` and setting `WARNING_CFLAGS` overrides its default value (starting with `-Wall -Wextra`), so if you just want to add some warning options to the default ones, you can do so by setting `CFLAGS=-O2 -Werror` for example. Setting `WARNING_CFLAGS` is useful when you want to get rid of its default content (for example because your compiler doesn't accept `-Wall` as an option). Directory-specific options cannot be overridden from the command line. Depending on your platform, you might run into some issues. Please check the Makefiles in `library/`, `programs/` and `tests/` for options to manually add or remove for specific platforms. You can also check [the Mbed TLS Knowledge Base](https://tls.mbed.org/kb) for articles on your platform or issue. In case you find that you need to do something else as well, please let us know what, so we can add it to the [Mbed TLS Knowledge Base](https://tls.mbed.org/kb). ### CMake In order to build the source using CMake in a separate directory (recommended), just enter at the command line: mkdir /path/to/build_dir && cd /path/to/build_dir cmake /path/to/mbedtls_source cmake --build . In order to run the tests, enter: ctest The test suites need Python to be built and Perl to be executed. If you don't have one of these installed, you'll want to disable the test suites with: cmake -DENABLE_TESTING=Off /path/to/mbedtls_source If you disabled the test suites, but kept the programs enabled, you can still run a much smaller set of tests with: programs/test/selftest To configure CMake for building shared libraries, use: cmake -DUSE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY=On /path/to/mbedtls_source There are many different build modes available within the CMake buildsystem. Most of them are available for gcc and clang, though some are compiler-specific: - `Release`. This generates the default code without any unnecessary information in the binary files. - `Debug`. This generates debug information and disables optimization of the code. - `Coverage`. This generates code coverage information in addition to debug information. - `ASan`. This instruments the code with AddressSanitizer to check for memory errors. (This includes LeakSanitizer, with recent version of gcc and clang.) (With recent version of clang, this mode also instruments the code with UndefinedSanitizer to check for undefined behaviour.) - `ASanDbg`. Same as ASan but slower, with debug information and better stack traces. - `MemSan`. This instruments the code with MemorySanitizer to check for uninitialised memory reads. Experimental, needs recent clang on Linux/x86\_64. - `MemSanDbg`. Same as MemSan but slower, with debug information, better stack traces and origin tracking. - `Check`. This activates the compiler warnings that depend on optimization and treats all warnings as errors. Switching build modes in CMake is simple. For debug mode, enter at the command line: cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Debug /path/to/mbedtls_source To list other available CMake options, use: cmake -LH Note that, with CMake, you can't adjust the compiler or its flags after the initial invocation of cmake. This means that `CC=your_cc make` and `make CC=your_cc` will *not* work (similarly with `CFLAGS` and other variables). These variables need to be adjusted when invoking cmake for the first time, for example: CC=your_cc cmake /path/to/mbedtls_source If you already invoked cmake and want to change those settings, you need to remove the build directory and create it again. Note that it is possible to build in-place; this will however overwrite the provided Makefiles (see `scripts/tmp_ignore_makefiles.sh` if you want to prevent `git status` from showing them as modified). In order to do so, from the Mbed TLS source directory, use: cmake . make If you want to change `CC` or `CFLAGS` afterwards, you will need to remove the CMake cache. This can be done with the following command using GNU find: find . -iname '*cmake*' -not -name CMakeLists.txt -exec rm -rf {} + You can now make the desired change: CC=your_cc cmake . make Regarding variables, also note that if you set CFLAGS when invoking cmake, your value of CFLAGS doesn't override the content provided by cmake (depending on the build mode as seen above), it's merely prepended to it. #### Mbed TLS as a subproject Mbed TLS supports being built as a CMake subproject. One can use `add_subdirectory()` from a parent CMake project to include Mbed TLS as a subproject. ### Microsoft Visual Studio The build files for Microsoft Visual Studio are generated for Visual Studio 2010. The solution file `mbedTLS.sln` contains all the basic projects needed to build the library and all the programs. The files in tests are not generated and compiled, as these need Python and perl environments as well. However, the selftest program in `programs/test/` is still available. Example programs ---------------- We've included example programs for a lot of different features and uses in [`programs/`](programs/README.md). Please note that the goal of these sample programs is to demonstrate specific features of the library, and the code may need to be adapted to build a real-world application. Tests ----- Mbed TLS includes an elaborate test suite in `tests/` that initially requires Python to generate the tests files (e.g. `test\_suite\_mpi.c`). These files are generated from a `function file` (e.g. `suites/test\_suite\_mpi.function`) and a `data file` (e.g. `suites/test\_suite\_mpi.data`). The `function file` contains the test functions. The `data file` contains the test cases, specified as parameters that will be passed to the test function. For machines with a Unix shell and OpenSSL (and optionally GnuTLS) installed, additional test scripts are available: - `tests/ssl-opt.sh` runs integration tests for various TLS options (renegotiation, resumption, etc.) and tests interoperability of these options with other implementations. - `tests/compat.sh` tests interoperability of every ciphersuite with other implementations. - `tests/scripts/test-ref-configs.pl` test builds in various reduced configurations. - `tests/scripts/key-exchanges.pl` test builds in configurations with a single key exchange enabled - `tests/scripts/all.sh` runs a combination of the above tests, plus some more, with various build options (such as ASan, full `config.h`, etc). Porting Mbed TLS ---------------- Mbed TLS can be ported to many different architectures, OS's and platforms. Before starting a port, you may find the following Knowledge Base articles useful: - [Porting Mbed TLS to a new environment or OS](https://tls.mbed.org/kb/how-to/how-do-i-port-mbed-tls-to-a-new-environment-OS) - [What external dependencies does Mbed TLS rely on?](https://tls.mbed.org/kb/development/what-external-dependencies-does-mbedtls-rely-on) - [How do I configure Mbed TLS](https://tls.mbed.org/kb/compiling-and-building/how-do-i-configure-mbedtls) PSA cryptography API -------------------- ### PSA API design Arm's [Platform Security Architecture (PSA)](https://developer.arm.com/architectures/security-architectures/platform-security-architecture) is a holistic set of threat models, security analyses, hardware and firmware architecture specifications, and an open source firmware reference implementation. PSA provides a recipe, based on industry best practice, that allows security to be consistently designed in, at both a hardware and firmware level. The [PSA cryptography API](https://armmbed.github.io/mbed-crypto/psa/#application-programming-interface) provides access to a set of cryptographic primitives. It has a dual purpose. First, it can be used in a PSA-compliant platform to build services, such as secure boot, secure storage and secure communication. Second, it can also be used independently of other PSA components on any platform. The design goals of the PSA cryptography API include: * The API distinguishes caller memory from internal memory, which allows the library to be implemented in an isolated space for additional security. Library calls can be implemented as direct function calls if isolation is not desired, and as remote procedure calls if isolation is desired. * The structure of internal data is hidden to the application, which allows substituting alternative implementations at build time or run time, for example, in order to take advantage of hardware accelerators. * All access to the keys happens through key identifiers, which allows support for external cryptoprocessors that is transparent to applications. * The interface to algorithms is generic, favoring algorithm agility. * The interface is designed to be easy to use and hard to accidentally misuse. Arm welcomes feedback on the design of the API. If you think something could be improved, please open an issue on our Github repository. Alternatively, if you prefer to provide your feedback privately, please email us at [`mbed-crypto@arm.com`](mailto:mbed-crypto@arm.com). All feedback received by email is treated confidentially. ### PSA API documentation A browsable copy of the PSA Cryptography API documents is available on the [PSA cryptography interfaces documentation portal](https://armmbed.github.io/mbed-crypto/psa/#application-programming-interface) in [PDF](https://armmbed.github.io/mbed-crypto/PSA_Cryptography_API_Specification.pdf) and [HTML](https://armmbed.github.io/mbed-crypto/html/index.html) formats. ### PSA implementation in Mbed TLS Mbed TLS includes a reference implementation of the PSA Cryptography API. This implementation is not yet as mature as the rest of the library. Some parts of the code have not been reviewed as thoroughly, and some parts of the PSA implementation are not yet well optimized for code size. The X.509 and TLS code can use PSA cryptography for a limited subset of operations. To enable this support, activate the compilation option `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` in `config.h`. There are currently a few deviations where the library does not yet implement the latest version of the specification. Please refer to the [compliance issues on Github](https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/labels/compliance) for an up-to-date list. ### Upcoming features Future releases of this library will include: * A driver programming interface, which makes it possible to use hardware accelerators instead of the default software implementation for chosen algorithms. * Support for external keys to be stored and manipulated exclusively in a separate cryptoprocessor. * A configuration mechanism to compile only the algorithms you need for your application. * A wider set of cryptographic algorithms. License ------- Unless specifically indicated otherwise in a file, Mbed TLS files are provided under the [Apache-2.0](https://spdx.org/licenses/Apache-2.0.html) license. See the [LICENSE](LICENSE) file for the full text of this license. Contributors must accept that their contributions are made under both the Apache-2.0 AND [GPL-2.0-or-later](https://spdx.org/licenses/GPL-2.0-or-later.html) licenses. This enables LTS (Long Term Support) branches of the software to be provided under either the Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later licenses. Contributing ------------ We gratefully accept bug reports and contributions from the community. Please see the [contributing guidelines](CONTRIBUTING.md) for details on how to do this. usr/doc/mbedtls-2.25.0/dco.txt0000644000000000000000000000261513764415275014636 0ustar rootrootDeveloper Certificate of Origin Version 1.1 Copyright (C) 2004, 2006 The Linux Foundation and its contributors. 1 Letterman Drive Suite D4700 San Francisco, CA, 94129 Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies of this license document, but changing it is not allowed. Developer's Certificate of Origin 1.1 By making a contribution to this project, I certify that: (a) The contribution was created in whole or in part by me and I have the right to submit it under the open source license indicated in the file; or (b) The contribution is based upon previous work that, to the best of my knowledge, is covered under an appropriate open source license and I have the right under that license to submit that work with modifications, whether created in whole or in part by me, under the same open source license (unless I am permitted to submit under a different license), as indicated in the file; or (c) The contribution was provided directly to me by some other person who certified (a), (b) or (c) and I have not modified it. (d) I understand and agree that this project and the contribution are public and that a record of the contribution (including all personal information I submit with it, including my sign-off) is maintained indefinitely and may be redistributed consistent with this project or the open source license(s) involved. usr/doc/mbedtls-2.25.0/mbedtls.SlackBuild0000644000000000000000000001764713776116122016724 0ustar rootroot#!/bin/sh # $Id: mbedtls.SlackBuild,v 1.1 2020/10/06 19:26:54 root Exp root $ # Copyright 2020, 2021 Eric Hameleers, Eindhoven, NL # All rights reserved. # # Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for # any purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that # the above copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all # copies. # # THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED # WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF # MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. # IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS AND COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND THEIR # CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, # SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT # LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF # USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND # ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, # OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT # OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF # SUCH DAMAGE. # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- # # Slackware SlackBuild script # =========================== # By: Eric Hameleers # For: mbedtls # Descr: cryptographic C library with small footprint # URL: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/projects/mbed-tls/ # Build needs: # Needs: # Changelog: # 2.24.0-1: 05/Oct/2020 by Eric Hameleers # * Initial build. # 2.25.0-1: 08/jan/2021 by Eric Hameleers # * Initial build. # # Run 'sh mbedtls.SlackBuild' to build a Slackware package. # The package (.t?z) and .txt file as well as build logs are created in /tmp . # Install the package using 'installpkg' or 'upgradepkg --install-new'. # # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- PRGNAM=mbedtls VERSION=${VERSION:-2.25.0} BUILD=${BUILD:-1} NUMJOBS=${NUMJOBS:-" -j$(nproc) "} TAG=${TAG:-alien} DOCS="CONTRIBUTING.md ChangeLog LICENSE README.md dco.txt" # Where do we look for sources? SRCDIR=$(cd $(dirname $0); pwd) # Place to build (TMP) package (PKG) and output (OUTPUT) the program: TMP=${TMP:-/tmp/build} PKG=$TMP/package-$PRGNAM OUTPUT=${OUTPUT:-/tmp} SOURCE="$SRCDIR/${PRGNAM}-${VERSION}.tar.gz" SRCURL="https://github.com/ARMmbed/${PRGNAM}/archive/v${VERSION}.tar.gz" ## ## --- with a little luck, you won't have to edit below this point --- ## ## # Automatically determine the architecture we're building on: if [ -z "$ARCH" ]; then case "$(uname -m)" in i?86) ARCH=i586 ;; arm*) readelf /usr/bin/file -A | egrep -q "Tag_CPU.*[4,5]" && ARCH=arm || ARCH=armv7hl ;; # Unless $ARCH is already set, use uname -m for all other archs: *) ARCH=$(uname -m) ;; esac export ARCH fi # Set CFLAGS/CXXFLAGS and LIBDIRSUFFIX: case "$ARCH" in i?86) SLKCFLAGS="-O2 -march=${ARCH} -mtune=i686" SLKLDFLAGS=""; LIBDIRSUFFIX="" ;; x86_64) SLKCFLAGS="-O2 -fPIC" SLKLDFLAGS="-L/usr/lib64"; LIBDIRSUFFIX="64" ;; armv7hl) SLKCFLAGS="-O2 -march=armv7-a -mfpu=vfpv3-d16" SLKLDFLAGS=""; LIBDIRSUFFIX="" ;; *) SLKCFLAGS=${SLKCFLAGS:-"-O2"} SLKLDFLAGS=${SLKLDFLAGS:-""}; LIBDIRSUFFIX=${LIBDIRSUFFIX:-""} ;; esac case "$ARCH" in arm*) TARGET=$ARCH-slackware-linux-gnueabi ;; *) TARGET=$ARCH-slackware-linux ;; esac # Exit the script on errors: set -e trap 'echo "$0 FAILED at line ${LINENO}" | tee $OUTPUT/error-${PRGNAM}.log' ERR # Catch unitialized variables: set -u P1=${1:-1} # Save old umask and set to 0022: _UMASK_=$(umask) umask 0022 # Create working directories: mkdir -p $OUTPUT # place for the package to be saved mkdir -p $TMP/tmp-$PRGNAM # location to build the source mkdir -p $PKG # place for the package to be built rm -rf $PKG/* # always erase old package's contents rm -rf $TMP/tmp-$PRGNAM/* # remove the remnants of previous build rm -rf $OUTPUT/{checkout,configure,make,install,error,makepkg,patch}-$PRGNAM.log # remove old log files # Source file availability: if ! [ -f ${SOURCE} ]; then echo "Source '$(basename ${SOURCE})' not available yet..." # Check if the $SRCDIR is writable at all - if not, download to $OUTPUT [ -w "$SRCDIR" ] || SOURCE="$OUTPUT/$(basename $SOURCE)" if [ -f ${SOURCE} ]; then echo "Ah, found it!"; continue; fi if ! [ "x${SRCURL}" == "x" ]; then echo "Will download file to $(dirname $SOURCE)" wget --no-check-certificate -nv -T 20 -O "${SOURCE}" "${SRCURL}" || true if [ $? -ne 0 -o ! -s "${SOURCE}" ]; then echo "Downloading '$(basename ${SOURCE})' failed... aborting the build." mv -f "${SOURCE}" "${SOURCE}".FAIL exit 1 fi else echo "File '$(basename ${SOURCE})' not available... aborting the build." exit 1 fi fi if [ "$P1" == "--download" ]; then echo "Download complete." exit 0 fi # --- PACKAGE BUILDING --- echo "++" echo "|| $PRGNAM-$VERSION" echo "++" cd $TMP/tmp-$PRGNAM echo "Extracting the source archive(s) for $PRGNAM..." tar -xvf ${SOURCE} cd ${PRGNAM}-${VERSION} # Enable those features in the header files that we want to use, sed -i 's|//\(#define MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT\)|\1|' include/mbedtls/config.h sed -i 's|//\(#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_C\)|\1|' include/mbedtls/config.h sed -i 's|//\(#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD\)|\1|' include/mbedtls/config.h # Use temporary Arch Linux fix for incompatibilities with GCC 10, # which surfaced when I enabled threading above: sed -i 's/thread_id, -ret/thread_id, (unsigned int)(-ret)/' programs/ssl/ssl_pthread_server.c sed -i 's/thread_id, ret/thread_id, (unsigned int)ret/' programs/ssl/ssl_pthread_server.c sed -i 's/ -ret );/ (unsigned int)(-ret) );/' programs/ssl/ssl_pthread_server.c sed -i 's/ -ret, error_buf/ (unsigned int)(-ret), error_buf/' programs/ssl/ssl_pthread_server.c sed -i 's/04x\\n", ret /04x\\n", (unsigned int)ret /' programs/ssl/ssl_pthread_server.c chown -R root:root . chmod -R u+w,go+r-w,a+rX-st . echo Building ... mkdir -p build-${PRGNAM} cd build-${PRGNAM} cmake \ -DCMAKE_C_FLAGS:STRING="$SLKCFLAGS" \ -DCMAKE_CXX_FLAGS:STRING="$SLKCFLAGS" \ -DCMAKE_C_FLAGS_RELEASE:STRING="$SLKCFLAGS" \ -DCMAKE_CXX_FLAGS_RELEASE:STRING="$SLKCFLAGS" \ -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release \ -DCMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX=/usr \ -DLIB_INSTALL_DIR=lib${LIBDIRSUFFIX} \ -DUSE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY=ON \ -DENABLE_TESTING=OFF \ -DENABLE_ZLIB_SUPPORT=ON \ .. make $NUMJOBS 2>&1 | tee $OUTPUT/make-${PRGNAM}.log make DESTDIR=$PKG install 2>&1 | tee $OUTPUT/install-${PRGNAM}.log cd - # Several program names clash with coreutils, so we prefix them all: cd ${PKG}/usr/bin for MBEDPRG in * ; do mv ${MBEDPRG} ${PRGNAM}-${MBEDPRG} done cd - 1>/dev/null # Add documentation: mkdir -p $PKG/usr/doc/$PRGNAM-$VERSION cp -a $DOCS $PKG/usr/doc/$PRGNAM-$VERSION || true cat $SRCDIR/$(basename $0) > $PKG/usr/doc/$PRGNAM-$VERSION/$PRGNAM.SlackBuild chown -R root:root $PKG/usr/doc/$PRGNAM-$VERSION find $PKG/usr/doc -type f -exec chmod 644 {} \; # Strip binaries (if any): find $PKG | xargs file | grep -e "executable" -e "shared object" | grep ELF \ | cut -f 1 -d : | xargs strip --strip-unneeded 2> /dev/null || true # Add a package description: mkdir -p $PKG/install cat $SRCDIR/slack-desc > $PKG/install/slack-desc # Build the package: cd $PKG makepkg --linkadd y --chown n $OUTPUT/${PRGNAM}-${VERSION}-${ARCH}-${BUILD}${TAG}.${PKGTYPE:-tgz} 2>&1 | tee $OUTPUT/makepkg-${PRGNAM}.log cd $OUTPUT md5sum ${PRGNAM}-${VERSION}-${ARCH}-${BUILD}${TAG}.${PKGTYPE:-tgz} > ${PRGNAM}-${VERSION}-${ARCH}-${BUILD}${TAG}.${PKGTYPE:-tgz}.md5 cd - cat $PKG/install/slack-desc | grep "^${PRGNAM}" > $OUTPUT/${PRGNAM}-${VERSION}-${ARCH}-${BUILD}${TAG}.txt # Restore the original umask: umask ${_UMASK_} usr/include/0000755000000000000000000000000013776116122012016 5ustar rootrootusr/include/mbedtls/0000755000000000000000000000000013776116122013450 5ustar rootrootusr/include/mbedtls/aes.h0000644000000000000000000007124213764415275014407 0ustar rootroot/** * \file aes.h * * \brief This file contains AES definitions and functions. * * The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) specifies a FIPS-approved * cryptographic algorithm that can be used to protect electronic * data. * * The AES algorithm is a symmetric block cipher that can * encrypt and decrypt information. For more information, see * FIPS Publication 197: Advanced Encryption Standard and * ISO/IEC 18033-2:2006: Information technology -- Security * techniques -- Encryption algorithms -- Part 2: Asymmetric * ciphers. * * The AES-XTS block mode is standardized by NIST SP 800-38E * * and described in detail by IEEE P1619 * . */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_AES_H #define MBEDTLS_AES_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include #include /* padlock.c and aesni.c rely on these values! */ #define MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT 1 /**< AES encryption. */ #define MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT 0 /**< AES decryption. */ /* Error codes in range 0x0020-0x0022 */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH -0x0020 /**< Invalid key length. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x0022 /**< Invalid data input length. */ /* Error codes in range 0x0021-0x0025 */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0021 /**< Invalid input data. */ /* MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is deprecated and should not be used. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x0023 /**< Feature not available. For example, an unsupported AES key size. */ /* MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0025 /**< AES hardware accelerator failed. */ #if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) #define inline __inline #endif #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ALT) // Regular implementation // /** * \brief The AES context-type definition. */ typedef struct mbedtls_aes_context { int nr; /*!< The number of rounds. */ uint32_t *rk; /*!< AES round keys. */ uint32_t buf[68]; /*!< Unaligned data buffer. This buffer can hold 32 extra Bytes, which can be used for one of the following purposes:
  • Alignment if VIA padlock is used.
  • Simplifying key expansion in the 256-bit case by generating an extra round key.
*/ } mbedtls_aes_context; #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) /** * \brief The AES XTS context-type definition. */ typedef struct mbedtls_aes_xts_context { mbedtls_aes_context crypt; /*!< The AES context to use for AES block encryption or decryption. */ mbedtls_aes_context tweak; /*!< The AES context used for tweak computation. */ } mbedtls_aes_xts_context; #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ #else /* MBEDTLS_AES_ALT */ #include "aes_alt.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ALT */ /** * \brief This function initializes the specified AES context. * * It must be the first API called before using * the context. * * \param ctx The AES context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_aes_init( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx ); /** * \brief This function releases and clears the specified AES context. * * \param ctx The AES context to clear. * If this is \c NULL, this function does nothing. * Otherwise, the context must have been at least initialized. */ void mbedtls_aes_free( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) /** * \brief This function initializes the specified AES XTS context. * * It must be the first API called before using * the context. * * \param ctx The AES XTS context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_aes_xts_init( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx ); /** * \brief This function releases and clears the specified AES XTS context. * * \param ctx The AES XTS context to clear. * If this is \c NULL, this function does nothing. * Otherwise, the context must have been at least initialized. */ void mbedtls_aes_xts_free( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ /** * \brief This function sets the encryption key. * * \param ctx The AES context to which the key should be bound. * It must be initialized. * \param key The encryption key. * This must be a readable buffer of size \p keybits bits. * \param keybits The size of data passed in bits. Valid options are: *
  • 128 bits
    • *
  • 192 bits
    • *
  • 256 bits
* * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH on failure. */ int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits ); /** * \brief This function sets the decryption key. * * \param ctx The AES context to which the key should be bound. * It must be initialized. * \param key The decryption key. * This must be a readable buffer of size \p keybits bits. * \param keybits The size of data passed. Valid options are: *
  • 128 bits
    • *
  • 192 bits
    • *
  • 256 bits
* * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH on failure. */ int mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) /** * \brief This function prepares an XTS context for encryption and * sets the encryption key. * * \param ctx The AES XTS context to which the key should be bound. * It must be initialized. * \param key The encryption key. This is comprised of the XTS key1 * concatenated with the XTS key2. * This must be a readable buffer of size \p keybits bits. * \param keybits The size of \p key passed in bits. Valid options are: *
  • 256 bits (each of key1 and key2 is a 128-bit key)
    • *
  • 512 bits (each of key1 and key2 is a 256-bit key)
* * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH on failure. */ int mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits ); /** * \brief This function prepares an XTS context for decryption and * sets the decryption key. * * \param ctx The AES XTS context to which the key should be bound. * It must be initialized. * \param key The decryption key. This is comprised of the XTS key1 * concatenated with the XTS key2. * This must be a readable buffer of size \p keybits bits. * \param keybits The size of \p key passed in bits. Valid options are: *
  • 256 bits (each of key1 and key2 is a 128-bit key)
    • *
  • 512 bits (each of key1 and key2 is a 256-bit key)
* * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH on failure. */ int mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_dec( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ /** * \brief This function performs an AES single-block encryption or * decryption operation. * * It performs the operation defined in the \p mode parameter * (encrypt or decrypt), on the input data buffer defined in * the \p input parameter. * * mbedtls_aes_init(), and either mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc() or * mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec() must be called before the first * call to this API with the same context. * * \param ctx The AES context to use for encryption or decryption. * It must be initialized and bound to a key. * \param mode The AES operation: #MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or * #MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. * It must be readable and at least \c 16 Bytes long. * \param output The buffer where the output data will be written. * It must be writeable and at least \c 16 Bytes long. * \return \c 0 on success. */ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, int mode, const unsigned char input[16], unsigned char output[16] ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) /** * \brief This function performs an AES-CBC encryption or decryption operation * on full blocks. * * It performs the operation defined in the \p mode * parameter (encrypt/decrypt), on the input data buffer defined in * the \p input parameter. * * It can be called as many times as needed, until all the input * data is processed. mbedtls_aes_init(), and either * mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc() or mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec() must be called * before the first call to this API with the same context. * * \note This function operates on full blocks, that is, the input size * must be a multiple of the AES block size of \c 16 Bytes. * * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can * call the same function again on the next * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage. * If you need to retain the contents of the IV, you should * either save it manually or use the cipher module instead. * * * \param ctx The AES context to use for encryption or decryption. * It must be initialized and bound to a key. * \param mode The AES operation: #MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or * #MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT. * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. This must be a * multiple of the block size (\c 16 Bytes). * \param iv Initialization vector (updated after use). * It must be a readable and writeable buffer of \c 16 Bytes. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. * It must be readable and of size \p length Bytes. * \param output The buffer holding the output data. * It must be writeable and of size \p length Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH * on failure. */ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, unsigned char iv[16], const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) /** * \brief This function performs an AES-XTS encryption or decryption * operation for an entire XTS data unit. * * AES-XTS encrypts or decrypts blocks based on their location as * defined by a data unit number. The data unit number must be * provided by \p data_unit. * * NIST SP 800-38E limits the maximum size of a data unit to 2^20 * AES blocks. If the data unit is larger than this, this function * returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH. * * \param ctx The AES XTS context to use for AES XTS operations. * It must be initialized and bound to a key. * \param mode The AES operation: #MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or * #MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT. * \param length The length of a data unit in Bytes. This can be any * length between 16 bytes and 2^24 bytes inclusive * (between 1 and 2^20 block cipher blocks). * \param data_unit The address of the data unit encoded as an array of 16 * bytes in little-endian format. For disk encryption, this * is typically the index of the block device sector that * contains the data. * \param input The buffer holding the input data (which is an entire * data unit). This function reads \p length Bytes from \p * input. * \param output The buffer holding the output data (which is an entire * data unit). This function writes \p length Bytes to \p * output. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH if \p length is * smaller than an AES block in size (16 Bytes) or if \p * length is larger than 2^20 blocks (16 MiB). */ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, const unsigned char data_unit[16], const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) /** * \brief This function performs an AES-CFB128 encryption or decryption * operation. * * It performs the operation defined in the \p mode * parameter (encrypt or decrypt), on the input data buffer * defined in the \p input parameter. * * For CFB, you must set up the context with mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(), * regardless of whether you are performing an encryption or decryption * operation, that is, regardless of the \p mode parameter. This is * because CFB mode uses the same key schedule for encryption and * decryption. * * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can * call the same function again on the next * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage. * If you need to retain the contents of the * IV, you must either save it manually or use the cipher * module instead. * * * \param ctx The AES context to use for encryption or decryption. * It must be initialized and bound to a key. * \param mode The AES operation: #MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or * #MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT. * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. * \param iv_off The offset in IV (updated after use). * It must point to a valid \c size_t. * \param iv The initialization vector (updated after use). * It must be a readable and writeable buffer of \c 16 Bytes. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. * It must be readable and of size \p length Bytes. * \param output The buffer holding the output data. * It must be writeable and of size \p length Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. */ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, size_t *iv_off, unsigned char iv[16], const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); /** * \brief This function performs an AES-CFB8 encryption or decryption * operation. * * It performs the operation defined in the \p mode * parameter (encrypt/decrypt), on the input data buffer defined * in the \p input parameter. * * Due to the nature of CFB, you must use the same key schedule for * both encryption and decryption operations. Therefore, you must * use the context initialized with mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc() for * both #MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT and #MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT. * * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can * call the same function again on the next * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage. * If you need to retain the contents of the * IV, you should either save it manually or use the cipher * module instead. * * * \param ctx The AES context to use for encryption or decryption. * It must be initialized and bound to a key. * \param mode The AES operation: #MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or * #MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT * \param length The length of the input data. * \param iv The initialization vector (updated after use). * It must be a readable and writeable buffer of \c 16 Bytes. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. * It must be readable and of size \p length Bytes. * \param output The buffer holding the output data. * It must be writeable and of size \p length Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. */ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb8( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, unsigned char iv[16], const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); #endif /*MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) /** * \brief This function performs an AES-OFB (Output Feedback Mode) * encryption or decryption operation. * * For OFB, you must set up the context with * mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(), regardless of whether you are * performing an encryption or decryption operation. This is * because OFB mode uses the same key schedule for encryption and * decryption. * * The OFB operation is identical for encryption or decryption, * therefore no operation mode needs to be specified. * * \note Upon exit, the content of iv, the Initialisation Vector, is * updated so that you can call the same function again on the next * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was encrypted * in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage, by initialising * iv_off to 0 before the first call, and preserving its value * between calls. * * For non-streaming use, the iv should be initialised on each call * to a unique value, and iv_off set to 0 on each call. * * If you need to retain the contents of the initialisation vector, * you must either save it manually or use the cipher module * instead. * * \warning For the OFB mode, the initialisation vector must be unique * every encryption operation. Reuse of an initialisation vector * will compromise security. * * \param ctx The AES context to use for encryption or decryption. * It must be initialized and bound to a key. * \param length The length of the input data. * \param iv_off The offset in IV (updated after use). * It must point to a valid \c size_t. * \param iv The initialization vector (updated after use). * It must be a readable and writeable buffer of \c 16 Bytes. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. * It must be readable and of size \p length Bytes. * \param output The buffer holding the output data. * It must be writeable and of size \p length Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. */ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ofb( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, size_t length, size_t *iv_off, unsigned char iv[16], const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) /** * \brief This function performs an AES-CTR encryption or decryption * operation. * * This function performs the operation defined in the \p mode * parameter (encrypt/decrypt), on the input data buffer * defined in the \p input parameter. * * Due to the nature of CTR, you must use the same key schedule * for both encryption and decryption operations. Therefore, you * must use the context initialized with mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc() * for both #MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT and #MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT. * * \warning You must never reuse a nonce value with the same key. Doing so * would void the encryption for the two messages encrypted with * the same nonce and key. * * There are two common strategies for managing nonces with CTR: * * 1. You can handle everything as a single message processed over * successive calls to this function. In that case, you want to * set \p nonce_counter and \p nc_off to 0 for the first call, and * then preserve the values of \p nonce_counter, \p nc_off and \p * stream_block across calls to this function as they will be * updated by this function. * * With this strategy, you must not encrypt more than 2**128 * blocks of data with the same key. * * 2. You can encrypt separate messages by dividing the \p * nonce_counter buffer in two areas: the first one used for a * per-message nonce, handled by yourself, and the second one * updated by this function internally. * * For example, you might reserve the first 12 bytes for the * per-message nonce, and the last 4 bytes for internal use. In that * case, before calling this function on a new message you need to * set the first 12 bytes of \p nonce_counter to your chosen nonce * value, the last 4 to 0, and \p nc_off to 0 (which will cause \p * stream_block to be ignored). That way, you can encrypt at most * 2**96 messages of up to 2**32 blocks each with the same key. * * The per-message nonce (or information sufficient to reconstruct * it) needs to be communicated with the ciphertext and must be unique. * The recommended way to ensure uniqueness is to use a message * counter. An alternative is to generate random nonces, but this * limits the number of messages that can be securely encrypted: * for example, with 96-bit random nonces, you should not encrypt * more than 2**32 messages with the same key. * * Note that for both stategies, sizes are measured in blocks and * that an AES block is 16 bytes. * * \warning Upon return, \p stream_block contains sensitive data. Its * content must not be written to insecure storage and should be * securely discarded as soon as it's no longer needed. * * \param ctx The AES context to use for encryption or decryption. * It must be initialized and bound to a key. * \param length The length of the input data. * \param nc_off The offset in the current \p stream_block, for * resuming within the current cipher stream. The * offset pointer should be 0 at the start of a stream. * It must point to a valid \c size_t. * \param nonce_counter The 128-bit nonce and counter. * It must be a readable-writeable buffer of \c 16 Bytes. * \param stream_block The saved stream block for resuming. This is * overwritten by the function. * It must be a readable-writeable buffer of \c 16 Bytes. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. * It must be readable and of size \p length Bytes. * \param output The buffer holding the output data. * It must be writeable and of size \p length Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. */ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, size_t length, size_t *nc_off, unsigned char nonce_counter[16], unsigned char stream_block[16], const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ /** * \brief Internal AES block encryption function. This is only * exposed to allow overriding it using * \c MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT. * * \param ctx The AES context to use for encryption. * \param input The plaintext block. * \param output The output (ciphertext) block. * * \return \c 0 on success. */ int mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char input[16], unsigned char output[16] ); /** * \brief Internal AES block decryption function. This is only * exposed to allow overriding it using see * \c MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT. * * \param ctx The AES context to use for decryption. * \param input The ciphertext block. * \param output The output (plaintext) block. * * \return \c 0 on success. */ int mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char input[16], unsigned char output[16] ); #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) #else #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /** * \brief Deprecated internal AES block encryption function * without return value. * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt() * * \param ctx The AES context to use for encryption. * \param input Plaintext block. * \param output Output (ciphertext) block. */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char input[16], unsigned char output[16] ); /** * \brief Deprecated internal AES block decryption function * without return value. * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt() * * \param ctx The AES context to use for decryption. * \param input Ciphertext block. * \param output Output (plaintext) block. */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char input[16], unsigned char output[16] ); #undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** * \brief Checkup routine. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return \c 1 on failure. */ int mbedtls_aes_self_test( int verbose ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* aes.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/aesni.h0000644000000000000000000001062113764415275014730 0ustar rootroot/** * \file aesni.h * * \brief AES-NI for hardware AES acceleration on some Intel processors * * \warning These functions are only for internal use by other library * functions; you must not call them directly. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_AESNI_H #define MBEDTLS_AESNI_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include "mbedtls/aes.h" #define MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES 0x02000000u #define MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL 0x00000002u #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && defined(__GNUC__) && \ ( defined(__amd64__) || defined(__x86_64__) ) && \ ! defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64) #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64 #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64) #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /** * \brief Internal function to detect the AES-NI feature in CPUs. * * \note This function is only for internal use by other library * functions; you must not call it directly. * * \param what The feature to detect * (MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES or MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL) * * \return 1 if CPU has support for the feature, 0 otherwise */ int mbedtls_aesni_has_support( unsigned int what ); /** * \brief Internal AES-NI AES-ECB block encryption and decryption * * \note This function is only for internal use by other library * functions; you must not call it directly. * * \param ctx AES context * \param mode MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT * \param input 16-byte input block * \param output 16-byte output block * * \return 0 on success (cannot fail) */ int mbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, int mode, const unsigned char input[16], unsigned char output[16] ); /** * \brief Internal GCM multiplication: c = a * b in GF(2^128) * * \note This function is only for internal use by other library * functions; you must not call it directly. * * \param c Result * \param a First operand * \param b Second operand * * \note Both operands and result are bit strings interpreted as * elements of GF(2^128) as per the GCM spec. */ void mbedtls_aesni_gcm_mult( unsigned char c[16], const unsigned char a[16], const unsigned char b[16] ); /** * \brief Internal round key inversion. This function computes * decryption round keys from the encryption round keys. * * \note This function is only for internal use by other library * functions; you must not call it directly. * * \param invkey Round keys for the equivalent inverse cipher * \param fwdkey Original round keys (for encryption) * \param nr Number of rounds (that is, number of round keys minus one) */ void mbedtls_aesni_inverse_key( unsigned char *invkey, const unsigned char *fwdkey, int nr ); /** * \brief Internal key expansion for encryption * * \note This function is only for internal use by other library * functions; you must not call it directly. * * \param rk Destination buffer where the round keys are written * \param key Encryption key * \param bits Key size in bits (must be 128, 192 or 256) * * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH */ int mbedtls_aesni_setkey_enc( unsigned char *rk, const unsigned char *key, size_t bits ); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_H */ usr/include/mbedtls/arc4.h0000644000000000000000000000772713764415275014477 0ustar rootroot/** * \file arc4.h * * \brief The ARCFOUR stream cipher * * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers instead. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. * */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ARC4_H #define MBEDTLS_ARC4_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include /* MBEDTLS_ERR_ARC4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARC4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0019 /**< ARC4 hardware accelerator failed. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT) // Regular implementation // /** * \brief ARC4 context structure * * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers instead. * */ typedef struct mbedtls_arc4_context { int x; /*!< permutation index */ int y; /*!< permutation index */ unsigned char m[256]; /*!< permutation table */ } mbedtls_arc4_context; #else /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT */ #include "arc4_alt.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT */ /** * \brief Initialize ARC4 context * * \param ctx ARC4 context to be initialized * * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers * instead. * */ void mbedtls_arc4_init( mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx ); /** * \brief Clear ARC4 context * * \param ctx ARC4 context to be cleared * * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers * instead. * */ void mbedtls_arc4_free( mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx ); /** * \brief ARC4 key schedule * * \param ctx ARC4 context to be setup * \param key the secret key * \param keylen length of the key, in bytes * * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers * instead. * */ void mbedtls_arc4_setup( mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keylen ); /** * \brief ARC4 cipher function * * \param ctx ARC4 context * \param length length of the input data * \param input buffer holding the input data * \param output buffer for the output data * * \return 0 if successful * * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers * instead. * */ int mbedtls_arc4_crypt( mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** * \brief Checkup routine * * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed * * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers * instead. * */ int mbedtls_arc4_self_test( int verbose ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* arc4.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/aria.h0000644000000000000000000003757313764415275014564 0ustar rootroot/** * \file aria.h * * \brief ARIA block cipher * * The ARIA algorithm is a symmetric block cipher that can encrypt and * decrypt information. It is defined by the Korean Agency for * Technology and Standards (KATS) in KS X 1213:2004 (in * Korean, but see http://210.104.33.10/ARIA/index-e.html in English) * and also described by the IETF in RFC 5794. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ARIA_H #define MBEDTLS_ARIA_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include #include #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #define MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT 1 /**< ARIA encryption. */ #define MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT 0 /**< ARIA decryption. */ #define MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE 16 /**< ARIA block size in bytes. */ #define MBEDTLS_ARIA_MAX_ROUNDS 16 /**< Maxiumum number of rounds in ARIA. */ #define MBEDTLS_ARIA_MAX_KEYSIZE 32 /**< Maximum size of an ARIA key in bytes. */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT( -0x005C ) #endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x005C /**< Bad input data. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x005E /**< Invalid data input length. */ /* MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is deprecated and should not be used. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x005A /**< Feature not available. For example, an unsupported ARIA key size. */ /* MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0058 /**< ARIA hardware accelerator failed. */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT) // Regular implementation // #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /** * \brief The ARIA context-type definition. */ typedef struct mbedtls_aria_context { unsigned char nr; /*!< The number of rounds (12, 14 or 16) */ /*! The ARIA round keys. */ uint32_t rk[MBEDTLS_ARIA_MAX_ROUNDS + 1][MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE / 4]; } mbedtls_aria_context; #else /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT */ #include "aria_alt.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT */ /** * \brief This function initializes the specified ARIA context. * * It must be the first API called before using * the context. * * \param ctx The ARIA context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_aria_init( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx ); /** * \brief This function releases and clears the specified ARIA context. * * \param ctx The ARIA context to clear. This may be \c NULL, in which * case this function returns immediately. If it is not \c NULL, * it must point to an initialized ARIA context. */ void mbedtls_aria_free( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx ); /** * \brief This function sets the encryption key. * * \param ctx The ARIA context to which the key should be bound. * This must be initialized. * \param key The encryption key. This must be a readable buffer * of size \p keybits Bits. * \param keybits The size of \p key in Bits. Valid options are: *
  • 128 bits
    • *
  • 192 bits
    • *
  • 256 bits
* * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits ); /** * \brief This function sets the decryption key. * * \param ctx The ARIA context to which the key should be bound. * This must be initialized. * \param key The decryption key. This must be a readable buffer * of size \p keybits Bits. * \param keybits The size of data passed. Valid options are: *
  • 128 bits
    • *
  • 192 bits
    • *
  • 256 bits
* * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits ); /** * \brief This function performs an ARIA single-block encryption or * decryption operation. * * It performs encryption or decryption (depending on whether * the key was set for encryption on decryption) on the input * data buffer defined in the \p input parameter. * * mbedtls_aria_init(), and either mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc() or * mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec() must be called before the first * call to this API with the same context. * * \param ctx The ARIA context to use for encryption or decryption. * This must be initialized and bound to a key. * \param input The 16-Byte buffer holding the input data. * \param output The 16-Byte buffer holding the output data. * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, const unsigned char input[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE], unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE] ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) /** * \brief This function performs an ARIA-CBC encryption or decryption operation * on full blocks. * * It performs the operation defined in the \p mode * parameter (encrypt/decrypt), on the input data buffer defined in * the \p input parameter. * * It can be called as many times as needed, until all the input * data is processed. mbedtls_aria_init(), and either * mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc() or mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec() must be called * before the first call to this API with the same context. * * \note This function operates on aligned blocks, that is, the input size * must be a multiple of the ARIA block size of 16 Bytes. * * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can * call the same function again on the next * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage. * If you need to retain the contents of the IV, you should * either save it manually or use the cipher module instead. * * * \param ctx The ARIA context to use for encryption or decryption. * This must be initialized and bound to a key. * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either * #MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT for encryption, or * #MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT for decryption. * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. This must be a * multiple of the block size (16 Bytes). * \param iv Initialization vector (updated after use). * This must be a readable buffer of size 16 Bytes. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must * be a readable buffer of length \p length Bytes. * \param output The buffer holding the output data. This must * be a writable buffer of length \p length Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE], const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) /** * \brief This function performs an ARIA-CFB128 encryption or decryption * operation. * * It performs the operation defined in the \p mode * parameter (encrypt or decrypt), on the input data buffer * defined in the \p input parameter. * * For CFB, you must set up the context with mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc(), * regardless of whether you are performing an encryption or decryption * operation, that is, regardless of the \p mode parameter. This is * because CFB mode uses the same key schedule for encryption and * decryption. * * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can * call the same function again on the next * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage. * If you need to retain the contents of the * IV, you must either save it manually or use the cipher * module instead. * * * \param ctx The ARIA context to use for encryption or decryption. * This must be initialized and bound to a key. * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either * #MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT for encryption, or * #MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT for decryption. * \param length The length of the input data \p input in Bytes. * \param iv_off The offset in IV (updated after use). * This must not be larger than 15. * \param iv The initialization vector (updated after use). * This must be a readable buffer of size 16 Bytes. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must * be a readable buffer of length \p length Bytes. * \param output The buffer holding the output data. This must * be a writable buffer of length \p length Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_cfb128( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, size_t *iv_off, unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE], const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) /** * \brief This function performs an ARIA-CTR encryption or decryption * operation. * * This function performs the operation defined in the \p mode * parameter (encrypt/decrypt), on the input data buffer * defined in the \p input parameter. * * Due to the nature of CTR, you must use the same key schedule * for both encryption and decryption operations. Therefore, you * must use the context initialized with mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc() * for both #MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT and #MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT. * * \warning You must never reuse a nonce value with the same key. Doing so * would void the encryption for the two messages encrypted with * the same nonce and key. * * There are two common strategies for managing nonces with CTR: * * 1. You can handle everything as a single message processed over * successive calls to this function. In that case, you want to * set \p nonce_counter and \p nc_off to 0 for the first call, and * then preserve the values of \p nonce_counter, \p nc_off and \p * stream_block across calls to this function as they will be * updated by this function. * * With this strategy, you must not encrypt more than 2**128 * blocks of data with the same key. * * 2. You can encrypt separate messages by dividing the \p * nonce_counter buffer in two areas: the first one used for a * per-message nonce, handled by yourself, and the second one * updated by this function internally. * * For example, you might reserve the first 12 bytes for the * per-message nonce, and the last 4 bytes for internal use. In that * case, before calling this function on a new message you need to * set the first 12 bytes of \p nonce_counter to your chosen nonce * value, the last 4 to 0, and \p nc_off to 0 (which will cause \p * stream_block to be ignored). That way, you can encrypt at most * 2**96 messages of up to 2**32 blocks each with the same key. * * The per-message nonce (or information sufficient to reconstruct * it) needs to be communicated with the ciphertext and must be unique. * The recommended way to ensure uniqueness is to use a message * counter. An alternative is to generate random nonces, but this * limits the number of messages that can be securely encrypted: * for example, with 96-bit random nonces, you should not encrypt * more than 2**32 messages with the same key. * * Note that for both stategies, sizes are measured in blocks and * that an ARIA block is 16 bytes. * * \warning Upon return, \p stream_block contains sensitive data. Its * content must not be written to insecure storage and should be * securely discarded as soon as it's no longer needed. * * \param ctx The ARIA context to use for encryption or decryption. * This must be initialized and bound to a key. * \param length The length of the input data \p input in Bytes. * \param nc_off The offset in Bytes in the current \p stream_block, * for resuming within the current cipher stream. The * offset pointer should be \c 0 at the start of a * stream. This must not be larger than \c 15 Bytes. * \param nonce_counter The 128-bit nonce and counter. This must point to * a read/write buffer of length \c 16 bytes. * \param stream_block The saved stream block for resuming. This must * point to a read/write buffer of length \c 16 bytes. * This is overwritten by the function. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must * be a readable buffer of length \p length Bytes. * \param output The buffer holding the output data. This must * be a writable buffer of length \p length Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_ctr( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, size_t length, size_t *nc_off, unsigned char nonce_counter[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE], unsigned char stream_block[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE], const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** * \brief Checkup routine. * * \return \c 0 on success, or \c 1 on failure. */ int mbedtls_aria_self_test( int verbose ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* aria.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/asn1.h0000644000000000000000000006311513764415275014501 0ustar rootroot/** * \file asn1.h * * \brief Generic ASN.1 parsing */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ASN1_H #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) #include "mbedtls/bignum.h" #endif /** * \addtogroup asn1_module * \{ */ /** * \name ASN1 Error codes * These error codes are OR'ed to X509 error codes for * higher error granularity. * ASN1 is a standard to specify data structures. * \{ */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA -0x0060 /**< Out of data when parsing an ASN1 data structure. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG -0x0062 /**< ASN1 tag was of an unexpected value. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH -0x0064 /**< Error when trying to determine the length or invalid length. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH -0x0066 /**< Actual length differs from expected length. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA -0x0068 /**< Data is invalid. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED -0x006A /**< Memory allocation failed */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL -0x006C /**< Buffer too small when writing ASN.1 data structure. */ /* \} name */ /** * \name DER constants * These constants comply with the DER encoded ASN.1 type tags. * DER encoding uses hexadecimal representation. * An example DER sequence is:\n * - 0x02 -- tag indicating INTEGER * - 0x01 -- length in octets * - 0x05 -- value * Such sequences are typically read into \c ::mbedtls_x509_buf. * \{ */ #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_BOOLEAN 0x01 #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER 0x02 #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING 0x03 #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING 0x04 #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL 0x05 #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID 0x06 #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_ENUMERATED 0x0A #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING 0x0C #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE 0x10 #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET 0x11 #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING 0x13 #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_T61_STRING 0x14 #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING 0x16 #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME 0x17 #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME 0x18 #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_STRING 0x1C #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_BMP_STRING 0x1E #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRIMITIVE 0x00 #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED 0x20 #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC 0x80 /* Slightly smaller way to check if tag is a string tag * compared to canonical implementation. */ #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_IS_STRING_TAG( tag ) \ ( ( tag ) < 32u && ( \ ( ( 1u << ( tag ) ) & ( ( 1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_BMP_STRING ) | \ ( 1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING ) | \ ( 1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_T61_STRING ) | \ ( 1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING ) | \ ( 1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_STRING ) | \ ( 1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING ) | \ ( 1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING ) ) ) != 0 ) ) /* * Bit masks for each of the components of an ASN.1 tag as specified in * ITU X.690 (08/2015), section 8.1 "General rules for encoding", * paragraph 8.1.2.2: * * Bit 8 7 6 5 1 * +-------+-----+------------+ * | Class | P/C | Tag number | * +-------+-----+------------+ */ #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK 0xC0 #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_PC_MASK 0x20 #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK 0x1F /* \} name */ /* \} addtogroup asn1_module */ /** Returns the size of the binary string, without the trailing \\0 */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) - 1) /** * Compares an mbedtls_asn1_buf structure to a reference OID. * * Only works for 'defined' oid_str values (MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA1), you cannot use a * 'unsigned char *oid' here! */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(oid_str, oid_buf) \ ( ( MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(oid_str) != (oid_buf)->len ) || \ memcmp( (oid_str), (oid_buf)->p, (oid_buf)->len) != 0 ) #define MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(oid_str, oid_buf, oid_buf_len) \ ( ( MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(oid_str) != (oid_buf_len) ) || \ memcmp( (oid_str), (oid_buf), (oid_buf_len) ) != 0 ) #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /** * \name Functions to parse ASN.1 data structures * \{ */ /** * Type-length-value structure that allows for ASN1 using DER. */ typedef struct mbedtls_asn1_buf { int tag; /**< ASN1 type, e.g. MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING. */ size_t len; /**< ASN1 length, in octets. */ unsigned char *p; /**< ASN1 data, e.g. in ASCII. */ } mbedtls_asn1_buf; /** * Container for ASN1 bit strings. */ typedef struct mbedtls_asn1_bitstring { size_t len; /**< ASN1 length, in octets. */ unsigned char unused_bits; /**< Number of unused bits at the end of the string */ unsigned char *p; /**< Raw ASN1 data for the bit string */ } mbedtls_asn1_bitstring; /** * Container for a sequence of ASN.1 items */ typedef struct mbedtls_asn1_sequence { mbedtls_asn1_buf buf; /**< Buffer containing the given ASN.1 item. */ struct mbedtls_asn1_sequence *next; /**< The next entry in the sequence. */ } mbedtls_asn1_sequence; /** * Container for a sequence or list of 'named' ASN.1 data items */ typedef struct mbedtls_asn1_named_data { mbedtls_asn1_buf oid; /**< The object identifier. */ mbedtls_asn1_buf val; /**< The named value. */ struct mbedtls_asn1_named_data *next; /**< The next entry in the sequence. */ unsigned char next_merged; /**< Merge next item into the current one? */ } mbedtls_asn1_named_data; /** * \brief Get the length of an ASN.1 element. * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the length. * * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the first byte of the length, * i.e. immediately after the tag. * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte * after the length, i.e. the first byte of the content. * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. * \param end End of data. * \param len On successful completion, \c *len contains the length * read from the ASN.1 input. * * \return 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA if the ASN.1 element * would end beyond \p end. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH if the length is unparseable. */ int mbedtls_asn1_get_len( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, size_t *len ); /** * \brief Get the tag and length of the element. * Check for the requested tag. * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the tag and length. * * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element. * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte * after the length, i.e. the first byte of the content. * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. * \param end End of data. * \param len On successful completion, \c *len contains the length * read from the ASN.1 input. * \param tag The expected tag. * * \return 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG if the data does not start * with the requested tag. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA if the ASN.1 element * would end beyond \p end. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH if the length is unparseable. */ int mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, size_t *len, int tag ); /** * \brief Retrieve a boolean ASN.1 tag and its value. * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the full tag. * * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element. * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte * beyond the ASN.1 element. * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. * \param end End of data. * \param val On success, the parsed value (\c 0 or \c 1). * * \return 0 if successful. * \return An ASN.1 error code if the input does not start with * a valid ASN.1 BOOLEAN. */ int mbedtls_asn1_get_bool( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, int *val ); /** * \brief Retrieve an integer ASN.1 tag and its value. * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the full tag. * * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element. * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte * beyond the ASN.1 element. * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. * \param end End of data. * \param val On success, the parsed value. * * \return 0 if successful. * \return An ASN.1 error code if the input does not start with * a valid ASN.1 INTEGER. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH if the parsed value does * not fit in an \c int. */ int mbedtls_asn1_get_int( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, int *val ); /** * \brief Retrieve an enumerated ASN.1 tag and its value. * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the full tag. * * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element. * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte * beyond the ASN.1 element. * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. * \param end End of data. * \param val On success, the parsed value. * * \return 0 if successful. * \return An ASN.1 error code if the input does not start with * a valid ASN.1 ENUMERATED. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH if the parsed value does * not fit in an \c int. */ int mbedtls_asn1_get_enum( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, int *val ); /** * \brief Retrieve a bitstring ASN.1 tag and its value. * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the full tag. * * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element. * On successful completion, \c *p is equal to \p end. * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. * \param end End of data. * \param bs On success, ::mbedtls_asn1_bitstring information about * the parsed value. * * \return 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH if the input contains * extra data after a valid BIT STRING. * \return An ASN.1 error code if the input does not start with * a valid ASN.1 BIT STRING. */ int mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_asn1_bitstring *bs ); /** * \brief Retrieve a bitstring ASN.1 tag without unused bits and its * value. * Updates the pointer to the beginning of the bit/octet string. * * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element. * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte * of the content of the BIT STRING. * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. * \param end End of data. * \param len On success, \c *len is the length of the content in bytes. * * \return 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA if the input starts with * a valid BIT STRING with a nonzero number of unused bits. * \return An ASN.1 error code if the input does not start with * a valid ASN.1 BIT STRING. */ int mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, size_t *len ); /** * \brief Parses and splits an ASN.1 "SEQUENCE OF ". * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the full sequence tag. * * This function allocates memory for the sequence elements. You can free * the allocated memory with mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free(). * * \note On error, this function may return a partial list in \p cur. * You must set `cur->next = NULL` before calling this function! * Otherwise it is impossible to distinguish a previously non-null * pointer from a pointer to an object allocated by this function. * * \note If the sequence is empty, this function does not modify * \c *cur. If the sequence is valid and non-empty, this * function sets `cur->buf.tag` to \p tag. This allows * callers to distinguish between an empty sequence and * a one-element sequence. * * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element. * On successful completion, \c *p is equal to \p end. * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. * \param end End of data. * \param cur A ::mbedtls_asn1_sequence which this function fills. * When this function returns, \c *cur is the head of a linked * list. Each node in this list is allocated with * mbedtls_calloc() apart from \p cur itself, and should * therefore be freed with mbedtls_free(). * The list describes the content of the sequence. * The head of the list (i.e. \c *cur itself) describes the * first element, `*cur->next` describes the second element, etc. * For each element, `buf.tag == tag`, `buf.len` is the length * of the content of the content of the element, and `buf.p` * points to the first byte of the content (i.e. immediately * past the length of the element). * Note that list elements may be allocated even on error. * \param tag Each element of the sequence must have this tag. * * \return 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH if the input contains * extra data after a valid SEQUENCE OF \p tag. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG if the input starts with * an ASN.1 SEQUENCE in which an element has a tag that * is different from \p tag. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. * \return An ASN.1 error code if the input does not start with * a valid ASN.1 SEQUENCE. */ int mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur, int tag ); /** * \brief Free a heap-allocated linked list presentation of * an ASN.1 sequence, including the first element. * * There are two common ways to manage the memory used for the representation * of a parsed ASN.1 sequence: * - Allocate a head node `mbedtls_asn1_sequence *head` with mbedtls_calloc(). * Pass this node as the `cur` argument to mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of(). * When you have finished processing the sequence, * call mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free() on `head`. * - Allocate a head node `mbedtls_asn1_sequence *head` in any manner, * for example on the stack. Make sure that `head->next == NULL`. * Pass `head` as the `cur` argument to mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of(). * When you have finished processing the sequence, * call mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free() on `head->cur`, * then free `head` itself in the appropriate manner. * * \param seq The address of the first sequence component. This may * be \c NULL, in which case this functions returns * immediately. */ void mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free( mbedtls_asn1_sequence *seq ); /** * \brief Traverse an ASN.1 SEQUENCE container and * call a callback for each entry. * * This function checks that the input is a SEQUENCE of elements that * each have a "must" tag, and calls a callback function on the elements * that have a "may" tag. * * For example, to validate that the input is a SEQUENCE of `tag1` and call * `cb` on each element, use * ``` * mbedtls_asn1_traverse_sequence_of(&p, end, 0xff, tag1, 0, 0, cb, ctx); * ``` * * To validate that the input is a SEQUENCE of ANY and call `cb` on * each element, use * ``` * mbedtls_asn1_traverse_sequence_of(&p, end, 0, 0, 0, 0, cb, ctx); * ``` * * To validate that the input is a SEQUENCE of CHOICE {NULL, OCTET STRING} * and call `cb` on each element that is an OCTET STRING, use * ``` * mbedtls_asn1_traverse_sequence_of(&p, end, 0xfe, 0x04, 0xff, 0x04, cb, ctx); * ``` * * The callback is called on the elements with a "may" tag from left to * right. If the input is not a valid SEQUENCE of elements with a "must" tag, * the callback is called on the elements up to the leftmost point where * the input is invalid. * * \warning This function is still experimental and may change * at any time. * * \param p The address of the pointer to the beginning of * the ASN.1 SEQUENCE header. This is updated to * point to the end of the ASN.1 SEQUENCE container * on a successful invocation. * \param end The end of the ASN.1 SEQUENCE container. * \param tag_must_mask A mask to be applied to the ASN.1 tags found within * the SEQUENCE before comparing to \p tag_must_value. * \param tag_must_val The required value of each ASN.1 tag found in the * SEQUENCE, after masking with \p tag_must_mask. * Mismatching tags lead to an error. * For example, a value of \c 0 for both \p tag_must_mask * and \p tag_must_val means that every tag is allowed, * while a value of \c 0xFF for \p tag_must_mask means * that \p tag_must_val is the only allowed tag. * \param tag_may_mask A mask to be applied to the ASN.1 tags found within * the SEQUENCE before comparing to \p tag_may_value. * \param tag_may_val The desired value of each ASN.1 tag found in the * SEQUENCE, after masking with \p tag_may_mask. * Mismatching tags will be silently ignored. * For example, a value of \c 0 for \p tag_may_mask and * \p tag_may_val means that any tag will be considered, * while a value of \c 0xFF for \p tag_may_mask means * that all tags with value different from \p tag_may_val * will be ignored. * \param cb The callback to trigger for each component * in the ASN.1 SEQUENCE that matches \p tag_may_val. * The callback function is called with the following * parameters: * - \p ctx. * - The tag of the current element. * - A pointer to the start of the current element's * content inside the input. * - The length of the content of the current element. * If the callback returns a non-zero value, * the function stops immediately, * forwarding the callback's return value. * \param ctx The context to be passed to the callback \p cb. * * \return \c 0 if successful the entire ASN.1 SEQUENCE * was traversed without parsing or callback errors. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH if the input * contains extra data after a valid SEQUENCE * of elements with an accepted tag. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG if the input starts * with an ASN.1 SEQUENCE in which an element has a tag * that is not accepted. * \return An ASN.1 error code if the input does not start with * a valid ASN.1 SEQUENCE. * \return A non-zero error code forwarded from the callback * \p cb in case the latter returns a non-zero value. */ int mbedtls_asn1_traverse_sequence_of( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, unsigned char tag_must_mask, unsigned char tag_must_val, unsigned char tag_may_mask, unsigned char tag_may_val, int (*cb)( void *ctx, int tag, unsigned char* start, size_t len ), void *ctx ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) /** * \brief Retrieve an integer ASN.1 tag and its value. * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the full tag. * * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element. * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte * beyond the ASN.1 element. * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. * \param end End of data. * \param X On success, the parsed value. * * \return 0 if successful. * \return An ASN.1 error code if the input does not start with * a valid ASN.1 INTEGER. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH if the parsed value does * not fit in an \c int. * \return An MPI error code if the parsed value is too large. */ int mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_mpi *X ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ /** * \brief Retrieve an AlgorithmIdentifier ASN.1 sequence. * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the full * AlgorithmIdentifier. * * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element. * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte * beyond the AlgorithmIdentifier element. * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. * \param end End of data. * \param alg The buffer to receive the OID. * \param params The buffer to receive the parameters. * This is zeroized if there are no parameters. * * \return 0 if successful or a specific ASN.1 or MPI error code. */ int mbedtls_asn1_get_alg( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_asn1_buf *alg, mbedtls_asn1_buf *params ); /** * \brief Retrieve an AlgorithmIdentifier ASN.1 sequence with NULL or no * params. * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the full * AlgorithmIdentifier. * * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element. * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte * beyond the AlgorithmIdentifier element. * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. * \param end End of data. * \param alg The buffer to receive the OID. * * \return 0 if successful or a specific ASN.1 or MPI error code. */ int mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_asn1_buf *alg ); /** * \brief Find a specific named_data entry in a sequence or list based on * the OID. * * \param list The list to seek through * \param oid The OID to look for * \param len Size of the OID * * \return NULL if not found, or a pointer to the existing entry. */ mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data( mbedtls_asn1_named_data *list, const char *oid, size_t len ); /** * \brief Free a mbedtls_asn1_named_data entry * * \param entry The named data entry to free. * This function calls mbedtls_free() on * `entry->oid.p` and `entry->val.p`. */ void mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data( mbedtls_asn1_named_data *entry ); /** * \brief Free all entries in a mbedtls_asn1_named_data list. * * \param head Pointer to the head of the list of named data entries to free. * This function calls mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data() and * mbedtls_free() on each list element and * sets \c *head to \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head ); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* asn1.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/asn1write.h0000644000000000000000000003574613764415275015565 0ustar rootroot/** * \file asn1write.h * * \brief ASN.1 buffer writing functionality */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_H #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(g, f) \ do \ { \ if( ( ret = (f) ) < 0 ) \ return( ret ); \ else \ (g) += ret; \ } while( 0 ) #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /** * \brief Write a length field in ASN.1 format. * * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. * * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. * \param len The length value to write. * * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_asn1_write_len( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, size_t len ); /** * \brief Write an ASN.1 tag in ASN.1 format. * * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. * * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. * \param tag The tag to write. * * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, unsigned char tag ); /** * \brief Write raw buffer data. * * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. * * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. * \param buf The data buffer to write. * \param size The length of the data buffer. * * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, const unsigned char *buf, size_t size ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) /** * \brief Write a arbitrary-precision number (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER) * in ASN.1 format. * * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. * * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. * \param X The MPI to write. * It must be non-negative. * * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, const mbedtls_mpi *X ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ /** * \brief Write a NULL tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL) with zero data * in ASN.1 format. * * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. * * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. * * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_asn1_write_null( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start ); /** * \brief Write an OID tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID) and data * in ASN.1 format. * * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. * * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. * \param oid The OID to write. * \param oid_len The length of the OID. * * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_asn1_write_oid( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, const char *oid, size_t oid_len ); /** * \brief Write an AlgorithmIdentifier sequence in ASN.1 format. * * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. * * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. * \param oid The OID of the algorithm to write. * \param oid_len The length of the algorithm's OID. * \param par_len The length of the parameters, which must be already written. * If 0, NULL parameters are added * * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, const char *oid, size_t oid_len, size_t par_len ); /** * \brief Write a boolean tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_BOOLEAN) and value * in ASN.1 format. * * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. * * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. * \param boolean The boolean value to write, either \c 0 or \c 1. * * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_asn1_write_bool( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int boolean ); /** * \brief Write an int tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER) and value * in ASN.1 format. * * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. * * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. * \param val The integer value to write. * It must be non-negative. * * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_asn1_write_int( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int val ); /** * \brief Write an enum tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_ENUMERATED) and value * in ASN.1 format. * * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. * * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. * \param val The integer value to write. * * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_asn1_write_enum( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int val ); /** * \brief Write a string in ASN.1 format using a specific * string encoding tag. * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. * * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. * \param tag The string encoding tag to write, e.g. * #MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING. * \param text The string to write. * \param text_len The length of \p text in bytes (which might * be strictly larger than the number of characters). * * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int tag, const char *text, size_t text_len ); /** * \brief Write a string in ASN.1 format using the PrintableString * string encoding tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING). * * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. * * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. * \param text The string to write. * \param text_len The length of \p text in bytes (which might * be strictly larger than the number of characters). * * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_asn1_write_printable_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, const char *text, size_t text_len ); /** * \brief Write a UTF8 string in ASN.1 format using the UTF8String * string encoding tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING). * * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. * * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. * \param text The string to write. * \param text_len The length of \p text in bytes (which might * be strictly larger than the number of characters). * * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_asn1_write_utf8_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, const char *text, size_t text_len ); /** * \brief Write a string in ASN.1 format using the IA5String * string encoding tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING). * * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. * * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. * \param text The string to write. * \param text_len The length of \p text in bytes (which might * be strictly larger than the number of characters). * * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_asn1_write_ia5_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, const char *text, size_t text_len ); /** * \brief Write a bitstring tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING) and * value in ASN.1 format. * * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. * * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. * \param buf The bitstring to write. * \param bits The total number of bits in the bitstring. * * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, const unsigned char *buf, size_t bits ); /** * \brief This function writes a named bitstring tag * (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING) and value in ASN.1 format. * * As stated in RFC 5280 Appendix B, trailing zeroes are * omitted when encoding named bitstrings in DER. * * \note This function works backwards within the data buffer. * * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. * \param start The start of the buffer which is used for bounds-checking. * \param buf The bitstring to write. * \param bits The total number of bits in the bitstring. * * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, const unsigned char *buf, size_t bits ); /** * \brief Write an octet string tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING) * and value in ASN.1 format. * * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. * * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. * \param buf The buffer holding the data to write. * \param size The length of the data buffer \p buf. * * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, const unsigned char *buf, size_t size ); /** * \brief Create or find a specific named_data entry for writing in a * sequence or list based on the OID. If not already in there, * a new entry is added to the head of the list. * Warning: Destructive behaviour for the val data! * * \param list The pointer to the location of the head of the list to seek * through (will be updated in case of a new entry). * \param oid The OID to look for. * \param oid_len The size of the OID. * \param val The associated data to store. If this is \c NULL, * no data is copied to the new or existing buffer. * \param val_len The minimum length of the data buffer needed. * If this is 0, do not allocate a buffer for the associated * data. * If the OID was already present, enlarge, shrink or free * the existing buffer to fit \p val_len. * * \return A pointer to the new / existing entry on success. * \return \c NULL if if there was a memory allocation error. */ mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **list, const char *oid, size_t oid_len, const unsigned char *val, size_t val_len ); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_H */ usr/include/mbedtls/base64.h0000644000000000000000000000623013764415275014716 0ustar rootroot/** * \file base64.h * * \brief RFC 1521 base64 encoding/decoding */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_BASE64_H #define MBEDTLS_BASE64_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include #define MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x002A /**< Output buffer too small. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER -0x002C /**< Invalid character in input. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /** * \brief Encode a buffer into base64 format * * \param dst destination buffer * \param dlen size of the destination buffer * \param olen number of bytes written * \param src source buffer * \param slen amount of data to be encoded * * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. * *olen is always updated to reflect the amount * of data that has (or would have) been written. * If that length cannot be represented, then no data is * written to the buffer and *olen is set to the maximum * length representable as a size_t. * * \note Call this function with dlen = 0 to obtain the * required buffer size in *olen */ int mbedtls_base64_encode( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen, const unsigned char *src, size_t slen ); /** * \brief Decode a base64-formatted buffer * * \param dst destination buffer (can be NULL for checking size) * \param dlen size of the destination buffer * \param olen number of bytes written * \param src source buffer * \param slen amount of data to be decoded * * \return 0 if successful, MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, or * MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER if the input data is * not correct. *olen is always updated to reflect the amount * of data that has (or would have) been written. * * \note Call this function with *dst = NULL or dlen = 0 to obtain * the required buffer size in *olen */ int mbedtls_base64_decode( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen, const unsigned char *src, size_t slen ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** * \brief Checkup routine * * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed */ int mbedtls_base64_self_test( int verbose ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* base64.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/bignum.h0000644000000000000000000012376513764415275015130 0ustar rootroot/** * \file bignum.h * * \brief Multi-precision integer library */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_H #define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include #include #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) #include #endif #define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x0002 /**< An error occurred while reading from or writing to a file. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0004 /**< Bad input parameters to function. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_INVALID_CHARACTER -0x0006 /**< There is an invalid character in the digit string. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x0008 /**< The buffer is too small to write to. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE -0x000A /**< The input arguments are negative or result in illegal output. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO -0x000C /**< The input argument for division is zero, which is not allowed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE -0x000E /**< The input arguments are not acceptable. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED -0x0010 /**< Memory allocation failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(f) \ do \ { \ if( ( ret = (f) ) != 0 ) \ goto cleanup; \ } while( 0 ) /* * Maximum size MPIs are allowed to grow to in number of limbs. */ #define MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS 10000 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE) /* * Maximum window size used for modular exponentiation. Default: 6 * Minimum value: 1. Maximum value: 6. * * Result is an array of ( 2 ** MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE ) MPIs used * for the sliding window calculation. (So 64 by default) * * Reduction in size, reduces speed. */ #define MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE 6 /**< Maximum window size used. */ #endif /* !MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE) /* * Maximum size of MPIs allowed in bits and bytes for user-MPIs. * ( Default: 512 bytes => 4096 bits, Maximum tested: 2048 bytes => 16384 bits ) * * Note: Calculations can temporarily result in larger MPIs. So the number * of limbs required (MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS) is higher. */ #define MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE 1024 /**< Maximum number of bytes for usable MPIs. */ #endif /* !MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE */ #define MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS ( 8 * MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE ) /**< Maximum number of bits for usable MPIs. */ /* * When reading from files with mbedtls_mpi_read_file() and writing to files with * mbedtls_mpi_write_file() the buffer should have space * for a (short) label, the MPI (in the provided radix), the newline * characters and the '\0'. * * By default we assume at least a 10 char label, a minimum radix of 10 * (decimal) and a maximum of 4096 bit numbers (1234 decimal chars). * Autosized at compile time for at least a 10 char label, a minimum radix * of 10 (decimal) for a number of MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS size. * * This used to be statically sized to 1250 for a maximum of 4096 bit * numbers (1234 decimal chars). * * Calculate using the formula: * MBEDTLS_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE = ceil(MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS / ln(10) * ln(2)) + * LabelSize + 6 */ #define MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS_SCALE100 ( 100 * MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS ) #define MBEDTLS_LN_2_DIV_LN_10_SCALE100 332 #define MBEDTLS_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE ( ((MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS_SCALE100 + MBEDTLS_LN_2_DIV_LN_10_SCALE100 - 1) / MBEDTLS_LN_2_DIV_LN_10_SCALE100) + 10 + 6 ) /* * Define the base integer type, architecture-wise. * * 32 or 64-bit integer types can be forced regardless of the underlying * architecture by defining MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 or MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 * respectively and undefining MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM. * * Double-width integers (e.g. 128-bit in 64-bit architectures) can be * disabled by defining MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION. */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) #if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_M_AMD64) /* Always choose 64-bit when using MSC */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 #endif /* !MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 */ typedef int64_t mbedtls_mpi_sint; typedef uint64_t mbedtls_mpi_uint; #elif defined(__GNUC__) && ( \ defined(__amd64__) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ defined(__ppc64__) || defined(__powerpc64__) || \ defined(__ia64__) || defined(__alpha__) || \ ( defined(__sparc__) && defined(__arch64__) ) || \ defined(__s390x__) || defined(__mips64) || \ defined(__aarch64__) ) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 */ typedef int64_t mbedtls_mpi_sint; typedef uint64_t mbedtls_mpi_uint; #if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION) /* mbedtls_t_udbl defined as 128-bit unsigned int */ typedef unsigned int mbedtls_t_udbl __attribute__((mode(TI))); #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL #endif /* !MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION */ #elif defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) && defined(__aarch64__) /* * __ARMCC_VERSION is defined for both armcc and armclang and * __aarch64__ is only defined by armclang when compiling 64-bit code */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 #endif /* !MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 */ typedef int64_t mbedtls_mpi_sint; typedef uint64_t mbedtls_mpi_uint; #if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION) /* mbedtls_t_udbl defined as 128-bit unsigned int */ typedef __uint128_t mbedtls_t_udbl; #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL #endif /* !MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION */ #elif defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) /* Force 64-bit integers with unknown compiler */ typedef int64_t mbedtls_mpi_sint; typedef uint64_t mbedtls_mpi_uint; #endif #endif /* !MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) /* Default to 32-bit compilation */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 #endif /* !MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 */ typedef int32_t mbedtls_mpi_sint; typedef uint32_t mbedtls_mpi_uint; #if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION) typedef uint64_t mbedtls_t_udbl; #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL #endif /* !MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION */ #endif /* !MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /** * \brief MPI structure */ typedef struct mbedtls_mpi { int s; /*!< Sign: -1 if the mpi is negative, 1 otherwise */ size_t n; /*!< total # of limbs */ mbedtls_mpi_uint *p; /*!< pointer to limbs */ } mbedtls_mpi; /** * \brief Initialize an MPI context. * * This makes the MPI ready to be set or freed, * but does not define a value for the MPI. * * \param X The MPI context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_mpi_init( mbedtls_mpi *X ); /** * \brief This function frees the components of an MPI context. * * \param X The MPI context to be cleared. This may be \c NULL, * in which case this function is a no-op. If it is * not \c NULL, it must point to an initialized MPI. */ void mbedtls_mpi_free( mbedtls_mpi *X ); /** * \brief Enlarge an MPI to the specified number of limbs. * * \note This function does nothing if the MPI is * already large enough. * * \param X The MPI to grow. It must be initialized. * \param nblimbs The target number of limbs. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_mpi_grow( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nblimbs ); /** * \brief This function resizes an MPI downwards, keeping at least the * specified number of limbs. * * If \c X is smaller than \c nblimbs, it is resized up * instead. * * \param X The MPI to shrink. This must point to an initialized MPI. * \param nblimbs The minimum number of limbs to keep. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed * (this can only happen when resizing up). * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_mpi_shrink( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nblimbs ); /** * \brief Make a copy of an MPI. * * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. * \param Y The source MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. * * \note The limb-buffer in the destination MPI is enlarged * if necessary to hold the value in the source MPI. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_mpi_copy( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y ); /** * \brief Swap the contents of two MPIs. * * \param X The first MPI. It must be initialized. * \param Y The second MPI. It must be initialized. */ void mbedtls_mpi_swap( mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi *Y ); /** * \brief Perform a safe conditional copy of MPI which doesn't * reveal whether the condition was true or not. * * \param X The MPI to conditionally assign to. This must point * to an initialized MPI. * \param Y The MPI to be assigned from. This must point to an * initialized MPI. * \param assign The condition deciding whether to perform the * assignment or not. Possible values: * * \c 1: Perform the assignment `X = Y`. * * \c 0: Keep the original value of \p X. * * \note This function is equivalent to * `if( assign ) mbedtls_mpi_copy( X, Y );` * except that it avoids leaking any information about whether * the assignment was done or not (the above code may leak * information through branch prediction and/or memory access * patterns analysis). * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y, unsigned char assign ); /** * \brief Perform a safe conditional swap which doesn't * reveal whether the condition was true or not. * * \param X The first MPI. This must be initialized. * \param Y The second MPI. This must be initialized. * \param assign The condition deciding whether to perform * the swap or not. Possible values: * * \c 1: Swap the values of \p X and \p Y. * * \c 0: Keep the original values of \p X and \p Y. * * \note This function is equivalent to * if( assign ) mbedtls_mpi_swap( X, Y ); * except that it avoids leaking any information about whether * the assignment was done or not (the above code may leak * information through branch prediction and/or memory access * patterns analysis). * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. * */ int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap( mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi *Y, unsigned char assign ); /** * \brief Store integer value in MPI. * * \param X The MPI to set. This must be initialized. * \param z The value to use. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_mpi_lset( mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi_sint z ); /** * \brief Get a specific bit from an MPI. * * \param X The MPI to query. This must be initialized. * \param pos Zero-based index of the bit to query. * * \return \c 0 or \c 1 on success, depending on whether bit \c pos * of \c X is unset or set. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( const mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t pos ); /** * \brief Modify a specific bit in an MPI. * * \note This function will grow the target MPI if necessary to set a * bit to \c 1 in a not yet existing limb. It will not grow if * the bit should be set to \c 0. * * \param X The MPI to modify. This must be initialized. * \param pos Zero-based index of the bit to modify. * \param val The desired value of bit \c pos: \c 0 or \c 1. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t pos, unsigned char val ); /** * \brief Return the number of bits of value \c 0 before the * least significant bit of value \c 1. * * \note This is the same as the zero-based index of * the least significant bit of value \c 1. * * \param X The MPI to query. * * \return The number of bits of value \c 0 before the least significant * bit of value \c 1 in \p X. */ size_t mbedtls_mpi_lsb( const mbedtls_mpi *X ); /** * \brief Return the number of bits up to and including the most * significant bit of value \c 1. * * * \note This is same as the one-based index of the most * significant bit of value \c 1. * * \param X The MPI to query. This must point to an initialized MPI. * * \return The number of bits up to and including the most * significant bit of value \c 1. */ size_t mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( const mbedtls_mpi *X ); /** * \brief Return the total size of an MPI value in bytes. * * \param X The MPI to use. This must point to an initialized MPI. * * \note The value returned by this function may be less than * the number of bytes used to store \p X internally. * This happens if and only if there are trailing bytes * of value zero. * * \return The least number of bytes capable of storing * the absolute value of \p X. */ size_t mbedtls_mpi_size( const mbedtls_mpi *X ); /** * \brief Import an MPI from an ASCII string. * * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. * \param radix The numeric base of the input string. * \param s Null-terminated string buffer. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_mpi_read_string( mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, const char *s ); /** * \brief Export an MPI to an ASCII string. * * \param X The source MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. * \param radix The numeric base of the output string. * \param buf The buffer to write the string to. This must be writable * buffer of length \p buflen Bytes. * \param buflen The available size in Bytes of \p buf. * \param olen The address at which to store the length of the string * written, including the final \c NULL byte. This must * not be \c NULL. * * \note You can call this function with `buflen == 0` to obtain the * minimum required buffer size in `*olen`. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the target buffer \p buf * is too small to hold the value of \p X in the desired base. * In this case, `*olen` is nonetheless updated to contain the * size of \p buf required for a successful call. * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_mpi_write_string( const mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, char *buf, size_t buflen, size_t *olen ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) /** * \brief Read an MPI from a line in an opened file. * * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. * \param radix The numeric base of the string representation used * in the source line. * \param fin The input file handle to use. This must not be \c NULL. * * \note On success, this function advances the file stream * to the end of the current line or to EOF. * * The function returns \c 0 on an empty line. * * Leading whitespaces are ignored, as is a * '0x' prefix for radix \c 16. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the file read buffer * is too small. * \return Another negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_mpi_read_file( mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, FILE *fin ); /** * \brief Export an MPI into an opened file. * * \param p A string prefix to emit prior to the MPI data. * For example, this might be a label, or "0x" when * printing in base \c 16. This may be \c NULL if no prefix * is needed. * \param X The source MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. * \param radix The numeric base to be used in the emitted string. * \param fout The output file handle. This may be \c NULL, in which case * the output is written to \c stdout. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_mpi_write_file( const char *p, const mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, FILE *fout ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ /** * \brief Import an MPI from unsigned big endian binary data. * * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. * \param buf The input buffer. This must be a readable buffer of length * \p buflen Bytes. * \param buflen The length of the input buffer \p p in Bytes. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( mbedtls_mpi *X, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); /** * \brief Import X from unsigned binary data, little endian * * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. * \param buf The input buffer. This must be a readable buffer of length * \p buflen Bytes. * \param buflen The length of the input buffer \p p in Bytes. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le( mbedtls_mpi *X, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); /** * \brief Export X into unsigned binary data, big endian. * Always fills the whole buffer, which will start with zeros * if the number is smaller. * * \param X The source MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. * \param buf The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer of length * \p buflen Bytes. * \param buflen The size of the output buffer \p buf in Bytes. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p buf isn't * large enough to hold the value of \p X. * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( const mbedtls_mpi *X, unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); /** * \brief Export X into unsigned binary data, little endian. * Always fills the whole buffer, which will end with zeros * if the number is smaller. * * \param X The source MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. * \param buf The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer of length * \p buflen Bytes. * \param buflen The size of the output buffer \p buf in Bytes. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p buf isn't * large enough to hold the value of \p X. * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le( const mbedtls_mpi *X, unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); /** * \brief Perform a left-shift on an MPI: X <<= count * * \param X The MPI to shift. This must point to an initialized MPI. * \param count The number of bits to shift by. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count ); /** * \brief Perform a right-shift on an MPI: X >>= count * * \param X The MPI to shift. This must point to an initialized MPI. * \param count The number of bits to shift by. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count ); /** * \brief Compare the absolute values of two MPIs. * * \param X The left-hand MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. * \param Y The right-hand MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. * * \return \c 1 if `|X|` is greater than `|Y|`. * \return \c -1 if `|X|` is lesser than `|Y|`. * \return \c 0 if `|X|` is equal to `|Y|`. */ int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs( const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y ); /** * \brief Compare two MPIs. * * \param X The left-hand MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. * \param Y The right-hand MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. * * \return \c 1 if \p X is greater than \p Y. * \return \c -1 if \p X is lesser than \p Y. * \return \c 0 if \p X is equal to \p Y. */ int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y ); /** * \brief Check if an MPI is less than the other in constant time. * * \param X The left-hand MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI * with the same allocated length as Y. * \param Y The right-hand MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI * with the same allocated length as X. * \param ret The result of the comparison: * \c 1 if \p X is less than \p Y. * \c 0 if \p X is greater than or equal to \p Y. * * \return 0 on success. * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the allocated length of * the two input MPIs is not the same. */ int mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct( const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y, unsigned *ret ); /** * \brief Compare an MPI with an integer. * * \param X The left-hand MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. * \param z The integer value to compare \p X to. * * \return \c 1 if \p X is greater than \p z. * \return \c -1 if \p X is lesser than \p z. * \return \c 0 if \p X is equal to \p z. */ int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( const mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi_sint z ); /** * \brief Perform an unsigned addition of MPIs: X = |A| + |B| * * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. * \param A The first summand. This must point to an initialized MPI. * \param B The second summand. This must point to an initialized MPI. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ); /** * \brief Perform an unsigned subtraction of MPIs: X = |A| - |B| * * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. * \param A The minuend. This must point to an initialized MPI. * \param B The subtrahend. This must point to an initialized MPI. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE if \p B is greater than \p A. * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. * */ int mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ); /** * \brief Perform a signed addition of MPIs: X = A + B * * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. * \param A The first summand. This must point to an initialized MPI. * \param B The second summand. This must point to an initialized MPI. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ); /** * \brief Perform a signed subtraction of MPIs: X = A - B * * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. * \param A The minuend. This must point to an initialized MPI. * \param B The subtrahend. This must point to an initialized MPI. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ); /** * \brief Perform a signed addition of an MPI and an integer: X = A + b * * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. * \param A The first summand. This must point to an initialized MPI. * \param b The second summand. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_mpi_add_int( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_sint b ); /** * \brief Perform a signed subtraction of an MPI and an integer: * X = A - b * * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. * \param A The minuend. This must point to an initialized MPI. * \param b The subtrahend. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_sint b ); /** * \brief Perform a multiplication of two MPIs: X = A * B * * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. * \param A The first factor. This must point to an initialized MPI. * \param B The second factor. This must point to an initialized MPI. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. * */ int mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ); /** * \brief Perform a multiplication of an MPI with an unsigned integer: * X = A * b * * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. * \param A The first factor. This must point to an initialized MPI. * \param b The second factor. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. * */ int mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_uint b ); /** * \brief Perform a division with remainder of two MPIs: * A = Q * B + R * * \param Q The destination MPI for the quotient. * This may be \c NULL if the value of the * quotient is not needed. * \param R The destination MPI for the remainder value. * This may be \c NULL if the value of the * remainder is not needed. * \param A The dividend. This must point to an initialized MPi. * \param B The divisor. This must point to an initialized MPI. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO if \p B equals zero. * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ); /** * \brief Perform a division with remainder of an MPI by an integer: * A = Q * b + R * * \param Q The destination MPI for the quotient. * This may be \c NULL if the value of the * quotient is not needed. * \param R The destination MPI for the remainder value. * This may be \c NULL if the value of the * remainder is not needed. * \param A The dividend. This must point to an initialized MPi. * \param b The divisor. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO if \p b equals zero. * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_mpi_div_int( mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_sint b ); /** * \brief Perform a modular reduction. R = A mod B * * \param R The destination MPI for the residue value. * This must point to an initialized MPI. * \param A The MPI to compute the residue of. * This must point to an initialized MPI. * \param B The base of the modular reduction. * This must point to an initialized MPI. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO if \p B equals zero. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE if \p B is negative. * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. * */ int mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ); /** * \brief Perform a modular reduction with respect to an integer. * r = A mod b * * \param r The address at which to store the residue. * This must not be \c NULL. * \param A The MPI to compute the residue of. * This must point to an initialized MPi. * \param b The integer base of the modular reduction. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO if \p b equals zero. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE if \p b is negative. * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_mpi_mod_int( mbedtls_mpi_uint *r, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_sint b ); /** * \brief Perform a sliding-window exponentiation: X = A^E mod N * * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. * \param A The base of the exponentiation. * This must point to an initialized MPI. * \param E The exponent MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. * \param N The base for the modular reduction. This must point to an * initialized MPI. * \param _RR A helper MPI depending solely on \p N which can be used to * speed-up multiple modular exponentiations for the same value * of \p N. This may be \c NULL. If it is not \c NULL, it must * point to an initialized MPI. If it hasn't been used after * the call to mbedtls_mpi_init(), this function will compute * the helper value and store it in \p _RR for reuse on * subsequent calls to this function. Otherwise, the function * will assume that \p _RR holds the helper value set by a * previous call to mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(), and reuse it. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \c N is negative or * even, or if \c E is negative. * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failures. * */ int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *E, const mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi *_RR ); /** * \brief Fill an MPI with a number of random bytes. * * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. * \param size The number of random bytes to generate. * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. * \return Another negative error code on failure. * * \note The bytes obtained from the RNG are interpreted * as a big-endian representation of an MPI; this can * be relevant in applications like deterministic ECDSA. */ int mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t size, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); /** * \brief Compute the greatest common divisor: G = gcd(A, B) * * \param G The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. * \param A The first operand. This must point to an initialized MPI. * \param B The second operand. This must point to an initialized MPI. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_mpi_gcd( mbedtls_mpi *G, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ); /** * \brief Compute the modular inverse: X = A^-1 mod N * * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. * \param A The MPI to calculate the modular inverse of. This must point * to an initialized MPI. * \param N The base of the modular inversion. This must point to an * initialized MPI. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p N is less than * or equal to one. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE if \p has no modular inverse * with respect to \p N. */ int mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *N ); #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) #else #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /** * \brief Perform a Miller-Rabin primality test with error * probability of 2-80. * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext() which allows * specifying the number of Miller-Rabin rounds. * * \param X The MPI to check for primality. * This must point to an initialized MPI. * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. * This may be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't use a * context parameter. * * \return \c 0 if successful, i.e. \p X is probably prime. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE if \p X is not prime. * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime( const mbedtls_mpi *X, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); #undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ /** * \brief Miller-Rabin primality test. * * \warning If \p X is potentially generated by an adversary, for example * when validating cryptographic parameters that you didn't * generate yourself and that are supposed to be prime, then * \p rounds should be at least the half of the security * strength of the cryptographic algorithm. On the other hand, * if \p X is chosen uniformly or non-adversially (as is the * case when mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime calls this function), then * \p rounds can be much lower. * * \param X The MPI to check for primality. * This must point to an initialized MPI. * \param rounds The number of bases to perform the Miller-Rabin primality * test for. The probability of returning 0 on a composite is * at most 2-2*\p rounds. * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. * This may be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't use * a context parameter. * * \return \c 0 if successful, i.e. \p X is probably prime. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE if \p X is not prime. * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( const mbedtls_mpi *X, int rounds, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); /** * \brief Flags for mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime() * * Each of these flags is a constraint on the result X returned by * mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime(). */ typedef enum { MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_DH = 0x0001, /**< (X-1)/2 is prime too */ MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_LOW_ERR = 0x0002, /**< lower error rate from 2-80 to 2-128 */ } mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime_flag_t; /** * \brief Generate a prime number. * * \param X The destination MPI to store the generated prime in. * This must point to an initialized MPi. * \param nbits The required size of the destination MPI in bits. * This must be between \c 3 and #MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS. * \param flags A mask of flags of type #mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime_flag_t. * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. * This may be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't use * a context parameter. * * \return \c 0 if successful, in which case \p X holds a * probably prime number. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if `nbits` is not between * \c 3 and #MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS. */ int mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nbits, int flags, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** * \brief Checkup routine * * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed */ int mbedtls_mpi_self_test( int verbose ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* bignum.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/blowfish.h0000644000000000000000000003031713764415275015452 0ustar rootroot/** * \file blowfish.h * * \brief Blowfish block cipher */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_H #define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include #include #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT 1 #define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT 0 #define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_MAX_KEY_BITS 448 #define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_MIN_KEY_BITS 32 #define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS 16 /**< Rounds to use. When increasing this value, make sure to extend the initialisation vectors */ #define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE 8 /* Blowfish uses 64 bit blocks */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) #define MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT( -0x0016 ) #endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0016 /**< Bad input data. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x0018 /**< Invalid data input length. */ /* MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0017 /**< Blowfish hardware accelerator failed. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT) // Regular implementation // /** * \brief Blowfish context structure */ typedef struct mbedtls_blowfish_context { uint32_t P[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 2]; /*!< Blowfish round keys */ uint32_t S[4][256]; /*!< key dependent S-boxes */ } mbedtls_blowfish_context; #else /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT */ #include "blowfish_alt.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT */ /** * \brief Initialize a Blowfish context. * * \param ctx The Blowfish context to be initialized. * This must not be \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_blowfish_init( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx ); /** * \brief Clear a Blowfish context. * * \param ctx The Blowfish context to be cleared. * This may be \c NULL, in which case this function * returns immediately. If it is not \c NULL, it must * point to an initialized Blowfish context. */ void mbedtls_blowfish_free( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx ); /** * \brief Perform a Blowfish key schedule operation. * * \param ctx The Blowfish context to perform the key schedule on. * \param key The encryption key. This must be a readable buffer of * length \p keybits Bits. * \param keybits The length of \p key in Bits. This must be between * \c 32 and \c 448 and a multiple of \c 8. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_blowfish_setkey( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits ); /** * \brief Perform a Blowfish-ECB block encryption/decryption operation. * * \param ctx The Blowfish context to use. This must be initialized * and bound to a key. * \param mode The mode of operation. Possible values are * #MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT for encryption, or * #MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT for decryption. * \param input The input block. This must be a readable buffer * of size \c 8 Bytes. * \param output The output block. This must be a writable buffer * of size \c 8 Bytes. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, int mode, const unsigned char input[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE] ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) /** * \brief Perform a Blowfish-CBC buffer encryption/decryption operation. * * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can * call the function same function again on the following * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage. * If on the other hand you need to retain the contents of the * IV, you should either save it manually or use the cipher * module instead. * * \param ctx The Blowfish context to use. This must be initialized * and bound to a key. * \param mode The mode of operation. Possible values are * #MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT for encryption, or * #MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT for decryption. * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. This must be * multiple of \c 8. * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a read/write buffer * of length \c 8 Bytes. It is updated by this function. * \param input The input data. This must be a readable buffer of length * \p length Bytes. * \param output The output data. This must be a writable buffer of length * \p length Bytes. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) /** * \brief Perform a Blowfish CFB buffer encryption/decryption operation. * * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can * call the function same function again on the following * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage. * If on the other hand you need to retain the contents of the * IV, you should either save it manually or use the cipher * module instead. * * \param ctx The Blowfish context to use. This must be initialized * and bound to a key. * \param mode The mode of operation. Possible values are * #MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT for encryption, or * #MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT for decryption. * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. * \param iv_off The offset in the initialiation vector. * The value pointed to must be smaller than \c 8 Bytes. * It is updated by this function to support the aforementioned * streaming usage. * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a read/write buffer * of size \c 8 Bytes. It is updated after use. * \param input The input data. This must be a readable buffer of length * \p length Bytes. * \param output The output data. This must be a writable buffer of length * \p length Bytes. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cfb64( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, size_t *iv_off, unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); #endif /*MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) /** * \brief Perform a Blowfish-CTR buffer encryption/decryption operation. * * \warning You must never reuse a nonce value with the same key. Doing so * would void the encryption for the two messages encrypted with * the same nonce and key. * * There are two common strategies for managing nonces with CTR: * * 1. You can handle everything as a single message processed over * successive calls to this function. In that case, you want to * set \p nonce_counter and \p nc_off to 0 for the first call, and * then preserve the values of \p nonce_counter, \p nc_off and \p * stream_block across calls to this function as they will be * updated by this function. * * With this strategy, you must not encrypt more than 2**64 * blocks of data with the same key. * * 2. You can encrypt separate messages by dividing the \p * nonce_counter buffer in two areas: the first one used for a * per-message nonce, handled by yourself, and the second one * updated by this function internally. * * For example, you might reserve the first 4 bytes for the * per-message nonce, and the last 4 bytes for internal use. In that * case, before calling this function on a new message you need to * set the first 4 bytes of \p nonce_counter to your chosen nonce * value, the last 4 to 0, and \p nc_off to 0 (which will cause \p * stream_block to be ignored). That way, you can encrypt at most * 2**32 messages of up to 2**32 blocks each with the same key. * * The per-message nonce (or information sufficient to reconstruct * it) needs to be communicated with the ciphertext and must be unique. * The recommended way to ensure uniqueness is to use a message * counter. * * Note that for both stategies, sizes are measured in blocks and * that a Blowfish block is 8 bytes. * * \warning Upon return, \p stream_block contains sensitive data. Its * content must not be written to insecure storage and should be * securely discarded as soon as it's no longer needed. * * \param ctx The Blowfish context to use. This must be initialized * and bound to a key. * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. * \param nc_off The offset in the current stream_block (for resuming * within current cipher stream). The offset pointer * should be \c 0 at the start of a stream and must be * smaller than \c 8. It is updated by this function. * \param nonce_counter The 64-bit nonce and counter. This must point to a * read/write buffer of length \c 8 Bytes. * \param stream_block The saved stream-block for resuming. This must point to * a read/write buffer of length \c 8 Bytes. * \param input The input data. This must be a readable buffer of * length \p length Bytes. * \param output The output data. This must be a writable buffer of * length \p length Bytes. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ctr( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, size_t length, size_t *nc_off, unsigned char nonce_counter[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], unsigned char stream_block[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* blowfish.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/bn_mul.h0000644000000000000000000010763213764415275015116 0ustar rootroot/** * \file bn_mul.h * * \brief Multi-precision integer library */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ /* * Multiply source vector [s] with b, add result * to destination vector [d] and set carry c. * * Currently supports: * * . IA-32 (386+) . AMD64 / EM64T * . IA-32 (SSE2) . Motorola 68000 * . PowerPC, 32-bit . MicroBlaze * . PowerPC, 64-bit . TriCore * . SPARC v8 . ARM v3+ * . Alpha . MIPS32 * . C, longlong . C, generic */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_BN_MUL_H #define MBEDTLS_BN_MUL_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include "mbedtls/bignum.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) #ifndef asm #define asm __asm #endif /* armcc5 --gnu defines __GNUC__ but doesn't support GNU's extended asm */ #if defined(__GNUC__) && \ ( !defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || __ARMCC_VERSION >= 6000000 ) /* * Disable use of the i386 assembly code below if option -O0, to disable all * compiler optimisations, is passed, detected with __OPTIMIZE__ * This is done as the number of registers used in the assembly code doesn't * work with the -O0 option. */ #if defined(__i386__) && defined(__OPTIMIZE__) #define MULADDC_INIT \ asm( \ "movl %%ebx, %0 \n\t" \ "movl %5, %%esi \n\t" \ "movl %6, %%edi \n\t" \ "movl %7, %%ecx \n\t" \ "movl %8, %%ebx \n\t" #define MULADDC_CORE \ "lodsl \n\t" \ "mull %%ebx \n\t" \ "addl %%ecx, %%eax \n\t" \ "adcl $0, %%edx \n\t" \ "addl (%%edi), %%eax \n\t" \ "adcl $0, %%edx \n\t" \ "movl %%edx, %%ecx \n\t" \ "stosl \n\t" #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2) #define MULADDC_HUIT \ "movd %%ecx, %%mm1 \n\t" \ "movd %%ebx, %%mm0 \n\t" \ "movd (%%edi), %%mm3 \n\t" \ "paddq %%mm3, %%mm1 \n\t" \ "movd (%%esi), %%mm2 \n\t" \ "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm2 \n\t" \ "movd 4(%%esi), %%mm4 \n\t" \ "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm4 \n\t" \ "movd 8(%%esi), %%mm6 \n\t" \ "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm6 \n\t" \ "movd 12(%%esi), %%mm7 \n\t" \ "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm7 \n\t" \ "paddq %%mm2, %%mm1 \n\t" \ "movd 4(%%edi), %%mm3 \n\t" \ "paddq %%mm4, %%mm3 \n\t" \ "movd 8(%%edi), %%mm5 \n\t" \ "paddq %%mm6, %%mm5 \n\t" \ "movd 12(%%edi), %%mm4 \n\t" \ "paddq %%mm4, %%mm7 \n\t" \ "movd %%mm1, (%%edi) \n\t" \ "movd 16(%%esi), %%mm2 \n\t" \ "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm2 \n\t" \ "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \ "movd 20(%%esi), %%mm4 \n\t" \ "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm4 \n\t" \ "paddq %%mm3, %%mm1 \n\t" \ "movd 24(%%esi), %%mm6 \n\t" \ "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm6 \n\t" \ "movd %%mm1, 4(%%edi) \n\t" \ "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \ "movd 28(%%esi), %%mm3 \n\t" \ "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm3 \n\t" \ "paddq %%mm5, %%mm1 \n\t" \ "movd 16(%%edi), %%mm5 \n\t" \ "paddq %%mm5, %%mm2 \n\t" \ "movd %%mm1, 8(%%edi) \n\t" \ "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \ "paddq %%mm7, %%mm1 \n\t" \ "movd 20(%%edi), %%mm5 \n\t" \ "paddq %%mm5, %%mm4 \n\t" \ "movd %%mm1, 12(%%edi) \n\t" \ "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \ "paddq %%mm2, %%mm1 \n\t" \ "movd 24(%%edi), %%mm5 \n\t" \ "paddq %%mm5, %%mm6 \n\t" \ "movd %%mm1, 16(%%edi) \n\t" \ "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \ "paddq %%mm4, %%mm1 \n\t" \ "movd 28(%%edi), %%mm5 \n\t" \ "paddq %%mm5, %%mm3 \n\t" \ "movd %%mm1, 20(%%edi) \n\t" \ "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \ "paddq %%mm6, %%mm1 \n\t" \ "movd %%mm1, 24(%%edi) \n\t" \ "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \ "paddq %%mm3, %%mm1 \n\t" \ "movd %%mm1, 28(%%edi) \n\t" \ "addl $32, %%edi \n\t" \ "addl $32, %%esi \n\t" \ "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \ "movd %%mm1, %%ecx \n\t" #define MULADDC_STOP \ "emms \n\t" \ "movl %4, %%ebx \n\t" \ "movl %%ecx, %1 \n\t" \ "movl %%edi, %2 \n\t" \ "movl %%esi, %3 \n\t" \ : "=m" (t), "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ : "m" (t), "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ : "eax", "ebx", "ecx", "edx", "esi", "edi" \ ); #else #define MULADDC_STOP \ "movl %4, %%ebx \n\t" \ "movl %%ecx, %1 \n\t" \ "movl %%edi, %2 \n\t" \ "movl %%esi, %3 \n\t" \ : "=m" (t), "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ : "m" (t), "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ : "eax", "ebx", "ecx", "edx", "esi", "edi" \ ); #endif /* SSE2 */ #endif /* i386 */ #if defined(__amd64__) || defined (__x86_64__) #define MULADDC_INIT \ asm( \ "xorq %%r8, %%r8\n" #define MULADDC_CORE \ "movq (%%rsi), %%rax\n" \ "mulq %%rbx\n" \ "addq $8, %%rsi\n" \ "addq %%rcx, %%rax\n" \ "movq %%r8, %%rcx\n" \ "adcq $0, %%rdx\n" \ "nop \n" \ "addq %%rax, (%%rdi)\n" \ "adcq %%rdx, %%rcx\n" \ "addq $8, %%rdi\n" #define MULADDC_STOP \ : "+c" (c), "+D" (d), "+S" (s) \ : "b" (b) \ : "rax", "rdx", "r8" \ ); #endif /* AMD64 */ #if defined(__aarch64__) #define MULADDC_INIT \ asm( #define MULADDC_CORE \ "ldr x4, [%2], #8 \n\t" \ "ldr x5, [%1] \n\t" \ "mul x6, x4, %3 \n\t" \ "umulh x7, x4, %3 \n\t" \ "adds x5, x5, x6 \n\t" \ "adc x7, x7, xzr \n\t" \ "adds x5, x5, %0 \n\t" \ "adc %0, x7, xzr \n\t" \ "str x5, [%1], #8 \n\t" #define MULADDC_STOP \ : "+r" (c), "+r" (d), "+r" (s) \ : "r" (b) \ : "x4", "x5", "x6", "x7", "cc" \ ); #endif /* Aarch64 */ #if defined(__mc68020__) || defined(__mcpu32__) #define MULADDC_INIT \ asm( \ "movl %3, %%a2 \n\t" \ "movl %4, %%a3 \n\t" \ "movl %5, %%d3 \n\t" \ "movl %6, %%d2 \n\t" \ "moveq #0, %%d0 \n\t" #define MULADDC_CORE \ "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ "mulul %%d2, %%d4:%%d1 \n\t" \ "addl %%d3, %%d1 \n\t" \ "addxl %%d0, %%d4 \n\t" \ "moveq #0, %%d3 \n\t" \ "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ "addxl %%d4, %%d3 \n\t" #define MULADDC_STOP \ "movl %%d3, %0 \n\t" \ "movl %%a3, %1 \n\t" \ "movl %%a2, %2 \n\t" \ : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ : "d0", "d1", "d2", "d3", "d4", "a2", "a3" \ ); #define MULADDC_HUIT \ "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ "mulul %%d2, %%d4:%%d1 \n\t" \ "addxl %%d3, %%d1 \n\t" \ "addxl %%d0, %%d4 \n\t" \ "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ "mulul %%d2, %%d3:%%d1 \n\t" \ "addxl %%d4, %%d1 \n\t" \ "addxl %%d0, %%d3 \n\t" \ "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ "mulul %%d2, %%d4:%%d1 \n\t" \ "addxl %%d3, %%d1 \n\t" \ "addxl %%d0, %%d4 \n\t" \ "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ "mulul %%d2, %%d3:%%d1 \n\t" \ "addxl %%d4, %%d1 \n\t" \ "addxl %%d0, %%d3 \n\t" \ "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ "mulul %%d2, %%d4:%%d1 \n\t" \ "addxl %%d3, %%d1 \n\t" \ "addxl %%d0, %%d4 \n\t" \ "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ "mulul %%d2, %%d3:%%d1 \n\t" \ "addxl %%d4, %%d1 \n\t" \ "addxl %%d0, %%d3 \n\t" \ "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ "mulul %%d2, %%d4:%%d1 \n\t" \ "addxl %%d3, %%d1 \n\t" \ "addxl %%d0, %%d4 \n\t" \ "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ "mulul %%d2, %%d3:%%d1 \n\t" \ "addxl %%d4, %%d1 \n\t" \ "addxl %%d0, %%d3 \n\t" \ "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ "addxl %%d0, %%d3 \n\t" #endif /* MC68000 */ #if defined(__powerpc64__) || defined(__ppc64__) #if defined(__MACH__) && defined(__APPLE__) #define MULADDC_INIT \ asm( \ "ld r3, %3 \n\t" \ "ld r4, %4 \n\t" \ "ld r5, %5 \n\t" \ "ld r6, %6 \n\t" \ "addi r3, r3, -8 \n\t" \ "addi r4, r4, -8 \n\t" \ "addic r5, r5, 0 \n\t" #define MULADDC_CORE \ "ldu r7, 8(r3) \n\t" \ "mulld r8, r7, r6 \n\t" \ "mulhdu r9, r7, r6 \n\t" \ "adde r8, r8, r5 \n\t" \ "ld r7, 8(r4) \n\t" \ "addze r5, r9 \n\t" \ "addc r8, r8, r7 \n\t" \ "stdu r8, 8(r4) \n\t" #define MULADDC_STOP \ "addze r5, r5 \n\t" \ "addi r4, r4, 8 \n\t" \ "addi r3, r3, 8 \n\t" \ "std r5, %0 \n\t" \ "std r4, %1 \n\t" \ "std r3, %2 \n\t" \ : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ : "r3", "r4", "r5", "r6", "r7", "r8", "r9" \ ); #else /* __MACH__ && __APPLE__ */ #define MULADDC_INIT \ asm( \ "ld %%r3, %3 \n\t" \ "ld %%r4, %4 \n\t" \ "ld %%r5, %5 \n\t" \ "ld %%r6, %6 \n\t" \ "addi %%r3, %%r3, -8 \n\t" \ "addi %%r4, %%r4, -8 \n\t" \ "addic %%r5, %%r5, 0 \n\t" #define MULADDC_CORE \ "ldu %%r7, 8(%%r3) \n\t" \ "mulld %%r8, %%r7, %%r6 \n\t" \ "mulhdu %%r9, %%r7, %%r6 \n\t" \ "adde %%r8, %%r8, %%r5 \n\t" \ "ld %%r7, 8(%%r4) \n\t" \ "addze %%r5, %%r9 \n\t" \ "addc %%r8, %%r8, %%r7 \n\t" \ "stdu %%r8, 8(%%r4) \n\t" #define MULADDC_STOP \ "addze %%r5, %%r5 \n\t" \ "addi %%r4, %%r4, 8 \n\t" \ "addi %%r3, %%r3, 8 \n\t" \ "std %%r5, %0 \n\t" \ "std %%r4, %1 \n\t" \ "std %%r3, %2 \n\t" \ : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ : "r3", "r4", "r5", "r6", "r7", "r8", "r9" \ ); #endif /* __MACH__ && __APPLE__ */ #elif defined(__powerpc__) || defined(__ppc__) /* end PPC64/begin PPC32 */ #if defined(__MACH__) && defined(__APPLE__) #define MULADDC_INIT \ asm( \ "lwz r3, %3 \n\t" \ "lwz r4, %4 \n\t" \ "lwz r5, %5 \n\t" \ "lwz r6, %6 \n\t" \ "addi r3, r3, -4 \n\t" \ "addi r4, r4, -4 \n\t" \ "addic r5, r5, 0 \n\t" #define MULADDC_CORE \ "lwzu r7, 4(r3) \n\t" \ "mullw r8, r7, r6 \n\t" \ "mulhwu r9, r7, r6 \n\t" \ "adde r8, r8, r5 \n\t" \ "lwz r7, 4(r4) \n\t" \ "addze r5, r9 \n\t" \ "addc r8, r8, r7 \n\t" \ "stwu r8, 4(r4) \n\t" #define MULADDC_STOP \ "addze r5, r5 \n\t" \ "addi r4, r4, 4 \n\t" \ "addi r3, r3, 4 \n\t" \ "stw r5, %0 \n\t" \ "stw r4, %1 \n\t" \ "stw r3, %2 \n\t" \ : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ : "r3", "r4", "r5", "r6", "r7", "r8", "r9" \ ); #else /* __MACH__ && __APPLE__ */ #define MULADDC_INIT \ asm( \ "lwz %%r3, %3 \n\t" \ "lwz %%r4, %4 \n\t" \ "lwz %%r5, %5 \n\t" \ "lwz %%r6, %6 \n\t" \ "addi %%r3, %%r3, -4 \n\t" \ "addi %%r4, %%r4, -4 \n\t" \ "addic %%r5, %%r5, 0 \n\t" #define MULADDC_CORE \ "lwzu %%r7, 4(%%r3) \n\t" \ "mullw %%r8, %%r7, %%r6 \n\t" \ "mulhwu %%r9, %%r7, %%r6 \n\t" \ "adde %%r8, %%r8, %%r5 \n\t" \ "lwz %%r7, 4(%%r4) \n\t" \ "addze %%r5, %%r9 \n\t" \ "addc %%r8, %%r8, %%r7 \n\t" \ "stwu %%r8, 4(%%r4) \n\t" #define MULADDC_STOP \ "addze %%r5, %%r5 \n\t" \ "addi %%r4, %%r4, 4 \n\t" \ "addi %%r3, %%r3, 4 \n\t" \ "stw %%r5, %0 \n\t" \ "stw %%r4, %1 \n\t" \ "stw %%r3, %2 \n\t" \ : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ : "r3", "r4", "r5", "r6", "r7", "r8", "r9" \ ); #endif /* __MACH__ && __APPLE__ */ #endif /* PPC32 */ /* * The Sparc(64) assembly is reported to be broken. * Disable it for now, until we're able to fix it. */ #if 0 && defined(__sparc__) #if defined(__sparc64__) #define MULADDC_INIT \ asm( \ "ldx %3, %%o0 \n\t" \ "ldx %4, %%o1 \n\t" \ "ld %5, %%o2 \n\t" \ "ld %6, %%o3 \n\t" #define MULADDC_CORE \ "ld [%%o0], %%o4 \n\t" \ "inc 4, %%o0 \n\t" \ "ld [%%o1], %%o5 \n\t" \ "umul %%o3, %%o4, %%o4 \n\t" \ "addcc %%o4, %%o2, %%o4 \n\t" \ "rd %%y, %%g1 \n\t" \ "addx %%g1, 0, %%g1 \n\t" \ "addcc %%o4, %%o5, %%o4 \n\t" \ "st %%o4, [%%o1] \n\t" \ "addx %%g1, 0, %%o2 \n\t" \ "inc 4, %%o1 \n\t" #define MULADDC_STOP \ "st %%o2, %0 \n\t" \ "stx %%o1, %1 \n\t" \ "stx %%o0, %2 \n\t" \ : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ : "g1", "o0", "o1", "o2", "o3", "o4", \ "o5" \ ); #else /* __sparc64__ */ #define MULADDC_INIT \ asm( \ "ld %3, %%o0 \n\t" \ "ld %4, %%o1 \n\t" \ "ld %5, %%o2 \n\t" \ "ld %6, %%o3 \n\t" #define MULADDC_CORE \ "ld [%%o0], %%o4 \n\t" \ "inc 4, %%o0 \n\t" \ "ld [%%o1], %%o5 \n\t" \ "umul %%o3, %%o4, %%o4 \n\t" \ "addcc %%o4, %%o2, %%o4 \n\t" \ "rd %%y, %%g1 \n\t" \ "addx %%g1, 0, %%g1 \n\t" \ "addcc %%o4, %%o5, %%o4 \n\t" \ "st %%o4, [%%o1] \n\t" \ "addx %%g1, 0, %%o2 \n\t" \ "inc 4, %%o1 \n\t" #define MULADDC_STOP \ "st %%o2, %0 \n\t" \ "st %%o1, %1 \n\t" \ "st %%o0, %2 \n\t" \ : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ : "g1", "o0", "o1", "o2", "o3", "o4", \ "o5" \ ); #endif /* __sparc64__ */ #endif /* __sparc__ */ #if defined(__microblaze__) || defined(microblaze) #define MULADDC_INIT \ asm( \ "lwi r3, %3 \n\t" \ "lwi r4, %4 \n\t" \ "lwi r5, %5 \n\t" \ "lwi r6, %6 \n\t" \ "andi r7, r6, 0xffff \n\t" \ "bsrli r6, r6, 16 \n\t" #define MULADDC_CORE \ "lhui r8, r3, 0 \n\t" \ "addi r3, r3, 2 \n\t" \ "lhui r9, r3, 0 \n\t" \ "addi r3, r3, 2 \n\t" \ "mul r10, r9, r6 \n\t" \ "mul r11, r8, r7 \n\t" \ "mul r12, r9, r7 \n\t" \ "mul r13, r8, r6 \n\t" \ "bsrli r8, r10, 16 \n\t" \ "bsrli r9, r11, 16 \n\t" \ "add r13, r13, r8 \n\t" \ "add r13, r13, r9 \n\t" \ "bslli r10, r10, 16 \n\t" \ "bslli r11, r11, 16 \n\t" \ "add r12, r12, r10 \n\t" \ "addc r13, r13, r0 \n\t" \ "add r12, r12, r11 \n\t" \ "addc r13, r13, r0 \n\t" \ "lwi r10, r4, 0 \n\t" \ "add r12, r12, r10 \n\t" \ "addc r13, r13, r0 \n\t" \ "add r12, r12, r5 \n\t" \ "addc r5, r13, r0 \n\t" \ "swi r12, r4, 0 \n\t" \ "addi r4, r4, 4 \n\t" #define MULADDC_STOP \ "swi r5, %0 \n\t" \ "swi r4, %1 \n\t" \ "swi r3, %2 \n\t" \ : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ : "r3", "r4", "r5", "r6", "r7", "r8", \ "r9", "r10", "r11", "r12", "r13" \ ); #endif /* MicroBlaze */ #if defined(__tricore__) #define MULADDC_INIT \ asm( \ "ld.a %%a2, %3 \n\t" \ "ld.a %%a3, %4 \n\t" \ "ld.w %%d4, %5 \n\t" \ "ld.w %%d1, %6 \n\t" \ "xor %%d5, %%d5 \n\t" #define MULADDC_CORE \ "ld.w %%d0, [%%a2+] \n\t" \ "madd.u %%e2, %%e4, %%d0, %%d1 \n\t" \ "ld.w %%d0, [%%a3] \n\t" \ "addx %%d2, %%d2, %%d0 \n\t" \ "addc %%d3, %%d3, 0 \n\t" \ "mov %%d4, %%d3 \n\t" \ "st.w [%%a3+], %%d2 \n\t" #define MULADDC_STOP \ "st.w %0, %%d4 \n\t" \ "st.a %1, %%a3 \n\t" \ "st.a %2, %%a2 \n\t" \ : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ : "d0", "d1", "e2", "d4", "a2", "a3" \ ); #endif /* TriCore */ /* * Note, gcc -O0 by default uses r7 for the frame pointer, so it complains about * our use of r7 below, unless -fomit-frame-pointer is passed. * * On the other hand, -fomit-frame-pointer is implied by any -Ox options with * x !=0, which we can detect using __OPTIMIZE__ (which is also defined by * clang and armcc5 under the same conditions). * * So, only use the optimized assembly below for optimized build, which avoids * the build error and is pretty reasonable anyway. */ #if defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__OPTIMIZE__) #define MULADDC_CANNOT_USE_R7 #endif #if defined(__arm__) && !defined(MULADDC_CANNOT_USE_R7) #if defined(__thumb__) && !defined(__thumb2__) #define MULADDC_INIT \ asm( \ "ldr r0, %3 \n\t" \ "ldr r1, %4 \n\t" \ "ldr r2, %5 \n\t" \ "ldr r3, %6 \n\t" \ "lsr r7, r3, #16 \n\t" \ "mov r9, r7 \n\t" \ "lsl r7, r3, #16 \n\t" \ "lsr r7, r7, #16 \n\t" \ "mov r8, r7 \n\t" #define MULADDC_CORE \ "ldmia r0!, {r6} \n\t" \ "lsr r7, r6, #16 \n\t" \ "lsl r6, r6, #16 \n\t" \ "lsr r6, r6, #16 \n\t" \ "mov r4, r8 \n\t" \ "mul r4, r6 \n\t" \ "mov r3, r9 \n\t" \ "mul r6, r3 \n\t" \ "mov r5, r9 \n\t" \ "mul r5, r7 \n\t" \ "mov r3, r8 \n\t" \ "mul r7, r3 \n\t" \ "lsr r3, r6, #16 \n\t" \ "add r5, r5, r3 \n\t" \ "lsr r3, r7, #16 \n\t" \ "add r5, r5, r3 \n\t" \ "add r4, r4, r2 \n\t" \ "mov r2, #0 \n\t" \ "adc r5, r2 \n\t" \ "lsl r3, r6, #16 \n\t" \ "add r4, r4, r3 \n\t" \ "adc r5, r2 \n\t" \ "lsl r3, r7, #16 \n\t" \ "add r4, r4, r3 \n\t" \ "adc r5, r2 \n\t" \ "ldr r3, [r1] \n\t" \ "add r4, r4, r3 \n\t" \ "adc r2, r5 \n\t" \ "stmia r1!, {r4} \n\t" #define MULADDC_STOP \ "str r2, %0 \n\t" \ "str r1, %1 \n\t" \ "str r0, %2 \n\t" \ : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ : "r0", "r1", "r2", "r3", "r4", "r5", \ "r6", "r7", "r8", "r9", "cc" \ ); #elif (__ARM_ARCH >= 6) && \ defined (__ARM_FEATURE_DSP) && (__ARM_FEATURE_DSP == 1) #define MULADDC_INIT \ asm( #define MULADDC_CORE \ "ldr r0, [%0], #4 \n\t" \ "ldr r1, [%1] \n\t" \ "umaal r1, %2, %3, r0 \n\t" \ "str r1, [%1], #4 \n\t" #define MULADDC_STOP \ : "=r" (s), "=r" (d), "=r" (c) \ : "r" (b), "0" (s), "1" (d), "2" (c) \ : "r0", "r1", "memory" \ ); #else #define MULADDC_INIT \ asm( \ "ldr r0, %3 \n\t" \ "ldr r1, %4 \n\t" \ "ldr r2, %5 \n\t" \ "ldr r3, %6 \n\t" #define MULADDC_CORE \ "ldr r4, [r0], #4 \n\t" \ "mov r5, #0 \n\t" \ "ldr r6, [r1] \n\t" \ "umlal r2, r5, r3, r4 \n\t" \ "adds r7, r6, r2 \n\t" \ "adc r2, r5, #0 \n\t" \ "str r7, [r1], #4 \n\t" #define MULADDC_STOP \ "str r2, %0 \n\t" \ "str r1, %1 \n\t" \ "str r0, %2 \n\t" \ : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ : "r0", "r1", "r2", "r3", "r4", "r5", \ "r6", "r7", "cc" \ ); #endif /* Thumb */ #endif /* ARMv3 */ #if defined(__alpha__) #define MULADDC_INIT \ asm( \ "ldq $1, %3 \n\t" \ "ldq $2, %4 \n\t" \ "ldq $3, %5 \n\t" \ "ldq $4, %6 \n\t" #define MULADDC_CORE \ "ldq $6, 0($1) \n\t" \ "addq $1, 8, $1 \n\t" \ "mulq $6, $4, $7 \n\t" \ "umulh $6, $4, $6 \n\t" \ "addq $7, $3, $7 \n\t" \ "cmpult $7, $3, $3 \n\t" \ "ldq $5, 0($2) \n\t" \ "addq $7, $5, $7 \n\t" \ "cmpult $7, $5, $5 \n\t" \ "stq $7, 0($2) \n\t" \ "addq $2, 8, $2 \n\t" \ "addq $6, $3, $3 \n\t" \ "addq $5, $3, $3 \n\t" #define MULADDC_STOP \ "stq $3, %0 \n\t" \ "stq $2, %1 \n\t" \ "stq $1, %2 \n\t" \ : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ : "$1", "$2", "$3", "$4", "$5", "$6", "$7" \ ); #endif /* Alpha */ #if defined(__mips__) && !defined(__mips64) #define MULADDC_INIT \ asm( \ "lw $10, %3 \n\t" \ "lw $11, %4 \n\t" \ "lw $12, %5 \n\t" \ "lw $13, %6 \n\t" #define MULADDC_CORE \ "lw $14, 0($10) \n\t" \ "multu $13, $14 \n\t" \ "addi $10, $10, 4 \n\t" \ "mflo $14 \n\t" \ "mfhi $9 \n\t" \ "addu $14, $12, $14 \n\t" \ "lw $15, 0($11) \n\t" \ "sltu $12, $14, $12 \n\t" \ "addu $15, $14, $15 \n\t" \ "sltu $14, $15, $14 \n\t" \ "addu $12, $12, $9 \n\t" \ "sw $15, 0($11) \n\t" \ "addu $12, $12, $14 \n\t" \ "addi $11, $11, 4 \n\t" #define MULADDC_STOP \ "sw $12, %0 \n\t" \ "sw $11, %1 \n\t" \ "sw $10, %2 \n\t" \ : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ : "$9", "$10", "$11", "$12", "$13", "$14", "$15", "lo", "hi" \ ); #endif /* MIPS */ #endif /* GNUC */ #if (defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_M_IX86)) || defined(__WATCOMC__) #define MULADDC_INIT \ __asm mov esi, s \ __asm mov edi, d \ __asm mov ecx, c \ __asm mov ebx, b #define MULADDC_CORE \ __asm lodsd \ __asm mul ebx \ __asm add eax, ecx \ __asm adc edx, 0 \ __asm add eax, [edi] \ __asm adc edx, 0 \ __asm mov ecx, edx \ __asm stosd #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2) #define EMIT __asm _emit #define MULADDC_HUIT \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0xC9 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0xC3 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x1F \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCB \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x16 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xD0 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x66 EMIT 0x04 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xE0 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x76 EMIT 0x08 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xF0 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x0C \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xF8 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCA \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x5F EMIT 0x04 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xDC \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x6F EMIT 0x08 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xEE \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x67 EMIT 0x0C \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xFC \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x0F \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x56 EMIT 0x10 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xD0 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x66 EMIT 0x14 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xE0 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCB \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x76 EMIT 0x18 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xF0 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x4F EMIT 0x04 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x5E EMIT 0x1C \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xD8 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCD \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x6F EMIT 0x10 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xD5 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x4F EMIT 0x08 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCF \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x6F EMIT 0x14 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xE5 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x4F EMIT 0x0C \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCA \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x6F EMIT 0x18 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xF5 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x4F EMIT 0x10 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCC \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x6F EMIT 0x1C \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xDD \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x4F EMIT 0x14 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCE \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x4F EMIT 0x18 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCB \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x4F EMIT 0x1C \ EMIT 0x83 EMIT 0xC7 EMIT 0x20 \ EMIT 0x83 EMIT 0xC6 EMIT 0x20 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0xC9 #define MULADDC_STOP \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x77 \ __asm mov c, ecx \ __asm mov d, edi \ __asm mov s, esi \ #else #define MULADDC_STOP \ __asm mov c, ecx \ __asm mov d, edi \ __asm mov s, esi \ #endif /* SSE2 */ #endif /* MSVC */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM */ #if !defined(MULADDC_CORE) #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL) #define MULADDC_INIT \ { \ mbedtls_t_udbl r; \ mbedtls_mpi_uint r0, r1; #define MULADDC_CORE \ r = *(s++) * (mbedtls_t_udbl) b; \ r0 = (mbedtls_mpi_uint) r; \ r1 = (mbedtls_mpi_uint)( r >> biL ); \ r0 += c; r1 += (r0 < c); \ r0 += *d; r1 += (r0 < *d); \ c = r1; *(d++) = r0; #define MULADDC_STOP \ } #else #define MULADDC_INIT \ { \ mbedtls_mpi_uint s0, s1, b0, b1; \ mbedtls_mpi_uint r0, r1, rx, ry; \ b0 = ( b << biH ) >> biH; \ b1 = ( b >> biH ); #define MULADDC_CORE \ s0 = ( *s << biH ) >> biH; \ s1 = ( *s >> biH ); s++; \ rx = s0 * b1; r0 = s0 * b0; \ ry = s1 * b0; r1 = s1 * b1; \ r1 += ( rx >> biH ); \ r1 += ( ry >> biH ); \ rx <<= biH; ry <<= biH; \ r0 += rx; r1 += (r0 < rx); \ r0 += ry; r1 += (r0 < ry); \ r0 += c; r1 += (r0 < c); \ r0 += *d; r1 += (r0 < *d); \ c = r1; *(d++) = r0; #define MULADDC_STOP \ } #endif /* C (generic) */ #endif /* C (longlong) */ #endif /* bn_mul.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/camellia.h0000644000000000000000000003331013764415275015400 0ustar rootroot/** * \file camellia.h * * \brief Camellia block cipher */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_H #define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include #include #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT 1 #define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT 0 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT( -0x0024 ) #endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0024 /**< Bad input data. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x0026 /**< Invalid data input length. */ /* MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0027 /**< Camellia hardware accelerator failed. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT) // Regular implementation // /** * \brief CAMELLIA context structure */ typedef struct mbedtls_camellia_context { int nr; /*!< number of rounds */ uint32_t rk[68]; /*!< CAMELLIA round keys */ } mbedtls_camellia_context; #else /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT */ #include "camellia_alt.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT */ /** * \brief Initialize a CAMELLIA context. * * \param ctx The CAMELLIA context to be initialized. * This must not be \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_camellia_init( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx ); /** * \brief Clear a CAMELLIA context. * * \param ctx The CAMELLIA context to be cleared. This may be \c NULL, * in which case this function returns immediately. If it is not * \c NULL, it must be initialized. */ void mbedtls_camellia_free( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx ); /** * \brief Perform a CAMELLIA key schedule operation for encryption. * * \param ctx The CAMELLIA context to use. This must be initialized. * \param key The encryption key to use. This must be a readable buffer * of size \p keybits Bits. * \param keybits The length of \p key in Bits. This must be either \c 128, * \c 192 or \c 256. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits ); /** * \brief Perform a CAMELLIA key schedule operation for decryption. * * \param ctx The CAMELLIA context to use. This must be initialized. * \param key The decryption key. This must be a readable buffer * of size \p keybits Bits. * \param keybits The length of \p key in Bits. This must be either \c 128, * \c 192 or \c 256. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits ); /** * \brief Perform a CAMELLIA-ECB block encryption/decryption operation. * * \param ctx The CAMELLIA context to use. This must be initialized * and bound to a key. * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either * #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT or #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT. * \param input The input block. This must be a readable buffer * of size \c 16 Bytes. * \param output The output block. This must be a writable buffer * of size \c 16 Bytes. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, int mode, const unsigned char input[16], unsigned char output[16] ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) /** * \brief Perform a CAMELLIA-CBC buffer encryption/decryption operation. * * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can * call the function same function again on the following * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage. * If on the other hand you need to retain the contents of the * IV, you should either save it manually or use the cipher * module instead. * * \param ctx The CAMELLIA context to use. This must be initialized * and bound to a key. * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either * #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT or #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT. * \param length The length in Bytes of the input data \p input. * This must be a multiple of \c 16 Bytes. * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a read/write buffer * of length \c 16 Bytes. It is updated to allow streaming * use as explained above. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must point to a * readable buffer of length \p length Bytes. * \param output The buffer holding the output data. This must point to a * writable buffer of length \p length Bytes. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, unsigned char iv[16], const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) /** * \brief Perform a CAMELLIA-CFB128 buffer encryption/decryption * operation. * * \note Due to the nature of CFB mode, you should use the same * key for both encryption and decryption. In particular, calls * to this function should be preceded by a key-schedule via * mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc() regardless of whether \p mode * is #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT or #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT. * * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can * call the function same function again on the following * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage. * If on the other hand you need to retain the contents of the * IV, you should either save it manually or use the cipher * module instead. * * \param ctx The CAMELLIA context to use. This must be initialized * and bound to a key. * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either * #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT or #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT. * \param length The length of the input data \p input. Any value is allowed. * \param iv_off The current offset in the IV. This must be smaller * than \c 16 Bytes. It is updated after this call to allow * the aforementioned streaming usage. * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a read/write buffer * of length \c 16 Bytes. It is updated after this call to * allow the aforementioned streaming usage. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a readable * buffer of size \p length Bytes. * \param output The buffer to hold the output data. This must be a writable * buffer of length \p length Bytes. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cfb128( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, size_t *iv_off, unsigned char iv[16], const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) /** * \brief Perform a CAMELLIA-CTR buffer encryption/decryption operation. * * *note Due to the nature of CTR mode, you should use the same * key for both encryption and decryption. In particular, calls * to this function should be preceded by a key-schedule via * mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc() regardless of whether \p mode * is #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT or #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT. * * \warning You must never reuse a nonce value with the same key. Doing so * would void the encryption for the two messages encrypted with * the same nonce and key. * * There are two common strategies for managing nonces with CTR: * * 1. You can handle everything as a single message processed over * successive calls to this function. In that case, you want to * set \p nonce_counter and \p nc_off to 0 for the first call, and * then preserve the values of \p nonce_counter, \p nc_off and \p * stream_block across calls to this function as they will be * updated by this function. * * With this strategy, you must not encrypt more than 2**128 * blocks of data with the same key. * * 2. You can encrypt separate messages by dividing the \p * nonce_counter buffer in two areas: the first one used for a * per-message nonce, handled by yourself, and the second one * updated by this function internally. * * For example, you might reserve the first \c 12 Bytes for the * per-message nonce, and the last \c 4 Bytes for internal use. * In that case, before calling this function on a new message you * need to set the first \c 12 Bytes of \p nonce_counter to your * chosen nonce value, the last four to \c 0, and \p nc_off to \c 0 * (which will cause \p stream_block to be ignored). That way, you * can encrypt at most \c 2**96 messages of up to \c 2**32 blocks * each with the same key. * * The per-message nonce (or information sufficient to reconstruct * it) needs to be communicated with the ciphertext and must be * unique. The recommended way to ensure uniqueness is to use a * message counter. An alternative is to generate random nonces, * but this limits the number of messages that can be securely * encrypted: for example, with 96-bit random nonces, you should * not encrypt more than 2**32 messages with the same key. * * Note that for both stategies, sizes are measured in blocks and * that a CAMELLIA block is \c 16 Bytes. * * \warning Upon return, \p stream_block contains sensitive data. Its * content must not be written to insecure storage and should be * securely discarded as soon as it's no longer needed. * * \param ctx The CAMELLIA context to use. This must be initialized * and bound to a key. * \param length The length of the input data \p input in Bytes. * Any value is allowed. * \param nc_off The offset in the current \p stream_block (for resuming * within current cipher stream). The offset pointer to * should be \c 0 at the start of a stream. It is updated * at the end of this call. * \param nonce_counter The 128-bit nonce and counter. This must be a read/write * buffer of length \c 16 Bytes. * \param stream_block The saved stream-block for resuming. This must be a * read/write buffer of length \c 16 Bytes. * \param input The input data stream. This must be a readable buffer of * size \p length Bytes. * \param output The output data stream. This must be a writable buffer * of size \p length Bytes. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctr( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, size_t length, size_t *nc_off, unsigned char nonce_counter[16], unsigned char stream_block[16], const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** * \brief Checkup routine * * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed */ int mbedtls_camellia_self_test( int verbose ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* camellia.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/ccm.h0000644000000000000000000003322613764415275014401 0ustar rootroot/** * \file ccm.h * * \brief This file provides an API for the CCM authenticated encryption * mode for block ciphers. * * CCM combines Counter mode encryption with CBC-MAC authentication * for 128-bit block ciphers. * * Input to CCM includes the following elements: *
  • Payload - data that is both authenticated and encrypted.
    • *
  • Associated data (Adata) - data that is authenticated but not * encrypted, For example, a header.
    • *
  • Nonce - A unique value that is assigned to the payload and the * associated data.
* * Definition of CCM: * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38C/SP800-38C_updated-July20_2007.pdf * RFC 3610 "Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM)" * * Related: * RFC 5116 "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated Encryption" * * Definition of CCM*: * IEEE 802.15.4 - IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks * Integer representation is fixed most-significant-octet-first order and * the representation of octets is most-significant-bit-first order. This is * consistent with RFC 3610. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CCM_H #define MBEDTLS_CCM_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT -0x000D /**< Bad input parameters to the function. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED -0x000F /**< Authenticated decryption failed. */ /* MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0011 /**< CCM hardware accelerator failed. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT) // Regular implementation // /** * \brief The CCM context-type definition. The CCM context is passed * to the APIs called. */ typedef struct mbedtls_ccm_context { mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx; /*!< The cipher context used. */ } mbedtls_ccm_context; #else /* MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT */ #include "ccm_alt.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT */ /** * \brief This function initializes the specified CCM context, * to make references valid, and prepare the context * for mbedtls_ccm_setkey() or mbedtls_ccm_free(). * * \param ctx The CCM context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_ccm_init( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx ); /** * \brief This function initializes the CCM context set in the * \p ctx parameter and sets the encryption key. * * \param ctx The CCM context to initialize. This must be an initialized * context. * \param cipher The 128-bit block cipher to use. * \param key The encryption key. This must not be \c NULL. * \param keybits The key size in bits. This must be acceptable by the cipher. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A CCM or cipher-specific error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ccm_setkey( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits ); /** * \brief This function releases and clears the specified CCM context * and underlying cipher sub-context. * * \param ctx The CCM context to clear. If this is \c NULL, the function * has no effect. Otherwise, this must be initialized. */ void mbedtls_ccm_free( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx ); /** * \brief This function encrypts a buffer using CCM. * * \note The tag is written to a separate buffer. To concatenate * the \p tag with the \p output, as done in RFC-3610: * Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM), use * \p tag = \p output + \p length, and make sure that the * output buffer is at least \p length + \p tag_len wide. * * \param ctx The CCM context to use for encryption. This must be * initialized and bound to a key. * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. * \param iv The initialization vector (nonce). This must be a readable * buffer of at least \p iv_len Bytes. * \param iv_len The length of the nonce in Bytes: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, * or 13. The length L of the message length field is * 15 - \p iv_len. * \param add The additional data field. If \p add_len is greater than * zero, \p add must be a readable buffer of at least that * length. * \param add_len The length of additional data in Bytes. * This must be less than `2^16 - 2^8`. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater * than zero, \p input must be a readable buffer of at least * that length. * \param output The buffer holding the output data. If \p length is greater * than zero, \p output must be a writable buffer of at least * that length. * \param tag The buffer holding the authentication field. This must be a * writable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. * \param tag_len The length of the authentication field to generate in Bytes: * 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 or 16. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A CCM or cipher-specific error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ); /** * \brief This function encrypts a buffer using CCM*. * * \note The tag is written to a separate buffer. To concatenate * the \p tag with the \p output, as done in RFC-3610: * Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM), use * \p tag = \p output + \p length, and make sure that the * output buffer is at least \p length + \p tag_len wide. * * \note When using this function in a variable tag length context, * the tag length has to be encoded into the \p iv passed to * this function. * * \param ctx The CCM context to use for encryption. This must be * initialized and bound to a key. * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. * \param iv The initialization vector (nonce). This must be a readable * buffer of at least \p iv_len Bytes. * \param iv_len The length of the nonce in Bytes: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, * or 13. The length L of the message length field is * 15 - \p iv_len. * \param add The additional data field. This must be a readable buffer of * at least \p add_len Bytes. * \param add_len The length of additional data in Bytes. * This must be less than 2^16 - 2^8. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater * than zero, \p input must be a readable buffer of at least * that length. * \param output The buffer holding the output data. If \p length is greater * than zero, \p output must be a writable buffer of at least * that length. * \param tag The buffer holding the authentication field. This must be a * writable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. * \param tag_len The length of the authentication field to generate in Bytes: * 0, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 or 16. * * \warning Passing \c 0 as \p tag_len means that the message is no * longer authenticated. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A CCM or cipher-specific error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ); /** * \brief This function performs a CCM authenticated decryption of a * buffer. * * \param ctx The CCM context to use for decryption. This must be * initialized and bound to a key. * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. * \param iv The initialization vector (nonce). This must be a readable * buffer of at least \p iv_len Bytes. * \param iv_len The length of the nonce in Bytes: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, * or 13. The length L of the message length field is * 15 - \p iv_len. * \param add The additional data field. This must be a readable buffer * of at least that \p add_len Bytes.. * \param add_len The length of additional data in Bytes. * This must be less than 2^16 - 2^8. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater * than zero, \p input must be a readable buffer of at least * that length. * \param output The buffer holding the output data. If \p length is greater * than zero, \p output must be a writable buffer of at least * that length. * \param tag The buffer holding the authentication field. This must be a * readable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. * \param tag_len The length of the authentication field to generate in Bytes: * 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 or 16. * * \return \c 0 on success. This indicates that the message is authentic. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED if the tag does not match. * \return A cipher-specific error code on calculation failure. */ int mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ); /** * \brief This function performs a CCM* authenticated decryption of a * buffer. * * \note When using this function in a variable tag length context, * the tag length has to be decoded from \p iv and passed to * this function as \p tag_len. (\p tag needs to be adjusted * accordingly.) * * \param ctx The CCM context to use for decryption. This must be * initialized and bound to a key. * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. * \param iv The initialization vector (nonce). This must be a readable * buffer of at least \p iv_len Bytes. * \param iv_len The length of the nonce in Bytes: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, * or 13. The length L of the message length field is * 15 - \p iv_len. * \param add The additional data field. This must be a readable buffer of * at least that \p add_len Bytes. * \param add_len The length of additional data in Bytes. * This must be less than 2^16 - 2^8. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater * than zero, \p input must be a readable buffer of at least * that length. * \param output The buffer holding the output data. If \p length is greater * than zero, \p output must be a writable buffer of at least * that length. * \param tag The buffer holding the authentication field. This must be a * readable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. * \param tag_len The length of the authentication field in Bytes. * 0, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 or 16. * * \warning Passing \c 0 as \p tag_len means that the message is nos * longer authenticated. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED if the tag does not match. * \return A cipher-specific error code on calculation failure. */ int mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) /** * \brief The CCM checkup routine. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return \c 1 on failure. */ int mbedtls_ccm_self_test( int verbose ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST && MBEDTLS_AES_C */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_H */ usr/include/mbedtls/certs.h0000644000000000000000000002216313764415275014755 0ustar rootroot/** * \file certs.h * * \brief Sample certificates and DHM parameters for testing */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CERTS_H #define MBEDTLS_CERTS_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* List of all PEM-encoded CA certificates, terminated by NULL; * PEM encoded if MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C is enabled, DER encoded * otherwise. */ extern const char * mbedtls_test_cas[]; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cas_len[]; /* List of all DER-encoded CA certificates, terminated by NULL */ extern const unsigned char * mbedtls_test_cas_der[]; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cas_der_len[]; #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) /* Concatenation of all CA certificates in PEM format if available */ extern const char mbedtls_test_cas_pem[]; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cas_pem_len; #endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ /* * CA test certificates */ extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_pem[]; extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_pem[]; extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_pem[]; extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_pem[]; extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_pem[]; extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_pem[]; extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_pem[]; extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_der[]; extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_der[]; extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_der[]; extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_der[]; extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_der[]; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_pem_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_pem_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_pem_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_pem_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_pem_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_pem_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_pem_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_der_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_der_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_der_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_der_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_der_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_der_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_der_len; /* Config-dependent dispatch between PEM and DER encoding * (PEM if enabled, otherwise DER) */ extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec[]; extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec[]; extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec[]; extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa[]; extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa[]; extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1[]; extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256[]; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_len; /* Config-dependent dispatch between SHA-1 and SHA-256 * (SHA-256 if enabled, otherwise SHA-1) */ extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa[]; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_len; /* Config-dependent dispatch between EC and RSA * (RSA if enabled, otherwise EC) */ extern const char * mbedtls_test_ca_crt; extern const char * mbedtls_test_ca_key; extern const char * mbedtls_test_ca_pwd; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_len; /* * Server test certificates */ extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_pem[]; extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_pem[]; extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_pem[]; extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_pem[]; extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_pem[]; extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_pem[]; extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_pem[]; extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_der[]; extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_der[]; extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_der[]; extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_der[]; extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_der[]; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_pem_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_pem_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_pem_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_pem_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_pem_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_pem_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_pem_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_der_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_der_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_der_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_der_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_der_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_der_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_der_len; /* Config-dependent dispatch between PEM and DER encoding * (PEM if enabled, otherwise DER) */ extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec[]; extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec[]; extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec[]; extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa[]; extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa[]; extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1[]; extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256[]; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_len; /* Config-dependent dispatch between SHA-1 and SHA-256 * (SHA-256 if enabled, otherwise SHA-1) */ extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa[]; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_len; /* Config-dependent dispatch between EC and RSA * (RSA if enabled, otherwise EC) */ extern const char * mbedtls_test_srv_crt; extern const char * mbedtls_test_srv_key; extern const char * mbedtls_test_srv_pwd; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_len; /* * Client test certificates */ extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_pem[]; extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_pem[]; extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec_pem[]; extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_pem[]; extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa_pem[]; extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_pem[]; extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_der[]; extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_der[]; extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_der[]; extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_der[]; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_pem_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_pem_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec_pem_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_pem_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa_pem_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_pem_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_der_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_der_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_der_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_der_len; /* Config-dependent dispatch between PEM and DER encoding * (PEM if enabled, otherwise DER) */ extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec[]; extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec[]; extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec[]; extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa[]; extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa[]; extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa[]; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_len; /* Config-dependent dispatch between EC and RSA * (RSA if enabled, otherwise EC) */ extern const char * mbedtls_test_cli_crt; extern const char * mbedtls_test_cli_key; extern const char * mbedtls_test_cli_pwd; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_len; extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_len; #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* certs.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/chacha20.h0000644000000000000000000002102413764415275015201 0ustar rootroot/** * \file chacha20.h * * \brief This file contains ChaCha20 definitions and functions. * * ChaCha20 is a stream cipher that can encrypt and decrypt * information. ChaCha was created by Daniel Bernstein as a variant of * its Salsa cipher https://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf * ChaCha20 is the variant with 20 rounds, that was also standardized * in RFC 7539. * * \author Daniel King */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_H #define MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include #include #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0051 /**< Invalid input parameter(s). */ /* MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is deprecated and should not be * used. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x0053 /**< Feature not available. For example, s part of the API is not implemented. */ /* MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0055 /**< Chacha20 hardware accelerator failed. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT) typedef struct mbedtls_chacha20_context { uint32_t state[16]; /*! The state (before round operations). */ uint8_t keystream8[64]; /*! Leftover keystream bytes. */ size_t keystream_bytes_used; /*! Number of keystream bytes already used. */ } mbedtls_chacha20_context; #else /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT */ #include "chacha20_alt.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT */ /** * \brief This function initializes the specified ChaCha20 context. * * It must be the first API called before using * the context. * * It is usually followed by calls to * \c mbedtls_chacha20_setkey() and * \c mbedtls_chacha20_starts(), then one or more calls to * to \c mbedtls_chacha20_update(), and finally to * \c mbedtls_chacha20_free(). * * \param ctx The ChaCha20 context to initialize. * This must not be \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_chacha20_init( mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx ); /** * \brief This function releases and clears the specified * ChaCha20 context. * * \param ctx The ChaCha20 context to clear. This may be \c NULL, * in which case this function is a no-op. If it is not * \c NULL, it must point to an initialized context. * */ void mbedtls_chacha20_free( mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx ); /** * \brief This function sets the encryption/decryption key. * * \note After using this function, you must also call * \c mbedtls_chacha20_starts() to set a nonce before you * start encrypting/decrypting data with * \c mbedtls_chacha_update(). * * \param ctx The ChaCha20 context to which the key should be bound. * It must be initialized. * \param key The encryption/decryption key. This must be \c 32 Bytes * in length. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA if ctx or key is NULL. */ int mbedtls_chacha20_setkey( mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[32] ); /** * \brief This function sets the nonce and initial counter value. * * \note A ChaCha20 context can be re-used with the same key by * calling this function to change the nonce. * * \warning You must never use the same nonce twice with the same key. * This would void any confidentiality guarantees for the * messages encrypted with the same nonce and key. * * \param ctx The ChaCha20 context to which the nonce should be bound. * It must be initialized and bound to a key. * \param nonce The nonce. This must be \c 12 Bytes in size. * \param counter The initial counter value. This is usually \c 0. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA if ctx or nonce is * NULL. */ int mbedtls_chacha20_starts( mbedtls_chacha20_context* ctx, const unsigned char nonce[12], uint32_t counter ); /** * \brief This function encrypts or decrypts data. * * Since ChaCha20 is a stream cipher, the same operation is * used for encrypting and decrypting data. * * \note The \p input and \p output pointers must either be equal or * point to non-overlapping buffers. * * \note \c mbedtls_chacha20_setkey() and * \c mbedtls_chacha20_starts() must be called at least once * to setup the context before this function can be called. * * \note This function can be called multiple times in a row in * order to encrypt of decrypt data piecewise with the same * key and nonce. * * \param ctx The ChaCha20 context to use for encryption or decryption. * It must be initialized and bound to a key and nonce. * \param size The length of the input data in Bytes. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. * This pointer can be \c NULL if `size == 0`. * \param output The buffer holding the output data. * This must be able to hold \p size Bytes. * This pointer can be \c NULL if `size == 0`. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_chacha20_update( mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx, size_t size, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); /** * \brief This function encrypts or decrypts data with ChaCha20 and * the given key and nonce. * * Since ChaCha20 is a stream cipher, the same operation is * used for encrypting and decrypting data. * * \warning You must never use the same (key, nonce) pair more than * once. This would void any confidentiality guarantees for * the messages encrypted with the same nonce and key. * * \note The \p input and \p output pointers must either be equal or * point to non-overlapping buffers. * * \param key The encryption/decryption key. * This must be \c 32 Bytes in length. * \param nonce The nonce. This must be \c 12 Bytes in size. * \param counter The initial counter value. This is usually \c 0. * \param size The length of the input data in Bytes. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. * This pointer can be \c NULL if `size == 0`. * \param output The buffer holding the output data. * This must be able to hold \p size Bytes. * This pointer can be \c NULL if `size == 0`. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_chacha20_crypt( const unsigned char key[32], const unsigned char nonce[12], uint32_t counter, size_t size, const unsigned char* input, unsigned char* output ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** * \brief The ChaCha20 checkup routine. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return \c 1 on failure. */ int mbedtls_chacha20_self_test( int verbose ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_H */ usr/include/mbedtls/chachapoly.h0000644000000000000000000003736613764415275015763 0ustar rootroot/** * \file chachapoly.h * * \brief This file contains the AEAD-ChaCha20-Poly1305 definitions and * functions. * * ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an algorithm for Authenticated Encryption * with Associated Data (AEAD) that can be used to encrypt and * authenticate data. It is based on ChaCha20 and Poly1305 by Daniel * Bernstein and was standardized in RFC 7539. * * \author Daniel King */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_H #define MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif /* for shared error codes */ #include "mbedtls/poly1305.h" #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE -0x0054 /**< The requested operation is not permitted in the current state. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_AUTH_FAILED -0x0056 /**< Authenticated decryption failed: data was not authentic. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif typedef enum { MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT, /**< The mode value for performing encryption. */ MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_DECRYPT /**< The mode value for performing decryption. */ } mbedtls_chachapoly_mode_t; #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT) #include "mbedtls/chacha20.h" typedef struct mbedtls_chachapoly_context { mbedtls_chacha20_context chacha20_ctx; /**< The ChaCha20 context. */ mbedtls_poly1305_context poly1305_ctx; /**< The Poly1305 context. */ uint64_t aad_len; /**< The length (bytes) of the Additional Authenticated Data. */ uint64_t ciphertext_len; /**< The length (bytes) of the ciphertext. */ int state; /**< The current state of the context. */ mbedtls_chachapoly_mode_t mode; /**< Cipher mode (encrypt or decrypt). */ } mbedtls_chachapoly_context; #else /* !MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT */ #include "chachapoly_alt.h" #endif /* !MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT */ /** * \brief This function initializes the specified ChaCha20-Poly1305 context. * * It must be the first API called before using * the context. It must be followed by a call to * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey() before any operation can be * done, and to \c mbedtls_chachapoly_free() once all * operations with that context have been finished. * * In order to encrypt or decrypt full messages at once, for * each message you should make a single call to * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_crypt_and_tag() or * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt(). * * In order to encrypt messages piecewise, for each * message you should make a call to * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_starts(), then 0 or more calls to * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_update_aad(), then 0 or more calls to * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_update(), then one call to * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_finish(). * * \warning Decryption with the piecewise API is discouraged! Always * use \c mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt() when possible! * * If however this is not possible because the data is too * large to fit in memory, you need to: * * - call \c mbedtls_chachapoly_starts() and (if needed) * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_update_aad() as above, * - call \c mbedtls_chachapoly_update() multiple times and * ensure its output (the plaintext) is NOT used in any other * way than placing it in temporary storage at this point, * - call \c mbedtls_chachapoly_finish() to compute the * authentication tag and compared it in constant time to the * tag received with the ciphertext. * * If the tags are not equal, you must immediately discard * all previous outputs of \c mbedtls_chachapoly_update(), * otherwise you can now safely use the plaintext. * * \param ctx The ChachaPoly context to initialize. Must not be \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_chachapoly_init( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx ); /** * \brief This function releases and clears the specified * ChaCha20-Poly1305 context. * * \param ctx The ChachaPoly context to clear. This may be \c NULL, in which * case this function is a no-op. */ void mbedtls_chachapoly_free( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx ); /** * \brief This function sets the ChaCha20-Poly1305 * symmetric encryption key. * * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context to which the key should be * bound. This must be initialized. * \param key The \c 256 Bit (\c 32 Bytes) key. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[32] ); /** * \brief This function starts a ChaCha20-Poly1305 encryption or * decryption operation. * * \warning You must never use the same nonce twice with the same key. * This would void any confidentiality and authenticity * guarantees for the messages encrypted with the same nonce * and key. * * \note If the context is being used for AAD only (no data to * encrypt or decrypt) then \p mode can be set to any value. * * \warning Decryption with the piecewise API is discouraged, see the * warning on \c mbedtls_chachapoly_init(). * * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context. This must be initialized * and bound to a key. * \param nonce The nonce/IV to use for the message. * This must be a redable buffer of length \c 12 Bytes. * \param mode The operation to perform: #MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT or * #MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_DECRYPT (discouraged, see warning). * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_chachapoly_starts( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, const unsigned char nonce[12], mbedtls_chachapoly_mode_t mode ); /** * \brief This function feeds additional data to be authenticated * into an ongoing ChaCha20-Poly1305 operation. * * The Additional Authenticated Data (AAD), also called * Associated Data (AD) is only authenticated but not * encrypted nor included in the encrypted output. It is * usually transmitted separately from the ciphertext or * computed locally by each party. * * \note This function is called before data is encrypted/decrypted. * I.e. call this function to process the AAD before calling * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_update(). * * You may call this function multiple times to process * an arbitrary amount of AAD. It is permitted to call * this function 0 times, if no AAD is used. * * This function cannot be called any more if data has * been processed by \c mbedtls_chachapoly_update(), * or if the context has been finished. * * \warning Decryption with the piecewise API is discouraged, see the * warning on \c mbedtls_chachapoly_init(). * * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context. This must be initialized * and bound to a key. * \param aad_len The length in Bytes of the AAD. The length has no * restrictions. * \param aad Buffer containing the AAD. * This pointer can be \c NULL if `aad_len == 0`. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA * if \p ctx or \p aad are NULL. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE * if the operations has not been started or has been * finished, or if the AAD has been finished. */ int mbedtls_chachapoly_update_aad( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, const unsigned char *aad, size_t aad_len ); /** * \brief Thus function feeds data to be encrypted or decrypted * into an on-going ChaCha20-Poly1305 * operation. * * The direction (encryption or decryption) depends on the * mode that was given when calling * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_starts(). * * You may call this function multiple times to process * an arbitrary amount of data. It is permitted to call * this function 0 times, if no data is to be encrypted * or decrypted. * * \warning Decryption with the piecewise API is discouraged, see the * warning on \c mbedtls_chachapoly_init(). * * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context to use. This must be initialized. * \param len The length (in bytes) of the data to encrypt or decrypt. * \param input The buffer containing the data to encrypt or decrypt. * This pointer can be \c NULL if `len == 0`. * \param output The buffer to where the encrypted or decrypted data is * written. This must be able to hold \p len bytes. * This pointer can be \c NULL if `len == 0`. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE * if the operation has not been started or has been * finished. * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_chachapoly_update( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, size_t len, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); /** * \brief This function finished the ChaCha20-Poly1305 operation and * generates the MAC (authentication tag). * * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context to use. This must be initialized. * \param mac The buffer to where the 128-bit (16 bytes) MAC is written. * * \warning Decryption with the piecewise API is discouraged, see the * warning on \c mbedtls_chachapoly_init(). * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE * if the operation has not been started or has been * finished. * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_chachapoly_finish( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, unsigned char mac[16] ); /** * \brief This function performs a complete ChaCha20-Poly1305 * authenticated encryption with the previously-set key. * * \note Before using this function, you must set the key with * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey(). * * \warning You must never use the same nonce twice with the same key. * This would void any confidentiality and authenticity * guarantees for the messages encrypted with the same nonce * and key. * * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context to use (holds the key). * This must be initialized. * \param length The length (in bytes) of the data to encrypt or decrypt. * \param nonce The 96-bit (12 bytes) nonce/IV to use. * \param aad The buffer containing the additional authenticated * data (AAD). This pointer can be \c NULL if `aad_len == 0`. * \param aad_len The length (in bytes) of the AAD data to process. * \param input The buffer containing the data to encrypt or decrypt. * This pointer can be \c NULL if `ilen == 0`. * \param output The buffer to where the encrypted or decrypted data * is written. This pointer can be \c NULL if `ilen == 0`. * \param tag The buffer to where the computed 128-bit (16 bytes) MAC * is written. This must not be \c NULL. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_chachapoly_encrypt_and_tag( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char nonce[12], const unsigned char *aad, size_t aad_len, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, unsigned char tag[16] ); /** * \brief This function performs a complete ChaCha20-Poly1305 * authenticated decryption with the previously-set key. * * \note Before using this function, you must set the key with * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey(). * * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context to use (holds the key). * \param length The length (in Bytes) of the data to decrypt. * \param nonce The \c 96 Bit (\c 12 bytes) nonce/IV to use. * \param aad The buffer containing the additional authenticated data (AAD). * This pointer can be \c NULL if `aad_len == 0`. * \param aad_len The length (in bytes) of the AAD data to process. * \param tag The buffer holding the authentication tag. * This must be a readable buffer of length \c 16 Bytes. * \param input The buffer containing the data to decrypt. * This pointer can be \c NULL if `ilen == 0`. * \param output The buffer to where the decrypted data is written. * This pointer can be \c NULL if `ilen == 0`. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_AUTH_FAILED * if the data was not authentic. * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char nonce[12], const unsigned char *aad, size_t aad_len, const unsigned char tag[16], const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** * \brief The ChaCha20-Poly1305 checkup routine. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return \c 1 on failure. */ int mbedtls_chachapoly_self_test( int verbose ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_H */ usr/include/mbedtls/check_config.h0000644000000000000000000010616313764415275016242 0ustar rootroot/** * \file check_config.h * * \brief Consistency checks for configuration options */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ /* * It is recommended to include this file from your config.h * in order to catch dependency issues early. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CHECK_CONFIG_H #define MBEDTLS_CHECK_CONFIG_H /* * We assume CHAR_BIT is 8 in many places. In practice, this is true on our * target platforms, so not an issue, but let's just be extra sure. */ #include #if CHAR_BIT != 8 #error "mbed TLS requires a platform with 8-bit chars" #endif #if defined(_WIN32) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C is required on Windows" #endif /* Fix the config here. Not convenient to put an #ifdef _WIN32 in config.h as * it would confuse config.py. */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO) #define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO) #define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT #endif #endif /* _WIN32 */ #if defined(TARGET_LIKE_MBED) && \ ( defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) ) #error "The NET and TIMING modules are not available for mbed OS - please use the network and timing functions provided by mbed OS" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) && \ !defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__clang__) #error "MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING only works with GCC and Clang" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) #error "MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE without MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME does not make sense" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) #error "MBEDTLS_AESNI_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) #error "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) #error "MBEDTLS_DHM_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) #error "MBEDTLS_CMAC_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) && \ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) ) #error "MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) #error "MBEDTLS_ECDH_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && \ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) || \ !( defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) ) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) ) #error "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C) && \ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) ) #error "MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) && \ ( defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) ) #error "MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE defined, but it cannot coexist with an alternative or PSA-based ECP implementation" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) && \ ! defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) #error "MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE defined, but not MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) #error "MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED defined, but MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT not disabled" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) && !defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) #error "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || ( \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) ) ) #error "MBEDTLS_ECP_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && !( \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)) #error "MBEDTLS_ECP_C requires a DRBG module unless MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG is defined or an alternative implementation is used" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) #error "MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C defined, but not all prerequesites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && (!defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) #error "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN) && (MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN > 64) #error "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN value too high" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && \ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) ) \ && defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN) && (MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN > 32) #error "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN value too high" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) #error "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(__has_feature) #if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer) #define MBEDTLS_HAS_MEMSAN #endif #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN) && !defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_MEMSAN) #error "MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN requires building with MemorySanitizer" #endif #undef MBEDTLS_HAS_MEMSAN #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) && \ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES) ) #error "MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) && \ ( defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) || defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) ) #error "MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY defined, but entropy sources too" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && ( \ !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) ) #error "MBEDTLS_GCM_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) #error "MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) #error "MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) #error "MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) #error "MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) #error "MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) #error "MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) #error "MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) #error "MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) #error "MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) #error "MBEDTLS_HKDF_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) #error "MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) && \ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) ) #error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) && \ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) ) #error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) #error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) #error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) ) #error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) ) #error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) && \ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) ) #error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) && \ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) ) #error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) ) #error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) && \ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) ) #error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) && \ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) ) #error "!MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE requires MBEDTLS_SHA512_C, MBEDTLS_SHA256_C or MBEDTLS_SHA1_C" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) && \ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) ) #error "MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) #error "MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE defined, but not all prerequesites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) && !defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) #error "MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG defined, but not all prerequesites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) #error "MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) #error "MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) #error "MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) && \ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) ) #error "MBEDTLS_PK_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) #error "MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) #error "MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) #error "MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C) #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) #error "MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" #elif defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) #warning "MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO) &&\ ( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT) ||\ defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT) ) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT/MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT cannot be defined simultaneously" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT) &&\ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) ||\ !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) ) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO) &&\ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) ||\ !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) ) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO) &&\ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) ||\ !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) ) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO) &&\ ( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME) ||\ defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT) ) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME/MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT cannot be defined simultaneously" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO) &&\ ( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME) ||\ defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT) ) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME/MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT cannot be defined simultaneously" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO) &&\ ( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF) ||\ defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT) ) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF/MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT cannot be defined simultaneously" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO) &&\ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) ) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO) &&\ defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE cannot be defined simultaneously" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO must be defined if MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO is" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO) &&\ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) ) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO) &&\ defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC cannot be defined simultaneously" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO must be defined if MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO is" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO) &&\ ( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF) ||\ defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT) ) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF/MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT cannot be defined simultaneously" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO) &&\ ( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF) ||\ defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT) ) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF/MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT cannot be defined simultaneously" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR) &&\ !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT) &&\ !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME) &&\ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT) ||\ !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) ) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF) &&\ !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF) &&\ !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF) &&\ !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) &&\ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) ) #error "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT) &&\ !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ) &&\ !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE) &&\ !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_READ_MACRO) &&\ ( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ) ||\ defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT) ) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_READ_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ cannot be defined simultaneously" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_WRITE_MACRO) &&\ ( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE) ||\ defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT) ) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_WRITE_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE cannot be defined simultaneously" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && \ !( defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) ) #error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) #error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) && \ ! ( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) ) #error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) && \ ! defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) #error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) && \ !( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) ) #error "MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES) #error "MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY is not compatible with actual entropy sources" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) #error "MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) #error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER defined, but it cannot coexist with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO." #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) ) #error "MBEDTLS_RSA_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) ) #error "MBEDTLS_RSA_C defined, but none of the PKCS1 versions enabled" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) && \ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) ) #error "MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) #error "MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 defined without MBEDTLS_SHA512_C" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) ) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) ) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) ) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) ) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) ) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)) && \ !(defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) ) #error "One or more versions of the TLS protocol are enabled " \ "but no key exchange methods defined with MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_xxxx" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) ) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && (!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C defined, but no protocols are active" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1)) #error "Illegal protocol selection" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)) #error "Illegal protocol selection" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && (!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1))) #error "Illegal protocol selection" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) && \ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) ) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) ) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX) && \ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX > 255 #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX too large (max 255)" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX) && \ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX > 255 #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX too large (max 255)" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) && \ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) ) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC defined, but not all prerequsites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET defined, but not all prerequsites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL) #error "MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #define MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL) #error "MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #define MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL) #error "MBEDTLS_THREADING_C defined, single threading implementation required" #endif #undef MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) #error "MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES) && !defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C) #error "MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) ) #error "MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) ) #error "MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) #error "MBEDTLS_CERTS_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) ) #error "MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) ) #error "MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) ) #error "MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) ) #error "MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) ) #error "MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) #error "MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 and MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 cannot be defined simultaneously" #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 && MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 */ #if ( defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) || defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) ) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) #error "MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32/MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 and MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM cannot be defined simultaneously" #endif /* (MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 || MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" #elif defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) #warning "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO) #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" #elif defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) #warning "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" #elif defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) #warning "MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" #endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) ) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif /* * Avoid warning from -pedantic. This is a convenient place for this * workaround since this is included by every single file before the * #if defined(MBEDTLS_xxx_C) that results in empty translation units. */ typedef int mbedtls_iso_c_forbids_empty_translation_units; #endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_CONFIG_H */ usr/include/mbedtls/cipher.h0000644000000000000000000014531013764415275015107 0ustar rootroot/** * \file cipher.h * * \brief This file contains an abstraction interface for use with the cipher * primitives provided by the library. It provides a common interface to all of * the available cipher operations. * * \author Adriaan de Jong */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CIPHER_H #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM #endif #if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) #define inline __inline #endif #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x6080 /**< The selected feature is not available. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x6100 /**< Bad input parameters. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED -0x6180 /**< Failed to allocate memory. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING -0x6200 /**< Input data contains invalid padding and is rejected. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED -0x6280 /**< Decryption of block requires a full block. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED -0x6300 /**< Authentication failed (for AEAD modes). */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT -0x6380 /**< The context is invalid. For example, because it was freed. */ /* MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x6400 /**< Cipher hardware accelerator failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN 0x01 /**< Cipher accepts IVs of variable length. */ #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN 0x02 /**< Cipher accepts keys of variable length. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /** * \brief Supported cipher types. * * \warning RC4 and DES are considered weak ciphers and their use * constitutes a security risk. Arm recommends considering stronger * ciphers instead. */ typedef enum { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_NONE = 0, /**< Placeholder to mark the end of cipher ID lists. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_NULL, /**< The identity cipher, treated as a stream cipher. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, /**< The AES cipher. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_DES, /**< The DES cipher. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_3DES, /**< The Triple DES cipher. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA, /**< The Camellia cipher. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_BLOWFISH, /**< The Blowfish cipher. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARC4, /**< The RC4 cipher. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARIA, /**< The Aria cipher. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CHACHA20, /**< The ChaCha20 cipher. */ } mbedtls_cipher_id_t; /** * \brief Supported {cipher type, cipher mode} pairs. * * \warning RC4 and DES are considered weak ciphers and their use * constitutes a security risk. Arm recommends considering stronger * ciphers instead. */ typedef enum { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE = 0, /**< Placeholder to mark the end of cipher-pair lists. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, /**< The identity stream cipher. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB, /**< AES cipher with 128-bit ECB mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB, /**< AES cipher with 192-bit ECB mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB, /**< AES cipher with 256-bit ECB mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, /**< AES cipher with 128-bit CBC mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC, /**< AES cipher with 192-bit CBC mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, /**< AES cipher with 256-bit CBC mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128, /**< AES cipher with 128-bit CFB128 mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CFB128, /**< AES cipher with 192-bit CFB128 mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CFB128, /**< AES cipher with 256-bit CFB128 mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR, /**< AES cipher with 128-bit CTR mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CTR, /**< AES cipher with 192-bit CTR mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CTR, /**< AES cipher with 256-bit CTR mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, /**< AES cipher with 128-bit GCM mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM, /**< AES cipher with 192-bit GCM mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, /**< AES cipher with 256-bit GCM mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_ECB, /**< Camellia cipher with 128-bit ECB mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_ECB, /**< Camellia cipher with 192-bit ECB mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_ECB, /**< Camellia cipher with 256-bit ECB mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, /**< Camellia cipher with 128-bit CBC mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC, /**< Camellia cipher with 192-bit CBC mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, /**< Camellia cipher with 256-bit CBC mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128, /**< Camellia cipher with 128-bit CFB128 mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CFB128, /**< Camellia cipher with 192-bit CFB128 mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CFB128, /**< Camellia cipher with 256-bit CFB128 mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR, /**< Camellia cipher with 128-bit CTR mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CTR, /**< Camellia cipher with 192-bit CTR mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CTR, /**< Camellia cipher with 256-bit CTR mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, /**< Camellia cipher with 128-bit GCM mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM, /**< Camellia cipher with 192-bit GCM mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, /**< Camellia cipher with 256-bit GCM mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_ECB, /**< DES cipher with ECB mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC, /**< DES cipher with CBC mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_ECB, /**< DES cipher with EDE ECB mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC, /**< DES cipher with EDE CBC mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB, /**< DES cipher with EDE3 ECB mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, /**< DES cipher with EDE3 CBC mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_ECB, /**< Blowfish cipher with ECB mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC, /**< Blowfish cipher with CBC mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64, /**< Blowfish cipher with CFB64 mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR, /**< Blowfish cipher with CTR mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, /**< RC4 cipher with 128-bit mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, /**< AES cipher with 128-bit CCM mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM, /**< AES cipher with 192-bit CCM mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, /**< AES cipher with 256-bit CCM mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM, /**< Camellia cipher with 128-bit CCM mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM, /**< Camellia cipher with 192-bit CCM mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM, /**< Camellia cipher with 256-bit CCM mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_ECB, /**< Aria cipher with 128-bit key and ECB mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_ECB, /**< Aria cipher with 192-bit key and ECB mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_ECB, /**< Aria cipher with 256-bit key and ECB mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, /**< Aria cipher with 128-bit key and CBC mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC, /**< Aria cipher with 192-bit key and CBC mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, /**< Aria cipher with 256-bit key and CBC mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CFB128, /**< Aria cipher with 128-bit key and CFB-128 mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CFB128, /**< Aria cipher with 192-bit key and CFB-128 mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CFB128, /**< Aria cipher with 256-bit key and CFB-128 mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CTR, /**< Aria cipher with 128-bit key and CTR mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CTR, /**< Aria cipher with 192-bit key and CTR mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CTR, /**< Aria cipher with 256-bit key and CTR mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, /**< Aria cipher with 128-bit key and GCM mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_GCM, /**< Aria cipher with 192-bit key and GCM mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, /**< Aria cipher with 256-bit key and GCM mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM, /**< Aria cipher with 128-bit key and CCM mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM, /**< Aria cipher with 192-bit key and CCM mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM, /**< Aria cipher with 256-bit key and CCM mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB, /**< AES 128-bit cipher in OFB mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB, /**< AES 192-bit cipher in OFB mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB, /**< AES 256-bit cipher in OFB mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_XTS, /**< AES 128-bit cipher in XTS block mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_XTS, /**< AES 256-bit cipher in XTS block mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20, /**< ChaCha20 stream cipher. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, /**< ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD cipher. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KW, /**< AES cipher with 128-bit NIST KW mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KW, /**< AES cipher with 192-bit NIST KW mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KW, /**< AES cipher with 256-bit NIST KW mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KWP, /**< AES cipher with 128-bit NIST KWP mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KWP, /**< AES cipher with 192-bit NIST KWP mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KWP, /**< AES cipher with 256-bit NIST KWP mode. */ } mbedtls_cipher_type_t; /** Supported cipher modes. */ typedef enum { MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE = 0, /**< None. */ MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, /**< The ECB cipher mode. */ MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, /**< The CBC cipher mode. */ MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, /**< The CFB cipher mode. */ MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB, /**< The OFB cipher mode. */ MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, /**< The CTR cipher mode. */ MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, /**< The GCM cipher mode. */ MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM, /**< The stream cipher mode. */ MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, /**< The CCM cipher mode. */ MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS, /**< The XTS cipher mode. */ MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY, /**< The ChaCha-Poly cipher mode. */ MBEDTLS_MODE_KW, /**< The SP800-38F KW mode */ MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP, /**< The SP800-38F KWP mode */ } mbedtls_cipher_mode_t; /** Supported cipher padding types. */ typedef enum { MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7 = 0, /**< PKCS7 padding (default). */ MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS, /**< ISO/IEC 7816-4 padding. */ MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN, /**< ANSI X.923 padding. */ MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS, /**< Zero padding (not reversible). */ MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE, /**< Never pad (full blocks only). */ } mbedtls_cipher_padding_t; /** Type of operation. */ typedef enum { MBEDTLS_OPERATION_NONE = -1, MBEDTLS_DECRYPT = 0, MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT, } mbedtls_operation_t; enum { /** Undefined key length. */ MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_NONE = 0, /** Key length, in bits (including parity), for DES keys. */ MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES = 64, /** Key length in bits, including parity, for DES in two-key EDE. */ MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE = 128, /** Key length in bits, including parity, for DES in three-key EDE. */ MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE3 = 192, }; /** Maximum length of any IV, in Bytes. */ /* This should ideally be derived automatically from list of ciphers. * This should be kept in sync with MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH defined * in ssl_internal.h. */ #define MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH 16 /** Maximum block size of any cipher, in Bytes. */ /* This should ideally be derived automatically from list of ciphers. * This should be kept in sync with MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH defined * in ssl_internal.h. */ #define MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH 16 /** Maximum key length, in Bytes. */ /* This should ideally be derived automatically from list of ciphers. * For now, only check whether XTS is enabled which uses 64 Byte keys, * and use 32 Bytes as an upper bound for the maximum key length otherwise. * This should be kept in sync with MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH defined * in ssl_internal.h, which however deliberately ignores the case of XTS * since the latter isn't used in SSL/TLS. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) #define MBEDTLS_MAX_KEY_LENGTH 64 #else #define MBEDTLS_MAX_KEY_LENGTH 32 #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ /** * Base cipher information (opaque struct). */ typedef struct mbedtls_cipher_base_t mbedtls_cipher_base_t; /** * CMAC context (opaque struct). */ typedef struct mbedtls_cmac_context_t mbedtls_cmac_context_t; /** * Cipher information. Allows calling cipher functions * in a generic way. */ typedef struct mbedtls_cipher_info_t { /** Full cipher identifier. For example, * MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC. */ mbedtls_cipher_type_t type; /** The cipher mode. For example, MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC. */ mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode; /** The cipher key length, in bits. This is the * default length for variable sized ciphers. * Includes parity bits for ciphers like DES. */ unsigned int key_bitlen; /** Name of the cipher. */ const char * name; /** IV or nonce size, in Bytes. * For ciphers that accept variable IV sizes, * this is the recommended size. */ unsigned int iv_size; /** Bitflag comprised of MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN and * MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN indicating whether the * cipher supports variable IV or variable key sizes, respectively. */ int flags; /** The block size, in Bytes. */ unsigned int block_size; /** Struct for base cipher information and functions. */ const mbedtls_cipher_base_t *base; } mbedtls_cipher_info_t; /** * Generic cipher context. */ typedef struct mbedtls_cipher_context_t { /** Information about the associated cipher. */ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; /** Key length to use. */ int key_bitlen; /** Operation that the key of the context has been * initialized for. */ mbedtls_operation_t operation; #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING) /** Padding functions to use, if relevant for * the specific cipher mode. */ void (*add_padding)( unsigned char *output, size_t olen, size_t data_len ); int (*get_padding)( unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, size_t *data_len ); #endif /** Buffer for input that has not been processed yet. */ unsigned char unprocessed_data[MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; /** Number of Bytes that have not been processed yet. */ size_t unprocessed_len; /** Current IV or NONCE_COUNTER for CTR-mode, data unit (or sector) number * for XTS-mode. */ unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; /** IV size in Bytes, for ciphers with variable-length IVs. */ size_t iv_size; /** The cipher-specific context. */ void *cipher_ctx; #if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) /** CMAC-specific context. */ mbedtls_cmac_context_t *cmac_ctx; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) /** Indicates whether the cipher operations should be performed * by Mbed TLS' own crypto library or an external implementation * of the PSA Crypto API. * This is unset if the cipher context was established through * mbedtls_cipher_setup(), and set if it was established through * mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa(). */ unsigned char psa_enabled; #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ } mbedtls_cipher_context_t; /** * \brief This function retrieves the list of ciphers supported * by the generic cipher module. * * For any cipher identifier in the returned list, you can * obtain the corresponding generic cipher information structure * via mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(), which can then be used * to prepare a cipher context via mbedtls_cipher_setup(). * * * \return A statically-allocated array of cipher identifiers * of type cipher_type_t. The last entry is zero. */ const int *mbedtls_cipher_list( void ); /** * \brief This function retrieves the cipher-information * structure associated with the given cipher name. * * \param cipher_name Name of the cipher to search for. This must not be * \c NULL. * * \return The cipher information structure associated with the * given \p cipher_name. * \return \c NULL if the associated cipher information is not found. */ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_string( const char *cipher_name ); /** * \brief This function retrieves the cipher-information * structure associated with the given cipher type. * * \param cipher_type Type of the cipher to search for. * * \return The cipher information structure associated with the * given \p cipher_type. * \return \c NULL if the associated cipher information is not found. */ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( const mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type ); /** * \brief This function retrieves the cipher-information * structure associated with the given cipher ID, * key size and mode. * * \param cipher_id The ID of the cipher to search for. For example, * #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES. * \param key_bitlen The length of the key in bits. * \param mode The cipher mode. For example, #MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC. * * \return The cipher information structure associated with the * given \p cipher_id. * \return \c NULL if the associated cipher information is not found. */ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( const mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id, int key_bitlen, const mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode ); /** * \brief This function initializes a \p cipher_context as NONE. * * \param ctx The context to be initialized. This must not be \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_cipher_init( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ); /** * \brief This function frees and clears the cipher-specific * context of \p ctx. Freeing \p ctx itself remains the * responsibility of the caller. * * \param ctx The context to be freed. If this is \c NULL, the * function has no effect, otherwise this must point to an * initialized context. */ void mbedtls_cipher_free( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ); /** * \brief This function initializes a cipher context for * use with the given cipher primitive. * * \param ctx The context to initialize. This must be initialized. * \param cipher_info The cipher to use. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on * parameter-verification failure. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED if allocation of the * cipher-specific context fails. * * \internal Currently, the function also clears the structure. * In future versions, the caller will be required to call * mbedtls_cipher_init() on the structure first. */ int mbedtls_cipher_setup( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) /** * \brief This function initializes a cipher context for * PSA-based use with the given cipher primitive. * * \note See #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO for information on PSA. * * \param ctx The context to initialize. May not be \c NULL. * \param cipher_info The cipher to use. * \param taglen For AEAD ciphers, the length in bytes of the * authentication tag to use. Subsequent uses of * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt() or * mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt() must provide * the same tag length. * For non-AEAD ciphers, the value must be \c 0. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on * parameter-verification failure. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED if allocation of the * cipher-specific context fails. */ int mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info, size_t taglen ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ /** * \brief This function returns the block size of the given cipher. * * \param ctx The context of the cipher. This must be initialized. * * \return The block size of the underlying cipher. * \return \c 0 if \p ctx has not been initialized. */ static inline unsigned int mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) { MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL, 0 ); if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) return 0; return ctx->cipher_info->block_size; } /** * \brief This function returns the mode of operation for * the cipher. For example, MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC. * * \param ctx The context of the cipher. This must be initialized. * * \return The mode of operation. * \return #MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE if \p ctx has not been initialized. */ static inline mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) { MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL, MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE ); if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) return MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE; return ctx->cipher_info->mode; } /** * \brief This function returns the size of the IV or nonce * of the cipher, in Bytes. * * \param ctx The context of the cipher. This must be initialized. * * \return The recommended IV size if no IV has been set. * \return \c 0 for ciphers not using an IV or a nonce. * \return The actual size if an IV has been set. */ static inline int mbedtls_cipher_get_iv_size( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) { MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL, 0 ); if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) return 0; if( ctx->iv_size != 0 ) return (int) ctx->iv_size; return (int) ctx->cipher_info->iv_size; } /** * \brief This function returns the type of the given cipher. * * \param ctx The context of the cipher. This must be initialized. * * \return The type of the cipher. * \return #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE if \p ctx has not been initialized. */ static inline mbedtls_cipher_type_t mbedtls_cipher_get_type( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) { MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE ); if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) return MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE; return ctx->cipher_info->type; } /** * \brief This function returns the name of the given cipher * as a string. * * \param ctx The context of the cipher. This must be initialized. * * \return The name of the cipher. * \return NULL if \p ctx has not been not initialized. */ static inline const char *mbedtls_cipher_get_name( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) { MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL, 0 ); if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) return 0; return ctx->cipher_info->name; } /** * \brief This function returns the key length of the cipher. * * \param ctx The context of the cipher. This must be initialized. * * \return The key length of the cipher in bits. * \return #MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_NONE if ctx \p has not been * initialized. */ static inline int mbedtls_cipher_get_key_bitlen( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) { MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL, MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_NONE ); if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) return MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_NONE; return (int) ctx->cipher_info->key_bitlen; } /** * \brief This function returns the operation of the given cipher. * * \param ctx The context of the cipher. This must be initialized. * * \return The type of operation: #MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT or #MBEDTLS_DECRYPT. * \return #MBEDTLS_OPERATION_NONE if \p ctx has not been initialized. */ static inline mbedtls_operation_t mbedtls_cipher_get_operation( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) { MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL, MBEDTLS_OPERATION_NONE ); if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) return MBEDTLS_OPERATION_NONE; return ctx->operation; } /** * \brief This function sets the key to use with the given context. * * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and * bound to a cipher information structure. * \param key The key to use. This must be a readable buffer of at * least \p key_bitlen Bits. * \param key_bitlen The key length to use, in Bits. * \param operation The operation that the key will be used for: * #MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT or #MBEDTLS_DECRYPT. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on * parameter-verification failure. * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_cipher_setkey( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *key, int key_bitlen, const mbedtls_operation_t operation ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING) /** * \brief This function sets the padding mode, for cipher modes * that use padding. * * The default passing mode is PKCS7 padding. * * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and * bound to a cipher information structure. * \param mode The padding mode. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE * if the selected padding mode is not supported. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the cipher mode * does not support padding. */ int mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, mbedtls_cipher_padding_t mode ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */ /** * \brief This function sets the initialization vector (IV) * or nonce. * * \note Some ciphers do not use IVs nor nonce. For these * ciphers, this function has no effect. * * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and * bound to a cipher information structure. * \param iv The IV to use, or NONCE_COUNTER for CTR-mode ciphers. This * must be a readable buffer of at least \p iv_len Bytes. * \param iv_len The IV length for ciphers with variable-size IV. * This parameter is discarded by ciphers with fixed-size IV. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on * parameter-verification failure. */ int mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len ); /** * \brief This function resets the cipher state. * * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on * parameter-verification failure. */ int mbedtls_cipher_reset( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) /** * \brief This function adds additional data for AEAD ciphers. * Currently supported with GCM and ChaCha20+Poly1305. * This must be called exactly once, after * mbedtls_cipher_reset(). * * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized. * \param ad The additional data to use. This must be a readable * buffer of at least \p ad_len Bytes. * \param ad_len The length of \p ad in Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A specific error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ /** * \brief The generic cipher update function. It encrypts or * decrypts using the given cipher context. Writes as * many block-sized blocks of data as possible to output. * Any data that cannot be written immediately is either * added to the next block, or flushed when * mbedtls_cipher_finish() is called. * Exception: For MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, expects a single block * in size. For example, 16 Bytes for AES. * * \note If the underlying cipher is used in GCM mode, all calls * to this function, except for the last one before * mbedtls_cipher_finish(), must have \p ilen as a * multiple of the block size of the cipher. * * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and * bound to a key. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a * readable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes. * \param ilen The length of the input data. * \param output The buffer for the output data. This must be able to * hold at least `ilen + block_size`. This must not be the * same buffer as \p input. * \param olen The length of the output data, to be updated with the * actual number of Bytes written. This must not be * \c NULL. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on * parameter-verification failure. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE on an * unsupported mode for a cipher. * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_cipher_update( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen ); /** * \brief The generic cipher finalization function. If data still * needs to be flushed from an incomplete block, the data * contained in it is padded to the size of * the last block, and written to the \p output buffer. * * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and * bound to a key. * \param output The buffer to write data to. This needs to be a writable * buffer of at least \p block_size Bytes. * \param olen The length of the data written to the \p output buffer. * This may not be \c NULL. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on * parameter-verification failure. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED on decryption * expecting a full block but not receiving one. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING on invalid padding * while decrypting. * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_cipher_finish( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) /** * \brief This function writes a tag for AEAD ciphers. * Currently supported with GCM and ChaCha20+Poly1305. * This must be called after mbedtls_cipher_finish(). * * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized, * bound to a key, and have just completed a cipher * operation through mbedtls_cipher_finish() the tag for * which should be written. * \param tag The buffer to write the tag to. This must be a writable * buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. * \param tag_len The length of the tag to write. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A specific error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_cipher_write_tag( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ); /** * \brief This function checks the tag for AEAD ciphers. * Currently supported with GCM and ChaCha20+Poly1305. * This must be called after mbedtls_cipher_finish(). * * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized. * \param tag The buffer holding the tag. This must be a readable * buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. * \param tag_len The length of the tag to check. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A specific error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_cipher_check_tag( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ /** * \brief The generic all-in-one encryption/decryption function, * for all ciphers except AEAD constructs. * * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized. * \param iv The IV to use, or NONCE_COUNTER for CTR-mode ciphers. * This must be a readable buffer of at least \p iv_len * Bytes. * \param iv_len The IV length for ciphers with variable-size IV. * This parameter is discarded by ciphers with fixed-size * IV. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a * readable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes. * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. * \param output The buffer for the output data. This must be able to * hold at least `ilen + block_size`. This must not be the * same buffer as \p input. * \param olen The length of the output data, to be updated with the * actual number of Bytes written. This must not be * \c NULL. * * \note Some ciphers do not use IVs nor nonce. For these * ciphers, use \p iv = NULL and \p iv_len = 0. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on * parameter-verification failure. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED on decryption * expecting a full block but not receiving one. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING on invalid padding * while decrypting. * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_cipher_crypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) #if ! defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) #else #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ /** * \brief The generic authenticated encryption (AEAD) function. * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(). * * \note This function only supports AEAD algorithms, not key * wrapping algorithms such as NIST_KW; for this, see * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(). * * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and * bound to a key associated with an AEAD algorithm. * \param iv The nonce to use. This must be a readable buffer of * at least \p iv_len Bytes and must not be \c NULL. * \param iv_len The length of the nonce. This must satisfy the * constraints imposed by the AEAD cipher used. * \param ad The additional data to authenticate. This must be a * readable buffer of at least \p ad_len Bytes, and may * be \c NULL is \p ad_len is \c 0. * \param ad_len The length of \p ad. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a * readable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes, and may be * \c NULL if \p ilen is \c 0. * \param ilen The length of the input data. * \param output The buffer for the output data. This must be a * writable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes, and must * not be \c NULL. * \param olen This will be filled with the actual number of Bytes * written to the \p output buffer. This must point to a * writable object of type \c size_t. * \param tag The buffer for the authentication tag. This must be a * writable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. See note * below regarding restrictions with PSA-based contexts. * \param tag_len The desired length of the authentication tag. This * must match the constraints imposed by the AEAD cipher * used, and in particular must not be \c 0. * * \note If the context is based on PSA (that is, it was set up * with mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa()), then it is required * that \c tag == output + ilen. That is, the tag must be * appended to the ciphertext as recommended by RFC 5116. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on * parameter-verification failure. * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED; /** * \brief The generic authenticated decryption (AEAD) function. * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext(). * * \note This function only supports AEAD algorithms, not key * wrapping algorithms such as NIST_KW; for this, see * mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext(). * * \note If the data is not authentic, then the output buffer * is zeroed out to prevent the unauthentic plaintext being * used, making this interface safer. * * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and * bound to a key associated with an AEAD algorithm. * \param iv The nonce to use. This must be a readable buffer of * at least \p iv_len Bytes and must not be \c NULL. * \param iv_len The length of the nonce. This must satisfy the * constraints imposed by the AEAD cipher used. * \param ad The additional data to authenticate. This must be a * readable buffer of at least \p ad_len Bytes, and may * be \c NULL is \p ad_len is \c 0. * \param ad_len The length of \p ad. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a * readable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes, and may be * \c NULL if \p ilen is \c 0. * \param ilen The length of the input data. * \param output The buffer for the output data. This must be a * writable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes, and must * not be \c NULL. * \param olen This will be filled with the actual number of Bytes * written to the \p output buffer. This must point to a * writable object of type \c size_t. * \param tag The buffer for the authentication tag. This must be a * readable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. See note * below regarding restrictions with PSA-based contexts. * \param tag_len The length of the authentication tag. This must match * the constraints imposed by the AEAD cipher used, and in * particular must not be \c 0. * * \note If the context is based on PSA (that is, it was set up * with mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa()), then it is required * that \c tag == input + len. That is, the tag must be * appended to the ciphertext as recommended by RFC 5116. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on * parameter-verification failure. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED if data is not authentic. * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED; #undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) || defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) /** * \brief The authenticated encryption (AEAD/NIST_KW) function. * * \note For AEAD modes, the tag will be appended to the * ciphertext, as recommended by RFC 5116. * (NIST_KW doesn't have a separate tag.) * * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and * bound to a key, with an AEAD algorithm or NIST_KW. * \param iv The nonce to use. This must be a readable buffer of * at least \p iv_len Bytes and may be \c NULL if \p * iv_len is \c 0. * \param iv_len The length of the nonce. For AEAD ciphers, this must * satisfy the constraints imposed by the cipher used. * For NIST_KW, this must be \c 0. * \param ad The additional data to authenticate. This must be a * readable buffer of at least \p ad_len Bytes, and may * be \c NULL is \p ad_len is \c 0. * \param ad_len The length of \p ad. For NIST_KW, this must be \c 0. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a * readable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes, and may be * \c NULL if \p ilen is \c 0. * \param ilen The length of the input data. * \param output The buffer for the output data. This must be a * writable buffer of at least \p output_len Bytes, and * must not be \c NULL. * \param output_len The length of the \p output buffer in Bytes. For AEAD * ciphers, this must be at least \p ilen + \p tag_len. * For NIST_KW, this must be at least \p ilen + 8 * (rounded up to a multiple of 8 if KWP is used); * \p ilen + 15 is always a safe value. * \param olen This will be filled with the actual number of Bytes * written to the \p output buffer. This must point to a * writable object of type \c size_t. * \param tag_len The desired length of the authentication tag. For AEAD * ciphers, this must match the constraints imposed by * the cipher used, and in particular must not be \c 0. * For NIST_KW, this must be \c 0. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on * parameter-verification failure. * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, size_t *olen, size_t tag_len ); /** * \brief The authenticated encryption (AEAD/NIST_KW) function. * * \note If the data is not authentic, then the output buffer * is zeroed out to prevent the unauthentic plaintext being * used, making this interface safer. * * \note For AEAD modes, the tag must be appended to the * ciphertext, as recommended by RFC 5116. * (NIST_KW doesn't have a separate tag.) * * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and * bound to a key, with an AEAD algorithm or NIST_KW. * \param iv The nonce to use. This must be a readable buffer of * at least \p iv_len Bytes and may be \c NULL if \p * iv_len is \c 0. * \param iv_len The length of the nonce. For AEAD ciphers, this must * satisfy the constraints imposed by the cipher used. * For NIST_KW, this must be \c 0. * \param ad The additional data to authenticate. This must be a * readable buffer of at least \p ad_len Bytes, and may * be \c NULL is \p ad_len is \c 0. * \param ad_len The length of \p ad. For NIST_KW, this must be \c 0. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a * readable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes, and may be * \c NULL if \p ilen is \c 0. * \param ilen The length of the input data. For AEAD ciphers this * must be at least \p tag_len. For NIST_KW this must be * at least \c 8. * \param output The buffer for the output data. This must be a * writable buffer of at least \p output_len Bytes, and * may be \c NULL if \p output_len is \c 0. * \param output_len The length of the \p output buffer in Bytes. For AEAD * ciphers, this must be at least \p ilen - \p tag_len. * For NIST_KW, this must be at least \p ilen - 8. * \param olen This will be filled with the actual number of Bytes * written to the \p output buffer. This must point to a * writable object of type \c size_t. * \param tag_len The actual length of the authentication tag. For AEAD * ciphers, this must match the constraints imposed by * the cipher used, and in particular must not be \c 0. * For NIST_KW, this must be \c 0. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on * parameter-verification failure. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED if data is not authentic. * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, size_t *olen, size_t tag_len ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD || MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_H */ usr/include/mbedtls/cipher_internal.h0000644000000000000000000001144013764415275016777 0ustar rootroot/** * \file cipher_internal.h * * \brief Cipher wrappers. * * \author Adriaan de Jong */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CIPHER_WRAP_H #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_WRAP_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) #include "psa/crypto.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /** * Base cipher information. The non-mode specific functions and values. */ struct mbedtls_cipher_base_t { /** Base Cipher type (e.g. MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES) */ mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher; /** Encrypt using ECB */ int (*ecb_func)( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t mode, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) /** Encrypt using CBC */ int (*cbc_func)( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t mode, size_t length, unsigned char *iv, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) /** Encrypt using CFB (Full length) */ int (*cfb_func)( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t mode, size_t length, size_t *iv_off, unsigned char *iv, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) /** Encrypt using OFB (Full length) */ int (*ofb_func)( void *ctx, size_t length, size_t *iv_off, unsigned char *iv, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) /** Encrypt using CTR */ int (*ctr_func)( void *ctx, size_t length, size_t *nc_off, unsigned char *nonce_counter, unsigned char *stream_block, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) /** Encrypt or decrypt using XTS. */ int (*xts_func)( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t mode, size_t length, const unsigned char data_unit[16], const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) /** Encrypt using STREAM */ int (*stream_func)( void *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); #endif /** Set key for encryption purposes */ int (*setkey_enc_func)( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_bitlen ); /** Set key for decryption purposes */ int (*setkey_dec_func)( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_bitlen); /** Allocate a new context */ void * (*ctx_alloc_func)( void ); /** Free the given context */ void (*ctx_free_func)( void *ctx ); }; typedef struct { mbedtls_cipher_type_t type; const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info; } mbedtls_cipher_definition_t; #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) typedef enum { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_UNSET = 0, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_OWNED, /* Used for PSA-based cipher contexts which */ /* use raw key material internally imported */ /* as a volatile key, and which hence need */ /* to destroy that key when the context is */ /* freed. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_NOT_OWNED, /* Used for PSA-based cipher contexts */ /* which use a key provided by the */ /* user, and which hence will not be */ /* destroyed when the context is freed. */ } mbedtls_cipher_psa_key_ownership; typedef struct { psa_algorithm_t alg; psa_key_id_t slot; mbedtls_cipher_psa_key_ownership slot_state; } mbedtls_cipher_context_psa; #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ extern const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t mbedtls_cipher_definitions[]; extern int mbedtls_cipher_supported[]; #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_WRAP_H */ usr/include/mbedtls/cmac.h0000644000000000000000000001734413764415275014545 0ustar rootroot/** * \file cmac.h * * \brief This file contains CMAC definitions and functions. * * The Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) Mode for * Authentication is defined in RFC-4493: The AES-CMAC Algorithm. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CMAC_H #define MBEDTLS_CMAC_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* MBEDTLS_ERR_CMAC_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CMAC_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x007A /**< CMAC hardware accelerator failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE 16 #define MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE 8 #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX 16 /**< The longest block used by CMAC is that of AES. */ #else #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX 8 /**< The longest block used by CMAC is that of 3DES. */ #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT) /** * The CMAC context structure. */ struct mbedtls_cmac_context_t { /** The internal state of the CMAC algorithm. */ unsigned char state[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; /** Unprocessed data - either data that was not block aligned and is still * pending processing, or the final block. */ unsigned char unprocessed_block[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; /** The length of data pending processing. */ size_t unprocessed_len; }; #else /* !MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT */ #include "cmac_alt.h" #endif /* !MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT */ /** * \brief This function sets the CMAC key, and prepares to authenticate * the input data. * Must be called with an initialized cipher context. * * \param ctx The cipher context used for the CMAC operation, initialized * as one of the following types: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB, * MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB, * or MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB. * \param key The CMAC key. * \param keybits The length of the CMAC key in bits. * Must be supported by the cipher. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_starts( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *key, size_t keybits ); /** * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing CMAC * computation. * * It is called between mbedtls_cipher_cmac_starts() or * mbedtls_cipher_cmac_reset(), and mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish(). * Can be called repeatedly. * * \param ctx The cipher context used for the CMAC operation. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. * \param ilen The length of the input data. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA * if parameter verification fails. */ int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ); /** * \brief This function finishes the CMAC operation, and writes * the result to the output buffer. * * It is called after mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update(). * It can be followed by mbedtls_cipher_cmac_reset() and * mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update(), or mbedtls_cipher_free(). * * \param ctx The cipher context used for the CMAC operation. * \param output The output buffer for the CMAC checksum result. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA * if parameter verification fails. */ int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output ); /** * \brief This function prepares the authentication of another * message with the same key as the previous CMAC * operation. * * It is called after mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish() * and before mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update(). * * \param ctx The cipher context used for the CMAC operation. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA * if parameter verification fails. */ int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_reset( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ); /** * \brief This function calculates the full generic CMAC * on the input buffer with the provided key. * * The function allocates the context, performs the * calculation, and frees the context. * * The CMAC result is calculated as * output = generic CMAC(cmac key, input buffer). * * * \param cipher_info The cipher information. * \param key The CMAC key. * \param keylen The length of the CMAC key in bits. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. * \param ilen The length of the input data. * \param output The buffer for the generic CMAC result. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA * if parameter verification fails. */ int mbedtls_cipher_cmac( const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) /** * \brief This function implements the AES-CMAC-PRF-128 pseudorandom * function, as defined in * RFC-4615: The Advanced Encryption Standard-Cipher-based * Message Authentication Code-Pseudo-Random Function-128 * (AES-CMAC-PRF-128) Algorithm for the Internet Key * Exchange Protocol (IKE). * * \param key The key to use. * \param key_len The key length in Bytes. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. * \param in_len The length of the input data in Bytes. * \param output The buffer holding the generated 16 Bytes of * pseudorandom output. * * \return \c 0 on success. */ int mbedtls_aes_cmac_prf_128( const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len, const unsigned char *input, size_t in_len, unsigned char output[16] ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && ( defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) ) /** * \brief The CMAC checkup routine. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return \c 1 on failure. */ int mbedtls_cmac_self_test( int verbose ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST && ( MBEDTLS_AES_C || MBEDTLS_DES_C ) */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_H */ usr/include/mbedtls/compat-1.3.h0000644000000000000000000037523213764415275015427 0ustar rootroot/** * \file compat-1.3.h * * \brief Compatibility definitions for using mbed TLS with client code written * for the PolarSSL naming conventions. * * \deprecated Use the new names directly instead */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #if ! defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) #warning "Including compat-1.3.h is deprecated" #endif #ifndef MBEDTLS_COMPAT13_H #define MBEDTLS_COMPAT13_H /* * config.h options */ #if defined MBEDTLS_AESNI_C #define POLARSSL_AESNI_C MBEDTLS_AESNI_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_AES_ALT #define POLARSSL_AES_ALT MBEDTLS_AES_ALT #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_AES_C #define POLARSSL_AES_C MBEDTLS_AES_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES #define POLARSSL_AES_ROM_TABLES MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT #define POLARSSL_ARC4_ALT MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_ARC4_C #define POLARSSL_ARC4_C MBEDTLS_ARC4_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C #define POLARSSL_ASN1_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C #define POLARSSL_ASN1_WRITE_C MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_BASE64_C #define POLARSSL_BASE64_C MBEDTLS_BASE64_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C #define POLARSSL_BIGNUM_C MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT #define POLARSSL_BLOWFISH_ALT MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C #define POLARSSL_BLOWFISH_C MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT #define POLARSSL_CAMELLIA_ALT MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C #define POLARSSL_CAMELLIA_C MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY #define POLARSSL_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_CCM_C #define POLARSSL_CCM_C MBEDTLS_CCM_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_CERTS_C #define POLARSSL_CERTS_C MBEDTLS_CERTS_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_C MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_CFB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C #define POLARSSL_CTR_DRBG_C MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C #define POLARSSL_DEBUG_C MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED #define POLARSSL_DEPRECATED_REMOVED MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING #define POLARSSL_DEPRECATED_WARNING MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_DES_ALT #define POLARSSL_DES_ALT MBEDTLS_DES_ALT #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_DES_C #define POLARSSL_DES_C MBEDTLS_DES_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_DHM_C #define POLARSSL_DHM_C MBEDTLS_DHM_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_ECDH_C #define POLARSSL_ECDH_C MBEDTLS_ECDH_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C #define POLARSSL_ECDSA_C MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC #define POLARSSL_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_C #define POLARSSL_ECP_C MBEDTLS_ECP_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED #define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED #define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED #define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED #define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_M255_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED #define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED #define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED #define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED #define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED #define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED #define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED #define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED #define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM #define POLARSSL_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS #define POLARSSL_ECP_MAX_BITS MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM #define POLARSSL_ECP_NIST_OPTIM MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE #define POLARSSL_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES #define POLARSSL_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C #define POLARSSL_ENTROPY_C MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 #define POLARSSL_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_ERROR_C #define POLARSSL_ERROR_C MBEDTLS_ERROR_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY #define POLARSSL_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_FS_IO #define POLARSSL_FS_IO MBEDTLS_FS_IO #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_GCM_C #define POLARSSL_GCM_C MBEDTLS_GCM_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_GENPRIME #define POLARSSL_GENPRIME MBEDTLS_GENPRIME #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C #define POLARSSL_HAVEGE_C MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM #define POLARSSL_HAVE_ASM MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2 #define POLARSSL_HAVE_SSE2 MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2 #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME #define POLARSSL_HAVE_TIME MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C #define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_C MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT #define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST #define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT #define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL #define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED #define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED #define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED #define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED #define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED #define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED #define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED #define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED #define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED #define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED #define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT #define POLARSSL_MD2_ALT MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_MD2_C #define POLARSSL_MD2_C MBEDTLS_MD2_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT #define POLARSSL_MD2_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT #define POLARSSL_MD4_ALT MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_MD4_C #define POLARSSL_MD4_C MBEDTLS_MD4_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT #define POLARSSL_MD4_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT #define POLARSSL_MD5_ALT MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_MD5_C #define POLARSSL_MD5_C MBEDTLS_MD5_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT #define POLARSSL_MD5_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_MD_C #define POLARSSL_MD_C MBEDTLS_MD_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE #define POLARSSL_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE #define POLARSSL_MEMORY_BACKTRACE MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C #define POLARSSL_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG #define POLARSSL_MEMORY_DEBUG MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE #define POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE #define POLARSSL_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_NET_C #define POLARSSL_NET_C MBEDTLS_NET_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES #define POLARSSL_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY #define POLARSSL_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_OID_C #define POLARSSL_OID_C MBEDTLS_OID_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C #define POLARSSL_PADLOCK_C MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C #define POLARSSL_PEM_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C #define POLARSSL_PEM_WRITE_C MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C #define POLARSSL_PKCS11_C MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C #define POLARSSL_PKCS12_C MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 #define POLARSSL_PKCS1_V15 MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 #define POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21 MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C #define POLARSSL_PKCS5_C MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_PK_C #define POLARSSL_PK_C MBEDTLS_PK_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C #define POLARSSL_PK_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED #define POLARSSL_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT #define POLARSSL_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C #define POLARSSL_PK_WRITE_C MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C #define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_C MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT #define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO #define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT #define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO #define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO #define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY #define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_MEMORY MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS #define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT #define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO #define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT #define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO #define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT #define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF #define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE #define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_FREE MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR #define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF #define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF #define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN #define POLARSSL_PSK_MAX_LEN MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES #define POLARSSL_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT #define POLARSSL_RIPEMD160_ALT MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C #define POLARSSL_RIPEMD160_C MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT #define POLARSSL_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_RSA_C #define POLARSSL_RSA_C MBEDTLS_RSA_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT #define POLARSSL_RSA_NO_CRT MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST #define POLARSSL_SELF_TEST MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT #define POLARSSL_SHA1_ALT MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_SHA1_C #define POLARSSL_SHA1_C MBEDTLS_SHA1_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT #define POLARSSL_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT #define POLARSSL_SHA256_ALT MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_SHA256_C #define POLARSSL_SHA256_C MBEDTLS_SHA256_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT #define POLARSSL_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT #define POLARSSL_SHA512_ALT MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_SHA512_C #define POLARSSL_SHA512_C MBEDTLS_SHA512_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT #define POLARSSL_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES #define POLARSSL_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN #define POLARSSL_SSL_ALPN MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C #define POLARSSL_SSL_CACHE_C MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING #define POLARSSL_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C #define POLARSSL_SSL_CLI_C MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C #define POLARSSL_SSL_COOKIE_C MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT #define POLARSSL_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL #define POLARSSL_SSL_DEBUG_ALL MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY #define POLARSSL_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT #define POLARSSL_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY #define POLARSSL_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC #define POLARSSL_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET #define POLARSSL_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV #define POLARSSL_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL #define POLARSSL_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH #define POLARSSL_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS #define POLARSSL_SSL_PROTO_DTLS MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 #define POLARSSL_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 #define POLARSSL_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 #define POLARSSL_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 #define POLARSSL_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION #define POLARSSL_SSL_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION #define POLARSSL_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS #define POLARSSL_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C #define POLARSSL_SSL_SRV_C MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE #define POLARSSL_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO #define POLARSSL_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C #define POLARSSL_SSL_TLS_C MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC #define POLARSSL_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT #define POLARSSL_THREADING_ALT MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_THREADING_C #define POLARSSL_THREADING_C MBEDTLS_THREADING_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD #define POLARSSL_THREADING_PTHREAD MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT #define POLARSSL_TIMING_ALT MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_TIMING_C #define POLARSSL_TIMING_C MBEDTLS_TIMING_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_VERSION_C #define POLARSSL_VERSION_C MBEDTLS_VERSION_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES #define POLARSSL_VERSION_FEATURES MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 #define POLARSSL_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION #define POLARSSL_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE #define POLARSSL_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE #define POLARSSL_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C #define POLARSSL_X509_CREATE_C MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C #define POLARSSL_X509_CRL_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C #define POLARSSL_X509_CRT_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C #define POLARSSL_X509_CRT_WRITE_C MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C #define POLARSSL_X509_CSR_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C #define POLARSSL_X509_CSR_WRITE_C MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA #define POLARSSL_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT #define POLARSSL_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C #define POLARSSL_X509_USE_C MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT #define POLARSSL_XTEA_ALT MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_XTEA_C #define POLARSSL_XTEA_C MBEDTLS_XTEA_C #endif #if defined MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT #define POLARSSL_ZLIB_SUPPORT MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT #endif /* * Misc names (macros, types, functions, enum constants...) */ #define AES_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT #define AES_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT #define ASN1_BIT_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING #define ASN1_BMP_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_BMP_STRING #define ASN1_BOOLEAN MBEDTLS_ASN1_BOOLEAN #define ASN1_CHK_ADD MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD #define ASN1_CONSTRUCTED MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED #define ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC #define ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME MBEDTLS_ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME #define ASN1_IA5_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING #define ASN1_INTEGER MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER #define ASN1_NULL MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL #define ASN1_OCTET_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING #define ASN1_OID MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID #define ASN1_PRIMITIVE MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRIMITIVE #define ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING #define ASN1_SEQUENCE MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE #define ASN1_SET MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET #define ASN1_T61_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_T61_STRING #define ASN1_UNIVERSAL_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_STRING #define ASN1_UTC_TIME MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME #define ASN1_UTF8_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING #define BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH #define BADCERT_EXPIRED MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED #define BADCERT_FUTURE MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE #define BADCERT_MISSING MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING #define BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED #define BADCERT_OTHER MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER #define BADCERT_REVOKED MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED #define BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY #define BADCRL_EXPIRED MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED #define BADCRL_FUTURE MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE #define BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED #define BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE #define BLOWFISH_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT #define BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT #define BLOWFISH_MAX_KEY MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_MAX_KEY_BITS #define BLOWFISH_MIN_KEY MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_MIN_KEY_BITS #define BLOWFISH_ROUNDS MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS #define CAMELLIA_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT #define CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT #define COLLECT_SIZE MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE #define CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE #define CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN #define CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS #define CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE #define CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT #define CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST #define CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT #define CTR_DRBG_PR_OFF MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_OFF #define CTR_DRBG_PR_ON MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_ON #define CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL #define CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN #define DEPRECATED MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #define DES_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT #define DES_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_DES_ENCRYPT #define DES_KEY_SIZE MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE #define ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE #define ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER #define ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE #define ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES #define ENTROPY_MIN_HARDCLOCK MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDCLOCK #define ENTROPY_MIN_HAVEGE MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HAVEGE #define ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM #define ENTROPY_SOURCE_MANUAL MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_MANUAL #define EXT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER #define EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS #define EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES #define EXT_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS #define EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE #define EXT_FRESHEST_CRL MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_FRESHEST_CRL #define EXT_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY #define EXT_ISSUER_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_ISSUER_ALT_NAME #define EXT_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE #define EXT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS #define EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE #define EXT_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS #define EXT_POLICY_MAPPINGS MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_POLICY_MAPPINGS #define EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME #define EXT_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS #define EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER #define GCM_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT #define GCM_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT #define KU_CRL_SIGN MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN #define KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT #define KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE #define KU_KEY_AGREEMENT MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT #define KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN #define KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT #define KU_NON_REPUDIATION MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION #define LN_2_DIV_LN_10_SCALE100 MBEDTLS_LN_2_DIV_LN_10_SCALE100 #define MEMORY_VERIFY_ALLOC MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALLOC #define MEMORY_VERIFY_ALWAYS MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALWAYS #define MEMORY_VERIFY_FREE MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_FREE #define MEMORY_VERIFY_NONE MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_NONE #define MPI_CHK MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK #define NET_PROTO_TCP MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP #define NET_PROTO_UDP MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP #define NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL #define NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL_CA MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL_CA #define NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING #define NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING_CA MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING_CA #define NS_CERT_TYPE_RESERVED MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_RESERVED #define NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CA MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CA #define NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT #define NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER #define OID_ANSI_X9_62 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62 #define OID_ANSI_X9_62_FIELD_TYPE MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_FIELD_TYPE #define OID_ANSI_X9_62_PRIME_FIELD MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_PRIME_FIELD #define OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG #define OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG_SHA2 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG_SHA2 #define OID_ANY_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE #define OID_AT MBEDTLS_OID_AT #define OID_AT_CN MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN #define OID_AT_COUNTRY MBEDTLS_OID_AT_COUNTRY #define OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER #define OID_AT_GENERATION_QUALIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GENERATION_QUALIFIER #define OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME #define OID_AT_INITIALS MBEDTLS_OID_AT_INITIALS #define OID_AT_LOCALITY MBEDTLS_OID_AT_LOCALITY #define OID_AT_ORGANIZATION MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORGANIZATION #define OID_AT_ORG_UNIT MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORG_UNIT #define OID_AT_POSTAL_ADDRESS MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_ADDRESS #define OID_AT_POSTAL_CODE MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_CODE #define OID_AT_PSEUDONYM MBEDTLS_OID_AT_PSEUDONYM #define OID_AT_SERIAL_NUMBER MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SERIAL_NUMBER #define OID_AT_STATE MBEDTLS_OID_AT_STATE #define OID_AT_SUR_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SUR_NAME #define OID_AT_TITLE MBEDTLS_OID_AT_TITLE #define OID_AT_UNIQUE_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AT_UNIQUE_IDENTIFIER #define OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER #define OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS #define OID_CERTICOM MBEDTLS_OID_CERTICOM #define OID_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES MBEDTLS_OID_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES #define OID_CLIENT_AUTH MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH #define OID_CMP MBEDTLS_OID_CMP #define OID_CODE_SIGNING MBEDTLS_OID_CODE_SIGNING #define OID_COUNTRY_US MBEDTLS_OID_COUNTRY_US #define OID_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS MBEDTLS_OID_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS #define OID_CRL_NUMBER MBEDTLS_OID_CRL_NUMBER #define OID_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_DES_CBC #define OID_DES_EDE3_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC #define OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD2 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD2 #define OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD4 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD4 #define OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD5 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD5 #define OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA1 #define OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA224 #define OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA256 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA256 #define OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA384 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA384 #define OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA512 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA512 #define OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT #define OID_ECDSA_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA1 #define OID_ECDSA_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA224 #define OID_ECDSA_SHA256 MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA256 #define OID_ECDSA_SHA384 MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA384 #define OID_ECDSA_SHA512 MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA512 #define OID_EC_ALG_ECDH MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_ECDH #define OID_EC_ALG_UNRESTRICTED MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_UNRESTRICTED #define OID_EC_BRAINPOOL_V1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_BRAINPOOL_V1 #define OID_EC_GRP_BP256R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP256R1 #define OID_EC_GRP_BP384R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP384R1 #define OID_EC_GRP_BP512R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP512R1 #define OID_EC_GRP_SECP192K1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192K1 #define OID_EC_GRP_SECP192R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192R1 #define OID_EC_GRP_SECP224K1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224K1 #define OID_EC_GRP_SECP224R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224R1 #define OID_EC_GRP_SECP256K1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256K1 #define OID_EC_GRP_SECP256R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256R1 #define OID_EC_GRP_SECP384R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP384R1 #define OID_EC_GRP_SECP521R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP521R1 #define OID_EMAIL_PROTECTION MBEDTLS_OID_EMAIL_PROTECTION #define OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE #define OID_FRESHEST_CRL MBEDTLS_OID_FRESHEST_CRL #define OID_GOV MBEDTLS_OID_GOV #define OID_HMAC_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA1 #define OID_ID_CE MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE #define OID_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY MBEDTLS_OID_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY #define OID_ISO_CCITT_DS MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_CCITT_DS #define OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG #define OID_ISO_ITU_COUNTRY MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_ITU_COUNTRY #define OID_ISO_ITU_US_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_ITU_US_ORG #define OID_ISO_MEMBER_BODIES MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_MEMBER_BODIES #define OID_ISSUER_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_ISSUER_ALT_NAME #define OID_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE #define OID_KP MBEDTLS_OID_KP #define OID_MGF1 MBEDTLS_OID_MGF1 #define OID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS #define OID_NETSCAPE MBEDTLS_OID_NETSCAPE #define OID_NS_BASE_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_BASE_URL #define OID_NS_CA_POLICY_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CA_POLICY_URL #define OID_NS_CA_REVOCATION_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CA_REVOCATION_URL #define OID_NS_CERT MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT #define OID_NS_CERT_SEQUENCE MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_SEQUENCE #define OID_NS_CERT_TYPE MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE #define OID_NS_COMMENT MBEDTLS_OID_NS_COMMENT #define OID_NS_DATA_TYPE MBEDTLS_OID_NS_DATA_TYPE #define OID_NS_RENEWAL_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_RENEWAL_URL #define OID_NS_REVOCATION_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_REVOCATION_URL #define OID_NS_SSL_SERVER_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_NS_SSL_SERVER_NAME #define OID_OCSP_SIGNING MBEDTLS_OID_OCSP_SIGNING #define OID_OIW_SECSIG MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG #define OID_OIW_SECSIG_ALG MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_ALG #define OID_OIW_SECSIG_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_SHA1 #define OID_ORGANIZATION MBEDTLS_OID_ORGANIZATION #define OID_ORG_ANSI_X9_62 MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_ANSI_X9_62 #define OID_ORG_CERTICOM MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_CERTICOM #define OID_ORG_DOD MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_DOD #define OID_ORG_GOV MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_GOV #define OID_ORG_NETSCAPE MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_NETSCAPE #define OID_ORG_OIW MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_OIW #define OID_ORG_RSA_DATA_SECURITY MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_RSA_DATA_SECURITY #define OID_ORG_TELETRUST MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_TELETRUST #define OID_PKCS MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS #define OID_PKCS1 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 #define OID_PKCS12 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12 #define OID_PKCS12_PBE MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE #define OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC #define OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC #define OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC #define OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC #define OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128 #define OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40 #define OID_PKCS1_MD2 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD2 #define OID_PKCS1_MD4 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD4 #define OID_PKCS1_MD5 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD5 #define OID_PKCS1_RSA MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_RSA #define OID_PKCS1_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA1 #define OID_PKCS1_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA224 #define OID_PKCS1_SHA256 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA256 #define OID_PKCS1_SHA384 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA384 #define OID_PKCS1_SHA512 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA512 #define OID_PKCS5 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 #define OID_PKCS5_PBES2 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBES2 #define OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC #define OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD2_RC2_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD2_RC2_CBC #define OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC #define OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD5_RC2_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD5_RC2_CBC #define OID_PKCS5_PBE_SHA1_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_SHA1_DES_CBC #define OID_PKCS5_PBE_SHA1_RC2_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_SHA1_RC2_CBC #define OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2 #define OID_PKCS5_PBMAC1 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBMAC1 #define OID_PKCS9 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9 #define OID_PKCS9_CSR_EXT_REQ MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_CSR_EXT_REQ #define OID_PKCS9_EMAIL MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL #define OID_PKIX MBEDTLS_OID_PKIX #define OID_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS #define OID_POLICY_MAPPINGS MBEDTLS_OID_POLICY_MAPPINGS #define OID_PRIVATE_KEY_USAGE_PERIOD MBEDTLS_OID_PRIVATE_KEY_USAGE_PERIOD #define OID_RSASSA_PSS MBEDTLS_OID_RSASSA_PSS #define OID_RSA_COMPANY MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY #define OID_RSA_SHA_OBS MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_SHA_OBS #define OID_SERVER_AUTH MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH #define OID_SIZE MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE #define OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME #define OID_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS #define OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER #define OID_TELETRUST MBEDTLS_OID_TELETRUST #define OID_TIME_STAMPING MBEDTLS_OID_TIME_STAMPING #define PADLOCK_ACE MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ACE #define PADLOCK_ALIGN16 MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16 #define PADLOCK_PHE MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_PHE #define PADLOCK_PMM MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_PMM #define PADLOCK_RNG MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_RNG #define PKCS12_DERIVE_IV MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_IV #define PKCS12_DERIVE_KEY MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_KEY #define PKCS12_DERIVE_MAC_KEY MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_MAC_KEY #define PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT #define PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT #define PKCS5_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT #define PKCS5_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_PKCS5_ENCRYPT #define POLARSSL_AESNI_AES MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES #define POLARSSL_AESNI_CLMUL MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL #define POLARSSL_AESNI_H MBEDTLS_AESNI_H #define POLARSSL_AES_H MBEDTLS_AES_H #define POLARSSL_ARC4_H MBEDTLS_ARC4_H #define POLARSSL_ASN1_H MBEDTLS_ASN1_H #define POLARSSL_ASN1_WRITE_H MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_H #define POLARSSL_BASE64_H MBEDTLS_BASE64_H #define POLARSSL_BIGNUM_H MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_H #define POLARSSL_BLOWFISH_H MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_H #define POLARSSL_BN_MUL_H MBEDTLS_BN_MUL_H #define POLARSSL_CAMELLIA_H MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_H #define POLARSSL_CCM_H MBEDTLS_CCM_H #define POLARSSL_CERTS_H MBEDTLS_CERTS_H #define POLARSSL_CHECK_CONFIG_H MBEDTLS_CHECK_CONFIG_H #define POLARSSL_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS #define POLARSSL_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG #define POLARSSL_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128 #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_CFB128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CFB128 #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CTR #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_CFB128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CFB128 #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CTR #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ARC4_128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128 #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64 #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_ECB #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128 #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_ECB #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CFB128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CFB128 #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CTR #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_ECB #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CFB128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CFB128 #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CTR #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_ECB #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_ECB #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_EDE_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_ECB #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_H MBEDTLS_CIPHER_H #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_3DES MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_3DES #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_AES MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_ARC4 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARC4 #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_BLOWFISH MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_BLOWFISH #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_DES MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_DES #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_NONE MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_NONE #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_NULL MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_NULL #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_NONE MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_NULL MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN #define POLARSSL_CIPHER_WRAP_H MBEDTLS_CIPHER_WRAP_H #define POLARSSL_CONFIG_H MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H #define POLARSSL_CTR_DRBG_H MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_H #define POLARSSL_DEBUG_H MBEDTLS_DEBUG_H #define POLARSSL_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_DECRYPT #define POLARSSL_DES_H MBEDTLS_DES_H #define POLARSSL_DHM_H MBEDTLS_DHM_H #define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_G MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_G #define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P #define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_G MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_G #define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_P MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_P #define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_G MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_G #define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_P MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_P #define POLARSSL_ECDH_H MBEDTLS_ECDH_H #define POLARSSL_ECDH_OURS MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS #define POLARSSL_ECDH_THEIRS MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS #define POLARSSL_ECDSA_H MBEDTLS_ECDSA_H #define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_BP256R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1 #define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_BP384R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1 #define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_BP512R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1 #define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_M255 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 #define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_MAX MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX #define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_NONE MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE #define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP192K1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1 #define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP192R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1 #define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP224K1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1 #define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP224R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1 #define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP256K1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1 #define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP256R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1 #define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP384R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1 #define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP521R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1 #define POLARSSL_ECP_H MBEDTLS_ECP_H #define POLARSSL_ECP_MAX_BYTES MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES #define POLARSSL_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN #define POLARSSL_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED #define POLARSSL_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED #define POLARSSL_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE #define POLARSSL_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT #define POLARSSL_ENTROPY_H MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_H #define POLARSSL_ENTROPY_POLL_H MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_POLL_H #define POLARSSL_ENTROPY_SHA256_ACCUMULATOR MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA256_ACCUMULATOR #define POLARSSL_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR #define POLARSSL_ERROR_H MBEDTLS_ERROR_H #define POLARSSL_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH #define POLARSSL_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH #define POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL #define POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA #define POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH #define POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH #define POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA #define POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG #define POLARSSL_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL #define POLARSSL_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER #define POLARSSL_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH #define POLARSSL_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH #define POLARSSL_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH #define POLARSSL_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH #define POLARSSL_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT #define POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA #define POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE #define POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED #define POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING #define POLARSSL_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR #define POLARSSL_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG #define POLARSSL_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG #define POLARSSL_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH #define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA #define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_CALC_SECRET_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_CALC_SECRET_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR #define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT #define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_ALLOC_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_READ_PARAMS_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PARAMS_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_READ_PUBLIC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PUBLIC_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA #define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL #define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE #define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY #define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH #define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR #define POLARSSL_ERR_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES #define POLARSSL_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_SOURCES_DEFINED MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_SOURCES_DEFINED #define POLARSSL_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT #define POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR #define POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG #define POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG #define POLARSSL_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA #define POLARSSL_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE #define POLARSSL_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR #define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA #define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL #define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO #define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR #define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_INVALID_CHARACTER MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_INVALID_CHARACTER #define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE #define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE #define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_CONNECT_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONNECT_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET #define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_LISTEN_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_LISTEN_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_RECV_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_RECV_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_SEND_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SEND_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_TIMEOUT MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT #define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST #define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_READ MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ #define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_WRITE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE #define POLARSSL_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL #define POLARSSL_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND #define POLARSSL_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED MBEDTLS_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED #define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA #define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE #define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA #define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV #define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_ALLOC_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT #define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH #define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED #define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG #define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA #define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE #define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH #define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT #define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS5_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_BAD_INPUT_DATA #define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE #define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT #define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH #define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA #define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE #define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR #define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG #define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY #define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT #define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION #define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH #define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED #define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH #define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH #define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE #define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG #define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA #define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING #define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE #define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_PEER_VERIFY_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_VERIFY_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_CIPHER MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_CIPHER #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY #define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO #define POLARSSL_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA #define POLARSSL_ERR_THREADING_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE #define POLARSSL_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR #define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA #define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_FORMAT MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_FORMAT #define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE #define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR #define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG #define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE #define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS #define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT #define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME #define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL #define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE #define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION #define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED #define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH #define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_OID MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_OID #define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG #define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION #define POLARSSL_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH #define POLARSSL_GCM_H MBEDTLS_GCM_H #define POLARSSL_HAVEGE_H MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_H #define POLARSSL_HAVE_INT32 MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 #define POLARSSL_HAVE_INT64 MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 #define POLARSSL_HAVE_UDBL MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL #define POLARSSL_HAVE_X86 MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86 #define POLARSSL_HAVE_X86_64 MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64 #define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_H MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_H #define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_PR_OFF MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_OFF #define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON #define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK #define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA #define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA #define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK #define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA #define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA #define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA #define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE #define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK #define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA #define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK #define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDHE_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED #define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED #define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED #define POLARSSL_KEY_LENGTH_DES MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES #define POLARSSL_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE #define POLARSSL_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE3 MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE3 #define POLARSSL_KEY_LENGTH_NONE MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_NONE #define POLARSSL_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH #define POLARSSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH #define POLARSSL_MD2_H MBEDTLS_MD2_H #define POLARSSL_MD4_H MBEDTLS_MD4_H #define POLARSSL_MD5_H MBEDTLS_MD5_H #define POLARSSL_MD_H MBEDTLS_MD_H #define POLARSSL_MD_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE #define POLARSSL_MD_MD2 MBEDTLS_MD_MD2 #define POLARSSL_MD_MD4 MBEDTLS_MD_MD4 #define POLARSSL_MD_MD5 MBEDTLS_MD_MD5 #define POLARSSL_MD_NONE MBEDTLS_MD_NONE #define POLARSSL_MD_RIPEMD160 MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160 #define POLARSSL_MD_SHA1 MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 #define POLARSSL_MD_SHA224 MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 #define POLARSSL_MD_SHA256 MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 #define POLARSSL_MD_SHA384 MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 #define POLARSSL_MD_SHA512 MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 #define POLARSSL_MD_WRAP_H MBEDTLS_MD_WRAP_H #define POLARSSL_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_H MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_H #define POLARSSL_MODE_CBC MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC #define POLARSSL_MODE_CCM MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM #define POLARSSL_MODE_CFB MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB #define POLARSSL_MODE_CTR MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR #define POLARSSL_MODE_ECB MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB #define POLARSSL_MODE_GCM MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM #define POLARSSL_MODE_NONE MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE #define POLARSSL_MODE_OFB MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB #define POLARSSL_MODE_STREAM MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM #define POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_BITS MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS #define POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_BITS_SCALE100 MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS_SCALE100 #define POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_LIMBS MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS #define POLARSSL_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE MBEDTLS_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE #define POLARSSL_NET_H MBEDTLS_NET_SOCKETS_H #define POLARSSL_NET_LISTEN_BACKLOG MBEDTLS_NET_LISTEN_BACKLOG #define POLARSSL_OID_H MBEDTLS_OID_H #define POLARSSL_OPERATION_NONE MBEDTLS_OPERATION_NONE #define POLARSSL_PADDING_NONE MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE #define POLARSSL_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS #define POLARSSL_PADDING_PKCS7 MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7 #define POLARSSL_PADDING_ZEROS MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS #define POLARSSL_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN #define POLARSSL_PADLOCK_H MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_H #define POLARSSL_PEM_H MBEDTLS_PEM_H #define POLARSSL_PKCS11_H MBEDTLS_PKCS11_H #define POLARSSL_PKCS12_H MBEDTLS_PKCS12_H #define POLARSSL_PKCS5_H MBEDTLS_PKCS5_H #define POLARSSL_PK_DEBUG_ECP MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_ECP #define POLARSSL_PK_DEBUG_MAX_ITEMS MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MAX_ITEMS #define POLARSSL_PK_DEBUG_MPI MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MPI #define POLARSSL_PK_DEBUG_NONE MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_NONE #define POLARSSL_PK_ECDSA MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA #define POLARSSL_PK_ECKEY MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY #define POLARSSL_PK_ECKEY_DH MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH #define POLARSSL_PK_H MBEDTLS_PK_H #define POLARSSL_PK_NONE MBEDTLS_PK_NONE #define POLARSSL_PK_RSA MBEDTLS_PK_RSA #define POLARSSL_PK_RSASSA_PSS MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS #define POLARSSL_PK_RSA_ALT MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT #define POLARSSL_PK_WRAP_H MBEDTLS_PK_WRAP_H #define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_H MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_H #define POLARSSL_PREMASTER_SIZE MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE #define POLARSSL_RIPEMD160_H MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_H #define POLARSSL_RSA_H MBEDTLS_RSA_H #define POLARSSL_SHA1_H MBEDTLS_SHA1_H #define POLARSSL_SHA256_H MBEDTLS_SHA256_H #define POLARSSL_SHA512_H MBEDTLS_SHA512_H #define POLARSSL_SSL_CACHE_H MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_H #define POLARSSL_SSL_CIPHERSUITES_H MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES_H #define POLARSSL_SSL_COOKIE_H MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_H #define POLARSSL_SSL_H MBEDTLS_SSL_H #define POLARSSL_THREADING_H MBEDTLS_THREADING_H #define POLARSSL_THREADING_IMPL MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL #define POLARSSL_TIMING_H MBEDTLS_TIMING_H #define POLARSSL_VERSION_H MBEDTLS_VERSION_H #define POLARSSL_VERSION_MAJOR MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR #define POLARSSL_VERSION_MINOR MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR #define POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER #define POLARSSL_VERSION_PATCH MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH #define POLARSSL_VERSION_STRING MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING #define POLARSSL_VERSION_STRING_FULL MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL #define POLARSSL_X509_CRL_H MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_H #define POLARSSL_X509_CRT_H MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_H #define POLARSSL_X509_CSR_H MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_H #define POLARSSL_X509_H MBEDTLS_X509_H #define POLARSSL_XTEA_H MBEDTLS_XTEA_H #define RSA_CRYPT MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT #define RSA_PKCS_V15 MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 #define RSA_PKCS_V21 MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 #define RSA_PRIVATE MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE #define RSA_PUBLIC MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC #define RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY #define RSA_SIGN MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN #define SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL #define SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING #define SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED #define SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT #define SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_RECORD_MAC MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_RECORD_MAC #define SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED #define SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED #define SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN #define SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY #define SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR #define SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE #define SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPTION_FAILED MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPTION_FAILED #define SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR #define SSL_ALERT_MSG_EXPORT_RESTRICTION MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_EXPORT_RESTRICTION #define SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE #define SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER #define SSL_ALERT_MSG_INAPROPRIATE_FALLBACK MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INAPROPRIATE_FALLBACK #define SSL_ALERT_MSG_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY #define SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR #define SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL #define SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT #define SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION #define SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION #define SSL_ALERT_MSG_RECORD_OVERFLOW MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_RECORD_OVERFLOW #define SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE #define SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA #define SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY #define SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME #define SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT #define SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT #define SSL_ALERT_MSG_USER_CANCELED MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_USER_CANCELED #define SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED #define SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_ENABLED #define SSL_ARC4_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED #define SSL_ARC4_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_ENABLED #define SSL_BUFFER_LEN ( ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN ) < ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN ) ) \ ? ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN ) : ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN ) ) #define SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES #define SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT #define SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED #define SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED #define SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST #define SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY #define SSL_CERT_TYPE_ECDSA_SIGN MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_ECDSA_SIGN #define SSL_CERT_TYPE_RSA_SIGN MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_RSA_SIGN #define SSL_CHANNEL_INBOUND MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_INBOUND #define SSL_CHANNEL_OUTBOUND MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_OUTBOUND #define SSL_CIPHERSUITES MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES #define SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE #define SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC #define SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED #define SSL_CLIENT_HELLO MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO #define SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE #define SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD #define SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE #define SSL_COMPRESS_NULL MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL #define SSL_DEBUG_BUF MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF #define SSL_DEBUG_CRT MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT #define SSL_DEBUG_ECP MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP #define SSL_DEBUG_MPI MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI #define SSL_DEBUG_MSG MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG #define SSL_DEBUG_RET MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET #define SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIME MBEDTLS_SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIME #define SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MAX #define SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MIN MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MIN #define SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO #define SSL_ETM_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED #define SSL_ETM_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED #define SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED #define SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED #define SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV #define SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS #define SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER #define SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP #define SSL_HASH_MD5 MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5 #define SSL_HASH_NONE MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE #define SSL_HASH_SHA1 MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1 #define SSL_HASH_SHA224 MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA224 #define SSL_HASH_SHA256 MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256 #define SSL_HASH_SHA384 MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384 #define SSL_HASH_SHA512 MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512 #define SSL_HELLO_REQUEST MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST #define SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE #define SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST #define SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY #define SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO #define SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE #define SSL_HS_FINISHED MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED #define SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST #define SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST #define SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET #define SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO #define SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE #define SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE #define SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE #define SSL_IS_CLIENT MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT #define SSL_IS_FALLBACK MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK #define SSL_IS_NOT_FALLBACK MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_NOT_FALLBACK #define SSL_IS_SERVER MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER #define SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION #define SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE #define SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION #define SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION #define SSL_MAC_ADD MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD #define SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 #define SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN #define SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024 #define SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048 #define SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096 #define SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512 #define SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID #define SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE #define SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION #define SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION #define SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 #define SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 #define SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 #define SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 #define SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION #define SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION #define SSL_MSG_ALERT MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT #define SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA #define SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC #define SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE #define SSL_PADDING_ADD MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD #define SSL_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION #define SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED #define SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE #define SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED #define SSL_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ENFORCED MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ENFORCED #define SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING #define SSL_RENEGO_MAX_RECORDS_DEFAULT MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGO_MAX_RECORDS_DEFAULT #define SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED #define SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING #define SSL_RETRANS_SENDING MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING #define SSL_RETRANS_WAITING MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING #define SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION #define SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE #define SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC #define SSL_SERVER_FINISHED MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED #define SSL_SERVER_HELLO MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO #define SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE #define SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT #define SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE #define SSL_SERVER_NEW_SESSION_TICKET MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NEW_SESSION_TICKET #define SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED #define SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED #define SSL_SIG_ANON MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ANON #define SSL_SIG_ECDSA MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA #define SSL_SIG_RSA MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA #define SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM #define SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM #define SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_LEN MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_LEN #define SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED #define SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED #define SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN #define SSL_VERIFY_NONE MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE #define SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL #define SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED #define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA #define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA #define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 #define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM #define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 #define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 #define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA #define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 #define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM #define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 #define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 #define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 #define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 #define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 #define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 #define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA #define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 #define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 #define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA #define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA #define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA #define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 #define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM #define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 #define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 #define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA #define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 #define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM #define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 #define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 #define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA #define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 #define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 #define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA #define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 #define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 #define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA #define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA #define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA #define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 #define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM #define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 #define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 #define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA #define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 #define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM #define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 #define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 #define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 #define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 #define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 #define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 #define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA #define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA #define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA #define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA #define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 #define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA #define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 #define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 #define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 #define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA #define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 #define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 #define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA #define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA #define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA #define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 #define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 #define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA #define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 #define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 #define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 #define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 #define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 #define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 #define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA #define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA #define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA #define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA #define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 #define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 #define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA #define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 #define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 #define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 #define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 #define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 #define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 #define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA #define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA #define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA #define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA #define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 #define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 #define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA #define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 #define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 #define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 #define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 #define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 #define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 #define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA #define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA #define TLS_EXT_ALPN MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN #define TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC #define TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET #define TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH #define TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO #define TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME #define TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME #define TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET #define TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG #define TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES #define TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS #define TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT #define TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC #define TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA #define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA #define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 #define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM #define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 #define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 #define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA #define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 #define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM #define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 #define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 #define TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 #define TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 #define TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 #define TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 #define TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA #define TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 #define TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 #define TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA #define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA #define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA #define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 #define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 #define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA #define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 #define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 #define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 #define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 #define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 #define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 #define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA #define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 #define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 #define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA #define TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA #define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA #define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 #define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM #define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 #define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 #define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA #define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 #define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM #define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 #define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 #define TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA #define TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 #define TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 #define TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA #define TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 #define TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 #define TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA #define TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 #define TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA #define TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 #define TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 #define TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA #define X509_CRT_VERSION_1 MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_1 #define X509_CRT_VERSION_2 MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_2 #define X509_CRT_VERSION_3 MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3 #define X509_FORMAT_DER MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_DER #define X509_FORMAT_PEM MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_PEM #define X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE #define X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN #define X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN #define XTEA_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_XTEA_DECRYPT #define XTEA_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_XTEA_ENCRYPT #define _asn1_bitstring mbedtls_asn1_bitstring #define _asn1_buf mbedtls_asn1_buf #define _asn1_named_data mbedtls_asn1_named_data #define _asn1_sequence mbedtls_asn1_sequence #define _ssl_cache_context mbedtls_ssl_cache_context #define _ssl_cache_entry mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry #define _ssl_ciphersuite_t mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t #define _ssl_context mbedtls_ssl_context #define _ssl_flight_item mbedtls_ssl_flight_item #define _ssl_handshake_params mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params #define _ssl_key_cert mbedtls_ssl_key_cert #define _ssl_premaster_secret mbedtls_ssl_premaster_secret #define _ssl_session mbedtls_ssl_session #define _ssl_transform mbedtls_ssl_transform #define _x509_crl mbedtls_x509_crl #define _x509_crl_entry mbedtls_x509_crl_entry #define _x509_crt mbedtls_x509_crt #define _x509_csr mbedtls_x509_csr #define _x509_time mbedtls_x509_time #define _x509write_cert mbedtls_x509write_cert #define _x509write_csr mbedtls_x509write_csr #define aes_context mbedtls_aes_context #define aes_crypt_cbc mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc #define aes_crypt_cfb128 mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128 #define aes_crypt_cfb8 mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb8 #define aes_crypt_ctr mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr #define aes_crypt_ecb mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb #define aes_free mbedtls_aes_free #define aes_init mbedtls_aes_init #define aes_self_test mbedtls_aes_self_test #define aes_setkey_dec mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec #define aes_setkey_enc mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc #define aesni_crypt_ecb mbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecb #define aesni_gcm_mult mbedtls_aesni_gcm_mult #define aesni_inverse_key mbedtls_aesni_inverse_key #define aesni_setkey_enc mbedtls_aesni_setkey_enc #define aesni_supports mbedtls_aesni_has_support #define alarmed mbedtls_timing_alarmed #define arc4_context mbedtls_arc4_context #define arc4_crypt mbedtls_arc4_crypt #define arc4_free mbedtls_arc4_free #define arc4_init mbedtls_arc4_init #define arc4_self_test mbedtls_arc4_self_test #define arc4_setup mbedtls_arc4_setup #define asn1_bitstring mbedtls_asn1_bitstring #define asn1_buf mbedtls_asn1_buf #define asn1_find_named_data mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data #define asn1_free_named_data mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data #define asn1_free_named_data_list mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list #define asn1_get_alg mbedtls_asn1_get_alg #define asn1_get_alg_null mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null #define asn1_get_bitstring mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring #define asn1_get_bitstring_null mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null #define asn1_get_bool mbedtls_asn1_get_bool #define asn1_get_int mbedtls_asn1_get_int #define asn1_get_len mbedtls_asn1_get_len #define asn1_get_mpi mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi #define asn1_get_sequence_of mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of #define asn1_get_tag mbedtls_asn1_get_tag #define asn1_named_data mbedtls_asn1_named_data #define asn1_sequence mbedtls_asn1_sequence #define asn1_store_named_data mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data #define asn1_write_algorithm_identifier mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier #define asn1_write_bitstring mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring #define asn1_write_bool mbedtls_asn1_write_bool #define asn1_write_ia5_string mbedtls_asn1_write_ia5_string #define asn1_write_int mbedtls_asn1_write_int #define asn1_write_len mbedtls_asn1_write_len #define asn1_write_mpi mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi #define asn1_write_null mbedtls_asn1_write_null #define asn1_write_octet_string mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string #define asn1_write_oid mbedtls_asn1_write_oid #define asn1_write_printable_string mbedtls_asn1_write_printable_string #define asn1_write_raw_buffer mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer #define asn1_write_tag mbedtls_asn1_write_tag #define base64_decode mbedtls_base64_decode #define base64_encode mbedtls_base64_encode #define base64_self_test mbedtls_base64_self_test #define blowfish_context mbedtls_blowfish_context #define blowfish_crypt_cbc mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cbc #define blowfish_crypt_cfb64 mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cfb64 #define blowfish_crypt_ctr mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ctr #define blowfish_crypt_ecb mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb #define blowfish_free mbedtls_blowfish_free #define blowfish_init mbedtls_blowfish_init #define blowfish_setkey mbedtls_blowfish_setkey #define camellia_context mbedtls_camellia_context #define camellia_crypt_cbc mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbc #define camellia_crypt_cfb128 mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cfb128 #define camellia_crypt_ctr mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctr #define camellia_crypt_ecb mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb #define camellia_free mbedtls_camellia_free #define camellia_init mbedtls_camellia_init #define camellia_self_test mbedtls_camellia_self_test #define camellia_setkey_dec mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec #define camellia_setkey_enc mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc #define ccm_auth_decrypt mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt #define ccm_context mbedtls_ccm_context #define ccm_encrypt_and_tag mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag #define ccm_free mbedtls_ccm_free #define ccm_init mbedtls_ccm_init #define ccm_self_test mbedtls_ccm_self_test #define cipher_auth_decrypt mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt #define cipher_auth_encrypt mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt #define cipher_base_t mbedtls_cipher_base_t #define cipher_check_tag mbedtls_cipher_check_tag #define cipher_context_t mbedtls_cipher_context_t #define cipher_crypt mbedtls_cipher_crypt #define cipher_definition_t mbedtls_cipher_definition_t #define cipher_definitions mbedtls_cipher_definitions #define cipher_finish mbedtls_cipher_finish #define cipher_free mbedtls_cipher_free #define cipher_get_block_size mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size #define cipher_get_cipher_mode mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode #define cipher_get_iv_size mbedtls_cipher_get_iv_size #define cipher_get_key_size mbedtls_cipher_get_key_bitlen #define cipher_get_name mbedtls_cipher_get_name #define cipher_get_operation mbedtls_cipher_get_operation #define cipher_get_type mbedtls_cipher_get_type #define cipher_id_t mbedtls_cipher_id_t #define cipher_info_from_string mbedtls_cipher_info_from_string #define cipher_info_from_type mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type #define cipher_info_from_values mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values #define cipher_info_t mbedtls_cipher_info_t #define cipher_init mbedtls_cipher_init #define cipher_init_ctx mbedtls_cipher_setup #define cipher_list mbedtls_cipher_list #define cipher_mode_t mbedtls_cipher_mode_t #define cipher_padding_t mbedtls_cipher_padding_t #define cipher_reset mbedtls_cipher_reset #define cipher_set_iv mbedtls_cipher_set_iv #define cipher_set_padding_mode mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode #define cipher_setkey mbedtls_cipher_setkey #define cipher_type_t mbedtls_cipher_type_t #define cipher_update mbedtls_cipher_update #define cipher_update_ad mbedtls_cipher_update_ad #define cipher_write_tag mbedtls_cipher_write_tag #define ctr_drbg_context mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context #define ctr_drbg_free mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free #define ctr_drbg_init mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init #define ctr_drbg_random mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random #define ctr_drbg_random_with_add mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add #define ctr_drbg_reseed mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed #define ctr_drbg_self_test mbedtls_ctr_drbg_self_test #define ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len #define ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance #define ctr_drbg_set_reseed_interval mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_reseed_interval #define ctr_drbg_update mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update #define ctr_drbg_update_seed_file mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_seed_file #define ctr_drbg_write_seed_file mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file #define debug_print_buf mbedtls_debug_print_buf #define debug_print_crt mbedtls_debug_print_crt #define debug_print_ecp mbedtls_debug_print_ecp #define debug_print_mpi mbedtls_debug_print_mpi #define debug_print_msg mbedtls_debug_print_msg #define debug_print_ret mbedtls_debug_print_ret #define debug_set_threshold mbedtls_debug_set_threshold #define des3_context mbedtls_des3_context #define des3_crypt_cbc mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc #define des3_crypt_ecb mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb #define des3_free mbedtls_des3_free #define des3_init mbedtls_des3_init #define des3_set2key_dec mbedtls_des3_set2key_dec #define des3_set2key_enc mbedtls_des3_set2key_enc #define des3_set3key_dec mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec #define des3_set3key_enc mbedtls_des3_set3key_enc #define des_context mbedtls_des_context #define des_crypt_cbc mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc #define des_crypt_ecb mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb #define des_free mbedtls_des_free #define des_init mbedtls_des_init #define des_key_check_key_parity mbedtls_des_key_check_key_parity #define des_key_check_weak mbedtls_des_key_check_weak #define des_key_set_parity mbedtls_des_key_set_parity #define des_self_test mbedtls_des_self_test #define des_setkey_dec mbedtls_des_setkey_dec #define des_setkey_enc mbedtls_des_setkey_enc #define dhm_calc_secret mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret #define dhm_context mbedtls_dhm_context #define dhm_free mbedtls_dhm_free #define dhm_init mbedtls_dhm_init #define dhm_make_params mbedtls_dhm_make_params #define dhm_make_public mbedtls_dhm_make_public #define dhm_parse_dhm mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm #define dhm_parse_dhmfile mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhmfile #define dhm_read_params mbedtls_dhm_read_params #define dhm_read_public mbedtls_dhm_read_public #define dhm_self_test mbedtls_dhm_self_test #define ecdh_calc_secret mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret #define ecdh_compute_shared mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared #define ecdh_context mbedtls_ecdh_context #define ecdh_free mbedtls_ecdh_free #define ecdh_gen_public mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public #define ecdh_get_params mbedtls_ecdh_get_params #define ecdh_init mbedtls_ecdh_init #define ecdh_make_params mbedtls_ecdh_make_params #define ecdh_make_public mbedtls_ecdh_make_public #define ecdh_read_params mbedtls_ecdh_read_params #define ecdh_read_public mbedtls_ecdh_read_public #define ecdh_side mbedtls_ecdh_side #define ecdsa_context mbedtls_ecdsa_context #define ecdsa_free mbedtls_ecdsa_free #define ecdsa_from_keypair mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair #define ecdsa_genkey mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey #define ecdsa_info mbedtls_ecdsa_info #define ecdsa_init mbedtls_ecdsa_init #define ecdsa_read_signature mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature #define ecdsa_sign mbedtls_ecdsa_sign #define ecdsa_sign_det mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det #define ecdsa_verify mbedtls_ecdsa_verify #define ecdsa_write_signature mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature #define ecdsa_write_signature_det mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_det #define eckey_info mbedtls_eckey_info #define eckeydh_info mbedtls_eckeydh_info #define ecp_check_privkey mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey #define ecp_check_pub_priv mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv #define ecp_check_pubkey mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey #define ecp_copy mbedtls_ecp_copy #define ecp_curve_info mbedtls_ecp_curve_info #define ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id #define ecp_curve_info_from_name mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_name #define ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id #define ecp_curve_list mbedtls_ecp_curve_list #define ecp_gen_key mbedtls_ecp_gen_key #define ecp_gen_keypair mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair #define ecp_group mbedtls_ecp_group #define ecp_group_copy mbedtls_ecp_group_copy #define ecp_group_free mbedtls_ecp_group_free #define ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecp_group_id #define ecp_group_init mbedtls_ecp_group_init #define ecp_grp_id_list mbedtls_ecp_grp_id_list #define ecp_is_zero mbedtls_ecp_is_zero #define ecp_keypair mbedtls_ecp_keypair #define ecp_keypair_free mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free #define ecp_keypair_init mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init #define ecp_mul mbedtls_ecp_mul #define ecp_point mbedtls_ecp_point #define ecp_point_free mbedtls_ecp_point_free #define ecp_point_init mbedtls_ecp_point_init #define ecp_point_read_binary mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary #define ecp_point_read_string mbedtls_ecp_point_read_string #define ecp_point_write_binary mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary #define ecp_self_test mbedtls_ecp_self_test #define ecp_set_zero mbedtls_ecp_set_zero #define ecp_tls_read_group mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group #define ecp_tls_read_point mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point #define ecp_tls_write_group mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group #define ecp_tls_write_point mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point #define ecp_use_known_dp mbedtls_ecp_group_load #define entropy_add_source mbedtls_entropy_add_source #define entropy_context mbedtls_entropy_context #define entropy_free mbedtls_entropy_free #define entropy_func mbedtls_entropy_func #define entropy_gather mbedtls_entropy_gather #define entropy_init mbedtls_entropy_init #define entropy_self_test mbedtls_entropy_self_test #define entropy_update_manual mbedtls_entropy_update_manual #define entropy_update_seed_file mbedtls_entropy_update_seed_file #define entropy_write_seed_file mbedtls_entropy_write_seed_file #define error_strerror mbedtls_strerror #define f_source_ptr mbedtls_entropy_f_source_ptr #define gcm_auth_decrypt mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt #define gcm_context mbedtls_gcm_context #define gcm_crypt_and_tag mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag #define gcm_finish mbedtls_gcm_finish #define gcm_free mbedtls_gcm_free #define gcm_init mbedtls_gcm_init #define gcm_self_test mbedtls_gcm_self_test #define gcm_starts mbedtls_gcm_starts #define gcm_update mbedtls_gcm_update #define get_timer mbedtls_timing_get_timer #define hardclock mbedtls_timing_hardclock #define hardclock_poll mbedtls_hardclock_poll #define havege_free mbedtls_havege_free #define havege_init mbedtls_havege_init #define havege_poll mbedtls_havege_poll #define havege_random mbedtls_havege_random #define havege_state mbedtls_havege_state #define hmac_drbg_context mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context #define hmac_drbg_free mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free #define hmac_drbg_init mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init #define hmac_drbg_random mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random #define hmac_drbg_random_with_add mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add #define hmac_drbg_reseed mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed #define hmac_drbg_self_test mbedtls_hmac_drbg_self_test #define hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len #define hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance #define hmac_drbg_set_reseed_interval mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_reseed_interval #define hmac_drbg_update mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update #define hmac_drbg_update_seed_file mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_seed_file #define hmac_drbg_write_seed_file mbedtls_hmac_drbg_write_seed_file #define hr_time mbedtls_timing_hr_time #define key_exchange_type_t mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t #define md mbedtls_md #define md2 mbedtls_md2 #define md2_context mbedtls_md2_context #define md2_finish mbedtls_md2_finish #define md2_free mbedtls_md2_free #define md2_info mbedtls_md2_info #define md2_init mbedtls_md2_init #define md2_process mbedtls_md2_process #define md2_self_test mbedtls_md2_self_test #define md2_starts mbedtls_md2_starts #define md2_update mbedtls_md2_update #define md4 mbedtls_md4 #define md4_context mbedtls_md4_context #define md4_finish mbedtls_md4_finish #define md4_free mbedtls_md4_free #define md4_info mbedtls_md4_info #define md4_init mbedtls_md4_init #define md4_process mbedtls_md4_process #define md4_self_test mbedtls_md4_self_test #define md4_starts mbedtls_md4_starts #define md4_update mbedtls_md4_update #define md5 mbedtls_md5 #define md5_context mbedtls_md5_context #define md5_finish mbedtls_md5_finish #define md5_free mbedtls_md5_free #define md5_info mbedtls_md5_info #define md5_init mbedtls_md5_init #define md5_process mbedtls_md5_process #define md5_self_test mbedtls_md5_self_test #define md5_starts mbedtls_md5_starts #define md5_update mbedtls_md5_update #define md_context_t mbedtls_md_context_t #define md_file mbedtls_md_file #define md_finish mbedtls_md_finish #define md_free mbedtls_md_free #define md_get_name mbedtls_md_get_name #define md_get_size mbedtls_md_get_size #define md_get_type mbedtls_md_get_type #define md_hmac mbedtls_md_hmac #define md_hmac_finish mbedtls_md_hmac_finish #define md_hmac_reset mbedtls_md_hmac_reset #define md_hmac_starts mbedtls_md_hmac_starts #define md_hmac_update mbedtls_md_hmac_update #define md_info_from_string mbedtls_md_info_from_string #define md_info_from_type mbedtls_md_info_from_type #define md_info_t mbedtls_md_info_t #define md_init mbedtls_md_init #define md_init_ctx mbedtls_md_init_ctx #define md_list mbedtls_md_list #define md_process mbedtls_md_process #define md_starts mbedtls_md_starts #define md_type_t mbedtls_md_type_t #define md_update mbedtls_md_update #define memory_buffer_alloc_cur_get mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_cur_get #define memory_buffer_alloc_free mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free #define memory_buffer_alloc_init mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init #define memory_buffer_alloc_max_get mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_max_get #define memory_buffer_alloc_max_reset mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_max_reset #define memory_buffer_alloc_self_test mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_self_test #define memory_buffer_alloc_status mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_status #define memory_buffer_alloc_verify mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_verify #define memory_buffer_set_verify mbedtls_memory_buffer_set_verify #define mpi mbedtls_mpi #define mpi_add_abs mbedtls_mpi_add_abs #define mpi_add_int mbedtls_mpi_add_int #define mpi_add_mpi mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi #define mpi_cmp_abs mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs #define mpi_cmp_int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int #define mpi_cmp_mpi mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi #define mpi_copy mbedtls_mpi_copy #define mpi_div_int mbedtls_mpi_div_int #define mpi_div_mpi mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi #define mpi_exp_mod mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod #define mpi_fill_random mbedtls_mpi_fill_random #define mpi_free mbedtls_mpi_free #define mpi_gcd mbedtls_mpi_gcd #define mpi_gen_prime mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime #define mpi_get_bit mbedtls_mpi_get_bit #define mpi_grow mbedtls_mpi_grow #define mpi_init mbedtls_mpi_init #define mpi_inv_mod mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod #define mpi_is_prime mbedtls_mpi_is_prime #define mpi_lsb mbedtls_mpi_lsb #define mpi_lset mbedtls_mpi_lset #define mpi_mod_int mbedtls_mpi_mod_int #define mpi_mod_mpi mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi #define mpi_msb mbedtls_mpi_bitlen #define mpi_mul_int mbedtls_mpi_mul_int #define mpi_mul_mpi mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi #define mpi_read_binary mbedtls_mpi_read_binary #define mpi_read_file mbedtls_mpi_read_file #define mpi_read_string mbedtls_mpi_read_string #define mpi_safe_cond_assign mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign #define mpi_safe_cond_swap mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap #define mpi_self_test mbedtls_mpi_self_test #define mpi_set_bit mbedtls_mpi_set_bit #define mpi_shift_l mbedtls_mpi_shift_l #define mpi_shift_r mbedtls_mpi_shift_r #define mpi_shrink mbedtls_mpi_shrink #define mpi_size mbedtls_mpi_size #define mpi_sub_abs mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs #define mpi_sub_int mbedtls_mpi_sub_int #define mpi_sub_mpi mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi #define mpi_swap mbedtls_mpi_swap #define mpi_write_binary mbedtls_mpi_write_binary #define mpi_write_file mbedtls_mpi_write_file #define mpi_write_string mbedtls_mpi_write_string #define net_accept mbedtls_net_accept #define net_bind mbedtls_net_bind #define net_close mbedtls_net_free #define net_connect mbedtls_net_connect #define net_recv mbedtls_net_recv #define net_recv_timeout mbedtls_net_recv_timeout #define net_send mbedtls_net_send #define net_set_block mbedtls_net_set_block #define net_set_nonblock mbedtls_net_set_nonblock #define net_usleep mbedtls_net_usleep #define oid_descriptor_t mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t #define oid_get_attr_short_name mbedtls_oid_get_attr_short_name #define oid_get_cipher_alg mbedtls_oid_get_cipher_alg #define oid_get_ec_grp mbedtls_oid_get_ec_grp #define oid_get_extended_key_usage mbedtls_oid_get_extended_key_usage #define oid_get_md_alg mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg #define oid_get_numeric_string mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string #define oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp #define oid_get_oid_by_md mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md #define oid_get_oid_by_pk_alg mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_pk_alg #define oid_get_oid_by_sig_alg mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_sig_alg #define oid_get_pk_alg mbedtls_oid_get_pk_alg #define oid_get_pkcs12_pbe_alg mbedtls_oid_get_pkcs12_pbe_alg #define oid_get_sig_alg mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg #define oid_get_sig_alg_desc mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg_desc #define oid_get_x509_ext_type mbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_type #define operation_t mbedtls_operation_t #define padlock_supports mbedtls_padlock_has_support #define padlock_xcryptcbc mbedtls_padlock_xcryptcbc #define padlock_xcryptecb mbedtls_padlock_xcryptecb #define pem_context mbedtls_pem_context #define pem_free mbedtls_pem_free #define pem_init mbedtls_pem_init #define pem_read_buffer mbedtls_pem_read_buffer #define pem_write_buffer mbedtls_pem_write_buffer #define pk_can_do mbedtls_pk_can_do #define pk_check_pair mbedtls_pk_check_pair #define pk_context mbedtls_pk_context #define pk_debug mbedtls_pk_debug #define pk_debug_item mbedtls_pk_debug_item #define pk_debug_type mbedtls_pk_debug_type #define pk_decrypt mbedtls_pk_decrypt #define pk_ec mbedtls_pk_ec #define pk_encrypt mbedtls_pk_encrypt #define pk_free mbedtls_pk_free #define pk_get_len mbedtls_pk_get_len #define pk_get_name mbedtls_pk_get_name #define pk_get_size mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen #define pk_get_type mbedtls_pk_get_type #define pk_info_from_type mbedtls_pk_info_from_type #define pk_info_t mbedtls_pk_info_t #define pk_init mbedtls_pk_init #define pk_init_ctx mbedtls_pk_setup #define pk_init_ctx_rsa_alt mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt #define pk_load_file mbedtls_pk_load_file #define pk_parse_key mbedtls_pk_parse_key #define pk_parse_keyfile mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile #define pk_parse_public_key mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key #define pk_parse_public_keyfile mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile #define pk_parse_subpubkey mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey #define pk_rsa mbedtls_pk_rsa #define pk_rsa_alt_decrypt_func mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_decrypt_func #define pk_rsa_alt_key_len_func mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_key_len_func #define pk_rsa_alt_sign_func mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_sign_func #define pk_rsassa_pss_options mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options #define pk_sign mbedtls_pk_sign #define pk_type_t mbedtls_pk_type_t #define pk_verify mbedtls_pk_verify #define pk_verify_ext mbedtls_pk_verify_ext #define pk_write_key_der mbedtls_pk_write_key_der #define pk_write_key_pem mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem #define pk_write_pubkey mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey #define pk_write_pubkey_der mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der #define pk_write_pubkey_pem mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_pem #define pkcs11_context mbedtls_pkcs11_context #define pkcs11_decrypt mbedtls_pkcs11_decrypt #define pkcs11_priv_key_free mbedtls_pkcs11_priv_key_free #define pkcs11_priv_key_init mbedtls_pkcs11_priv_key_bind #define pkcs11_sign mbedtls_pkcs11_sign #define pkcs11_x509_cert_init mbedtls_pkcs11_x509_cert_bind #define pkcs12_derivation mbedtls_pkcs12_derivation #define pkcs12_pbe mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe #define pkcs12_pbe_sha1_rc4_128 mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_sha1_rc4_128 #define pkcs5_pbes2 mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2 #define pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac #define pkcs5_self_test mbedtls_pkcs5_self_test #define platform_entropy_poll mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll #define platform_set_exit mbedtls_platform_set_exit #define platform_set_fprintf mbedtls_platform_set_fprintf #define platform_set_printf mbedtls_platform_set_printf #define platform_set_snprintf mbedtls_platform_set_snprintf #define polarssl_exit mbedtls_exit #define polarssl_fprintf mbedtls_fprintf #define polarssl_free mbedtls_free #define polarssl_mutex_free mbedtls_mutex_free #define polarssl_mutex_init mbedtls_mutex_init #define polarssl_mutex_lock mbedtls_mutex_lock #define polarssl_mutex_unlock mbedtls_mutex_unlock #define polarssl_printf mbedtls_printf #define polarssl_snprintf mbedtls_snprintf #define polarssl_strerror mbedtls_strerror #define ripemd160 mbedtls_ripemd160 #define ripemd160_context mbedtls_ripemd160_context #define ripemd160_finish mbedtls_ripemd160_finish #define ripemd160_free mbedtls_ripemd160_free #define ripemd160_info mbedtls_ripemd160_info #define ripemd160_init mbedtls_ripemd160_init #define ripemd160_process mbedtls_ripemd160_process #define ripemd160_self_test mbedtls_ripemd160_self_test #define ripemd160_starts mbedtls_ripemd160_starts #define ripemd160_update mbedtls_ripemd160_update #define rsa_alt_context mbedtls_rsa_alt_context #define rsa_alt_info mbedtls_rsa_alt_info #define rsa_check_privkey mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey #define rsa_check_pub_priv mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv #define rsa_check_pubkey mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey #define rsa_context mbedtls_rsa_context #define rsa_copy mbedtls_rsa_copy #define rsa_free mbedtls_rsa_free #define rsa_gen_key mbedtls_rsa_gen_key #define rsa_info mbedtls_rsa_info #define rsa_init mbedtls_rsa_init #define rsa_pkcs1_decrypt mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt #define rsa_pkcs1_encrypt mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt #define rsa_pkcs1_sign mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign #define rsa_pkcs1_verify mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify #define rsa_private mbedtls_rsa_private #define rsa_public mbedtls_rsa_public #define rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt #define rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt #define rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt #define rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt #define rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign #define rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify #define rsa_rsassa_pss_sign mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign #define rsa_rsassa_pss_verify mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify #define rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext #define rsa_self_test mbedtls_rsa_self_test #define rsa_set_padding mbedtls_rsa_set_padding #define safer_memcmp mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp #define set_alarm mbedtls_set_alarm #define sha1 mbedtls_sha1 #define sha1_context mbedtls_sha1_context #define sha1_finish mbedtls_sha1_finish #define sha1_free mbedtls_sha1_free #define sha1_info mbedtls_sha1_info #define sha1_init mbedtls_sha1_init #define sha1_process mbedtls_sha1_process #define sha1_self_test mbedtls_sha1_self_test #define sha1_starts mbedtls_sha1_starts #define sha1_update mbedtls_sha1_update #define sha224_info mbedtls_sha224_info #define sha256 mbedtls_sha256 #define sha256_context mbedtls_sha256_context #define sha256_finish mbedtls_sha256_finish #define sha256_free mbedtls_sha256_free #define sha256_info mbedtls_sha256_info #define sha256_init mbedtls_sha256_init #define sha256_process mbedtls_sha256_process #define sha256_self_test mbedtls_sha256_self_test #define sha256_starts mbedtls_sha256_starts #define sha256_update mbedtls_sha256_update #define sha384_info mbedtls_sha384_info #define sha512 mbedtls_sha512 #define sha512_context mbedtls_sha512_context #define sha512_finish mbedtls_sha512_finish #define sha512_free mbedtls_sha512_free #define sha512_info mbedtls_sha512_info #define sha512_init mbedtls_sha512_init #define sha512_process mbedtls_sha512_process #define sha512_self_test mbedtls_sha512_self_test #define sha512_starts mbedtls_sha512_starts #define sha512_update mbedtls_sha512_update #define source_state mbedtls_entropy_source_state #define ssl_cache_context mbedtls_ssl_cache_context #define ssl_cache_entry mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry #define ssl_cache_free mbedtls_ssl_cache_free #define ssl_cache_get mbedtls_ssl_cache_get #define ssl_cache_init mbedtls_ssl_cache_init #define ssl_cache_set mbedtls_ssl_cache_set #define ssl_cache_set_max_entries mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_max_entries #define ssl_cache_set_timeout mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_timeout #define ssl_check_cert_usage mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage #define ssl_ciphersuite_from_id mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id #define ssl_ciphersuite_from_string mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_string #define ssl_ciphersuite_t mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t #define ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec #define ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk #define ssl_close_notify mbedtls_ssl_close_notify #define ssl_context mbedtls_ssl_context #define ssl_cookie_check mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check #define ssl_cookie_check_t mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t #define ssl_cookie_ctx mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx #define ssl_cookie_free mbedtls_ssl_cookie_free #define ssl_cookie_init mbedtls_ssl_cookie_init #define ssl_cookie_set_timeout mbedtls_ssl_cookie_set_timeout #define ssl_cookie_setup mbedtls_ssl_cookie_setup #define ssl_cookie_write mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write #define ssl_cookie_write_t mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t #define ssl_derive_keys mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys #define ssl_dtls_replay_check mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check #define ssl_dtls_replay_update mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update #define ssl_fetch_input mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input #define ssl_flight_item mbedtls_ssl_flight_item #define ssl_flush_output mbedtls_ssl_flush_output #define ssl_free mbedtls_ssl_free #define ssl_get_alpn_protocol mbedtls_ssl_get_alpn_protocol #define ssl_get_bytes_avail mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail #define ssl_get_ciphersuite mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite #define ssl_get_ciphersuite_id mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_id #define ssl_get_ciphersuite_name mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name #define ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg #define ssl_get_peer_cert mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert #define ssl_get_record_expansion mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion #define ssl_get_session mbedtls_ssl_get_session #define ssl_get_verify_result mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result #define ssl_get_version mbedtls_ssl_get_version #define ssl_handshake mbedtls_ssl_handshake #define ssl_handshake_client_step mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step #define ssl_handshake_free mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free #define ssl_handshake_params mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params #define ssl_handshake_server_step mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step #define ssl_handshake_step mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step #define ssl_handshake_wrapup mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup #define ssl_hdr_len mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len #define ssl_hs_hdr_len mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len #define ssl_hw_record_activate mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate #define ssl_hw_record_finish mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_finish #define ssl_hw_record_init mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init #define ssl_hw_record_read mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read #define ssl_hw_record_reset mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset #define ssl_hw_record_write mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write #define ssl_init mbedtls_ssl_init #define ssl_key_cert mbedtls_ssl_key_cert #define ssl_legacy_renegotiation mbedtls_ssl_conf_legacy_renegotiation #define ssl_list_ciphersuites mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites #define ssl_md_alg_from_hash mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash #define ssl_optimize_checksum mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum #define ssl_own_cert mbedtls_ssl_own_cert #define ssl_own_key mbedtls_ssl_own_key #define ssl_parse_certificate mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate #define ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec #define ssl_parse_finished mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished #define ssl_pk_alg_from_sig mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig #define ssl_pkcs11_decrypt mbedtls_ssl_pkcs11_decrypt #define ssl_pkcs11_key_len mbedtls_ssl_pkcs11_key_len #define ssl_pkcs11_sign mbedtls_ssl_pkcs11_sign #define ssl_psk_derive_premaster mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster #define ssl_read mbedtls_ssl_read #define ssl_read_record mbedtls_ssl_read_record #define ssl_read_version mbedtls_ssl_read_version #define ssl_recv_flight_completed mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed #define ssl_renegotiate mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate #define ssl_resend mbedtls_ssl_resend #define ssl_reset_checksum mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum #define ssl_send_alert_message mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message #define ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure #define ssl_send_flight_completed mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed #define ssl_session mbedtls_ssl_session #define ssl_session_free mbedtls_ssl_session_free #define ssl_session_init mbedtls_ssl_session_init #define ssl_session_reset mbedtls_ssl_session_reset #define ssl_set_alpn_protocols mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols #define ssl_set_arc4_support mbedtls_ssl_conf_arc4_support #define ssl_set_authmode mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode #define ssl_set_bio mbedtls_ssl_set_bio #define ssl_set_ca_chain mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain #define ssl_set_cbc_record_splitting mbedtls_ssl_conf_cbc_record_splitting #define ssl_set_ciphersuites mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites #define ssl_set_ciphersuites_for_version mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites_for_version #define ssl_set_client_transport_id mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id #define ssl_set_curves mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves #define ssl_set_dbg mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg #define ssl_set_dh_param mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param #define ssl_set_dh_param_ctx mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_ctx #define ssl_set_dtls_anti_replay mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_anti_replay #define ssl_set_dtls_badmac_limit mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit #define ssl_set_dtls_cookies mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_cookies #define ssl_set_encrypt_then_mac mbedtls_ssl_conf_encrypt_then_mac #define ssl_set_endpoint mbedtls_ssl_conf_endpoint #define ssl_set_extended_master_secret mbedtls_ssl_conf_extended_master_secret #define ssl_set_fallback mbedtls_ssl_conf_fallback #define ssl_set_handshake_timeout mbedtls_ssl_conf_handshake_timeout #define ssl_set_hostname mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname #define ssl_set_max_frag_len mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len #define ssl_set_max_version mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version #define ssl_set_min_version mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version #define ssl_set_own_cert mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert #define ssl_set_psk mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk #define ssl_set_psk_cb mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb #define ssl_set_renegotiation mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation #define ssl_set_renegotiation_enforced mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_enforced #define ssl_set_renegotiation_period mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_period #define ssl_set_rng mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng #define ssl_set_session mbedtls_ssl_set_session #define ssl_set_session_cache mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache #define ssl_set_session_tickets mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets #define ssl_set_sni mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni #define ssl_set_transport mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport #define ssl_set_truncated_hmac mbedtls_ssl_conf_truncated_hmac #define ssl_set_verify mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify #define ssl_sig_from_pk mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk #define ssl_states mbedtls_ssl_states #define ssl_transform mbedtls_ssl_transform #define ssl_transform_free mbedtls_ssl_transform_free #define ssl_write mbedtls_ssl_write #define ssl_write_certificate mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate #define ssl_write_change_cipher_spec mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec #define ssl_write_finished mbedtls_ssl_write_finished #define ssl_write_record mbedtls_ssl_write_record #define ssl_write_version mbedtls_ssl_write_version #define supported_ciphers mbedtls_cipher_supported #define t_sint mbedtls_mpi_sint #define t_udbl mbedtls_t_udbl #define t_uint mbedtls_mpi_uint #define test_ca_crt mbedtls_test_ca_crt #define test_ca_crt_ec mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec #define test_ca_crt_rsa mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa #define test_ca_key mbedtls_test_ca_key #define test_ca_key_ec mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec #define test_ca_key_rsa mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa #define test_ca_list mbedtls_test_cas_pem #define test_ca_pwd mbedtls_test_ca_pwd #define test_ca_pwd_ec mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec #define test_ca_pwd_rsa mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa #define test_cli_crt mbedtls_test_cli_crt #define test_cli_crt_ec mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec #define test_cli_crt_rsa mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa #define test_cli_key mbedtls_test_cli_key #define test_cli_key_ec mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec #define test_cli_key_rsa mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa #define test_srv_crt mbedtls_test_srv_crt #define test_srv_crt_ec mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec #define test_srv_crt_rsa mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa #define test_srv_key mbedtls_test_srv_key #define test_srv_key_ec mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec #define test_srv_key_rsa mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa #define threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_mutex_t #define threading_set_alt mbedtls_threading_set_alt #define timing_self_test mbedtls_timing_self_test #define version_check_feature mbedtls_version_check_feature #define version_get_number mbedtls_version_get_number #define version_get_string mbedtls_version_get_string #define version_get_string_full mbedtls_version_get_string_full #define x509_bitstring mbedtls_x509_bitstring #define x509_buf mbedtls_x509_buf #define x509_crl mbedtls_x509_crl #define x509_crl_entry mbedtls_x509_crl_entry #define x509_crl_free mbedtls_x509_crl_free #define x509_crl_info mbedtls_x509_crl_info #define x509_crl_init mbedtls_x509_crl_init #define x509_crl_parse mbedtls_x509_crl_parse #define x509_crl_parse_der mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der #define x509_crl_parse_file mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_file #define x509_crt mbedtls_x509_crt #define x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage #define x509_crt_check_key_usage mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage #define x509_crt_free mbedtls_x509_crt_free #define x509_crt_info mbedtls_x509_crt_info #define x509_crt_init mbedtls_x509_crt_init #define x509_crt_parse mbedtls_x509_crt_parse #define x509_crt_parse_der mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der #define x509_crt_parse_file mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file #define x509_crt_parse_path mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path #define x509_crt_revoked mbedtls_x509_crt_is_revoked #define x509_crt_verify mbedtls_x509_crt_verify #define x509_csr mbedtls_x509_csr #define x509_csr_free mbedtls_x509_csr_free #define x509_csr_info mbedtls_x509_csr_info #define x509_csr_init mbedtls_x509_csr_init #define x509_csr_parse mbedtls_x509_csr_parse #define x509_csr_parse_der mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der #define x509_csr_parse_file mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file #define x509_dn_gets mbedtls_x509_dn_gets #define x509_get_alg mbedtls_x509_get_alg #define x509_get_alg_null mbedtls_x509_get_alg_null #define x509_get_ext mbedtls_x509_get_ext #define x509_get_name mbedtls_x509_get_name #define x509_get_rsassa_pss_params mbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_params #define x509_get_serial mbedtls_x509_get_serial #define x509_get_sig mbedtls_x509_get_sig #define x509_get_sig_alg mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg #define x509_get_time mbedtls_x509_get_time #define x509_key_size_helper mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper #define x509_name mbedtls_x509_name #define x509_self_test mbedtls_x509_self_test #define x509_sequence mbedtls_x509_sequence #define x509_serial_gets mbedtls_x509_serial_gets #define x509_set_extension mbedtls_x509_set_extension #define x509_sig_alg_gets mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets #define x509_string_to_names mbedtls_x509_string_to_names #define x509_time mbedtls_x509_time #define x509_time_expired mbedtls_x509_time_is_past #define x509_time_future mbedtls_x509_time_is_future #define x509_write_extensions mbedtls_x509_write_extensions #define x509_write_names mbedtls_x509_write_names #define x509_write_sig mbedtls_x509_write_sig #define x509write_cert mbedtls_x509write_cert #define x509write_crt_der mbedtls_x509write_crt_der #define x509write_crt_free mbedtls_x509write_crt_free #define x509write_crt_init mbedtls_x509write_crt_init #define x509write_crt_pem mbedtls_x509write_crt_pem #define x509write_crt_set_authority_key_identifier mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_authority_key_identifier #define x509write_crt_set_basic_constraints mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_basic_constraints #define x509write_crt_set_extension mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension #define x509write_crt_set_issuer_key mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_key #define x509write_crt_set_issuer_name mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_name #define x509write_crt_set_key_usage mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_usage #define x509write_crt_set_md_alg mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_md_alg #define x509write_crt_set_ns_cert_type mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_ns_cert_type #define x509write_crt_set_serial mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial #define x509write_crt_set_subject_key mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key #define x509write_crt_set_subject_key_identifier mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key_identifier #define x509write_crt_set_subject_name mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_name #define x509write_crt_set_validity mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_validity #define x509write_crt_set_version mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_version #define x509write_csr mbedtls_x509write_csr #define x509write_csr_der mbedtls_x509write_csr_der #define x509write_csr_free mbedtls_x509write_csr_free #define x509write_csr_init mbedtls_x509write_csr_init #define x509write_csr_pem mbedtls_x509write_csr_pem #define x509write_csr_set_extension mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension #define x509write_csr_set_key mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key #define x509write_csr_set_key_usage mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key_usage #define x509write_csr_set_md_alg mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_md_alg #define x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type #define x509write_csr_set_subject_name mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_subject_name #define xtea_context mbedtls_xtea_context #define xtea_crypt_cbc mbedtls_xtea_crypt_cbc #define xtea_crypt_ecb mbedtls_xtea_crypt_ecb #define xtea_free mbedtls_xtea_free #define xtea_init mbedtls_xtea_init #define xtea_self_test mbedtls_xtea_self_test #define xtea_setup mbedtls_xtea_setup #endif /* compat-1.3.h */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ usr/include/mbedtls/config.h0000644000000000000000000040004013776116110015061 0ustar rootroot/** * \file config.h * * \brief Configuration options (set of defines) * * This set of compile-time options may be used to enable * or disable features selectively, and reduce the global * memory footprint. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H #define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H #if defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE) #define _CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE 1 #endif /** * \name SECTION: System support * * This section sets system specific settings. * \{ */ /** * \def MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM * * The compiler has support for asm(). * * Requires support for asm() in compiler. * * Used in: * library/aria.c * library/timing.c * include/mbedtls/bn_mul.h * * Required by: * MBEDTLS_AESNI_C * MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C * * Comment to disable the use of assembly code. */ #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM /** * \def MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION * * The platform lacks support for double-width integer division (64-bit * division on a 32-bit platform, 128-bit division on a 64-bit platform). * * Used in: * include/mbedtls/bignum.h * library/bignum.c * * The bignum code uses double-width division to speed up some operations. * Double-width division is often implemented in software that needs to * be linked with the program. The presence of a double-width integer * type is usually detected automatically through preprocessor macros, * but the automatic detection cannot know whether the code needs to * and can be linked with an implementation of division for that type. * By default division is assumed to be usable if the type is present. * Uncomment this option to prevent the use of double-width division. * * Note that division for the native integer type is always required. * Furthermore, a 64-bit type is always required even on a 32-bit * platform, but it need not support multiplication or division. In some * cases it is also desirable to disable some double-width operations. For * example, if double-width division is implemented in software, disabling * it can reduce code size in some embedded targets. */ //#define MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION /** * \def MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION * * The platform lacks support for 32x32 -> 64-bit multiplication. * * Used in: * library/poly1305.c * * Some parts of the library may use multiplication of two unsigned 32-bit * operands with a 64-bit result in order to speed up computations. On some * platforms, this is not available in hardware and has to be implemented in * software, usually in a library provided by the toolchain. * * Sometimes it is not desirable to have to link to that library. This option * removes the dependency of that library on platforms that lack a hardware * 64-bit multiplier by embedding a software implementation in Mbed TLS. * * Note that depending on the compiler, this may decrease performance compared * to using the library function provided by the toolchain. */ //#define MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION /** * \def MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2 * * CPU supports SSE2 instruction set. * * Uncomment if the CPU supports SSE2 (IA-32 specific). */ //#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2 /** * \def MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME * * System has time.h and time(). * The time does not need to be correct, only time differences are used, * by contrast with MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE * * Defining MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME allows you to specify MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT, * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO, MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO and * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME. * * Comment if your system does not support time functions */ #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME /** * \def MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE * * System has time.h, time(), and an implementation for * mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() (see below). * The time needs to be correct (not necessarily very accurate, but at least * the date should be correct). This is used to verify the validity period of * X.509 certificates. * * Comment if your system does not have a correct clock. * * \note mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() is an abstraction in platform_util.h that * behaves similarly to the gmtime_r() function from the C standard. Refer to * the documentation for mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() for more information. * * \note It is possible to configure an implementation for * mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() at compile-time by using the macro * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT. */ #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE /** * \def MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY * * Enable the memory allocation layer. * * By default mbed TLS uses the system-provided calloc() and free(). * This allows different allocators (self-implemented or provided) to be * provided to the platform abstraction layer. * * Enabling MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY without the * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_{FREE,CALLOC}_MACROs will provide * "mbedtls_platform_set_calloc_free()" allowing you to set an alternative calloc() and * free() function pointer at runtime. * * Enabling MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY and specifying * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_{CALLOC,FREE}_MACROs will allow you to specify the * alternate function at compile time. * * Requires: MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C * * Enable this layer to allow use of alternative memory allocators. */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY /** * \def MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS * * Do not assign standard functions in the platform layer (e.g. calloc() to * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC and printf() to MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF) * * This makes sure there are no linking errors on platforms that do not support * these functions. You will HAVE to provide alternatives, either at runtime * via the platform_set_xxx() functions or at compile time by setting * the MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_XXX defines, or enabling a * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_MACRO. * * Requires: MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C * * Uncomment to prevent default assignment of standard functions in the * platform layer. */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS /** * \def MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT * * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_ALT: Uncomment a macro to let mbed TLS support the * function in the platform abstraction layer. * * Example: In case you uncomment MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT, mbed TLS will * provide a function "mbedtls_platform_set_printf()" that allows you to set an * alternative printf function pointer. * * All these define require MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C to be defined! * * \note MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT is required on Windows; * it will be enabled automatically by check_config.h * * \warning MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_ALT cannot be defined at the same time as * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_MACRO! * * Requires: MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT requires MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME * * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of specific base * platform function */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT /** * \def MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING * * Mark deprecated functions and features so that they generate a warning if * used. Functionality deprecated in one version will usually be removed in the * next version. You can enable this to help you prepare the transition to a * new major version by making sure your code is not using this functionality. * * This only works with GCC and Clang. With other compilers, you may want to * use MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED * * Uncomment to get warnings on using deprecated functions and features. */ //#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING /** * \def MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED * * Remove deprecated functions and features so that they generate an error if * used. Functionality deprecated in one version will usually be removed in the * next version. You can enable this to help you prepare the transition to a * new major version by making sure your code is not using this functionality. * * Uncomment to get errors on using deprecated functions and features. */ //#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED /** * \def MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS * * This configuration option controls whether the library validates more of * the parameters passed to it. * * When this flag is not defined, the library only attempts to validate an * input parameter if: (1) they may come from the outside world (such as the * network, the filesystem, etc.) or (2) not validating them could result in * internal memory errors such as overflowing a buffer controlled by the * library. On the other hand, it doesn't attempt to validate parameters whose * values are fully controlled by the application (such as pointers). * * When this flag is defined, the library additionally attempts to validate * parameters that are fully controlled by the application, and should always * be valid if the application code is fully correct and trusted. * * For example, when a function accepts as input a pointer to a buffer that may * contain untrusted data, and its documentation mentions that this pointer * must not be NULL: * - The pointer is checked to be non-NULL only if this option is enabled. * - The content of the buffer is always validated. * * When this flag is defined, if a library function receives a parameter that * is invalid: * 1. The function will invoke the macro MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(). * 2. If MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() did not terminate the program, the function * will immediately return. If the function returns an Mbed TLS error code, * the error code in this case is MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx_BAD_INPUT_DATA. * * When defining this flag, you also need to arrange a definition for * MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(). You can do this by any of the following methods: * - By default, the library defines MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() to call a * function mbedtls_param_failed(), but the library does not define this * function. If you do not make any other arrangements, you must provide * the function mbedtls_param_failed() in your application. * See `platform_util.h` for its prototype. * - If you enable the macro #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT, then the * library defines MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(\c cond) to be `assert(cond)`. * You can still supply an alternative definition of * MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(), which may call `assert`. * - If you define a macro MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() before including `config.h` * or you uncomment the definition of MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() in `config.h`, * the library will call the macro that you defined and will not supply * its own version. Note that if MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() calls `assert`, * you need to enable #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT so that library source * files include ``. * * Uncomment to enable validation of application-controlled parameters. */ //#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS /** * \def MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT * * Allow MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() to call `assert`, and make it default to * `assert`. This macro is only used if #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS is defined. * * If this macro is not defined, then MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() defaults to * calling a function mbedtls_param_failed(). See the documentation of * #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS for details. * * Uncomment to allow MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() to call `assert`. */ //#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT /* \} name SECTION: System support */ /** * \name SECTION: mbed TLS feature support * * This section sets support for features that are or are not needed * within the modules that are enabled. * \{ */ /** * \def MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT * * Uncomment to provide your own alternate implementation for mbedtls_timing_hardclock(), * mbedtls_timing_get_timer(), mbedtls_set_alarm(), mbedtls_set/get_delay() * * Only works if you have MBEDTLS_TIMING_C enabled. * * You will need to provide a header "timing_alt.h" and an implementation at * compile time. */ //#define MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT /** * \def MBEDTLS_AES_ALT * * MBEDTLS__MODULE_NAME__ALT: Uncomment a macro to let mbed TLS use your * alternate core implementation of a symmetric crypto, an arithmetic or hash * module (e.g. platform specific assembly optimized implementations). Keep * in mind that the function prototypes should remain the same. * * This replaces the whole module. If you only want to replace one of the * functions, use one of the MBEDTLS__FUNCTION_NAME__ALT flags. * * Example: In case you uncomment MBEDTLS_AES_ALT, mbed TLS will no longer * provide the "struct mbedtls_aes_context" definition and omit the base * function declarations and implementations. "aes_alt.h" will be included from * "aes.h" to include the new function definitions. * * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of the corresponding * module. * * \warning MD2, MD4, MD5, ARC4, DES and SHA-1 are considered weak and their * use constitutes a security risk. If possible, we recommend * avoiding dependencies on them, and considering stronger message * digests and ciphers instead. * */ //#define MBEDTLS_AES_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_DES_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT /* * When replacing the elliptic curve module, pleace consider, that it is * implemented with two .c files: * - ecp.c * - ecp_curves.c * You can replace them very much like all the other MBEDTLS__MODULE_NAME__ALT * macros as described above. The only difference is that you have to make sure * that you provide functionality for both .c files. */ //#define MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT /** * \def MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT * * MBEDTLS__FUNCTION_NAME__ALT: Uncomment a macro to let mbed TLS use you * alternate core implementation of symmetric crypto or hash function. Keep in * mind that function prototypes should remain the same. * * This replaces only one function. The header file from mbed TLS is still * used, in contrast to the MBEDTLS__MODULE_NAME__ALT flags. * * Example: In case you uncomment MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT, mbed TLS will * no longer provide the mbedtls_sha1_process() function, but it will still provide * the other function (using your mbedtls_sha1_process() function) and the definition * of mbedtls_sha1_context, so your implementation of mbedtls_sha1_process must be compatible * with this definition. * * \note Because of a signature change, the core AES encryption and decryption routines are * currently named mbedtls_aes_internal_encrypt and mbedtls_aes_internal_decrypt, * respectively. When setting up alternative implementations, these functions should * be overridden, but the wrapper functions mbedtls_aes_decrypt and mbedtls_aes_encrypt * must stay untouched. * * \note If you use the AES_xxx_ALT macros, then is is recommended to also set * MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES in order to help the linker garbage-collect the AES * tables. * * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of the corresponding * function. * * \warning MD2, MD4, MD5, DES and SHA-1 are considered weak and their use * constitutes a security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding * dependencies on them, and considering stronger message digests * and ciphers instead. * * \warning If both MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT and MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC are * enabled, then the deterministic ECDH signature functions pass the * the static HMAC-DRBG as RNG to mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(). Therefore * alternative implementations should use the RNG only for generating * the ephemeral key and nothing else. If this is not possible, then * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC should be disabled and an alternative * implementation should be provided for mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext() * (and for mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() too if backward compatibility is * desirable). * */ //#define MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT /** * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT * * Expose a part of the internal interface of the Elliptic Curve Point module. * * MBEDTLS_ECP__FUNCTION_NAME__ALT: Uncomment a macro to let mbed TLS use your * alternative core implementation of elliptic curve arithmetic. Keep in mind * that function prototypes should remain the same. * * This partially replaces one function. The header file from mbed TLS is still * used, in contrast to the MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT flag. The original implementation * is still present and it is used for group structures not supported by the * alternative. * * Any of these options become available by defining MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT * and implementing the following functions: * unsigned char mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( * const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) * int mbedtls_internal_ecp_init( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) * void mbedtls_internal_ecp_free( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) * The mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable function should return 1 if the * replacement functions implement arithmetic for the given group and 0 * otherwise. * The functions mbedtls_internal_ecp_init and mbedtls_internal_ecp_free are * called before and after each point operation and provide an opportunity to * implement optimized set up and tear down instructions. * * Example: In case you uncomment MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT and * MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT, mbed TLS will still provide the ecp_double_jac * function, but will use your mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_jac if the group is * supported (your mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable function returns 1 when * receives it as an argument). If the group is not supported then the original * implementation is used. The other functions and the definition of * mbedtls_ecp_group and mbedtls_ecp_point will not change, so your * implementation of mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_jac and * mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable must be compatible with this definition. * * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of the corresponding * function. */ /* Required for all the functions in this section */ //#define MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT /* Support for Weierstrass curves with Jacobi representation */ //#define MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT /* Support for curves with Montgomery arithmetic */ //#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT /** * \def MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY * * Enables testing and use of mbed TLS without any configured entropy sources. * This permits use of the library on platforms before an entropy source has * been integrated (see for example the MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT or the * MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED switches). * * WARNING! This switch MUST be disabled in production builds, and is suitable * only for development. * Enabling the switch negates any security provided by the library. * * Requires MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C, MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES * */ //#define MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY /** * \def MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT * * Uncomment this macro to let mbed TLS use your own implementation of a * hardware entropy collector. * * Your function must be called \c mbedtls_hardware_poll(), have the same * prototype as declared in entropy_poll.h, and accept NULL as first argument. * * Uncomment to use your own hardware entropy collector. */ //#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT /** * \def MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES * * Use precomputed AES tables stored in ROM. * * Uncomment this macro to use precomputed AES tables stored in ROM. * Comment this macro to generate AES tables in RAM at runtime. * * Tradeoff: Using precomputed ROM tables reduces RAM usage by ~8kb * (or ~2kb if \c MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES is used) and reduces the * initialization time before the first AES operation can be performed. * It comes at the cost of additional ~8kb ROM use (resp. ~2kb if \c * MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES below is used), and potentially degraded * performance if ROM access is slower than RAM access. * * This option is independent of \c MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES. * */ //#define MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES /** * \def MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES * * Use less ROM/RAM for AES tables. * * Uncommenting this macro omits 75% of the AES tables from * ROM / RAM (depending on the value of \c MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES) * by computing their values on the fly during operations * (the tables are entry-wise rotations of one another). * * Tradeoff: Uncommenting this reduces the RAM / ROM footprint * by ~6kb but at the cost of more arithmetic operations during * runtime. Specifically, one has to compare 4 accesses within * different tables to 4 accesses with additional arithmetic * operations within the same table. The performance gain/loss * depends on the system and memory details. * * This option is independent of \c MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES. * */ //#define MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES /** * \def MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY * * Use less ROM for the Camellia implementation (saves about 768 bytes). * * Uncomment this macro to use less memory for Camellia. */ //#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY /** * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC * * Enable Cipher Block Chaining mode (CBC) for symmetric ciphers. */ #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC /** * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB * * Enable Cipher Feedback mode (CFB) for symmetric ciphers. */ #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB /** * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR * * Enable Counter Block Cipher mode (CTR) for symmetric ciphers. */ #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR /** * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB * * Enable Output Feedback mode (OFB) for symmetric ciphers. */ #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB /** * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS * * Enable Xor-encrypt-xor with ciphertext stealing mode (XTS) for AES. */ #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS /** * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER * * Enable NULL cipher. * Warning: Only do so when you know what you are doing. This allows for * encryption or channels without any security! * * Requires MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES as well to enable * the following ciphersuites: * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA * * Uncomment this macro to enable the NULL cipher and ciphersuites */ //#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER /** * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 * * MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_XXX: Uncomment or comment macros to add support for * specific padding modes in the cipher layer with cipher modes that support * padding (e.g. CBC) * * If you disable all padding modes, only full blocks can be used with CBC. * * Enable padding modes in the cipher layer. */ #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS /** \def MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY * * Uncomment this macro to use a 128-bit key in the CTR_DRBG module. * By default, CTR_DRBG uses a 256-bit key. */ //#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY /** * \def MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES * * Enable weak ciphersuites in SSL / TLS. * Warning: Only do so when you know what you are doing. This allows for * channels with virtually no security at all! * * This enables the following ciphersuites: * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA * * Uncomment this macro to enable weak ciphersuites * * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers instead. */ //#define MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES /** * \def MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES * * Remove RC4 ciphersuites by default in SSL / TLS. * This flag removes the ciphersuites based on RC4 from the default list as * returned by mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites(). However, it is still possible to * enable (some of) them with mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites() by including them * explicitly. * * Uncomment this macro to remove RC4 ciphersuites by default. */ #define MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES /** * \def MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES * * Remove 3DES ciphersuites by default in SSL / TLS. * This flag removes the ciphersuites based on 3DES from the default list as * returned by mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites(). However, it is still possible * to enable (some of) them with mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites() by including * them explicitly. * * A man-in-the-browser attacker can recover authentication tokens sent through * a TLS connection using a 3DES based cipher suite (see "On the Practical * (In-)Security of 64-bit Block Ciphers" by Karthikeyan Bhargavan and Gaëtan * Leurent, see https://sweet32.info/SWEET32_CCS16.pdf). If this attack falls * in your threat model or you are unsure, then you should keep this option * enabled to remove 3DES based cipher suites. * * Comment this macro to keep 3DES in the default ciphersuite list. */ #define MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES /** * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED * * MBEDTLS_ECP_XXXX_ENABLED: Enables specific curves within the Elliptic Curve * module. By default all supported curves are enabled. * * Comment macros to disable the curve and functions for it */ /* Short Weierstrass curves (supporting ECP, ECDH, ECDSA) */ #define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED #define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED #define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED #define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED #define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED #define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED #define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED #define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED #define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED #define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED #define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED /* Montgomery curves (supporting ECP) */ #define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED #define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED /** * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM * * Enable specific 'modulo p' routines for each NIST prime. * Depending on the prime and architecture, makes operations 4 to 8 times * faster on the corresponding curve. * * Comment this macro to disable NIST curves optimisation. */ #define MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM /** * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG * * When this option is disabled, mbedtls_ecp_mul() will make use of an * internal RNG when called with a NULL \c f_rng argument, in order to protect * against some side-channel attacks. * * This protection introduces a dependency of the ECP module on one of the * DRBG modules. For very constrained implementations that don't require this * protection (for example, because you're only doing signature verification, * so not manipulating any secret, or because local/physical side-channel * attacks are outside your threat model), it might be desirable to get rid of * that dependency. * * \warning Enabling this option makes some uses of ECP vulnerable to some * side-channel attacks. Only enable it if you know that's not a problem for * your use case. * * Uncomment this macro to disable some counter-measures in ECP. */ //#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG /** * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE * * Enable "non-blocking" ECC operations that can return early and be resumed. * * This allows various functions to pause by returning * #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS (or, for functions in the SSL module, * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS) and then be called later again in * order to further progress and eventually complete their operation. This is * controlled through mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() which limits the maximum * number of ECC operations a function may perform before pausing; see * mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() for more information. * * This is useful in non-threaded environments if you want to avoid blocking * for too long on ECC (and, hence, X.509 or SSL/TLS) operations. * * Uncomment this macro to enable restartable ECC computations. * * \note This option only works with the default software implementation of * elliptic curve functionality. It is incompatible with * MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT, MBEDTLS_ECDH_XXX_ALT, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_XXX_ALT * and MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT. */ //#define MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE /** * \def MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT * * Use a backward compatible ECDH context. * * Mbed TLS supports two formats for ECDH contexts (#mbedtls_ecdh_context * defined in `ecdh.h`). For most applications, the choice of format makes * no difference, since all library functions can work with either format, * except that the new format is incompatible with MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE. * The new format used when this option is disabled is smaller * (56 bytes on a 32-bit platform). In future versions of the library, it * will support alternative implementations of ECDH operations. * The new format is incompatible with applications that access * context fields directly and with restartable ECP operations. * * Define this macro if you enable MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE or if you * want to access ECDH context fields directly. Otherwise you should * comment out this macro definition. * * This option has no effect if #MBEDTLS_ECDH_C is not enabled. * * \note This configuration option is experimental. Future versions of the * library may modify the way the ECDH context layout is configured * and may modify the layout of the new context type. */ #define MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT /** * \def MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC * * Enable deterministic ECDSA (RFC 6979). * Standard ECDSA is "fragile" in the sense that lack of entropy when signing * may result in a compromise of the long-term signing key. This is avoided by * the deterministic variant. * * Requires: MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C * * Comment this macro to disable deterministic ECDSA. */ #define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC /** * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED * * Enable the PSK based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. * * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are * enabled as well): * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */ #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED /** * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED * * Enable the DHE-PSK based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. * * Requires: MBEDTLS_DHM_C * * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are * enabled as well): * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA * * \warning Using DHE constitutes a security risk as it * is not possible to validate custom DH parameters. * If possible, it is recommended users should consider * preferring other methods of key exchange. * See dhm.h for more details. * */ #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED /** * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED * * Enable the ECDHE-PSK based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. * * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C * * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are * enabled as well): * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */ #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED /** * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED * * Enable the RSA-PSK based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. * * Requires: MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15, * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C * * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are * enabled as well): * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */ #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED /** * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED * * Enable the RSA-only based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. * * Requires: MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15, * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C * * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are * enabled as well): * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 */ #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED /** * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED * * Enable the DHE-RSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. * * Requires: MBEDTLS_DHM_C, MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15, * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C * * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are * enabled as well): * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA * * \warning Using DHE constitutes a security risk as it * is not possible to validate custom DH parameters. * If possible, it is recommended users should consider * preferring other methods of key exchange. * See dhm.h for more details. * */ #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED /** * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED * * Enable the ECDHE-RSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. * * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15, * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C * * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are * enabled as well): * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */ #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED /** * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED * * Enable the ECDHE-ECDSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. * * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C, MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C, * * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are * enabled as well): * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */ #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED /** * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED * * Enable the ECDH-ECDSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. * * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C, MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C * * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are * enabled as well): * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */ #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED /** * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED * * Enable the ECDH-RSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. * * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C * * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are * enabled as well): * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */ #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED /** * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED * * Enable the ECJPAKE based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. * * \warning This is currently experimental. EC J-PAKE support is based on the * Thread v1.0.0 specification; incompatible changes to the specification * might still happen. For this reason, this is disabled by default. * * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C * MBEDTLS_SHA256_C * MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED * * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are * enabled as well): * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECJPAKE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 */ //#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED /** * \def MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED * * Enhance support for reading EC keys using variants of SEC1 not allowed by * RFC 5915 and RFC 5480. * * Currently this means parsing the SpecifiedECDomain choice of EC * parameters (only known groups are supported, not arbitrary domains, to * avoid validation issues). * * Disable if you only need to support RFC 5915 + 5480 key formats. */ #define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED /** * \def MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY * * Enable a dummy error function to make use of mbedtls_strerror() in * third party libraries easier when MBEDTLS_ERROR_C is disabled * (no effect when MBEDTLS_ERROR_C is enabled). * * You can safely disable this if MBEDTLS_ERROR_C is enabled, or if you're * not using mbedtls_strerror() or error_strerror() in your application. * * Disable if you run into name conflicts and want to really remove the * mbedtls_strerror() */ #define MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY /** * \def MBEDTLS_GENPRIME * * Enable the prime-number generation code. * * Requires: MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ #define MBEDTLS_GENPRIME /** * \def MBEDTLS_FS_IO * * Enable functions that use the filesystem. */ #define MBEDTLS_FS_IO /** * \def MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES * * Do not add default entropy sources. These are the platform specific, * mbedtls_timing_hardclock and HAVEGE based poll functions. * * This is useful to have more control over the added entropy sources in an * application. * * Uncomment this macro to prevent loading of default entropy functions. */ //#define MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES /** * \def MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY * * Do not use built-in platform entropy functions. * This is useful if your platform does not support * standards like the /dev/urandom or Windows CryptoAPI. * * Uncomment this macro to disable the built-in platform entropy functions. */ //#define MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY /** * \def MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 * * Force the entropy accumulator to use a SHA-256 accumulator instead of the * default SHA-512 based one (if both are available). * * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA256_C * * On 32-bit systems SHA-256 can be much faster than SHA-512. Use this option * if you have performance concerns. * * This option is only useful if both MBEDTLS_SHA256_C and * MBEDTLS_SHA512_C are defined. Otherwise the available hash module is used. */ //#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 /** * \def MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED * * Enable the non-volatile (NV) seed file-based entropy source. * (Also enables the NV seed read/write functions in the platform layer) * * This is crucial (if not required) on systems that do not have a * cryptographic entropy source (in hardware or kernel) available. * * Requires: MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C, MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C * * \note The read/write functions that are used by the entropy source are * determined in the platform layer, and can be modified at runtime and/or * compile-time depending on the flags (MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_*) used. * * \note If you use the default implementation functions that read a seedfile * with regular fopen(), please make sure you make a seedfile with the * proper name (defined in MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE) and at * least MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE bytes in size that can be read from * and written to or you will get an entropy source error! The default * implementation will only use the first MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE * bytes from the file. * * \note The entropy collector will write to the seed file before entropy is * given to an external source, to update it. */ //#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER * * Enable key identifiers that encode a key owner identifier. * * The owner of a key is identified by a value of type ::mbedtls_key_owner_id_t * which is currently hard-coded to be int32_t. * * Note that this option is meant for internal use only and may be removed * without notice. It is incompatible with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO. */ //#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER /** * \def MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG * * Enable debugging of buffer allocator memory issues. Automatically prints * (to stderr) all (fatal) messages on memory allocation issues. Enables * function for 'debug output' of allocated memory. * * Requires: MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C * * Uncomment this macro to let the buffer allocator print out error messages. */ //#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG /** * \def MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE * * Include backtrace information with each allocated block. * * Requires: MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C * GLIBC-compatible backtrace() an backtrace_symbols() support * * Uncomment this macro to include backtrace information */ //#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE /** * \def MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT * * Support external private RSA keys (eg from a HSM) in the PK layer. * * Comment this macro to disable support for external private RSA keys. */ #define MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT /** * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 * * Enable support for PKCS#1 v1.5 encoding. * * Requires: MBEDTLS_RSA_C * * This enables support for PKCS#1 v1.5 operations. */ #define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 /** * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 * * Enable support for PKCS#1 v2.1 encoding. * * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD_C, MBEDTLS_RSA_C * * This enables support for RSAES-OAEP and RSASSA-PSS operations. */ #define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 /** \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS * * Enable support for the experimental PSA crypto driver interface. * * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C * * \warning This interface is experimental and may change or be removed * without notice. */ //#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS /** * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM * * When MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM is defined, the code is built for SPM (Secure * Partition Manager) integration which separates the code into two parts: a * NSPE (Non-Secure Process Environment) and an SPE (Secure Process * Environment). * * Module: library/psa_crypto.c * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C * */ //#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM /** * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY * * Enable support for entropy injection at first boot. This feature is * required on systems that do not have a built-in entropy source (TRNG). * This feature is currently not supported on systems that have a built-in * entropy source. * * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED * */ //#define MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY /** * \def MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT * * Do not use the Chinese Remainder Theorem * for the RSA private operation. * * Uncomment this macro to disable the use of CRT in RSA. * */ //#define MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT /** * \def MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST * * Enable the checkup functions (*_self_test). */ #define MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST /** * \def MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER * * Enable an implementation of SHA-256 that has lower ROM footprint but also * lower performance. * * The default implementation is meant to be a reasonnable compromise between * performance and size. This version optimizes more aggressively for size at * the expense of performance. Eg on Cortex-M4 it reduces the size of * mbedtls_sha256_process() from ~2KB to ~0.5KB for a performance hit of about * 30%. * * Uncomment to enable the smaller implementation of SHA256. */ //#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER /** * \def MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER * * Enable an implementation of SHA-512 that has lower ROM footprint but also * lower performance. * * Uncomment to enable the smaller implementation of SHA512. */ //#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER /** * \def MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 * * Disable the SHA-384 option of the SHA-512 module. Use this to save some * code size on devices that don't use SHA-384. * * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA512_C * * Uncomment to disable SHA-384 */ //#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES * * Enable sending of alert messages in case of encountered errors as per RFC. * If you choose not to send the alert messages, mbed TLS can still communicate * with other servers, only debugging of failures is harder. * * The advantage of not sending alert messages, is that no information is given * about reasons for failures thus preventing adversaries of gaining intel. * * Enable sending of all alert messages */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING * * Enable the function mbedtls_ssl_check_record() which can be used to check * the validity and authenticity of an incoming record, to verify that it has * not been seen before. These checks are performed without modifying the * externally visible state of the SSL context. * * See mbedtls_ssl_check_record() for more information. * * Uncomment to enable support for record checking. */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID * * Enable support for the DTLS Connection ID extension * (version draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05, * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05) * which allows to identify DTLS connections across changes * in the underlying transport. * * Setting this option enables the SSL APIs `mbedtls_ssl_set_cid()`, * `mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid()` and `mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid()`. * See the corresponding documentation for more information. * * \warning The Connection ID extension is still in draft state. * We make no stability promises for the availability * or the shape of the API controlled by this option. * * The maximum lengths of outgoing and incoming CIDs can be configured * through the options * - MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX * - MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX. * * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS * * Uncomment to enable the Connection ID extension. */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE * * Enable asynchronous external private key operations in SSL. This allows * you to configure an SSL connection to call an external cryptographic * module to perform private key operations instead of performing the * operation inside the library. * */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION * * Enable serialization of the TLS context structures, through use of the * functions mbedtls_ssl_context_save() and mbedtls_ssl_context_load(). * * This pair of functions allows one side of a connection to serialize the * context associated with the connection, then free or re-use that context * while the serialized state is persisted elsewhere, and finally deserialize * that state to a live context for resuming read/write operations on the * connection. From a protocol perspective, the state of the connection is * unaffected, in particular this is entirely transparent to the peer. * * Note: this is distinct from TLS session resumption, which is part of the * protocol and fully visible by the peer. TLS session resumption enables * establishing new connections associated to a saved session with shorter, * lighter handshakes, while context serialization is a local optimization in * handling a single, potentially long-lived connection. * * Enabling these APIs makes some SSL structures larger, as 64 extra bytes are * saved after the handshake to allow for more efficient serialization, so if * you don't need this feature you'll save RAM by disabling it. * * Comment to disable the context serialization APIs. */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL * * Enable the debug messages in SSL module for all issues. * Debug messages have been disabled in some places to prevent timing * attacks due to (unbalanced) debugging function calls. * * If you need all error reporting you should enable this during debugging, * but remove this for production servers that should log as well. * * Uncomment this macro to report all debug messages on errors introducing * a timing side-channel. * */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL /** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC * * Enable support for Encrypt-then-MAC, RFC 7366. * * This allows peers that both support it to use a more robust protection for * ciphersuites using CBC, providing deep resistance against timing attacks * on the padding or underlying cipher. * * This only affects CBC ciphersuites, and is useless if none is defined. * * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 or * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 or * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 * * Comment this macro to disable support for Encrypt-then-MAC */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC /** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET * * Enable support for RFC 7627: Session Hash and Extended Master Secret * Extension. * * This was introduced as "the proper fix" to the Triple Handshake familiy of * attacks, but it is recommended to always use it (even if you disable * renegotiation), since it actually fixes a more fundamental issue in the * original SSL/TLS design, and has implications beyond Triple Handshake. * * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 or * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 or * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 * * Comment this macro to disable support for Extended Master Secret. */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV * * Enable support for RFC 7507: Fallback Signaling Cipher Suite Value (SCSV) * for Preventing Protocol Downgrade Attacks. * * For servers, it is recommended to always enable this, unless you support * only one version of TLS, or know for sure that none of your clients * implements a fallback strategy. * * For clients, you only need this if you're using a fallback strategy, which * is not recommended in the first place, unless you absolutely need it to * interoperate with buggy (version-intolerant) servers. * * Comment this macro to disable support for FALLBACK_SCSV */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE * * This option controls the availability of the API mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert() * giving access to the peer's certificate after completion of the handshake. * * Unless you need mbedtls_ssl_peer_cert() in your application, it is * recommended to disable this option for reduced RAM usage. * * \note If this option is disabled, mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert() is still * defined, but always returns \c NULL. * * \note This option has no influence on the protection against the * triple handshake attack. Even if it is disabled, Mbed TLS will * still ensure that certificates do not change during renegotiation, * for exaple by keeping a hash of the peer's certificate. * * Comment this macro to disable storing the peer's certificate * after the handshake. */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL * * Enable hooking functions in SSL module for hardware acceleration of * individual records. * * \deprecated This option is deprecated and will be removed in a future * version of Mbed TLS. * * Uncomment this macro to enable hooking functions. */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING * * Enable 1/n-1 record splitting for CBC mode in SSLv3 and TLS 1.0. * * This is a countermeasure to the BEAST attack, which also minimizes the risk * of interoperability issues compared to sending 0-length records. * * Comment this macro to disable 1/n-1 record splitting. */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION * * Enable support for TLS renegotiation. * * The two main uses of renegotiation are (1) refresh keys on long-lived * connections and (2) client authentication after the initial handshake. * If you don't need renegotiation, it's probably better to disable it, since * it has been associated with security issues in the past and is easy to * misuse/misunderstand. * * Comment this to disable support for renegotiation. * * \note Even if this option is disabled, both client and server are aware * of the Renegotiation Indication Extension (RFC 5746) used to * prevent the SSL renegotiation attack (see RFC 5746 Sect. 1). * (See \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_legacy_renegotiation for the * configuration of this extension). * */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO * * Enable support for receiving and parsing SSLv2 Client Hello messages for the * SSL Server module (MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C). * * \deprecated This option is deprecated and will be removed in a future * version of Mbed TLS. * * Uncomment this macro to enable support for SSLv2 Client Hello messages. */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE * * Pick the ciphersuite according to the client's preferences rather than ours * in the SSL Server module (MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C). * * Uncomment this macro to respect client's ciphersuite order */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH * * Enable support for RFC 6066 max_fragment_length extension in SSL. * * Comment this macro to disable support for the max_fragment_length extension */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 * * Enable support for SSL 3.0. * * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD5_C * MBEDTLS_SHA1_C * * \deprecated This option is deprecated and will be removed in a future * version of Mbed TLS. * * Comment this macro to disable support for SSL 3.0 */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 * * Enable support for TLS 1.0. * * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD5_C * MBEDTLS_SHA1_C * * Comment this macro to disable support for TLS 1.0 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 * * Enable support for TLS 1.1 (and DTLS 1.0 if DTLS is enabled). * * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD5_C * MBEDTLS_SHA1_C * * Comment this macro to disable support for TLS 1.1 / DTLS 1.0 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 * * Enable support for TLS 1.2 (and DTLS 1.2 if DTLS is enabled). * * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA1_C or MBEDTLS_SHA256_C or MBEDTLS_SHA512_C * (Depends on ciphersuites) * * Comment this macro to disable support for TLS 1.2 / DTLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL * * This macro is used to selectively enable experimental parts * of the code that contribute to the ongoing development of * the prototype TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3 implementation, and provide * no other purpose. * * \warning TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3 aren't yet supported in Mbed TLS, * and no feature exposed through this macro is part of the * public API. In particular, features under the control * of this macro are experimental and don't come with any * stability guarantees. * * Uncomment this macro to enable experimental and partial * functionality specific to TLS 1.3. */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS * * Enable support for DTLS (all available versions). * * Enable this and MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 to enable DTLS 1.0, * and/or this and MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 to enable DTLS 1.2. * * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 * or MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 * * Comment this macro to disable support for DTLS */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN * * Enable support for RFC 7301 Application Layer Protocol Negotiation. * * Comment this macro to disable support for ALPN. */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY * * Enable support for the anti-replay mechanism in DTLS. * * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS * * \warning Disabling this is often a security risk! * See mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_anti_replay() for details. * * Comment this to disable anti-replay in DTLS. */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY * * Enable support for HelloVerifyRequest on DTLS servers. * * This feature is highly recommended to prevent DTLS servers being used as * amplifiers in DoS attacks against other hosts. It should always be enabled * unless you know for sure amplification cannot be a problem in the * environment in which your server operates. * * \warning Disabling this can ba a security risk! (see above) * * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS * * Comment this to disable support for HelloVerifyRequest. */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP * * Enable support for negotation of DTLS-SRTP (RFC 5764) * through the use_srtp extension. * * \note This feature provides the minimum functionality required * to negotiate the use of DTLS-SRTP and to allow the derivation of * the associated SRTP packet protection key material. * In particular, the SRTP packet protection itself, as well as the * demultiplexing of RTP and DTLS packets at the datagram layer * (see Section 5 of RFC 5764), are not handled by this feature. * Instead, after successful completion of a handshake negotiating * the use of DTLS-SRTP, the extended key exporter API * mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_ext_cb() should be used to implement * the key exporter described in Section 4.2 of RFC 5764 and RFC 5705 * (this is implemented in the SSL example programs). * The resulting key should then be passed to an SRTP stack. * * Setting this option enables the runtime API * mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles() * through which the supported DTLS-SRTP protection * profiles can be configured. You must call this API at * runtime if you wish to negotiate the use of DTLS-SRTP. * * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS * * Uncomment this to enable support for use_srtp extension. */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE * * Enable server-side support for clients that reconnect from the same port. * * Some clients unexpectedly close the connection and try to reconnect using the * same source port. This needs special support from the server to handle the * new connection securely, as described in section 4.2.8 of RFC 6347. This * flag enables that support. * * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY * * Comment this to disable support for clients reusing the source port. */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT * * Enable support for a limit of records with bad MAC. * * See mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit(). * * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS * * Enable support for RFC 5077 session tickets in SSL. * Client-side, provides full support for session tickets (maintenance of a * session store remains the responsibility of the application, though). * Server-side, you also need to provide callbacks for writing and parsing * tickets, including authenticated encryption and key management. Example * callbacks are provided by MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C. * * Comment this macro to disable support for SSL session tickets */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS * * Enable support for exporting key block and master secret. * This is required for certain users of TLS, e.g. EAP-TLS. * * Comment this macro to disable support for key export */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION * * Enable support for RFC 6066 server name indication (SNI) in SSL. * * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C * * Comment this macro to disable support for server name indication in SSL */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC * * Enable support for RFC 6066 truncated HMAC in SSL. * * Comment this macro to disable support for truncated HMAC in SSL */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT * * Fallback to old (pre-2.7), non-conforming implementation of the truncated * HMAC extension which also truncates the HMAC key. Note that this option is * only meant for a transitory upgrade period and will be removed in a future * version of the library. * * \warning The old implementation is non-compliant and has a security weakness * (2^80 brute force attack on the HMAC key used for a single, * uninterrupted connection). This should only be enabled temporarily * when (1) the use of truncated HMAC is essential in order to save * bandwidth, and (2) the peer is an Mbed TLS stack that doesn't use * the fixed implementation yet (pre-2.7). * * \deprecated This option is deprecated and will be removed in a * future version of Mbed TLS. * * Uncomment to fallback to old, non-compliant truncated HMAC implementation. * * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH * * Enable modifying the maximum I/O buffer size. */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH /** * \def MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN * * Enable testing of the constant-flow nature of some sensitive functions with * clang's MemorySanitizer. This causes some existing tests to also test * this non-functional property of the code under test. * * This setting requires compiling with clang -fsanitize=memory. The test * suites can then be run normally. * * \warning This macro is only used for extended testing; it is not considered * part of the library's API, so it may change or disappear at any time. * * Uncomment to enable testing of the constant-flow nature of selected code. */ //#define MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN /** * \def MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND * * Enable testing of the constant-flow nature of some sensitive functions with * valgrind's memcheck tool. This causes some existing tests to also test * this non-functional property of the code under test. * * This setting requires valgrind headers for building, and is only useful for * testing if the tests suites are run with valgrind's memcheck. This can be * done for an individual test suite with 'valgrind ./test_suite_xxx', or when * using CMake, this can be done for all test suites with 'make memcheck'. * * \warning This macro is only used for extended testing; it is not considered * part of the library's API, so it may change or disappear at any time. * * Uncomment to enable testing of the constant-flow nature of selected code. */ //#define MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND /** * \def MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS * * Enable features for invasive testing such as introspection functions and * hooks for fault injection. This enables additional unit tests. * * Merely enabling this feature should not change the behavior of the product. * It only adds new code, and new branching points where the default behavior * is the same as when this feature is disabled. * However, this feature increases the attack surface: there is an added * risk of vulnerabilities, and more gadgets that can make exploits easier. * Therefore this feature must never be enabled in production. * * See `docs/architecture/testing/mbed-crypto-invasive-testing.md` for more * information. * * Uncomment to enable invasive tests. */ //#define MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS /** * \def MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT * * Provide your own alternate threading implementation. * * Requires: MBEDTLS_THREADING_C * * Uncomment this to allow your own alternate threading implementation. */ //#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT /** * \def MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD * * Enable the pthread wrapper layer for the threading layer. * * Requires: MBEDTLS_THREADING_C * * Uncomment this to enable pthread mutexes. */ #define MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD /** * \def MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO * * Make the X.509 and TLS library use PSA for cryptographic operations, and * enable new APIs for using keys handled by PSA Crypto. * * \note Development of this option is currently in progress, and parts of Mbed * TLS's X.509 and TLS modules are not ported to PSA yet. However, these parts * will still continue to work as usual, so enabling this option should not * break backwards compatibility. * * \warning The PSA Crypto API is in beta stage. While you're welcome to * experiment using it, incompatible API changes are still possible, and some * parts may not have reached the same quality as the rest of Mbed TLS yet. * * \warning This option enables new Mbed TLS APIs that are dependent on the * PSA Crypto API, so can't come with the same stability guarantees as the * rest of the Mbed TLS APIs. You're welcome to experiment with them, but for * now, access to these APIs is opt-in (via enabling the present option), in * order to clearly differentiate them from the stable Mbed TLS APIs. * * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C. * * Uncomment this to enable internal use of PSA Crypto and new associated APIs. */ //#define MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO /** * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG * * This setting allows support for cryptographic mechanisms through the PSA * API to be configured separately from support through the mbedtls API. * * Uncomment this to enable use of PSA Crypto configuration settings which * can be found in include/psa/crypto_config.h. * * If you enable this option and write your own configuration file, you must * include mbedtls/config_psa.h in your configuration file. The default * provided mbedtls/config.h contains the necessary inclusion. * * This feature is still experimental and is not ready for production since * it is not completed. */ //#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG /** * \def MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES * * Allow run-time checking of compile-time enabled features. Thus allowing users * to check at run-time if the library is for instance compiled with threading * support via mbedtls_version_check_feature(). * * Requires: MBEDTLS_VERSION_C * * Comment this to disable run-time checking and save ROM space */ #define MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES /** * \def MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 * * If set, the X509 parser will not break-off when parsing an X509 certificate * and encountering an extension in a v1 or v2 certificate. * * Uncomment to prevent an error. */ //#define MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 /** * \def MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION * * If set, the X509 parser will not break-off when parsing an X509 certificate * and encountering an unknown critical extension. * * \warning Depending on your PKI use, enabling this can be a security risk! * * Uncomment to prevent an error. */ //#define MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION /** * \def MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK * * If set, this enables the X.509 API `mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb()` * and the SSL API `mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb()` which allow users to configure * the set of trusted certificates through a callback instead of a linked * list. * * This is useful for example in environments where a large number of trusted * certificates is present and storing them in a linked list isn't efficient * enough, or when the set of trusted certificates changes frequently. * * See the documentation of `mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb()` and * `mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb()` for more information. * * Uncomment to enable trusted certificate callbacks. */ //#define MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK /** * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE * * Enable verification of the keyUsage extension (CA and leaf certificates). * * Disabling this avoids problems with mis-issued and/or misused * (intermediate) CA and leaf certificates. * * \warning Depending on your PKI use, disabling this can be a security risk! * * Comment to skip keyUsage checking for both CA and leaf certificates. */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE /** * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE * * Enable verification of the extendedKeyUsage extension (leaf certificates). * * Disabling this avoids problems with mis-issued and/or misused certificates. * * \warning Depending on your PKI use, disabling this can be a security risk! * * Comment to skip extendedKeyUsage checking for certificates. */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE /** * \def MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT * * Enable parsing and verification of X.509 certificates, CRLs and CSRS * signed with RSASSA-PSS (aka PKCS#1 v2.1). * * Comment this macro to disallow using RSASSA-PSS in certificates. */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT /** * \def MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT * * If set, the SSL/TLS module uses ZLIB to support compression and * decompression of packet data. * * \warning TLS-level compression MAY REDUCE SECURITY! See for example the * CRIME attack. Before enabling this option, you should examine with care if * CRIME or similar exploits may be applicable to your use case. * * \note Currently compression can't be used with DTLS. * * \deprecated This feature is deprecated and will be removed * in the next major revision of the library. * * Used in: library/ssl_tls.c * library/ssl_cli.c * library/ssl_srv.c * * This feature requires zlib library and headers to be present. * * Uncomment to enable use of ZLIB */ #define MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT /* \} name SECTION: mbed TLS feature support */ /** * \name SECTION: mbed TLS modules * * This section enables or disables entire modules in mbed TLS * \{ */ /** * \def MBEDTLS_AESNI_C * * Enable AES-NI support on x86-64. * * Module: library/aesni.c * Caller: library/aes.c * * Requires: MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM * * This modules adds support for the AES-NI instructions on x86-64 */ #define MBEDTLS_AESNI_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_AES_C * * Enable the AES block cipher. * * Module: library/aes.c * Caller: library/cipher.c * library/pem.c * library/ctr_drbg.c * * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are * enabled as well): * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * * PEM_PARSE uses AES for decrypting encrypted keys. */ #define MBEDTLS_AES_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_ARC4_C * * Enable the ARCFOUR stream cipher. * * Module: library/arc4.c * Caller: library/cipher.c * * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are * enabled as well): * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA * * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a * security risk. If possible, we recommend avoidng dependencies on * it, and considering stronger ciphers instead. * */ #define MBEDTLS_ARC4_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C * * Enable the generic ASN1 parser. * * Module: library/asn1.c * Caller: library/x509.c * library/dhm.c * library/pkcs12.c * library/pkcs5.c * library/pkparse.c */ #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C * * Enable the generic ASN1 writer. * * Module: library/asn1write.c * Caller: library/ecdsa.c * library/pkwrite.c * library/x509_create.c * library/x509write_crt.c * library/x509write_csr.c */ #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_BASE64_C * * Enable the Base64 module. * * Module: library/base64.c * Caller: library/pem.c * * This module is required for PEM support (required by X.509). */ #define MBEDTLS_BASE64_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C * * Enable the multi-precision integer library. * * Module: library/bignum.c * Caller: library/dhm.c * library/ecp.c * library/ecdsa.c * library/rsa.c * library/rsa_internal.c * library/ssl_tls.c * * This module is required for RSA, DHM and ECC (ECDH, ECDSA) support. */ #define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C * * Enable the Blowfish block cipher. * * Module: library/blowfish.c */ #define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C * * Enable the Camellia block cipher. * * Module: library/camellia.c * Caller: library/cipher.c * * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are * enabled as well): * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */ #define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_ARIA_C * * Enable the ARIA block cipher. * * Module: library/aria.c * Caller: library/cipher.c * * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are * enabled as well): * * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 */ //#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_CCM_C * * Enable the Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) mode for 128-bit block cipher. * * Module: library/ccm.c * * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C or MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C * * This module enables the AES-CCM ciphersuites, if other requisites are * enabled as well. */ #define MBEDTLS_CCM_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_CERTS_C * * Enable the test certificates. * * Module: library/certs.c * Caller: * * This module is used for testing (ssl_client/server). */ #define MBEDTLS_CERTS_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C * * Enable the ChaCha20 stream cipher. * * Module: library/chacha20.c */ #define MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C * * Enable the ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD algorithm. * * Module: library/chachapoly.c * * This module requires: MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C, MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C */ #define MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C * * Enable the generic cipher layer. * * Module: library/cipher.c * Caller: library/ssl_tls.c * * Uncomment to enable generic cipher wrappers. */ #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_CMAC_C * * Enable the CMAC (Cipher-based Message Authentication Code) mode for block * ciphers. * * Module: library/cmac.c * * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C or MBEDTLS_DES_C * */ //#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C * * Enable the CTR_DRBG AES-based random generator. * The CTR_DRBG generator uses AES-256 by default. * To use AES-128 instead, enable \c MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY above. * * \note To achieve a 256-bit security strength with CTR_DRBG, * you must use AES-256 *and* use sufficient entropy. * See ctr_drbg.h for more details. * * Module: library/ctr_drbg.c * Caller: * * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C * * This module provides the CTR_DRBG AES random number generator. */ #define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C * * Enable the debug functions. * * Module: library/debug.c * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c * library/ssl_srv.c * library/ssl_tls.c * * This module provides debugging functions. */ #define MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_DES_C * * Enable the DES block cipher. * * Module: library/des.c * Caller: library/pem.c * library/cipher.c * * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are * enabled as well): * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA * * PEM_PARSE uses DES/3DES for decrypting encrypted keys. * * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers instead. */ #define MBEDTLS_DES_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_DHM_C * * Enable the Diffie-Hellman-Merkle module. * * Module: library/dhm.c * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c * library/ssl_srv.c * * This module is used by the following key exchanges: * DHE-RSA, DHE-PSK * * \warning Using DHE constitutes a security risk as it * is not possible to validate custom DH parameters. * If possible, it is recommended users should consider * preferring other methods of key exchange. * See dhm.h for more details. * */ #define MBEDTLS_DHM_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_ECDH_C * * Enable the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman library. * * Module: library/ecdh.c * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c * library/ssl_srv.c * * This module is used by the following key exchanges: * ECDHE-ECDSA, ECDHE-RSA, DHE-PSK * * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ #define MBEDTLS_ECDH_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C * * Enable the elliptic curve DSA library. * * Module: library/ecdsa.c * Caller: * * This module is used by the following key exchanges: * ECDHE-ECDSA * * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECP_C, MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C, * and at least one MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_XXX_ENABLED for a * short Weierstrass curve. */ #define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C * * Enable the elliptic curve J-PAKE library. * * \warning This is currently experimental. EC J-PAKE support is based on the * Thread v1.0.0 specification; incompatible changes to the specification * might still happen. For this reason, this is disabled by default. * * Module: library/ecjpake.c * Caller: * * This module is used by the following key exchanges: * ECJPAKE * * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECP_C, MBEDTLS_MD_C */ //#define MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_C * * Enable the elliptic curve over GF(p) library. * * Module: library/ecp.c * Caller: library/ecdh.c * library/ecdsa.c * library/ecjpake.c * * Requires: MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C and at least one MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_XXX_ENABLED */ #define MBEDTLS_ECP_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C * * Enable the platform-specific entropy code. * * Module: library/entropy.c * Caller: * * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA512_C or MBEDTLS_SHA256_C * * This module provides a generic entropy pool */ #define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_ERROR_C * * Enable error code to error string conversion. * * Module: library/error.c * Caller: * * This module enables mbedtls_strerror(). */ #define MBEDTLS_ERROR_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_GCM_C * * Enable the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM). * * Module: library/gcm.c * * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C or MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C or MBEDTLS_ARIA_C * * This module enables the AES-GCM and CAMELLIA-GCM ciphersuites, if other * requisites are enabled as well. */ #define MBEDTLS_GCM_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C * * Enable the HAVEGE random generator. * * Warning: the HAVEGE random generator is not suitable for virtualized * environments * * Warning: the HAVEGE random generator is dependent on timing and specific * processor traits. It is therefore not advised to use HAVEGE as * your applications primary random generator or primary entropy pool * input. As a secondary input to your entropy pool, it IS able add * the (limited) extra entropy it provides. * * Module: library/havege.c * Caller: * * Requires: MBEDTLS_TIMING_C * * Uncomment to enable the HAVEGE random generator. */ //#define MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_HKDF_C * * Enable the HKDF algorithm (RFC 5869). * * Module: library/hkdf.c * Caller: * * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD_C * * This module adds support for the Hashed Message Authentication Code * (HMAC)-based key derivation function (HKDF). */ #define MBEDTLS_HKDF_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C * * Enable the HMAC_DRBG random generator. * * Module: library/hmac_drbg.c * Caller: * * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD_C * * Uncomment to enable the HMAC_DRBG random number geerator. */ #define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C * * Enable the Key Wrapping mode for 128-bit block ciphers, * as defined in NIST SP 800-38F. Only KW and KWP modes * are supported. At the moment, only AES is approved by NIST. * * Module: library/nist_kw.c * * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C and MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ //#define MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_MD_C * * Enable the generic message digest layer. * * Module: library/md.c * Caller: * * Uncomment to enable generic message digest wrappers. */ #define MBEDTLS_MD_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_MD2_C * * Enable the MD2 hash algorithm. * * Module: library/md2.c * Caller: * * Uncomment to enable support for (rare) MD2-signed X.509 certs. * * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a * security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies on * it, and considering stronger message digests instead. * */ //#define MBEDTLS_MD2_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_MD4_C * * Enable the MD4 hash algorithm. * * Module: library/md4.c * Caller: * * Uncomment to enable support for (rare) MD4-signed X.509 certs. * * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a * security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies on * it, and considering stronger message digests instead. * */ //#define MBEDTLS_MD4_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_MD5_C * * Enable the MD5 hash algorithm. * * Module: library/md5.c * Caller: library/md.c * library/pem.c * library/ssl_tls.c * * This module is required for SSL/TLS up to version 1.1, and for TLS 1.2 * depending on the handshake parameters. Further, it is used for checking * MD5-signed certificates, and for PBKDF1 when decrypting PEM-encoded * encrypted keys. * * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a * security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies on * it, and considering stronger message digests instead. * */ #define MBEDTLS_MD5_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C * * Enable the buffer allocator implementation that makes use of a (stack) * based buffer to 'allocate' dynamic memory. (replaces calloc() and free() * calls) * * Module: library/memory_buffer_alloc.c * * Requires: MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY (to use it within mbed TLS) * * Enable this module to enable the buffer memory allocator. */ //#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_NET_C * * Enable the TCP and UDP over IPv6/IPv4 networking routines. * * \note This module only works on POSIX/Unix (including Linux, BSD and OS X) * and Windows. For other platforms, you'll want to disable it, and write your * own networking callbacks to be passed to \c mbedtls_ssl_set_bio(). * * \note See also our Knowledge Base article about porting to a new * environment: * https://tls.mbed.org/kb/how-to/how-do-i-port-mbed-tls-to-a-new-environment-OS * * Module: library/net_sockets.c * * This module provides networking routines. */ #define MBEDTLS_NET_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_OID_C * * Enable the OID database. * * Module: library/oid.c * Caller: library/asn1write.c * library/pkcs5.c * library/pkparse.c * library/pkwrite.c * library/rsa.c * library/x509.c * library/x509_create.c * library/x509_crl.c * library/x509_crt.c * library/x509_csr.c * library/x509write_crt.c * library/x509write_csr.c * * This modules translates between OIDs and internal values. */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C * * Enable VIA Padlock support on x86. * * Module: library/padlock.c * Caller: library/aes.c * * Requires: MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM * * This modules adds support for the VIA PadLock on x86. */ #define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C * * Enable PEM decoding / parsing. * * Module: library/pem.c * Caller: library/dhm.c * library/pkparse.c * library/x509_crl.c * library/x509_crt.c * library/x509_csr.c * * Requires: MBEDTLS_BASE64_C * * This modules adds support for decoding / parsing PEM files. */ #define MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C * * Enable PEM encoding / writing. * * Module: library/pem.c * Caller: library/pkwrite.c * library/x509write_crt.c * library/x509write_csr.c * * Requires: MBEDTLS_BASE64_C * * This modules adds support for encoding / writing PEM files. */ #define MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_PK_C * * Enable the generic public (asymetric) key layer. * * Module: library/pk.c * Caller: library/ssl_tls.c * library/ssl_cli.c * library/ssl_srv.c * * Requires: MBEDTLS_RSA_C or MBEDTLS_ECP_C * * Uncomment to enable generic public key wrappers. */ #define MBEDTLS_PK_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C * * Enable the generic public (asymetric) key parser. * * Module: library/pkparse.c * Caller: library/x509_crt.c * library/x509_csr.c * * Requires: MBEDTLS_PK_C * * Uncomment to enable generic public key parse functions. */ #define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C * * Enable the generic public (asymetric) key writer. * * Module: library/pkwrite.c * Caller: library/x509write.c * * Requires: MBEDTLS_PK_C * * Uncomment to enable generic public key write functions. */ #define MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C * * Enable PKCS#5 functions. * * Module: library/pkcs5.c * * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD_C * * This module adds support for the PKCS#5 functions. */ #define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C * * Enable wrapper for PKCS#11 smartcard support via the pkcs11-helper library. * * \deprecated This option is deprecated and will be removed in a future * version of Mbed TLS. * * Module: library/pkcs11.c * Caller: library/pk.c * * Requires: MBEDTLS_PK_C * * This module enables SSL/TLS PKCS #11 smartcard support. * Requires the presence of the PKCS#11 helper library (libpkcs11-helper) */ //#define MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C * * Enable PKCS#12 PBE functions. * Adds algorithms for parsing PKCS#8 encrypted private keys * * Module: library/pkcs12.c * Caller: library/pkparse.c * * Requires: MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C, MBEDTLS_MD_C * Can use: MBEDTLS_ARC4_C * * This module enables PKCS#12 functions. */ #define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C * * Enable the platform abstraction layer that allows you to re-assign * functions like calloc(), free(), snprintf(), printf(), fprintf(), exit(). * * Enabling MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C enables to use of MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_ALT * or MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_MACRO directives, allowing the functions mentioned * above to be specified at runtime or compile time respectively. * * \note This abstraction layer must be enabled on Windows (including MSYS2) * as other module rely on it for a fixed snprintf implementation. * * Module: library/platform.c * Caller: Most other .c files * * This module enables abstraction of common (libc) functions. */ #define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C * * Enable the Poly1305 MAC algorithm. * * Module: library/poly1305.c * Caller: library/chachapoly.c */ #define MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C * * Enable the Platform Security Architecture cryptography API. * * \warning The PSA Crypto API is still beta status. While you're welcome to * experiment using it, incompatible API changes are still possible, and some * parts may not have reached the same quality as the rest of Mbed TLS yet. * * Module: library/psa_crypto.c * * Requires: MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C * */ #define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C * * Enable secure element support in the Platform Security Architecture * cryptography API. * * \warning This feature is not yet suitable for production. It is provided * for API evaluation and testing purposes only. * * Module: library/psa_crypto_se.c * * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C, MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C * */ //#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C * * Enable the Platform Security Architecture persistent key storage. * * Module: library/psa_crypto_storage.c * * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C, * either MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C or a native implementation of * the PSA ITS interface */ #define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C * * Enable the emulation of the Platform Security Architecture * Internal Trusted Storage (PSA ITS) over files. * * Module: library/psa_its_file.c * * Requires: MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ #define MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C * * Enable the RIPEMD-160 hash algorithm. * * Module: library/ripemd160.c * Caller: library/md.c * */ #define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_RSA_C * * Enable the RSA public-key cryptosystem. * * Module: library/rsa.c * library/rsa_internal.c * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c * library/ssl_srv.c * library/ssl_tls.c * library/x509.c * * This module is used by the following key exchanges: * RSA, DHE-RSA, ECDHE-RSA, RSA-PSK * * Requires: MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C, MBEDTLS_OID_C */ #define MBEDTLS_RSA_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_SHA1_C * * Enable the SHA1 cryptographic hash algorithm. * * Module: library/sha1.c * Caller: library/md.c * library/ssl_cli.c * library/ssl_srv.c * library/ssl_tls.c * library/x509write_crt.c * * This module is required for SSL/TLS up to version 1.1, for TLS 1.2 * depending on the handshake parameters, and for SHA1-signed certificates. * * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes * a security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies * on it, and considering stronger message digests instead. * */ #define MBEDTLS_SHA1_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_SHA256_C * * Enable the SHA-224 and SHA-256 cryptographic hash algorithms. * * Module: library/sha256.c * Caller: library/entropy.c * library/md.c * library/ssl_cli.c * library/ssl_srv.c * library/ssl_tls.c * * This module adds support for SHA-224 and SHA-256. * This module is required for the SSL/TLS 1.2 PRF function. */ #define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_SHA512_C * * Enable the SHA-384 and SHA-512 cryptographic hash algorithms. * * Module: library/sha512.c * Caller: library/entropy.c * library/md.c * library/ssl_cli.c * library/ssl_srv.c * * This module adds support for SHA-384 and SHA-512. */ #define MBEDTLS_SHA512_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C * * Enable simple SSL cache implementation. * * Module: library/ssl_cache.c * Caller: * * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C * * Enable basic implementation of DTLS cookies for hello verification. * * Module: library/ssl_cookie.c * Caller: */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C * * Enable an implementation of TLS server-side callbacks for session tickets. * * Module: library/ssl_ticket.c * Caller: * * Requires: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C * * Enable the SSL/TLS client code. * * Module: library/ssl_cli.c * Caller: * * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C * * This module is required for SSL/TLS client support. */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C * * Enable the SSL/TLS server code. * * Module: library/ssl_srv.c * Caller: * * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C * * This module is required for SSL/TLS server support. */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C * * Enable the generic SSL/TLS code. * * Module: library/ssl_tls.c * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c * library/ssl_srv.c * * Requires: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C, MBEDTLS_MD_C * and at least one of the MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_XXX defines * * This module is required for SSL/TLS. */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_THREADING_C * * Enable the threading abstraction layer. * By default mbed TLS assumes it is used in a non-threaded environment or that * contexts are not shared between threads. If you do intend to use contexts * between threads, you will need to enable this layer to prevent race * conditions. See also our Knowledge Base article about threading: * https://tls.mbed.org/kb/development/thread-safety-and-multi-threading * * Module: library/threading.c * * This allows different threading implementations (self-implemented or * provided). * * You will have to enable either MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT or * MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD. * * Enable this layer to allow use of mutexes within mbed TLS */ #define MBEDTLS_THREADING_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_TIMING_C * * Enable the semi-portable timing interface. * * \note The provided implementation only works on POSIX/Unix (including Linux, * BSD and OS X) and Windows. On other platforms, you can either disable that * module and provide your own implementations of the callbacks needed by * \c mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb() for DTLS, or leave it enabled and provide * your own implementation of the whole module by setting * \c MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT in the current file. * * \note See also our Knowledge Base article about porting to a new * environment: * https://tls.mbed.org/kb/how-to/how-do-i-port-mbed-tls-to-a-new-environment-OS * * Module: library/timing.c * Caller: library/havege.c * * This module is used by the HAVEGE random number generator. */ #define MBEDTLS_TIMING_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_VERSION_C * * Enable run-time version information. * * Module: library/version.c * * This module provides run-time version information. */ #define MBEDTLS_VERSION_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C * * Enable X.509 core for using certificates. * * Module: library/x509.c * Caller: library/x509_crl.c * library/x509_crt.c * library/x509_csr.c * * Requires: MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C, MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C, MBEDTLS_OID_C, * MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C * * This module is required for the X.509 parsing modules. */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C * * Enable X.509 certificate parsing. * * Module: library/x509_crt.c * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c * library/ssl_srv.c * library/ssl_tls.c * * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C * * This module is required for X.509 certificate parsing. */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C * * Enable X.509 CRL parsing. * * Module: library/x509_crl.c * Caller: library/x509_crt.c * * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C * * This module is required for X.509 CRL parsing. */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C * * Enable X.509 Certificate Signing Request (CSR) parsing. * * Module: library/x509_csr.c * Caller: library/x509_crt_write.c * * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C * * This module is used for reading X.509 certificate request. */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C * * Enable X.509 core for creating certificates. * * Module: library/x509_create.c * * Requires: MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C, MBEDTLS_OID_C, MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C * * This module is the basis for creating X.509 certificates and CSRs. */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C * * Enable creating X.509 certificates. * * Module: library/x509_crt_write.c * * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C * * This module is required for X.509 certificate creation. */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C * * Enable creating X.509 Certificate Signing Requests (CSR). * * Module: library/x509_csr_write.c * * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C * * This module is required for X.509 certificate request writing. */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_XTEA_C * * Enable the XTEA block cipher. * * Module: library/xtea.c * Caller: */ #define MBEDTLS_XTEA_C /* \} name SECTION: mbed TLS modules */ /** * \name SECTION: Module configuration options * * This section allows for the setting of module specific sizes and * configuration options. The default values are already present in the * relevant header files and should suffice for the regular use cases. * * Our advice is to enable options and change their values here * only if you have a good reason and know the consequences. * * Please check the respective header file for documentation on these * parameters (to prevent duplicate documentation). * \{ */ /* MPI / BIGNUM options */ //#define MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE 6 /**< Maximum window size used. */ //#define MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE 1024 /**< Maximum number of bytes for usable MPIs. */ /* CTR_DRBG options */ //#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN 48 /**< Amount of entropy used per seed by default (48 with SHA-512, 32 with SHA-256) */ //#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL 10000 /**< Interval before reseed is performed by default */ //#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT 256 /**< Maximum number of additional input bytes */ //#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST 1024 /**< Maximum number of requested bytes per call */ //#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT 384 /**< Maximum size of (re)seed buffer */ /* HMAC_DRBG options */ //#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL 10000 /**< Interval before reseed is performed by default */ //#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT 256 /**< Maximum number of additional input bytes */ //#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST 1024 /**< Maximum number of requested bytes per call */ //#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT 384 /**< Maximum size of (re)seed buffer */ /* ECP options */ //#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 521 /**< Maximum bit size of groups */ //#define MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE 6 /**< Maximum window size used */ //#define MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM 1 /**< Enable fixed-point speed-up */ /* Entropy options */ //#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES 20 /**< Maximum number of sources supported */ //#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER 128 /**< Maximum amount requested from entropy sources */ //#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE 32 /**< Default minimum number of bytes required for the hardware entropy source mbedtls_hardware_poll() before entropy is released */ /* Memory buffer allocator options */ //#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE 4 /**< Align on multiples of this value */ /* Platform options */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR /**< Header to include if MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS is defined. Don't define if no header is needed. */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC calloc /**< Default allocator to use, can be undefined */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE free /**< Default free to use, can be undefined */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT exit /**< Default exit to use, can be undefined */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME time /**< Default time to use, can be undefined. MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME must be enabled */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF fprintf /**< Default fprintf to use, can be undefined */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF printf /**< Default printf to use, can be undefined */ /* Note: your snprintf must correctly zero-terminate the buffer! */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF snprintf /**< Default snprintf to use, can be undefined */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_SUCCESS 0 /**< Default exit value to use, can be undefined */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_FAILURE 1 /**< Default exit value to use, can be undefined */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_read /**< Default nv_seed_read function to use, can be undefined */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_write /**< Default nv_seed_write function to use, can be undefined */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE "seedfile" /**< Seed file to read/write with default implementation */ /* To Use Function Macros MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C must be enabled */ /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_ALT cannot both be defined */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO calloc /**< Default allocator macro to use, can be undefined */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO free /**< Default free macro to use, can be undefined */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO exit /**< Default exit macro to use, can be undefined */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO time /**< Default time macro to use, can be undefined. MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME must be enabled */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO time_t /**< Default time macro to use, can be undefined. MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME must be enabled */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO fprintf /**< Default fprintf macro to use, can be undefined */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO printf /**< Default printf macro to use, can be undefined */ /* Note: your snprintf must correctly zero-terminate the buffer! */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO snprintf /**< Default snprintf macro to use, can be undefined */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO vsnprintf /**< Default vsnprintf macro to use, can be undefined */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_READ_MACRO mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_read /**< Default nv_seed_read function to use, can be undefined */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_WRITE_MACRO mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_write /**< Default nv_seed_write function to use, can be undefined */ /** * \brief This macro is invoked by the library when an invalid parameter * is detected that is only checked with #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS * (see the documentation of that option for context). * * When you leave this undefined here, the library provides * a default definition. If the macro #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT * is defined, the default definition is `assert(cond)`, * otherwise the default definition calls a function * mbedtls_param_failed(). This function is declared in * `platform_util.h` for the benefit of the library, but * you need to define in your application. * * When you define this here, this replaces the default * definition in platform_util.h (which no longer declares the * function mbedtls_param_failed()) and it is your responsibility * to make sure this macro expands to something suitable (in * particular, that all the necessary declarations are visible * from within the library - you can ensure that by providing * them in this file next to the macro definition). * If you define this macro to call `assert`, also define * #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT so that library source files * include ``. * * Note that you may define this macro to expand to nothing, in * which case you don't have to worry about declarations or * definitions. However, you will then be notified about invalid * parameters only in non-void functions, and void function will * just silently return early on invalid parameters, which * partially negates the benefits of enabling * #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS in the first place, so is discouraged. * * \param cond The expression that should evaluate to true, but doesn't. */ //#define MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED( cond ) assert( cond ) /* SSL Cache options */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT 86400 /**< 1 day */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES 50 /**< Maximum entries in cache */ /* SSL options */ /** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN * * Maximum length (in bytes) of incoming and outgoing plaintext fragments. * * This determines the size of both the incoming and outgoing TLS I/O buffers * in such a way that both are capable of holding the specified amount of * plaintext data, regardless of the protection mechanism used. * * To configure incoming and outgoing I/O buffers separately, use * #MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN and #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, * which overwrite the value set by this option. * * \note When using a value less than the default of 16KB on the client, it is * recommended to use the Maximum Fragment Length (MFL) extension to * inform the server about this limitation. On the server, there * is no supported, standardized way of informing the client about * restriction on the maximum size of incoming messages, and unless * the limitation has been communicated by other means, it is recommended * to only change the outgoing buffer size #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN * while keeping the default value of 16KB for the incoming buffer. * * Uncomment to set the maximum plaintext size of both * incoming and outgoing I/O buffers. */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN 16384 /** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN * * Maximum length (in bytes) of incoming plaintext fragments. * * This determines the size of the incoming TLS I/O buffer in such a way * that it is capable of holding the specified amount of plaintext data, * regardless of the protection mechanism used. * * If this option is undefined, it inherits its value from * #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN. * * \note When using a value less than the default of 16KB on the client, it is * recommended to use the Maximum Fragment Length (MFL) extension to * inform the server about this limitation. On the server, there * is no supported, standardized way of informing the client about * restriction on the maximum size of incoming messages, and unless * the limitation has been communicated by other means, it is recommended * to only change the outgoing buffer size #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN * while keeping the default value of 16KB for the incoming buffer. * * Uncomment to set the maximum plaintext size of the incoming I/O buffer * independently of the outgoing I/O buffer. */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN 16384 /** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX * * The maximum length of CIDs used for incoming DTLS messages. * */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX 32 /** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX * * The maximum length of CIDs used for outgoing DTLS messages. * */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX 32 /** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY * * This option controls the use of record plaintext padding * when using the Connection ID extension in DTLS 1.2. * * The padding will always be chosen so that the length of the * padded plaintext is a multiple of the value of this option. * * Note: A value of \c 1 means that no padding will be used * for outgoing records. * * Note: On systems lacking division instructions, * a power of two should be preferred. * */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY 16 /** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY * * This option controls the use of record plaintext padding * in TLS 1.3. * * The padding will always be chosen so that the length of the * padded plaintext is a multiple of the value of this option. * * Note: A value of \c 1 means that no padding will be used * for outgoing records. * * Note: On systems lacking division instructions, * a power of two should be preferred. */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY 1 /** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN * * Maximum length (in bytes) of outgoing plaintext fragments. * * This determines the size of the outgoing TLS I/O buffer in such a way * that it is capable of holding the specified amount of plaintext data, * regardless of the protection mechanism used. * * If this option undefined, it inherits its value from * #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN. * * It is possible to save RAM by setting a smaller outward buffer, while keeping * the default inward 16384 byte buffer to conform to the TLS specification. * * The minimum required outward buffer size is determined by the handshake * protocol's usage. Handshaking will fail if the outward buffer is too small. * The specific size requirement depends on the configured ciphers and any * certificate data which is sent during the handshake. * * Uncomment to set the maximum plaintext size of the outgoing I/O buffer * independently of the incoming I/O buffer. */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN 16384 /** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING * * Maximum number of heap-allocated bytes for the purpose of * DTLS handshake message reassembly and future message buffering. * * This should be at least 9/8 * MBEDTLSSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN * to account for a reassembled handshake message of maximum size, * together with its reassembly bitmap. * * A value of 2 * MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN (32768 by default) * should be sufficient for all practical situations as it allows * to reassembly a large handshake message (such as a certificate) * while buffering multiple smaller handshake messages. * */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING 32768 //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIME 86400 /**< Lifetime of session tickets (if enabled) */ //#define MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN 32 /**< Max size of TLS pre-shared keys, in bytes (default 256 bits) */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT 60 /**< Default expiration delay of DTLS cookies, in seconds if HAVE_TIME, or in number of cookies issued */ /** * Complete list of ciphersuites to use, in order of preference. * * \warning No dependency checking is done on that field! This option can only * be used to restrict the set of available ciphersuites. It is your * responsibility to make sure the needed modules are active. * * Use this to save a few hundred bytes of ROM (default ordering of all * available ciphersuites) and a few to a few hundred bytes of RAM. * * The value below is only an example, not the default. */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 /* X509 options */ //#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA 8 /**< Maximum number of intermediate CAs in a verification chain. */ //#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN 512 /**< Maximum length of a path/filename string in bytes including the null terminator character ('\0'). */ /** * Allow SHA-1 in the default TLS configuration for certificate signing. * Without this build-time option, SHA-1 support must be activated explicitly * through mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile. Turning on this option is not * recommended because of it is possible to generate SHA-1 collisions, however * this may be safe for legacy infrastructure where additional controls apply. * * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes * a security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies * on it, and considering stronger message digests instead. * */ //#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_CERTIFICATES /** * Allow SHA-1 in the default TLS configuration for TLS 1.2 handshake * signature and ciphersuite selection. Without this build-time option, SHA-1 * support must be activated explicitly through mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes. * The use of SHA-1 in TLS <= 1.1 and in HMAC-SHA-1 is always allowed by * default. At the time of writing, there is no practical attack on the use * of SHA-1 in handshake signatures, hence this option is turned on by default * to preserve compatibility with existing peers, but the general * warning applies nonetheless: * * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes * a security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies * on it, and considering stronger message digests instead. * */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_KEY_EXCHANGE /** * Uncomment the macro to let mbed TLS use your alternate implementation of * mbedtls_platform_zeroize(). This replaces the default implementation in * platform_util.c. * * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() is a widely used function across the library to * zero a block of memory. The implementation is expected to be secure in the * sense that it has been written to prevent the compiler from removing calls * to mbedtls_platform_zeroize() as part of redundant code elimination * optimizations. However, it is difficult to guarantee that calls to * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() will not be optimized by the compiler as older * versions of the C language standards do not provide a secure implementation * of memset(). Therefore, MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT enables users to * configure their own implementation of mbedtls_platform_zeroize(), for * example by using directives specific to their compiler, features from newer * C standards (e.g using memset_s() in C11) or calling a secure memset() from * their system (e.g explicit_bzero() in BSD). */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT /** * Uncomment the macro to let Mbed TLS use your alternate implementation of * mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r(). This replaces the default implementation in * platform_util.c. * * gmtime() is not a thread-safe function as defined in the C standard. The * library will try to use safer implementations of this function, such as * gmtime_r() when available. However, if Mbed TLS cannot identify the target * system, the implementation of mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() will default to * using the standard gmtime(). In this case, calls from the library to * gmtime() will be guarded by the global mutex mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex * if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled. We recommend that calls from outside the * library are also guarded with this mutex to avoid race conditions. However, * if the macro MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT is defined, Mbed TLS will * unconditionally use the implementation for mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() * supplied at compile time. */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT /** * Enable the verified implementations of ECDH primitives from Project Everest * (currently only Curve25519). This feature changes the layout of ECDH * contexts and therefore is a compatibility break for applications that access * fields of a mbedtls_ecdh_context structure directly. See also * MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT in include/mbedtls/ecdh.h. */ //#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED /* \} name SECTION: Customisation configuration options */ /* Target and application specific configurations * * Allow user to override any previous default. * */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE) #include MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) #include "mbedtls/config_psa.h" #endif #include "mbedtls/check_config.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H */ usr/include/mbedtls/config_psa.h0000644000000000000000000002401413764415275015742 0ustar rootroot/** * \file mbedtls/config_psa.h * \brief PSA crypto configuration options (set of defines) * * This set of compile-time options takes settings defined in * include/mbedtls/config.h and include/psa/crypto_config.h and uses * those definitions to define symbols used in the library code. * * Users and integrators should not edit this file, please edit * include/mbedtls/config.h for MBETLS_XXX settings or * include/psa/crypto_config.h for PSA_WANT_XXX settings. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_PSA_H #define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_PSA_H #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) #include "psa/crypto_config.h" #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA 1 #define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC #define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C #define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C #define MBEDTLS_MD_C #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA */ #endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA */ #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDH) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH 1 #define MBEDTLS_ECDH_C #define MBEDTLS_ECP_C #define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDH */ #endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH */ #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA 1 #define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA */ #endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA */ #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF 1 #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF */ #endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF */ #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HMAC) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1 #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HMAC */ #endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC */ #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_MD2) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD2 1 #define MBEDTLS_MD2_C #endif #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_MD4) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD4 1 #define MBEDTLS_MD4_C #endif #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_MD5) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5 1 #define MBEDTLS_MD5_C #endif #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RIPEMD160) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160 1 #define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C #endif #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_OAEP) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP 1 #define MBEDTLS_RSA_C #define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C #define MBEDTLS_OID_C #define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 #define MBEDTLS_MD_C #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_OAEP */ #endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP */ #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT 1 #define MBEDTLS_RSA_C #define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C #define MBEDTLS_OID_C #define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT */ #endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT */ #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1 #define MBEDTLS_RSA_C #define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C #define MBEDTLS_OID_C #define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 #define MBEDTLS_MD_C #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN */ #endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN */ #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PSS) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS 1 #define MBEDTLS_RSA_C #define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C #define MBEDTLS_OID_C #define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 #define MBEDTLS_MD_C #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PSS */ #endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS */ #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_1) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1 1 #define MBEDTLS_SHA1_C #endif #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_224) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224 1 #define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C #endif #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_256) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256 1 #define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C #endif #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_384) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384 1 #define MBEDTLS_SHA512_C #endif #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_512) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512 1 #define MBEDTLS_SHA512_C #endif #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_PRF) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF 1 #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_PRF */ #endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF */ #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS 1 #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ #endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ #if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR 1 #define MBEDTLS_ECP_C #define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR */ #endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR */ #if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1 #define MBEDTLS_ECP_C #define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */ #endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */ #if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR 1 #define MBEDTLS_RSA_C #define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C #define MBEDTLS_OID_C #define MBEDTLS_GENPRIME #define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C #define MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C #define MBEDTLS_PK_C #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR */ #endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR */ #if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1 #define MBEDTLS_RSA_C #define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C #define MBEDTLS_OID_C #define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C #define MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C #define MBEDTLS_PK_C #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY */ #endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY */ #else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG */ /* * Ensure PSA_WANT_* defines are setup properly if MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG * is not defined */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH 1 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA 1 // Only add in DETERMINISTIC support if ECDSA is also enabled #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA 1 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR 1 #define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR 1 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1 #define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC 1 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF 1 #endif /* MBEDTLS_HKDF_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC 1 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF 1 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS 1 #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD2 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 1 #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD4 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 1 #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 1 #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 1 #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT 1 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1 #endif /* MBEDTLSS_PKCS1_V15 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP 1 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS 1 #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR 1 #define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR 1 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1 #define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1 #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 1 #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224 1 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 1 #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 1 #endif #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 1 #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_PSA_H */ usr/include/mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h0000644000000000000000000005565613764415275015440 0ustar rootroot/** * \file ctr_drbg.h * * \brief This file contains definitions and functions for the * CTR_DRBG pseudorandom generator. * * CTR_DRBG is a standardized way of building a PRNG from a block-cipher * in counter mode operation, as defined in NIST SP 800-90A: * Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random * Bit Generators. * * The Mbed TLS implementation of CTR_DRBG uses AES-256 (default) or AES-128 * (if \c MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY is enabled at compile time) * as the underlying block cipher, with a derivation function. * * The security strength as defined in NIST SP 800-90A is * 128 bits when AES-128 is used (\c MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY enabled) * and 256 bits otherwise, provided that #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN is * kept at its default value (and not overridden in config.h) and that the * DRBG instance is set up with default parameters. * See the documentation of mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() for more * information. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_H #define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include "mbedtls/aes.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) #include "mbedtls/threading.h" #endif #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED -0x0034 /**< The entropy source failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG -0x0036 /**< The requested random buffer length is too big. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG -0x0038 /**< The input (entropy + additional data) is too large. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x003A /**< Read or write error in file. */ #define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE 16 /**< The block size used by the cipher. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY) #define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE 16 /**< The key size in bytes used by the cipher. * * Compile-time choice: 16 bytes (128 bits) * because #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY is enabled. */ #else #define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE 32 /**< The key size in bytes used by the cipher. * * Compile-time choice: 32 bytes (256 bits) * because \c MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY is disabled. */ #endif #define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ( MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE * 8 ) /**< The key size for the DRBG operation, in bits. */ #define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN ( MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) /**< The seed length, calculated as (counter + AES key). */ /** * \name SECTION: Module settings * * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. * Either change them in config.h or define them using the compiler command * line. * \{ */ /** \def MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN * * \brief The amount of entropy used per seed by default, in bytes. */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) /** This is 48 bytes because the entropy module uses SHA-512 * (\c MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 is disabled). */ #define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN 48 #else /* defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) */ /** This is 32 bytes because the entropy module uses SHA-256 * (the SHA512 module is disabled or * \c MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 is enabled). */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY) /** \warning To achieve a 256-bit security strength, you must pass a nonce * to mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(). */ #endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY) */ #define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN 32 #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) */ #endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN) */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL) #define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL 10000 /**< The interval before reseed is performed by default. */ #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT) #define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT 256 /**< The maximum number of additional input Bytes. */ #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST) #define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST 1024 /**< The maximum number of requested Bytes per call. */ #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT) #define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT 384 /**< The maximum size of seed or reseed buffer in bytes. */ #endif /* \} name SECTION: Module settings */ #define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_OFF 0 /**< Prediction resistance is disabled. */ #define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_ON 1 /**< Prediction resistance is enabled. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif #if MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN >= MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE * 3 / 2 /** The default length of the nonce read from the entropy source. * * This is \c 0 because a single read from the entropy source is sufficient * to include a nonce. * See the documentation of mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() for more information. */ #define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_NONCE_LEN 0 #else /** The default length of the nonce read from the entropy source. * * This is half of the default entropy length because a single read from * the entropy source does not provide enough material to form a nonce. * See the documentation of mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() for more information. */ #define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_NONCE_LEN ( MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN + 1 ) / 2 #endif /** * \brief The CTR_DRBG context structure. */ typedef struct mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context { unsigned char counter[16]; /*!< The counter (V). */ int reseed_counter; /*!< The reseed counter. * This is the number of requests that have * been made since the last (re)seeding, * minus one. * Before the initial seeding, this field * contains the amount of entropy in bytes * to use as a nonce for the initial seeding, * or -1 if no nonce length has been explicitly * set (see mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len()). */ int prediction_resistance; /*!< This determines whether prediction resistance is enabled, that is whether to systematically reseed before each random generation. */ size_t entropy_len; /*!< The amount of entropy grabbed on each seed or reseed operation, in bytes. */ int reseed_interval; /*!< The reseed interval. * This is the maximum number of requests * that can be made between reseedings. */ mbedtls_aes_context aes_ctx; /*!< The AES context. */ /* * Callbacks (Entropy) */ int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t); /*!< The entropy callback function. */ void *p_entropy; /*!< The context for the entropy function. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; #endif } mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context; /** * \brief This function initializes the CTR_DRBG context, * and prepares it for mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() * or mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free(). * * \note The reseed interval is * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL by default. * You can override it by calling * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_reseed_interval(). * * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context to initialize. */ void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx ); /** * \brief This function seeds and sets up the CTR_DRBG * entropy source for future reseeds. * * A typical choice for the \p f_entropy and \p p_entropy parameters is * to use the entropy module: * - \p f_entropy is mbedtls_entropy_func(); * - \p p_entropy is an instance of ::mbedtls_entropy_context initialized * with mbedtls_entropy_init() (which registers the platform's default * entropy sources). * * The entropy length is #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN by default. * You can override it by calling mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len(). * * The entropy nonce length is: * - \c 0 if the entropy length is at least 3/2 times the entropy length, * which guarantees that the security strength is the maximum permitted * by the key size and entropy length according to NIST SP 800-90A §10.2.1; * - Half the entropy length otherwise. * You can override it by calling mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len(). * With the default entropy length, the entropy nonce length is * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_NONCE_LEN. * * You can provide a nonce and personalization string in addition to the * entropy source, to make this instantiation as unique as possible. * See SP 800-90A §8.6.7 for more details about nonces. * * The _seed_material_ value passed to the derivation function in * the CTR_DRBG Instantiate Process described in NIST SP 800-90A §10.2.1.3.2 * is the concatenation of the following strings: * - A string obtained by calling \p f_entropy function for the entropy * length. */ #if MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_NONCE_LEN == 0 /** * - If mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len() has been called, a string * obtained by calling \p f_entropy function for the specified length. */ #else /** * - A string obtained by calling \p f_entropy function for the entropy nonce * length. If the entropy nonce length is \c 0, this function does not * make a second call to \p f_entropy. */ #endif /** * - The \p custom string. * * \note To achieve the nominal security strength permitted * by CTR_DRBG, the entropy length must be: * - at least 16 bytes for a 128-bit strength * (maximum achievable strength when using AES-128); * - at least 32 bytes for a 256-bit strength * (maximum achievable strength when using AES-256). * * In addition, if you do not pass a nonce in \p custom, * the sum of the entropy length * and the entropy nonce length must be: * - at least 24 bytes for a 128-bit strength * (maximum achievable strength when using AES-128); * - at least 48 bytes for a 256-bit strength * (maximum achievable strength when using AES-256). * * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context to seed. * It must have been initialized with * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(). * After a successful call to mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(), * you may not call mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() again on * the same context unless you call * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free() and mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init() * again first. * \param f_entropy The entropy callback, taking as arguments the * \p p_entropy context, the buffer to fill, and the * length of the buffer. * \p f_entropy is always called with a buffer size * less than or equal to the entropy length. * \param p_entropy The entropy context to pass to \p f_entropy. * \param custom The personalization string. * This can be \c NULL, in which case the personalization * string is empty regardless of the value of \p len. * \param len The length of the personalization string. * This must be at most * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT * - #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED on failure. */ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_entropy, const unsigned char *custom, size_t len ); /** * \brief This function resets CTR_DRBG context to the state immediately * after initial call of mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(). * * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context to clear. */ void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx ); /** * \brief This function turns prediction resistance on or off. * The default value is off. * * \note If enabled, entropy is gathered at the beginning of * every call to mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add() * or mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random(). * Only use this if your entropy source has sufficient * throughput. * * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context. * \param resistance #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_ON or #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_OFF. */ void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, int resistance ); /** * \brief This function sets the amount of entropy grabbed on each * seed or reseed. * * The default value is #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN. * * \note The security strength of CTR_DRBG is bounded by the * entropy length. Thus: * - When using AES-256 * (\c MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY is disabled, * which is the default), * \p len must be at least 32 (in bytes) * to achieve a 256-bit strength. * - When using AES-128 * (\c MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY is enabled) * \p len must be at least 16 (in bytes) * to achieve a 128-bit strength. * * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context. * \param len The amount of entropy to grab, in bytes. * This must be at most #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT * and at most the maximum length accepted by the * entropy function that is set in the context. */ void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, size_t len ); /** * \brief This function sets the amount of entropy grabbed * as a nonce for the initial seeding. * * Call this function before calling mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() to read * a nonce from the entropy source during the initial seeding. * * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context. * \param len The amount of entropy to grab for the nonce, in bytes. * This must be at most #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT * and at most the maximum length accepted by the * entropy function that is set in the context. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG if \p len is * more than #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED * if the initial seeding has already taken place. */ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, size_t len ); /** * \brief This function sets the reseed interval. * * The reseed interval is the number of calls to mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random() * or mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add() after which the entropy function * is called again. * * The default value is #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL. * * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context. * \param interval The reseed interval. */ void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_reseed_interval( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, int interval ); /** * \brief This function reseeds the CTR_DRBG context, that is * extracts data from the entropy source. * * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context. * \param additional Additional data to add to the state. Can be \c NULL. * \param len The length of the additional data. * This must be less than * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - \c entropy_len * where \c entropy_len is the entropy length * configured for the context. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED on failure. */ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, const unsigned char *additional, size_t len ); /** * \brief This function updates the state of the CTR_DRBG context. * * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context. * \param additional The data to update the state with. This must not be * \c NULL unless \p add_len is \c 0. * \param add_len Length of \p additional in bytes. This must be at * most #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG if * \p add_len is more than * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT. * \return An error from the underlying AES cipher on failure. */ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len ); /** * \brief This function updates a CTR_DRBG instance with additional * data and uses it to generate random data. * * This function automatically reseeds if the reseed counter is exceeded * or prediction resistance is enabled. * * \param p_rng The CTR_DRBG context. This must be a pointer to a * #mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context structure. * \param output The buffer to fill. * \param output_len The length of the buffer in bytes. * \param additional Additional data to update. Can be \c NULL, in which * case the additional data is empty regardless of * the value of \p add_len. * \param add_len The length of the additional data * if \p additional is not \c NULL. * This must be less than #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT * and less than * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - \c entropy_len * where \c entropy_len is the entropy length * configured for the context. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED or * #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG on failure. */ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len ); /** * \brief This function uses CTR_DRBG to generate random data. * * This function automatically reseeds if the reseed counter is exceeded * or prediction resistance is enabled. * * * \param p_rng The CTR_DRBG context. This must be a pointer to a * #mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context structure. * \param output The buffer to fill. * \param output_len The length of the buffer in bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED or * #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG on failure. */ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t output_len ); #if ! defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) #else #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /** * \brief This function updates the state of the CTR_DRBG context. * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret() * in 2.16.0. * * \note If \p add_len is greater than * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT, only the first * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT Bytes are used. * The remaining Bytes are silently discarded. * * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context. * \param additional The data to update the state with. * \param add_len Length of \p additional data. */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len ); #undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) /** * \brief This function writes a seed file. * * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context. * \param path The name of the file. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR on file error. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED on reseed * failure. */ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path ); /** * \brief This function reads and updates a seed file. The seed * is added to this instance. * * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context. * \param path The name of the file. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR on file error. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED on * reseed failure. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG if the existing * seed file is too large. */ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_seed_file( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** * \brief The CTR_DRBG checkup routine. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return \c 1 on failure. */ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_self_test( int verbose ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* ctr_drbg.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/debug.h0000644000000000000000000002355713764415275014733 0ustar rootroot/** * \file debug.h * * \brief Functions for controlling and providing debug output from the library. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_DEBUG_H #define MBEDTLS_DEBUG_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) #include "mbedtls/ecp.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) #define MBEDTLS_DEBUG_STRIP_PARENS( ... ) __VA_ARGS__ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( level, args ) \ mbedtls_debug_print_msg( ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, \ MBEDTLS_DEBUG_STRIP_PARENS args ) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( level, text, ret ) \ mbedtls_debug_print_ret( ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, text, ret ) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( level, text, buf, len ) \ mbedtls_debug_print_buf( ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, text, buf, len ) #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( level, text, X ) \ mbedtls_debug_print_mpi( ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, text, X ) #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP( level, text, X ) \ mbedtls_debug_print_ecp( ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, text, X ) #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( level, text, crt ) \ mbedtls_debug_print_crt( ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, text, crt ) #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( level, ecdh, attr ) \ mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh( ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, ecdh, attr ) #endif #else /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( level, args ) do { } while( 0 ) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( level, text, ret ) do { } while( 0 ) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( level, text, buf, len ) do { } while( 0 ) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( level, text, X ) do { } while( 0 ) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP( level, text, X ) do { } while( 0 ) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( level, text, crt ) do { } while( 0 ) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( level, ecdh, attr ) do { } while( 0 ) #endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /** * \brief Set the threshold error level to handle globally all debug output. * Debug messages that have a level over the threshold value are * discarded. * (Default value: 0 = No debug ) * * \param threshold theshold level of messages to filter on. Messages at a * higher level will be discarded. * - Debug levels * - 0 No debug * - 1 Error * - 2 State change * - 3 Informational * - 4 Verbose */ void mbedtls_debug_set_threshold( int threshold ); /** * \brief Print a message to the debug output. This function is always used * through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG() macro, which supplies the ssl * context, file and line number parameters. * * \param ssl SSL context * \param level error level of the debug message * \param file file the message has occurred in * \param line line number the message has occurred at * \param format format specifier, in printf format * \param ... variables used by the format specifier * * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the * library only. */ void mbedtls_debug_print_msg( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, const char *file, int line, const char *format, ... ); /** * \brief Print the return value of a function to the debug output. This * function is always used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET() macro, * which supplies the ssl context, file and line number parameters. * * \param ssl SSL context * \param level error level of the debug message * \param file file the error has occurred in * \param line line number the error has occurred in * \param text the name of the function that returned the error * \param ret the return code value * * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the * library only. */ void mbedtls_debug_print_ret( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, const char *file, int line, const char *text, int ret ); /** * \brief Output a buffer of size len bytes to the debug output. This function * is always used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF() macro, * which supplies the ssl context, file and line number parameters. * * \param ssl SSL context * \param level error level of the debug message * \param file file the error has occurred in * \param line line number the error has occurred in * \param text a name or label for the buffer being dumped. Normally the * variable or buffer name * \param buf the buffer to be outputted * \param len length of the buffer * * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the * library only. */ void mbedtls_debug_print_buf( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, const char *file, int line, const char *text, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) /** * \brief Print a MPI variable to the debug output. This function is always * used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI() macro, which supplies the * ssl context, file and line number parameters. * * \param ssl SSL context * \param level error level of the debug message * \param file file the error has occurred in * \param line line number the error has occurred in * \param text a name or label for the MPI being output. Normally the * variable name * \param X the MPI variable * * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the * library only. */ void mbedtls_debug_print_mpi( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, const char *file, int line, const char *text, const mbedtls_mpi *X ); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) /** * \brief Print an ECP point to the debug output. This function is always * used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP() macro, which supplies the * ssl context, file and line number parameters. * * \param ssl SSL context * \param level error level of the debug message * \param file file the error has occurred in * \param line line number the error has occurred in * \param text a name or label for the ECP point being output. Normally the * variable name * \param X the ECP point * * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the * library only. */ void mbedtls_debug_print_ecp( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, const char *file, int line, const char *text, const mbedtls_ecp_point *X ); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) /** * \brief Print a X.509 certificate structure to the debug output. This * function is always used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT() macro, * which supplies the ssl context, file and line number parameters. * * \param ssl SSL context * \param level error level of the debug message * \param file file the error has occurred in * \param line line number the error has occurred in * \param text a name or label for the certificate being output * \param crt X.509 certificate structure * * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the * library only. */ void mbedtls_debug_print_crt( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, const char *file, int line, const char *text, const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt ); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) typedef enum { MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q, MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP, MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z, } mbedtls_debug_ecdh_attr; /** * \brief Print a field of the ECDH structure in the SSL context to the debug * output. This function is always used through the * MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH() macro, which supplies the ssl context, file * and line number parameters. * * \param ssl SSL context * \param level error level of the debug message * \param file file the error has occurred in * \param line line number the error has occurred in * \param ecdh the ECDH context * \param attr the identifier of the attribute being output * * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the * library only. */ void mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, const char *file, int line, const mbedtls_ecdh_context *ecdh, mbedtls_debug_ecdh_attr attr ); #endif #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* debug.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/des.h0000644000000000000000000002602713764415275014413 0ustar rootroot/** * \file des.h * * \brief DES block cipher * * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers * instead. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. * */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_DES_H #define MBEDTLS_DES_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include #include #define MBEDTLS_DES_ENCRYPT 1 #define MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT 0 #define MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x0032 /**< The data input has an invalid length. */ /* MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0033 /**< DES hardware accelerator failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE 8 #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DES_ALT) // Regular implementation // /** * \brief DES context structure * * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers * instead. */ typedef struct mbedtls_des_context { uint32_t sk[32]; /*!< DES subkeys */ } mbedtls_des_context; /** * \brief Triple-DES context structure */ typedef struct mbedtls_des3_context { uint32_t sk[96]; /*!< 3DES subkeys */ } mbedtls_des3_context; #else /* MBEDTLS_DES_ALT */ #include "des_alt.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_ALT */ /** * \brief Initialize DES context * * \param ctx DES context to be initialized * * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers * instead. */ void mbedtls_des_init( mbedtls_des_context *ctx ); /** * \brief Clear DES context * * \param ctx DES context to be cleared * * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers * instead. */ void mbedtls_des_free( mbedtls_des_context *ctx ); /** * \brief Initialize Triple-DES context * * \param ctx DES3 context to be initialized */ void mbedtls_des3_init( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx ); /** * \brief Clear Triple-DES context * * \param ctx DES3 context to be cleared */ void mbedtls_des3_free( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx ); /** * \brief Set key parity on the given key to odd. * * DES keys are 56 bits long, but each byte is padded with * a parity bit to allow verification. * * \param key 8-byte secret key * * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers * instead. */ void mbedtls_des_key_set_parity( unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] ); /** * \brief Check that key parity on the given key is odd. * * DES keys are 56 bits long, but each byte is padded with * a parity bit to allow verification. * * \param key 8-byte secret key * * \return 0 is parity was ok, 1 if parity was not correct. * * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers * instead. */ int mbedtls_des_key_check_key_parity( const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] ); /** * \brief Check that key is not a weak or semi-weak DES key * * \param key 8-byte secret key * * \return 0 if no weak key was found, 1 if a weak key was identified. * * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers * instead. */ int mbedtls_des_key_check_weak( const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] ); /** * \brief DES key schedule (56-bit, encryption) * * \param ctx DES context to be initialized * \param key 8-byte secret key * * \return 0 * * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers * instead. */ int mbedtls_des_setkey_enc( mbedtls_des_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] ); /** * \brief DES key schedule (56-bit, decryption) * * \param ctx DES context to be initialized * \param key 8-byte secret key * * \return 0 * * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers * instead. */ int mbedtls_des_setkey_dec( mbedtls_des_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] ); /** * \brief Triple-DES key schedule (112-bit, encryption) * * \param ctx 3DES context to be initialized * \param key 16-byte secret key * * \return 0 */ int mbedtls_des3_set2key_enc( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE * 2] ); /** * \brief Triple-DES key schedule (112-bit, decryption) * * \param ctx 3DES context to be initialized * \param key 16-byte secret key * * \return 0 */ int mbedtls_des3_set2key_dec( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE * 2] ); /** * \brief Triple-DES key schedule (168-bit, encryption) * * \param ctx 3DES context to be initialized * \param key 24-byte secret key * * \return 0 */ int mbedtls_des3_set3key_enc( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE * 3] ); /** * \brief Triple-DES key schedule (168-bit, decryption) * * \param ctx 3DES context to be initialized * \param key 24-byte secret key * * \return 0 */ int mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE * 3] ); /** * \brief DES-ECB block encryption/decryption * * \param ctx DES context * \param input 64-bit input block * \param output 64-bit output block * * \return 0 if successful * * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers * instead. */ int mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_des_context *ctx, const unsigned char input[8], unsigned char output[8] ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) /** * \brief DES-CBC buffer encryption/decryption * * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can * call the function same function again on the following * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage. * If on the other hand you need to retain the contents of the * IV, you should either save it manually or use the cipher * module instead. * * \param ctx DES context * \param mode MBEDTLS_DES_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT * \param length length of the input data * \param iv initialization vector (updated after use) * \param input buffer holding the input data * \param output buffer holding the output data * * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers * instead. */ int mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_des_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, unsigned char iv[8], const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ /** * \brief 3DES-ECB block encryption/decryption * * \param ctx 3DES context * \param input 64-bit input block * \param output 64-bit output block * * \return 0 if successful */ int mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, const unsigned char input[8], unsigned char output[8] ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) /** * \brief 3DES-CBC buffer encryption/decryption * * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can * call the function same function again on the following * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage. * If on the other hand you need to retain the contents of the * IV, you should either save it manually or use the cipher * module instead. * * \param ctx 3DES context * \param mode MBEDTLS_DES_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT * \param length length of the input data * \param iv initialization vector (updated after use) * \param input buffer holding the input data * \param output buffer holding the output data * * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH */ int mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, unsigned char iv[8], const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ /** * \brief Internal function for key expansion. * (Only exposed to allow overriding it, * see MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT) * * \param SK Round keys * \param key Base key * * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers * instead. */ void mbedtls_des_setkey( uint32_t SK[32], const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** * \brief Checkup routine * * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed */ int mbedtls_des_self_test( int verbose ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* des.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/dhm.h0000644000000000000000000015254513764415275014415 0ustar rootroot/** * \file dhm.h * * \brief This file contains Diffie-Hellman-Merkle (DHM) key exchange * definitions and functions. * * Diffie-Hellman-Merkle (DHM) key exchange is defined in * RFC-2631: Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method and * Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #3: Diffie * Hellman Key Agreement Standard. * * RFC-3526: More Modular Exponential (MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups for * Internet Key Exchange (IKE) defines a number of standardized * Diffie-Hellman groups for IKE. * * RFC-5114: Additional Diffie-Hellman Groups for Use with IETF * Standards defines a number of standardized Diffie-Hellman * groups that can be used. * * \warning The security of the DHM key exchange relies on the proper choice * of prime modulus - optimally, it should be a safe prime. The usage * of non-safe primes both decreases the difficulty of the underlying * discrete logarithm problem and can lead to small subgroup attacks * leaking private exponent bits when invalid public keys are used * and not detected. This is especially relevant if the same DHM * parameters are reused for multiple key exchanges as in static DHM, * while the criticality of small-subgroup attacks is lower for * ephemeral DHM. * * \warning For performance reasons, the code does neither perform primality * nor safe primality tests, nor the expensive checks for invalid * subgroups. Moreover, even if these were performed, non-standardized * primes cannot be trusted because of the possibility of backdoors * that can't be effectively checked for. * * \warning Diffie-Hellman-Merkle is therefore a security risk when not using * standardized primes generated using a trustworthy ("nothing up * my sleeve") method, such as the RFC 3526 / 7919 primes. In the TLS * protocol, DH parameters need to be negotiated, so using the default * primes systematically is not always an option. If possible, use * Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH), which has better performance, * and for which the TLS protocol mandates the use of standard * parameters. * */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_DHM_H #define MBEDTLS_DHM_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include "mbedtls/bignum.h" /* * DHM Error codes */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x3080 /**< Bad input parameters. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PARAMS_FAILED -0x3100 /**< Reading of the DHM parameters failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED -0x3180 /**< Making of the DHM parameters failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PUBLIC_FAILED -0x3200 /**< Reading of the public values failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED -0x3280 /**< Making of the public value failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_CALC_SECRET_FAILED -0x3300 /**< Calculation of the DHM secret failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT -0x3380 /**< The ASN.1 data is not formatted correctly. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_ALLOC_FAILED -0x3400 /**< Allocation of memory failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x3480 /**< Read or write of file failed. */ /* MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x3500 /**< DHM hardware accelerator failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_SET_GROUP_FAILED -0x3580 /**< Setting the modulus and generator failed. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT) /** * \brief The DHM context structure. */ typedef struct mbedtls_dhm_context { size_t len; /*!< The size of \p P in Bytes. */ mbedtls_mpi P; /*!< The prime modulus. */ mbedtls_mpi G; /*!< The generator. */ mbedtls_mpi X; /*!< Our secret value. */ mbedtls_mpi GX; /*!< Our public key = \c G^X mod \c P. */ mbedtls_mpi GY; /*!< The public key of the peer = \c G^Y mod \c P. */ mbedtls_mpi K; /*!< The shared secret = \c G^(XY) mod \c P. */ mbedtls_mpi RP; /*!< The cached value = \c R^2 mod \c P. */ mbedtls_mpi Vi; /*!< The blinding value. */ mbedtls_mpi Vf; /*!< The unblinding value. */ mbedtls_mpi pX; /*!< The previous \c X. */ } mbedtls_dhm_context; #else /* MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT */ #include "dhm_alt.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT */ /** * \brief This function initializes the DHM context. * * \param ctx The DHM context to initialize. */ void mbedtls_dhm_init( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx ); /** * \brief This function parses the DHM parameters in a * TLS ServerKeyExchange handshake message * (DHM modulus, generator, and public key). * * \note In a TLS handshake, this is the how the client * sets up its DHM context from the server's public * DHM key material. * * \param ctx The DHM context to use. This must be initialized. * \param p On input, *p must be the start of the input buffer. * On output, *p is updated to point to the end of the data * that has been read. On success, this is the first byte * past the end of the ServerKeyExchange parameters. * On error, this is the point at which an error has been * detected, which is usually not useful except to debug * failures. * \param end The end of the input buffer. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_dhm_read_params( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end ); /** * \brief This function generates a DHM key pair and exports its * public part together with the DHM parameters in the format * used in a TLS ServerKeyExchange handshake message. * * \note This function assumes that the DHM parameters \c ctx->P * and \c ctx->G have already been properly set. For that, use * mbedtls_dhm_set_group() below in conjunction with * mbedtls_mpi_read_binary() and mbedtls_mpi_read_string(). * * \note In a TLS handshake, this is the how the server generates * and exports its DHM key material. * * \param ctx The DHM context to use. This must be initialized * and have the DHM parameters set. It may or may not * already have imported the peer's public key. * \param x_size The private key size in Bytes. * \param olen The address at which to store the number of Bytes * written on success. This must not be \c NULL. * \param output The destination buffer. This must be a writable buffer of * sufficient size to hold the reduced binary presentation of * the modulus, the generator and the public key, each wrapped * with a 2-byte length field. It is the responsibility of the * caller to ensure that enough space is available. Refer to * mbedtls_mpi_size() to computing the byte-size of an MPI. * \param f_rng The RNG function. Must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context parameter. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_dhm_make_params( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); /** * \brief This function sets the prime modulus and generator. * * \note This function can be used to set \c ctx->P, \c ctx->G * in preparation for mbedtls_dhm_make_params(). * * \param ctx The DHM context to configure. This must be initialized. * \param P The MPI holding the DHM prime modulus. This must be * an initialized MPI. * \param G The MPI holding the DHM generator. This must be an * initialized MPI. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_dhm_set_group( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *G ); /** * \brief This function imports the raw public value of the peer. * * \note In a TLS handshake, this is the how the server imports * the Client's public DHM key. * * \param ctx The DHM context to use. This must be initialized and have * its DHM parameters set, e.g. via mbedtls_dhm_set_group(). * It may or may not already have generated its own private key. * \param input The input buffer containing the \c G^Y value of the peer. * This must be a readable buffer of size \p ilen Bytes. * \param ilen The size of the input buffer \p input in Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_dhm_read_public( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ); /** * \brief This function creates a DHM key pair and exports * the raw public key in big-endian format. * * \note The destination buffer is always fully written * so as to contain a big-endian representation of G^X mod P. * If it is larger than \c ctx->len, it is padded accordingly * with zero-bytes at the beginning. * * \param ctx The DHM context to use. This must be initialized and * have the DHM parameters set. It may or may not already * have imported the peer's public key. * \param x_size The private key size in Bytes. * \param output The destination buffer. This must be a writable buffer of * size \p olen Bytes. * \param olen The length of the destination buffer. This must be at least * equal to `ctx->len` (the size of \c P). * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL * if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_dhm_make_public( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size, unsigned char *output, size_t olen, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); /** * \brief This function derives and exports the shared secret * \c (G^Y)^X mod \c P. * * \note If \p f_rng is not \c NULL, it is used to blind the input as * a countermeasure against timing attacks. Blinding is used * only if our private key \c X is re-used, and not used * otherwise. We recommend always passing a non-NULL * \p f_rng argument. * * \param ctx The DHM context to use. This must be initialized * and have its own private key generated and the peer's * public key imported. * \param output The buffer to write the generated shared key to. This * must be a writable buffer of size \p output_size Bytes. * \param output_size The size of the destination buffer. This must be at * least the size of \c ctx->len (the size of \c P). * \param olen On exit, holds the actual number of Bytes written. * \param f_rng The RNG function, for blinding purposes. This may * b \c NULL if blinding isn't needed. * \param p_rng The RNG context. This may be \c NULL if \p f_rng * doesn't need a context argument. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, unsigned char *output, size_t output_size, size_t *olen, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); /** * \brief This function frees and clears the components * of a DHM context. * * \param ctx The DHM context to free and clear. This may be \c NULL, * in which case this function is a no-op. If it is not \c NULL, * it must point to an initialized DHM context. */ void mbedtls_dhm_free( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) /** * \brief This function parses DHM parameters in PEM or DER format. * * \param dhm The DHM context to import the DHM parameters into. * This must be initialized. * \param dhmin The input buffer. This must be a readable buffer of * length \p dhminlen Bytes. * \param dhminlen The size of the input buffer \p dhmin, including the * terminating \c NULL Byte for PEM data. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_XXX error * code on failure. */ int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm( mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const unsigned char *dhmin, size_t dhminlen ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) /** * \brief This function loads and parses DHM parameters from a file. * * \param dhm The DHM context to load the parameters to. * This must be initialized. * \param path The filename to read the DHM parameters from. * This must not be \c NULL. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_XXX * error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhmfile( mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const char *path ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** * \brief The DMH checkup routine. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return \c 1 on failure. */ int mbedtls_dhm_self_test( int verbose ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif /** * RFC 3526, RFC 5114 and RFC 7919 standardize a number of * Diffie-Hellman groups, some of which are included here * for use within the SSL/TLS module and the user's convenience * when configuring the Diffie-Hellman parameters by hand * through \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param. * * The following lists the source of the above groups in the standards: * - RFC 5114 section 2.2: 2048-bit MODP Group with 224-bit Prime Order Subgroup * - RFC 3526 section 3: 2048-bit MODP Group * - RFC 3526 section 4: 3072-bit MODP Group * - RFC 3526 section 5: 4096-bit MODP Group * - RFC 7919 section A.1: ffdhe2048 * - RFC 7919 section A.2: ffdhe3072 * - RFC 7919 section A.3: ffdhe4096 * - RFC 7919 section A.4: ffdhe6144 * - RFC 7919 section A.5: ffdhe8192 * * The constants with suffix "_p" denote the chosen prime moduli, while * the constants with suffix "_g" denote the chosen generator * of the associated prime field. * * The constants further suffixed with "_bin" are provided in binary format, * while all other constants represent null-terminated strings holding the * hexadecimal presentation of the respective numbers. * * The primes from RFC 3526 and RFC 7919 have been generating by the following * trust-worthy procedure: * - Fix N in { 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192 } and consider the N-bit number * the first and last 64 bits are all 1, and the remaining N - 128 bits of * which are 0x7ff...ff. * - Add the smallest multiple of the first N - 129 bits of the binary expansion * of pi (for RFC 5236) or e (for RFC 7919) to this intermediate bit-string * such that the resulting integer is a safe-prime. * - The result is the respective RFC 3526 / 7919 prime, and the corresponding * generator is always chosen to be 2 (which is a square for these prime, * hence the corresponding subgroup has order (p-1)/2 and avoids leaking a * bit in the private exponent). * */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) /** * \warning The origin of the primes in RFC 5114 is not documented and * their use therefore constitutes a security risk! * * \deprecated The hex-encoded primes from RFC 5114 are deprecated and are * likely to be removed in a future version of the library without * replacement. */ /** * The hexadecimal presentation of the prime underlying the * 2048-bit MODP Group with 224-bit Prime Order Subgroup, as defined * in RFC-5114: Additional Diffie-Hellman Groups for Use with * IETF Standards. */ #define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_P \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( \ "AD107E1E9123A9D0D660FAA79559C51FA20D64E5683B9FD1" \ "B54B1597B61D0A75E6FA141DF95A56DBAF9A3C407BA1DF15" \ "EB3D688A309C180E1DE6B85A1274A0A66D3F8152AD6AC212" \ "9037C9EDEFDA4DF8D91E8FEF55B7394B7AD5B7D0B6C12207" \ "C9F98D11ED34DBF6C6BA0B2C8BBC27BE6A00E0A0B9C49708" \ "B3BF8A317091883681286130BC8985DB1602E714415D9330" \ "278273C7DE31EFDC7310F7121FD5A07415987D9ADC0A486D" \ "CDF93ACC44328387315D75E198C641A480CD86A1B9E587E8" \ "BE60E69CC928B2B9C52172E413042E9B23F10B0E16E79763" \ "C9B53DCF4BA80A29E3FB73C16B8E75B97EF363E2FFA31F71" \ "CF9DE5384E71B81C0AC4DFFE0C10E64F" ) /** * The hexadecimal presentation of the chosen generator of the 2048-bit MODP * Group with 224-bit Prime Order Subgroup, as defined in RFC-5114: * Additional Diffie-Hellman Groups for Use with IETF Standards. */ #define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_G \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( \ "AC4032EF4F2D9AE39DF30B5C8FFDAC506CDEBE7B89998CAF" \ "74866A08CFE4FFE3A6824A4E10B9A6F0DD921F01A70C4AFA" \ "AB739D7700C29F52C57DB17C620A8652BE5E9001A8D66AD7" \ "C17669101999024AF4D027275AC1348BB8A762D0521BC98A" \ "E247150422EA1ED409939D54DA7460CDB5F6C6B250717CBE" \ "F180EB34118E98D119529A45D6F834566E3025E316A330EF" \ "BB77A86F0C1AB15B051AE3D428C8F8ACB70A8137150B8EEB" \ "10E183EDD19963DDD9E263E4770589EF6AA21E7F5F2FF381" \ "B539CCE3409D13CD566AFBB48D6C019181E1BCFE94B30269" \ "EDFE72FE9B6AA4BD7B5A0F1C71CFFF4C19C418E1F6EC0179" \ "81BC087F2A7065B384B890D3191F2BFA" ) /** * The hexadecimal presentation of the prime underlying the 2048-bit MODP * Group, as defined in RFC-3526: More Modular Exponential (MODP) * Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). * * \deprecated The hex-encoded primes from RFC 3625 are deprecated and * superseded by the corresponding macros providing them as * binary constants. Their hex-encoded constants are likely * to be removed in a future version of the library. * */ #define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( \ "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD1" \ "29024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DD" \ "EF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245" \ "E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7ED" \ "EE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE45B3D" \ "C2007CB8A163BF0598DA48361C55D39A69163FA8FD24CF5F" \ "83655D23DCA3AD961C62F356208552BB9ED529077096966D" \ "670C354E4ABC9804F1746C08CA18217C32905E462E36CE3B" \ "E39E772C180E86039B2783A2EC07A28FB5C55DF06F4C52C9" \ "DE2BCBF6955817183995497CEA956AE515D2261898FA0510" \ "15728E5A8AACAA68FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF" ) /** * The hexadecimal presentation of the chosen generator of the 2048-bit MODP * Group, as defined in RFC-3526: More Modular Exponential (MODP) * Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). */ #define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_G \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( "02" ) /** * The hexadecimal presentation of the prime underlying the 3072-bit MODP * Group, as defined in RFC-3072: More Modular Exponential (MODP) * Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). */ #define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_P \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( \ "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD1" \ "29024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DD" \ "EF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245" \ "E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7ED" \ "EE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE45B3D" \ "C2007CB8A163BF0598DA48361C55D39A69163FA8FD24CF5F" \ "83655D23DCA3AD961C62F356208552BB9ED529077096966D" \ "670C354E4ABC9804F1746C08CA18217C32905E462E36CE3B" \ "E39E772C180E86039B2783A2EC07A28FB5C55DF06F4C52C9" \ "DE2BCBF6955817183995497CEA956AE515D2261898FA0510" \ "15728E5A8AAAC42DAD33170D04507A33A85521ABDF1CBA64" \ "ECFB850458DBEF0A8AEA71575D060C7DB3970F85A6E1E4C7" \ "ABF5AE8CDB0933D71E8C94E04A25619DCEE3D2261AD2EE6B" \ "F12FFA06D98A0864D87602733EC86A64521F2B18177B200C" \ "BBE117577A615D6C770988C0BAD946E208E24FA074E5AB31" \ "43DB5BFCE0FD108E4B82D120A93AD2CAFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF" ) /** * The hexadecimal presentation of the chosen generator of the 3072-bit MODP * Group, as defined in RFC-3526: More Modular Exponential (MODP) * Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). */ #define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_G \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( "02" ) /** * The hexadecimal presentation of the prime underlying the 4096-bit MODP * Group, as defined in RFC-3526: More Modular Exponential (MODP) * Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). */ #define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_4096_P \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( \ "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD1" \ "29024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DD" \ "EF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245" \ "E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7ED" \ "EE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE45B3D" \ "C2007CB8A163BF0598DA48361C55D39A69163FA8FD24CF5F" \ "83655D23DCA3AD961C62F356208552BB9ED529077096966D" \ "670C354E4ABC9804F1746C08CA18217C32905E462E36CE3B" \ "E39E772C180E86039B2783A2EC07A28FB5C55DF06F4C52C9" \ "DE2BCBF6955817183995497CEA956AE515D2261898FA0510" \ "15728E5A8AAAC42DAD33170D04507A33A85521ABDF1CBA64" \ "ECFB850458DBEF0A8AEA71575D060C7DB3970F85A6E1E4C7" \ "ABF5AE8CDB0933D71E8C94E04A25619DCEE3D2261AD2EE6B" \ "F12FFA06D98A0864D87602733EC86A64521F2B18177B200C" \ "BBE117577A615D6C770988C0BAD946E208E24FA074E5AB31" \ "43DB5BFCE0FD108E4B82D120A92108011A723C12A787E6D7" \ "88719A10BDBA5B2699C327186AF4E23C1A946834B6150BDA" \ "2583E9CA2AD44CE8DBBBC2DB04DE8EF92E8EFC141FBECAA6" \ "287C59474E6BC05D99B2964FA090C3A2233BA186515BE7ED" \ "1F612970CEE2D7AFB81BDD762170481CD0069127D5B05AA9" \ "93B4EA988D8FDDC186FFB7DC90A6C08F4DF435C934063199" \ "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF" ) /** * The hexadecimal presentation of the chosen generator of the 4096-bit MODP * Group, as defined in RFC-3526: More Modular Exponential (MODP) * Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). */ #define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_4096_G \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( "02" ) #endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ /* * Trustworthy DHM parameters in binary form */ #define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P_BIN { \ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, \ 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34, \ 0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1, \ 0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74, \ 0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22, \ 0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD, \ 0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B, \ 0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37, \ 0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45, \ 0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6, \ 0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B, \ 0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED, \ 0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5, \ 0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11, 0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6, \ 0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE4, 0x5B, 0x3D, \ 0xC2, 0x00, 0x7C, 0xB8, 0xA1, 0x63, 0xBF, 0x05, \ 0x98, 0xDA, 0x48, 0x36, 0x1C, 0x55, 0xD3, 0x9A, \ 0x69, 0x16, 0x3F, 0xA8, 0xFD, 0x24, 0xCF, 0x5F, \ 0x83, 0x65, 0x5D, 0x23, 0xDC, 0xA3, 0xAD, 0x96, \ 0x1C, 0x62, 0xF3, 0x56, 0x20, 0x85, 0x52, 0xBB, \ 0x9E, 0xD5, 0x29, 0x07, 0x70, 0x96, 0x96, 0x6D, \ 0x67, 0x0C, 0x35, 0x4E, 0x4A, 0xBC, 0x98, 0x04, \ 0xF1, 0x74, 0x6C, 0x08, 0xCA, 0x18, 0x21, 0x7C, \ 0x32, 0x90, 0x5E, 0x46, 0x2E, 0x36, 0xCE, 0x3B, \ 0xE3, 0x9E, 0x77, 0x2C, 0x18, 0x0E, 0x86, 0x03, \ 0x9B, 0x27, 0x83, 0xA2, 0xEC, 0x07, 0xA2, 0x8F, \ 0xB5, 0xC5, 0x5D, 0xF0, 0x6F, 0x4C, 0x52, 0xC9, \ 0xDE, 0x2B, 0xCB, 0xF6, 0x95, 0x58, 0x17, 0x18, \ 0x39, 0x95, 0x49, 0x7C, 0xEA, 0x95, 0x6A, 0xE5, \ 0x15, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x18, 0x98, 0xFA, 0x05, 0x10, \ 0x15, 0x72, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x8A, 0xAC, 0xAA, 0x68, \ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF } #define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_G_BIN { 0x02 } #define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_P_BIN { \ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, \ 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34, \ 0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1, \ 0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74, \ 0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22, \ 0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD, \ 0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B, \ 0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37, \ 0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45, \ 0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6, \ 0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B, \ 0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED, \ 0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5, \ 0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11, 0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6, \ 0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE4, 0x5B, 0x3D, \ 0xC2, 0x00, 0x7C, 0xB8, 0xA1, 0x63, 0xBF, 0x05, \ 0x98, 0xDA, 0x48, 0x36, 0x1C, 0x55, 0xD3, 0x9A, \ 0x69, 0x16, 0x3F, 0xA8, 0xFD, 0x24, 0xCF, 0x5F, \ 0x83, 0x65, 0x5D, 0x23, 0xDC, 0xA3, 0xAD, 0x96, \ 0x1C, 0x62, 0xF3, 0x56, 0x20, 0x85, 0x52, 0xBB, \ 0x9E, 0xD5, 0x29, 0x07, 0x70, 0x96, 0x96, 0x6D, \ 0x67, 0x0C, 0x35, 0x4E, 0x4A, 0xBC, 0x98, 0x04, \ 0xF1, 0x74, 0x6C, 0x08, 0xCA, 0x18, 0x21, 0x7C, \ 0x32, 0x90, 0x5E, 0x46, 0x2E, 0x36, 0xCE, 0x3B, \ 0xE3, 0x9E, 0x77, 0x2C, 0x18, 0x0E, 0x86, 0x03, \ 0x9B, 0x27, 0x83, 0xA2, 0xEC, 0x07, 0xA2, 0x8F, \ 0xB5, 0xC5, 0x5D, 0xF0, 0x6F, 0x4C, 0x52, 0xC9, \ 0xDE, 0x2B, 0xCB, 0xF6, 0x95, 0x58, 0x17, 0x18, \ 0x39, 0x95, 0x49, 0x7C, 0xEA, 0x95, 0x6A, 0xE5, \ 0x15, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x18, 0x98, 0xFA, 0x05, 0x10, \ 0x15, 0x72, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x8A, 0xAA, 0xC4, 0x2D, \ 0xAD, 0x33, 0x17, 0x0D, 0x04, 0x50, 0x7A, 0x33, \ 0xA8, 0x55, 0x21, 0xAB, 0xDF, 0x1C, 0xBA, 0x64, \ 0xEC, 0xFB, 0x85, 0x04, 0x58, 0xDB, 0xEF, 0x0A, \ 0x8A, 0xEA, 0x71, 0x57, 0x5D, 0x06, 0x0C, 0x7D, \ 0xB3, 0x97, 0x0F, 0x85, 0xA6, 0xE1, 0xE4, 0xC7, \ 0xAB, 0xF5, 0xAE, 0x8C, 0xDB, 0x09, 0x33, 0xD7, \ 0x1E, 0x8C, 0x94, 0xE0, 0x4A, 0x25, 0x61, 0x9D, \ 0xCE, 0xE3, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x1A, 0xD2, 0xEE, 0x6B, \ 0xF1, 0x2F, 0xFA, 0x06, 0xD9, 0x8A, 0x08, 0x64, \ 0xD8, 0x76, 0x02, 0x73, 0x3E, 0xC8, 0x6A, 0x64, \ 0x52, 0x1F, 0x2B, 0x18, 0x17, 0x7B, 0x20, 0x0C, \ 0xBB, 0xE1, 0x17, 0x57, 0x7A, 0x61, 0x5D, 0x6C, \ 0x77, 0x09, 0x88, 0xC0, 0xBA, 0xD9, 0x46, 0xE2, \ 0x08, 0xE2, 0x4F, 0xA0, 0x74, 0xE5, 0xAB, 0x31, \ 0x43, 0xDB, 0x5B, 0xFC, 0xE0, 0xFD, 0x10, 0x8E, \ 0x4B, 0x82, 0xD1, 0x20, 0xA9, 0x3A, 0xD2, 0xCA, \ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF } #define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_G_BIN { 0x02 } #define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_4096_P_BIN { \ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, \ 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34, \ 0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1, \ 0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74, \ 0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22, \ 0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD, \ 0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B, \ 0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37, \ 0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45, \ 0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6, \ 0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B, \ 0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED, \ 0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5, \ 0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11, 0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6, \ 0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE4, 0x5B, 0x3D, \ 0xC2, 0x00, 0x7C, 0xB8, 0xA1, 0x63, 0xBF, 0x05, \ 0x98, 0xDA, 0x48, 0x36, 0x1C, 0x55, 0xD3, 0x9A, \ 0x69, 0x16, 0x3F, 0xA8, 0xFD, 0x24, 0xCF, 0x5F, \ 0x83, 0x65, 0x5D, 0x23, 0xDC, 0xA3, 0xAD, 0x96, \ 0x1C, 0x62, 0xF3, 0x56, 0x20, 0x85, 0x52, 0xBB, \ 0x9E, 0xD5, 0x29, 0x07, 0x70, 0x96, 0x96, 0x6D, \ 0x67, 0x0C, 0x35, 0x4E, 0x4A, 0xBC, 0x98, 0x04, \ 0xF1, 0x74, 0x6C, 0x08, 0xCA, 0x18, 0x21, 0x7C, \ 0x32, 0x90, 0x5E, 0x46, 0x2E, 0x36, 0xCE, 0x3B, \ 0xE3, 0x9E, 0x77, 0x2C, 0x18, 0x0E, 0x86, 0x03, \ 0x9B, 0x27, 0x83, 0xA2, 0xEC, 0x07, 0xA2, 0x8F, \ 0xB5, 0xC5, 0x5D, 0xF0, 0x6F, 0x4C, 0x52, 0xC9, \ 0xDE, 0x2B, 0xCB, 0xF6, 0x95, 0x58, 0x17, 0x18, \ 0x39, 0x95, 0x49, 0x7C, 0xEA, 0x95, 0x6A, 0xE5, \ 0x15, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x18, 0x98, 0xFA, 0x05, 0x10, \ 0x15, 0x72, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x8A, 0xAA, 0xC4, 0x2D, \ 0xAD, 0x33, 0x17, 0x0D, 0x04, 0x50, 0x7A, 0x33, \ 0xA8, 0x55, 0x21, 0xAB, 0xDF, 0x1C, 0xBA, 0x64, \ 0xEC, 0xFB, 0x85, 0x04, 0x58, 0xDB, 0xEF, 0x0A, \ 0x8A, 0xEA, 0x71, 0x57, 0x5D, 0x06, 0x0C, 0x7D, \ 0xB3, 0x97, 0x0F, 0x85, 0xA6, 0xE1, 0xE4, 0xC7, \ 0xAB, 0xF5, 0xAE, 0x8C, 0xDB, 0x09, 0x33, 0xD7, \ 0x1E, 0x8C, 0x94, 0xE0, 0x4A, 0x25, 0x61, 0x9D, \ 0xCE, 0xE3, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x1A, 0xD2, 0xEE, 0x6B, \ 0xF1, 0x2F, 0xFA, 0x06, 0xD9, 0x8A, 0x08, 0x64, \ 0xD8, 0x76, 0x02, 0x73, 0x3E, 0xC8, 0x6A, 0x64, \ 0x52, 0x1F, 0x2B, 0x18, 0x17, 0x7B, 0x20, 0x0C, \ 0xBB, 0xE1, 0x17, 0x57, 0x7A, 0x61, 0x5D, 0x6C, \ 0x77, 0x09, 0x88, 0xC0, 0xBA, 0xD9, 0x46, 0xE2, \ 0x08, 0xE2, 0x4F, 0xA0, 0x74, 0xE5, 0xAB, 0x31, \ 0x43, 0xDB, 0x5B, 0xFC, 0xE0, 0xFD, 0x10, 0x8E, \ 0x4B, 0x82, 0xD1, 0x20, 0xA9, 0x21, 0x08, 0x01, \ 0x1A, 0x72, 0x3C, 0x12, 0xA7, 0x87, 0xE6, 0xD7, \ 0x88, 0x71, 0x9A, 0x10, 0xBD, 0xBA, 0x5B, 0x26, \ 0x99, 0xC3, 0x27, 0x18, 0x6A, 0xF4, 0xE2, 0x3C, \ 0x1A, 0x94, 0x68, 0x34, 0xB6, 0x15, 0x0B, 0xDA, \ 0x25, 0x83, 0xE9, 0xCA, 0x2A, 0xD4, 0x4C, 0xE8, \ 0xDB, 0xBB, 0xC2, 0xDB, 0x04, 0xDE, 0x8E, 0xF9, \ 0x2E, 0x8E, 0xFC, 0x14, 0x1F, 0xBE, 0xCA, 0xA6, \ 0x28, 0x7C, 0x59, 0x47, 0x4E, 0x6B, 0xC0, 0x5D, \ 0x99, 0xB2, 0x96, 0x4F, 0xA0, 0x90, 0xC3, 0xA2, \ 0x23, 0x3B, 0xA1, 0x86, 0x51, 0x5B, 0xE7, 0xED, \ 0x1F, 0x61, 0x29, 0x70, 0xCE, 0xE2, 0xD7, 0xAF, \ 0xB8, 0x1B, 0xDD, 0x76, 0x21, 0x70, 0x48, 0x1C, \ 0xD0, 0x06, 0x91, 0x27, 0xD5, 0xB0, 0x5A, 0xA9, \ 0x93, 0xB4, 0xEA, 0x98, 0x8D, 0x8F, 0xDD, 0xC1, \ 0x86, 0xFF, 0xB7, 0xDC, 0x90, 0xA6, 0xC0, 0x8F, \ 0x4D, 0xF4, 0x35, 0xC9, 0x34, 0x06, 0x31, 0x99, \ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF } #define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_4096_G_BIN { 0x02 } #define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE2048_P_BIN { \ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, \ 0xAD, 0xF8, 0x54, 0x58, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0x4A, 0x9A, \ 0xAF, 0xDC, 0x56, 0x20, 0x27, 0x3D, 0x3C, 0xF1, \ 0xD8, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0x83, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0x36, 0x95, \ 0xA9, 0xE1, 0x36, 0x41, 0x14, 0x64, 0x33, 0xFB, \ 0xCC, 0x93, 0x9D, 0xCE, 0x24, 0x9B, 0x3E, 0xF9, \ 0x7D, 0x2F, 0xE3, 0x63, 0x63, 0x0C, 0x75, 0xD8, \ 0xF6, 0x81, 0xB2, 0x02, 0xAE, 0xC4, 0x61, 0x7A, \ 0xD3, 0xDF, 0x1E, 0xD5, 0xD5, 0xFD, 0x65, 0x61, \ 0x24, 0x33, 0xF5, 0x1F, 0x5F, 0x06, 0x6E, 0xD0, \ 0x85, 0x63, 0x65, 0x55, 0x3D, 0xED, 0x1A, 0xF3, \ 0xB5, 0x57, 0x13, 0x5E, 0x7F, 0x57, 0xC9, 0x35, \ 0x98, 0x4F, 0x0C, 0x70, 0xE0, 0xE6, 0x8B, 0x77, \ 0xE2, 0xA6, 0x89, 0xDA, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xE8, 0x72, \ 0x1D, 0xF1, 0x58, 0xA1, 0x36, 0xAD, 0xE7, 0x35, \ 0x30, 0xAC, 0xCA, 0x4F, 0x48, 0x3A, 0x79, 0x7A, \ 0xBC, 0x0A, 0xB1, 0x82, 0xB3, 0x24, 0xFB, 0x61, \ 0xD1, 0x08, 0xA9, 0x4B, 0xB2, 0xC8, 0xE3, 0xFB, \ 0xB9, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0xB7, 0x60, 0xD7, 0xF4, 0x68, \ 0x1D, 0x4F, 0x42, 0xA3, 0xDE, 0x39, 0x4D, 0xF4, \ 0xAE, 0x56, 0xED, 0xE7, 0x63, 0x72, 0xBB, 0x19, \ 0x0B, 0x07, 0xA7, 0xC8, 0xEE, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0x70, \ 0x9E, 0x02, 0xFC, 0xE1, 0xCD, 0xF7, 0xE2, 0xEC, \ 0xC0, 0x34, 0x04, 0xCD, 0x28, 0x34, 0x2F, 0x61, \ 0x91, 0x72, 0xFE, 0x9C, 0xE9, 0x85, 0x83, 0xFF, \ 0x8E, 0x4F, 0x12, 0x32, 0xEE, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x83, \ 0xC3, 0xFE, 0x3B, 0x1B, 0x4C, 0x6F, 0xAD, 0x73, \ 0x3B, 0xB5, 0xFC, 0xBC, 0x2E, 0xC2, 0x20, 0x05, \ 0xC5, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0x83, 0x7D, 0x16, 0x83, 0xB2, \ 0xC6, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x26, 0xC1, 0xB2, 0xEF, 0xFA, \ 0x88, 0x6B, 0x42, 0x38, 0x61, 0x28, 0x5C, 0x97, \ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, } #define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE2048_G_BIN { 0x02 } #define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE3072_P_BIN { \ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, \ 0xAD, 0xF8, 0x54, 0x58, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0x4A, 0x9A, \ 0xAF, 0xDC, 0x56, 0x20, 0x27, 0x3D, 0x3C, 0xF1, \ 0xD8, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0x83, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0x36, 0x95, \ 0xA9, 0xE1, 0x36, 0x41, 0x14, 0x64, 0x33, 0xFB, \ 0xCC, 0x93, 0x9D, 0xCE, 0x24, 0x9B, 0x3E, 0xF9, \ 0x7D, 0x2F, 0xE3, 0x63, 0x63, 0x0C, 0x75, 0xD8, \ 0xF6, 0x81, 0xB2, 0x02, 0xAE, 0xC4, 0x61, 0x7A, \ 0xD3, 0xDF, 0x1E, 0xD5, 0xD5, 0xFD, 0x65, 0x61, \ 0x24, 0x33, 0xF5, 0x1F, 0x5F, 0x06, 0x6E, 0xD0, \ 0x85, 0x63, 0x65, 0x55, 0x3D, 0xED, 0x1A, 0xF3, \ 0xB5, 0x57, 0x13, 0x5E, 0x7F, 0x57, 0xC9, 0x35, \ 0x98, 0x4F, 0x0C, 0x70, 0xE0, 0xE6, 0x8B, 0x77, \ 0xE2, 0xA6, 0x89, 0xDA, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xE8, 0x72, \ 0x1D, 0xF1, 0x58, 0xA1, 0x36, 0xAD, 0xE7, 0x35, \ 0x30, 0xAC, 0xCA, 0x4F, 0x48, 0x3A, 0x79, 0x7A, \ 0xBC, 0x0A, 0xB1, 0x82, 0xB3, 0x24, 0xFB, 0x61, \ 0xD1, 0x08, 0xA9, 0x4B, 0xB2, 0xC8, 0xE3, 0xFB, \ 0xB9, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0xB7, 0x60, 0xD7, 0xF4, 0x68, \ 0x1D, 0x4F, 0x42, 0xA3, 0xDE, 0x39, 0x4D, 0xF4, \ 0xAE, 0x56, 0xED, 0xE7, 0x63, 0x72, 0xBB, 0x19, \ 0x0B, 0x07, 0xA7, 0xC8, 0xEE, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0x70, \ 0x9E, 0x02, 0xFC, 0xE1, 0xCD, 0xF7, 0xE2, 0xEC, \ 0xC0, 0x34, 0x04, 0xCD, 0x28, 0x34, 0x2F, 0x61, \ 0x91, 0x72, 0xFE, 0x9C, 0xE9, 0x85, 0x83, 0xFF, \ 0x8E, 0x4F, 0x12, 0x32, 0xEE, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x83, \ 0xC3, 0xFE, 0x3B, 0x1B, 0x4C, 0x6F, 0xAD, 0x73, \ 0x3B, 0xB5, 0xFC, 0xBC, 0x2E, 0xC2, 0x20, 0x05, \ 0xC5, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0x83, 0x7D, 0x16, 0x83, 0xB2, \ 0xC6, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x26, 0xC1, 0xB2, 0xEF, 0xFA, \ 0x88, 0x6B, 0x42, 0x38, 0x61, 0x1F, 0xCF, 0xDC, \ 0xDE, 0x35, 0x5B, 0x3B, 0x65, 0x19, 0x03, 0x5B, \ 0xBC, 0x34, 0xF4, 0xDE, 0xF9, 0x9C, 0x02, 0x38, \ 0x61, 0xB4, 0x6F, 0xC9, 0xD6, 0xE6, 0xC9, 0x07, \ 0x7A, 0xD9, 0x1D, 0x26, 0x91, 0xF7, 0xF7, 0xEE, \ 0x59, 0x8C, 0xB0, 0xFA, 0xC1, 0x86, 0xD9, 0x1C, \ 0xAE, 0xFE, 0x13, 0x09, 0x85, 0x13, 0x92, 0x70, \ 0xB4, 0x13, 0x0C, 0x93, 0xBC, 0x43, 0x79, 0x44, \ 0xF4, 0xFD, 0x44, 0x52, 0xE2, 0xD7, 0x4D, 0xD3, \ 0x64, 0xF2, 0xE2, 0x1E, 0x71, 0xF5, 0x4B, 0xFF, \ 0x5C, 0xAE, 0x82, 0xAB, 0x9C, 0x9D, 0xF6, 0x9E, \ 0xE8, 0x6D, 0x2B, 0xC5, 0x22, 0x36, 0x3A, 0x0D, \ 0xAB, 0xC5, 0x21, 0x97, 0x9B, 0x0D, 0xEA, 0xDA, \ 0x1D, 0xBF, 0x9A, 0x42, 0xD5, 0xC4, 0x48, 0x4E, \ 0x0A, 0xBC, 0xD0, 0x6B, 0xFA, 0x53, 0xDD, 0xEF, \ 0x3C, 0x1B, 0x20, 0xEE, 0x3F, 0xD5, 0x9D, 0x7C, \ 0x25, 0xE4, 0x1D, 0x2B, 0x66, 0xC6, 0x2E, 0x37, \ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF } #define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE3072_G_BIN { 0x02 } #define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE4096_P_BIN { \ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, \ 0xAD, 0xF8, 0x54, 0x58, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0x4A, 0x9A, \ 0xAF, 0xDC, 0x56, 0x20, 0x27, 0x3D, 0x3C, 0xF1, \ 0xD8, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0x83, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0x36, 0x95, \ 0xA9, 0xE1, 0x36, 0x41, 0x14, 0x64, 0x33, 0xFB, \ 0xCC, 0x93, 0x9D, 0xCE, 0x24, 0x9B, 0x3E, 0xF9, \ 0x7D, 0x2F, 0xE3, 0x63, 0x63, 0x0C, 0x75, 0xD8, \ 0xF6, 0x81, 0xB2, 0x02, 0xAE, 0xC4, 0x61, 0x7A, \ 0xD3, 0xDF, 0x1E, 0xD5, 0xD5, 0xFD, 0x65, 0x61, \ 0x24, 0x33, 0xF5, 0x1F, 0x5F, 0x06, 0x6E, 0xD0, \ 0x85, 0x63, 0x65, 0x55, 0x3D, 0xED, 0x1A, 0xF3, \ 0xB5, 0x57, 0x13, 0x5E, 0x7F, 0x57, 0xC9, 0x35, \ 0x98, 0x4F, 0x0C, 0x70, 0xE0, 0xE6, 0x8B, 0x77, \ 0xE2, 0xA6, 0x89, 0xDA, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xE8, 0x72, \ 0x1D, 0xF1, 0x58, 0xA1, 0x36, 0xAD, 0xE7, 0x35, \ 0x30, 0xAC, 0xCA, 0x4F, 0x48, 0x3A, 0x79, 0x7A, \ 0xBC, 0x0A, 0xB1, 0x82, 0xB3, 0x24, 0xFB, 0x61, \ 0xD1, 0x08, 0xA9, 0x4B, 0xB2, 0xC8, 0xE3, 0xFB, \ 0xB9, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0xB7, 0x60, 0xD7, 0xF4, 0x68, \ 0x1D, 0x4F, 0x42, 0xA3, 0xDE, 0x39, 0x4D, 0xF4, \ 0xAE, 0x56, 0xED, 0xE7, 0x63, 0x72, 0xBB, 0x19, \ 0x0B, 0x07, 0xA7, 0xC8, 0xEE, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0x70, \ 0x9E, 0x02, 0xFC, 0xE1, 0xCD, 0xF7, 0xE2, 0xEC, \ 0xC0, 0x34, 0x04, 0xCD, 0x28, 0x34, 0x2F, 0x61, \ 0x91, 0x72, 0xFE, 0x9C, 0xE9, 0x85, 0x83, 0xFF, \ 0x8E, 0x4F, 0x12, 0x32, 0xEE, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x83, \ 0xC3, 0xFE, 0x3B, 0x1B, 0x4C, 0x6F, 0xAD, 0x73, \ 0x3B, 0xB5, 0xFC, 0xBC, 0x2E, 0xC2, 0x20, 0x05, \ 0xC5, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0x83, 0x7D, 0x16, 0x83, 0xB2, \ 0xC6, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x26, 0xC1, 0xB2, 0xEF, 0xFA, \ 0x88, 0x6B, 0x42, 0x38, 0x61, 0x1F, 0xCF, 0xDC, \ 0xDE, 0x35, 0x5B, 0x3B, 0x65, 0x19, 0x03, 0x5B, \ 0xBC, 0x34, 0xF4, 0xDE, 0xF9, 0x9C, 0x02, 0x38, \ 0x61, 0xB4, 0x6F, 0xC9, 0xD6, 0xE6, 0xC9, 0x07, \ 0x7A, 0xD9, 0x1D, 0x26, 0x91, 0xF7, 0xF7, 0xEE, \ 0x59, 0x8C, 0xB0, 0xFA, 0xC1, 0x86, 0xD9, 0x1C, \ 0xAE, 0xFE, 0x13, 0x09, 0x85, 0x13, 0x92, 0x70, \ 0xB4, 0x13, 0x0C, 0x93, 0xBC, 0x43, 0x79, 0x44, \ 0xF4, 0xFD, 0x44, 0x52, 0xE2, 0xD7, 0x4D, 0xD3, \ 0x64, 0xF2, 0xE2, 0x1E, 0x71, 0xF5, 0x4B, 0xFF, \ 0x5C, 0xAE, 0x82, 0xAB, 0x9C, 0x9D, 0xF6, 0x9E, \ 0xE8, 0x6D, 0x2B, 0xC5, 0x22, 0x36, 0x3A, 0x0D, \ 0xAB, 0xC5, 0x21, 0x97, 0x9B, 0x0D, 0xEA, 0xDA, \ 0x1D, 0xBF, 0x9A, 0x42, 0xD5, 0xC4, 0x48, 0x4E, \ 0x0A, 0xBC, 0xD0, 0x6B, 0xFA, 0x53, 0xDD, 0xEF, \ 0x3C, 0x1B, 0x20, 0xEE, 0x3F, 0xD5, 0x9D, 0x7C, \ 0x25, 0xE4, 0x1D, 0x2B, 0x66, 0x9E, 0x1E, 0xF1, \ 0x6E, 0x6F, 0x52, 0xC3, 0x16, 0x4D, 0xF4, 0xFB, \ 0x79, 0x30, 0xE9, 0xE4, 0xE5, 0x88, 0x57, 0xB6, \ 0xAC, 0x7D, 0x5F, 0x42, 0xD6, 0x9F, 0x6D, 0x18, \ 0x77, 0x63, 0xCF, 0x1D, 0x55, 0x03, 0x40, 0x04, \ 0x87, 0xF5, 0x5B, 0xA5, 0x7E, 0x31, 0xCC, 0x7A, \ 0x71, 0x35, 0xC8, 0x86, 0xEF, 0xB4, 0x31, 0x8A, \ 0xED, 0x6A, 0x1E, 0x01, 0x2D, 0x9E, 0x68, 0x32, \ 0xA9, 0x07, 0x60, 0x0A, 0x91, 0x81, 0x30, 0xC4, \ 0x6D, 0xC7, 0x78, 0xF9, 0x71, 0xAD, 0x00, 0x38, \ 0x09, 0x29, 0x99, 0xA3, 0x33, 0xCB, 0x8B, 0x7A, \ 0x1A, 0x1D, 0xB9, 0x3D, 0x71, 0x40, 0x00, 0x3C, \ 0x2A, 0x4E, 0xCE, 0xA9, 0xF9, 0x8D, 0x0A, 0xCC, \ 0x0A, 0x82, 0x91, 0xCD, 0xCE, 0xC9, 0x7D, 0xCF, \ 0x8E, 0xC9, 0xB5, 0x5A, 0x7F, 0x88, 0xA4, 0x6B, \ 0x4D, 0xB5, 0xA8, 0x51, 0xF4, 0x41, 0x82, 0xE1, \ 0xC6, 0x8A, 0x00, 0x7E, 0x5E, 0x65, 0x5F, 0x6A, \ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF } #define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE4096_G_BIN { 0x02 } #define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE6144_P_BIN { \ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, \ 0xAD, 0xF8, 0x54, 0x58, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0x4A, 0x9A, \ 0xAF, 0xDC, 0x56, 0x20, 0x27, 0x3D, 0x3C, 0xF1, \ 0xD8, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0x83, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0x36, 0x95, \ 0xA9, 0xE1, 0x36, 0x41, 0x14, 0x64, 0x33, 0xFB, \ 0xCC, 0x93, 0x9D, 0xCE, 0x24, 0x9B, 0x3E, 0xF9, \ 0x7D, 0x2F, 0xE3, 0x63, 0x63, 0x0C, 0x75, 0xD8, \ 0xF6, 0x81, 0xB2, 0x02, 0xAE, 0xC4, 0x61, 0x7A, \ 0xD3, 0xDF, 0x1E, 0xD5, 0xD5, 0xFD, 0x65, 0x61, \ 0x24, 0x33, 0xF5, 0x1F, 0x5F, 0x06, 0x6E, 0xD0, \ 0x85, 0x63, 0x65, 0x55, 0x3D, 0xED, 0x1A, 0xF3, \ 0xB5, 0x57, 0x13, 0x5E, 0x7F, 0x57, 0xC9, 0x35, \ 0x98, 0x4F, 0x0C, 0x70, 0xE0, 0xE6, 0x8B, 0x77, \ 0xE2, 0xA6, 0x89, 0xDA, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xE8, 0x72, \ 0x1D, 0xF1, 0x58, 0xA1, 0x36, 0xAD, 0xE7, 0x35, \ 0x30, 0xAC, 0xCA, 0x4F, 0x48, 0x3A, 0x79, 0x7A, \ 0xBC, 0x0A, 0xB1, 0x82, 0xB3, 0x24, 0xFB, 0x61, \ 0xD1, 0x08, 0xA9, 0x4B, 0xB2, 0xC8, 0xE3, 0xFB, \ 0xB9, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0xB7, 0x60, 0xD7, 0xF4, 0x68, \ 0x1D, 0x4F, 0x42, 0xA3, 0xDE, 0x39, 0x4D, 0xF4, \ 0xAE, 0x56, 0xED, 0xE7, 0x63, 0x72, 0xBB, 0x19, \ 0x0B, 0x07, 0xA7, 0xC8, 0xEE, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0x70, \ 0x9E, 0x02, 0xFC, 0xE1, 0xCD, 0xF7, 0xE2, 0xEC, \ 0xC0, 0x34, 0x04, 0xCD, 0x28, 0x34, 0x2F, 0x61, \ 0x91, 0x72, 0xFE, 0x9C, 0xE9, 0x85, 0x83, 0xFF, \ 0x8E, 0x4F, 0x12, 0x32, 0xEE, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x83, \ 0xC3, 0xFE, 0x3B, 0x1B, 0x4C, 0x6F, 0xAD, 0x73, \ 0x3B, 0xB5, 0xFC, 0xBC, 0x2E, 0xC2, 0x20, 0x05, \ 0xC5, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0x83, 0x7D, 0x16, 0x83, 0xB2, \ 0xC6, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x26, 0xC1, 0xB2, 0xEF, 0xFA, \ 0x88, 0x6B, 0x42, 0x38, 0x61, 0x1F, 0xCF, 0xDC, \ 0xDE, 0x35, 0x5B, 0x3B, 0x65, 0x19, 0x03, 0x5B, \ 0xBC, 0x34, 0xF4, 0xDE, 0xF9, 0x9C, 0x02, 0x38, \ 0x61, 0xB4, 0x6F, 0xC9, 0xD6, 0xE6, 0xC9, 0x07, \ 0x7A, 0xD9, 0x1D, 0x26, 0x91, 0xF7, 0xF7, 0xEE, \ 0x59, 0x8C, 0xB0, 0xFA, 0xC1, 0x86, 0xD9, 0x1C, \ 0xAE, 0xFE, 0x13, 0x09, 0x85, 0x13, 0x92, 0x70, \ 0xB4, 0x13, 0x0C, 0x93, 0xBC, 0x43, 0x79, 0x44, \ 0xF4, 0xFD, 0x44, 0x52, 0xE2, 0xD7, 0x4D, 0xD3, \ 0x64, 0xF2, 0xE2, 0x1E, 0x71, 0xF5, 0x4B, 0xFF, \ 0x5C, 0xAE, 0x82, 0xAB, 0x9C, 0x9D, 0xF6, 0x9E, \ 0xE8, 0x6D, 0x2B, 0xC5, 0x22, 0x36, 0x3A, 0x0D, \ 0xAB, 0xC5, 0x21, 0x97, 0x9B, 0x0D, 0xEA, 0xDA, \ 0x1D, 0xBF, 0x9A, 0x42, 0xD5, 0xC4, 0x48, 0x4E, \ 0x0A, 0xBC, 0xD0, 0x6B, 0xFA, 0x53, 0xDD, 0xEF, \ 0x3C, 0x1B, 0x20, 0xEE, 0x3F, 0xD5, 0x9D, 0x7C, \ 0x25, 0xE4, 0x1D, 0x2B, 0x66, 0x9E, 0x1E, 0xF1, \ 0x6E, 0x6F, 0x52, 0xC3, 0x16, 0x4D, 0xF4, 0xFB, \ 0x79, 0x30, 0xE9, 0xE4, 0xE5, 0x88, 0x57, 0xB6, \ 0xAC, 0x7D, 0x5F, 0x42, 0xD6, 0x9F, 0x6D, 0x18, \ 0x77, 0x63, 0xCF, 0x1D, 0x55, 0x03, 0x40, 0x04, \ 0x87, 0xF5, 0x5B, 0xA5, 0x7E, 0x31, 0xCC, 0x7A, \ 0x71, 0x35, 0xC8, 0x86, 0xEF, 0xB4, 0x31, 0x8A, \ 0xED, 0x6A, 0x1E, 0x01, 0x2D, 0x9E, 0x68, 0x32, \ 0xA9, 0x07, 0x60, 0x0A, 0x91, 0x81, 0x30, 0xC4, \ 0x6D, 0xC7, 0x78, 0xF9, 0x71, 0xAD, 0x00, 0x38, \ 0x09, 0x29, 0x99, 0xA3, 0x33, 0xCB, 0x8B, 0x7A, \ 0x1A, 0x1D, 0xB9, 0x3D, 0x71, 0x40, 0x00, 0x3C, \ 0x2A, 0x4E, 0xCE, 0xA9, 0xF9, 0x8D, 0x0A, 0xCC, \ 0x0A, 0x82, 0x91, 0xCD, 0xCE, 0xC9, 0x7D, 0xCF, \ 0x8E, 0xC9, 0xB5, 0x5A, 0x7F, 0x88, 0xA4, 0x6B, \ 0x4D, 0xB5, 0xA8, 0x51, 0xF4, 0x41, 0x82, 0xE1, \ 0xC6, 0x8A, 0x00, 0x7E, 0x5E, 0x0D, 0xD9, 0x02, \ 0x0B, 0xFD, 0x64, 0xB6, 0x45, 0x03, 0x6C, 0x7A, \ 0x4E, 0x67, 0x7D, 0x2C, 0x38, 0x53, 0x2A, 0x3A, \ 0x23, 0xBA, 0x44, 0x42, 0xCA, 0xF5, 0x3E, 0xA6, \ 0x3B, 0xB4, 0x54, 0x32, 0x9B, 0x76, 0x24, 0xC8, \ 0x91, 0x7B, 0xDD, 0x64, 0xB1, 0xC0, 0xFD, 0x4C, \ 0xB3, 0x8E, 0x8C, 0x33, 0x4C, 0x70, 0x1C, 0x3A, \ 0xCD, 0xAD, 0x06, 0x57, 0xFC, 0xCF, 0xEC, 0x71, \ 0x9B, 0x1F, 0x5C, 0x3E, 0x4E, 0x46, 0x04, 0x1F, \ 0x38, 0x81, 0x47, 0xFB, 0x4C, 0xFD, 0xB4, 0x77, \ 0xA5, 0x24, 0x71, 0xF7, 0xA9, 0xA9, 0x69, 0x10, \ 0xB8, 0x55, 0x32, 0x2E, 0xDB, 0x63, 0x40, 0xD8, \ 0xA0, 0x0E, 0xF0, 0x92, 0x35, 0x05, 0x11, 0xE3, \ 0x0A, 0xBE, 0xC1, 0xFF, 0xF9, 0xE3, 0xA2, 0x6E, \ 0x7F, 0xB2, 0x9F, 0x8C, 0x18, 0x30, 0x23, 0xC3, \ 0x58, 0x7E, 0x38, 0xDA, 0x00, 0x77, 0xD9, 0xB4, \ 0x76, 0x3E, 0x4E, 0x4B, 0x94, 0xB2, 0xBB, 0xC1, \ 0x94, 0xC6, 0x65, 0x1E, 0x77, 0xCA, 0xF9, 0x92, \ 0xEE, 0xAA, 0xC0, 0x23, 0x2A, 0x28, 0x1B, 0xF6, \ 0xB3, 0xA7, 0x39, 0xC1, 0x22, 0x61, 0x16, 0x82, \ 0x0A, 0xE8, 0xDB, 0x58, 0x47, 0xA6, 0x7C, 0xBE, \ 0xF9, 0xC9, 0x09, 0x1B, 0x46, 0x2D, 0x53, 0x8C, \ 0xD7, 0x2B, 0x03, 0x74, 0x6A, 0xE7, 0x7F, 0x5E, \ 0x62, 0x29, 0x2C, 0x31, 0x15, 0x62, 0xA8, 0x46, \ 0x50, 0x5D, 0xC8, 0x2D, 0xB8, 0x54, 0x33, 0x8A, \ 0xE4, 0x9F, 0x52, 0x35, 0xC9, 0x5B, 0x91, 0x17, \ 0x8C, 0xCF, 0x2D, 0xD5, 0xCA, 0xCE, 0xF4, 0x03, \ 0xEC, 0x9D, 0x18, 0x10, 0xC6, 0x27, 0x2B, 0x04, \ 0x5B, 0x3B, 0x71, 0xF9, 0xDC, 0x6B, 0x80, 0xD6, \ 0x3F, 0xDD, 0x4A, 0x8E, 0x9A, 0xDB, 0x1E, 0x69, \ 0x62, 0xA6, 0x95, 0x26, 0xD4, 0x31, 0x61, 0xC1, \ 0xA4, 0x1D, 0x57, 0x0D, 0x79, 0x38, 0xDA, 0xD4, \ 0xA4, 0x0E, 0x32, 0x9C, 0xD0, 0xE4, 0x0E, 0x65, \ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF } #define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE6144_G_BIN { 0x02 } #define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE8192_P_BIN { \ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, \ 0xAD, 0xF8, 0x54, 0x58, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0x4A, 0x9A, \ 0xAF, 0xDC, 0x56, 0x20, 0x27, 0x3D, 0x3C, 0xF1, \ 0xD8, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0x83, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0x36, 0x95, \ 0xA9, 0xE1, 0x36, 0x41, 0x14, 0x64, 0x33, 0xFB, \ 0xCC, 0x93, 0x9D, 0xCE, 0x24, 0x9B, 0x3E, 0xF9, \ 0x7D, 0x2F, 0xE3, 0x63, 0x63, 0x0C, 0x75, 0xD8, \ 0xF6, 0x81, 0xB2, 0x02, 0xAE, 0xC4, 0x61, 0x7A, \ 0xD3, 0xDF, 0x1E, 0xD5, 0xD5, 0xFD, 0x65, 0x61, \ 0x24, 0x33, 0xF5, 0x1F, 0x5F, 0x06, 0x6E, 0xD0, \ 0x85, 0x63, 0x65, 0x55, 0x3D, 0xED, 0x1A, 0xF3, \ 0xB5, 0x57, 0x13, 0x5E, 0x7F, 0x57, 0xC9, 0x35, \ 0x98, 0x4F, 0x0C, 0x70, 0xE0, 0xE6, 0x8B, 0x77, \ 0xE2, 0xA6, 0x89, 0xDA, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xE8, 0x72, \ 0x1D, 0xF1, 0x58, 0xA1, 0x36, 0xAD, 0xE7, 0x35, \ 0x30, 0xAC, 0xCA, 0x4F, 0x48, 0x3A, 0x79, 0x7A, \ 0xBC, 0x0A, 0xB1, 0x82, 0xB3, 0x24, 0xFB, 0x61, \ 0xD1, 0x08, 0xA9, 0x4B, 0xB2, 0xC8, 0xE3, 0xFB, \ 0xB9, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0xB7, 0x60, 0xD7, 0xF4, 0x68, \ 0x1D, 0x4F, 0x42, 0xA3, 0xDE, 0x39, 0x4D, 0xF4, \ 0xAE, 0x56, 0xED, 0xE7, 0x63, 0x72, 0xBB, 0x19, \ 0x0B, 0x07, 0xA7, 0xC8, 0xEE, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0x70, \ 0x9E, 0x02, 0xFC, 0xE1, 0xCD, 0xF7, 0xE2, 0xEC, \ 0xC0, 0x34, 0x04, 0xCD, 0x28, 0x34, 0x2F, 0x61, \ 0x91, 0x72, 0xFE, 0x9C, 0xE9, 0x85, 0x83, 0xFF, \ 0x8E, 0x4F, 0x12, 0x32, 0xEE, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x83, \ 0xC3, 0xFE, 0x3B, 0x1B, 0x4C, 0x6F, 0xAD, 0x73, \ 0x3B, 0xB5, 0xFC, 0xBC, 0x2E, 0xC2, 0x20, 0x05, \ 0xC5, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0x83, 0x7D, 0x16, 0x83, 0xB2, \ 0xC6, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x26, 0xC1, 0xB2, 0xEF, 0xFA, \ 0x88, 0x6B, 0x42, 0x38, 0x61, 0x1F, 0xCF, 0xDC, \ 0xDE, 0x35, 0x5B, 0x3B, 0x65, 0x19, 0x03, 0x5B, \ 0xBC, 0x34, 0xF4, 0xDE, 0xF9, 0x9C, 0x02, 0x38, \ 0x61, 0xB4, 0x6F, 0xC9, 0xD6, 0xE6, 0xC9, 0x07, \ 0x7A, 0xD9, 0x1D, 0x26, 0x91, 0xF7, 0xF7, 0xEE, \ 0x59, 0x8C, 0xB0, 0xFA, 0xC1, 0x86, 0xD9, 0x1C, \ 0xAE, 0xFE, 0x13, 0x09, 0x85, 0x13, 0x92, 0x70, \ 0xB4, 0x13, 0x0C, 0x93, 0xBC, 0x43, 0x79, 0x44, \ 0xF4, 0xFD, 0x44, 0x52, 0xE2, 0xD7, 0x4D, 0xD3, \ 0x64, 0xF2, 0xE2, 0x1E, 0x71, 0xF5, 0x4B, 0xFF, \ 0x5C, 0xAE, 0x82, 0xAB, 0x9C, 0x9D, 0xF6, 0x9E, \ 0xE8, 0x6D, 0x2B, 0xC5, 0x22, 0x36, 0x3A, 0x0D, \ 0xAB, 0xC5, 0x21, 0x97, 0x9B, 0x0D, 0xEA, 0xDA, \ 0x1D, 0xBF, 0x9A, 0x42, 0xD5, 0xC4, 0x48, 0x4E, \ 0x0A, 0xBC, 0xD0, 0x6B, 0xFA, 0x53, 0xDD, 0xEF, \ 0x3C, 0x1B, 0x20, 0xEE, 0x3F, 0xD5, 0x9D, 0x7C, \ 0x25, 0xE4, 0x1D, 0x2B, 0x66, 0x9E, 0x1E, 0xF1, \ 0x6E, 0x6F, 0x52, 0xC3, 0x16, 0x4D, 0xF4, 0xFB, \ 0x79, 0x30, 0xE9, 0xE4, 0xE5, 0x88, 0x57, 0xB6, \ 0xAC, 0x7D, 0x5F, 0x42, 0xD6, 0x9F, 0x6D, 0x18, \ 0x77, 0x63, 0xCF, 0x1D, 0x55, 0x03, 0x40, 0x04, \ 0x87, 0xF5, 0x5B, 0xA5, 0x7E, 0x31, 0xCC, 0x7A, \ 0x71, 0x35, 0xC8, 0x86, 0xEF, 0xB4, 0x31, 0x8A, \ 0xED, 0x6A, 0x1E, 0x01, 0x2D, 0x9E, 0x68, 0x32, \ 0xA9, 0x07, 0x60, 0x0A, 0x91, 0x81, 0x30, 0xC4, \ 0x6D, 0xC7, 0x78, 0xF9, 0x71, 0xAD, 0x00, 0x38, \ 0x09, 0x29, 0x99, 0xA3, 0x33, 0xCB, 0x8B, 0x7A, \ 0x1A, 0x1D, 0xB9, 0x3D, 0x71, 0x40, 0x00, 0x3C, \ 0x2A, 0x4E, 0xCE, 0xA9, 0xF9, 0x8D, 0x0A, 0xCC, \ 0x0A, 0x82, 0x91, 0xCD, 0xCE, 0xC9, 0x7D, 0xCF, \ 0x8E, 0xC9, 0xB5, 0x5A, 0x7F, 0x88, 0xA4, 0x6B, \ 0x4D, 0xB5, 0xA8, 0x51, 0xF4, 0x41, 0x82, 0xE1, \ 0xC6, 0x8A, 0x00, 0x7E, 0x5E, 0x0D, 0xD9, 0x02, \ 0x0B, 0xFD, 0x64, 0xB6, 0x45, 0x03, 0x6C, 0x7A, \ 0x4E, 0x67, 0x7D, 0x2C, 0x38, 0x53, 0x2A, 0x3A, \ 0x23, 0xBA, 0x44, 0x42, 0xCA, 0xF5, 0x3E, 0xA6, \ 0x3B, 0xB4, 0x54, 0x32, 0x9B, 0x76, 0x24, 0xC8, \ 0x91, 0x7B, 0xDD, 0x64, 0xB1, 0xC0, 0xFD, 0x4C, \ 0xB3, 0x8E, 0x8C, 0x33, 0x4C, 0x70, 0x1C, 0x3A, \ 0xCD, 0xAD, 0x06, 0x57, 0xFC, 0xCF, 0xEC, 0x71, \ 0x9B, 0x1F, 0x5C, 0x3E, 0x4E, 0x46, 0x04, 0x1F, \ 0x38, 0x81, 0x47, 0xFB, 0x4C, 0xFD, 0xB4, 0x77, \ 0xA5, 0x24, 0x71, 0xF7, 0xA9, 0xA9, 0x69, 0x10, \ 0xB8, 0x55, 0x32, 0x2E, 0xDB, 0x63, 0x40, 0xD8, \ 0xA0, 0x0E, 0xF0, 0x92, 0x35, 0x05, 0x11, 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0xA0, \ 0xA1, 0xFE, 0x30, 0x75, 0xA5, 0x77, 0xE2, 0x31, \ 0x83, 0xF8, 0x1D, 0x4A, 0x3F, 0x2F, 0xA4, 0x57, \ 0x1E, 0xFC, 0x8C, 0xE0, 0xBA, 0x8A, 0x4F, 0xE8, \ 0xB6, 0x85, 0x5D, 0xFE, 0x72, 0xB0, 0xA6, 0x6E, \ 0xDE, 0xD2, 0xFB, 0xAB, 0xFB, 0xE5, 0x8A, 0x30, \ 0xFA, 0xFA, 0xBE, 0x1C, 0x5D, 0x71, 0xA8, 0x7E, \ 0x2F, 0x74, 0x1E, 0xF8, 0xC1, 0xFE, 0x86, 0xFE, \ 0xA6, 0xBB, 0xFD, 0xE5, 0x30, 0x67, 0x7F, 0x0D, \ 0x97, 0xD1, 0x1D, 0x49, 0xF7, 0xA8, 0x44, 0x3D, \ 0x08, 0x22, 0xE5, 0x06, 0xA9, 0xF4, 0x61, 0x4E, \ 0x01, 0x1E, 0x2A, 0x94, 0x83, 0x8F, 0xF8, 0x8C, \ 0xD6, 0x8C, 0x8B, 0xB7, 0xC5, 0xC6, 0x42, 0x4C, \ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF } #define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE8192_G_BIN { 0x02 } #endif /* dhm.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/ecdh.h0000644000000000000000000004426613764415275014550 0ustar rootroot/** * \file ecdh.h * * \brief This file contains ECDH definitions and functions. * * The Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) protocol is an anonymous * key agreement protocol allowing two parties to establish a shared * secret over an insecure channel. Each party must have an * elliptic-curve public–private key pair. * * For more information, see NIST SP 800-56A Rev. 2: Recommendation for * Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm * Cryptography. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ECDH_H #define MBEDTLS_ECDH_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include "mbedtls/ecp.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) #undef MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT #include "everest/everest.h" #endif #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /** * Defines the source of the imported EC key. */ typedef enum { MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS, /**< Our key. */ MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS, /**< The key of the peer. */ } mbedtls_ecdh_side; #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) /** * Defines the ECDH implementation used. * * Later versions of the library may add new variants, therefore users should * not make any assumptions about them. */ typedef enum { MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_NONE = 0, /*!< Implementation not defined. */ MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0,/*!< The default Mbed TLS implementation */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST /*!< Everest implementation */ #endif } mbedtls_ecdh_variant; /** * The context used by the default ECDH implementation. * * Later versions might change the structure of this context, therefore users * should not make any assumptions about the structure of * mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed. */ typedef struct mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed { mbedtls_ecp_group grp; /*!< The elliptic curve used. */ mbedtls_mpi d; /*!< The private key. */ mbedtls_ecp_point Q; /*!< The public key. */ mbedtls_ecp_point Qp; /*!< The value of the public key of the peer. */ mbedtls_mpi z; /*!< The shared secret. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx rs; /*!< The restart context for EC computations. */ #endif } mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed; #endif /** * * \warning Performing multiple operations concurrently on the same * ECDSA context is not supported; objects of this type * should not be shared between multiple threads. * \brief The ECDH context structure. */ typedef struct mbedtls_ecdh_context { #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) mbedtls_ecp_group grp; /*!< The elliptic curve used. */ mbedtls_mpi d; /*!< The private key. */ mbedtls_ecp_point Q; /*!< The public key. */ mbedtls_ecp_point Qp; /*!< The value of the public key of the peer. */ mbedtls_mpi z; /*!< The shared secret. */ int point_format; /*!< The format of point export in TLS messages. */ mbedtls_ecp_point Vi; /*!< The blinding value. */ mbedtls_ecp_point Vf; /*!< The unblinding value. */ mbedtls_mpi _d; /*!< The previous \p d. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) int restart_enabled; /*!< The flag for restartable mode. */ mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx rs; /*!< The restart context for EC computations. */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ #else uint8_t point_format; /*!< The format of point export in TLS messages as defined in RFC 4492. */ mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id;/*!< The elliptic curve used. */ mbedtls_ecdh_variant var; /*!< The ECDH implementation/structure used. */ union { mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed mbed_ecdh; #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) mbedtls_ecdh_context_everest everest_ecdh; #endif } ctx; /*!< Implementation-specific context. The context in use is specified by the \c var field. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) uint8_t restart_enabled; /*!< The flag for restartable mode. Functions of an alternative implementation not supporting restartable mode must return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED error if this flag is set. */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT */ } mbedtls_ecdh_context; /** * \brief Check whether a given group can be used for ECDH. * * \param gid The ECP group ID to check. * * \return \c 1 if the group can be used, \c 0 otherwise */ int mbedtls_ecdh_can_do( mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid ); /** * \brief This function generates an ECDH keypair on an elliptic * curve. * * This function performs the first of two core computations * implemented during the ECDH key exchange. The second core * computation is performed by mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared(). * * \see ecp.h * * \param grp The ECP group to use. This must be initialized and have * domain parameters loaded, for example through * mbedtls_ecp_load() or mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group(). * \param d The destination MPI (private key). * This must be initialized. * \param Q The destination point (public key). * This must be initialized. * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be * \c NULL in case \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or * \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); /** * \brief This function computes the shared secret. * * This function performs the second of two core computations * implemented during the ECDH key exchange. The first core * computation is performed by mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public(). * * \see ecp.h * * \note If \p f_rng is not NULL, it is used to implement * countermeasures against side-channel attacks. * For more information, see mbedtls_ecp_mul(). * * \param grp The ECP group to use. This must be initialized and have * domain parameters loaded, for example through * mbedtls_ecp_load() or mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group(). * \param z The destination MPI (shared secret). * This must be initialized. * \param Q The public key from another party. * This must be initialized. * \param d Our secret exponent (private key). * This must be initialized. * \param f_rng The RNG function. This may be \c NULL if randomization * of intermediate results during the ECP computations is * not needed (discouraged). See the documentation of * mbedtls_ecp_mul() for more. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a * context argument. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or * \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *z, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *d, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); /** * \brief This function initializes an ECDH context. * * \param ctx The ECDH context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_ecdh_init( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx ); /** * \brief This function sets up the ECDH context with the information * given. * * This function should be called after mbedtls_ecdh_init() but * before mbedtls_ecdh_make_params(). There is no need to call * this function before mbedtls_ecdh_read_params(). * * This is the first function used by a TLS server for ECDHE * ciphersuites. * * \param ctx The ECDH context to set up. This must be initialized. * \param grp_id The group id of the group to set up the context for. * * \return \c 0 on success. */ int mbedtls_ecdh_setup( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id ); /** * \brief This function frees a context. * * \param ctx The context to free. This may be \c NULL, in which * case this function does nothing. If it is not \c NULL, * it must point to an initialized ECDH context. */ void mbedtls_ecdh_free( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx ); /** * \brief This function generates an EC key pair and exports its * in the format used in a TLS ServerKeyExchange handshake * message. * * This is the second function used by a TLS server for ECDHE * ciphersuites. (It is called after mbedtls_ecdh_setup().) * * \see ecp.h * * \param ctx The ECDH context to use. This must be initialized * and bound to a group, for example via mbedtls_ecdh_setup(). * \param olen The address at which to store the number of Bytes written. * \param buf The destination buffer. This must be a writable buffer of * length \p blen Bytes. * \param blen The length of the destination buffer \p buf in Bytes. * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be * \c NULL in case \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ecdh_make_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen, unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); /** * \brief This function parses the ECDHE parameters in a * TLS ServerKeyExchange handshake message. * * \note In a TLS handshake, this is the how the client * sets up its ECDHE context from the server's public * ECDHE key material. * * \see ecp.h * * \param ctx The ECDHE context to use. This must be initialized. * \param buf On input, \c *buf must be the start of the input buffer. * On output, \c *buf is updated to point to the end of the * data that has been read. On success, this is the first byte * past the end of the ServerKeyExchange parameters. * On error, this is the point at which an error has been * detected, which is usually not useful except to debug * failures. * \param end The end of the input buffer. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure. * */ int mbedtls_ecdh_read_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, const unsigned char **buf, const unsigned char *end ); /** * \brief This function sets up an ECDH context from an EC key. * * It is used by clients and servers in place of the * ServerKeyEchange for static ECDH, and imports ECDH * parameters from the EC key information of a certificate. * * \see ecp.h * * \param ctx The ECDH context to set up. This must be initialized. * \param key The EC key to use. This must be initialized. * \param side Defines the source of the key. Possible values are: * - #MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS: The key is ours. * - #MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS: The key is that of the peer. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure. * */ int mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, mbedtls_ecdh_side side ); /** * \brief This function generates a public key and exports it * as a TLS ClientKeyExchange payload. * * This is the second function used by a TLS client for ECDH(E) * ciphersuites. * * \see ecp.h * * \param ctx The ECDH context to use. This must be initialized * and bound to a group, the latter usually by * mbedtls_ecdh_read_params(). * \param olen The address at which to store the number of Bytes written. * This must not be \c NULL. * \param buf The destination buffer. This must be a writable buffer * of length \p blen Bytes. * \param blen The size of the destination buffer \p buf in Bytes. * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be * \c NULL in case \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen, unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); /** * \brief This function parses and processes the ECDHE payload of a * TLS ClientKeyExchange message. * * This is the third function used by a TLS server for ECDH(E) * ciphersuites. (It is called after mbedtls_ecdh_setup() and * mbedtls_ecdh_make_params().) * * \see ecp.h * * \param ctx The ECDH context to use. This must be initialized * and bound to a group, for example via mbedtls_ecdh_setup(). * \param buf The pointer to the ClientKeyExchange payload. This must * be a readable buffer of length \p blen Bytes. * \param blen The length of the input buffer \p buf in Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ecdh_read_public( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ); /** * \brief This function derives and exports the shared secret. * * This is the last function used by both TLS client * and servers. * * \note If \p f_rng is not NULL, it is used to implement * countermeasures against side-channel attacks. * For more information, see mbedtls_ecp_mul(). * * \see ecp.h * \param ctx The ECDH context to use. This must be initialized * and have its own private key generated and the peer's * public key imported. * \param olen The address at which to store the total number of * Bytes written on success. This must not be \c NULL. * \param buf The buffer to write the generated shared key to. This * must be a writable buffer of size \p blen Bytes. * \param blen The length of the destination buffer \p buf in Bytes. * \param f_rng The RNG function, for blinding purposes. This may * b \c NULL if blinding isn't needed. * \param p_rng The RNG context. This may be \c NULL if \p f_rng * doesn't need a context argument. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen, unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) /** * \brief This function enables restartable EC computations for this * context. (Default: disabled.) * * \see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() * * \note It is not possible to safely disable restartable * computations once enabled, except by free-ing the context, * which cancels possible in-progress operations. * * \param ctx The ECDH context to use. This must be initialized. */ void mbedtls_ecdh_enable_restart( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* ecdh.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h0000644000000000000000000007056013764415275014720 0ustar rootroot/** * \file ecdsa.h * * \brief This file contains ECDSA definitions and functions. * * The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in * Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group (SECG): * SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography. * The use of ECDSA for TLS is defined in RFC-4492: Elliptic Curve * Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS). * */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ECDSA_H #define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include "mbedtls/ecp.h" #include "mbedtls/md.h" /** * \brief Maximum ECDSA signature size for a given curve bit size * * \param bits Curve size in bits * \return Maximum signature size in bytes * * \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its argument * is one. It may evaluate its argument multiple times. */ /* * Ecdsa-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE { * r INTEGER, * s INTEGER * } * * For each of r and s, the value (V) may include an extra initial "0" bit. */ #define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_SIG_LEN( bits ) \ ( /*T,L of SEQUENCE*/ ( ( bits ) >= 61 * 8 ? 3 : 2 ) + \ /*T,L of r,s*/ 2 * ( ( ( bits ) >= 127 * 8 ? 3 : 2 ) + \ /*V of r,s*/ ( ( bits ) + 8 ) / 8 ) ) /** The maximal size of an ECDSA signature in Bytes. */ #define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_SIG_LEN( MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS ) #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /** * \brief The ECDSA context structure. * * \warning Performing multiple operations concurrently on the same * ECDSA context is not supported; objects of this type * should not be shared between multiple threads. */ typedef mbedtls_ecp_keypair mbedtls_ecdsa_context; #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) /** * \brief Internal restart context for ecdsa_verify() * * \note Opaque struct, defined in ecdsa.c */ typedef struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver_ctx; /** * \brief Internal restart context for ecdsa_sign() * * \note Opaque struct, defined in ecdsa.c */ typedef struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig_ctx; #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) /** * \brief Internal restart context for ecdsa_sign_det() * * \note Opaque struct, defined in ecdsa.c */ typedef struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det_ctx; #endif /** * \brief General context for resuming ECDSA operations */ typedef struct { mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx ecp; /*!< base context for ECP restart and shared administrative info */ mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver_ctx *ver; /*!< ecdsa_verify() sub-context */ mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig_ctx *sig; /*!< ecdsa_sign() sub-context */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det_ctx *det; /*!< ecdsa_sign_det() sub-context */ #endif } mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx; #else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ /* Now we can declare functions that take a pointer to that */ typedef void mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx; #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ /** * \brief This function checks whether a given group can be used * for ECDSA. * * \param gid The ECP group ID to check. * * \return \c 1 if the group can be used, \c 0 otherwise */ int mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do( mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid ); /** * \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature of a * previously-hashed message. * * \note The deterministic version implemented in * mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() is usually preferred. * * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated * as defined in Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group * (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography, section * 4.1.3, step 5. * * \see ecp.h * * \param grp The context for the elliptic curve to use. * This must be initialized and have group parameters * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). * \param r The MPI context in which to store the first part * the signature. This must be initialized. * \param s The MPI context in which to store the second part * the signature. This must be initialized. * \param d The private signing key. This must be initialized. * \param buf The content to be signed. This is usually the hash of * the original data to be signed. This must be a readable * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if * \p blen is zero. * \param blen The length of \p buf in Bytes. * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context parameter. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX * or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) #if ! defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) #else #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /** * \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature of a * previously-hashed message, deterministic version. * * For more information, see RFC-6979: Deterministic * Usage of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic * Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). * * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as * defined in Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group * (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography, section * 4.1.3, step 5. * * \warning Since the output of the internal RNG is always the same for * the same key and message, this limits the efficiency of * blinding and leaks information through side channels. For * secure behavior use mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext() instead. * * (Optimally the blinding is a random value that is different * on every execution. In this case the blinding is still * random from the attackers perspective, but is the same on * each execution. This means that this blinding does not * prevent attackers from recovering secrets by combining * several measurement traces, but may prevent some attacks * that exploit relationships between secret data.) * * \see ecp.h * * \param grp The context for the elliptic curve to use. * This must be initialized and have group parameters * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). * \param r The MPI context in which to store the first part * the signature. This must be initialized. * \param s The MPI context in which to store the second part * the signature. This must be initialized. * \param d The private signing key. This must be initialized * and setup, for example through mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey(). * \param buf The hashed content to be signed. This must be a readable * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if * \p blen is zero. * \param blen The length of \p buf in Bytes. * \param md_alg The hash algorithm used to hash the original data. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX * error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED; #undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ /** * \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature of a * previously-hashed message, deterministic version. * * For more information, see RFC-6979: Deterministic * Usage of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic * Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). * * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as * defined in Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group * (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography, section * 4.1.3, step 5. * * \see ecp.h * * \param grp The context for the elliptic curve to use. * This must be initialized and have group parameters * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). * \param r The MPI context in which to store the first part * the signature. This must be initialized. * \param s The MPI context in which to store the second part * the signature. This must be initialized. * \param d The private signing key. This must be initialized * and setup, for example through mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey(). * \param buf The hashed content to be signed. This must be a readable * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if * \p blen is zero. * \param blen The length of \p buf in Bytes. * \param md_alg The hash algorithm used to hash the original data. * \param f_rng_blind The RNG function used for blinding. This must not be * \c NULL. * \param p_rng_blind The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context parameter. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX * error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng_blind ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ /** * \brief This function verifies the ECDSA signature of a * previously-hashed message. * * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as * defined in Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group * (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography, section * 4.1.4, step 3. * * \see ecp.h * * \param grp The ECP group to use. * This must be initialized and have group parameters * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). * \param buf The hashed content that was signed. This must be a readable * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if * \p blen is zero. * \param blen The length of \p buf in Bytes. * \param Q The public key to use for verification. This must be * initialized and setup. * \param r The first integer of the signature. * This must be initialized. * \param s The second integer of the signature. * This must be initialized. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the signature * is invalid. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX * error code on failure for any other reason. */ int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s); /** * \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature and writes it * to a buffer, serialized as defined in RFC-4492: * Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for * Transport Layer Security (TLS). * * \warning It is not thread-safe to use the same context in * multiple threads. * * \note The deterministic version is used if * #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC is defined. For more * information, see RFC-6979: Deterministic Usage * of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic * Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). * * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as * defined in Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group * (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography, section * 4.1.3, step 5. * * \see ecp.h * * \param ctx The ECDSA context to use. This must be initialized * and have a group and private key bound to it, for example * via mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey() or mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(). * \param md_alg The message digest that was used to hash the message. * \param hash The message hash to be signed. This must be a readable * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. * \param hlen The length of the hash \p hash in Bytes. * \param sig The buffer to which to write the signature. This must be a * writable buffer of length at least twice as large as the * size of the curve used, plus 9. For example, 73 Bytes if * a 256-bit curve is used. A buffer length of * #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN is always safe. * \param slen The address at which to store the actual length of * the signature written. Must not be \c NULL. * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL if * #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC is unset. Otherwise, * it is used only for blinding and may be set to \c NULL, but * doing so is DEPRECATED. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't use a context. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX, \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX or * \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); /** * \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature and writes it * to a buffer, in a restartable way. * * \see \c mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature() * * \note This function is like \c mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature() * but it can return early and restart according to the limit * set with \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking. * * \param ctx The ECDSA context to use. This must be initialized * and have a group and private key bound to it, for example * via mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey() or mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(). * \param md_alg The message digest that was used to hash the message. * \param hash The message hash to be signed. This must be a readable * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. * \param hlen The length of the hash \p hash in Bytes. * \param sig The buffer to which to write the signature. This must be a * writable buffer of length at least twice as large as the * size of the curve used, plus 9. For example, 73 Bytes if * a 256-bit curve is used. A buffer length of * #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN is always safe. * \param slen The address at which to store the actual length of * the signature written. Must not be \c NULL. * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL if * #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC is unset. Otherwise, * it is unused and may be set to \c NULL. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't use a context. * \param rs_ctx The restart context to use. This may be \c NULL to disable * restarting. If it is not \c NULL, it must point to an * initialized restart context. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX, \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX or * \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) #if ! defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) #else #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /** * \brief This function computes an ECDSA signature and writes * it to a buffer, serialized as defined in RFC-4492: * Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for * Transport Layer Security (TLS). * * The deterministic version is defined in RFC-6979: * Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) * and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). * * \warning It is not thread-safe to use the same context in * multiple threads. * * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as * defined in Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group * (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography, section * 4.1.3, step 5. * * \see ecp.h * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature() in * Mbed TLS version 2.0 and later. * * \param ctx The ECDSA context to use. This must be initialized * and have a group and private key bound to it, for example * via mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey() or mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(). * \param hash The message hash to be signed. This must be a readable * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. * \param hlen The length of the hash \p hash in Bytes. * \param sig The buffer to which to write the signature. This must be a * writable buffer of length at least twice as large as the * size of the curve used, plus 9. For example, 73 Bytes if * a 256-bit curve is used. A buffer length of * #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN is always safe. * \param slen The address at which to store the actual length of * the signature written. Must not be \c NULL. * \param md_alg The message digest that was used to hash the message. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX, \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX or * \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_det( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED; #undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ /** * \brief This function reads and verifies an ECDSA signature. * * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as * defined in Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group * (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography, section * 4.1.4, step 3. * * \see ecp.h * * \param ctx The ECDSA context to use. This must be initialized * and have a group and public key bound to it. * \param hash The message hash that was signed. This must be a readable * buffer of length \p size Bytes. * \param hlen The size of the hash \p hash. * \param sig The signature to read and verify. This must be a readable * buffer of length \p slen Bytes. * \param slen The size of \p sig in Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if signature is invalid. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH if there is a valid * signature in \p sig, but its length is less than \p siglen. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX * error code on failure for any other reason. */ int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, const unsigned char *sig, size_t slen ); /** * \brief This function reads and verifies an ECDSA signature, * in a restartable way. * * \see \c mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature() * * \note This function is like \c mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature() * but it can return early and restart according to the limit * set with \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking. * * \param ctx The ECDSA context to use. This must be initialized * and have a group and public key bound to it. * \param hash The message hash that was signed. This must be a readable * buffer of length \p size Bytes. * \param hlen The size of the hash \p hash. * \param sig The signature to read and verify. This must be a readable * buffer of length \p slen Bytes. * \param slen The size of \p sig in Bytes. * \param rs_ctx The restart context to use. This may be \c NULL to disable * restarting. If it is not \c NULL, it must point to an * initialized restart context. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if signature is invalid. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH if there is a valid * signature in \p sig, but its length is less than \p siglen. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX * error code on failure for any other reason. */ int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, const unsigned char *sig, size_t slen, mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ); /** * \brief This function generates an ECDSA keypair on the given curve. * * \see ecp.h * * \param ctx The ECDSA context to store the keypair in. * This must be initialized. * \param gid The elliptic curve to use. One of the various * \c MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_XXX macros depending on configuration. * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); /** * \brief This function sets up an ECDSA context from an EC key pair. * * \see ecp.h * * \param ctx The ECDSA context to setup. This must be initialized. * \param key The EC key to use. This must be initialized and hold * a private-public key pair or a public key. In the former * case, the ECDSA context may be used for signature creation * and verification after this call. In the latter case, it * may be used for signature verification. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key ); /** * \brief This function initializes an ECDSA context. * * \param ctx The ECDSA context to initialize. * This must not be \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_ecdsa_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx ); /** * \brief This function frees an ECDSA context. * * \param ctx The ECDSA context to free. This may be \c NULL, * in which case this function does nothing. If it * is not \c NULL, it must be initialized. */ void mbedtls_ecdsa_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) /** * \brief Initialize a restart context. * * \param ctx The restart context to initialize. * This must not be \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *ctx ); /** * \brief Free the components of a restart context. * * \param ctx The restart context to free. This may be \c NULL, * in which case this function does nothing. If it * is not \c NULL, it must be initialized. */ void mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *ctx ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* ecdsa.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/ecjpake.h0000644000000000000000000002600613764415275015237 0ustar rootroot/** * \file ecjpake.h * * \brief Elliptic curve J-PAKE */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_H #define MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_H /* * J-PAKE is a password-authenticated key exchange that allows deriving a * strong shared secret from a (potentially low entropy) pre-shared * passphrase, with forward secrecy and mutual authentication. * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password_Authenticated_Key_Exchange_by_Juggling * * This file implements the Elliptic Curve variant of J-PAKE, * as defined in Chapter 7.4 of the Thread v1.0 Specification, * available to members of the Thread Group http://threadgroup.org/ * * As the J-PAKE algorithm is inherently symmetric, so is our API. * Each party needs to send its first round message, in any order, to the * other party, then each sends its second round message, in any order. * The payloads are serialized in a way suitable for use in TLS, but could * also be use outside TLS. */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include "mbedtls/ecp.h" #include "mbedtls/md.h" #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /** * Roles in the EC J-PAKE exchange */ typedef enum { MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT = 0, /**< Client */ MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER, /**< Server */ } mbedtls_ecjpake_role; #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT) /** * EC J-PAKE context structure. * * J-PAKE is a symmetric protocol, except for the identifiers used in * Zero-Knowledge Proofs, and the serialization of the second message * (KeyExchange) as defined by the Thread spec. * * In order to benefit from this symmetry, we choose a different naming * convetion from the Thread v1.0 spec. Correspondance is indicated in the * description as a pair C: client name, S: server name */ typedef struct mbedtls_ecjpake_context { const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; /**< Hash to use */ mbedtls_ecp_group grp; /**< Elliptic curve */ mbedtls_ecjpake_role role; /**< Are we client or server? */ int point_format; /**< Format for point export */ mbedtls_ecp_point Xm1; /**< My public key 1 C: X1, S: X3 */ mbedtls_ecp_point Xm2; /**< My public key 2 C: X2, S: X4 */ mbedtls_ecp_point Xp1; /**< Peer public key 1 C: X3, S: X1 */ mbedtls_ecp_point Xp2; /**< Peer public key 2 C: X4, S: X2 */ mbedtls_ecp_point Xp; /**< Peer public key C: Xs, S: Xc */ mbedtls_mpi xm1; /**< My private key 1 C: x1, S: x3 */ mbedtls_mpi xm2; /**< My private key 2 C: x2, S: x4 */ mbedtls_mpi s; /**< Pre-shared secret (passphrase) */ } mbedtls_ecjpake_context; #else /* MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT */ #include "ecjpake_alt.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT */ /** * \brief Initialize an ECJPAKE context. * * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to initialize. * This must not be \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_ecjpake_init( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx ); /** * \brief Set up an ECJPAKE context for use. * * \note Currently the only values for hash/curve allowed by the * standard are #MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256/#MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1. * * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to set up. This must be initialized. * \param role The role of the caller. This must be either * #MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT or #MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER. * \param hash The identifier of the hash function to use, * for example #MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256. * \param curve The identifier of the elliptic curve to use, * for example #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1. * \param secret The pre-shared secret (passphrase). This must be * a readable buffer of length \p len Bytes. It need * only be valid for the duration of this call. * \param len The length of the pre-shared secret \p secret. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ecjpake_setup( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, mbedtls_ecjpake_role role, mbedtls_md_type_t hash, mbedtls_ecp_group_id curve, const unsigned char *secret, size_t len ); /** * \brief Check if an ECJPAKE context is ready for use. * * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to check. This must be * initialized. * * \return \c 0 if the context is ready for use. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA otherwise. */ int mbedtls_ecjpake_check( const mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx ); /** * \brief Generate and write the first round message * (TLS: contents of the Client/ServerHello extension, * excluding extension type and length bytes). * * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to use. This must be * initialized and set up. * \param buf The buffer to write the contents to. This must be a * writable buffer of length \p len Bytes. * \param len The length of \p buf in Bytes. * \param olen The address at which to store the total number * of Bytes written to \p buf. This must not be \c NULL. * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. This * may be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't use a context. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *olen, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); /** * \brief Read and process the first round message * (TLS: contents of the Client/ServerHello extension, * excluding extension type and length bytes). * * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to use. This must be initialized * and set up. * \param buf The buffer holding the first round message. This must * be a readable buffer of length \p len Bytes. * \param len The length in Bytes of \p buf. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ); /** * \brief Generate and write the second round message * (TLS: contents of the Client/ServerKeyExchange). * * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to use. This must be initialized, * set up, and already have performed round one. * \param buf The buffer to write the round two contents to. * This must be a writable buffer of length \p len Bytes. * \param len The size of \p buf in Bytes. * \param olen The address at which to store the total number of Bytes * written to \p buf. This must not be \c NULL. * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. This * may be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't use a context. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *olen, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); /** * \brief Read and process the second round message * (TLS: contents of the Client/ServerKeyExchange). * * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to use. This must be initialized * and set up and already have performed round one. * \param buf The buffer holding the second round message. This must * be a readable buffer of length \p len Bytes. * \param len The length in Bytes of \p buf. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ); /** * \brief Derive the shared secret * (TLS: Pre-Master Secret). * * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to use. This must be initialized, * set up and have performed both round one and two. * \param buf The buffer to write the derived secret to. This must * be a writable buffer of length \p len Bytes. * \param len The length of \p buf in Bytes. * \param olen The address at which to store the total number of Bytes * written to \p buf. This must not be \c NULL. * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. This * may be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't use a context. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *olen, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); /** * \brief This clears an ECJPAKE context and frees any * embedded data structure. * * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to free. This may be \c NULL, * in which case this function does nothing. If it is not * \c NULL, it must point to an initialized ECJPAKE context. */ void mbedtls_ecjpake_free( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** * \brief Checkup routine * * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if a test failed */ int mbedtls_ecjpake_self_test( int verbose ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* ecjpake.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/ecp.h0000644000000000000000000015623713764415275014416 0ustar rootroot/** * \file ecp.h * * \brief This file provides an API for Elliptic Curves over GF(P) (ECP). * * The use of ECP in cryptography and TLS is defined in * Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group (SECG): SEC1 * Elliptic Curve Cryptography and * RFC-4492: Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites * for Transport Layer Security (TLS). * * RFC-2409: The Internet Key Exchange (IKE) defines ECP * group types. * */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ECP_H #define MBEDTLS_ECP_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include "mbedtls/bignum.h" /* * ECP error codes */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x4F80 /**< Bad input parameters to function. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x4F00 /**< The buffer is too small to write to. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x4E80 /**< The requested feature is not available, for example, the requested curve is not supported. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED -0x4E00 /**< The signature is not valid. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED -0x4D80 /**< Memory allocation failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED -0x4D00 /**< Generation of random value, such as ephemeral key, failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY -0x4C80 /**< Invalid private or public key. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH -0x4C00 /**< The buffer contains a valid signature followed by more data. */ /* MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x4B80 /**< The ECP hardware accelerator failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS -0x4B00 /**< Operation in progress, call again with the same parameters to continue. */ /* Flags indicating whether to include code that is specific to certain * types of curves. These flags are for internal library use only. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) #define MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) #define MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED #endif #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /** * Domain-parameter identifiers: curve, subgroup, and generator. * * \note Only curves over prime fields are supported. * * \warning This library does not support validation of arbitrary domain * parameters. Therefore, only standardized domain parameters from trusted * sources should be used. See mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). */ /* Note: when adding a new curve: * - Add it at the end of this enum, otherwise you'll break the ABI by * changing the numerical value for existing curves. * - Increment MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX below if needed. * - Add the corresponding MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx_ENABLED macro definition to * config.h. * - List the curve as a dependency of MBEDTLS_ECP_C and * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C if supported in check_config.h. * - Add the curve to the appropriate curve type macro * MBEDTLS_ECP_yyy_ENABLED above. * - Add the necessary definitions to ecp_curves.c. * - Add the curve to the ecp_supported_curves array in ecp.c. * - Add the curve to applicable profiles in x509_crt.c if applicable. */ typedef enum { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE = 0, /*!< Curve not defined. */ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1, /*!< Domain parameters for the 192-bit curve defined by FIPS 186-4 and SEC1. */ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1, /*!< Domain parameters for the 224-bit curve defined by FIPS 186-4 and SEC1. */ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, /*!< Domain parameters for the 256-bit curve defined by FIPS 186-4 and SEC1. */ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1, /*!< Domain parameters for the 384-bit curve defined by FIPS 186-4 and SEC1. */ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1, /*!< Domain parameters for the 521-bit curve defined by FIPS 186-4 and SEC1. */ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1, /*!< Domain parameters for 256-bit Brainpool curve. */ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1, /*!< Domain parameters for 384-bit Brainpool curve. */ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1, /*!< Domain parameters for 512-bit Brainpool curve. */ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519, /*!< Domain parameters for Curve25519. */ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1, /*!< Domain parameters for 192-bit "Koblitz" curve. */ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1, /*!< Domain parameters for 224-bit "Koblitz" curve. */ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1, /*!< Domain parameters for 256-bit "Koblitz" curve. */ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448, /*!< Domain parameters for Curve448. */ } mbedtls_ecp_group_id; /** * The number of supported curves, plus one for #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE. * * \note Montgomery curves are currently excluded. */ #define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX 12 /* * Curve types */ typedef enum { MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_NONE = 0, MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS, /* y^2 = x^3 + a x + b */ MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY, /* y^2 = x^3 + a x^2 + x */ } mbedtls_ecp_curve_type; /** * Curve information, for use by other modules. */ typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_curve_info { mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; /*!< An internal identifier. */ uint16_t tls_id; /*!< The TLS NamedCurve identifier. */ uint16_t bit_size; /*!< The curve size in bits. */ const char *name; /*!< A human-friendly name. */ } mbedtls_ecp_curve_info; /** * \brief The ECP point structure, in Jacobian coordinates. * * \note All functions expect and return points satisfying * the following condition: Z == 0 or * Z == 1. Other values of \p Z are * used only by internal functions. * The point is zero, or "at infinity", if Z == 0. * Otherwise, \p X and \p Y are its standard (affine) * coordinates. */ typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_point { mbedtls_mpi X; /*!< The X coordinate of the ECP point. */ mbedtls_mpi Y; /*!< The Y coordinate of the ECP point. */ mbedtls_mpi Z; /*!< The Z coordinate of the ECP point. */ } mbedtls_ecp_point; #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) /* * default mbed TLS elliptic curve arithmetic implementation * * (in case MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT is defined then the developer has to provide an * alternative implementation for the whole module and it will replace this * one.) */ /** * \brief The ECP group structure. * * We consider two types of curve equations: *
  • Short Weierstrass: y^2 = x^3 + A x + B mod P * (SEC1 + RFC-4492)
    • *
  • Montgomery: y^2 = x^3 + A x^2 + x mod P (Curve25519, * Curve448)
* In both cases, the generator (\p G) for a prime-order subgroup is fixed. * * For Short Weierstrass, this subgroup is the whole curve, and its * cardinality is denoted by \p N. Our code requires that \p N is an * odd prime as mbedtls_ecp_mul() requires an odd number, and * mbedtls_ecdsa_sign() requires that it is prime for blinding purposes. * * For Montgomery curves, we do not store \p A, but (A + 2) / 4, * which is the quantity used in the formulas. Additionally, \p nbits is * not the size of \p N but the required size for private keys. * * If \p modp is NULL, reduction modulo \p P is done using a generic algorithm. * Otherwise, \p modp must point to a function that takes an \p mbedtls_mpi in the * range of 0..2^(2*pbits)-1, and transforms it in-place to an integer * which is congruent mod \p P to the given MPI, and is close enough to \p pbits * in size, so that it may be efficiently brought in the 0..P-1 range by a few * additions or subtractions. Therefore, it is only an approximative modular * reduction. It must return 0 on success and non-zero on failure. * * \note Alternative implementations must keep the group IDs distinct. If * two group structures have the same ID, then they must be * identical. * */ typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_group { mbedtls_ecp_group_id id; /*!< An internal group identifier. */ mbedtls_mpi P; /*!< The prime modulus of the base field. */ mbedtls_mpi A; /*!< For Short Weierstrass: \p A in the equation. For Montgomery curves: (A + 2) / 4. */ mbedtls_mpi B; /*!< For Short Weierstrass: \p B in the equation. For Montgomery curves: unused. */ mbedtls_ecp_point G; /*!< The generator of the subgroup used. */ mbedtls_mpi N; /*!< The order of \p G. */ size_t pbits; /*!< The number of bits in \p P.*/ size_t nbits; /*!< For Short Weierstrass: The number of bits in \p P. For Montgomery curves: the number of bits in the private keys. */ unsigned int h; /*!< \internal 1 if the constants are static. */ int (*modp)(mbedtls_mpi *); /*!< The function for fast pseudo-reduction mod \p P (see above).*/ int (*t_pre)(mbedtls_ecp_point *, void *); /*!< Unused. */ int (*t_post)(mbedtls_ecp_point *, void *); /*!< Unused. */ void *t_data; /*!< Unused. */ mbedtls_ecp_point *T; /*!< Pre-computed points for ecp_mul_comb(). */ size_t T_size; /*!< The number of pre-computed points. */ } mbedtls_ecp_group; /** * \name SECTION: Module settings * * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. * Either change them in config.h, or define them using the compiler command line. * \{ */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS) /** * The maximum size of the groups, that is, of \c N and \c P. */ #define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 521 /**< The maximum size of groups, in bits. */ #endif #define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES ( ( MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS + 7 ) / 8 ) #define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN ( 2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES + 1 ) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE) /* * Maximum "window" size used for point multiplication. * Default: 6. * Minimum value: 2. Maximum value: 7. * * Result is an array of at most ( 1 << ( MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE - 1 ) ) * points used for point multiplication. This value is directly tied to EC * peak memory usage, so decreasing it by one should roughly cut memory usage * by two (if large curves are in use). * * Reduction in size may reduce speed, but larger curves are impacted first. * Sample performances (in ECDHE handshakes/s, with FIXED_POINT_OPTIM = 1): * w-size: 6 5 4 3 2 * 521 145 141 135 120 97 * 384 214 209 198 177 146 * 256 320 320 303 262 226 * 224 475 475 453 398 342 * 192 640 640 633 587 476 */ #define MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE 6 /**< The maximum window size used. */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM) /* * Trade memory for speed on fixed-point multiplication. * * This speeds up repeated multiplication of the generator (that is, the * multiplication in ECDSA signatures, and half of the multiplications in * ECDSA verification and ECDHE) by a factor roughly 3 to 4. * * The cost is increasing EC peak memory usage by a factor roughly 2. * * Change this value to 0 to reduce peak memory usage. */ #define MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM 1 /**< Enable fixed-point speed-up. */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM */ /* \} name SECTION: Module settings */ #else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */ #include "ecp_alt.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) /** * \brief Internal restart context for multiplication * * \note Opaque struct */ typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul_ctx; /** * \brief Internal restart context for ecp_muladd() * * \note Opaque struct */ typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd_ctx; /** * \brief General context for resuming ECC operations */ typedef struct { unsigned ops_done; /*!< current ops count */ unsigned depth; /*!< call depth (0 = top-level) */ mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul_ctx *rsm; /*!< ecp_mul_comb() sub-context */ mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd_ctx *ma; /*!< ecp_muladd() sub-context */ } mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx; /* * Operation counts for restartable functions */ #define MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_CHK 3 /*!< basic ops count for ecp_check_pubkey() */ #define MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_DBL 8 /*!< basic ops count for ecp_double_jac() */ #define MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_ADD 11 /*!< basic ops count for see ecp_add_mixed() */ #define MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV 120 /*!< empirical equivalent for mpi_mod_inv() */ /** * \brief Internal; for restartable functions in other modules. * Check and update basic ops budget. * * \param grp Group structure * \param rs_ctx Restart context * \param ops Number of basic ops to do * * \return \c 0 if doing \p ops basic ops is still allowed, * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS otherwise. */ int mbedtls_ecp_check_budget( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx, unsigned ops ); /* Utility macro for checking and updating ops budget */ #define MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( ops ) \ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_check_budget( grp, rs_ctx, \ (unsigned) (ops) ) ); #else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ #define MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( ops ) /* no-op; for compatibility */ /* We want to declare restartable versions of existing functions anyway */ typedef void mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx; #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ /** * \brief The ECP key-pair structure. * * A generic key-pair that may be used for ECDSA and fixed ECDH, for example. * * \note Members are deliberately in the same order as in the * ::mbedtls_ecdsa_context structure. */ typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_keypair { mbedtls_ecp_group grp; /*!< Elliptic curve and base point */ mbedtls_mpi d; /*!< our secret value */ mbedtls_ecp_point Q; /*!< our public value */ } mbedtls_ecp_keypair; /* * Point formats, from RFC 4492's enum ECPointFormat */ #define MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED 0 /**< Uncompressed point format. */ #define MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED 1 /**< Compressed point format. */ /* * Some other constants from RFC 4492 */ #define MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE 3 /**< The named_curve of ECCurveType. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) /** * \brief Set the maximum number of basic operations done in a row. * * If more operations are needed to complete a computation, * #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS will be returned by the * function performing the computation. It is then the * caller's responsibility to either call again with the same * parameters until it returns 0 or an error code; or to free * the restart context if the operation is to be aborted. * * It is strictly required that all input parameters and the * restart context be the same on successive calls for the * same operation, but output parameters need not be the * same; they must not be used until the function finally * returns 0. * * This only applies to functions whose documentation * mentions they may return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS (or * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS for functions in the * SSL module). For functions that accept a "restart context" * argument, passing NULL disables restart and makes the * function equivalent to the function with the same name * with \c _restartable removed. For functions in the ECDH * module, restart is disabled unless the function accepts * an "ECDH context" argument and * mbedtls_ecdh_enable_restart() was previously called on * that context. For function in the SSL module, restart is * only enabled for specific sides and key exchanges * (currently only for clients and ECDHE-ECDSA). * * \param max_ops Maximum number of basic operations done in a row. * Default: 0 (unlimited). * Lower (non-zero) values mean ECC functions will block for * a lesser maximum amount of time. * * \note A "basic operation" is defined as a rough equivalent of a * multiplication in GF(p) for the NIST P-256 curve. * As an indication, with default settings, a scalar * multiplication (full run of \c mbedtls_ecp_mul()) is: * - about 3300 basic operations for P-256 * - about 9400 basic operations for P-384 * * \note Very low values are not always respected: sometimes * functions need to block for a minimum number of * operations, and will do so even if max_ops is set to a * lower value. That minimum depends on the curve size, and * can be made lower by decreasing the value of * \c MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE. As an indication, here is the * lowest effective value for various curves and values of * that parameter (w for short): * w=6 w=5 w=4 w=3 w=2 * P-256 208 208 160 136 124 * P-384 682 416 320 272 248 * P-521 1364 832 640 544 496 * * \note This setting is currently ignored by Curve25519. */ void mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops( unsigned max_ops ); /** * \brief Check if restart is enabled (max_ops != 0) * * \return \c 0 if \c max_ops == 0 (restart disabled) * \return \c 1 otherwise (restart enabled) */ int mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled( void ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ /* * Get the type of a curve */ mbedtls_ecp_curve_type mbedtls_ecp_get_type( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ); /** * \brief This function retrieves the information defined in * mbedtls_ecp_curve_info() for all supported curves in order * of preference. * * \note This function returns information about all curves * supported by the library. Some curves may not be * supported for all algorithms. Call mbedtls_ecdh_can_do() * or mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do() to check if a curve is * supported for ECDH or ECDSA. * * \return A statically allocated array. The last entry is 0. */ const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_list( void ); /** * \brief This function retrieves the list of internal group * identifiers of all supported curves in the order of * preference. * * \note This function returns information about all curves * supported by the library. Some curves may not be * supported for all algorithms. Call mbedtls_ecdh_can_do() * or mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do() to check if a curve is * supported for ECDH or ECDSA. * * \return A statically allocated array, * terminated with MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE. */ const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *mbedtls_ecp_grp_id_list( void ); /** * \brief This function retrieves curve information from an internal * group identifier. * * \param grp_id An \c MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_XXX value. * * \return The associated curve information on success. * \return NULL on failure. */ const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id ); /** * \brief This function retrieves curve information from a TLS * NamedCurve value. * * \param tls_id An \c MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_XXX value. * * \return The associated curve information on success. * \return NULL on failure. */ const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id( uint16_t tls_id ); /** * \brief This function retrieves curve information from a * human-readable name. * * \param name The human-readable name. * * \return The associated curve information on success. * \return NULL on failure. */ const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_name( const char *name ); /** * \brief This function initializes a point as zero. * * \param pt The point to initialize. */ void mbedtls_ecp_point_init( mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ); /** * \brief This function initializes an ECP group context * without loading any domain parameters. * * \note After this function is called, domain parameters * for various ECP groups can be loaded through the * mbedtls_ecp_group_load() or mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group() * functions. */ void mbedtls_ecp_group_init( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ); /** * \brief This function initializes a key pair as an invalid one. * * \param key The key pair to initialize. */ void mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key ); /** * \brief This function frees the components of a point. * * \param pt The point to free. */ void mbedtls_ecp_point_free( mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ); /** * \brief This function frees the components of an ECP group. * * \param grp The group to free. This may be \c NULL, in which * case this function returns immediately. If it is not * \c NULL, it must point to an initialized ECP group. */ void mbedtls_ecp_group_free( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ); /** * \brief This function frees the components of a key pair. * * \param key The key pair to free. This may be \c NULL, in which * case this function returns immediately. If it is not * \c NULL, it must point to an initialized ECP key pair. */ void mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) /** * \brief Initialize a restart context. * * \param ctx The restart context to initialize. This must * not be \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_ecp_restart_init( mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *ctx ); /** * \brief Free the components of a restart context. * * \param ctx The restart context to free. This may be \c NULL, in which * case this function returns immediately. If it is not * \c NULL, it must point to an initialized restart context. */ void mbedtls_ecp_restart_free( mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *ctx ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ /** * \brief This function copies the contents of point \p Q into * point \p P. * * \param P The destination point. This must be initialized. * \param Q The source point. This must be initialized. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. * \return Another negative error code for other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_ecp_copy( mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q ); /** * \brief This function copies the contents of group \p src into * group \p dst. * * \param dst The destination group. This must be initialized. * \param src The source group. This must be initialized. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_ecp_group_copy( mbedtls_ecp_group *dst, const mbedtls_ecp_group *src ); /** * \brief This function sets a point to the point at infinity. * * \param pt The point to set. This must be initialized. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_ecp_set_zero( mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ); /** * \brief This function checks if a point is the point at infinity. * * \param pt The point to test. This must be initialized. * * \return \c 1 if the point is zero. * \return \c 0 if the point is non-zero. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ); /** * \brief This function compares two points. * * \note This assumes that the points are normalized. Otherwise, * they may compare as "not equal" even if they are. * * \param P The first point to compare. This must be initialized. * \param Q The second point to compare. This must be initialized. * * \return \c 0 if the points are equal. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the points are not equal. */ int mbedtls_ecp_point_cmp( const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q ); /** * \brief This function imports a non-zero point from two ASCII * strings. * * \param P The destination point. This must be initialized. * \param radix The numeric base of the input. * \param x The first affine coordinate, as a null-terminated string. * \param y The second affine coordinate, as a null-terminated string. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ecp_point_read_string( mbedtls_ecp_point *P, int radix, const char *x, const char *y ); /** * \brief This function exports a point into unsigned binary data. * * \param grp The group to which the point should belong. * This must be initialized and have group parameters * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). * \param P The point to export. This must be initialized. * \param format The point format. This must be either * #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED or #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED. * (For groups without these formats, this parameter is * ignored. But it still has to be either of the above * values.) * \param olen The address at which to store the length of * the output in Bytes. This must not be \c NULL. * \param buf The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer * of length \p buflen Bytes. * \param buflen The length of the output buffer \p buf in Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the output buffer * is too small to hold the point. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the point format * or the export for the given group is not implemented. * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, int format, size_t *olen, unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); /** * \brief This function imports a point from unsigned binary data. * * \note This function does not check that the point actually * belongs to the given group, see mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey() * for that. * * \param grp The group to which the point should belong. * This must be initialized and have group parameters * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). * \param P The destination context to import the point to. * This must be initialized. * \param buf The input buffer. This must be a readable buffer * of length \p ilen Bytes. * \param ilen The length of the input buffer \p buf in Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the input is invalid. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the import for the * given group is not implemented. */ int mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const unsigned char *buf, size_t ilen ); /** * \brief This function imports a point from a TLS ECPoint record. * * \note On function return, \p *buf is updated to point immediately * after the ECPoint record. * * \param grp The ECP group to use. * This must be initialized and have group parameters * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). * \param pt The destination point. * \param buf The address of the pointer to the start of the input buffer. * \param len The length of the buffer. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX error code on initialization * failure. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if input is invalid. */ int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *pt, const unsigned char **buf, size_t len ); /** * \brief This function exports a point as a TLS ECPoint record * defined in RFC 4492, Section 5.4. * * \param grp The ECP group to use. * This must be initialized and have group parameters * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). * \param pt The point to be exported. This must be initialized. * \param format The point format to use. This must be either * #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED or #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED. * \param olen The address at which to store the length in Bytes * of the data written. * \param buf The target buffer. This must be a writable buffer of * length \p blen Bytes. * \param blen The length of the target buffer \p buf in Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the input is invalid. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the target buffer * is too small to hold the exported point. * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt, int format, size_t *olen, unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ); /** * \brief This function sets up an ECP group context * from a standardized set of domain parameters. * * \note The index should be a value of the NamedCurve enum, * as defined in RFC-4492: Elliptic Curve Cryptography * (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS), * usually in the form of an \c MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_XXX macro. * * \param grp The group context to setup. This must be initialized. * \param id The identifier of the domain parameter set to load. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if \p id doesn't * correspond to a known group. * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_ecp_group_load( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_group_id id ); /** * \brief This function sets up an ECP group context from a TLS * ECParameters record as defined in RFC 4492, Section 5.4. * * \note The read pointer \p buf is updated to point right after * the ECParameters record on exit. * * \param grp The group context to setup. This must be initialized. * \param buf The address of the pointer to the start of the input buffer. * \param len The length of the input buffer \c *buf in Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if input is invalid. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the group is not * recognized. * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const unsigned char **buf, size_t len ); /** * \brief This function extracts an elliptic curve group ID from a * TLS ECParameters record as defined in RFC 4492, Section 5.4. * * \note The read pointer \p buf is updated to point right after * the ECParameters record on exit. * * \param grp The address at which to store the group id. * This must not be \c NULL. * \param buf The address of the pointer to the start of the input buffer. * \param len The length of the input buffer \c *buf in Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if input is invalid. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the group is not * recognized. * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group_id( mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp, const unsigned char **buf, size_t len ); /** * \brief This function exports an elliptic curve as a TLS * ECParameters record as defined in RFC 4492, Section 5.4. * * \param grp The ECP group to be exported. * This must be initialized and have group parameters * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). * \param olen The address at which to store the number of Bytes written. * This must not be \c NULL. * \param buf The buffer to write to. This must be a writable buffer * of length \p blen Bytes. * \param blen The length of the output buffer \p buf in Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the output * buffer is too small to hold the exported group. * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, size_t *olen, unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ); /** * \brief This function performs a scalar multiplication of a point * by an integer: \p R = \p m * \p P. * * It is not thread-safe to use same group in multiple threads. * * \note To prevent timing attacks, this function * executes the exact same sequence of base-field * operations for any valid \p m. It avoids any if-branch or * array index depending on the value of \p m. * * \note If \p f_rng is not NULL, it is used to randomize * intermediate results to prevent potential timing attacks * targeting these results. We recommend always providing * a non-NULL \p f_rng. The overhead is negligible. * Note: unless #MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG is defined, when * \p f_rng is NULL, an internal RNG (seeded from the value * of \p m) will be used instead. * * \param grp The ECP group to use. * This must be initialized and have group parameters * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). * \param R The point in which to store the result of the calculation. * This must be initialized. * \param m The integer by which to multiply. This must be initialized. * \param P The point to multiply. This must be initialized. * \param f_rng The RNG function. This may be \c NULL if randomization * of intermediate results isn't desired (discouraged). * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p p_rng. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY if \p m is not a valid private * key, or \p P is not a valid public key. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_ecp_mul( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); /** * \brief This function performs multiplication of a point by * an integer: \p R = \p m * \p P in a restartable way. * * \see mbedtls_ecp_mul() * * \note This function does the same as \c mbedtls_ecp_mul(), but * it can return early and restart according to the limit set * with \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking. * * \param grp The ECP group to use. * This must be initialized and have group parameters * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). * \param R The point in which to store the result of the calculation. * This must be initialized. * \param m The integer by which to multiply. This must be initialized. * \param P The point to multiply. This must be initialized. * \param f_rng The RNG function. This may be \c NULL if randomization * of intermediate results isn't desired (discouraged). * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p p_rng. * \param rs_ctx The restart context (NULL disables restart). * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY if \p m is not a valid private * key, or \p P is not a valid public key. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) /** * \brief This function performs multiplication and addition of two * points by integers: \p R = \p m * \p P + \p n * \p Q * * It is not thread-safe to use same group in multiple threads. * * \note In contrast to mbedtls_ecp_mul(), this function does not * guarantee a constant execution flow and timing. * * \note This function is only defined for short Weierstrass curves. * It may not be included in builds without any short * Weierstrass curve. * * \param grp The ECP group to use. * This must be initialized and have group parameters * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). * \param R The point in which to store the result of the calculation. * This must be initialized. * \param m The integer by which to multiply \p P. * This must be initialized. * \param P The point to multiply by \p m. This must be initialized. * \param n The integer by which to multiply \p Q. * This must be initialized. * \param Q The point to be multiplied by \p n. * This must be initialized. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY if \p m or \p n are not * valid private keys, or \p P or \p Q are not valid public * keys. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if \p grp does not * designate a short Weierstrass curve. * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_ecp_muladd( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_mpi *n, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q ); /** * \brief This function performs multiplication and addition of two * points by integers: \p R = \p m * \p P + \p n * \p Q in a * restartable way. * * \see \c mbedtls_ecp_muladd() * * \note This function works the same as \c mbedtls_ecp_muladd(), * but it can return early and restart according to the limit * set with \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking. * * \note This function is only defined for short Weierstrass curves. * It may not be included in builds without any short * Weierstrass curve. * * \param grp The ECP group to use. * This must be initialized and have group parameters * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). * \param R The point in which to store the result of the calculation. * This must be initialized. * \param m The integer by which to multiply \p P. * This must be initialized. * \param P The point to multiply by \p m. This must be initialized. * \param n The integer by which to multiply \p Q. * This must be initialized. * \param Q The point to be multiplied by \p n. * This must be initialized. * \param rs_ctx The restart context (NULL disables restart). * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY if \p m or \p n are not * valid private keys, or \p P or \p Q are not valid public * keys. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if \p grp does not * designate a short Weierstrass curve. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_mpi *n, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ /** * \brief This function checks that a point is a valid public key * on this curve. * * It only checks that the point is non-zero, has * valid coordinates and lies on the curve. It does not verify * that it is indeed a multiple of \p G. This additional * check is computationally more expensive, is not required * by standards, and should not be necessary if the group * used has a small cofactor. In particular, it is useless for * the NIST groups which all have a cofactor of 1. * * \note This function uses bare components rather than an * ::mbedtls_ecp_keypair structure, to ease use with other * structures, such as ::mbedtls_ecdh_context or * ::mbedtls_ecdsa_context. * * \param grp The ECP group the point should belong to. * This must be initialized and have group parameters * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). * \param pt The point to check. This must be initialized. * * \return \c 0 if the point is a valid public key. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY if the point is not * a valid public key for the given curve. * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ); /** * \brief This function checks that an \p mbedtls_mpi is a * valid private key for this curve. * * \note This function uses bare components rather than an * ::mbedtls_ecp_keypair structure to ease use with other * structures, such as ::mbedtls_ecdh_context or * ::mbedtls_ecdsa_context. * * \param grp The ECP group the private key should belong to. * This must be initialized and have group parameters * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). * \param d The integer to check. This must be initialized. * * \return \c 0 if the point is a valid private key. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY if the point is not a valid * private key for the given curve. * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_mpi *d ); /** * \brief This function generates a private key. * * \param grp The ECP group to generate a private key for. * This must be initialized and have group parameters * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). * \param d The destination MPI (secret part). This must be initialized. * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code * on failure. */ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *d, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); /** * \brief This function generates a keypair with a configurable base * point. * * \note This function uses bare components rather than an * ::mbedtls_ecp_keypair structure to ease use with other * structures, such as ::mbedtls_ecdh_context or * ::mbedtls_ecdsa_context. * * \param grp The ECP group to generate a key pair for. * This must be initialized and have group parameters * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). * \param G The base point to use. This must be initialized * and belong to \p grp. It replaces the default base * point \c grp->G used by mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair(). * \param d The destination MPI (secret part). * This must be initialized. * \param Q The destination point (public part). * This must be initialized. * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may * be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code * on failure. */ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); /** * \brief This function generates an ECP keypair. * * \note This function uses bare components rather than an * ::mbedtls_ecp_keypair structure to ease use with other * structures, such as ::mbedtls_ecdh_context or * ::mbedtls_ecdsa_context. * * \param grp The ECP group to generate a key pair for. * This must be initialized and have group parameters * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). * \param d The destination MPI (secret part). * This must be initialized. * \param Q The destination point (public part). * This must be initialized. * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may * be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code * on failure. */ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); /** * \brief This function generates an ECP key. * * \param grp_id The ECP group identifier. * \param key The destination key. This must be initialized. * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may * be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code * on failure. */ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_key( mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); /** * \brief This function reads an elliptic curve private key. * * \param grp_id The ECP group identifier. * \param key The destination key. * \param buf The the buffer containing the binary representation of the * key. (Big endian integer for Weierstrass curves, byte * string for Montgomery curves.) * \param buflen The length of the buffer in bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY error if the key is * invalid. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the operation for * the group is not implemented. * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_ecp_read_key( mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); /** * \brief This function exports an elliptic curve private key. * * \param key The private key. * \param buf The output buffer for containing the binary representation * of the key. (Big endian integer for Weierstrass curves, byte * string for Montgomery curves.) * \param buflen The total length of the buffer in bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the \p key representation is larger than the available space in \p buf. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the operation for * the group is not implemented. * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_ecp_write_key( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); /** * \brief This function checks that the keypair objects * \p pub and \p prv have the same group and the * same public point, and that the private key in * \p prv is consistent with the public key. * * \param pub The keypair structure holding the public key. This * must be initialized. If it contains a private key, that * part is ignored. * \param prv The keypair structure holding the full keypair. * This must be initialized. * * \return \c 0 on success, meaning that the keys are valid and match. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the keys are invalid or do not match. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or an \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX * error code on calculation failure. */ int mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv( const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *pub, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *prv ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** * \brief The ECP checkup routine. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return \c 1 on failure. */ int mbedtls_ecp_self_test( int verbose ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* ecp.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/ecp_internal.h0000644000000000000000000002460613764415275016304 0ustar rootroot/** * \file ecp_internal.h * * \brief Function declarations for alternative implementation of elliptic curve * point arithmetic. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ /* * References: * * [1] BERNSTEIN, Daniel J. Curve25519: new Diffie-Hellman speed records. * * * [2] CORON, Jean-S'ebastien. Resistance against differential power analysis * for elliptic curve cryptosystems. In : Cryptographic Hardware and * Embedded Systems. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1999. p. 292-302. * * * [3] HEDABOU, Mustapha, PINEL, Pierre, et B'EN'ETEAU, Lucien. A comb method to * render ECC resistant against Side Channel Attacks. IACR Cryptology * ePrint Archive, 2004, vol. 2004, p. 342. * * * [4] Certicom Research. SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters. * * * [5] HANKERSON, Darrel, MENEZES, Alfred J., VANSTONE, Scott. Guide to Elliptic * Curve Cryptography. * * [6] Digital Signature Standard (DSS), FIPS 186-4. * * * [7] Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer * Security (TLS), RFC 4492. * * * [8] * * [9] COHEN, Henri. A Course in Computational Algebraic Number Theory. * Springer Science & Business Media, 1 Aug 2000 */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_H #define MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) /** * \brief Indicate if the Elliptic Curve Point module extension can * handle the group. * * \param grp The pointer to the elliptic curve group that will be the * basis of the cryptographic computations. * * \return Non-zero if successful. */ unsigned char mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ); /** * \brief Initialise the Elliptic Curve Point module extension. * * If mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable returns true for a * group, this function has to be able to initialise the * module for it. * * This module can be a driver to a crypto hardware * accelerator, for which this could be an initialise function. * * \param grp The pointer to the group the module needs to be * initialised for. * * \return 0 if successful. */ int mbedtls_internal_ecp_init( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ); /** * \brief Frees and deallocates the Elliptic Curve Point module * extension. * * \param grp The pointer to the group the module was initialised for. */ void mbedtls_internal_ecp_free( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT) /** * \brief Randomize jacobian coordinates: * (X, Y, Z) -> (l^2 X, l^3 Y, l Z) for random l. * * \param grp Pointer to the group representing the curve. * * \param pt The point on the curve to be randomised, given with Jacobian * coordinates. * * \param f_rng A function pointer to the random number generator. * * \param p_rng A pointer to the random number generator state. * * \return 0 if successful. */ int mbedtls_internal_ecp_randomize_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *pt, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) /** * \brief Addition: R = P + Q, mixed affine-Jacobian coordinates. * * The coordinates of Q must be normalized (= affine), * but those of P don't need to. R is not normalized. * * This function is used only as a subrutine of * ecp_mul_comb(). * * Special cases: (1) P or Q is zero, (2) R is zero, * (3) P == Q. * None of these cases can happen as intermediate step in * ecp_mul_comb(): * - at each step, P, Q and R are multiples of the base * point, the factor being less than its order, so none of * them is zero; * - Q is an odd multiple of the base point, P an even * multiple, due to the choice of precomputed points in the * modified comb method. * So branches for these cases do not leak secret information. * * We accept Q->Z being unset (saving memory in tables) as * meaning 1. * * Cost in field operations if done by [5] 3.22: * 1A := 8M + 3S * * \param grp Pointer to the group representing the curve. * * \param R Pointer to a point structure to hold the result. * * \param P Pointer to the first summand, given with Jacobian * coordinates * * \param Q Pointer to the second summand, given with affine * coordinates. * * \return 0 if successful. */ int mbedtls_internal_ecp_add_mixed( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q ); #endif /** * \brief Point doubling R = 2 P, Jacobian coordinates. * * Cost: 1D := 3M + 4S (A == 0) * 4M + 4S (A == -3) * 3M + 6S + 1a otherwise * when the implementation is based on the "dbl-1998-cmo-2" * doubling formulas in [8] and standard optimizations are * applied when curve parameter A is one of { 0, -3 }. * * \param grp Pointer to the group representing the curve. * * \param R Pointer to a point structure to hold the result. * * \param P Pointer to the point that has to be doubled, given with * Jacobian coordinates. * * \return 0 if successful. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) int mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P ); #endif /** * \brief Normalize jacobian coordinates of an array of (pointers to) * points. * * Using Montgomery's trick to perform only one inversion mod P * the cost is: * 1N(t) := 1I + (6t - 3)M + 1S * (See for example Algorithm 10.3.4. in [9]) * * This function is used only as a subrutine of * ecp_mul_comb(). * * Warning: fails (returning an error) if one of the points is * zero! * This should never happen, see choice of w in ecp_mul_comb(). * * \param grp Pointer to the group representing the curve. * * \param T Array of pointers to the points to normalise. * * \param t_len Number of elements in the array. * * \return 0 if successful, * an error if one of the points is zero. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT) int mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_jac_many( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *T[], size_t t_len ); #endif /** * \brief Normalize jacobian coordinates so that Z == 0 || Z == 1. * * Cost in field operations if done by [5] 3.2.1: * 1N := 1I + 3M + 1S * * \param grp Pointer to the group representing the curve. * * \param pt pointer to the point to be normalised. This is an * input/output parameter. * * \return 0 if successful. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT) int mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ); #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) int mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_add_mxz( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, mbedtls_ecp_point *S, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *d ); #endif /** * \brief Randomize projective x/z coordinates: * (X, Z) -> (l X, l Z) for random l * * \param grp pointer to the group representing the curve * * \param P the point on the curve to be randomised given with * projective coordinates. This is an input/output parameter. * * \param f_rng a function pointer to the random number generator * * \param p_rng a pointer to the random number generator state * * \return 0 if successful */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT) int mbedtls_internal_ecp_randomize_mxz( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *P, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); #endif /** * \brief Normalize Montgomery x/z coordinates: X = X/Z, Z = 1. * * \param grp pointer to the group representing the curve * * \param P pointer to the point to be normalised. This is an * input/output parameter. * * \return 0 if successful */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT) int mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_mxz( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *P ); #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ #endif /* ecp_internal.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/entropy.h0000644000000000000000000002267313764415275015343 0ustar rootroot/** * \file entropy.h * * \brief Entropy accumulator implementation */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_H #define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) #include "mbedtls/sha512.h" #define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR #else #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) #define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA256_ACCUMULATOR #include "mbedtls/sha256.h" #endif #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) #include "mbedtls/threading.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) #include "mbedtls/havege.h" #endif #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED -0x003C /**< Critical entropy source failure. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES -0x003E /**< No more sources can be added. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_SOURCES_DEFINED -0x0040 /**< No sources have been added to poll. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_STRONG_SOURCE -0x003D /**< No strong sources have been added to poll. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x003F /**< Read/write error in file. */ /** * \name SECTION: Module settings * * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. * \{ */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES) #define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES 20 /**< Maximum number of sources supported */ #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER) #define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER 128 /**< Maximum amount requested from entropy sources */ #endif /* \} name SECTION: Module settings */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR) #define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE 64 /**< Block size of entropy accumulator (SHA-512) */ #else #define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE 32 /**< Block size of entropy accumulator (SHA-256) */ #endif #define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE 1024 /**< Maximum size of seed we read from seed file */ #define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_MANUAL MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES #define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG 1 /**< Entropy source is strong */ #define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_WEAK 0 /**< Entropy source is weak */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /** * \brief Entropy poll callback pointer * * \param data Callback-specific data pointer * \param output Data to fill * \param len Maximum size to provide * \param olen The actual amount of bytes put into the buffer (Can be 0) * * \return 0 if no critical failures occurred, * MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED otherwise */ typedef int (*mbedtls_entropy_f_source_ptr)(void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen); /** * \brief Entropy source state */ typedef struct mbedtls_entropy_source_state { mbedtls_entropy_f_source_ptr f_source; /**< The entropy source callback */ void * p_source; /**< The callback data pointer */ size_t size; /**< Amount received in bytes */ size_t threshold; /**< Minimum bytes required before release */ int strong; /**< Is the source strong? */ } mbedtls_entropy_source_state; /** * \brief Entropy context structure */ typedef struct mbedtls_entropy_context { int accumulator_started; #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR) mbedtls_sha512_context accumulator; #else mbedtls_sha256_context accumulator; #endif int source_count; mbedtls_entropy_source_state source[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES]; #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) mbedtls_havege_state havege_data; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; /*!< mutex */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) int initial_entropy_run; #endif } mbedtls_entropy_context; /** * \brief Initialize the context * * \param ctx Entropy context to initialize */ void mbedtls_entropy_init( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ); /** * \brief Free the data in the context * * \param ctx Entropy context to free */ void mbedtls_entropy_free( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ); /** * \brief Adds an entropy source to poll * (Thread-safe if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled) * * \param ctx Entropy context * \param f_source Entropy function * \param p_source Function data * \param threshold Minimum required from source before entropy is released * ( with mbedtls_entropy_func() ) (in bytes) * \param strong MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG or * MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_WEAK. * At least one strong source needs to be added. * Weaker sources (such as the cycle counter) can be used as * a complement. * * \return 0 if successful or MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES */ int mbedtls_entropy_add_source( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, mbedtls_entropy_f_source_ptr f_source, void *p_source, size_t threshold, int strong ); /** * \brief Trigger an extra gather poll for the accumulator * (Thread-safe if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled) * * \param ctx Entropy context * * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED */ int mbedtls_entropy_gather( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ); /** * \brief Retrieve entropy from the accumulator * (Maximum length: MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE) * (Thread-safe if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled) * * \param data Entropy context * \param output Buffer to fill * \param len Number of bytes desired, must be at most MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE * * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED */ int mbedtls_entropy_func( void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len ); /** * \brief Add data to the accumulator manually * (Thread-safe if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled) * * \param ctx Entropy context * \param data Data to add * \param len Length of data * * \return 0 if successful */ int mbedtls_entropy_update_manual( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t len ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) /** * \brief Trigger an update of the seed file in NV by using the * current entropy pool. * * \param ctx Entropy context * * \return 0 if successful */ int mbedtls_entropy_update_nv_seed( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) /** * \brief Write a seed file * * \param ctx Entropy context * \param path Name of the file * * \return 0 if successful, * MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR on file error, or * MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED */ int mbedtls_entropy_write_seed_file( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, const char *path ); /** * \brief Read and update a seed file. Seed is added to this * instance. No more than MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE bytes are * read from the seed file. The rest is ignored. * * \param ctx Entropy context * \param path Name of the file * * \return 0 if successful, * MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR on file error, * MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED */ int mbedtls_entropy_update_seed_file( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, const char *path ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** * \brief Checkup routine * * This module self-test also calls the entropy self-test, * mbedtls_entropy_source_self_test(); * * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if a test failed */ int mbedtls_entropy_self_test( int verbose ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) /** * \brief Checkup routine * * Verifies the integrity of the hardware entropy source * provided by the function 'mbedtls_hardware_poll()'. * * Note this is the only hardware entropy source that is known * at link time, and other entropy sources configured * dynamically at runtime by the function * mbedtls_entropy_add_source() will not be tested. * * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if a test failed */ int mbedtls_entropy_source_self_test( int verbose ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* entropy.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/entropy_poll.h0000644000000000000000000000624213764415275016363 0ustar rootroot/** * \file entropy_poll.h * * \brief Platform-specific and custom entropy polling functions */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_POLL_H #define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_POLL_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* * Default thresholds for built-in sources, in bytes */ #define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM 32 /**< Minimum for platform source */ #define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HAVEGE 32 /**< Minimum for HAVEGE */ #define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDCLOCK 4 /**< Minimum for mbedtls_timing_hardclock() */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE) #define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE 32 /**< Minimum for the hardware source */ #endif /** * \brief Entropy poll callback that provides 0 entropy. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) int mbedtls_null_entropy_poll( void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen ); #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY) /** * \brief Platform-specific entropy poll callback */ int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll( void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen ); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) /** * \brief HAVEGE based entropy poll callback * * Requires an HAVEGE state as its data pointer. */ int mbedtls_havege_poll( void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen ); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) /** * \brief mbedtls_timing_hardclock-based entropy poll callback */ int mbedtls_hardclock_poll( void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen ); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) /** * \brief Entropy poll callback for a hardware source * * \warning This is not provided by mbed TLS! * See \c MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT in config.h. * * \note This must accept NULL as its first argument. */ int mbedtls_hardware_poll( void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen ); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) /** * \brief Entropy poll callback for a non-volatile seed file * * \note This must accept NULL as its first argument. */ int mbedtls_nv_seed_poll( void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen ); #endif #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* entropy_poll.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/error.h0000644000000000000000000001221613764415275014764 0ustar rootroot/** * \file error.h * * \brief Error to string translation */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ERROR_H #define MBEDTLS_ERROR_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include /** * Error code layout. * * Currently we try to keep all error codes within the negative space of 16 * bits signed integers to support all platforms (-0x0001 - -0x7FFF). In * addition we'd like to give two layers of information on the error if * possible. * * For that purpose the error codes are segmented in the following manner: * * 16 bit error code bit-segmentation * * 1 bit - Unused (sign bit) * 3 bits - High level module ID * 5 bits - Module-dependent error code * 7 bits - Low level module errors * * For historical reasons, low-level error codes are divided in even and odd, * even codes were assigned first, and -1 is reserved for other errors. * * Low-level module errors (0x0002-0x007E, 0x0001-0x007F) * * Module Nr Codes assigned * ERROR 2 0x006E 0x0001 * MPI 7 0x0002-0x0010 * GCM 3 0x0012-0x0014 0x0013-0x0013 * BLOWFISH 3 0x0016-0x0018 0x0017-0x0017 * THREADING 3 0x001A-0x001E * AES 5 0x0020-0x0022 0x0021-0x0025 * CAMELLIA 3 0x0024-0x0026 0x0027-0x0027 * XTEA 2 0x0028-0x0028 0x0029-0x0029 * BASE64 2 0x002A-0x002C * OID 1 0x002E-0x002E 0x000B-0x000B * PADLOCK 1 0x0030-0x0030 * DES 2 0x0032-0x0032 0x0033-0x0033 * CTR_DBRG 4 0x0034-0x003A * ENTROPY 3 0x003C-0x0040 0x003D-0x003F * NET 13 0x0042-0x0052 0x0043-0x0049 * ARIA 4 0x0058-0x005E * ASN1 7 0x0060-0x006C * CMAC 1 0x007A-0x007A * PBKDF2 1 0x007C-0x007C * HMAC_DRBG 4 0x0003-0x0009 * CCM 3 0x000D-0x0011 * ARC4 1 0x0019-0x0019 * MD2 1 0x002B-0x002B * MD4 1 0x002D-0x002D * MD5 1 0x002F-0x002F * RIPEMD160 1 0x0031-0x0031 * SHA1 1 0x0035-0x0035 0x0073-0x0073 * SHA256 1 0x0037-0x0037 0x0074-0x0074 * SHA512 1 0x0039-0x0039 0x0075-0x0075 * CHACHA20 3 0x0051-0x0055 * POLY1305 3 0x0057-0x005B * CHACHAPOLY 2 0x0054-0x0056 * PLATFORM 2 0x0070-0x0072 * * High-level module nr (3 bits - 0x0...-0x7...) * Name ID Nr of Errors * PEM 1 9 * PKCS#12 1 4 (Started from top) * X509 2 20 * PKCS5 2 4 (Started from top) * DHM 3 11 * PK 3 15 (Started from top) * RSA 4 11 * ECP 4 10 (Started from top) * MD 5 5 * HKDF 5 1 (Started from top) * SSL 5 2 (Started from 0x5F00) * CIPHER 6 8 (Started from 0x6080) * SSL 6 24 (Started from top, plus 0x6000) * SSL 7 32 * * Module dependent error code (5 bits 0x.00.-0x.F8.) */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR -0x0001 /**< Generic error */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED -0x006E /**< This is a bug in the library */ /** * \brief Translate a mbed TLS error code into a string representation, * Result is truncated if necessary and always includes a terminating * null byte. * * \param errnum error code * \param buffer buffer to place representation in * \param buflen length of the buffer */ void mbedtls_strerror( int errnum, char *buffer, size_t buflen ); /** * \brief Translate the high-level part of an Mbed TLS error code into a string * representation. * * This function returns a const pointer to an un-modifiable string. The caller * must not try to modify the string. It is intended to be used mostly for * logging purposes. * * \param error_code error code * * \return The string representation of the error code, or \c NULL if the error * code is unknown. */ const char * mbedtls_high_level_strerr( int error_code ); /** * \brief Translate the low-level part of an Mbed TLS error code into a string * representation. * * This function returns a const pointer to an un-modifiable string. The caller * must not try to modify the string. It is intended to be used mostly for * logging purposes. * * \param error_code error code * * \return The string representation of the error code, or \c NULL if the error * code is unknown. */ const char * mbedtls_low_level_strerr( int error_code ); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* error.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/gcm.h0000644000000000000000000003300613764415275014401 0ustar rootroot/** * \file gcm.h * * \brief This file contains GCM definitions and functions. * * The Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for 128-bit block ciphers is defined * in D. McGrew, J. Viega, The Galois/Counter Mode of Operation * (GCM), Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol. * * For more information on GCM, see NIST SP 800-38D: Recommendation for * Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC. * */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_GCM_H #define MBEDTLS_GCM_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" #include #define MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT 1 #define MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT 0 #define MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED -0x0012 /**< Authenticated decryption failed. */ /* MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0013 /**< GCM hardware accelerator failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT -0x0014 /**< Bad input parameters to function. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT) /** * \brief The GCM context structure. */ typedef struct mbedtls_gcm_context { mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx; /*!< The cipher context used. */ uint64_t HL[16]; /*!< Precalculated HTable low. */ uint64_t HH[16]; /*!< Precalculated HTable high. */ uint64_t len; /*!< The total length of the encrypted data. */ uint64_t add_len; /*!< The total length of the additional data. */ unsigned char base_ectr[16]; /*!< The first ECTR for tag. */ unsigned char y[16]; /*!< The Y working value. */ unsigned char buf[16]; /*!< The buf working value. */ int mode; /*!< The operation to perform: #MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT or #MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT. */ } mbedtls_gcm_context; #else /* !MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT */ #include "gcm_alt.h" #endif /* !MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT */ /** * \brief This function initializes the specified GCM context, * to make references valid, and prepares the context * for mbedtls_gcm_setkey() or mbedtls_gcm_free(). * * The function does not bind the GCM context to a particular * cipher, nor set the key. For this purpose, use * mbedtls_gcm_setkey(). * * \param ctx The GCM context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_gcm_init( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx ); /** * \brief This function associates a GCM context with a * cipher algorithm and a key. * * \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized. * \param cipher The 128-bit block cipher to use. * \param key The encryption key. This must be a readable buffer of at * least \p keybits bits. * \param keybits The key size in bits. Valid options are: *
  • 128 bits
    • *
  • 192 bits
    • *
  • 256 bits
* * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_gcm_setkey( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits ); /** * \brief This function performs GCM encryption or decryption of a buffer. * * \note For encryption, the output buffer can be the same as the * input buffer. For decryption, the output buffer cannot be * the same as input buffer. If the buffers overlap, the output * buffer must trail at least 8 Bytes behind the input buffer. * * \warning When this function performs a decryption, it outputs the * authentication tag and does not verify that the data is * authentic. You should use this function to perform encryption * only. For decryption, use mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt() instead. * * \param ctx The GCM context to use for encryption or decryption. This * must be initialized. * \param mode The operation to perform: * - #MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT to perform authenticated encryption. * The ciphertext is written to \p output and the * authentication tag is written to \p tag. * - #MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT to perform decryption. * The plaintext is written to \p output and the * authentication tag is written to \p tag. * Note that this mode is not recommended, because it does * not verify the authenticity of the data. For this reason, * you should use mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt() instead of * calling this function in decryption mode. * \param length The length of the input data, which is equal to the length * of the output data. * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a readable buffer of * at least \p iv_len Bytes. * \param iv_len The length of the IV. * \param add The buffer holding the additional data. This must be of at * least that size in Bytes. * \param add_len The length of the additional data. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater * than zero, this must be a readable buffer of at least that * size in Bytes. * \param output The buffer for holding the output data. If \p length is greater * than zero, this must be a writable buffer of at least that * size in Bytes. * \param tag_len The length of the tag to generate. * \param tag The buffer for holding the tag. This must be a writable * buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. * * \return \c 0 if the encryption or decryption was performed * successfully. Note that in #MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT mode, * this does not indicate that the data is authentic. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT if the lengths or pointers are * not valid or a cipher-specific error code if the encryption * or decryption failed. */ int mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, size_t tag_len, unsigned char *tag ); /** * \brief This function performs a GCM authenticated decryption of a * buffer. * * \note For decryption, the output buffer cannot be the same as * input buffer. If the buffers overlap, the output buffer * must trail at least 8 Bytes behind the input buffer. * * \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized. * \param length The length of the ciphertext to decrypt, which is also * the length of the decrypted plaintext. * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a readable buffer * of at least \p iv_len Bytes. * \param iv_len The length of the IV. * \param add The buffer holding the additional data. This must be of at * least that size in Bytes. * \param add_len The length of the additional data. * \param tag The buffer holding the tag to verify. This must be a * readable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. * \param tag_len The length of the tag to verify. * \param input The buffer holding the ciphertext. If \p length is greater * than zero, this must be a readable buffer of at least that * size. * \param output The buffer for holding the decrypted plaintext. If \p length * is greater than zero, this must be a writable buffer of at * least that size. * * \return \c 0 if successful and authenticated. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED if the tag does not match. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT if the lengths or pointers are * not valid or a cipher-specific error code if the decryption * failed. */ int mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); /** * \brief This function starts a GCM encryption or decryption * operation. * * \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized. * \param mode The operation to perform: #MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT or * #MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT. * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a readable buffer of * at least \p iv_len Bytes. * \param iv_len The length of the IV. * \param add The buffer holding the additional data, or \c NULL * if \p add_len is \c 0. * \param add_len The length of the additional data. If \c 0, * \p add may be \c NULL. * * \return \c 0 on success. */ int mbedtls_gcm_starts( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, int mode, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len ); /** * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing GCM * encryption or decryption operation. * * ` The function expects input to be a multiple of 16 * Bytes. Only the last call before calling * mbedtls_gcm_finish() can be less than 16 Bytes. * * \note For decryption, the output buffer cannot be the same as * input buffer. If the buffers overlap, the output buffer * must trail at least 8 Bytes behind the input buffer. * * \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized. * \param length The length of the input data. This must be a multiple of * 16 except in the last call before mbedtls_gcm_finish(). * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater * than zero, this must be a readable buffer of at least that * size in Bytes. * \param output The buffer for holding the output data. If \p length is * greater than zero, this must be a writable buffer of at * least that size in Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT on failure. */ int mbedtls_gcm_update( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); /** * \brief This function finishes the GCM operation and generates * the authentication tag. * * It wraps up the GCM stream, and generates the * tag. The tag can have a maximum length of 16 Bytes. * * \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized. * \param tag The buffer for holding the tag. This must be a writable * buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. * \param tag_len The length of the tag to generate. This must be at least * four. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT on failure. */ int mbedtls_gcm_finish( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ); /** * \brief This function clears a GCM context and the underlying * cipher sub-context. * * \param ctx The GCM context to clear. If this is \c NULL, the call has * no effect. Otherwise, this must be initialized. */ void mbedtls_gcm_free( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** * \brief The GCM checkup routine. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return \c 1 on failure. */ int mbedtls_gcm_self_test( int verbose ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* gcm.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/havege.h0000644000000000000000000000350513764415275015073 0ustar rootroot/** * \file havege.h * * \brief HAVEGE: HArdware Volatile Entropy Gathering and Expansion */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_H #define MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include #include #define MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE 1024 #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /** * \brief HAVEGE state structure */ typedef struct mbedtls_havege_state { uint32_t PT1, PT2, offset[2]; uint32_t pool[MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE]; uint32_t WALK[8192]; } mbedtls_havege_state; /** * \brief HAVEGE initialization * * \param hs HAVEGE state to be initialized */ void mbedtls_havege_init( mbedtls_havege_state *hs ); /** * \brief Clear HAVEGE state * * \param hs HAVEGE state to be cleared */ void mbedtls_havege_free( mbedtls_havege_state *hs ); /** * \brief HAVEGE rand function * * \param p_rng A HAVEGE state * \param output Buffer to fill * \param len Length of buffer * * \return 0 */ int mbedtls_havege_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t len ); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* havege.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/hkdf.h0000644000000000000000000001332013764415275014544 0ustar rootroot/** * \file hkdf.h * * \brief This file contains the HKDF interface. * * The HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF) is * specified by RFC 5869. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_HKDF_H #define MBEDTLS_HKDF_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include "mbedtls/md.h" /** * \name HKDF Error codes * \{ */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x5F80 /**< Bad input parameters to function. */ /* \} name */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /** * \brief This is the HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function * (HKDF). * * \param md A hash function; md.size denotes the length of the hash * function output in bytes. * \param salt An optional salt value (a non-secret random value); * if the salt is not provided, a string of all zeros of * md.size length is used as the salt. * \param salt_len The length in bytes of the optional \p salt. * \param ikm The input keying material. * \param ikm_len The length in bytes of \p ikm. * \param info An optional context and application specific information * string. This can be a zero-length string. * \param info_len The length of \p info in bytes. * \param okm The output keying material of \p okm_len bytes. * \param okm_len The length of the output keying material in bytes. This * must be less than or equal to 255 * md.size bytes. * * \return 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA when the parameters are invalid. * \return An MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_* error for errors returned from the underlying * MD layer. */ int mbedtls_hkdf( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md, const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len, const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikm_len, const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len, unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len ); /** * \brief Take the input keying material \p ikm and extract from it a * fixed-length pseudorandom key \p prk. * * \warning This function should only be used if the security of it has been * studied and established in that particular context (eg. TLS 1.3 * key schedule). For standard HKDF security guarantees use * \c mbedtls_hkdf instead. * * \param md A hash function; md.size denotes the length of the * hash function output in bytes. * \param salt An optional salt value (a non-secret random value); * if the salt is not provided, a string of all zeros * of md.size length is used as the salt. * \param salt_len The length in bytes of the optional \p salt. * \param ikm The input keying material. * \param ikm_len The length in bytes of \p ikm. * \param[out] prk A pseudorandom key of at least md.size bytes. * * \return 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA when the parameters are invalid. * \return An MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_* error for errors returned from the underlying * MD layer. */ int mbedtls_hkdf_extract( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md, const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len, const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikm_len, unsigned char *prk ); /** * \brief Expand the supplied \p prk into several additional pseudorandom * keys, which is the output of the HKDF. * * \warning This function should only be used if the security of it has been * studied and established in that particular context (eg. TLS 1.3 * key schedule). For standard HKDF security guarantees use * \c mbedtls_hkdf instead. * * \param md A hash function; md.size denotes the length of the hash * function output in bytes. * \param prk A pseudorandom key of at least md.size bytes. \p prk is * usually the output from the HKDF extract step. * \param prk_len The length in bytes of \p prk. * \param info An optional context and application specific information * string. This can be a zero-length string. * \param info_len The length of \p info in bytes. * \param okm The output keying material of \p okm_len bytes. * \param okm_len The length of the output keying material in bytes. This * must be less than or equal to 255 * md.size bytes. * * \return 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA when the parameters are invalid. * \return An MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_* error for errors returned from the underlying * MD layer. */ int mbedtls_hkdf_expand( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md, const unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_len, const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len, unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len ); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* hkdf.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h0000644000000000000000000004152613764415275015547 0ustar rootroot/** * \file hmac_drbg.h * * \brief The HMAC_DRBG pseudorandom generator. * * This module implements the HMAC_DRBG pseudorandom generator described * in NIST SP 800-90A: Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using * Deterministic Random Bit Generators. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_H #define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include "mbedtls/md.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) #include "mbedtls/threading.h" #endif /* * Error codes */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG -0x0003 /**< Too many random requested in single call. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG -0x0005 /**< Input too large (Entropy + additional). */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x0007 /**< Read/write error in file. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED -0x0009 /**< The entropy source failed. */ /** * \name SECTION: Module settings * * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. * \{ */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL) #define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL 10000 /**< Interval before reseed is performed by default */ #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT) #define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT 256 /**< Maximum number of additional input bytes */ #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST) #define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST 1024 /**< Maximum number of requested bytes per call */ #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT) #define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT 384 /**< Maximum size of (re)seed buffer */ #endif /* \} name SECTION: Module settings */ #define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_OFF 0 /**< No prediction resistance */ #define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON 1 /**< Prediction resistance enabled */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /** * HMAC_DRBG context. */ typedef struct mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context { /* Working state: the key K is not stored explicitly, * but is implied by the HMAC context */ mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; /*!< HMAC context (inc. K) */ unsigned char V[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; /*!< V in the spec */ int reseed_counter; /*!< reseed counter */ /* Administrative state */ size_t entropy_len; /*!< entropy bytes grabbed on each (re)seed */ int prediction_resistance; /*!< enable prediction resistance (Automatic reseed before every random generation) */ int reseed_interval; /*!< reseed interval */ /* Callbacks */ int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t); /*!< entropy function */ void *p_entropy; /*!< context for the entropy function */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; #endif } mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context; /** * \brief HMAC_DRBG context initialization. * * This function makes the context ready for mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed(), * mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf() or mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free(). * * \note The reseed interval is #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL * by default. Override this value by calling * mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_reseed_interval(). * * \param ctx HMAC_DRBG context to be initialized. */ void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx ); /** * \brief HMAC_DRBG initial seeding. * * Set the initial seed and set up the entropy source for future reseeds. * * A typical choice for the \p f_entropy and \p p_entropy parameters is * to use the entropy module: * - \p f_entropy is mbedtls_entropy_func(); * - \p p_entropy is an instance of ::mbedtls_entropy_context initialized * with mbedtls_entropy_init() (which registers the platform's default * entropy sources). * * You can provide a personalization string in addition to the * entropy source, to make this instantiation as unique as possible. * * \note By default, the security strength as defined by NIST is: * - 128 bits if \p md_info is SHA-1; * - 192 bits if \p md_info is SHA-224; * - 256 bits if \p md_info is SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512. * Note that SHA-256 is just as efficient as SHA-224. * The security strength can be reduced if a smaller * entropy length is set with * mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len(). * * \note The default entropy length is the security strength * (converted from bits to bytes). You can override * it by calling mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len(). * * \note During the initial seeding, this function calls * the entropy source to obtain a nonce * whose length is half the entropy length. * * \param ctx HMAC_DRBG context to be seeded. * \param md_info MD algorithm to use for HMAC_DRBG. * \param f_entropy The entropy callback, taking as arguments the * \p p_entropy context, the buffer to fill, and the * length of the buffer. * \p f_entropy is always called with a length that is * less than or equal to the entropy length. * \param p_entropy The entropy context to pass to \p f_entropy. * \param custom The personalization string. * This can be \c NULL, in which case the personalization * string is empty regardless of the value of \p len. * \param len The length of the personalization string. * This must be at most #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT * and also at most * #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - \p entropy_len * 3 / 2 * where \p entropy_len is the entropy length * described above. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p md_info is * invalid. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED if there was not enough * memory to allocate context data. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED * if the call to \p f_entropy failed. */ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t * md_info, int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_entropy, const unsigned char *custom, size_t len ); /** * \brief Initilisation of simpified HMAC_DRBG (never reseeds). * * This function is meant for use in algorithms that need a pseudorandom * input such as deterministic ECDSA. * * \param ctx HMAC_DRBG context to be initialised. * \param md_info MD algorithm to use for HMAC_DRBG. * \param data Concatenation of the initial entropy string and * the additional data. * \param data_len Length of \p data in bytes. * * \return \c 0 if successful. or * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p md_info is * invalid. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED if there was not enough * memory to allocate context data. */ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t * md_info, const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len ); /** * \brief This function turns prediction resistance on or off. * The default value is off. * * \note If enabled, entropy is gathered at the beginning of * every call to mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add() * or mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random(). * Only use this if your entropy source has sufficient * throughput. * * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context. * \param resistance #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON or #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_OFF. */ void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, int resistance ); /** * \brief This function sets the amount of entropy grabbed on each * seed or reseed. * * See the documentation of mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed() for the default value. * * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context. * \param len The amount of entropy to grab, in bytes. */ void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, size_t len ); /** * \brief Set the reseed interval. * * The reseed interval is the number of calls to mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random() * or mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add() after which the entropy function * is called again. * * The default value is #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL. * * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context. * \param interval The reseed interval. */ void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_reseed_interval( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, int interval ); /** * \brief This function updates the state of the HMAC_DRBG context. * * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context. * \param additional The data to update the state with. * If this is \c NULL, there is no additional data. * \param add_len Length of \p additional in bytes. * Unused if \p additional is \c NULL. * * \return \c 0 on success, or an error from the underlying * hash calculation. */ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len ); /** * \brief This function reseeds the HMAC_DRBG context, that is * extracts data from the entropy source. * * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context. * \param additional Additional data to add to the state. * If this is \c NULL, there is no additional data * and \p len should be \c 0. * \param len The length of the additional data. * This must be at most #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT * and also at most * #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - \p entropy_len * where \p entropy_len is the entropy length * (see mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len()). * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED * if a call to the entropy function failed. */ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const unsigned char *additional, size_t len ); /** * \brief This function updates an HMAC_DRBG instance with additional * data and uses it to generate random data. * * This function automatically reseeds if the reseed counter is exceeded * or prediction resistance is enabled. * * \param p_rng The HMAC_DRBG context. This must be a pointer to a * #mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context structure. * \param output The buffer to fill. * \param output_len The length of the buffer in bytes. * This must be at most #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST. * \param additional Additional data to update with. * If this is \c NULL, there is no additional data * and \p add_len should be \c 0. * \param add_len The length of the additional data. * This must be at most #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED * if a call to the entropy source failed. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG if * \p output_len > #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG if * \p add_len > #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT. */ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len ); /** * \brief This function uses HMAC_DRBG to generate random data. * * This function automatically reseeds if the reseed counter is exceeded * or prediction resistance is enabled. * * \param p_rng The HMAC_DRBG context. This must be a pointer to a * #mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context structure. * \param output The buffer to fill. * \param out_len The length of the buffer in bytes. * This must be at most #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED * if a call to the entropy source failed. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG if * \p out_len > #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST. */ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t out_len ); /** * \brief This function resets HMAC_DRBG context to the state immediately * after initial call of mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init(). * * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context to free. */ void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx ); #if ! defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) #else #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /** * \brief This function updates the state of the HMAC_DRBG context. * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret() * in 2.16.0. * * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context. * \param additional The data to update the state with. * If this is \c NULL, there is no additional data. * \param add_len Length of \p additional in bytes. * Unused if \p additional is \c NULL. */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len ); #undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) /** * \brief This function writes a seed file. * * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context. * \param path The name of the file. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR on file error. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED on reseed * failure. */ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_write_seed_file( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path ); /** * \brief This function reads and updates a seed file. The seed * is added to this instance. * * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context. * \param path The name of the file. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR on file error. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED on * reseed failure. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG if the existing * seed file is too large. */ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_seed_file( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** * \brief The HMAC_DRBG Checkup routine. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return \c 1 if the test failed. */ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_self_test( int verbose ); #endif #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* hmac_drbg.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/md.h0000644000000000000000000004335513764415275014243 0ustar rootroot /** * \file md.h * * \brief This file contains the generic message-digest wrapper. * * \author Adriaan de Jong */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_MD_H #define MBEDTLS_MD_H #include #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x5080 /**< The selected feature is not available. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x5100 /**< Bad input parameters to function. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED -0x5180 /**< Failed to allocate memory. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x5200 /**< Opening or reading of file failed. */ /* MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x5280 /**< MD hardware accelerator failed. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /** * \brief Supported message digests. * * \warning MD2, MD4, MD5 and SHA-1 are considered weak message digests and * their use constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ typedef enum { MBEDTLS_MD_NONE=0, /**< None. */ MBEDTLS_MD_MD2, /**< The MD2 message digest. */ MBEDTLS_MD_MD4, /**< The MD4 message digest. */ MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, /**< The MD5 message digest. */ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, /**< The SHA-1 message digest. */ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, /**< The SHA-224 message digest. */ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, /**< The SHA-256 message digest. */ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, /**< The SHA-384 message digest. */ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, /**< The SHA-512 message digest. */ MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, /**< The RIPEMD-160 message digest. */ } mbedtls_md_type_t; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) #define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE 64 /* longest known is SHA512 */ #else #define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE 32 /* longest known is SHA256 or less */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) #define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 128 #else #define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 64 #endif /** * Opaque struct defined in md_internal.h. */ typedef struct mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md_info_t; /** * The generic message-digest context. */ typedef struct mbedtls_md_context_t { /** Information about the associated message digest. */ const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; /** The digest-specific context. */ void *md_ctx; /** The HMAC part of the context. */ void *hmac_ctx; } mbedtls_md_context_t; /** * \brief This function returns the list of digests supported by the * generic digest module. * * \note The list starts with the strongest available hashes. * * \return A statically allocated array of digests. Each element * in the returned list is an integer belonging to the * message-digest enumeration #mbedtls_md_type_t. * The last entry is 0. */ const int *mbedtls_md_list( void ); /** * \brief This function returns the message-digest information * associated with the given digest name. * * \param md_name The name of the digest to search for. * * \return The message-digest information associated with \p md_name. * \return NULL if the associated message-digest information is not found. */ const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_string( const char *md_name ); /** * \brief This function returns the message-digest information * associated with the given digest type. * * \param md_type The type of digest to search for. * * \return The message-digest information associated with \p md_type. * \return NULL if the associated message-digest information is not found. */ const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_type( mbedtls_md_type_t md_type ); /** * \brief This function initializes a message-digest context without * binding it to a particular message-digest algorithm. * * This function should always be called first. It prepares the * context for mbedtls_md_setup() for binding it to a * message-digest algorithm. */ void mbedtls_md_init( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx ); /** * \brief This function clears the internal structure of \p ctx and * frees any embedded internal structure, but does not free * \p ctx itself. * * If you have called mbedtls_md_setup() on \p ctx, you must * call mbedtls_md_free() when you are no longer using the * context. * Calling this function if you have previously * called mbedtls_md_init() and nothing else is optional. * You must not call this function if you have not called * mbedtls_md_init(). */ void mbedtls_md_free( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx ); #if ! defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) #else #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /** * \brief This function selects the message digest algorithm to use, * and allocates internal structures. * * It should be called after mbedtls_md_init() or mbedtls_md_free(). * Makes it necessary to call mbedtls_md_free() later. * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md_setup() in 2.0.0 * * \param ctx The context to set up. * \param md_info The information structure of the message-digest algorithm * to use. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification * failure. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. */ int mbedtls_md_init_ctx( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info ) MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED; #undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ /** * \brief This function selects the message digest algorithm to use, * and allocates internal structures. * * It should be called after mbedtls_md_init() or * mbedtls_md_free(). Makes it necessary to call * mbedtls_md_free() later. * * \param ctx The context to set up. * \param md_info The information structure of the message-digest algorithm * to use. * \param hmac Defines if HMAC is used. 0: HMAC is not used (saves some memory), * or non-zero: HMAC is used with this context. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification * failure. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. */ int mbedtls_md_setup( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, int hmac ); /** * \brief This function clones the state of an message-digest * context. * * \note You must call mbedtls_md_setup() on \c dst before calling * this function. * * \note The two contexts must have the same type, * for example, both are SHA-256. * * \warning This function clones the message-digest state, not the * HMAC state. * * \param dst The destination context. * \param src The context to be cloned. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification failure. */ int mbedtls_md_clone( mbedtls_md_context_t *dst, const mbedtls_md_context_t *src ); /** * \brief This function extracts the message-digest size from the * message-digest information structure. * * \param md_info The information structure of the message-digest algorithm * to use. * * \return The size of the message-digest output in Bytes. */ unsigned char mbedtls_md_get_size( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info ); /** * \brief This function extracts the message-digest type from the * message-digest information structure. * * \param md_info The information structure of the message-digest algorithm * to use. * * \return The type of the message digest. */ mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_get_type( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info ); /** * \brief This function extracts the message-digest name from the * message-digest information structure. * * \param md_info The information structure of the message-digest algorithm * to use. * * \return The name of the message digest. */ const char *mbedtls_md_get_name( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info ); /** * \brief This function starts a message-digest computation. * * You must call this function after setting up the context * with mbedtls_md_setup(), and before passing data with * mbedtls_md_update(). * * \param ctx The generic message-digest context. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification * failure. */ int mbedtls_md_starts( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx ); /** * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing * message-digest computation. * * You must call mbedtls_md_starts() before calling this * function. You may call this function multiple times. * Afterwards, call mbedtls_md_finish(). * * \param ctx The generic message-digest context. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. * \param ilen The length of the input data. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification * failure. */ int mbedtls_md_update( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ); /** * \brief This function finishes the digest operation, * and writes the result to the output buffer. * * Call this function after a call to mbedtls_md_starts(), * followed by any number of calls to mbedtls_md_update(). * Afterwards, you may either clear the context with * mbedtls_md_free(), or call mbedtls_md_starts() to reuse * the context for another digest operation with the same * algorithm. * * \param ctx The generic message-digest context. * \param output The buffer for the generic message-digest checksum result. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification * failure. */ int mbedtls_md_finish( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output ); /** * \brief This function calculates the message-digest of a buffer, * with respect to a configurable message-digest algorithm * in a single call. * * The result is calculated as * Output = message_digest(input buffer). * * \param md_info The information structure of the message-digest algorithm * to use. * \param input The buffer holding the data. * \param ilen The length of the input data. * \param output The generic message-digest checksum result. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification * failure. */ int mbedtls_md( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) /** * \brief This function calculates the message-digest checksum * result of the contents of the provided file. * * The result is calculated as * Output = message_digest(file contents). * * \param md_info The information structure of the message-digest algorithm * to use. * \param path The input file name. * \param output The generic message-digest checksum result. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR on an I/O error accessing * the file pointed by \p path. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p md_info was NULL. */ int mbedtls_md_file( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const char *path, unsigned char *output ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ /** * \brief This function sets the HMAC key and prepares to * authenticate a new message. * * Call this function after mbedtls_md_setup(), to use * the MD context for an HMAC calculation, then call * mbedtls_md_hmac_update() to provide the input data, and * mbedtls_md_hmac_finish() to get the HMAC value. * * \param ctx The message digest context containing an embedded HMAC * context. * \param key The HMAC secret key. * \param keylen The length of the HMAC key in Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification * failure. */ int mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen ); /** * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing HMAC * computation. * * Call mbedtls_md_hmac_starts() or mbedtls_md_hmac_reset() * before calling this function. * You may call this function multiple times to pass the * input piecewise. * Afterwards, call mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(). * * \param ctx The message digest context containing an embedded HMAC * context. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. * \param ilen The length of the input data. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification * failure. */ int mbedtls_md_hmac_update( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ); /** * \brief This function finishes the HMAC operation, and writes * the result to the output buffer. * * Call this function after mbedtls_md_hmac_starts() and * mbedtls_md_hmac_update() to get the HMAC value. Afterwards * you may either call mbedtls_md_free() to clear the context, * or call mbedtls_md_hmac_reset() to reuse the context with * the same HMAC key. * * \param ctx The message digest context containing an embedded HMAC * context. * \param output The generic HMAC checksum result. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification * failure. */ int mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output); /** * \brief This function prepares to authenticate a new message with * the same key as the previous HMAC operation. * * You may call this function after mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(). * Afterwards call mbedtls_md_hmac_update() to pass the new * input. * * \param ctx The message digest context containing an embedded HMAC * context. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification * failure. */ int mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx ); /** * \brief This function calculates the full generic HMAC * on the input buffer with the provided key. * * The function allocates the context, performs the * calculation, and frees the context. * * The HMAC result is calculated as * output = generic HMAC(hmac key, input buffer). * * \param md_info The information structure of the message-digest algorithm * to use. * \param key The HMAC secret key. * \param keylen The length of the HMAC secret key in Bytes. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. * \param ilen The length of the input data. * \param output The generic HMAC result. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification * failure. */ int mbedtls_md_hmac( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output ); /* Internal use */ int mbedtls_md_process( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *data ); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_H */ usr/include/mbedtls/md2.h0000644000000000000000000002200713764415275014314 0ustar rootroot/** * \file md2.h * * \brief MD2 message digest algorithm (hash function) * * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a * security risk. We recommend considering stronger message digests * instead. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. * */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_MD2_H #define MBEDTLS_MD2_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include /* MBEDTLS_ERR_MD2_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD2_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x002B /**< MD2 hardware accelerator failed */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT) // Regular implementation // /** * \brief MD2 context structure * * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ typedef struct mbedtls_md2_context { unsigned char cksum[16]; /*!< checksum of the data block */ unsigned char state[48]; /*!< intermediate digest state */ unsigned char buffer[16]; /*!< data block being processed */ size_t left; /*!< amount of data in buffer */ } mbedtls_md2_context; #else /* MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT */ #include "md2_alt.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT */ /** * \brief Initialize MD2 context * * \param ctx MD2 context to be initialized * * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ void mbedtls_md2_init( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ); /** * \brief Clear MD2 context * * \param ctx MD2 context to be cleared * * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ void mbedtls_md2_free( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ); /** * \brief Clone (the state of) an MD2 context * * \param dst The destination context * \param src The context to be cloned * * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ void mbedtls_md2_clone( mbedtls_md2_context *dst, const mbedtls_md2_context *src ); /** * \brief MD2 context setup * * \param ctx context to be initialized * * \return 0 if successful * * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ int mbedtls_md2_starts_ret( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ); /** * \brief MD2 process buffer * * \param ctx MD2 context * \param input buffer holding the data * \param ilen length of the input data * * \return 0 if successful * * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ int mbedtls_md2_update_ret( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ); /** * \brief MD2 final digest * * \param ctx MD2 context * \param output MD2 checksum result * * \return 0 if successful * * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ int mbedtls_md2_finish_ret( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, unsigned char output[16] ); /** * \brief MD2 process data block (internal use only) * * \param ctx MD2 context * * \return 0 if successful * * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ int mbedtls_internal_md2_process( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ); #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) #else #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /** * \brief MD2 context setup * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md2_starts_ret() in 2.7.0 * * \param ctx context to be initialized * * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md2_starts( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ); /** * \brief MD2 process buffer * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md2_update_ret() in 2.7.0 * * \param ctx MD2 context * \param input buffer holding the data * \param ilen length of the input data * * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md2_update( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ); /** * \brief MD2 final digest * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md2_finish_ret() in 2.7.0 * * \param ctx MD2 context * \param output MD2 checksum result * * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md2_finish( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, unsigned char output[16] ); /** * \brief MD2 process data block (internal use only) * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_md2_process() in 2.7.0 * * \param ctx MD2 context * * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md2_process( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ); #undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ /** * \brief Output = MD2( input buffer ) * * \param input buffer holding the data * \param ilen length of the input data * \param output MD2 checksum result * * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ int mbedtls_md2_ret( const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char output[16] ); #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) #else #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /** * \brief Output = MD2( input buffer ) * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md2_ret() in 2.7.0 * * \param input buffer holding the data * \param ilen length of the input data * \param output MD2 checksum result * * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md2( const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char output[16] ); #undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** * \brief Checkup routine * * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed * * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ int mbedtls_md2_self_test( int verbose ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* mbedtls_md2.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/md4.h0000644000000000000000000002235613764415275014325 0ustar rootroot/** * \file md4.h * * \brief MD4 message digest algorithm (hash function) * * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a * security risk. We recommend considering stronger message digests * instead. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. * */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_MD4_H #define MBEDTLS_MD4_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include #include /* MBEDTLS_ERR_MD4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x002D /**< MD4 hardware accelerator failed */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT) // Regular implementation // /** * \brief MD4 context structure * * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ typedef struct mbedtls_md4_context { uint32_t total[2]; /*!< number of bytes processed */ uint32_t state[4]; /*!< intermediate digest state */ unsigned char buffer[64]; /*!< data block being processed */ } mbedtls_md4_context; #else /* MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT */ #include "md4_alt.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT */ /** * \brief Initialize MD4 context * * \param ctx MD4 context to be initialized * * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ void mbedtls_md4_init( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx ); /** * \brief Clear MD4 context * * \param ctx MD4 context to be cleared * * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ void mbedtls_md4_free( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx ); /** * \brief Clone (the state of) an MD4 context * * \param dst The destination context * \param src The context to be cloned * * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ void mbedtls_md4_clone( mbedtls_md4_context *dst, const mbedtls_md4_context *src ); /** * \brief MD4 context setup * * \param ctx context to be initialized * * \return 0 if successful * * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. */ int mbedtls_md4_starts_ret( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx ); /** * \brief MD4 process buffer * * \param ctx MD4 context * \param input buffer holding the data * \param ilen length of the input data * * \return 0 if successful * * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ int mbedtls_md4_update_ret( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ); /** * \brief MD4 final digest * * \param ctx MD4 context * \param output MD4 checksum result * * \return 0 if successful * * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ int mbedtls_md4_finish_ret( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, unsigned char output[16] ); /** * \brief MD4 process data block (internal use only) * * \param ctx MD4 context * \param data buffer holding one block of data * * \return 0 if successful * * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ int mbedtls_internal_md4_process( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[64] ); #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) #else #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /** * \brief MD4 context setup * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md4_starts_ret() in 2.7.0 * * \param ctx context to be initialized * * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md4_starts( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx ); /** * \brief MD4 process buffer * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md4_update_ret() in 2.7.0 * * \param ctx MD4 context * \param input buffer holding the data * \param ilen length of the input data * * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md4_update( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ); /** * \brief MD4 final digest * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md4_finish_ret() in 2.7.0 * * \param ctx MD4 context * \param output MD4 checksum result * * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md4_finish( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, unsigned char output[16] ); /** * \brief MD4 process data block (internal use only) * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_md4_process() in 2.7.0 * * \param ctx MD4 context * \param data buffer holding one block of data * * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md4_process( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[64] ); #undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ /** * \brief Output = MD4( input buffer ) * * \param input buffer holding the data * \param ilen length of the input data * \param output MD4 checksum result * * \return 0 if successful * * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ int mbedtls_md4_ret( const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char output[16] ); #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) #else #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /** * \brief Output = MD4( input buffer ) * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md4_ret() in 2.7.0 * * \param input buffer holding the data * \param ilen length of the input data * \param output MD4 checksum result * * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md4( const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char output[16] ); #undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** * \brief Checkup routine * * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed * * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ int mbedtls_md4_self_test( int verbose ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* mbedtls_md4.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/md5.h0000644000000000000000000002236413764415275014325 0ustar rootroot/** * \file md5.h * * \brief MD5 message digest algorithm (hash function) * * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a * security risk. We recommend considering stronger message * digests instead. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_MD5_H #define MBEDTLS_MD5_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include #include /* MBEDTLS_ERR_MD5_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD5_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x002F /**< MD5 hardware accelerator failed */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT) // Regular implementation // /** * \brief MD5 context structure * * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ typedef struct mbedtls_md5_context { uint32_t total[2]; /*!< number of bytes processed */ uint32_t state[4]; /*!< intermediate digest state */ unsigned char buffer[64]; /*!< data block being processed */ } mbedtls_md5_context; #else /* MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT */ #include "md5_alt.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT */ /** * \brief Initialize MD5 context * * \param ctx MD5 context to be initialized * * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ void mbedtls_md5_init( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx ); /** * \brief Clear MD5 context * * \param ctx MD5 context to be cleared * * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ void mbedtls_md5_free( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx ); /** * \brief Clone (the state of) an MD5 context * * \param dst The destination context * \param src The context to be cloned * * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ void mbedtls_md5_clone( mbedtls_md5_context *dst, const mbedtls_md5_context *src ); /** * \brief MD5 context setup * * \param ctx context to be initialized * * \return 0 if successful * * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ int mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx ); /** * \brief MD5 process buffer * * \param ctx MD5 context * \param input buffer holding the data * \param ilen length of the input data * * \return 0 if successful * * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ int mbedtls_md5_update_ret( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ); /** * \brief MD5 final digest * * \param ctx MD5 context * \param output MD5 checksum result * * \return 0 if successful * * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ int mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, unsigned char output[16] ); /** * \brief MD5 process data block (internal use only) * * \param ctx MD5 context * \param data buffer holding one block of data * * \return 0 if successful * * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ int mbedtls_internal_md5_process( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[64] ); #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) #else #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /** * \brief MD5 context setup * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md5_starts_ret() in 2.7.0 * * \param ctx context to be initialized * * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md5_starts( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx ); /** * \brief MD5 process buffer * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md5_update_ret() in 2.7.0 * * \param ctx MD5 context * \param input buffer holding the data * \param ilen length of the input data * * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md5_update( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ); /** * \brief MD5 final digest * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md5_finish_ret() in 2.7.0 * * \param ctx MD5 context * \param output MD5 checksum result * * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md5_finish( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, unsigned char output[16] ); /** * \brief MD5 process data block (internal use only) * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_md5_process() in 2.7.0 * * \param ctx MD5 context * \param data buffer holding one block of data * * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md5_process( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[64] ); #undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ /** * \brief Output = MD5( input buffer ) * * \param input buffer holding the data * \param ilen length of the input data * \param output MD5 checksum result * * \return 0 if successful * * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ int mbedtls_md5_ret( const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char output[16] ); #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) #else #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /** * \brief Output = MD5( input buffer ) * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md5_ret() in 2.7.0 * * \param input buffer holding the data * \param ilen length of the input data * \param output MD5 checksum result * * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md5( const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char output[16] ); #undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** * \brief Checkup routine * * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed * * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ int mbedtls_md5_self_test( int verbose ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* mbedtls_md5.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/md_internal.h0000644000000000000000000000437613764415275016137 0ustar rootroot/** * \file md_internal.h * * \brief Message digest wrappers. * * \warning This in an internal header. Do not include directly. * * \author Adriaan de Jong */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_MD_WRAP_H #define MBEDTLS_MD_WRAP_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include "mbedtls/md.h" #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /** * Message digest information. * Allows message digest functions to be called in a generic way. */ struct mbedtls_md_info_t { /** Name of the message digest */ const char * name; /** Digest identifier */ mbedtls_md_type_t type; /** Output length of the digest function in bytes */ unsigned char size; /** Block length of the digest function in bytes */ unsigned char block_size; }; #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md2_info; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md4_info; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md5_info; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_ripemd160_info; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha1_info; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha224_info; extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha256_info; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha384_info; #endif extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha512_info; #endif #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_WRAP_H */ usr/include/mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h0000644000000000000000000001171213764415275017646 0ustar rootroot/** * \file memory_buffer_alloc.h * * \brief Buffer-based memory allocator */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_H #define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include /** * \name SECTION: Module settings * * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. * \{ */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE) #define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE 4 /**< Align on multiples of this value */ #endif /* \} name SECTION: Module settings */ #define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_NONE 0 #define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALLOC (1 << 0) #define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_FREE (1 << 1) #define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALWAYS (MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALLOC | MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_FREE) #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /** * \brief Initialize use of stack-based memory allocator. * The stack-based allocator does memory management inside the * presented buffer and does not call calloc() and free(). * It sets the global mbedtls_calloc() and mbedtls_free() pointers * to its own functions. * (Provided mbedtls_calloc() and mbedtls_free() are thread-safe if * MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is defined) * * \note This code is not optimized and provides a straight-forward * implementation of a stack-based memory allocator. * * \param buf buffer to use as heap * \param len size of the buffer */ void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init( unsigned char *buf, size_t len ); /** * \brief Free the mutex for thread-safety and clear remaining memory */ void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free( void ); /** * \brief Determine when the allocator should automatically verify the state * of the entire chain of headers / meta-data. * (Default: MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_NONE) * * \param verify One of MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_NONE, MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALLOC, * MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_FREE or MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALWAYS */ void mbedtls_memory_buffer_set_verify( int verify ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) /** * \brief Print out the status of the allocated memory (primarily for use * after a program should have de-allocated all memory) * Prints out a list of 'still allocated' blocks and their stack * trace if MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE is defined. */ void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_status( void ); /** * \brief Get the peak heap usage so far * * \param max_used Peak number of bytes in use or committed. This * includes bytes in allocated blocks too small to split * into smaller blocks but larger than the requested size. * \param max_blocks Peak number of blocks in use, including free and used */ void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_max_get( size_t *max_used, size_t *max_blocks ); /** * \brief Reset peak statistics */ void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_max_reset( void ); /** * \brief Get the current heap usage * * \param cur_used Current number of bytes in use or committed. This * includes bytes in allocated blocks too small to split * into smaller blocks but larger than the requested size. * \param cur_blocks Current number of blocks in use, including free and used */ void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_cur_get( size_t *cur_used, size_t *cur_blocks ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG */ /** * \brief Verifies that all headers in the memory buffer are correct * and contain sane values. Helps debug buffer-overflow errors. * * Prints out first failure if MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG is defined. * Prints out full header information if MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG * is defined. (Includes stack trace information for each block if * MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE is defined as well). * * \return 0 if verified, 1 otherwise */ int mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_verify( void ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** * \brief Checkup routine * * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if a test failed */ int mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_self_test( int verbose ); #endif #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* memory_buffer_alloc.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/net.h0000644000000000000000000000221213764415275014414 0ustar rootroot/** * \file net.h * * \brief Deprecated header file that includes net_sockets.h * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls/net_sockets.h */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) #include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) #warning "Deprecated header file: Superseded by mbedtls/net_sockets.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ #endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ usr/include/mbedtls/net_sockets.h0000644000000000000000000002540213764415275016155 0ustar rootroot/** * \file net_sockets.h * * \brief Network sockets abstraction layer to integrate Mbed TLS into a * BSD-style sockets API. * * The network sockets module provides an example integration of the * Mbed TLS library into a BSD sockets implementation. The module is * intended to be an example of how Mbed TLS can be integrated into a * networking stack, as well as to be Mbed TLS's network integration * for its supported platforms. * * The module is intended only to be used with the Mbed TLS library and * is not intended to be used by third party application software * directly. * * The supported platforms are as follows: * * Microsoft Windows and Windows CE * * POSIX/Unix platforms including Linux, OS X * */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_NET_SOCKETS_H #define MBEDTLS_NET_SOCKETS_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" #include #include #define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED -0x0042 /**< Failed to open a socket. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONNECT_FAILED -0x0044 /**< The connection to the given server / port failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED -0x0046 /**< Binding of the socket failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_LISTEN_FAILED -0x0048 /**< Could not listen on the socket. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED -0x004A /**< Could not accept the incoming connection. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_RECV_FAILED -0x004C /**< Reading information from the socket failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SEND_FAILED -0x004E /**< Sending information through the socket failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET -0x0050 /**< Connection was reset by peer. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST -0x0052 /**< Failed to get an IP address for the given hostname. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x0043 /**< Buffer is too small to hold the data. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_INVALID_CONTEXT -0x0045 /**< The context is invalid, eg because it was free()ed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_POLL_FAILED -0x0047 /**< Polling the net context failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0049 /**< Input invalid. */ #define MBEDTLS_NET_LISTEN_BACKLOG 10 /**< The backlog that listen() should use. */ #define MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP 0 /**< The TCP transport protocol */ #define MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP 1 /**< The UDP transport protocol */ #define MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_READ 1 /**< Used in \c mbedtls_net_poll to check for pending data */ #define MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_WRITE 2 /**< Used in \c mbedtls_net_poll to check if write possible */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /** * Wrapper type for sockets. * * Currently backed by just a file descriptor, but might be more in the future * (eg two file descriptors for combined IPv4 + IPv6 support, or additional * structures for hand-made UDP demultiplexing). */ typedef struct mbedtls_net_context { int fd; /**< The underlying file descriptor */ } mbedtls_net_context; /** * \brief Initialize a context * Just makes the context ready to be used or freed safely. * * \param ctx Context to initialize */ void mbedtls_net_init( mbedtls_net_context *ctx ); /** * \brief Initiate a connection with host:port in the given protocol * * \param ctx Socket to use * \param host Host to connect to * \param port Port to connect to * \param proto Protocol: MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP or MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP * * \return 0 if successful, or one of: * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED, * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST, * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONNECT_FAILED * * \note Sets the socket in connected mode even with UDP. */ int mbedtls_net_connect( mbedtls_net_context *ctx, const char *host, const char *port, int proto ); /** * \brief Create a receiving socket on bind_ip:port in the chosen * protocol. If bind_ip == NULL, all interfaces are bound. * * \param ctx Socket to use * \param bind_ip IP to bind to, can be NULL * \param port Port number to use * \param proto Protocol: MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP or MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP * * \return 0 if successful, or one of: * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED, * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED, * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_LISTEN_FAILED * * \note Regardless of the protocol, opens the sockets and binds it. * In addition, make the socket listening if protocol is TCP. */ int mbedtls_net_bind( mbedtls_net_context *ctx, const char *bind_ip, const char *port, int proto ); /** * \brief Accept a connection from a remote client * * \param bind_ctx Relevant socket * \param client_ctx Will contain the connected client socket * \param client_ip Will contain the client IP address, can be NULL * \param buf_size Size of the client_ip buffer * \param ip_len Will receive the size of the client IP written, * can be NULL if client_ip is null * * \return 0 if successful, or * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED, or * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if buf_size is too small, * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ if bind_fd was set to * non-blocking and accept() would block. */ int mbedtls_net_accept( mbedtls_net_context *bind_ctx, mbedtls_net_context *client_ctx, void *client_ip, size_t buf_size, size_t *ip_len ); /** * \brief Check and wait for the context to be ready for read/write * * \param ctx Socket to check * \param rw Bitflag composed of MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_READ and * MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_WRITE specifying the events * to wait for: * - If MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_READ is set, the function * will return as soon as the net context is available * for reading. * - If MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_WRITE is set, the function * will return as soon as the net context is available * for writing. * \param timeout Maximal amount of time to wait before returning, * in milliseconds. If \c timeout is zero, the * function returns immediately. If \c timeout is * -1u, the function blocks potentially indefinitely. * * \return Bitmask composed of MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_READ/WRITE * on success or timeout, or a negative return code otherwise. */ int mbedtls_net_poll( mbedtls_net_context *ctx, uint32_t rw, uint32_t timeout ); /** * \brief Set the socket blocking * * \param ctx Socket to set * * \return 0 if successful, or a non-zero error code */ int mbedtls_net_set_block( mbedtls_net_context *ctx ); /** * \brief Set the socket non-blocking * * \param ctx Socket to set * * \return 0 if successful, or a non-zero error code */ int mbedtls_net_set_nonblock( mbedtls_net_context *ctx ); /** * \brief Portable usleep helper * * \param usec Amount of microseconds to sleep * * \note Real amount of time slept will not be less than * select()'s timeout granularity (typically, 10ms). */ void mbedtls_net_usleep( unsigned long usec ); /** * \brief Read at most 'len' characters. If no error occurs, * the actual amount read is returned. * * \param ctx Socket * \param buf The buffer to write to * \param len Maximum length of the buffer * * \return the number of bytes received, * or a non-zero error code; with a non-blocking socket, * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ indicates read() would block. */ int mbedtls_net_recv( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ); /** * \brief Write at most 'len' characters. If no error occurs, * the actual amount read is returned. * * \param ctx Socket * \param buf The buffer to read from * \param len The length of the buffer * * \return the number of bytes sent, * or a non-zero error code; with a non-blocking socket, * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE indicates write() would block. */ int mbedtls_net_send( void *ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ); /** * \brief Read at most 'len' characters, blocking for at most * 'timeout' seconds. If no error occurs, the actual amount * read is returned. * * \param ctx Socket * \param buf The buffer to write to * \param len Maximum length of the buffer * \param timeout Maximum number of milliseconds to wait for data * 0 means no timeout (wait forever) * * \return the number of bytes received, * or a non-zero error code: * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT if the operation timed out, * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ if interrupted by a signal. * * \note This function will block (until data becomes available or * timeout is reached) even if the socket is set to * non-blocking. Handling timeouts with non-blocking reads * requires a different strategy. */ int mbedtls_net_recv_timeout( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len, uint32_t timeout ); /** * \brief Closes down the connection and free associated data * * \param ctx The context to close */ void mbedtls_net_close( mbedtls_net_context *ctx ); /** * \brief Gracefully shutdown the connection and free associated data * * \param ctx The context to free */ void mbedtls_net_free( mbedtls_net_context *ctx ); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* net_sockets.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/nist_kw.h0000644000000000000000000001660613764415275015320 0ustar rootroot/** * \file nist_kw.h * * \brief This file provides an API for key wrapping (KW) and key wrapping with * padding (KWP) as defined in NIST SP 800-38F. * https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38F.pdf * * Key wrapping specifies a deterministic authenticated-encryption mode * of operation, according to NIST SP 800-38F: Recommendation for * Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping. Its * purpose is to protect cryptographic keys. * * Its equivalent is RFC 3394 for KW, and RFC 5649 for KWP. * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3394 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5649 * */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_H #define MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif typedef enum { MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW = 0, MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP = 1 } mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t; #if !defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT) // Regular implementation // /** * \brief The key wrapping context-type definition. The key wrapping context is passed * to the APIs called. * * \note The definition of this type may change in future library versions. * Don't make any assumptions on this context! */ typedef struct { mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx; /*!< The cipher context used. */ } mbedtls_nist_kw_context; #else /* MBEDTLS_NIST_key wrapping_ALT */ #include "nist_kw_alt.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT */ /** * \brief This function initializes the specified key wrapping context * to make references valid and prepare the context * for mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey() or mbedtls_nist_kw_free(). * * \param ctx The key wrapping context to initialize. * */ void mbedtls_nist_kw_init( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx ); /** * \brief This function initializes the key wrapping context set in the * \p ctx parameter and sets the encryption key. * * \param ctx The key wrapping context. * \param cipher The 128-bit block cipher to use. Only AES is supported. * \param key The Key Encryption Key (KEK). * \param keybits The KEK size in bits. This must be acceptable by the cipher. * \param is_wrap Specify whether the operation within the context is wrapping or unwrapping * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return \c MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA for any invalid input. * \return \c MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE for 128-bit block ciphers * which are not supported. * \return cipher-specific error code on failure of the underlying cipher. */ int mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx, mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits, const int is_wrap ); /** * \brief This function releases and clears the specified key wrapping context * and underlying cipher sub-context. * * \param ctx The key wrapping context to clear. */ void mbedtls_nist_kw_free( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx ); /** * \brief This function encrypts a buffer using key wrapping. * * \param ctx The key wrapping context to use for encryption. * \param mode The key wrapping mode to use (MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW or MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP) * \param input The buffer holding the input data. * \param in_len The length of the input data in Bytes. * The input uses units of 8 Bytes called semiblocks. *
  • For KW mode: a multiple of 8 bytes between 16 and 2^57-8 inclusive.
    • *
  • For KWP mode: any length between 1 and 2^32-1 inclusive.
* \param[out] output The buffer holding the output data. *
  • For KW mode: Must be at least 8 bytes larger than \p in_len.
    • *
  • For KWP mode: Must be at least 8 bytes larger rounded up to a multiple of * 8 bytes for KWP (15 bytes at most).
* \param[out] out_len The number of bytes written to the output buffer. \c 0 on failure. * \param[in] out_size The capacity of the output buffer. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return \c MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA for invalid input length. * \return cipher-specific error code on failure of the underlying cipher. */ int mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx, mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t mode, const unsigned char *input, size_t in_len, unsigned char *output, size_t* out_len, size_t out_size ); /** * \brief This function decrypts a buffer using key wrapping. * * \param ctx The key wrapping context to use for decryption. * \param mode The key wrapping mode to use (MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW or MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP) * \param input The buffer holding the input data. * \param in_len The length of the input data in Bytes. * The input uses units of 8 Bytes called semiblocks. * The input must be a multiple of semiblocks. *
  • For KW mode: a multiple of 8 bytes between 24 and 2^57 inclusive.
    • *
  • For KWP mode: a multiple of 8 bytes between 16 and 2^32 inclusive.
* \param[out] output The buffer holding the output data. * The output buffer's minimal length is 8 bytes shorter than \p in_len. * \param[out] out_len The number of bytes written to the output buffer. \c 0 on failure. * For KWP mode, the length could be up to 15 bytes shorter than \p in_len, * depending on how much padding was added to the data. * \param[in] out_size The capacity of the output buffer. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return \c MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA for invalid input length. * \return \c MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED for verification failure of the ciphertext. * \return cipher-specific error code on failure of the underlying cipher. */ int mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx, mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t mode, const unsigned char *input, size_t in_len, unsigned char *output, size_t* out_len, size_t out_size); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) /** * \brief The key wrapping checkup routine. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return \c 1 on failure. */ int mbedtls_nist_kw_self_test( int verbose ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST && MBEDTLS_AES_C */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_H */ usr/include/mbedtls/oid.h0000644000000000000000000010330613764415275014407 0ustar rootroot/** * \file oid.h * * \brief Object Identifier (OID) database */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_OID_H #define MBEDTLS_OID_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" #include "mbedtls/pk.h" #include #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) #include "mbedtls/md.h" #endif #define MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND -0x002E /**< OID is not found. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL -0x000B /**< output buffer is too small */ /* This is for the benefit of X.509, but defined here in order to avoid * having a "backwards" include of x.509.h here */ /* * X.509 extension types (internal, arbitrary values for bitsets) */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER (1 << 0) #define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER (1 << 1) #define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE (1 << 2) #define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES (1 << 3) #define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_POLICY_MAPPINGS (1 << 4) #define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME (1 << 5) #define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_ISSUER_ALT_NAME (1 << 6) #define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS (1 << 7) #define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS (1 << 8) #define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS (1 << 9) #define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS (1 << 10) #define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE (1 << 11) #define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS (1 << 12) #define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY (1 << 13) #define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_FRESHEST_CRL (1 << 14) #define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE (1 << 16) /* * Top level OID tuples */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_MEMBER_BODIES "\x2a" /* {iso(1) member-body(2)} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG "\x2b" /* {iso(1) identified-organization(3)} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_CCITT_DS "\x55" /* {joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5)} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_ITU_COUNTRY "\x60" /* {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)} */ /* * ISO Member bodies OID parts */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_COUNTRY_US "\x86\x48" /* {us(840)} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_RSA_DATA_SECURITY "\x86\xf7\x0d" /* {rsadsi(113549)} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_MEMBER_BODIES MBEDTLS_OID_COUNTRY_US \ MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_RSA_DATA_SECURITY /* {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_ANSI_X9_62 "\xce\x3d" /* ansi-X9-62(10045) */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62 MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_MEMBER_BODIES MBEDTLS_OID_COUNTRY_US \ MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_ANSI_X9_62 /* * ISO Identified organization OID parts */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_DOD "\x06" /* {dod(6)} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_OIW "\x0e" #define MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_OIW "\x03" #define MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_ALG MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG "\x02" #define MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_ALG "\x1a" #define MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_CERTICOM "\x81\x04" /* certicom(132) */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_CERTICOM MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_CERTICOM #define MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_TELETRUST "\x24" /* teletrust(36) */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_TELETRUST MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_TELETRUST /* * ISO ITU OID parts */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_ORGANIZATION "\x01" /* {organization(1)} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_ITU_US_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_ITU_COUNTRY MBEDTLS_OID_COUNTRY_US MBEDTLS_OID_ORGANIZATION /* {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1)} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_GOV "\x65" /* {gov(101)} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_GOV MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_ITU_US_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_GOV /* {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_NETSCAPE "\x86\xF8\x42" /* {netscape(113730)} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_NETSCAPE MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_ITU_US_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_NETSCAPE /* Netscape OID {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) netscape(113730)} */ /* ISO arc for standard certificate and CRL extensions */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_CCITT_DS "\x1D" /**< id-ce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) 29} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG MBEDTLS_OID_GOV "\x03\x04" /** { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) */ /** * Private Internet Extensions * { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) * security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_INTERNET MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_DOD "\x01" #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKIX MBEDTLS_OID_INTERNET "\x05\x05\x07" /* * Arc for standard naming attributes */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_AT MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_CCITT_DS "\x04" /**< id-at OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) 4} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x03" /**< id-at-commonName AttributeType:= {id-at 3} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SUR_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x04" /**< id-at-surName AttributeType:= {id-at 4} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SERIAL_NUMBER MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x05" /**< id-at-serialNumber AttributeType:= {id-at 5} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_COUNTRY MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x06" /**< id-at-countryName AttributeType:= {id-at 6} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_LOCALITY MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x07" /**< id-at-locality AttributeType:= {id-at 7} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_STATE MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x08" /**< id-at-state AttributeType:= {id-at 8} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORGANIZATION MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x0A" /**< id-at-organizationName AttributeType:= {id-at 10} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORG_UNIT MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x0B" /**< id-at-organizationalUnitName AttributeType:= {id-at 11} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_TITLE MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x0C" /**< id-at-title AttributeType:= {id-at 12} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_ADDRESS MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x10" /**< id-at-postalAddress AttributeType:= {id-at 16} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_CODE MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x11" /**< id-at-postalCode AttributeType:= {id-at 17} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x2A" /**< id-at-givenName AttributeType:= {id-at 42} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_INITIALS MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x2B" /**< id-at-initials AttributeType:= {id-at 43} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GENERATION_QUALIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x2C" /**< id-at-generationQualifier AttributeType:= {id-at 44} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_UNIQUE_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x2D" /**< id-at-uniqueIdentifier AttributType:= {id-at 45} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x2E" /**< id-at-dnQualifier AttributeType:= {id-at 46} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_PSEUDONYM MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x41" /**< id-at-pseudonym AttributeType:= {id-at 65} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT "\x09\x92\x26\x89\x93\xF2\x2C\x64\x01\x19" /** id-domainComponent AttributeType:= {itu-t(0) data(9) pss(2342) ucl(19200300) pilot(100) pilotAttributeType(1) domainComponent(25)} */ /* * OIDs for standard certificate extensions */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x23" /**< id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 35 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x0E" /**< id-ce-subjectKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 14 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x0F" /**< id-ce-keyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 15 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x20" /**< id-ce-certificatePolicies OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 32 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_POLICY_MAPPINGS MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x21" /**< id-ce-policyMappings OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 33 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x11" /**< id-ce-subjectAltName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 17 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_ISSUER_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x12" /**< id-ce-issuerAltName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 18 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x09" /**< id-ce-subjectDirectoryAttributes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 9 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x13" /**< id-ce-basicConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 19 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x1E" /**< id-ce-nameConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 30 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x24" /**< id-ce-policyConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 36 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x25" /**< id-ce-extKeyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 37 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x1F" /**< id-ce-cRLDistributionPoints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 31 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x36" /**< id-ce-inhibitAnyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 54 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_FRESHEST_CRL MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x2E" /**< id-ce-freshestCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 46 } */ /* * Certificate policies */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_POLICY MBEDTLS_OID_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES "\x00" /**< anyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce-certificatePolicies 0 } */ /* * Netscape certificate extensions */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT MBEDTLS_OID_NETSCAPE "\x01" #define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT "\x01" #define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_BASE_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT "\x02" #define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_REVOCATION_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT "\x03" #define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CA_REVOCATION_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT "\x04" #define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_RENEWAL_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT "\x07" #define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CA_POLICY_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT "\x08" #define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_SSL_SERVER_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT "\x0C" #define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_COMMENT MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT "\x0D" #define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_DATA_TYPE MBEDTLS_OID_NETSCAPE "\x02" #define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_SEQUENCE MBEDTLS_OID_NS_DATA_TYPE "\x05" /* * OIDs for CRL extensions */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PRIVATE_KEY_USAGE_PERIOD MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x10" #define MBEDTLS_OID_CRL_NUMBER MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x14" /**< id-ce-cRLNumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 20 } */ /* * X.509 v3 Extended key usage OIDs */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE "\x00" /**< anyExtendedKeyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce-extKeyUsage 0 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_KP MBEDTLS_OID_PKIX "\x03" /**< id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 3 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH MBEDTLS_OID_KP "\x01" /**< id-kp-serverAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 1 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH MBEDTLS_OID_KP "\x02" /**< id-kp-clientAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 2 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_CODE_SIGNING MBEDTLS_OID_KP "\x03" /**< id-kp-codeSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 3 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_EMAIL_PROTECTION MBEDTLS_OID_KP "\x04" /**< id-kp-emailProtection OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 4 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_TIME_STAMPING MBEDTLS_OID_KP "\x08" /**< id-kp-timeStamping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 8 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_OCSP_SIGNING MBEDTLS_OID_KP "\x09" /**< id-kp-OCSPSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 9 } */ /** * Wi-SUN Alliance Field Area Network * { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) * private(4) enterprise(1) WiSUN(45605) FieldAreaNetwork(1) } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_WISUN_FAN MBEDTLS_OID_INTERNET "\x04\x01\x82\xe4\x25\x01" #define MBEDTLS_OID_ON MBEDTLS_OID_PKIX "\x08" /**< id-on OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 8 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_ON "\x04" /**< id-on-hardwareModuleName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-on 4 } */ /* * PKCS definition OIDs */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x01" /**< pkcs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) 1 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS "\x01" /**< pkcs-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 1 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS "\x05" /**< pkcs-5 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 5 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS "\x09" /**< pkcs-9 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 9 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS "\x0c" /**< pkcs-12 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 12 } */ /* * PKCS#1 OIDs */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_RSA MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x01" /**< rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 1 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD2 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x02" /**< md2WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 2 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD4 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x03" /**< md4WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 3 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD5 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x04" /**< md5WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 4 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x05" /**< sha1WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 5 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x0e" /**< sha224WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 14 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA256 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x0b" /**< sha256WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 11 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA384 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x0c" /**< sha384WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 12 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA512 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x0d" /**< sha512WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 13 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_SHA_OBS "\x2B\x0E\x03\x02\x1D" #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9 "\x01" /**< emailAddress AttributeType ::= { pkcs-9 1 } */ /* RFC 4055 */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_RSASSA_PSS MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x0a" /**< id-RSASSA-PSS ::= { pkcs-1 10 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_MGF1 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x08" /**< id-mgf1 ::= { pkcs-1 8 } */ /* * Digest algorithms */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD2 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x02" /**< id-mbedtls_md2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 2 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD4 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x04" /**< id-mbedtls_md4 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 4 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD5 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x05" /**< id-mbedtls_md5 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 5 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_SHA1 /**< id-mbedtls_sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x02\x04" /**< id-sha224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 4 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA256 MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x02\x01" /**< id-mbedtls_sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 1 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA384 MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x02\x02" /**< id-sha384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 2 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA512 MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x02\x03" /**< id-mbedtls_sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 3 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_RIPEMD160 MBEDTLS_OID_TELETRUST "\x03\x02\x01" /**< id-ripemd160 OBJECT IDENTIFIER :: { iso(1) identified-organization(3) teletrust(36) algorithm(3) hashAlgorithm(2) ripemd160(1) } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x07" /**< id-hmacWithSHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 7 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x08" /**< id-hmacWithSHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 8 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x09" /**< id-hmacWithSHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 9 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x0A" /**< id-hmacWithSHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 10 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA512 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x0B" /**< id-hmacWithSHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 11 } */ /* * Encryption algorithms */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_ALG "\x07" /**< desCBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 7 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x03\x07" /**< des-ede3-cbc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) -- us(840) rsadsi(113549) encryptionAlgorithm(3) 7 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_AES MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x01" /** aes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 1 } */ /* * Key Wrapping algorithms */ /* * RFC 5649 */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_AES128_KW MBEDTLS_OID_AES "\x05" /** id-aes128-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { aes 5 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_AES128_KWP MBEDTLS_OID_AES "\x08" /** id-aes128-wrap-pad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { aes 8 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_AES192_KW MBEDTLS_OID_AES "\x19" /** id-aes192-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { aes 25 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_AES192_KWP MBEDTLS_OID_AES "\x1c" /** id-aes192-wrap-pad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { aes 28 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_AES256_KW MBEDTLS_OID_AES "\x2d" /** id-aes256-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { aes 45 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_AES256_KWP MBEDTLS_OID_AES "\x30" /** id-aes256-wrap-pad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { aes 48 } */ /* * PKCS#5 OIDs */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x0c" /**< id-PBKDF2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 12} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBES2 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x0d" /**< id-PBES2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 13} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBMAC1 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x0e" /**< id-PBMAC1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 14} */ /* * PKCS#5 PBES1 algorithms */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x01" /**< pbeWithMD2AndDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 1} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD2_RC2_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x04" /**< pbeWithMD2AndRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 4} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x03" /**< pbeWithMD5AndDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 3} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD5_RC2_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x06" /**< pbeWithMD5AndRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 6} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_SHA1_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x0a" /**< pbeWithSHA1AndDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 10} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_SHA1_RC2_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x0b" /**< pbeWithSHA1AndRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 11} */ /* * PKCS#8 OIDs */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_CSR_EXT_REQ MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9 "\x0e" /**< extensionRequest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-9 14} */ /* * PKCS#12 PBE OIDs */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12 "\x01" /**< pkcs-12PbeIds OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12 1} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE "\x01" /**< pbeWithSHAAnd128BitRC4 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 1} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE "\x02" /**< pbeWithSHAAnd40BitRC4 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 2} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE "\x03" /**< pbeWithSHAAnd3-KeyTripleDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 3} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE "\x04" /**< pbeWithSHAAnd2-KeyTripleDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 4} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE "\x05" /**< pbeWithSHAAnd128BitRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 5} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE "\x06" /**< pbeWithSHAAnd40BitRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 6} */ /* * EC key algorithms from RFC 5480 */ /* id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { * iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_UNRESTRICTED MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62 "\x02\01" /* id-ecDH OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { * iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) * schemes(1) ecdh(12) } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_ECDH MBEDTLS_OID_CERTICOM "\x01\x0c" /* * ECParameters namedCurve identifiers, from RFC 5480, RFC 5639, and SEC2 */ /* secp192r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { * iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) curves(3) prime(1) 1 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192R1 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62 "\x03\x01\x01" /* secp224r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { * iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 33 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224R1 MBEDTLS_OID_CERTICOM "\x00\x21" /* secp256r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { * iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) curves(3) prime(1) 7 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256R1 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62 "\x03\x01\x07" /* secp384r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { * iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 34 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP384R1 MBEDTLS_OID_CERTICOM "\x00\x22" /* secp521r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { * iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 35 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP521R1 MBEDTLS_OID_CERTICOM "\x00\x23" /* secp192k1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { * iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 31 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192K1 MBEDTLS_OID_CERTICOM "\x00\x1f" /* secp224k1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { * iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 32 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224K1 MBEDTLS_OID_CERTICOM "\x00\x20" /* secp256k1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { * iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 10 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256K1 MBEDTLS_OID_CERTICOM "\x00\x0a" /* RFC 5639 4.1 * ecStdCurvesAndGeneration OBJECT IDENTIFIER::= {iso(1) * identified-organization(3) teletrust(36) algorithm(3) signature- * algorithm(3) ecSign(2) 8} * ellipticCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {ecStdCurvesAndGeneration 1} * versionOne OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {ellipticCurve 1} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_BRAINPOOL_V1 MBEDTLS_OID_TELETRUST "\x03\x03\x02\x08\x01\x01" /* brainpoolP256r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {versionOne 7} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP256R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_BRAINPOOL_V1 "\x07" /* brainpoolP384r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {versionOne 11} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP384R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_BRAINPOOL_V1 "\x0B" /* brainpoolP512r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {versionOne 13} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP512R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_BRAINPOOL_V1 "\x0D" /* * SEC1 C.1 * * prime-field OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-fieldType 1 } * id-fieldType OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { ansi-X9-62 fieldType(1)} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_FIELD_TYPE MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62 "\x01" #define MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_PRIME_FIELD MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_FIELD_TYPE "\x01" /* * ECDSA signature identifiers, from RFC 5480 */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62 "\x04" /* signatures(4) */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG_SHA2 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG "\x03" /* ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) */ /* ecdsa-with-SHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { * iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) 1 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG "\x01" /* ecdsa-with-SHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { * iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) * ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 1 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG_SHA2 "\x01" /* ecdsa-with-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { * iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) * ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 2 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA256 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG_SHA2 "\x02" /* ecdsa-with-SHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { * iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) * ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA384 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG_SHA2 "\x03" /* ecdsa-with-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { * iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) * ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 4 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA512 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG_SHA2 "\x04" #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /** * \brief Base OID descriptor structure */ typedef struct mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t { const char *asn1; /*!< OID ASN.1 representation */ size_t asn1_len; /*!< length of asn1 */ const char *name; /*!< official name (e.g. from RFC) */ const char *description; /*!< human friendly description */ } mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t; /** * \brief Translate an ASN.1 OID into its numeric representation * (e.g. "\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D" into "1.2.840.113549") * * \param buf buffer to put representation in * \param size size of the buffer * \param oid OID to translate * * \return Length of the string written (excluding final NULL) or * MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL in case of error */ int mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid ); /** * \brief Translate an X.509 extension OID into local values * * \param oid OID to use * \param ext_type place to store the extension type * * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND */ int mbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_type( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, int *ext_type ); /** * \brief Translate an X.509 attribute type OID into the short name * (e.g. the OID for an X520 Common Name into "CN") * * \param oid OID to use * \param short_name place to store the string pointer * * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND */ int mbedtls_oid_get_attr_short_name( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, const char **short_name ); /** * \brief Translate PublicKeyAlgorithm OID into pk_type * * \param oid OID to use * \param pk_alg place to store public key algorithm * * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND */ int mbedtls_oid_get_pk_alg( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg ); /** * \brief Translate pk_type into PublicKeyAlgorithm OID * * \param pk_alg Public key type to look for * \param oid place to store ASN.1 OID string pointer * \param olen length of the OID * * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND */ int mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_pk_alg( mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg, const char **oid, size_t *olen ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) /** * \brief Translate NamedCurve OID into an EC group identifier * * \param oid OID to use * \param grp_id place to store group id * * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND */ int mbedtls_oid_get_ec_grp( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp_id ); /** * \brief Translate EC group identifier into NamedCurve OID * * \param grp_id EC group identifier * \param oid place to store ASN.1 OID string pointer * \param olen length of the OID * * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND */ int mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp( mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, const char **oid, size_t *olen ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) /** * \brief Translate SignatureAlgorithm OID into md_type and pk_type * * \param oid OID to use * \param md_alg place to store message digest algorithm * \param pk_alg place to store public key algorithm * * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND */ int mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg ); /** * \brief Translate SignatureAlgorithm OID into description * * \param oid OID to use * \param desc place to store string pointer * * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND */ int mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg_desc( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, const char **desc ); /** * \brief Translate md_type and pk_type into SignatureAlgorithm OID * * \param md_alg message digest algorithm * \param pk_alg public key algorithm * \param oid place to store ASN.1 OID string pointer * \param olen length of the OID * * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND */ int mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_sig_alg( mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const char **oid, size_t *olen ); /** * \brief Translate hash algorithm OID into md_type * * \param oid OID to use * \param md_alg place to store message digest algorithm * * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND */ int mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg ); /** * \brief Translate hmac algorithm OID into md_type * * \param oid OID to use * \param md_hmac place to store message hmac algorithm * * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND */ int mbedtls_oid_get_md_hmac( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_hmac ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ /** * \brief Translate Extended Key Usage OID into description * * \param oid OID to use * \param desc place to store string pointer * * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND */ int mbedtls_oid_get_extended_key_usage( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, const char **desc ); /** * \brief Translate certificate policies OID into description * * \param oid OID to use * \param desc place to store string pointer * * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND */ int mbedtls_oid_get_certificate_policies( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, const char **desc ); /** * \brief Translate md_type into hash algorithm OID * * \param md_alg message digest algorithm * \param oid place to store ASN.1 OID string pointer * \param olen length of the OID * * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND */ int mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md( mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const char **oid, size_t *olen ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) /** * \brief Translate encryption algorithm OID into cipher_type * * \param oid OID to use * \param cipher_alg place to store cipher algorithm * * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND */ int mbedtls_oid_get_cipher_alg( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_cipher_type_t *cipher_alg ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) /** * \brief Translate PKCS#12 PBE algorithm OID into md_type and * cipher_type * * \param oid OID to use * \param md_alg place to store message digest algorithm * \param cipher_alg place to store cipher algorithm * * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND */ int mbedtls_oid_get_pkcs12_pbe_alg( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_cipher_type_t *cipher_alg ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* oid.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/padlock.h0000644000000000000000000000734213764415275015254 0ustar rootroot/** * \file padlock.h * * \brief VIA PadLock ACE for HW encryption/decryption supported by some * processors * * \warning These functions are only for internal use by other library * functions; you must not call them directly. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_H #define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include "mbedtls/aes.h" #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED -0x0030 /**< Input data should be aligned. */ #if defined(__has_feature) #if __has_feature(address_sanitizer) #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASAN #endif #endif /* Some versions of ASan result in errors about not enough registers */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__i386__) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASAN) #ifndef MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86 #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86 #endif #include #define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_RNG 0x000C #define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ACE 0x00C0 #define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_PHE 0x0C00 #define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_PMM 0x3000 #define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16(x) (uint32_t *) (16 + ((int32_t) (x) & ~15)) #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /** * \brief Internal PadLock detection routine * * \note This function is only for internal use by other library * functions; you must not call it directly. * * \param feature The feature to detect * * \return 1 if CPU has support for the feature, 0 otherwise */ int mbedtls_padlock_has_support( int feature ); /** * \brief Internal PadLock AES-ECB block en(de)cryption * * \note This function is only for internal use by other library * functions; you must not call it directly. * * \param ctx AES context * \param mode MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT * \param input 16-byte input block * \param output 16-byte output block * * \return 0 if success, 1 if operation failed */ int mbedtls_padlock_xcryptecb( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, int mode, const unsigned char input[16], unsigned char output[16] ); /** * \brief Internal PadLock AES-CBC buffer en(de)cryption * * \note This function is only for internal use by other library * functions; you must not call it directly. * * \param ctx AES context * \param mode MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT * \param length length of the input data * \param iv initialization vector (updated after use) * \param input buffer holding the input data * \param output buffer holding the output data * * \return 0 if success, 1 if operation failed */ int mbedtls_padlock_xcryptcbc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, unsigned char iv[16], const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* HAVE_X86 */ #endif /* padlock.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/pem.h0000644000000000000000000001264713764415275014424 0ustar rootroot/** * \file pem.h * * \brief Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) decoding */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_PEM_H #define MBEDTLS_PEM_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include /** * \name PEM Error codes * These error codes are returned in case of errors reading the * PEM data. * \{ */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT -0x1080 /**< No PEM header or footer found. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA -0x1100 /**< PEM string is not as expected. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_ALLOC_FAILED -0x1180 /**< Failed to allocate memory. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV -0x1200 /**< RSA IV is not in hex-format. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG -0x1280 /**< Unsupported key encryption algorithm. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED -0x1300 /**< Private key password can't be empty. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH -0x1380 /**< Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x1400 /**< Unavailable feature, e.g. hashing/encryption combination. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x1480 /**< Bad input parameters to function. */ /* \} name */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) /** * \brief PEM context structure */ typedef struct mbedtls_pem_context { unsigned char *buf; /*!< buffer for decoded data */ size_t buflen; /*!< length of the buffer */ unsigned char *info; /*!< buffer for extra header information */ } mbedtls_pem_context; /** * \brief PEM context setup * * \param ctx context to be initialized */ void mbedtls_pem_init( mbedtls_pem_context *ctx ); /** * \brief Read a buffer for PEM information and store the resulting * data into the specified context buffers. * * \param ctx context to use * \param header header string to seek and expect * \param footer footer string to seek and expect * \param data source data to look in (must be nul-terminated) * \param pwd password for decryption (can be NULL) * \param pwdlen length of password * \param use_len destination for total length used (set after header is * correctly read, so unless you get * MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA or * MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT, use_len is * the length to skip) * * \note Attempts to check password correctness by verifying if * the decrypted text starts with an ASN.1 sequence of * appropriate length * * \return 0 on success, or a specific PEM error code */ int mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( mbedtls_pem_context *ctx, const char *header, const char *footer, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, size_t *use_len ); /** * \brief PEM context memory freeing * * \param ctx context to be freed */ void mbedtls_pem_free( mbedtls_pem_context *ctx ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) /** * \brief Write a buffer of PEM information from a DER encoded * buffer. * * \param header The header string to write. * \param footer The footer string to write. * \param der_data The DER data to encode. * \param der_len The length of the DER data \p der_data in Bytes. * \param buf The buffer to write to. * \param buf_len The length of the output buffer \p buf in Bytes. * \param olen The address at which to store the total length written * or required (if \p buf_len is not enough). * * \note You may pass \c NULL for \p buf and \c 0 for \p buf_len * to request the length of the resulting PEM buffer in * `*olen`. * * \note This function may be called with overlapping \p der_data * and \p buf buffers. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p buf isn't large * enough to hold the PEM buffer. In this case, `*olen` holds * the required minimum size of \p buf. * \return Another PEM or BASE64 error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_pem_write_buffer( const char *header, const char *footer, const unsigned char *der_data, size_t der_len, unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len, size_t *olen ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* pem.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/pk.h0000644000000000000000000010463713764415275014256 0ustar rootroot/** * \file pk.h * * \brief Public Key abstraction layer */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_PK_H #define MBEDTLS_PK_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include "mbedtls/md.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) #include "mbedtls/rsa.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) #include "mbedtls/ecp.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) #include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) #include "psa/crypto.h" #endif #if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) #define inline __inline #endif #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED -0x3F80 /**< Memory allocation failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH -0x3F00 /**< Type mismatch, eg attempt to encrypt with an ECDSA key */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x3E80 /**< Bad input parameters to function. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x3E00 /**< Read/write of file failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION -0x3D80 /**< Unsupported key version */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT -0x3D00 /**< Invalid key tag or value. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG -0x3C80 /**< Key algorithm is unsupported (only RSA and EC are supported). */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED -0x3C00 /**< Private key password can't be empty. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH -0x3B80 /**< Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY -0x3B00 /**< The pubkey tag or value is invalid (only RSA and EC are supported). */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG -0x3A80 /**< The algorithm tag or value is invalid. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE -0x3A00 /**< Elliptic curve is unsupported (only NIST curves are supported). */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x3980 /**< Unavailable feature, e.g. RSA disabled for RSA key. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH -0x3900 /**< The buffer contains a valid signature followed by more data. */ /* MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x3880 /**< PK hardware accelerator failed. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /** * \brief Public key types */ typedef enum { MBEDTLS_PK_NONE=0, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT, MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS, MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE, } mbedtls_pk_type_t; /** * \brief Options for RSASSA-PSS signature verification. * See \c mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext() */ typedef struct mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options { mbedtls_md_type_t mgf1_hash_id; int expected_salt_len; } mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options; /** * \brief Maximum size of a signature made by mbedtls_pk_sign(). */ /* We need to set MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE to the maximum signature * size among the supported signature types. Do it by starting at 0, * then incrementally increasing to be large enough for each supported * signature mechanism. * * The resulting value can be 0, for example if MBEDTLS_ECDH_C is enabled * (which allows the pk module to be included) but neither MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C * nor MBEDTLS_RSA_C nor any opaque signature mechanism (PSA or RSA_ALT). */ #define MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE 0 #if ( defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) ) && \ MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE > MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE /* For RSA, the signature can be as large as the bignum module allows. * For RSA_ALT, the signature size is not necessarily tied to what the * bignum module can do, but in the absence of any specific setting, * we use that (rsa_alt_sign_wrap in pk_wrap will check). */ #undef MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE #define MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && \ MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN > MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE /* For ECDSA, the ecdsa module exports a constant for the maximum * signature size. */ #undef MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE #define MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) #if PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE > MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE /* PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE is the maximum size of a signature made * through the PSA API in the PSA representation. */ #undef MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE #define MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE #endif #if PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE + 11 > MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE /* The Mbed TLS representation is different for ECDSA signatures: * PSA uses the raw concatenation of r and s, * whereas Mbed TLS uses the ASN.1 representation (SEQUENCE of two INTEGERs). * Add the overhead of ASN.1: up to (1+2) + 2 * (1+2+1) for the * types, lengths (represented by up to 2 bytes), and potential leading * zeros of the INTEGERs and the SEQUENCE. */ #undef MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE #define MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE ( PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE + 11 ) #endif #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) */ /** * \brief Types for interfacing with the debug module */ typedef enum { MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_NONE = 0, MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MPI, MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_ECP, } mbedtls_pk_debug_type; /** * \brief Item to send to the debug module */ typedef struct mbedtls_pk_debug_item { mbedtls_pk_debug_type type; const char *name; void *value; } mbedtls_pk_debug_item; /** Maximum number of item send for debugging, plus 1 */ #define MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MAX_ITEMS 3 /** * \brief Public key information and operations */ typedef struct mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_pk_info_t; /** * \brief Public key container */ typedef struct mbedtls_pk_context { const mbedtls_pk_info_t * pk_info; /**< Public key information */ void * pk_ctx; /**< Underlying public key context */ } mbedtls_pk_context; #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) /** * \brief Context for resuming operations */ typedef struct { const mbedtls_pk_info_t * pk_info; /**< Public key information */ void * rs_ctx; /**< Underlying restart context */ } mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx; #else /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ /* Now we can declare functions that take a pointer to that */ typedef void mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx; #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) /** * Quick access to an RSA context inside a PK context. * * \warning You must make sure the PK context actually holds an RSA context * before using this function! */ static inline mbedtls_rsa_context *mbedtls_pk_rsa( const mbedtls_pk_context pk ) { return( (mbedtls_rsa_context *) (pk).pk_ctx ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) /** * Quick access to an EC context inside a PK context. * * \warning You must make sure the PK context actually holds an EC context * before using this function! */ static inline mbedtls_ecp_keypair *mbedtls_pk_ec( const mbedtls_pk_context pk ) { return( (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) (pk).pk_ctx ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) /** * \brief Types for RSA-alt abstraction */ typedef int (*mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_decrypt_func)( void *ctx, int mode, size_t *olen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, size_t output_max_len ); typedef int (*mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_sign_func)( void *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, unsigned char *sig ); typedef size_t (*mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_key_len_func)( void *ctx ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */ /** * \brief Return information associated with the given PK type * * \param pk_type PK type to search for. * * \return The PK info associated with the type or NULL if not found. */ const mbedtls_pk_info_t *mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type ); /** * \brief Initialize a #mbedtls_pk_context (as NONE). * * \param ctx The context to initialize. * This must not be \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_pk_init( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ); /** * \brief Free the components of a #mbedtls_pk_context. * * \param ctx The context to clear. It must have been initialized. * If this is \c NULL, this function does nothing. * * \note For contexts that have been set up with * mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque(), this does not free the underlying * PSA key and you still need to call psa_destroy_key() * independently if you want to destroy that key. */ void mbedtls_pk_free( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) /** * \brief Initialize a restart context * * \param ctx The context to initialize. * This must not be \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_pk_restart_init( mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *ctx ); /** * \brief Free the components of a restart context * * \param ctx The context to clear. It must have been initialized. * If this is \c NULL, this function does nothing. */ void mbedtls_pk_restart_free( mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *ctx ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ /** * \brief Initialize a PK context with the information given * and allocates the type-specific PK subcontext. * * \param ctx Context to initialize. It must not have been set * up yet (type #MBEDTLS_PK_NONE). * \param info Information to use * * \return 0 on success, * MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA on invalid input, * MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED on allocation failure. * * \note For contexts holding an RSA-alt key, use * \c mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt() instead. */ int mbedtls_pk_setup( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) /** * \brief Initialize a PK context to wrap a PSA key. * * \note This function replaces mbedtls_pk_setup() for contexts * that wrap a (possibly opaque) PSA key instead of * storing and manipulating the key material directly. * * \param ctx The context to initialize. It must be empty (type NONE). * \param key The PSA key to wrap, which must hold an ECC key pair * (see notes below). * * \note The wrapped key must remain valid as long as the * wrapping PK context is in use, that is at least between * the point this function is called and the point * mbedtls_pk_free() is called on this context. The wrapped * key might then be independently used or destroyed. * * \note This function is currently only available for ECC key * pairs (that is, ECC keys containing private key material). * Support for other key types may be added later. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA on invalid input * (context already used, invalid key identifier). * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the key is not an * ECC key pair. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED on allocation failure. */ int mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const psa_key_id_t key ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) /** * \brief Initialize an RSA-alt context * * \param ctx Context to initialize. It must not have been set * up yet (type #MBEDTLS_PK_NONE). * \param key RSA key pointer * \param decrypt_func Decryption function * \param sign_func Signing function * \param key_len_func Function returning key length in bytes * * \return 0 on success, or MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the * context wasn't already initialized as RSA_ALT. * * \note This function replaces \c mbedtls_pk_setup() for RSA-alt. */ int mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, void * key, mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_decrypt_func decrypt_func, mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_sign_func sign_func, mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_key_len_func key_len_func ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */ /** * \brief Get the size in bits of the underlying key * * \param ctx The context to query. It must have been initialized. * * \return Key size in bits, or 0 on error */ size_t mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ); /** * \brief Get the length in bytes of the underlying key * * \param ctx The context to query. It must have been initialized. * * \return Key length in bytes, or 0 on error */ static inline size_t mbedtls_pk_get_len( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ) { return( ( mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen( ctx ) + 7 ) / 8 ); } /** * \brief Tell if a context can do the operation given by type * * \param ctx The context to query. It must have been initialized. * \param type The desired type. * * \return 1 if the context can do operations on the given type. * \return 0 if the context cannot do the operations on the given * type. This is always the case for a context that has * been initialized but not set up, or that has been * cleared with mbedtls_pk_free(). */ int mbedtls_pk_can_do( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_pk_type_t type ); /** * \brief Verify signature (including padding if relevant). * * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up. * \param md_alg Hash algorithm used (see notes) * \param hash Hash of the message to sign * \param hash_len Hash length or 0 (see notes) * \param sig Signature to verify * \param sig_len Signature length * * \return 0 on success (signature is valid), * #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH if there is a valid * signature in sig but its length is less than \p siglen, * or a specific error code. * * \note For RSA keys, the default padding type is PKCS#1 v1.5. * Use \c mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS, ... ) * to verify RSASSA_PSS signatures. * * \note If hash_len is 0, then the length associated with md_alg * is used instead, or an error returned if it is invalid. * * \note md_alg may be MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, only if hash_len != 0 */ int mbedtls_pk_verify( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len ); /** * \brief Restartable version of \c mbedtls_pk_verify() * * \note Performs the same job as \c mbedtls_pk_verify(), but can * return early and restart according to the limit set with * \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking for ECC * operations. For RSA, same as \c mbedtls_pk_verify(). * * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up. * \param md_alg Hash algorithm used (see notes) * \param hash Hash of the message to sign * \param hash_len Hash length or 0 (see notes) * \param sig Signature to verify * \param sig_len Signature length * \param rs_ctx Restart context (NULL to disable restart) * * \return See \c mbedtls_pk_verify(), or * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). */ int mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len, mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ); /** * \brief Verify signature, with options. * (Includes verification of the padding depending on type.) * * \param type Signature type (inc. possible padding type) to verify * \param options Pointer to type-specific options, or NULL * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up. * \param md_alg Hash algorithm used (see notes) * \param hash Hash of the message to sign * \param hash_len Hash length or 0 (see notes) * \param sig Signature to verify * \param sig_len Signature length * * \return 0 on success (signature is valid), * #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH if the PK context can't be * used for this type of signatures, * #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH if there is a valid * signature in sig but its length is less than \p siglen, * or a specific error code. * * \note If hash_len is 0, then the length associated with md_alg * is used instead, or an error returned if it is invalid. * * \note md_alg may be MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, only if hash_len != 0 * * \note If type is MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS, then options must point * to a mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options structure, * otherwise it must be NULL. */ int mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( mbedtls_pk_type_t type, const void *options, mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len ); /** * \brief Make signature, including padding if relevant. * * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up * with a private key. * \param md_alg Hash algorithm used (see notes) * \param hash Hash of the message to sign * \param hash_len Hash length or 0 (see notes) * \param sig Place to write the signature. * It must have enough room for the signature. * #MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE is always enough. * You may use a smaller buffer if it is large enough * given the key type. * \param sig_len On successful return, * the number of bytes written to \p sig. * \param f_rng RNG function * \param p_rng RNG parameter * * \return 0 on success, or a specific error code. * * \note For RSA keys, the default padding type is PKCS#1 v1.5. * There is no interface in the PK module to make RSASSA-PSS * signatures yet. * * \note If hash_len is 0, then the length associated with md_alg * is used instead, or an error returned if it is invalid. * * \note For RSA, md_alg may be MBEDTLS_MD_NONE if hash_len != 0. * For ECDSA, md_alg may never be MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. */ int mbedtls_pk_sign( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); /** * \brief Restartable version of \c mbedtls_pk_sign() * * \note Performs the same job as \c mbedtls_pk_sign(), but can * return early and restart according to the limit set with * \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking for ECC * operations. For RSA, same as \c mbedtls_pk_sign(). * * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up * with a private key. * \param md_alg Hash algorithm used (see notes for mbedtls_pk_sign()) * \param hash Hash of the message to sign * \param hash_len Hash length or 0 (see notes for mbedtls_pk_sign()) * \param sig Place to write the signature. * It must have enough room for the signature. * #MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE is always enough. * You may use a smaller buffer if it is large enough * given the key type. * \param sig_len On successful return, * the number of bytes written to \p sig. * \param f_rng RNG function * \param p_rng RNG parameter * \param rs_ctx Restart context (NULL to disable restart) * * \return See \c mbedtls_pk_sign(). * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). */ int mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ); /** * \brief Decrypt message (including padding if relevant). * * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up * with a private key. * \param input Input to decrypt * \param ilen Input size * \param output Decrypted output * \param olen Decrypted message length * \param osize Size of the output buffer * \param f_rng RNG function * \param p_rng RNG parameter * * \note For RSA keys, the default padding type is PKCS#1 v1.5. * * \return 0 on success, or a specific error code. */ int mbedtls_pk_decrypt( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); /** * \brief Encrypt message (including padding if relevant). * * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up. * \param input Message to encrypt * \param ilen Message size * \param output Encrypted output * \param olen Encrypted output length * \param osize Size of the output buffer * \param f_rng RNG function * \param p_rng RNG parameter * * \note For RSA keys, the default padding type is PKCS#1 v1.5. * * \return 0 on success, or a specific error code. */ int mbedtls_pk_encrypt( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); /** * \brief Check if a public-private pair of keys matches. * * \param pub Context holding a public key. * \param prv Context holding a private (and public) key. * * \return \c 0 on success (keys were checked and match each other). * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the keys could not * be checked - in that case they may or may not match. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA if a context is invalid. * \return Another non-zero value if the keys do not match. */ int mbedtls_pk_check_pair( const mbedtls_pk_context *pub, const mbedtls_pk_context *prv ); /** * \brief Export debug information * * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been initialized. * \param items Place to write debug items * * \return 0 on success or MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA */ int mbedtls_pk_debug( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items ); /** * \brief Access the type name * * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been initialized. * * \return Type name on success, or "invalid PK" */ const char * mbedtls_pk_get_name( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ); /** * \brief Get the key type * * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been initialized. * * \return Type on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_PK_NONE for a context that has not been set up. */ mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_pk_get_type( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) /** \ingroup pk_module */ /** * \brief Parse a private key in PEM or DER format * * \param ctx The PK context to fill. It must have been initialized * but not set up. * \param key Input buffer to parse. * The buffer must contain the input exactly, with no * extra trailing material. For PEM, the buffer must * contain a null-terminated string. * \param keylen Size of \b key in bytes. * For PEM data, this includes the terminating null byte, * so \p keylen must be equal to `strlen(key) + 1`. * \param pwd Optional password for decryption. * Pass \c NULL if expecting a non-encrypted key. * Pass a string of \p pwdlen bytes if expecting an encrypted * key; a non-encrypted key will also be accepted. * The empty password is not supported. * \param pwdlen Size of the password in bytes. * Ignored if \p pwd is \c NULL. * * \note On entry, ctx must be empty, either freshly initialised * with mbedtls_pk_init() or reset with mbedtls_pk_free(). If you need a * specific key type, check the result with mbedtls_pk_can_do(). * * \note The key is also checked for correctness. * * \return 0 if successful, or a specific PK or PEM error code */ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen ); /** \ingroup pk_module */ /** * \brief Parse a public key in PEM or DER format * * \param ctx The PK context to fill. It must have been initialized * but not set up. * \param key Input buffer to parse. * The buffer must contain the input exactly, with no * extra trailing material. For PEM, the buffer must * contain a null-terminated string. * \param keylen Size of \b key in bytes. * For PEM data, this includes the terminating null byte, * so \p keylen must be equal to `strlen(key) + 1`. * * \note On entry, ctx must be empty, either freshly initialised * with mbedtls_pk_init() or reset with mbedtls_pk_free(). If you need a * specific key type, check the result with mbedtls_pk_can_do(). * * \note The key is also checked for correctness. * * \return 0 if successful, or a specific PK or PEM error code */ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) /** \ingroup pk_module */ /** * \brief Load and parse a private key * * \param ctx The PK context to fill. It must have been initialized * but not set up. * \param path filename to read the private key from * \param password Optional password to decrypt the file. * Pass \c NULL if expecting a non-encrypted key. * Pass a null-terminated string if expecting an encrypted * key; a non-encrypted key will also be accepted. * The empty password is not supported. * * \note On entry, ctx must be empty, either freshly initialised * with mbedtls_pk_init() or reset with mbedtls_pk_free(). If you need a * specific key type, check the result with mbedtls_pk_can_do(). * * \note The key is also checked for correctness. * * \return 0 if successful, or a specific PK or PEM error code */ int mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const char *path, const char *password ); /** \ingroup pk_module */ /** * \brief Load and parse a public key * * \param ctx The PK context to fill. It must have been initialized * but not set up. * \param path filename to read the public key from * * \note On entry, ctx must be empty, either freshly initialised * with mbedtls_pk_init() or reset with mbedtls_pk_free(). If * you need a specific key type, check the result with * mbedtls_pk_can_do(). * * \note The key is also checked for correctness. * * \return 0 if successful, or a specific PK or PEM error code */ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const char *path ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) /** * \brief Write a private key to a PKCS#1 or SEC1 DER structure * Note: data is written at the end of the buffer! Use the * return value to determine where you should start * using the buffer * * \param ctx PK context which must contain a valid private key. * \param buf buffer to write to * \param size size of the buffer * * \return length of data written if successful, or a specific * error code */ int mbedtls_pk_write_key_der( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size ); /** * \brief Write a public key to a SubjectPublicKeyInfo DER structure * Note: data is written at the end of the buffer! Use the * return value to determine where you should start * using the buffer * * \param ctx PK context which must contain a valid public or private key. * \param buf buffer to write to * \param size size of the buffer * * \return length of data written if successful, or a specific * error code */ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) /** * \brief Write a public key to a PEM string * * \param ctx PK context which must contain a valid public or private key. * \param buf Buffer to write to. The output includes a * terminating null byte. * \param size Size of the buffer in bytes. * * \return 0 if successful, or a specific error code */ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_pem( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size ); /** * \brief Write a private key to a PKCS#1 or SEC1 PEM string * * \param ctx PK context which must contain a valid private key. * \param buf Buffer to write to. The output includes a * terminating null byte. * \param size Size of the buffer in bytes. * * \return 0 if successful, or a specific error code */ int mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C */ /* * WARNING: Low-level functions. You probably do not want to use these unless * you are certain you do ;) */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) /** * \brief Parse a SubjectPublicKeyInfo DER structure * * \param p the position in the ASN.1 data * \param end end of the buffer * \param pk The PK context to fill. It must have been initialized * but not set up. * * \return 0 if successful, or a specific PK error code */ int mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_pk_context *pk ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) /** * \brief Write a subjectPublicKey to ASN.1 data * Note: function works backwards in data buffer * * \param p reference to current position pointer * \param start start of the buffer (for bounds-checking) * \param key PK context which must contain a valid public or private key. * * \return the length written or a negative error code */ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, const mbedtls_pk_context *key ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C */ /* * Internal module functions. You probably do not want to use these unless you * know you do. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) int mbedtls_pk_load_file( const char *path, unsigned char **buf, size_t *n ); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) /** * \brief Turn an EC key into an opaque one. * * \warning This is a temporary utility function for tests. It might * change or be removed at any time without notice. * * \note Only ECDSA keys are supported so far. Signing with the * specified hash is the only allowed use of that key. * * \param pk Input: the EC key to import to a PSA key. * Output: a PK context wrapping that PSA key. * \param key Output: a PSA key identifier. * It's the caller's responsibility to call * psa_destroy_key() on that key identifier after calling * mbedtls_pk_free() on the PK context. * \param hash_alg The hash algorithm to allow for use with that key. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return An Mbed TLS error code otherwise. */ int mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque( mbedtls_pk_context *pk, psa_key_id_t *key, psa_algorithm_t hash_alg ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_H */ usr/include/mbedtls/pk_internal.h0000644000000000000000000001102113764415275016132 0ustar rootroot/** * \file pk_internal.h * * \brief Public Key abstraction layer: wrapper functions */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_PK_WRAP_H #define MBEDTLS_PK_WRAP_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include "mbedtls/pk.h" struct mbedtls_pk_info_t { /** Public key type */ mbedtls_pk_type_t type; /** Type name */ const char *name; /** Get key size in bits */ size_t (*get_bitlen)( const void * ); /** Tell if the context implements this type (e.g. ECKEY can do ECDSA) */ int (*can_do)( mbedtls_pk_type_t type ); /** Verify signature */ int (*verify_func)( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len ); /** Make signature */ int (*sign_func)( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) /** Verify signature (restartable) */ int (*verify_rs_func)( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len, void *rs_ctx ); /** Make signature (restartable) */ int (*sign_rs_func)( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, void *rs_ctx ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ /** Decrypt message */ int (*decrypt_func)( void *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); /** Encrypt message */ int (*encrypt_func)( void *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); /** Check public-private key pair */ int (*check_pair_func)( const void *pub, const void *prv ); /** Allocate a new context */ void * (*ctx_alloc_func)( void ); /** Free the given context */ void (*ctx_free_func)( void *ctx ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) /** Allocate the restart context */ void * (*rs_alloc_func)( void ); /** Free the restart context */ void (*rs_free_func)( void *rs_ctx ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ /** Interface with the debug module */ void (*debug_func)( const void *ctx, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items ); }; #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) /* Container for RSA-alt */ typedef struct { void *key; mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_decrypt_func decrypt_func; mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_sign_func sign_func; mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_key_len_func key_len_func; } mbedtls_rsa_alt_context; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_info; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_eckey_info; extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_eckeydh_info; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_ecdsa_info; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_alt_info; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_pk_opaque_info; #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRAP_H */ usr/include/mbedtls/pkcs11.h0000644000000000000000000002116013764415275014733 0ustar rootroot/** * \file pkcs11.h * * \brief Wrapper for PKCS#11 library libpkcs11-helper * * \author Adriaan de Jong */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_PKCS11_H #define MBEDTLS_PKCS11_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C) #include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" #include #if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) #define inline __inline #endif #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) /** * Context for PKCS #11 private keys. */ typedef struct mbedtls_pkcs11_context { pkcs11h_certificate_t pkcs11h_cert; int len; } mbedtls_pkcs11_context; #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) #else #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /** * Initialize a mbedtls_pkcs11_context. * (Just making memory references valid.) * * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a * future version of the library. */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_pkcs11_init( mbedtls_pkcs11_context *ctx ); /** * Fill in a mbed TLS certificate, based on the given PKCS11 helper certificate. * * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a * future version of the library. * * \param cert X.509 certificate to fill * \param pkcs11h_cert PKCS #11 helper certificate * * \return 0 on success. */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED int mbedtls_pkcs11_x509_cert_bind( mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, pkcs11h_certificate_t pkcs11h_cert ); /** * Set up a mbedtls_pkcs11_context storing the given certificate. Note that the * mbedtls_pkcs11_context will take over control of the certificate, freeing it when * done. * * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a * future version of the library. * * \param priv_key Private key structure to fill. * \param pkcs11_cert PKCS #11 helper certificate * * \return 0 on success */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED int mbedtls_pkcs11_priv_key_bind( mbedtls_pkcs11_context *priv_key, pkcs11h_certificate_t pkcs11_cert ); /** * Free the contents of the given private key context. Note that the structure * itself is not freed. * * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a * future version of the library. * * \param priv_key Private key structure to cleanup */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_pkcs11_priv_key_free( mbedtls_pkcs11_context *priv_key ); /** * \brief Do an RSA private key decrypt, then remove the message * padding * * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a future * version of the library. * * \param ctx PKCS #11 context * \param mode must be MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, for compatibility with rsa.c's signature * \param input buffer holding the encrypted data * \param output buffer that will hold the plaintext * \param olen will contain the plaintext length * \param output_max_len maximum length of the output buffer * * \return 0 if successful, or an MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code * * \note The output buffer must be as large as the size * of ctx->N (eg. 128 bytes if RSA-1024 is used) otherwise * an error is thrown. */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED int mbedtls_pkcs11_decrypt( mbedtls_pkcs11_context *ctx, int mode, size_t *olen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, size_t output_max_len ); /** * \brief Do a private RSA to sign a message digest * * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a future * version of the library. * * \param ctx PKCS #11 context * \param mode must be MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, for compatibility with rsa.c's signature * \param md_alg a MBEDTLS_MD_XXX (use MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data) * \param hashlen message digest length (for MBEDTLS_MD_NONE only) * \param hash buffer holding the message digest * \param sig buffer that will hold the ciphertext * * \return 0 if the signing operation was successful, * or an MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code * * \note The "sig" buffer must be as large as the size * of ctx->N (eg. 128 bytes if RSA-1024 is used). */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED int mbedtls_pkcs11_sign( mbedtls_pkcs11_context *ctx, int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, unsigned char *sig ); /** * SSL/TLS wrappers for PKCS#11 functions * * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a future * version of the library. */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED static inline int mbedtls_ssl_pkcs11_decrypt( void *ctx, int mode, size_t *olen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, size_t output_max_len ) { return mbedtls_pkcs11_decrypt( (mbedtls_pkcs11_context *) ctx, mode, olen, input, output, output_max_len ); } /** * \brief This function signs a message digest using RSA. * * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a future * version of the library. * * \param ctx The PKCS #11 context. * \param f_rng The RNG function. This parameter is unused. * \param p_rng The RNG context. This parameter is unused. * \param mode The operation to run. This must be set to * MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, for compatibility with rsa.c's * signature. * \param md_alg The message digest algorithm. One of the MBEDTLS_MD_XXX * must be passed to this function and MBEDTLS_MD_NONE can be * used for signing raw data. * \param hashlen The message digest length (for MBEDTLS_MD_NONE only). * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest. * \param sig The buffer that will hold the ciphertext. * * \return \c 0 if the signing operation was successful. * \return A non-zero error code on failure. * * \note The \p sig buffer must be as large as the size of * ctx->N. For example, 128 bytes if RSA-1024 is * used. */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED static inline int mbedtls_ssl_pkcs11_sign( void *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, unsigned char *sig ) { ((void) f_rng); ((void) p_rng); return mbedtls_pkcs11_sign( (mbedtls_pkcs11_context *) ctx, mode, md_alg, hashlen, hash, sig ); } /** * This function gets the length of the private key. * * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a future * version of the library. * * \param ctx The PKCS #11 context. * * \return The length of the private key. */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_pkcs11_key_len( void *ctx ) { return ( (mbedtls_pkcs11_context *) ctx )->len; } #undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS11_H */ usr/include/mbedtls/pkcs12.h0000644000000000000000000001202013764415275014727 0ustar rootroot/** * \file pkcs12.h * * \brief PKCS#12 Personal Information Exchange Syntax */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_PKCS12_H #define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include "mbedtls/md.h" #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" #include #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x1F80 /**< Bad input parameters to function. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x1F00 /**< Feature not available, e.g. unsupported encryption scheme. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT -0x1E80 /**< PBE ASN.1 data not as expected. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH -0x1E00 /**< Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption. */ #define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_KEY 1 /**< encryption/decryption key */ #define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_IV 2 /**< initialization vector */ #define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_MAC_KEY 3 /**< integrity / MAC key */ #define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT 0 #define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT 1 #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) /** * \brief PKCS12 Password Based function (encryption / decryption) * for pbeWithSHAAnd128BitRC4 * * \param pbe_params an ASN1 buffer containing the pkcs-12PbeParams structure * \param mode either MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT * \param pwd the password used (may be NULL if no password is used) * \param pwdlen length of the password (may be 0) * \param input the input data * \param len data length * \param output the output buffer * * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code */ int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_sha1_rc4_128( mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, const unsigned char *input, size_t len, unsigned char *output ); /** * \brief PKCS12 Password Based function (encryption / decryption) * for cipher-based and mbedtls_md-based PBE's * * \param pbe_params an ASN1 buffer containing the pkcs-12PbeParams structure * \param mode either MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT * \param cipher_type the cipher used * \param md_type the mbedtls_md used * \param pwd the password used (may be NULL if no password is used) * \param pwdlen length of the password (may be 0) * \param input the input data * \param len data length * \param output the output buffer * * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code */ int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe( mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type, mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, const unsigned char *input, size_t len, unsigned char *output ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ /** * \brief The PKCS#12 derivation function uses a password and a salt * to produce pseudo-random bits for a particular "purpose". * * Depending on the given id, this function can produce an * encryption/decryption key, an nitialization vector or an * integrity key. * * \param data buffer to store the derived data in * \param datalen length to fill * \param pwd password to use (may be NULL if no password is used) * \param pwdlen length of the password (may be 0) * \param salt salt buffer to use * \param saltlen length of the salt * \param mbedtls_md mbedtls_md type to use during the derivation * \param id id that describes the purpose (can be MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_KEY, * MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_IV or MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_MAC_KEY) * \param iterations number of iterations * * \return 0 if successful, or a MD, BIGNUM type error. */ int mbedtls_pkcs12_derivation( unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen, mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md, int id, int iterations ); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* pkcs12.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/pkcs5.h0000644000000000000000000000660713764415275014667 0ustar rootroot/** * \file pkcs5.h * * \brief PKCS#5 functions * * \author Mathias Olsson */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_PKCS5_H #define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" #include "mbedtls/md.h" #include #include #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x2f80 /**< Bad input parameters to function. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT -0x2f00 /**< Unexpected ASN.1 data. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x2e80 /**< Requested encryption or digest alg not available. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH -0x2e00 /**< Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption. */ #define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT 0 #define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_ENCRYPT 1 #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) /** * \brief PKCS#5 PBES2 function * * \param pbe_params the ASN.1 algorithm parameters * \param mode either MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT or MBEDTLS_PKCS5_ENCRYPT * \param pwd password to use when generating key * \param pwdlen length of password * \param data data to process * \param datalen length of data * \param output output buffer * * \returns 0 on success, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code if verification fails. */ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, unsigned char *output ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ /** * \brief PKCS#5 PBKDF2 using HMAC * * \param ctx Generic HMAC context * \param password Password to use when generating key * \param plen Length of password * \param salt Salt to use when generating key * \param slen Length of salt * \param iteration_count Iteration count * \param key_length Length of generated key in bytes * \param output Generated key. Must be at least as big as key_length * * \returns 0 on success, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code if verification fails. */ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *password, size_t plen, const unsigned char *salt, size_t slen, unsigned int iteration_count, uint32_t key_length, unsigned char *output ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** * \brief Checkup routine * * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed */ int mbedtls_pkcs5_self_test( int verbose ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* pkcs5.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/platform.h0000644000000000000000000003507113764415275015463 0ustar rootroot/** * \file platform.h * * \brief This file contains the definitions and functions of the * Mbed TLS platform abstraction layer. * * The platform abstraction layer removes the need for the library * to directly link to standard C library functions or operating * system services, making the library easier to port and embed. * Application developers and users of the library can provide their own * implementations of these functions, or implementations specific to * their platform, which can be statically linked to the library or * dynamically configured at runtime. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_H #define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) #include "mbedtls/platform_time.h" #endif #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0070 /**< Hardware accelerator failed */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED -0x0072 /**< The requested feature is not supported by the platform */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /** * \name SECTION: Module settings * * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. * \{ */ /* The older Microsoft Windows common runtime provides non-conforming * implementations of some standard library functions, including snprintf * and vsnprintf. This affects MSVC and MinGW builds. */ #if defined(__MINGW32__) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER <= 1900) #define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_SNPRINTF #define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_VSNPRINTF #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS) #include #include #include #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF) #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_SNPRINTF) #define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF mbedtls_platform_win32_snprintf /**< The default \c snprintf function to use. */ #else #define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF snprintf /**< The default \c snprintf function to use. */ #endif #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF) #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_VSNPRINTF) #define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF mbedtls_platform_win32_vsnprintf /**< The default \c vsnprintf function to use. */ #else #define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF vsnprintf /**< The default \c vsnprintf function to use. */ #endif #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF) #define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF printf /**< The default \c printf function to use. */ #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF) #define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF fprintf /**< The default \c fprintf function to use. */ #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC) #define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC calloc /**< The default \c calloc function to use. */ #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE) #define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE free /**< The default \c free function to use. */ #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT) #define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT exit /**< The default \c exit function to use. */ #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME) #define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME time /**< The default \c time function to use. */ #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_SUCCESS) #define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS /**< The default exit value to use. */ #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_FAILURE) #define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE /**< The default exit value to use. */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ) #define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_read #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE) #define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_write #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE) #define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE "seedfile" #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ #else /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR) #include MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS */ /* \} name SECTION: Module settings */ /* * The function pointers for calloc and free. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO) #define mbedtls_free MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO #define mbedtls_calloc MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO #else /* For size_t */ #include extern void *mbedtls_calloc( size_t n, size_t size ); extern void mbedtls_free( void *ptr ); /** * \brief This function dynamically sets the memory-management * functions used by the library, during runtime. * * \param calloc_func The \c calloc function implementation. * \param free_func The \c free function implementation. * * \return \c 0. */ int mbedtls_platform_set_calloc_free( void * (*calloc_func)( size_t, size_t ), void (*free_func)( void * ) ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO && MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO */ #else /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY */ #define mbedtls_free free #define mbedtls_calloc calloc #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY && !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_{FREE,CALLOC}_MACRO */ /* * The function pointers for fprintf */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT) /* We need FILE * */ #include extern int (*mbedtls_fprintf)( FILE *stream, const char *format, ... ); /** * \brief This function dynamically configures the fprintf * function that is called when the * mbedtls_fprintf() function is invoked by the library. * * \param fprintf_func The \c fprintf function implementation. * * \return \c 0. */ int mbedtls_platform_set_fprintf( int (*fprintf_func)( FILE *stream, const char *, ... ) ); #else #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO) #define mbedtls_fprintf MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO #else #define mbedtls_fprintf fprintf #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT */ /* * The function pointers for printf */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT) extern int (*mbedtls_printf)( const char *format, ... ); /** * \brief This function dynamically configures the snprintf * function that is called when the mbedtls_snprintf() * function is invoked by the library. * * \param printf_func The \c printf function implementation. * * \return \c 0 on success. */ int mbedtls_platform_set_printf( int (*printf_func)( const char *, ... ) ); #else /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO) #define mbedtls_printf MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO #else #define mbedtls_printf printf #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT */ /* * The function pointers for snprintf * * The snprintf implementation should conform to C99: * - it *must* always correctly zero-terminate the buffer * (except when n == 0, then it must leave the buffer untouched) * - however it is acceptable to return -1 instead of the required length when * the destination buffer is too short. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_SNPRINTF) /* For Windows (inc. MSYS2), we provide our own fixed implementation */ int mbedtls_platform_win32_snprintf( char *s, size_t n, const char *fmt, ... ); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT) extern int (*mbedtls_snprintf)( char * s, size_t n, const char * format, ... ); /** * \brief This function allows configuring a custom * \c snprintf function pointer. * * \param snprintf_func The \c snprintf function implementation. * * \return \c 0 on success. */ int mbedtls_platform_set_snprintf( int (*snprintf_func)( char * s, size_t n, const char * format, ... ) ); #else /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO) #define mbedtls_snprintf MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO #else #define mbedtls_snprintf MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT */ /* * The function pointers for vsnprintf * * The vsnprintf implementation should conform to C99: * - it *must* always correctly zero-terminate the buffer * (except when n == 0, then it must leave the buffer untouched) * - however it is acceptable to return -1 instead of the required length when * the destination buffer is too short. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_VSNPRINTF) #include /* For Older Windows (inc. MSYS2), we provide our own fixed implementation */ int mbedtls_platform_win32_vsnprintf( char *s, size_t n, const char *fmt, va_list arg ); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT) #include extern int (*mbedtls_vsnprintf)( char * s, size_t n, const char * format, va_list arg ); /** * \brief Set your own snprintf function pointer * * \param vsnprintf_func The \c vsnprintf function implementation * * \return \c 0 */ int mbedtls_platform_set_vsnprintf( int (*vsnprintf_func)( char * s, size_t n, const char * format, va_list arg ) ); #else /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO) #define mbedtls_vsnprintf MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO #else #define mbedtls_vsnprintf vsnprintf #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT */ /* * The function pointers for exit */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT) extern void (*mbedtls_exit)( int status ); /** * \brief This function dynamically configures the exit * function that is called when the mbedtls_exit() * function is invoked by the library. * * \param exit_func The \c exit function implementation. * * \return \c 0 on success. */ int mbedtls_platform_set_exit( void (*exit_func)( int status ) ); #else #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO) #define mbedtls_exit MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO #else #define mbedtls_exit exit #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT */ /* * The default exit values */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_SUCCESS) #define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_SUCCESS #else #define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS 0 #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_FAILURE) #define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_FAILURE #else #define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE 1 #endif /* * The function pointers for reading from and writing a seed file to * Non-Volatile storage (NV) in a platform-independent way * * Only enabled when the NV seed entropy source is enabled */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) /* Internal standard platform definitions */ int mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_read( unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ); int mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_write( unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT) extern int (*mbedtls_nv_seed_read)( unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ); extern int (*mbedtls_nv_seed_write)( unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ); /** * \brief This function allows configuring custom seed file writing and * reading functions. * * \param nv_seed_read_func The seed reading function implementation. * \param nv_seed_write_func The seed writing function implementation. * * \return \c 0 on success. */ int mbedtls_platform_set_nv_seed( int (*nv_seed_read_func)( unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ), int (*nv_seed_write_func)( unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ) ); #else #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_READ_MACRO) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_WRITE_MACRO) #define mbedtls_nv_seed_read MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_READ_MACRO #define mbedtls_nv_seed_write MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_WRITE_MACRO #else #define mbedtls_nv_seed_read mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_read #define mbedtls_nv_seed_write mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_write #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT) /** * \brief The platform context structure. * * \note This structure may be used to assist platform-specific * setup or teardown operations. */ typedef struct mbedtls_platform_context { char dummy; /**< A placeholder member, as empty structs are not portable. */ } mbedtls_platform_context; #else #include "platform_alt.h" #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT */ /** * \brief This function performs any platform-specific initialization * operations. * * \note This function should be called before any other library functions. * * Its implementation is platform-specific, and unless * platform-specific code is provided, it does nothing. * * \note The usage and necessity of this function is dependent on the platform. * * \param ctx The platform context. * * \return \c 0 on success. */ int mbedtls_platform_setup( mbedtls_platform_context *ctx ); /** * \brief This function performs any platform teardown operations. * * \note This function should be called after every other Mbed TLS module * has been correctly freed using the appropriate free function. * * Its implementation is platform-specific, and unless * platform-specific code is provided, it does nothing. * * \note The usage and necessity of this function is dependent on the platform. * * \param ctx The platform context. * */ void mbedtls_platform_teardown( mbedtls_platform_context *ctx ); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* platform.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/platform_time.h0000644000000000000000000000400013764415275016465 0ustar rootroot/** * \file platform_time.h * * \brief mbed TLS Platform time abstraction */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_H #define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /** * \name SECTION: Module settings * * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. * \{ */ /* * The time_t datatype */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO) typedef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO mbedtls_time_t; #else /* For time_t */ #include typedef time_t mbedtls_time_t; #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO */ /* * The function pointers for time */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT) extern mbedtls_time_t (*mbedtls_time)( mbedtls_time_t* time ); /** * \brief Set your own time function pointer * * \param time_func the time function implementation * * \return 0 */ int mbedtls_platform_set_time( mbedtls_time_t (*time_func)( mbedtls_time_t* time ) ); #else #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO) #define mbedtls_time MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO #else #define mbedtls_time time #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* platform_time.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/platform_util.h0000644000000000000000000001705713764415275016524 0ustar rootroot/** * \file platform_util.h * * \brief Common and shared functions used by multiple modules in the Mbed TLS * library. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_UTIL_H #define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_UTIL_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) #include "mbedtls/platform_time.h" #include #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS) #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT) /* Allow the user to define MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED to something like assert * (which is what our config.h suggests). */ #include #endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED) /** An alternative definition of MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED has been set in config.h. * * This flag can be used to check whether it is safe to assume that * MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() will expand to a call to mbedtls_param_failed(). */ #define MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED_ALT #elif defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT) #define MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED( cond ) assert( cond ) #define MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED_ALT #else /* MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED */ #define MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED( cond ) \ mbedtls_param_failed( #cond, __FILE__, __LINE__ ) /** * \brief User supplied callback function for parameter validation failure. * See #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS for context. * * This function will be called unless an alternative treatement * is defined through the #MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED macro. * * This function can return, and the operation will be aborted, or * alternatively, through use of setjmp()/longjmp() can resume * execution in the application code. * * \param failure_condition The assertion that didn't hold. * \param file The file where the assertion failed. * \param line The line in the file where the assertion failed. */ void mbedtls_param_failed( const char *failure_condition, const char *file, int line ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED */ /* Internal macro meant to be called only from within the library. */ #define MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, ret ) \ do { \ if( !(cond) ) \ { \ MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED( cond ); \ return( ret ); \ } \ } while( 0 ) /* Internal macro meant to be called only from within the library. */ #define MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) \ do { \ if( !(cond) ) \ { \ MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED( cond ); \ return; \ } \ } while( 0 ) #else /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS */ /* Internal macros meant to be called only from within the library. */ #define MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, ret ) do { } while( 0 ) #define MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) do { } while( 0 ) #endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS */ /* Internal helper macros for deprecating API constants. */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) /* Deliberately don't (yet) export MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED here * to avoid conflict with other headers which define and use * it, too. We might want to move all these definitions here at * some point for uniformity. */ #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED typedef char const * mbedtls_deprecated_string_constant_t; #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( VAL ) \ ( (mbedtls_deprecated_string_constant_t) ( VAL ) ) MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED typedef int mbedtls_deprecated_numeric_constant_t; #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT( VAL ) \ ( (mbedtls_deprecated_numeric_constant_t) ( VAL ) ) #undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #else /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( VAL ) VAL #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT( VAL ) VAL #endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ /** * \brief Securely zeroize a buffer * * The function is meant to wipe the data contained in a buffer so * that it can no longer be recovered even if the program memory * is later compromised. Call this function on sensitive data * stored on the stack before returning from a function, and on * sensitive data stored on the heap before freeing the heap * object. * * It is extremely difficult to guarantee that calls to * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() are not removed by aggressive * compiler optimizations in a portable way. For this reason, Mbed * TLS provides the configuration option * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT, which allows users to configure * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() to use a suitable implementation for * their platform and needs * * \param buf Buffer to be zeroized * \param len Length of the buffer in bytes * */ void mbedtls_platform_zeroize( void *buf, size_t len ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) /** * \brief Platform-specific implementation of gmtime_r() * * The function is a thread-safe abstraction that behaves * similarly to the gmtime_r() function from Unix/POSIX. * * Mbed TLS will try to identify the underlying platform and * make use of an appropriate underlying implementation (e.g. * gmtime_r() for POSIX and gmtime_s() for Windows). If this is * not possible, then gmtime() will be used. In this case, calls * from the library to gmtime() will be guarded by the mutex * mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is * enabled. It is recommended that calls from outside the library * are also guarded by this mutex. * * If MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT is defined, then Mbed TLS will * unconditionally use the alternative implementation for * mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() supplied by the user at compile time. * * \param tt Pointer to an object containing time (in seconds) since the * epoch to be converted * \param tm_buf Pointer to an object where the results will be stored * * \return Pointer to an object of type struct tm on success, otherwise * NULL */ struct tm *mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r( const mbedtls_time_t *tt, struct tm *tm_buf ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_UTIL_H */ usr/include/mbedtls/poly1305.h0000644000000000000000000001545713764415275015141 0ustar rootroot/** * \file poly1305.h * * \brief This file contains Poly1305 definitions and functions. * * Poly1305 is a one-time message authenticator that can be used to * authenticate messages. Poly1305-AES was created by Daniel * Bernstein https://cr.yp.to/mac/poly1305-20050329.pdf The generic * Poly1305 algorithm (not tied to AES) was also standardized in RFC * 7539. * * \author Daniel King */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_POLY1305_H #define MBEDTLS_POLY1305_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include #include #define MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0057 /**< Invalid input parameter(s). */ /* MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is deprecated and should not be * used. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x0059 /**< Feature not available. For example, s part of the API is not implemented. */ /* MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x005B /**< Poly1305 hardware accelerator failed. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT) typedef struct mbedtls_poly1305_context { uint32_t r[4]; /** The value for 'r' (low 128 bits of the key). */ uint32_t s[4]; /** The value for 's' (high 128 bits of the key). */ uint32_t acc[5]; /** The accumulator number. */ uint8_t queue[16]; /** The current partial block of data. */ size_t queue_len; /** The number of bytes stored in 'queue'. */ } mbedtls_poly1305_context; #else /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT */ #include "poly1305_alt.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT */ /** * \brief This function initializes the specified Poly1305 context. * * It must be the first API called before using * the context. * * It is usually followed by a call to * \c mbedtls_poly1305_starts(), then one or more calls to * \c mbedtls_poly1305_update(), then one call to * \c mbedtls_poly1305_finish(), then finally * \c mbedtls_poly1305_free(). * * \param ctx The Poly1305 context to initialize. This must * not be \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_poly1305_init( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx ); /** * \brief This function releases and clears the specified * Poly1305 context. * * \param ctx The Poly1305 context to clear. This may be \c NULL, in which * case this function is a no-op. If it is not \c NULL, it must * point to an initialized Poly1305 context. */ void mbedtls_poly1305_free( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx ); /** * \brief This function sets the one-time authentication key. * * \warning The key must be unique and unpredictable for each * invocation of Poly1305. * * \param ctx The Poly1305 context to which the key should be bound. * This must be initialized. * \param key The buffer containing the \c 32 Byte (\c 256 Bit) key. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_poly1305_starts( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[32] ); /** * \brief This functions feeds an input buffer into an ongoing * Poly1305 computation. * * It is called between \c mbedtls_cipher_poly1305_starts() and * \c mbedtls_cipher_poly1305_finish(). * It can be called repeatedly to process a stream of data. * * \param ctx The Poly1305 context to use for the Poly1305 operation. * This must be initialized and bound to a key. * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. * Any value is accepted. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. * This pointer can be \c NULL if `ilen == 0`. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_poly1305_update( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ); /** * \brief This function generates the Poly1305 Message * Authentication Code (MAC). * * \param ctx The Poly1305 context to use for the Poly1305 operation. * This must be initialized and bound to a key. * \param mac The buffer to where the MAC is written. This must * be a writable buffer of length \c 16 Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_poly1305_finish( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, unsigned char mac[16] ); /** * \brief This function calculates the Poly1305 MAC of the input * buffer with the provided key. * * \warning The key must be unique and unpredictable for each * invocation of Poly1305. * * \param key The buffer containing the \c 32 Byte (\c 256 Bit) key. * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. * Any value is accepted. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. * This pointer can be \c NULL if `ilen == 0`. * \param mac The buffer to where the MAC is written. This must be * a writable buffer of length \c 16 Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_poly1305_mac( const unsigned char key[32], const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char mac[16] ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** * \brief The Poly1305 checkup routine. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return \c 1 on failure. */ int mbedtls_poly1305_self_test( int verbose ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_H */ usr/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h0000644000000000000000000003435713764415275015465 0ustar rootroot/** * \file psa_util.h * * \brief Utility functions for the use of the PSA Crypto library. * * \warning This function is not part of the public API and may * change at any time. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_H #define MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) #include "psa/crypto.h" #include "mbedtls/ecp.h" #include "mbedtls/md.h" #include "mbedtls/pk.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include /* Translations for symmetric crypto. */ static inline psa_key_type_t mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_type( mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher ) { switch( cipher ) { case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM: case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM: case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM: case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM: case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM: case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM: case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC: case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC: case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC: return( PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES ); /* ARIA not yet supported in PSA. */ /* case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM: case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM: case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM: case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM: case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_GCM: case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM: case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC: case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC: case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC: return( PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA ); */ default: return( 0 ); } } static inline psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_mode( mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode, size_t taglen ) { switch( mode ) { case MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB: return( PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING ); case MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM: return( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_TAG_LENGTH( PSA_ALG_GCM, taglen ) ); case MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM: return( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_TAG_LENGTH( PSA_ALG_CCM, taglen ) ); case MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC: if( taglen == 0 ) return( PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING ); /* Intentional fallthrough for taglen != 0 */ /* fallthrough */ default: return( 0 ); } } static inline psa_key_usage_t mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_operation( mbedtls_operation_t op ) { switch( op ) { case MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT: return( PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT ); case MBEDTLS_DECRYPT: return( PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ); default: return( 0 ); } } /* Translations for hashing. */ static inline psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_psa_translate_md( mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) { switch( md_alg ) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: return( PSA_ALG_MD2 ); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: return( PSA_ALG_MD4 ); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: return( PSA_ALG_MD5 ); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: return( PSA_ALG_SHA_1 ); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: return( PSA_ALG_SHA_224 ); case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: return( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: return( PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ); case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: return( PSA_ALG_SHA_512 ); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: return( PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 ); #endif case MBEDTLS_MD_NONE: /* Intentional fallthrough */ default: return( 0 ); } } /* Translations for ECC. */ static inline int mbedtls_psa_get_ecc_oid_from_id( psa_ecc_family_t curve, size_t bits, char const **oid, size_t *oid_len ) { switch( curve ) { case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1: switch( bits ) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) case 192: *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192R1; *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192R1 ); return( 0 ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) case 224: *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224R1; *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224R1 ); return( 0 ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) case 256: *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256R1; *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256R1 ); return( 0 ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) case 384: *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP384R1; *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP384R1 ); return( 0 ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) case 521: *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP521R1; *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP521R1 ); return( 0 ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ } break; case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1: switch( bits ) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) case 192: *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192K1; *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192K1 ); return( 0 ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) case 224: *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224K1; *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224K1 ); return( 0 ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) case 256: *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256K1; *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256K1 ); return( 0 ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ } break; case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1: switch( bits ) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) case 256: *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP256R1; *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP256R1 ); return( 0 ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) case 384: *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP384R1; *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP384R1 ); return( 0 ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) case 512: *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP512R1; *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP512R1 ); return( 0 ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ } break; } (void) oid; (void) oid_len; return( -1 ); } #define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH 1 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) #if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 192 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) #undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH #define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 192 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) #if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 224 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) #undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH #define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 224 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) #if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 256 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) #undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH #define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 256 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) #if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 384 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) #undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH #define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 384 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) #if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 521 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) #undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH #define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 521 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) #if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 192 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) #undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH #define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 192 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) #if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 224 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) #undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH #define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 224 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) #if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 256 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) #undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH #define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 256 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) #if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 256 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) #undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH #define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 256 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) #if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 384 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) #undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH #define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 384 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) #if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 512 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) #undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH #define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 512 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ /* Translations for PK layer */ static inline int mbedtls_psa_err_translate_pk( psa_status_t status ) { switch( status ) { case PSA_SUCCESS: return( 0 ); case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED: return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY: return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED ); case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY: return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED ); case PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE: return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); /* All other failures */ case PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE: case PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE: case PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED: return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); default: /* We return the same as for the 'other failures', * but list them separately nonetheless to indicate * which failure conditions we have considered. */ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); } } /* Translations for ECC */ /* This function transforms an ECC group identifier from * https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-8 * into a PSA ECC group identifier. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) static inline psa_key_type_t mbedtls_psa_parse_tls_ecc_group( uint16_t tls_ecc_grp_reg_id, size_t *bits ) { const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id( tls_ecc_grp_reg_id ); if( curve_info == NULL ) return( 0 ); return( PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa( curve_info->grp_id, bits ) ) ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ /* This function takes a buffer holding an EC public key * exported through psa_export_public_key(), and converts * it into an ECPoint structure to be put into a ClientKeyExchange * message in an ECDHE exchange. * * Both the present and the foreseeable future format of EC public keys * used by PSA have the ECPoint structure contained in the exported key * as a subbuffer, and the function merely selects this subbuffer instead * of making a copy. */ static inline int mbedtls_psa_tls_psa_ec_to_ecpoint( unsigned char *src, size_t srclen, unsigned char **dst, size_t *dstlen ) { *dst = src; *dstlen = srclen; return( 0 ); } /* This function takes a buffer holding an ECPoint structure * (as contained in a TLS ServerKeyExchange message for ECDHE * exchanges) and converts it into a format that the PSA key * agreement API understands. */ static inline int mbedtls_psa_tls_ecpoint_to_psa_ec( unsigned char const *src, size_t srclen, unsigned char *dst, size_t dstlen, size_t *olen ) { if( srclen > dstlen ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); memcpy( dst, src, srclen ); *olen = srclen; return( 0 ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_H */ usr/include/mbedtls/ripemd160.h0000644000000000000000000001536013764415275015345 0ustar rootroot/** * \file ripemd160.h * * \brief RIPE MD-160 message digest */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_H #define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include #include /* MBEDTLS_ERR_RIPEMD160_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_RIPEMD160_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0031 /**< RIPEMD160 hardware accelerator failed */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT) // Regular implementation // /** * \brief RIPEMD-160 context structure */ typedef struct mbedtls_ripemd160_context { uint32_t total[2]; /*!< number of bytes processed */ uint32_t state[5]; /*!< intermediate digest state */ unsigned char buffer[64]; /*!< data block being processed */ } mbedtls_ripemd160_context; #else /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT */ #include "ripemd160_alt.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT */ /** * \brief Initialize RIPEMD-160 context * * \param ctx RIPEMD-160 context to be initialized */ void mbedtls_ripemd160_init( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx ); /** * \brief Clear RIPEMD-160 context * * \param ctx RIPEMD-160 context to be cleared */ void mbedtls_ripemd160_free( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx ); /** * \brief Clone (the state of) an RIPEMD-160 context * * \param dst The destination context * \param src The context to be cloned */ void mbedtls_ripemd160_clone( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *dst, const mbedtls_ripemd160_context *src ); /** * \brief RIPEMD-160 context setup * * \param ctx context to be initialized * * \return 0 if successful */ int mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx ); /** * \brief RIPEMD-160 process buffer * * \param ctx RIPEMD-160 context * \param input buffer holding the data * \param ilen length of the input data * * \return 0 if successful */ int mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ); /** * \brief RIPEMD-160 final digest * * \param ctx RIPEMD-160 context * \param output RIPEMD-160 checksum result * * \return 0 if successful */ int mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, unsigned char output[20] ); /** * \brief RIPEMD-160 process data block (internal use only) * * \param ctx RIPEMD-160 context * \param data buffer holding one block of data * * \return 0 if successful */ int mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[64] ); #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) #else #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /** * \brief RIPEMD-160 context setup * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret() in 2.7.0 * * \param ctx context to be initialized */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_ripemd160_starts( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx ); /** * \brief RIPEMD-160 process buffer * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret() in 2.7.0 * * \param ctx RIPEMD-160 context * \param input buffer holding the data * \param ilen length of the input data */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_ripemd160_update( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ); /** * \brief RIPEMD-160 final digest * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret() in 2.7.0 * * \param ctx RIPEMD-160 context * \param output RIPEMD-160 checksum result */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_ripemd160_finish( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, unsigned char output[20] ); /** * \brief RIPEMD-160 process data block (internal use only) * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process() in 2.7.0 * * \param ctx RIPEMD-160 context * \param data buffer holding one block of data */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_ripemd160_process( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[64] ); #undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ /** * \brief Output = RIPEMD-160( input buffer ) * * \param input buffer holding the data * \param ilen length of the input data * \param output RIPEMD-160 checksum result * * \return 0 if successful */ int mbedtls_ripemd160_ret( const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char output[20] ); #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) #else #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /** * \brief Output = RIPEMD-160( input buffer ) * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ripemd160_ret() in 2.7.0 * * \param input buffer holding the data * \param ilen length of the input data * \param output RIPEMD-160 checksum result */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_ripemd160( const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char output[20] ); #undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** * \brief Checkup routine * * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed */ int mbedtls_ripemd160_self_test( int verbose ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* mbedtls_ripemd160.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/rsa.h0000644000000000000000000017613213764415275014430 0ustar rootroot/** * \file rsa.h * * \brief This file provides an API for the RSA public-key cryptosystem. * * The RSA public-key cryptosystem is defined in Public-Key * Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1 v1.5: RSA Encryption * and Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1 v2.1: * RSA Cryptography Specifications. * */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_RSA_H #define MBEDTLS_RSA_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include "mbedtls/bignum.h" #include "mbedtls/md.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) #include "mbedtls/threading.h" #endif /* * RSA Error codes */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x4080 /**< Bad input parameters to function. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING -0x4100 /**< Input data contains invalid padding and is rejected. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED -0x4180 /**< Something failed during generation of a key. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED -0x4200 /**< Key failed to pass the validity check of the library. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED -0x4280 /**< The public key operation failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED -0x4300 /**< The private key operation failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED -0x4380 /**< The PKCS#1 verification failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE -0x4400 /**< The output buffer for decryption is not large enough. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED -0x4480 /**< The random generator failed to generate non-zeros. */ /* MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION is deprecated and should not be used. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION -0x4500 /**< The implementation does not offer the requested operation, for example, because of security violations or lack of functionality. */ /* MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x4580 /**< RSA hardware accelerator failed. */ /* * RSA constants */ #define MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC 0 /**< Request private key operation. */ #define MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE 1 /**< Request public key operation. */ #define MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 0 /**< Use PKCS#1 v1.5 encoding. */ #define MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 1 /**< Use PKCS#1 v2.1 encoding. */ #define MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN 1 /**< Identifier for RSA signature operations. */ #define MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT 2 /**< Identifier for RSA encryption and decryption operations. */ #define MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY -1 /* * The above constants may be used even if the RSA module is compile out, * eg for alternative (PKCS#11) RSA implemenations in the PK layers. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) // Regular implementation // /** * \brief The RSA context structure. * * \note Direct manipulation of the members of this structure * is deprecated. All manipulation should instead be done through * the public interface functions. */ typedef struct mbedtls_rsa_context { int ver; /*!< Always 0.*/ size_t len; /*!< The size of \p N in Bytes. */ mbedtls_mpi N; /*!< The public modulus. */ mbedtls_mpi E; /*!< The public exponent. */ mbedtls_mpi D; /*!< The private exponent. */ mbedtls_mpi P; /*!< The first prime factor. */ mbedtls_mpi Q; /*!< The second prime factor. */ mbedtls_mpi DP; /*!< D % (P - 1). */ mbedtls_mpi DQ; /*!< D % (Q - 1). */ mbedtls_mpi QP; /*!< 1 / (Q % P). */ mbedtls_mpi RN; /*!< cached R^2 mod N. */ mbedtls_mpi RP; /*!< cached R^2 mod P. */ mbedtls_mpi RQ; /*!< cached R^2 mod Q. */ mbedtls_mpi Vi; /*!< The cached blinding value. */ mbedtls_mpi Vf; /*!< The cached un-blinding value. */ int padding; /*!< Selects padding mode: #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 for 1.5 padding and #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 for OAEP or PSS. */ int hash_id; /*!< Hash identifier of mbedtls_md_type_t type, as specified in md.h for use in the MGF mask generating function used in the EME-OAEP and EMSA-PSS encodings. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; /*!< Thread-safety mutex. */ #endif } mbedtls_rsa_context; #else /* MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ #include "rsa_alt.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ /** * \brief This function initializes an RSA context. * * \note Set padding to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 for the RSAES-OAEP * encryption scheme and the RSASSA-PSS signature scheme. * * \note The \p hash_id parameter is ignored when using * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 padding. * * \note The choice of padding mode is strictly enforced for private key * operations, since there might be security concerns in * mixing padding modes. For public key operations it is * a default value, which can be overridden by calling specific * \c rsa_rsaes_xxx or \c rsa_rsassa_xxx functions. * * \note The hash selected in \p hash_id is always used for OEAP * encryption. For PSS signatures, it is always used for * making signatures, but can be overridden for verifying them. * If set to #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it is always overridden. * * \param ctx The RSA context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. * \param padding The padding mode to use. This must be either * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21. * \param hash_id The hash identifier of ::mbedtls_md_type_t type, if * \p padding is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21. It is unused * otherwise. */ void mbedtls_rsa_init( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int padding, int hash_id ); /** * \brief This function imports a set of core parameters into an * RSA context. * * \note This function can be called multiple times for successive * imports, if the parameters are not simultaneously present. * * Any sequence of calls to this function should be followed * by a call to mbedtls_rsa_complete(), which checks and * completes the provided information to a ready-for-use * public or private RSA key. * * \note See mbedtls_rsa_complete() for more information on which * parameters are necessary to set up a private or public * RSA key. * * \note The imported parameters are copied and need not be preserved * for the lifetime of the RSA context being set up. * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to store the parameters in. * \param N The RSA modulus. This may be \c NULL. * \param P The first prime factor of \p N. This may be \c NULL. * \param Q The second prime factor of \p N. This may be \c NULL. * \param D The private exponent. This may be \c NULL. * \param E The public exponent. This may be \c NULL. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A non-zero error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_rsa_import( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, const mbedtls_mpi *N, const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *D, const mbedtls_mpi *E ); /** * \brief This function imports core RSA parameters, in raw big-endian * binary format, into an RSA context. * * \note This function can be called multiple times for successive * imports, if the parameters are not simultaneously present. * * Any sequence of calls to this function should be followed * by a call to mbedtls_rsa_complete(), which checks and * completes the provided information to a ready-for-use * public or private RSA key. * * \note See mbedtls_rsa_complete() for more information on which * parameters are necessary to set up a private or public * RSA key. * * \note The imported parameters are copied and need not be preserved * for the lifetime of the RSA context being set up. * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to store the parameters in. * \param N The RSA modulus. This may be \c NULL. * \param N_len The Byte length of \p N; it is ignored if \p N == NULL. * \param P The first prime factor of \p N. This may be \c NULL. * \param P_len The Byte length of \p P; it ns ignored if \p P == NULL. * \param Q The second prime factor of \p N. This may be \c NULL. * \param Q_len The Byte length of \p Q; it is ignored if \p Q == NULL. * \param D The private exponent. This may be \c NULL. * \param D_len The Byte length of \p D; it is ignored if \p D == NULL. * \param E The public exponent. This may be \c NULL. * \param E_len The Byte length of \p E; it is ignored if \p E == NULL. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A non-zero error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, unsigned char const *N, size_t N_len, unsigned char const *P, size_t P_len, unsigned char const *Q, size_t Q_len, unsigned char const *D, size_t D_len, unsigned char const *E, size_t E_len ); /** * \brief This function completes an RSA context from * a set of imported core parameters. * * To setup an RSA public key, precisely \p N and \p E * must have been imported. * * To setup an RSA private key, sufficient information must * be present for the other parameters to be derivable. * * The default implementation supports the following: *
  • Derive \p P, \p Q from \p N, \p D, \p E.
    • *
  • Derive \p N, \p D from \p P, \p Q, \p E.
* Alternative implementations need not support these. * * If this function runs successfully, it guarantees that * the RSA context can be used for RSA operations without * the risk of failure or crash. * * \warning This function need not perform consistency checks * for the imported parameters. In particular, parameters that * are not needed by the implementation might be silently * discarded and left unchecked. To check the consistency * of the key material, see mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(). * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context holding imported parameters. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the attempted derivations * failed. * */ int mbedtls_rsa_complete( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ); /** * \brief This function exports the core parameters of an RSA key. * * If this function runs successfully, the non-NULL buffers * pointed to by \p N, \p P, \p Q, \p D, and \p E are fully * written, with additional unused space filled leading by * zero Bytes. * * Possible reasons for returning * #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED:
    *
  • An alternative RSA implementation is in use, which * stores the key externally, and either cannot or should * not export it into RAM.
    • *
  • A SW or HW implementation might not support a certain * deduction. For example, \p P, \p Q from \p N, \p D, * and \p E if the former are not part of the * implementation.
* * If the function fails due to an unsupported operation, * the RSA context stays intact and remains usable. * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context. * \param N The MPI to hold the RSA modulus. * This may be \c NULL if this field need not be exported. * \param P The MPI to hold the first prime factor of \p N. * This may be \c NULL if this field need not be exported. * \param Q The MPI to hold the second prime factor of \p N. * This may be \c NULL if this field need not be exported. * \param D The MPI to hold the private exponent. * This may be \c NULL if this field need not be exported. * \param E The MPI to hold the public exponent. * This may be \c NULL if this field need not be exported. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED if exporting the * requested parameters cannot be done due to missing * functionality or because of security policies. * \return A non-zero return code on any other failure. * */ int mbedtls_rsa_export( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi *P, mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *D, mbedtls_mpi *E ); /** * \brief This function exports core parameters of an RSA key * in raw big-endian binary format. * * If this function runs successfully, the non-NULL buffers * pointed to by \p N, \p P, \p Q, \p D, and \p E are fully * written, with additional unused space filled leading by * zero Bytes. * * Possible reasons for returning * #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED:
    *
  • An alternative RSA implementation is in use, which * stores the key externally, and either cannot or should * not export it into RAM.
    • *
  • A SW or HW implementation might not support a certain * deduction. For example, \p P, \p Q from \p N, \p D, * and \p E if the former are not part of the * implementation.
* If the function fails due to an unsupported operation, * the RSA context stays intact and remains usable. * * \note The length parameters are ignored if the corresponding * buffer pointers are NULL. * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context. * \param N The Byte array to store the RSA modulus, * or \c NULL if this field need not be exported. * \param N_len The size of the buffer for the modulus. * \param P The Byte array to hold the first prime factor of \p N, * or \c NULL if this field need not be exported. * \param P_len The size of the buffer for the first prime factor. * \param Q The Byte array to hold the second prime factor of \p N, * or \c NULL if this field need not be exported. * \param Q_len The size of the buffer for the second prime factor. * \param D The Byte array to hold the private exponent, * or \c NULL if this field need not be exported. * \param D_len The size of the buffer for the private exponent. * \param E The Byte array to hold the public exponent, * or \c NULL if this field need not be exported. * \param E_len The size of the buffer for the public exponent. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED if exporting the * requested parameters cannot be done due to missing * functionality or because of security policies. * \return A non-zero return code on any other failure. */ int mbedtls_rsa_export_raw( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, unsigned char *N, size_t N_len, unsigned char *P, size_t P_len, unsigned char *Q, size_t Q_len, unsigned char *D, size_t D_len, unsigned char *E, size_t E_len ); /** * \brief This function exports CRT parameters of a private RSA key. * * \note Alternative RSA implementations not using CRT-parameters * internally can implement this function based on * mbedtls_rsa_deduce_opt(). * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context. * \param DP The MPI to hold \c D modulo `P-1`, * or \c NULL if it need not be exported. * \param DQ The MPI to hold \c D modulo `Q-1`, * or \c NULL if it need not be exported. * \param QP The MPI to hold modular inverse of \c Q modulo \c P, * or \c NULL if it need not be exported. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A non-zero error code on failure. * */ int mbedtls_rsa_export_crt( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_mpi *DP, mbedtls_mpi *DQ, mbedtls_mpi *QP ); /** * \brief This function sets padding for an already initialized RSA * context. See mbedtls_rsa_init() for details. * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to be configured. * \param padding The padding mode to use. This must be either * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21. * \param hash_id The #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 hash identifier. */ void mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int padding, int hash_id ); /** * \brief This function retrieves the length of RSA modulus in Bytes. * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context. * * \return The length of the RSA modulus in Bytes. * */ size_t mbedtls_rsa_get_len( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ); /** * \brief This function generates an RSA keypair. * * \note mbedtls_rsa_init() must be called before this function, * to set up the RSA context. * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context used to hold the key. * \param f_rng The RNG function to be used for key generation. * This must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. * This may be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context. * \param nbits The size of the public key in bits. * \param exponent The public exponent to use. For example, \c 65537. * This must be odd and greater than \c 1. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_rsa_gen_key( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, unsigned int nbits, int exponent ); /** * \brief This function checks if a context contains at least an RSA * public key. * * If the function runs successfully, it is guaranteed that * enough information is present to perform an RSA public key * operation using mbedtls_rsa_public(). * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to check. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. * */ int mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ); /** * \brief This function checks if a context contains an RSA private key * and perform basic consistency checks. * * \note The consistency checks performed by this function not only * ensure that mbedtls_rsa_private() can be called successfully * on the given context, but that the various parameters are * mutually consistent with high probability, in the sense that * mbedtls_rsa_public() and mbedtls_rsa_private() are inverses. * * \warning This function should catch accidental misconfigurations * like swapping of parameters, but it cannot establish full * trust in neither the quality nor the consistency of the key * material that was used to setup the given RSA context: *
  • Consistency: Imported parameters that are irrelevant * for the implementation might be silently dropped. If dropped, * the current function does not have access to them, * and therefore cannot check them. See mbedtls_rsa_complete(). * If you want to check the consistency of the entire * content of an PKCS1-encoded RSA private key, for example, you * should use mbedtls_rsa_validate_params() before setting * up the RSA context. * Additionally, if the implementation performs empirical checks, * these checks substantiate but do not guarantee consistency.
    • *
  • Quality: This function is not expected to perform * extended quality assessments like checking that the prime * factors are safe. Additionally, it is the responsibility of the * user to ensure the trustworthiness of the source of his RSA * parameters, which goes beyond what is effectively checkable * by the library.
* * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to check. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ); /** * \brief This function checks a public-private RSA key pair. * * It checks each of the contexts, and makes sure they match. * * \param pub The initialized RSA context holding the public key. * \param prv The initialized RSA context holding the private key. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv( const mbedtls_rsa_context *pub, const mbedtls_rsa_context *prv ); /** * \brief This function performs an RSA public key operation. * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. * \param input The input buffer. This must be a readable buffer * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. * \param output The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. * * \note This function does not handle message padding. * * \note Make sure to set \p input[0] = 0 or ensure that * input is smaller than \p N. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_rsa_public( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); /** * \brief This function performs an RSA private key operation. * * \note Blinding is used if and only if a PRNG is provided. * * \note If blinding is used, both the base of exponentation * and the exponent are blinded, providing protection * against some side-channel attacks. * * \warning It is deprecated and a security risk to not provide * a PRNG here and thereby prevent the use of blinding. * Future versions of the library may enforce the presence * of a PRNG. * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. * \param f_rng The RNG function, used for blinding. It is discouraged * and deprecated to pass \c NULL here, in which case * blinding will be omitted. * \param p_rng The RNG context to pass to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL * if \p f_rng is \c NULL or if \p f_rng doesn't need a context. * \param input The input buffer. This must be a readable buffer * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. * \param output The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. * */ int mbedtls_rsa_private( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); /** * \brief This function adds the message padding, then performs an RSA * operation. * * It is the generic wrapper for performing a PKCS#1 encryption * operation using the \p mode from the context. * * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE mode. Future versions of the library * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. * * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. * \param f_rng The RNG to use. It is mandatory for PKCS#1 v2.1 padding * encoding, and for PKCS#1 v1.5 padding encoding when used * with \p mode set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. For PKCS#1 v1.5 * padding encoding and \p mode set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, * it is used for blinding and should be provided in this * case; see mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. May be * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or if \p f_rng doesn't * need a context argument. * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (deprecated). * \param ilen The length of the plaintext in Bytes. * \param input The input data to encrypt. This must be a readable * buffer of size \p ilen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if * `ilen == 0`. * \param output The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, int mode, size_t ilen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); /** * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption operation * (RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5-ENCRYPT). * * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE mode. Future versions of the library * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. * * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. It is needed for padding generation * if \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. If \p mode is * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (discouraged), it is used for * blinding and should be provided; see mbedtls_rsa_private(). * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may * be \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or if \p f_rng * doesn't need a context argument. * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (deprecated). * \param ilen The length of the plaintext in Bytes. * \param input The input data to encrypt. This must be a readable * buffer of size \p ilen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if * `ilen == 0`. * \param output The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, int mode, size_t ilen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); /** * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v2.1 OAEP encryption * operation (RSAES-OAEP-ENCRYPT). * * \note The output buffer must be as large as the size * of ctx->N. For example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used. * * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE mode. Future versions of the library * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. * * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. * * \param ctx The initnialized RSA context to use. * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This is needed for padding * generation and must be provided. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may * be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (deprecated). * \param label The buffer holding the custom label to use. * This must be a readable buffer of length \p label_len * Bytes. It may be \c NULL if \p label_len is \c 0. * \param label_len The length of the label in Bytes. * \param ilen The length of the plaintext buffer \p input in Bytes. * \param input The input data to encrypt. This must be a readable * buffer of size \p ilen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if * `ilen == 0`. * \param output The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, int mode, const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, size_t ilen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); /** * \brief This function performs an RSA operation, then removes the * message padding. * * It is the generic wrapper for performing a PKCS#1 decryption * operation using the \p mode from the context. * * \note The output buffer length \c output_max_len should be * as large as the size \p ctx->len of \p ctx->N (for example, * 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used) to be able to hold an * arbitrary decrypted message. If it is not large enough to * hold the decryption of the particular ciphertext provided, * the function returns \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE. * * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. * * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. * \param f_rng The RNG function. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, * this is used for blinding and should be provided; see * mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. If \p mode is * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, it is ignored. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context. * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC (deprecated). * \param olen The address at which to store the length of * the plaintext. This must not be \c NULL. * \param input The ciphertext buffer. This must be a readable buffer * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. * \param output The buffer used to hold the plaintext. This must * be a writable buffer of length \p output_max_len Bytes. * \param output_max_len The length in Bytes of the output buffer \p output. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, int mode, size_t *olen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, size_t output_max_len ); /** * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption * operation (RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5-DECRYPT). * * \note The output buffer length \c output_max_len should be * as large as the size \p ctx->len of \p ctx->N, for example, * 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used, to be able to hold an * arbitrary decrypted message. If it is not large enough to * hold the decryption of the particular ciphertext provided, * the function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE. * * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. * * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. * \param f_rng The RNG function. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, * this is used for blinding and should be provided; see * mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. If \p mode is * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, it is ignored. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context. * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC (deprecated). * \param olen The address at which to store the length of * the plaintext. This must not be \c NULL. * \param input The ciphertext buffer. This must be a readable buffer * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. * \param output The buffer used to hold the plaintext. This must * be a writable buffer of length \p output_max_len Bytes. * \param output_max_len The length in Bytes of the output buffer \p output. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. * */ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, int mode, size_t *olen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, size_t output_max_len ); /** * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v2.1 OAEP decryption * operation (RSAES-OAEP-DECRYPT). * * \note The output buffer length \c output_max_len should be * as large as the size \p ctx->len of \p ctx->N, for * example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used, to be able to * hold an arbitrary decrypted message. If it is not * large enough to hold the decryption of the particular * ciphertext provided, the function returns * #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE. * * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. * * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. * \param f_rng The RNG function. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, * this is used for blinding and should be provided; see * mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. If \p mode is * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, it is ignored. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context. * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC (deprecated). * \param label The buffer holding the custom label to use. * This must be a readable buffer of length \p label_len * Bytes. It may be \c NULL if \p label_len is \c 0. * \param label_len The length of the label in Bytes. * \param olen The address at which to store the length of * the plaintext. This must not be \c NULL. * \param input The ciphertext buffer. This must be a readable buffer * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. * \param output The buffer used to hold the plaintext. This must * be a writable buffer of length \p output_max_len Bytes. * \param output_max_len The length in Bytes of the output buffer \p output. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, int mode, const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, size_t *olen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, size_t output_max_len ); /** * \brief This function performs a private RSA operation to sign * a message digest using PKCS#1. * * It is the generic wrapper for performing a PKCS#1 * signature using the \p mode from the context. * * \note The \p sig buffer must be as large as the size * of \p ctx->N. For example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used. * * \note For PKCS#1 v2.1 encoding, see comments on * mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign() for details on * \p md_alg and \p hash_id. * * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. * * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. If the padding mode is PKCS#1 v2.1, * this must be provided. If the padding mode is PKCS#1 v1.5 and * \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, it is used for blinding * and should be provided; see mbedtls_rsa_private() for more * more. It is ignored otherwise. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL * if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context argument. * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC (deprecated). * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. * Ths is only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. * If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must be a readable * buffer of length \p hashlen Bytes. If \p md_alg is not * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it must be a readable buffer of length * the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg. * \param sig The buffer to hold the signature. This must be a writable * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. A buffer length of * #MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE is always safe. * * \return \c 0 if the signing operation was successful. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, unsigned char *sig ); /** * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v1.5 signature * operation (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-SIGN). * * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. * * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. * \param f_rng The RNG function. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, * this is used for blinding and should be provided; see * mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. If \p mode is * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, it is ignored. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL * if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context argument. * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC (deprecated). * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. * Ths is only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. * If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must be a readable * buffer of length \p hashlen Bytes. If \p md_alg is not * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it must be a readable buffer of length * the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg. * \param sig The buffer to hold the signature. This must be a writable * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. A buffer length of * #MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE is always safe. * * \return \c 0 if the signing operation was successful. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, unsigned char *sig ); /** * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v2.1 PSS signature * operation (RSASSA-PSS-SIGN). * * \note The \p hash_id in the RSA context is the one used for the * encoding. \p md_alg in the function call is the type of hash * that is encoded. According to RFC-3447: Public-Key * Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1 v2.1: RSA Cryptography * Specifications it is advised to keep both hashes the * same. * * \note This function always uses the maximum possible salt size, * up to the length of the payload hash. This choice of salt * size complies with FIPS 186-4 §5.5 (e) and RFC 8017 (PKCS#1 * v2.2) §9.1.1 step 3. Furthermore this function enforces a * minimum salt size which is the hash size minus 2 bytes. If * this minimum size is too large given the key size (the salt * size, plus the hash size, plus 2 bytes must be no more than * the key size in bytes), this function returns * #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA. * * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. * * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. * \param f_rng The RNG function. It must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL * if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC (deprecated). * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. * Ths is only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. * If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must be a readable * buffer of length \p hashlen Bytes. If \p md_alg is not * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it must be a readable buffer of length * the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg. * \param sig The buffer to hold the signature. This must be a writable * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. A buffer length of * #MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE is always safe. * * \return \c 0 if the signing operation was successful. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, unsigned char *sig ); /** * \brief This function performs a public RSA operation and checks * the message digest. * * This is the generic wrapper for performing a PKCS#1 * verification using the mode from the context. * * \note For PKCS#1 v2.1 encoding, see comments on * mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify() about \p md_alg and * \p hash_id. * * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE mode. Future versions of the library * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it * set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. * * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. * * \param ctx The initialized RSA public key context to use. * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, * this is used for blinding and should be provided; see * mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. Otherwise, it is ignored. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context. * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (deprecated). * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. * This is only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. * If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must be a readable * buffer of length \p hashlen Bytes. If \p md_alg is not * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it must be a readable buffer of length * the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg. * \param sig The buffer holding the signature. This must be a readable * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. * * \return \c 0 if the verify operation was successful. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, const unsigned char *sig ); /** * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v1.5 verification * operation (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-VERIFY). * * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE mode. Future versions of the library * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it * set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. * * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. * * \param ctx The initialized RSA public key context to use. * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, * this is used for blinding and should be provided; see * mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. Otherwise, it is ignored. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context. * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (deprecated). * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. * This is only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. * If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must be a readable * buffer of length \p hashlen Bytes. If \p md_alg is not * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it must be a readable buffer of length * the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg. * \param sig The buffer holding the signature. This must be a readable * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. * * \return \c 0 if the verify operation was successful. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, const unsigned char *sig ); /** * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v2.1 PSS verification * operation (RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY). * * The hash function for the MGF mask generating function * is that specified in the RSA context. * * \note The \p hash_id in the RSA context is the one used for the * verification. \p md_alg in the function call is the type of * hash that is verified. According to RFC-3447: Public-Key * Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1 v2.1: RSA Cryptography * Specifications it is advised to keep both hashes the * same. If \p hash_id in the RSA context is unset, * the \p md_alg from the function call is used. * * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE mode. Future versions of the library * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. * * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. * * \param ctx The initialized RSA public key context to use. * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, * this is used for blinding and should be provided; see * mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. Otherwise, it is ignored. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context. * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (deprecated). * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. * This is only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. * If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must be a readable * buffer of length \p hashlen Bytes. If \p md_alg is not * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it must be a readable buffer of length * the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg. * \param sig The buffer holding the signature. This must be a readable * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. * * \return \c 0 if the verify operation was successful. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, const unsigned char *sig ); /** * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v2.1 PSS verification * operation (RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY). * * The hash function for the MGF mask generating function * is that specified in \p mgf1_hash_id. * * \note The \p sig buffer must be as large as the size * of \p ctx->N. For example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used. * * \note The \p hash_id in the RSA context is ignored. * * \param ctx The initialized RSA public key context to use. * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, * this is used for blinding and should be provided; see * mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. Otherwise, it is ignored. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context. * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. * This is only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. * If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must be a readable * buffer of length \p hashlen Bytes. If \p md_alg is not * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it must be a readable buffer of length * the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg. * \param mgf1_hash_id The message digest used for mask generation. * \param expected_salt_len The length of the salt used in padding. Use * #MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY to accept any salt length. * \param sig The buffer holding the signature. This must be a readable * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. * * \return \c 0 if the verify operation was successful. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, mbedtls_md_type_t mgf1_hash_id, int expected_salt_len, const unsigned char *sig ); /** * \brief This function copies the components of an RSA context. * * \param dst The destination context. This must be initialized. * \param src The source context. This must be initialized. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory allocation failure. */ int mbedtls_rsa_copy( mbedtls_rsa_context *dst, const mbedtls_rsa_context *src ); /** * \brief This function frees the components of an RSA key. * * \param ctx The RSA context to free. May be \c NULL, in which case * this function is a no-op. If it is not \c NULL, it must * point to an initialized RSA context. */ void mbedtls_rsa_free( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** * \brief The RSA checkup routine. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return \c 1 on failure. */ int mbedtls_rsa_self_test( int verbose ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* rsa.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/rsa_internal.h0000644000000000000000000002134713764415275016321 0ustar rootroot/** * \file rsa_internal.h * * \brief Context-independent RSA helper functions * * This module declares some RSA-related helper functions useful when * implementing the RSA interface. These functions are provided in a separate * compilation unit in order to make it easy for designers of alternative RSA * implementations to use them in their own code, as it is conceived that the * functionality they provide will be necessary for most complete * implementations. * * End-users of Mbed TLS who are not providing their own alternative RSA * implementations should not use these functions directly, and should instead * use only the functions declared in rsa.h. * * The interface provided by this module will be maintained through LTS (Long * Term Support) branches of Mbed TLS, but may otherwise be subject to change, * and must be considered an internal interface of the library. * * There are two classes of helper functions: * * (1) Parameter-generating helpers. These are: * - mbedtls_rsa_deduce_primes * - mbedtls_rsa_deduce_private_exponent * - mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt * Each of these functions takes a set of core RSA parameters and * generates some other, or CRT related parameters. * * (2) Parameter-checking helpers. These are: * - mbedtls_rsa_validate_params * - mbedtls_rsa_validate_crt * They take a set of core or CRT related RSA parameters and check their * validity. * */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. * */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_RSA_INTERNAL_H #define MBEDTLS_RSA_INTERNAL_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include "mbedtls/bignum.h" #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /** * \brief Compute RSA prime moduli P, Q from public modulus N=PQ * and a pair of private and public key. * * \note This is a 'static' helper function not operating on * an RSA context. Alternative implementations need not * overwrite it. * * \param N RSA modulus N = PQ, with P, Q to be found * \param E RSA public exponent * \param D RSA private exponent * \param P Pointer to MPI holding first prime factor of N on success * \param Q Pointer to MPI holding second prime factor of N on success * * \return * - 0 if successful. In this case, P and Q constitute a * factorization of N. * - A non-zero error code otherwise. * * \note It is neither checked that P, Q are prime nor that * D, E are modular inverses wrt. P-1 and Q-1. For that, * use the helper function \c mbedtls_rsa_validate_params. * */ int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_primes( mbedtls_mpi const *N, mbedtls_mpi const *E, mbedtls_mpi const *D, mbedtls_mpi *P, mbedtls_mpi *Q ); /** * \brief Compute RSA private exponent from * prime moduli and public key. * * \note This is a 'static' helper function not operating on * an RSA context. Alternative implementations need not * overwrite it. * * \param P First prime factor of RSA modulus * \param Q Second prime factor of RSA modulus * \param E RSA public exponent * \param D Pointer to MPI holding the private exponent on success. * * \return * - 0 if successful. In this case, D is set to a simultaneous * modular inverse of E modulo both P-1 and Q-1. * - A non-zero error code otherwise. * * \note This function does not check whether P and Q are primes. * */ int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_private_exponent( mbedtls_mpi const *P, mbedtls_mpi const *Q, mbedtls_mpi const *E, mbedtls_mpi *D ); /** * \brief Generate RSA-CRT parameters * * \note This is a 'static' helper function not operating on * an RSA context. Alternative implementations need not * overwrite it. * * \param P First prime factor of N * \param Q Second prime factor of N * \param D RSA private exponent * \param DP Output variable for D modulo P-1 * \param DQ Output variable for D modulo Q-1 * \param QP Output variable for the modular inverse of Q modulo P. * * \return 0 on success, non-zero error code otherwise. * * \note This function does not check whether P, Q are * prime and whether D is a valid private exponent. * */ int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt( const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *D, mbedtls_mpi *DP, mbedtls_mpi *DQ, mbedtls_mpi *QP ); /** * \brief Check validity of core RSA parameters * * \note This is a 'static' helper function not operating on * an RSA context. Alternative implementations need not * overwrite it. * * \param N RSA modulus N = PQ * \param P First prime factor of N * \param Q Second prime factor of N * \param D RSA private exponent * \param E RSA public exponent * \param f_rng PRNG to be used for primality check, or NULL * \param p_rng PRNG context for f_rng, or NULL * * \return * - 0 if the following conditions are satisfied * if all relevant parameters are provided: * - P prime if f_rng != NULL (%) * - Q prime if f_rng != NULL (%) * - 1 < N = P * Q * - 1 < D, E < N * - D and E are modular inverses modulo P-1 and Q-1 * (%) This is only done if MBEDTLS_GENPRIME is defined. * - A non-zero error code otherwise. * * \note The function can be used with a restricted set of arguments * to perform specific checks only. E.g., calling it with * (-,P,-,-,-) and a PRNG amounts to a primality check for P. */ int mbedtls_rsa_validate_params( const mbedtls_mpi *N, const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *D, const mbedtls_mpi *E, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); /** * \brief Check validity of RSA CRT parameters * * \note This is a 'static' helper function not operating on * an RSA context. Alternative implementations need not * overwrite it. * * \param P First prime factor of RSA modulus * \param Q Second prime factor of RSA modulus * \param D RSA private exponent * \param DP MPI to check for D modulo P-1 * \param DQ MPI to check for D modulo P-1 * \param QP MPI to check for the modular inverse of Q modulo P. * * \return * - 0 if the following conditions are satisfied: * - D = DP mod P-1 if P, D, DP != NULL * - Q = DQ mod P-1 if P, D, DQ != NULL * - QP = Q^-1 mod P if P, Q, QP != NULL * - \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED if check failed, * potentially including \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX if some * MPI calculations failed. * - \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA if insufficient * data was provided to check DP, DQ or QP. * * \note The function can be used with a restricted set of arguments * to perform specific checks only. E.g., calling it with the * parameters (P, -, D, DP, -, -) will check DP = D mod P-1. */ int mbedtls_rsa_validate_crt( const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *D, const mbedtls_mpi *DP, const mbedtls_mpi *DQ, const mbedtls_mpi *QP ); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* rsa_internal.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/sha1.h0000644000000000000000000003076413764415275014477 0ustar rootroot/** * \file sha1.h * * \brief This file contains SHA-1 definitions and functions. * * The Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA-1) cryptographic hash function is defined in * FIPS 180-4: Secure Hash Standard (SHS). * * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes * a security risk. We recommend considering stronger message * digests instead. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_SHA1_H #define MBEDTLS_SHA1_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include #include /* MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0035 /**< SHA-1 hardware accelerator failed */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0073 /**< SHA-1 input data was malformed. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT) // Regular implementation // /** * \brief The SHA-1 context structure. * * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ typedef struct mbedtls_sha1_context { uint32_t total[2]; /*!< The number of Bytes processed. */ uint32_t state[5]; /*!< The intermediate digest state. */ unsigned char buffer[64]; /*!< The data block being processed. */ } mbedtls_sha1_context; #else /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT */ #include "sha1_alt.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT */ /** * \brief This function initializes a SHA-1 context. * * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * * \param ctx The SHA-1 context to initialize. * This must not be \c NULL. * */ void mbedtls_sha1_init( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx ); /** * \brief This function clears a SHA-1 context. * * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * * \param ctx The SHA-1 context to clear. This may be \c NULL, * in which case this function does nothing. If it is * not \c NULL, it must point to an initialized * SHA-1 context. * */ void mbedtls_sha1_free( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx ); /** * \brief This function clones the state of a SHA-1 context. * * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * * \param dst The SHA-1 context to clone to. This must be initialized. * \param src The SHA-1 context to clone from. This must be initialized. * */ void mbedtls_sha1_clone( mbedtls_sha1_context *dst, const mbedtls_sha1_context *src ); /** * \brief This function starts a SHA-1 checksum calculation. * * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * * \param ctx The SHA-1 context to initialize. This must be initialized. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. * */ int mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx ); /** * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing SHA-1 * checksum calculation. * * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * * \param ctx The SHA-1 context. This must be initialized * and have a hash operation started. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. * This must be a readable buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. * \param ilen The length of the input data \p input in Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ); /** * \brief This function finishes the SHA-1 operation, and writes * the result to the output buffer. * * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * * \param ctx The SHA-1 context to use. This must be initialized and * have a hash operation started. * \param output The SHA-1 checksum result. This must be a writable * buffer of length \c 20 Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, unsigned char output[20] ); /** * \brief SHA-1 process data block (internal use only). * * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * * \param ctx The SHA-1 context to use. This must be initialized. * \param data The data block being processed. This must be a * readable buffer of length \c 64 Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. * */ int mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[64] ); #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) #else #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /** * \brief This function starts a SHA-1 checksum calculation. * * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret() in 2.7.0. * * \param ctx The SHA-1 context to initialize. This must be initialized. * */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha1_starts( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx ); /** * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing SHA-1 * checksum calculation. * * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha1_update_ret() in 2.7.0. * * \param ctx The SHA-1 context. This must be initialized and * have a hash operation started. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. * This must be a readable buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. * \param ilen The length of the input data \p input in Bytes. * */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha1_update( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ); /** * \brief This function finishes the SHA-1 operation, and writes * the result to the output buffer. * * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret() in 2.7.0. * * \param ctx The SHA-1 context. This must be initialized and * have a hash operation started. * \param output The SHA-1 checksum result. * This must be a writable buffer of length \c 20 Bytes. */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha1_finish( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, unsigned char output[20] ); /** * \brief SHA-1 process data block (internal use only). * * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_sha1_process() in 2.7.0. * * \param ctx The SHA-1 context. This must be initialized. * \param data The data block being processed. * This must be a readable buffer of length \c 64 bytes. * */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha1_process( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[64] ); #undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ /** * \brief This function calculates the SHA-1 checksum of a buffer. * * The function allocates the context, performs the * calculation, and frees the context. * * The SHA-1 result is calculated as * output = SHA-1(input buffer). * * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * * \param input The buffer holding the input data. * This must be a readable buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. * \param ilen The length of the input data \p input in Bytes. * \param output The SHA-1 checksum result. * This must be a writable buffer of length \c 20 Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. * */ int mbedtls_sha1_ret( const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char output[20] ); #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) #else #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /** * \brief This function calculates the SHA-1 checksum of a buffer. * * The function allocates the context, performs the * calculation, and frees the context. * * The SHA-1 result is calculated as * output = SHA-1(input buffer). * * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha1_ret() in 2.7.0 * * \param input The buffer holding the input data. * This must be a readable buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. * \param ilen The length of the input data \p input in Bytes. * \param output The SHA-1 checksum result. This must be a writable * buffer of size \c 20 Bytes. * */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha1( const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char output[20] ); #undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** * \brief The SHA-1 checkup routine. * * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return \c 1 on failure. * */ int mbedtls_sha1_self_test( int verbose ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* mbedtls_sha1.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/sha256.h0000644000000000000000000002535413764415275014652 0ustar rootroot/** * \file sha256.h * * \brief This file contains SHA-224 and SHA-256 definitions and functions. * * The Secure Hash Algorithms 224 and 256 (SHA-224 and SHA-256) cryptographic * hash functions are defined in FIPS 180-4: Secure Hash Standard (SHS). */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_SHA256_H #define MBEDTLS_SHA256_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include #include /* MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0037 /**< SHA-256 hardware accelerator failed */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0074 /**< SHA-256 input data was malformed. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT) // Regular implementation // /** * \brief The SHA-256 context structure. * * The structure is used both for SHA-256 and for SHA-224 * checksum calculations. The choice between these two is * made in the call to mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret(). */ typedef struct mbedtls_sha256_context { uint32_t total[2]; /*!< The number of Bytes processed. */ uint32_t state[8]; /*!< The intermediate digest state. */ unsigned char buffer[64]; /*!< The data block being processed. */ int is224; /*!< Determines which function to use: 0: Use SHA-256, or 1: Use SHA-224. */ } mbedtls_sha256_context; #else /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT */ #include "sha256_alt.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT */ /** * \brief This function initializes a SHA-256 context. * * \param ctx The SHA-256 context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_sha256_init( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx ); /** * \brief This function clears a SHA-256 context. * * \param ctx The SHA-256 context to clear. This may be \c NULL, in which * case this function returns immediately. If it is not \c NULL, * it must point to an initialized SHA-256 context. */ void mbedtls_sha256_free( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx ); /** * \brief This function clones the state of a SHA-256 context. * * \param dst The destination context. This must be initialized. * \param src The context to clone. This must be initialized. */ void mbedtls_sha256_clone( mbedtls_sha256_context *dst, const mbedtls_sha256_context *src ); /** * \brief This function starts a SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum * calculation. * * \param ctx The context to use. This must be initialized. * \param is224 This determines which function to use. This must be * either \c 0 for SHA-256, or \c 1 for SHA-224. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, int is224 ); /** * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing * SHA-256 checksum calculation. * * \param ctx The SHA-256 context. This must be initialized * and have a hash operation started. * \param input The buffer holding the data. This must be a readable * buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ); /** * \brief This function finishes the SHA-256 operation, and writes * the result to the output buffer. * * \param ctx The SHA-256 context. This must be initialized * and have a hash operation started. * \param output The SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum result. * This must be a writable buffer of length \c 32 Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, unsigned char output[32] ); /** * \brief This function processes a single data block within * the ongoing SHA-256 computation. This function is for * internal use only. * * \param ctx The SHA-256 context. This must be initialized. * \param data The buffer holding one block of data. This must * be a readable buffer of length \c 64 Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[64] ); #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) #else #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /** * \brief This function starts a SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum * calculation. * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret() in 2.7.0. * * \param ctx The context to use. This must be initialized. * \param is224 Determines which function to use. This must be * either \c 0 for SHA-256, or \c 1 for SHA-224. */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha256_starts( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, int is224 ); /** * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing * SHA-256 checksum calculation. * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha256_update_ret() in 2.7.0. * * \param ctx The SHA-256 context to use. This must be * initialized and have a hash operation started. * \param input The buffer holding the data. This must be a readable * buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha256_update( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ); /** * \brief This function finishes the SHA-256 operation, and writes * the result to the output buffer. * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret() in 2.7.0. * * \param ctx The SHA-256 context. This must be initialized and * have a hash operation started. * \param output The SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum result. This must be * a writable buffer of length \c 32 Bytes. */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha256_finish( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, unsigned char output[32] ); /** * \brief This function processes a single data block within * the ongoing SHA-256 computation. This function is for * internal use only. * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_sha256_process() in 2.7.0. * * \param ctx The SHA-256 context. This must be initialized. * \param data The buffer holding one block of data. This must be * a readable buffer of size \c 64 Bytes. */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha256_process( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[64] ); #undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ /** * \brief This function calculates the SHA-224 or SHA-256 * checksum of a buffer. * * The function allocates the context, performs the * calculation, and frees the context. * * The SHA-256 result is calculated as * output = SHA-256(input buffer). * * \param input The buffer holding the data. This must be a readable * buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. * \param output The SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum result. This must * be a writable buffer of length \c 32 Bytes. * \param is224 Determines which function to use. This must be * either \c 0 for SHA-256, or \c 1 for SHA-224. */ int mbedtls_sha256_ret( const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char output[32], int is224 ); #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) #else #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /** * \brief This function calculates the SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum * of a buffer. * * The function allocates the context, performs the * calculation, and frees the context. * * The SHA-256 result is calculated as * output = SHA-256(input buffer). * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha256_ret() in 2.7.0. * * \param input The buffer holding the data. This must be a readable * buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. * \param output The SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum result. This must be * a writable buffer of length \c 32 Bytes. * \param is224 Determines which function to use. This must be either * \c 0 for SHA-256, or \c 1 for SHA-224. */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha256( const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char output[32], int is224 ); #undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** * \brief The SHA-224 and SHA-256 checkup routine. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return \c 1 on failure. */ int mbedtls_sha256_self_test( int verbose ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* mbedtls_sha256.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/sha512.h0000644000000000000000000002712113764415275014637 0ustar rootroot/** * \file sha512.h * \brief This file contains SHA-384 and SHA-512 definitions and functions. * * The Secure Hash Algorithms 384 and 512 (SHA-384 and SHA-512) cryptographic * hash functions are defined in FIPS 180-4: Secure Hash Standard (SHS). */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_SHA512_H #define MBEDTLS_SHA512_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include #include /* MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0039 /**< SHA-512 hardware accelerator failed */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0075 /**< SHA-512 input data was malformed. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT) // Regular implementation // /** * \brief The SHA-512 context structure. * * The structure is used both for SHA-384 and for SHA-512 * checksum calculations. The choice between these two is * made in the call to mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret(). */ typedef struct mbedtls_sha512_context { uint64_t total[2]; /*!< The number of Bytes processed. */ uint64_t state[8]; /*!< The intermediate digest state. */ unsigned char buffer[128]; /*!< The data block being processed. */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) int is384; /*!< Determines which function to use: 0: Use SHA-512, or 1: Use SHA-384. */ #endif } mbedtls_sha512_context; #else /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT */ #include "sha512_alt.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT */ /** * \brief This function initializes a SHA-512 context. * * \param ctx The SHA-512 context to initialize. This must * not be \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_sha512_init( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx ); /** * \brief This function clears a SHA-512 context. * * \param ctx The SHA-512 context to clear. This may be \c NULL, * in which case this function does nothing. If it * is not \c NULL, it must point to an initialized * SHA-512 context. */ void mbedtls_sha512_free( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx ); /** * \brief This function clones the state of a SHA-512 context. * * \param dst The destination context. This must be initialized. * \param src The context to clone. This must be initialized. */ void mbedtls_sha512_clone( mbedtls_sha512_context *dst, const mbedtls_sha512_context *src ); /** * \brief This function starts a SHA-384 or SHA-512 checksum * calculation. * * \param ctx The SHA-512 context to use. This must be initialized. * \param is384 Determines which function to use. This must be * either \c 0 for SHA-512, or \c 1 for SHA-384. * * \note When \c MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 is defined, \p is384 must * be \c 0, or the function will return * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, int is384 ); /** * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing * SHA-512 checksum calculation. * * \param ctx The SHA-512 context. This must be initialized * and have a hash operation started. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must * be a readable buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ); /** * \brief This function finishes the SHA-512 operation, and writes * the result to the output buffer. * * \param ctx The SHA-512 context. This must be initialized * and have a hash operation started. * \param output The SHA-384 or SHA-512 checksum result. * This must be a writable buffer of length \c 64 Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, unsigned char output[64] ); /** * \brief This function processes a single data block within * the ongoing SHA-512 computation. * This function is for internal use only. * * \param ctx The SHA-512 context. This must be initialized. * \param data The buffer holding one block of data. This * must be a readable buffer of length \c 128 Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[128] ); #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) #else #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /** * \brief This function starts a SHA-384 or SHA-512 checksum * calculation. * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret() in 2.7.0 * * \param ctx The SHA-512 context to use. This must be initialized. * \param is384 Determines which function to use. This must be either * \c 0 for SHA-512 or \c 1 for SHA-384. * * \note When \c MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 is defined, \p is384 must * be \c 0, or the function will fail to work. */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha512_starts( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, int is384 ); /** * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing * SHA-512 checksum calculation. * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha512_update_ret() in 2.7.0. * * \param ctx The SHA-512 context. This must be initialized * and have a hash operation started. * \param input The buffer holding the data. This must be a readable * buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha512_update( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ); /** * \brief This function finishes the SHA-512 operation, and writes * the result to the output buffer. * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret() in 2.7.0. * * \param ctx The SHA-512 context. This must be initialized * and have a hash operation started. * \param output The SHA-384 or SHA-512 checksum result. This must * be a writable buffer of size \c 64 Bytes. */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha512_finish( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, unsigned char output[64] ); /** * \brief This function processes a single data block within * the ongoing SHA-512 computation. This function is for * internal use only. * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_sha512_process() in 2.7.0. * * \param ctx The SHA-512 context. This must be initialized. * \param data The buffer holding one block of data. This must be * a readable buffer of length \c 128 Bytes. */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha512_process( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[128] ); #undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ /** * \brief This function calculates the SHA-512 or SHA-384 * checksum of a buffer. * * The function allocates the context, performs the * calculation, and frees the context. * * The SHA-512 result is calculated as * output = SHA-512(input buffer). * * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be * a readable buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. * \param output The SHA-384 or SHA-512 checksum result. * This must be a writable buffer of length \c 64 Bytes. * \param is384 Determines which function to use. This must be either * \c 0 for SHA-512, or \c 1 for SHA-384. * * \note When \c MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 is defined, \p is384 must * be \c 0, or the function will return * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_sha512_ret( const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char output[64], int is384 ); #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) #else #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /** * \brief This function calculates the SHA-512 or SHA-384 * checksum of a buffer. * * The function allocates the context, performs the * calculation, and frees the context. * * The SHA-512 result is calculated as * output = SHA-512(input buffer). * * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha512_ret() in 2.7.0 * * \param input The buffer holding the data. This must be a * readable buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. * \param output The SHA-384 or SHA-512 checksum result. This must * be a writable buffer of length \c 64 Bytes. * \param is384 Determines which function to use. This must be either * \c 0 for SHA-512, or \c 1 for SHA-384. * * \note When \c MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 is defined, \p is384 must * be \c 0, or the function will fail to work. */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha512( const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char output[64], int is384 ); #undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** * \brief The SHA-384 or SHA-512 checkup routine. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return \c 1 on failure. */ int mbedtls_sha512_self_test( int verbose ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* mbedtls_sha512.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/ssl.h0000644000000000000000000062557013764415275014451 0ustar rootroot/** * \file ssl.h * * \brief SSL/TLS functions. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_H #define MBEDTLS_SSL_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include "mbedtls/bignum.h" #include "mbedtls/ecp.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) #include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" #include "mbedtls/x509_crl.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) #include "mbedtls/dhm.h" #endif /* Adding guard for MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C to ensure no compile errors due * to guards also being in ssl_srv.c and ssl_cli.c. There is a gap * in functionality that access to ecdh_ctx structure is needed for * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C which does not seem correct. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) #include "mbedtls/ecdh.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) #warning "Record compression support via MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT is deprecated and will be removed in the next major revision of the library" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) #error "Record compression support via MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT is deprecated and cannot be used if MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED is set" #endif #include "zlib.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) #include "mbedtls/platform_time.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) #include "psa/crypto.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ /* * SSL Error codes */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x7080 /**< The requested feature is not available. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x7100 /**< Bad input parameters to function. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC -0x7180 /**< Verification of the message MAC failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD -0x7200 /**< An invalid SSL record was received. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF -0x7280 /**< The connection indicated an EOF. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_CIPHER -0x7300 /**< An unknown cipher was received. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN -0x7380 /**< The server has no ciphersuites in common with the client. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG -0x7400 /**< No RNG was provided to the SSL module. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE -0x7480 /**< No client certification received from the client, but required by the authentication mode. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE -0x7500 /**< Our own certificate(s) is/are too large to send in an SSL message. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED -0x7580 /**< The own certificate is not set, but needed by the server. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED -0x7600 /**< The own private key or pre-shared key is not set, but needed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED -0x7680 /**< No CA Chain is set, but required to operate. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE -0x7700 /**< An unexpected message was received from our peer. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE -0x7780 /**< A fatal alert message was received from our peer. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_VERIFY_FAILED -0x7800 /**< Verification of our peer failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY -0x7880 /**< The peer notified us that the connection is going to be closed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO -0x7900 /**< Processing of the ClientHello handshake message failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO -0x7980 /**< Processing of the ServerHello handshake message failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE -0x7A00 /**< Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST -0x7A80 /**< Processing of the CertificateRequest handshake message failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE -0x7B00 /**< Processing of the ServerKeyExchange handshake message failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE -0x7B80 /**< Processing of the ServerHelloDone handshake message failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE -0x7C00 /**< Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP -0x7C80 /**< Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed in DHM / ECDH Read Public. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS -0x7D00 /**< Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed in DHM / ECDH Calculate Secret. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY -0x7D80 /**< Processing of the CertificateVerify handshake message failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC -0x7E00 /**< Processing of the ChangeCipherSpec handshake message failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED -0x7E80 /**< Processing of the Finished handshake message failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED -0x7F00 /**< Memory allocation failed */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x7F80 /**< Hardware acceleration function returned with error */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH -0x6F80 /**< Hardware acceleration function skipped / left alone data */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED -0x6F00 /**< Processing of the compression / decompression failed */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION -0x6E80 /**< Handshake protocol not within min/max boundaries */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET -0x6E00 /**< Processing of the NewSessionTicket handshake message failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED -0x6D80 /**< Session ticket has expired. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH -0x6D00 /**< Public key type mismatch (eg, asked for RSA key exchange and presented EC key) */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY -0x6C80 /**< Unknown identity received (eg, PSK identity) */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR -0x6C00 /**< Internal error (eg, unexpected failure in lower-level module) */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING -0x6B80 /**< A counter would wrap (eg, too many messages exchanged). */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO -0x6B00 /**< Unexpected message at ServerHello in renegotiation. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED -0x6A80 /**< DTLS client must retry for hello verification */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x6A00 /**< A buffer is too small to receive or write a message */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE -0x6980 /**< None of the common ciphersuites is usable (eg, no suitable certificate, see debug messages). */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ -0x6900 /**< No data of requested type currently available on underlying transport. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE -0x6880 /**< Connection requires a write call. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT -0x6800 /**< The operation timed out. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT -0x6780 /**< The client initiated a reconnect from the same port. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD -0x6700 /**< Record header looks valid but is not expected. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL -0x6680 /**< The alert message received indicates a non-fatal error. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH -0x6600 /**< Couldn't set the hash for verifying CertificateVerify */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING -0x6580 /**< Internal-only message signaling that further message-processing should be done */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS -0x6500 /**< The asynchronous operation is not completed yet. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE -0x6480 /**< Internal-only message signaling that a message arrived early. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID -0x6000 /**< An encrypted DTLS-frame with an unexpected CID was received. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH -0x5F00 /**< An operation failed due to an unexpected version or configuration. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS -0x7000 /**< A cryptographic operation is in progress. Try again later. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG -0x5E80 /**< Invalid value in SSL config */ /* * Various constants */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 3 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 0 /*!< SSL v3.0 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 1 /*!< TLS v1.0 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 2 /*!< TLS v1.1 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 3 /*!< TLS v1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 4 /*!< TLS v1.3 (experimental) */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM 0 /*!< TLS */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM 1 /*!< DTLS */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_HOST_NAME_LEN 255 /*!< Maximum host name defined in RFC 1035 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_ALPN_NAME_LEN 255 /*!< Maximum size in bytes of a protocol name in alpn ext., RFC 7301 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_ALPN_LIST_LEN 65535 /*!< Maximum size in bytes of list in alpn ext., RFC 7301 */ /* RFC 6066 section 4, see also mfl_code_to_length in ssl_tls.c * NONE must be zero so that memset()ing structure to zero works */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE 0 /*!< don't use this extension */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512 1 /*!< MaxFragmentLength 2^9 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024 2 /*!< MaxFragmentLength 2^10 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048 3 /*!< MaxFragmentLength 2^11 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096 4 /*!< MaxFragmentLength 2^12 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID 5 /*!< first invalid value */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER 1 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_NOT_FALLBACK 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK 1 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED 1 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED 1 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED 1 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE 1 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL 1 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED 2 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET 3 /* Used only for sni_authmode */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION 1 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED 1 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_ENABLED 1 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ENFORCED -1 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGO_MAX_RECORDS_DEFAULT 16 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION 1 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE 2 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED 1 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_LEN 10 /* 80 bits, rfc 6066 section 7 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED 1 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED 1 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_ENABLED 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED 1 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_SUITEB 2 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED 1 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_DISABLED 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_UNSUPPORTED 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED 1 /* * Default range for DTLS retransmission timer value, in milliseconds. * RFC 6347 4.2.4.1 says from 1 second to 60 seconds. */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MIN 1000 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MAX 60000 /** * \name SECTION: Module settings * * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. * \{ */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIME) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIME 86400 /**< Lifetime of session tickets (if enabled) */ #endif /* * Maximum fragment length in bytes, * determines the size of each of the two internal I/O buffers. * * Note: the RFC defines the default size of SSL / TLS messages. If you * change the value here, other clients / servers may not be able to * communicate with you anymore. Only change this value if you control * both sides of the connection and have it reduced at both sides, or * if you're using the Max Fragment Length extension and you know all your * peers are using it too! */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN 16384 /**< Size of the input / output buffer */ #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN #endif /* * Maximum number of heap-allocated bytes for the purpose of * DTLS handshake message reassembly and future message buffering. */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING 32768 #endif /* * Maximum length of CIDs for incoming and outgoing messages. */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX 32 #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX 32 #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY 16 #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY 1 #endif /* \} name SECTION: Module settings */ /* * Length of the verify data for secure renegotiation */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN 36 #else #define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN 12 #endif /* * Signaling ciphersuite values (SCSV) */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO 0xFF /**< renegotiation info ext */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE 0x5600 /**< RFC 7507 section 2 */ /* * Supported Signature and Hash algorithms (For TLS 1.2) * RFC 5246 section 7.4.1.4.1 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5 1 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1 2 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA224 3 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256 4 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384 5 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512 6 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ANON 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA 1 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA 3 /* * Client Certificate Types * RFC 5246 section 7.4.4 plus RFC 4492 section 5.5 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_RSA_SIGN 1 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_ECDSA_SIGN 64 /* * Message, alert and handshake types */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 20 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT 21 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE 22 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA 23 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CID 25 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING 1 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL 2 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY 0 /* 0x00 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE 10 /* 0x0A */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_RECORD_MAC 20 /* 0x14 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPTION_FAILED 21 /* 0x15 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_RECORD_OVERFLOW 22 /* 0x16 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE 30 /* 0x1E */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE 40 /* 0x28 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT 41 /* 0x29 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT 42 /* 0x2A */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT 43 /* 0x2B */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED 44 /* 0x2C */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED 45 /* 0x2D */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN 46 /* 0x2E */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER 47 /* 0x2F */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA 48 /* 0x30 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED 49 /* 0x31 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR 50 /* 0x32 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR 51 /* 0x33 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_EXPORT_RESTRICTION 60 /* 0x3C */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION 70 /* 0x46 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY 71 /* 0x47 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR 80 /* 0x50 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INAPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 86 /* 0x56 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_USER_CANCELED 90 /* 0x5A */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION 100 /* 0x64 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT 110 /* 0x6E */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME 112 /* 0x70 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY 115 /* 0x73 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL 120 /* 0x78 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO 1 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO 2 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST 3 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET 4 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE 11 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE 12 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 13 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE 14 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY 15 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 16 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED 20 /* * TLS extensions */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME 0 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME 0 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH 1 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC 4 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES 10 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS 11 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG 13 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP 14 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN 16 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC 22 /* 0x16 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET 0x0017 /* 23 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET 35 /* The value of the CID extension is still TBD as of * draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 * (https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05) */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID 254 /* TBD */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP 256 /* experimental */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO 0xFF01 /* * Size defines */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN) #define MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN 32 /* 256 bits */ #endif /* Dummy type used only for its size */ union mbedtls_ssl_premaster_secret { #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) unsigned char _pms_rsa[48]; /* RFC 5246 8.1.1 */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) unsigned char _pms_dhm[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; /* RFC 5246 8.1.2 */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) unsigned char _pms_ecdh[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; /* RFC 4492 5.10 */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) unsigned char _pms_psk[4 + 2 * MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN]; /* RFC 4279 2 */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) unsigned char _pms_dhe_psk[4 + MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE + MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN]; /* RFC 4279 3 */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) unsigned char _pms_rsa_psk[52 + MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN]; /* RFC 4279 4 */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) unsigned char _pms_ecdhe_psk[4 + MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES + MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN]; /* RFC 5489 2 */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) unsigned char _pms_ecjpake[32]; /* Thread spec: SHA-256 output */ #endif }; #define MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE sizeof( union mbedtls_ssl_premaster_secret ) #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* * SSL state machine */ typedef enum { MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED, MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS, MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP, MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT, } mbedtls_ssl_states; /* * The tls_prf function types. */ typedef enum { MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SSL3, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_TLS1, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA384, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA256 } mbedtls_tls_prf_types; /** * \brief Callback type: send data on the network. * * \note That callback may be either blocking or non-blocking. * * \param ctx Context for the send callback (typically a file descriptor) * \param buf Buffer holding the data to send * \param len Length of the data to send * * \return The callback must return the number of bytes sent if any, * or a non-zero error code. * If performing non-blocking I/O, \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE * must be returned when the operation would block. * * \note The callback is allowed to send fewer bytes than requested. * It must always return the number of bytes actually sent. */ typedef int mbedtls_ssl_send_t( void *ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ); /** * \brief Callback type: receive data from the network. * * \note That callback may be either blocking or non-blocking. * * \param ctx Context for the receive callback (typically a file * descriptor) * \param buf Buffer to write the received data to * \param len Length of the receive buffer * * \return The callback must return the number of bytes received, * or a non-zero error code. * If performing non-blocking I/O, \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ * must be returned when the operation would block. * * \note The callback may receive fewer bytes than the length of the * buffer. It must always return the number of bytes actually * received and written to the buffer. */ typedef int mbedtls_ssl_recv_t( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ); /** * \brief Callback type: receive data from the network, with timeout * * \note That callback must block until data is received, or the * timeout delay expires, or the operation is interrupted by a * signal. * * \param ctx Context for the receive callback (typically a file descriptor) * \param buf Buffer to write the received data to * \param len Length of the receive buffer * \param timeout Maximum nomber of millisecondes to wait for data * 0 means no timeout (potentially waiting forever) * * \return The callback must return the number of bytes received, * or a non-zero error code: * \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT if the operation timed out, * \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ if interrupted by a signal. * * \note The callback may receive fewer bytes than the length of the * buffer. It must always return the number of bytes actually * received and written to the buffer. */ typedef int mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len, uint32_t timeout ); /** * \brief Callback type: set a pair of timers/delays to watch * * \param ctx Context pointer * \param int_ms Intermediate delay in milliseconds * \param fin_ms Final delay in milliseconds * 0 cancels the current timer. * * \note This callback must at least store the necessary information * for the associated \c mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t callback to * return correct information. * * \note If using a event-driven style of programming, an event must * be generated when the final delay is passed. The event must * cause a call to \c mbedtls_ssl_handshake() with the proper * SSL context to be scheduled. Care must be taken to ensure * that at most one such call happens at a time. * * \note Only one timer at a time must be running. Calling this * function while a timer is running must cancel it. Cancelled * timers must not generate any event. */ typedef void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_t( void * ctx, uint32_t int_ms, uint32_t fin_ms ); /** * \brief Callback type: get status of timers/delays * * \param ctx Context pointer * * \return This callback must return: * -1 if cancelled (fin_ms == 0), * 0 if none of the delays have passed, * 1 if only the intermediate delay has passed, * 2 if the final delay has passed. */ typedef int mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t( void * ctx ); /* Defined below */ typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_session mbedtls_ssl_session; typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_context mbedtls_ssl_context; typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_config mbedtls_ssl_config; /* Defined in ssl_internal.h */ typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_transform mbedtls_ssl_transform; typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params; typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t; #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_key_cert mbedtls_ssl_key_cert; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_flight_item mbedtls_ssl_flight_item; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) /** * \brief Callback type: start external signature operation. * * This callback is called during an SSL handshake to start * a signature decryption operation using an * external processor. The parameter \p cert contains * the public key; it is up to the callback function to * determine how to access the associated private key. * * This function typically sends or enqueues a request, and * does not wait for the operation to complete. This allows * the handshake step to be non-blocking. * * The parameters \p ssl and \p cert are guaranteed to remain * valid throughout the handshake. On the other hand, this * function must save the contents of \p hash if the value * is needed for later processing, because the \p hash buffer * is no longer valid after this function returns. * * This function may call mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data() * to store an operation context for later retrieval * by the resume or cancel callback. * * \note For RSA signatures, this function must produce output * that is consistent with PKCS#1 v1.5 in the same way as * mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(). Before the private key operation, * apply the padding steps described in RFC 8017, section 9.2 * "EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5" as follows. * - If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, apply the PKCS#1 v1.5 * encoding, treating \p hash as the DigestInfo to be * padded. In other words, apply EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 starting * from step 3, with `T = hash` and `tLen = hash_len`. * - If `md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE`, apply the PKCS#1 v1.5 * encoding, treating \p hash as the hash to be encoded and * padded. In other words, apply EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 starting * from step 2, with `digestAlgorithm` obtained by calling * mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md() on \p md_alg. * * \note For ECDSA signatures, the output format is the DER encoding * `Ecdsa-Sig-Value` defined in * [RFC 4492 section 5.4](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492#section-5.4). * * \param ssl The SSL connection instance. It should not be * modified other than via * mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data(). * \param cert Certificate containing the public key. * In simple cases, this is one of the pointers passed to * mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert() when configuring the SSL * connection. However, if other callbacks are used, this * property may not hold. For example, if an SNI callback * is registered with mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni(), then * this callback determines what certificate is used. * \param md_alg Hash algorithm. * \param hash Buffer containing the hash. This buffer is * no longer valid when the function returns. * \param hash_len Size of the \c hash buffer in bytes. * * \return 0 if the operation was started successfully and the SSL * stack should call the resume callback immediately. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS if the operation * was started successfully and the SSL stack should return * immediately without calling the resume callback yet. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH if the external * processor does not support this key. The SSL stack will * use the private key object instead. * \return Any other error indicates a fatal failure and is * propagated up the call chain. The callback should * use \c MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_xxx error codes, and must not * use \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_xxx error codes except as * directed in the documentation of this callback. */ typedef int mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len ); /** * \brief Callback type: start external decryption operation. * * This callback is called during an SSL handshake to start * an RSA decryption operation using an * external processor. The parameter \p cert contains * the public key; it is up to the callback function to * determine how to access the associated private key. * * This function typically sends or enqueues a request, and * does not wait for the operation to complete. This allows * the handshake step to be non-blocking. * * The parameters \p ssl and \p cert are guaranteed to remain * valid throughout the handshake. On the other hand, this * function must save the contents of \p input if the value * is needed for later processing, because the \p input buffer * is no longer valid after this function returns. * * This function may call mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data() * to store an operation context for later retrieval * by the resume or cancel callback. * * \warning RSA decryption as used in TLS is subject to a potential * timing side channel attack first discovered by Bleichenbacher * in 1998. This attack can be remotely exploitable * in practice. To avoid this attack, you must ensure that * if the callback performs an RSA decryption, the time it * takes to execute and return the result does not depend * on whether the RSA decryption succeeded or reported * invalid padding. * * \param ssl The SSL connection instance. It should not be * modified other than via * mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data(). * \param cert Certificate containing the public key. * In simple cases, this is one of the pointers passed to * mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert() when configuring the SSL * connection. However, if other callbacks are used, this * property may not hold. For example, if an SNI callback * is registered with mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni(), then * this callback determines what certificate is used. * \param input Buffer containing the input ciphertext. This buffer * is no longer valid when the function returns. * \param input_len Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. * * \return 0 if the operation was started successfully and the SSL * stack should call the resume callback immediately. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS if the operation * was started successfully and the SSL stack should return * immediately without calling the resume callback yet. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH if the external * processor does not support this key. The SSL stack will * use the private key object instead. * \return Any other error indicates a fatal failure and is * propagated up the call chain. The callback should * use \c MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_xxx error codes, and must not * use \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_xxx error codes except as * directed in the documentation of this callback. */ typedef int mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, const unsigned char *input, size_t input_len ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ /** * \brief Callback type: resume external operation. * * This callback is called during an SSL handshake to resume * an external operation started by the * ::mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t or * ::mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t callback. * * This function typically checks the status of a pending * request or causes the request queue to make progress, and * does not wait for the operation to complete. This allows * the handshake step to be non-blocking. * * This function may call mbedtls_ssl_get_async_operation_data() * to retrieve an operation context set by the start callback. * It may call mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data() to modify * this context. * * Note that when this function returns a status other than * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS, it must free any * resources associated with the operation. * * \param ssl The SSL connection instance. It should not be * modified other than via * mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data(). * \param output Buffer containing the output (signature or decrypted * data) on success. * \param output_len On success, number of bytes written to \p output. * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. * * \return 0 if output of the operation is available in the * \p output buffer. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS if the operation * is still in progress. Subsequent requests for progress * on the SSL connection will call the resume callback * again. * \return Any other error means that the operation is aborted. * The SSL handshake is aborted. The callback should * use \c MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_xxx error codes, and must not * use \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_xxx error codes except as * directed in the documentation of this callback. */ typedef int mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *output, size_t *output_len, size_t output_size ); /** * \brief Callback type: cancel external operation. * * This callback is called if an SSL connection is closed * while an asynchronous operation is in progress. Note that * this callback is not called if the * ::mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t callback has run and has * returned a value other than * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS, since in that case * the asynchronous operation has already completed. * * This function may call mbedtls_ssl_get_async_operation_data() * to retrieve an operation context set by the start callback. * * \param ssl The SSL connection instance. It should not be * modified. */ typedef void mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_MAX_LEN 48 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN 32 #elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN 48 #elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN 20 #else /* This is already checked in check_config.h, but be sure. */ #error "Bad configuration - need SHA-1, SHA-256 or SHA-512 enabled to compute digest of peer CRT." #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED && !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) #define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH 255 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH 4 /* * For code readability use a typedef for DTLS-SRTP profiles * * Use_srtp extension protection profiles values as defined in * http://www.iana.org/assignments/srtp-protection/srtp-protection.xhtml * * Reminder: if this list is expanded mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value * must be updated too. */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80 ( (uint16_t) 0x0001) #define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32 ( (uint16_t) 0x0002) #define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80 ( (uint16_t) 0x0005) #define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32 ( (uint16_t) 0x0006) /* This one is not iana defined, but for code readability. */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ( (uint16_t) 0x0000) typedef uint16_t mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile; typedef struct mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info_t { /*! The SRTP profile that was negotiated. */ mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile chosen_dtls_srtp_profile; /*! The length of mki_value. */ uint16_t mki_len; /*! The mki_value used, with max size of 256 bytes. */ unsigned char mki_value[MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH]; } mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ /* * This structure is used for storing current session data. * * Note: when changing this definition, we need to check and update: * - in tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function: * ssl_populate_session() and ssl_serialize_session_save_load() * - in library/ssl_tls.c: * mbedtls_ssl_session_init() and mbedtls_ssl_session_free() * mbedtls_ssl_session_save() and ssl_session_load() * ssl_session_copy() */ struct mbedtls_ssl_session { #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) mbedtls_time_t start; /*!< starting time */ #endif int ciphersuite; /*!< chosen ciphersuite */ int compression; /*!< chosen compression */ size_t id_len; /*!< session id length */ unsigned char id[32]; /*!< session identifier */ unsigned char master[48]; /*!< the master secret */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) mbedtls_x509_crt *peer_cert; /*!< peer X.509 cert chain */ #else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ /*! The digest of the peer's end-CRT. This must be kept to detect CRT * changes during renegotiation, mitigating the triple handshake attack. */ unsigned char *peer_cert_digest; size_t peer_cert_digest_len; mbedtls_md_type_t peer_cert_digest_type; #endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ uint32_t verify_result; /*!< verification result */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) unsigned char *ticket; /*!< RFC 5077 session ticket */ size_t ticket_len; /*!< session ticket length */ uint32_t ticket_lifetime; /*!< ticket lifetime hint */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) unsigned char mfl_code; /*!< MaxFragmentLength negotiated by peer */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) int trunc_hmac; /*!< flag for truncated hmac activation */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) int encrypt_then_mac; /*!< flag for EtM activation */ #endif }; /** * SSL/TLS configuration to be shared between mbedtls_ssl_context structures. */ struct mbedtls_ssl_config { /* Group items by size (largest first) to minimize padding overhead */ /* * Pointers */ const int *ciphersuite_list[4]; /*!< allowed ciphersuites per version */ /** Callback for printing debug output */ void (*f_dbg)(void *, int, const char *, int, const char *); void *p_dbg; /*!< context for the debug function */ /** Callback for getting (pseudo-)random numbers */ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t); void *p_rng; /*!< context for the RNG function */ /** Callback to retrieve a session from the cache */ int (*f_get_cache)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_session *); /** Callback to store a session into the cache */ int (*f_set_cache)(void *, const mbedtls_ssl_session *); void *p_cache; /*!< context for cache callbacks */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) /** Callback for setting cert according to SNI extension */ int (*f_sni)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); void *p_sni; /*!< context for SNI callback */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) /** Callback to customize X.509 certificate chain verification */ int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *); void *p_vrfy; /*!< context for X.509 verify calllback */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) /** Callback to retrieve PSK key from identity */ int (*f_psk)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); void *p_psk; /*!< context for PSK callback */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) /** Callback to create & write a cookie for ClientHello veirifcation */ int (*f_cookie_write)( void *, unsigned char **, unsigned char *, const unsigned char *, size_t ); /** Callback to verify validity of a ClientHello cookie */ int (*f_cookie_check)( void *, const unsigned char *, size_t, const unsigned char *, size_t ); void *p_cookie; /*!< context for the cookie callbacks */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) /** Callback to create & write a session ticket */ int (*f_ticket_write)( void *, const mbedtls_ssl_session *, unsigned char *, const unsigned char *, size_t *, uint32_t * ); /** Callback to parse a session ticket into a session structure */ int (*f_ticket_parse)( void *, mbedtls_ssl_session *, unsigned char *, size_t); void *p_ticket; /*!< context for the ticket callbacks */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) /** Callback to export key block and master secret */ int (*f_export_keys)( void *, const unsigned char *, const unsigned char *, size_t, size_t, size_t ); /** Callback to export key block, master secret, * tls_prf and random bytes. Should replace f_export_keys */ int (*f_export_keys_ext)( void *, const unsigned char *, const unsigned char *, size_t, size_t, size_t, const unsigned char[32], const unsigned char[32], mbedtls_tls_prf_types ); void *p_export_keys; /*!< context for key export callback */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) size_t cid_len; /*!< The length of CIDs for incoming DTLS records. */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *cert_profile; /*!< verification profile */ mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; /*!< own certificate/key pair(s) */ mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain; /*!< trusted CAs */ mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl; /*!< trusted CAs CRLs */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb; void *p_ca_cb; #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t *f_async_sign_start; /*!< start asynchronous signature operation */ mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t *f_async_decrypt_start; /*!< start asynchronous decryption operation */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t *f_async_resume; /*!< resume asynchronous operation */ mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t *f_async_cancel; /*!< cancel asynchronous operation */ void *p_async_config_data; /*!< Configuration data set by mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb(). */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) const int *sig_hashes; /*!< allowed signature hashes */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *curve_list; /*!< allowed curves */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) mbedtls_mpi dhm_P; /*!< prime modulus for DHM */ mbedtls_mpi dhm_G; /*!< generator for DHM */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) psa_key_id_t psk_opaque; /*!< PSA key slot holding opaque PSK. This field * should only be set via * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque(). * If either no PSK or a raw PSK have been * configured, this has value \c 0. */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ unsigned char *psk; /*!< The raw pre-shared key. This field should * only be set via mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(). * If either no PSK or an opaque PSK * have been configured, this has value NULL. */ size_t psk_len; /*!< The length of the raw pre-shared key. * This field should only be set via * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(). * Its value is non-zero if and only if * \c psk is not \c NULL. */ unsigned char *psk_identity; /*!< The PSK identity for PSK negotiation. * This field should only be set via * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(). * This is set if and only if either * \c psk or \c psk_opaque are set. */ size_t psk_identity_len;/*!< The length of PSK identity. * This field should only be set via * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(). * Its value is non-zero if and only if * \c psk is not \c NULL or \c psk_opaque * is not \c 0. */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) const char **alpn_list; /*!< ordered list of protocols */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) /*! ordered list of supported srtp profile */ const mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile *dtls_srtp_profile_list; /*! number of supported profiles */ size_t dtls_srtp_profile_list_len; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ /* * Numerical settings (int then char) */ uint32_t read_timeout; /*!< timeout for mbedtls_ssl_read (ms) */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) uint32_t hs_timeout_min; /*!< initial value of the handshake retransmission timeout (ms) */ uint32_t hs_timeout_max; /*!< maximum value of the handshake retransmission timeout (ms) */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) int renego_max_records; /*!< grace period for renegotiation */ unsigned char renego_period[8]; /*!< value of the record counters that triggers renegotiation */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) unsigned int badmac_limit; /*!< limit of records with a bad MAC */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) unsigned int dhm_min_bitlen; /*!< min. bit length of the DHM prime */ #endif unsigned char max_major_ver; /*!< max. major version used */ unsigned char max_minor_ver; /*!< max. minor version used */ unsigned char min_major_ver; /*!< min. major version used */ unsigned char min_minor_ver; /*!< min. minor version used */ /* * Flags (bitfields) */ unsigned int endpoint : 1; /*!< 0: client, 1: server */ unsigned int transport : 1; /*!< stream (TLS) or datagram (DTLS) */ unsigned int authmode : 2; /*!< MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_XXX */ /* needed even with renego disabled for LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE */ unsigned int allow_legacy_renegotiation : 2 ; /*!< MBEDTLS_LEGACY_XXX */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) unsigned int arc4_disabled : 1; /*!< blacklist RC4 ciphersuites? */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) unsigned int mfl_code : 3; /*!< desired fragment length */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) unsigned int encrypt_then_mac : 1 ; /*!< negotiate encrypt-then-mac? */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) unsigned int extended_ms : 1; /*!< negotiate extended master secret? */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) unsigned int anti_replay : 1; /*!< detect and prevent replay? */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) unsigned int cbc_record_splitting : 1; /*!< do cbc record splitting */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) unsigned int disable_renegotiation : 1; /*!< disable renegotiation? */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) unsigned int trunc_hmac : 1; /*!< negotiate truncated hmac? */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) unsigned int session_tickets : 1; /*!< use session tickets? */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) unsigned int fallback : 1; /*!< is this a fallback? */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) unsigned int cert_req_ca_list : 1; /*!< enable sending CA list in Certificate Request messages? */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) unsigned int ignore_unexpected_cid : 1; /*!< Determines whether DTLS * record with unexpected CID * should lead to failure. */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) unsigned int dtls_srtp_mki_support : 1; /* support having mki_value in the use_srtp extension */ #endif }; struct mbedtls_ssl_context { const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf; /*!< configuration information */ /* * Miscellaneous */ int state; /*!< SSL handshake: current state */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) int renego_status; /*!< Initial, in progress, pending? */ int renego_records_seen; /*!< Records since renego request, or with DTLS, number of retransmissions of request if renego_max_records is < 0 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ int major_ver; /*!< equal to MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 */ int minor_ver; /*!< either 0 (SSL3) or 1 (TLS1.0) */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) unsigned badmac_seen; /*!< records with a bad MAC received */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) /** Callback to customize X.509 certificate chain verification */ int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *); void *p_vrfy; /*!< context for X.509 verify callback */ #endif mbedtls_ssl_send_t *f_send; /*!< Callback for network send */ mbedtls_ssl_recv_t *f_recv; /*!< Callback for network receive */ mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t *f_recv_timeout; /*!< Callback for network receive with timeout */ void *p_bio; /*!< context for I/O operations */ /* * Session layer */ mbedtls_ssl_session *session_in; /*!< current session data (in) */ mbedtls_ssl_session *session_out; /*!< current session data (out) */ mbedtls_ssl_session *session; /*!< negotiated session data */ mbedtls_ssl_session *session_negotiate; /*!< session data in negotiation */ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake; /*!< params required only during the handshake process */ /* * Record layer transformations */ mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_in; /*!< current transform params (in) */ mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_out; /*!< current transform params (in) */ mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform; /*!< negotiated transform params */ mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_negotiate; /*!< transform params in negotiation */ /* * Timers */ void *p_timer; /*!< context for the timer callbacks */ mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_t *f_set_timer; /*!< set timer callback */ mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t *f_get_timer; /*!< get timer callback */ /* * Record layer (incoming data) */ unsigned char *in_buf; /*!< input buffer */ unsigned char *in_ctr; /*!< 64-bit incoming message counter TLS: maintained by us DTLS: read from peer */ unsigned char *in_hdr; /*!< start of record header */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) unsigned char *in_cid; /*!< The start of the CID; * (the end is marked by in_len). */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ unsigned char *in_len; /*!< two-bytes message length field */ unsigned char *in_iv; /*!< ivlen-byte IV */ unsigned char *in_msg; /*!< message contents (in_iv+ivlen) */ unsigned char *in_offt; /*!< read offset in application data */ int in_msgtype; /*!< record header: message type */ size_t in_msglen; /*!< record header: message length */ size_t in_left; /*!< amount of data read so far */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) size_t in_buf_len; /*!< length of input buffer */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) uint16_t in_epoch; /*!< DTLS epoch for incoming records */ size_t next_record_offset; /*!< offset of the next record in datagram (equal to in_left if none) */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) uint64_t in_window_top; /*!< last validated record seq_num */ uint64_t in_window; /*!< bitmask for replay detection */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ size_t in_hslen; /*!< current handshake message length, including the handshake header */ int nb_zero; /*!< # of 0-length encrypted messages */ int keep_current_message; /*!< drop or reuse current message on next call to record layer? */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) uint8_t disable_datagram_packing; /*!< Disable packing multiple records * within a single datagram. */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ /* * Record layer (outgoing data) */ unsigned char *out_buf; /*!< output buffer */ unsigned char *out_ctr; /*!< 64-bit outgoing message counter */ unsigned char *out_hdr; /*!< start of record header */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) unsigned char *out_cid; /*!< The start of the CID; * (the end is marked by in_len). */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ unsigned char *out_len; /*!< two-bytes message length field */ unsigned char *out_iv; /*!< ivlen-byte IV */ unsigned char *out_msg; /*!< message contents (out_iv+ivlen) */ int out_msgtype; /*!< record header: message type */ size_t out_msglen; /*!< record header: message length */ size_t out_left; /*!< amount of data not yet written */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) size_t out_buf_len; /*!< length of output buffer */ #endif unsigned char cur_out_ctr[8]; /*!< Outgoing record sequence number. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) uint16_t mtu; /*!< path mtu, used to fragment outgoing messages */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) unsigned char *compress_buf; /*!< zlib data buffer */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) signed char split_done; /*!< current record already splitted? */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING */ /* * PKI layer */ int client_auth; /*!< flag for client auth. */ /* * User settings */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) char *hostname; /*!< expected peer CN for verification (and SNI if available) */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) const char *alpn_chosen; /*!< negotiated protocol */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) /* * use_srtp extension */ mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info dtls_srtp_info; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ /* * Information for DTLS hello verify */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) unsigned char *cli_id; /*!< transport-level ID of the client */ size_t cli_id_len; /*!< length of cli_id */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ /* * Secure renegotiation */ /* needed to know when to send extension on server */ int secure_renegotiation; /*!< does peer support legacy or secure renegotiation */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) size_t verify_data_len; /*!< length of verify data stored */ char own_verify_data[MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN]; /*!< previous handshake verify data */ char peer_verify_data[MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN]; /*!< previous handshake verify data */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) /* CID configuration to use in subsequent handshakes. */ /*! The next incoming CID, chosen by the user and applying to * all subsequent handshakes. This may be different from the * CID currently used in case the user has re-configured the CID * after an initial handshake. */ unsigned char own_cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX ]; uint8_t own_cid_len; /*!< The length of \c own_cid. */ uint8_t negotiate_cid; /*!< This indicates whether the CID extension should * be negotiated in the next handshake or not. * Possible values are #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED * and #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ }; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_OUTBOUND MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT( 0 ) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_INBOUND MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT( 1 ) #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) #else #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED extern int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *key_enc, const unsigned char *key_dec, size_t keylen, const unsigned char *iv_enc, const unsigned char *iv_dec, size_t ivlen, const unsigned char *mac_enc, const unsigned char *mac_dec, size_t maclen); MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED extern int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int direction ); MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED extern int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED extern int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED extern int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED extern int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_finish)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); #undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ /** * \brief Return the name of the ciphersuite associated with the * given ID * * \param ciphersuite_id SSL ciphersuite ID * * \return a string containing the ciphersuite name */ const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name( const int ciphersuite_id ); /** * \brief Return the ID of the ciphersuite associated with the * given name * * \param ciphersuite_name SSL ciphersuite name * * \return the ID with the ciphersuite or 0 if not found */ int mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_id( const char *ciphersuite_name ); /** * \brief Initialize an SSL context * Just makes the context ready for mbedtls_ssl_setup() or * mbedtls_ssl_free() * * \param ssl SSL context */ void mbedtls_ssl_init( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); /** * \brief Set up an SSL context for use * * \note No copy of the configuration context is made, it can be * shared by many mbedtls_ssl_context structures. * * \warning The conf structure will be accessed during the session. * It must not be modified or freed as long as the session * is active. * * \warning This function must be called exactly once per context. * Calling mbedtls_ssl_setup again is not supported, even * if no session is active. * * \param ssl SSL context * \param conf SSL configuration to use * * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if * memory allocation failed */ int mbedtls_ssl_setup( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf ); /** * \brief Reset an already initialized SSL context for re-use * while retaining application-set variables, function * pointers and data. * * \param ssl SSL context * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED or * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED */ int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); /** * \brief Set the current endpoint type * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param endpoint must be MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT or MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_endpoint( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int endpoint ); /** * \brief Set the transport type (TLS or DTLS). * Default: TLS * * \note For DTLS, you must either provide a recv callback that * doesn't block, or one that handles timeouts, see * \c mbedtls_ssl_set_bio(). You also need to provide timer * callbacks with \c mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb(). * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param transport transport type: * MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM for TLS, * MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM for DTLS. */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int transport ); /** * \brief Set the certificate verification mode * Default: NONE on server, REQUIRED on client * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param authmode can be: * * MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE: peer certificate is not checked * (default on server) * (insecure on client) * * MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL: peer certificate is checked, however the * handshake continues even if verification failed; * mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result() can be called after the * handshake is complete. * * MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED: peer *must* present a valid certificate, * handshake is aborted if verification failed. * (default on client) * * \note On client, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED is the recommended mode. * With MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL, the user needs to call mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result() at * the right time(s), which may not be obvious, while REQUIRED always perform * the verification as soon as possible. For example, REQUIRED was protecting * against the "triple handshake" attack even before it was found. */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int authmode ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) /** * \brief Set the verification callback (Optional). * * If set, the provided verify callback is called for each * certificate in the peer's CRT chain, including the trusted * root. For more information, please see the documentation of * \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify(). * * \note For per context callbacks and contexts, please use * mbedtls_ssl_set_verify() instead. * * \param conf The SSL configuration to use. * \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use during CRT verification. * \param p_vrfy The opaque context to be passed to the callback. */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), void *p_vrfy ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ /** * \brief Set the random number generator callback * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param f_rng RNG function * \param p_rng RNG parameter */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); /** * \brief Set the debug callback * * The callback has the following argument: * void * opaque context for the callback * int debug level * const char * file name * int line number * const char * message * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param f_dbg debug function * \param p_dbg debug parameter */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, void (*f_dbg)(void *, int, const char *, int, const char *), void *p_dbg ); /** * \brief Set the underlying BIO callbacks for write, read and * read-with-timeout. * * \param ssl SSL context * \param p_bio parameter (context) shared by BIO callbacks * \param f_send write callback * \param f_recv read callback * \param f_recv_timeout blocking read callback with timeout. * * \note One of f_recv or f_recv_timeout can be NULL, in which case * the other is used. If both are non-NULL, f_recv_timeout is * used and f_recv is ignored (as if it were NULL). * * \note The two most common use cases are: * - non-blocking I/O, f_recv != NULL, f_recv_timeout == NULL * - blocking I/O, f_recv == NULL, f_recv_timout != NULL * * \note For DTLS, you need to provide either a non-NULL * f_recv_timeout callback, or a f_recv that doesn't block. * * \note See the documentations of \c mbedtls_ssl_send_t, * \c mbedtls_ssl_recv_t and \c mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t for * the conventions those callbacks must follow. * * \note On some platforms, net_sockets.c provides * \c mbedtls_net_send(), \c mbedtls_net_recv() and * \c mbedtls_net_recv_timeout() that are suitable to be used * here. */ void mbedtls_ssl_set_bio( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, void *p_bio, mbedtls_ssl_send_t *f_send, mbedtls_ssl_recv_t *f_recv, mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t *f_recv_timeout ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) /** * \brief Configure the use of the Connection ID (CID) * extension in the next handshake. * * Reference: draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 * * The DTLS CID extension allows the reliable association of * DTLS records to DTLS connections across changes in the * underlying transport (changed IP and Port metadata) by * adding explicit connection identifiers (CIDs) to the * headers of encrypted DTLS records. The desired CIDs are * configured by the application layer and are exchanged in * new `ClientHello` / `ServerHello` extensions during the * handshake, where each side indicates the CID it wants the * peer to use when writing encrypted messages. The CIDs are * put to use once records get encrypted: the stack discards * any incoming records that don't include the configured CID * in their header, and adds the peer's requested CID to the * headers of outgoing messages. * * This API enables or disables the use of the CID extension * in the next handshake and sets the value of the CID to * be used for incoming messages. * * \param ssl The SSL context to configure. This must be initialized. * \param enable This value determines whether the CID extension should * be used or not. Possible values are: * - MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED to enable the use of the CID. * - MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED (default) to disable the use * of the CID. * \param own_cid The address of the readable buffer holding the CID we want * the peer to use when sending encrypted messages to us. * This may be \c NULL if \p own_cid_len is \c 0. * This parameter is unused if \p enabled is set to * MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. * \param own_cid_len The length of \p own_cid. * This parameter is unused if \p enabled is set to * MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. * * \note The value of \p own_cid_len must match the value of the * \c len parameter passed to mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid() * when configuring the ::mbedtls_ssl_config that \p ssl * is bound to. * * \note This CID configuration applies to subsequent handshakes * performed on the SSL context \p ssl, but does not trigger * one. You still have to call `mbedtls_ssl_handshake()` * (for the initial handshake) or `mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate()` * (for a renegotiation handshake) explicitly after a * successful call to this function to run the handshake. * * \note This call cannot guarantee that the use of the CID * will be successfully negotiated in the next handshake, * because the peer might not support it. Specifically: * - On the Client, enabling the use of the CID through * this call implies that the `ClientHello` in the next * handshake will include the CID extension, thereby * offering the use of the CID to the server. Only if * the `ServerHello` contains the CID extension, too, * the CID extension will actually be put to use. * - On the Server, enabling the use of the CID through * this call implies that that the server will look for * the CID extension in a `ClientHello` from the client, * and, if present, reply with a CID extension in its * `ServerHello`. * * \note To check whether the use of the CID was negotiated * after the subsequent handshake has completed, please * use the API mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid(). * * \warning If the use of the CID extension is enabled in this call * and the subsequent handshake negotiates its use, Mbed TLS * will silently drop every packet whose CID does not match * the CID configured in \p own_cid. It is the responsibility * of the user to adapt the underlying transport to take care * of CID-based demultiplexing before handing datagrams to * Mbed TLS. * * \return \c 0 on success. In this case, the CID configuration * applies to the next handshake. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ssl_set_cid( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int enable, unsigned char const *own_cid, size_t own_cid_len ); /** * \brief Get information about the use of the CID extension * in the current connection. * * \param ssl The SSL context to query. * \param enabled The address at which to store whether the CID extension * is currently in use or not. If the CID is in use, * `*enabled` is set to MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED; * otherwise, it is set to MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. * \param peer_cid The address of the buffer in which to store the CID * chosen by the peer (if the CID extension is used). * This may be \c NULL in case the value of peer CID * isn't needed. If it is not \c NULL, \p peer_cid_len * must not be \c NULL. * \param peer_cid_len The address at which to store the size of the CID * chosen by the peer (if the CID extension is used). * This is also the number of Bytes in \p peer_cid that * have been written. * This may be \c NULL in case the length of the peer CID * isn't needed. If it is \c NULL, \p peer_cid must be * \c NULL, too. * * \note This applies to the state of the CID negotiated in * the last complete handshake. If a handshake is in * progress, this function will attempt to complete * the handshake first. * * \note If CID extensions have been exchanged but both client * and server chose to use an empty CID, this function * sets `*enabled` to #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED * (the rationale for this is that the resulting * communication is the same as if the CID extensions * hadn't been used). * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int *enabled, unsigned char peer_cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ], size_t *peer_cid_len ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ /** * \brief Set the Maximum Tranport Unit (MTU). * Special value: 0 means unset (no limit). * This represents the maximum size of a datagram payload * handled by the transport layer (usually UDP) as determined * by the network link and stack. In practice, this controls * the maximum size datagram the DTLS layer will pass to the * \c f_send() callback set using \c mbedtls_ssl_set_bio(). * * \note The limit on datagram size is converted to a limit on * record payload by subtracting the current overhead of * encapsulation and encryption/authentication if any. * * \note This can be called at any point during the connection, for * example when a Path Maximum Transfer Unit (PMTU) * estimate becomes available from other sources, * such as lower (or higher) protocol layers. * * \note This setting only controls the size of the packets we send, * and does not restrict the size of the datagrams we're * willing to receive. Client-side, you can request the * server to use smaller records with \c * mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len(). * * \note If both a MTU and a maximum fragment length have been * configured (or negotiated with the peer), the resulting * lower limit on record payload (see first note) is used. * * \note This can only be used to decrease the maximum size * of datagrams (hence records, see first note) sent. It * cannot be used to increase the maximum size of records over * the limit set by #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN. * * \note Values lower than the current record layer expansion will * result in an error when trying to send data. * * \note Using record compression together with a non-zero MTU value * will result in an error when trying to send data. * * \param ssl SSL context * \param mtu Value of the path MTU in bytes */ void mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t mtu ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) /** * \brief Set a connection-specific verification callback (optional). * * If set, the provided verify callback is called for each * certificate in the peer's CRT chain, including the trusted * root. For more information, please see the documentation of * \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify(). * * \note This call is analogous to mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify() but * binds the verification callback and context to an SSL context * as opposed to an SSL configuration. * If mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify() and mbedtls_ssl_set_verify() * are both used, mbedtls_ssl_set_verify() takes precedence. * * \param ssl The SSL context to use. * \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use during CRT verification. * \param p_vrfy The opaque context to be passed to the callback. */ void mbedtls_ssl_set_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), void *p_vrfy ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ /** * \brief Set the timeout period for mbedtls_ssl_read() * (Default: no timeout.) * * \param conf SSL configuration context * \param timeout Timeout value in milliseconds. * Use 0 for no timeout (default). * * \note With blocking I/O, this will only work if a non-NULL * \c f_recv_timeout was set with \c mbedtls_ssl_set_bio(). * With non-blocking I/O, this will only work if timer * callbacks were set with \c mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb(). * * \note With non-blocking I/O, you may also skip this function * altogether and handle timeouts at the application layer. */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_read_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t timeout ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING) /** * \brief Check whether a buffer contains a valid and authentic record * that has not been seen before. (DTLS only). * * This function does not change the user-visible state * of the SSL context. Its sole purpose is to provide * an indication of the legitimacy of an incoming record. * * This can be useful e.g. in distributed server environments * using the DTLS Connection ID feature, in which connections * might need to be passed between service instances on a change * of peer address, but where such disruptive operations should * only happen after the validity of incoming records has been * confirmed. * * \param ssl The SSL context to use. * \param buf The address of the buffer holding the record to be checked. * This must be a read/write buffer of length \p buflen Bytes. * \param buflen The length of \p buf in Bytes. * * \note This routine only checks whether the provided buffer begins * with a valid and authentic record that has not been seen * before, but does not check potential data following the * initial record. In particular, it is possible to pass DTLS * datagrams containing multiple records, in which case only * the first record is checked. * * \note This function modifies the input buffer \p buf. If you need * to preserve the original record, you have to maintain a copy. * * \return \c 0 if the record is valid and authentic and has not been * seen before. * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC if the check completed * successfully but the record was found to be not authentic. * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD if the check completed * successfully but the record was found to be invalid for * a reason different from authenticity checking. * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD if the check completed * successfully but the record was found to be unexpected * in the state of the SSL context, including replayed records. * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. * In this case, the SSL context becomes unusable and needs * to be freed or reset before reuse. */ int mbedtls_ssl_check_record( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING */ /** * \brief Set the timer callbacks (Mandatory for DTLS.) * * \param ssl SSL context * \param p_timer parameter (context) shared by timer callbacks * \param f_set_timer set timer callback * \param f_get_timer get timer callback. Must return: * * \note See the documentation of \c mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_t and * \c mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t for the conventions this pair of * callbacks must follow. * * \note On some platforms, timing.c provides * \c mbedtls_timing_set_delay() and * \c mbedtls_timing_get_delay() that are suitable for using * here, except if using an event-driven style. * * \note See also the "DTLS tutorial" article in our knowledge base. * https://tls.mbed.org/kb/how-to/dtls-tutorial */ void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, void *p_timer, mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_t *f_set_timer, mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t *f_get_timer ); /** * \brief Callback type: generate and write session ticket * * \note This describes what a callback implementation should do. * This callback should generate an encrypted and * authenticated ticket for the session and write it to the * output buffer. Here, ticket means the opaque ticket part * of the NewSessionTicket structure of RFC 5077. * * \param p_ticket Context for the callback * \param session SSL session to be written in the ticket * \param start Start of the output buffer * \param end End of the output buffer * \param tlen On exit, holds the length written * \param lifetime On exit, holds the lifetime of the ticket in seconds * * \return 0 if successful, or * a specific MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code. */ typedef int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t( void *p_ticket, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, unsigned char *start, const unsigned char *end, size_t *tlen, uint32_t *lifetime ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) /** * \brief Callback type: Export key block and master secret * * \note This is required for certain uses of TLS, e.g. EAP-TLS * (RFC 5216) and Thread. The key pointers are ephemeral and * therefore must not be stored. The master secret and keys * should not be used directly except as an input to a key * derivation function. * * \param p_expkey Context for the callback * \param ms Pointer to master secret (fixed length: 48 bytes) * \param kb Pointer to key block, see RFC 5246 section 6.3 * (variable length: 2 * maclen + 2 * keylen + 2 * ivlen). * \param maclen MAC length * \param keylen Key length * \param ivlen IV length * * \return 0 if successful, or * a specific MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code. */ typedef int mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t( void *p_expkey, const unsigned char *ms, const unsigned char *kb, size_t maclen, size_t keylen, size_t ivlen ); /** * \brief Callback type: Export key block, master secret, * handshake randbytes and the tls_prf function * used to derive keys. * * \note This is required for certain uses of TLS, e.g. EAP-TLS * (RFC 5216) and Thread. The key pointers are ephemeral and * therefore must not be stored. The master secret and keys * should not be used directly except as an input to a key * derivation function. * * \param p_expkey Context for the callback. * \param ms Pointer to master secret (fixed length: 48 bytes). * \param kb Pointer to key block, see RFC 5246 section 6.3. * (variable length: 2 * maclen + 2 * keylen + 2 * ivlen). * \param maclen MAC length. * \param keylen Key length. * \param ivlen IV length. * \param client_random The client random bytes. * \param server_random The server random bytes. * \param tls_prf_type The tls_prf enum type. * * \return 0 if successful, or * a specific MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code. */ typedef int mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_ext_t( void *p_expkey, const unsigned char *ms, const unsigned char *kb, size_t maclen, size_t keylen, size_t ivlen, const unsigned char client_random[32], const unsigned char server_random[32], mbedtls_tls_prf_types tls_prf_type ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */ /** * \brief Callback type: parse and load session ticket * * \note This describes what a callback implementation should do. * This callback should parse a session ticket as generated * by the corresponding mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t function, * and, if the ticket is authentic and valid, load the * session. * * \note The implementation is allowed to modify the first len * bytes of the input buffer, eg to use it as a temporary * area for the decrypted ticket contents. * * \param p_ticket Context for the callback * \param session SSL session to be loaded * \param buf Start of the buffer containing the ticket * \param len Length of the ticket. * * \return 0 if successful, or * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC if not authentic, or * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED if expired, or * any other non-zero code for other failures. */ typedef int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse_t( void *p_ticket, mbedtls_ssl_session *session, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) /** * \brief Configure SSL session ticket callbacks (server only). * (Default: none.) * * \note On server, session tickets are enabled by providing * non-NULL callbacks. * * \note On client, use \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets(). * * \param conf SSL configuration context * \param f_ticket_write Callback for writing a ticket * \param f_ticket_parse Callback for parsing a ticket * \param p_ticket Context shared by the two callbacks */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t *f_ticket_write, mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse_t *f_ticket_parse, void *p_ticket ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) /** * \brief Configure key export callback. * (Default: none.) * * \note See \c mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t. * * \param conf SSL configuration context * \param f_export_keys Callback for exporting keys * \param p_export_keys Context for the callback */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t *f_export_keys, void *p_export_keys ); /** * \brief Configure extended key export callback. * (Default: none.) * * \note See \c mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_ext_t. * \warning Exported key material must not be used for any purpose * before the (D)TLS handshake is completed * * \param conf SSL configuration context * \param f_export_keys_ext Callback for exporting keys * \param p_export_keys Context for the callback */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_ext_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_ext_t *f_export_keys_ext, void *p_export_keys ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) /** * \brief Configure asynchronous private key operation callbacks. * * \param conf SSL configuration context * \param f_async_sign Callback to start a signature operation. See * the description of ::mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t * for more information. This may be \c NULL if the * external processor does not support any signature * operation; in this case the private key object * associated with the certificate will be used. * \param f_async_decrypt Callback to start a decryption operation. See * the description of ::mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t * for more information. This may be \c NULL if the * external processor does not support any decryption * operation; in this case the private key object * associated with the certificate will be used. * \param f_async_resume Callback to resume an asynchronous operation. See * the description of ::mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t * for more information. This may not be \c NULL unless * \p f_async_sign and \p f_async_decrypt are both * \c NULL. * \param f_async_cancel Callback to cancel an asynchronous operation. See * the description of ::mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t * for more information. This may be \c NULL if * no cleanup is needed. * \param config_data A pointer to configuration data which can be * retrieved with * mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_async_config_data(). The * library stores this value without dereferencing it. */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t *f_async_sign, mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t *f_async_decrypt, mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t *f_async_resume, mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t *f_async_cancel, void *config_data ); /** * \brief Retrieve the configuration data set by * mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb(). * * \param conf SSL configuration context * \return The configuration data set by * mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb(). */ void *mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_async_config_data( const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf ); /** * \brief Retrieve the asynchronous operation user context. * * \note This function may only be called while a handshake * is in progress. * * \param ssl The SSL context to access. * * \return The asynchronous operation user context that was last * set during the current handshake. If * mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data() has not yet been * called during the current handshake, this function returns * \c NULL. */ void *mbedtls_ssl_get_async_operation_data( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); /** * \brief Retrieve the asynchronous operation user context. * * \note This function may only be called while a handshake * is in progress. * * \param ssl The SSL context to access. * \param ctx The new value of the asynchronous operation user context. * Call mbedtls_ssl_get_async_operation_data() later during the * same handshake to retrieve this value. */ void mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, void *ctx ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ /** * \brief Callback type: generate a cookie * * \param ctx Context for the callback * \param p Buffer to write to, * must be updated to point right after the cookie * \param end Pointer to one past the end of the output buffer * \param info Client ID info that was passed to * \c mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id() * \param ilen Length of info in bytes * * \return The callback must return 0 on success, * or a negative error code. */ typedef int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t( void *ctx, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, const unsigned char *info, size_t ilen ); /** * \brief Callback type: verify a cookie * * \param ctx Context for the callback * \param cookie Cookie to verify * \param clen Length of cookie * \param info Client ID info that was passed to * \c mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id() * \param ilen Length of info in bytes * * \return The callback must return 0 if cookie is valid, * or a negative error code. */ typedef int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t( void *ctx, const unsigned char *cookie, size_t clen, const unsigned char *info, size_t ilen ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) /** * \brief Register callbacks for DTLS cookies * (Server only. DTLS only.) * * Default: dummy callbacks that fail, in order to force you to * register working callbacks (and initialize their context). * * To disable HelloVerifyRequest, register NULL callbacks. * * \warning Disabling hello verification allows your server to be used * for amplification in DoS attacks against other hosts. * Only disable if you known this can't happen in your * particular environment. * * \note See comments on \c mbedtls_ssl_handshake() about handling * the MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED that is expected * on the first handshake attempt when this is enabled. * * \note This is also necessary to handle client reconnection from * the same port as described in RFC 6347 section 4.2.8 (only * the variant with cookies is supported currently). See * comments on \c mbedtls_ssl_read() for details. * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param f_cookie_write Cookie write callback * \param f_cookie_check Cookie check callback * \param p_cookie Context for both callbacks */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_cookies( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t *f_cookie_write, mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t *f_cookie_check, void *p_cookie ); /** * \brief Set client's transport-level identification info. * (Server only. DTLS only.) * * This is usually the IP address (and port), but could be * anything identify the client depending on the underlying * network stack. Used for HelloVerifyRequest with DTLS. * This is *not* used to route the actual packets. * * \param ssl SSL context * \param info Transport-level info identifying the client (eg IP + port) * \param ilen Length of info in bytes * * \note An internal copy is made, so the info buffer can be reused. * * \return 0 on success, * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if used on client, * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if out of memory. */ int mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *info, size_t ilen ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) /** * \brief Enable or disable anti-replay protection for DTLS. * (DTLS only, no effect on TLS.) * Default: enabled. * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param mode MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_ENABLED or MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED. * * \warning Disabling this is a security risk unless the application * protocol handles duplicated packets in a safe way. You * should not disable this without careful consideration. * However, if your application already detects duplicated * packets and needs information about them to adjust its * transmission strategy, then you'll want to disable this. */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_anti_replay( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char mode ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) /** * \brief Set a limit on the number of records with a bad MAC * before terminating the connection. * (DTLS only, no effect on TLS.) * Default: 0 (disabled). * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param limit Limit, or 0 to disable. * * \note If the limit is N, then the connection is terminated when * the Nth non-authentic record is seen. * * \note Records with an invalid header are not counted, only the * ones going through the authentication-decryption phase. * * \note This is a security trade-off related to the fact that it's * often relatively easy for an active attacker ot inject UDP * datagrams. On one hand, setting a low limit here makes it * easier for such an attacker to forcibly terminated a * connection. On the other hand, a high limit or no limit * might make us waste resources checking authentication on * many bogus packets. */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, unsigned limit ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) /** * \brief Allow or disallow packing of multiple handshake records * within a single datagram. * * \param ssl The SSL context to configure. * \param allow_packing This determines whether datagram packing may * be used or not. A value of \c 0 means that every * record will be sent in a separate datagram; a * value of \c 1 means that, if space permits, * multiple handshake messages (including CCS) belonging to * a single flight may be packed within a single datagram. * * \note This is enabled by default and should only be disabled * for test purposes, or if datagram packing causes * interoperability issues with peers that don't support it. * * \note Allowing datagram packing reduces the network load since * there's less overhead if multiple messages share the same * datagram. Also, it increases the handshake efficiency * since messages belonging to a single datagram will not * be reordered in transit, and so future message buffering * or flight retransmission (if no buffering is used) as * means to deal with reordering are needed less frequently. * * \note Application records are not affected by this option and * are currently always sent in separate datagrams. * */ void mbedtls_ssl_set_datagram_packing( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned allow_packing ); /** * \brief Set retransmit timeout values for the DTLS handshake. * (DTLS only, no effect on TLS.) * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param min Initial timeout value in milliseconds. * Default: 1000 (1 second). * \param max Maximum timeout value in milliseconds. * Default: 60000 (60 seconds). * * \note Default values are from RFC 6347 section 4.2.4.1. * * \note The 'min' value should typically be slightly above the * expected round-trip time to your peer, plus whatever time * it takes for the peer to process the message. For example, * if your RTT is about 600ms and you peer needs up to 1s to * do the cryptographic operations in the handshake, then you * should set 'min' slightly above 1600. Lower values of 'min' * might cause spurious resends which waste network resources, * while larger value of 'min' will increase overall latency * on unreliable network links. * * \note The more unreliable your network connection is, the larger * your max / min ratio needs to be in order to achieve * reliable handshakes. * * \note Messages are retransmitted up to log2(ceil(max/min)) times. * For example, if min = 1s and max = 5s, the retransmit plan * goes: send ... 1s -> resend ... 2s -> resend ... 4s -> * resend ... 5s -> give up and return a timeout error. */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_handshake_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t min, uint32_t max ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) /** * \brief Set the session cache callbacks (server-side only) * If not set, no session resuming is done (except if session * tickets are enabled too). * * The session cache has the responsibility to check for stale * entries based on timeout. See RFC 5246 for recommendations. * * Warning: session.peer_cert is cleared by the SSL/TLS layer on * connection shutdown, so do not cache the pointer! Either set * it to NULL or make a full copy of the certificate. * * The get callback is called once during the initial handshake * to enable session resuming. The get function has the * following parameters: (void *parameter, mbedtls_ssl_session *session) * If a valid entry is found, it should fill the master of * the session object with the cached values and return 0, * return 1 otherwise. Optionally peer_cert can be set as well * if it is properly present in cache entry. * * The set callback is called once during the initial handshake * to enable session resuming after the entire handshake has * been finished. The set function has the following parameters: * (void *parameter, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session). The function * should create a cache entry for future retrieval based on * the data in the session structure and should keep in mind * that the mbedtls_ssl_session object presented (and all its referenced * data) is cleared by the SSL/TLS layer when the connection is * terminated. It is recommended to add metadata to determine if * an entry is still valid in the future. Return 0 if * successfully cached, return 1 otherwise. * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param p_cache parmater (context) for both callbacks * \param f_get_cache session get callback * \param f_set_cache session set callback */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, void *p_cache, int (*f_get_cache)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_session *), int (*f_set_cache)(void *, const mbedtls_ssl_session *) ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) /** * \brief Request resumption of session (client-side only) * Session data is copied from presented session structure. * * \param ssl SSL context * \param session session context * * \return 0 if successful, * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed, * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if used server-side or * arguments are otherwise invalid * * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_session() */ int mbedtls_ssl_set_session( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ /** * \brief Load serialized session data into a session structure. * On client, this can be used for loading saved sessions * before resuming them with mbedstls_ssl_set_session(). * On server, this can be used for alternative implementations * of session cache or session tickets. * * \warning If a peer certificate chain is associated with the session, * the serialized state will only contain the peer's * end-entity certificate and the result of the chain * verification (unless verification was disabled), but not * the rest of the chain. * * \see mbedtls_ssl_session_save() * \see mbedtls_ssl_set_session() * * \param session The session structure to be populated. It must have been * initialised with mbedtls_ssl_session_init() but not * populated yet. * \param buf The buffer holding the serialized session data. It must be a * readable buffer of at least \p len bytes. * \param len The size of the serialized data in bytes. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if input data is invalid. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH if the serialized data * was generated in a different version or configuration of * Mbed TLS. * \return Another negative value for other kinds of errors (for * example, unsupported features in the embedded certificate). */ int mbedtls_ssl_session_load( mbedtls_ssl_session *session, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ); /** * \brief Save session structure as serialized data in a buffer. * On client, this can be used for saving session data, * potentially in non-volatile storage, for resuming later. * On server, this can be used for alternative implementations * of session cache or session tickets. * * \see mbedtls_ssl_session_load() * \see mbedtls_ssl_get_session_pointer() * * \param session The session structure to be saved. * \param buf The buffer to write the serialized data to. It must be a * writeable buffer of at least \p len bytes, or may be \c * NULL if \p len is \c 0. * \param buf_len The number of bytes available for writing in \p buf. * \param olen The size in bytes of the data that has been or would have * been written. It must point to a valid \c size_t. * * \note \p olen is updated to the correct value regardless of * whether \p buf_len was large enough. This makes it possible * to determine the necessary size by calling this function * with \p buf set to \c NULL and \p buf_len to \c 0. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p buf is too small. */ int mbedtls_ssl_session_save( const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len, size_t *olen ); /** * \brief Get a pointer to the current session structure, for example * to serialize it. * * \warning Ownership of the session remains with the SSL context, and * the returned pointer is only guaranteed to be valid until * the next API call operating on the same \p ssl context. * * \see mbedtls_ssl_session_save() * * \param ssl The SSL context. * * \return A pointer to the current session if successful. * \return \c NULL if no session is active. */ const mbedtls_ssl_session *mbedtls_ssl_get_session_pointer( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); /** * \brief Set the list of allowed ciphersuites and the preference * order. First in the list has the highest preference. * (Overrides all version-specific lists) * * The ciphersuites array is not copied, and must remain * valid for the lifetime of the ssl_config. * * Note: The server uses its own preferences * over the preference of the client unless * MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE is defined! * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param ciphersuites 0-terminated list of allowed ciphersuites */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const int *ciphersuites ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_IGNORE 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_FAIL 1 /** * \brief Specify the length of Connection IDs for incoming * encrypted DTLS records, as well as the behaviour * on unexpected CIDs. * * By default, the CID length is set to \c 0, * and unexpected CIDs are silently ignored. * * \param conf The SSL configuration to modify. * \param len The length in Bytes of the CID fields in encrypted * DTLS records using the CID mechanism. This must * not be larger than #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX. * \param ignore_other_cids This determines the stack's behaviour when * receiving a record with an unexpected CID. * Possible values are: * - #MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_IGNORE * In this case, the record is silently ignored. * - #MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_FAIL * In this case, the stack fails with the specific * error code #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID. * * \note The CID specification allows implementations to either * use a common length for all incoming connection IDs or * allow variable-length incoming IDs. Mbed TLS currently * requires a common length for all connections sharing the * same SSL configuration; this allows simpler parsing of * record headers. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p own_cid_len * is too large. */ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, size_t len, int ignore_other_cids ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ /** * \brief Set the list of allowed ciphersuites and the * preference order for a specific version of the protocol. * (Only useful on the server side) * * The ciphersuites array is not copied, and must remain * valid for the lifetime of the ssl_config. * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param ciphersuites 0-terminated list of allowed ciphersuites * \param major Major version number (only MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 * supported) * \param minor Minor version number (MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 and MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2, * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 supported) * * \note With DTLS, use MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 for DTLS 1.0 * and MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 for DTLS 1.2 */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites_for_version( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const int *ciphersuites, int major, int minor ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) /** * \brief Set the X.509 security profile used for verification * * \note The restrictions are enforced for all certificates in the * chain. However, signatures in the handshake are not covered * by this setting but by \b mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes(). * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param profile Profile to use */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile ); /** * \brief Set the data required to verify peer certificate * * \note See \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() for notes regarding the * parameters ca_chain (maps to trust_ca for that function) * and ca_crl. * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param ca_chain trusted CA chain (meaning all fully trusted top-level CAs) * \param ca_crl trusted CA CRLs */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain, mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) /** * \brief Set the trusted certificate callback. * * This API allows to register the set of trusted certificates * through a callback, instead of a linked list as configured * by mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain(). * * This is useful for example in contexts where a large number * of CAs are used, and the inefficiency of maintaining them * in a linked list cannot be tolerated. It is also useful when * the set of trusted CAs needs to be modified frequently. * * See the documentation of `mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t` for * more information. * * \param conf The SSL configuration to register the callback with. * \param f_ca_cb The trusted certificate callback to use when verifying * certificate chains. * \param p_ca_cb The context to be passed to \p f_ca_cb (for example, * a reference to a trusted CA database). * * \note This API is incompatible with mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain(): * Any call to this function overwrites the values set through * earlier calls to mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain() or * mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb(). * * \note This API is incompatible with CA indication in * CertificateRequest messages: A server-side SSL context which * is bound to an SSL configuration that uses a CA callback * configured via mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb(), and which requires * client authentication, will send an empty CA list in the * corresponding CertificateRequest message. * * \note This API is incompatible with mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain(): * If an SSL context is bound to an SSL configuration which uses * CA callbacks configured via mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb(), then * calls to mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain() have no effect. * * \note The use of this API disables the use of restartable ECC * during X.509 CRT signature verification (but doesn't affect * other uses). * * \warning This API is incompatible with the use of CRLs. Any call to * mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb() unsets CRLs configured through * earlier calls to mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain(). * * \warning In multi-threaded environments, the callback \p f_ca_cb * must be thread-safe, and it is the user's responsibility * to guarantee this (for example through a mutex * contained in the callback context pointed to by \p p_ca_cb). */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb, void *p_ca_cb ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ /** * \brief Set own certificate chain and private key * * \note own_cert should contain in order from the bottom up your * certificate chain. The top certificate (self-signed) * can be omitted. * * \note On server, this function can be called multiple times to * provision more than one cert/key pair (eg one ECDSA, one * RSA with SHA-256, one RSA with SHA-1). An adequate * certificate will be selected according to the client's * advertised capabilities. In case multiple certificates are * adequate, preference is given to the one set by the first * call to this function, then second, etc. * * \note On client, only the first call has any effect. That is, * only one client certificate can be provisioned. The * server's preferences in its CertficateRequest message will * be ignored and our only cert will be sent regardless of * whether it matches those preferences - the server can then * decide what it wants to do with it. * * \note The provided \p pk_key needs to match the public key in the * first certificate in \p own_cert, or all handshakes using * that certificate will fail. It is your responsibility * to ensure that; this function will not perform any check. * You may use mbedtls_pk_check_pair() in order to perform * this check yourself, but be aware that this function can * be computationally expensive on some key types. * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param own_cert own public certificate chain * \param pk_key own private key * * \return 0 on success or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED */ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, mbedtls_x509_crt *own_cert, mbedtls_pk_context *pk_key ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) /** * \brief Configure a pre-shared key (PSK) and identity * to be used in PSK-based ciphersuites. * * \note This is mainly useful for clients. Servers will usually * want to use \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb() instead. * * \note A PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() in the PSK callback * takes precedence over a PSK configured by this function. * * \warning Currently, clients can only register a single pre-shared key. * Calling this function or mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque() more * than once will overwrite values configured in previous calls. * Support for setting multiple PSKs on clients and selecting * one based on the identity hint is not a planned feature, * but feedback is welcomed. * * \param conf The SSL configuration to register the PSK with. * \param psk The pointer to the pre-shared key to use. * \param psk_len The length of the pre-shared key in bytes. * \param psk_identity The pointer to the pre-shared key identity. * \param psk_identity_len The length of the pre-shared key identity * in bytes. * * \note The PSK and its identity are copied internally and * hence need not be preserved by the caller for the lifetime * of the SSL configuration. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len, const unsigned char *psk_identity, size_t psk_identity_len ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) /** * \brief Configure an opaque pre-shared key (PSK) and identity * to be used in PSK-based ciphersuites. * * \note This is mainly useful for clients. Servers will usually * want to use \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb() instead. * * \note An opaque PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque() in * the PSK callback takes precedence over an opaque PSK * configured by this function. * * \warning Currently, clients can only register a single pre-shared key. * Calling this function or mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() more than * once will overwrite values configured in previous calls. * Support for setting multiple PSKs on clients and selecting * one based on the identity hint is not a planned feature, * but feedback is welcomed. * * \param conf The SSL configuration to register the PSK with. * \param psk The identifier of the key slot holding the PSK. * Until \p conf is destroyed or this function is successfully * called again, the key slot \p psk must be populated with a * key of type PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION whose policy * allows its use for the key derivation algorithm applied * in the handshake. * \param psk_identity The pointer to the pre-shared key identity. * \param psk_identity_len The length of the pre-shared key identity * in bytes. * * \note The PSK identity hint is copied internally and hence need * not be preserved by the caller for the lifetime of the * SSL configuration. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, psa_key_id_t psk, const unsigned char *psk_identity, size_t psk_identity_len ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ /** * \brief Set the pre-shared Key (PSK) for the current handshake. * * \note This should only be called inside the PSK callback, * i.e. the function passed to \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb(). * * \note A PSK set by this function takes precedence over a PSK * configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(). * * \param ssl The SSL context to configure a PSK for. * \param psk The pointer to the pre-shared key. * \param psk_len The length of the pre-shared key in bytes. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) /** * \brief Set an opaque pre-shared Key (PSK) for the current handshake. * * \note This should only be called inside the PSK callback, * i.e. the function passed to \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb(). * * \note An opaque PSK set by this function takes precedence over an * opaque PSK configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque(). * * \param ssl The SSL context to configure a PSK for. * \param psk The identifier of the key slot holding the PSK. * For the duration of the current handshake, the key slot * must be populated with a key of type * PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION whose policy allows its * use for the key derivation algorithm * applied in the handshake. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, psa_key_id_t psk ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ /** * \brief Set the PSK callback (server-side only). * * If set, the PSK callback is called for each * handshake where a PSK-based ciphersuite was negotiated. * The caller provides the identity received and wants to * receive the actual PSK data and length. * * The callback has the following parameters: * - \c void*: The opaque pointer \p p_psk. * - \c mbedtls_ssl_context*: The SSL context to which * the operation applies. * - \c const unsigned char*: The PSK identity * selected by the client. * - \c size_t: The length of the PSK identity * selected by the client. * * If a valid PSK identity is found, the callback should use * \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() or * \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque() * on the SSL context to set the correct PSK and return \c 0. * Any other return value will result in a denied PSK identity. * * \note A dynamic PSK (i.e. set by the PSK callback) takes * precedence over a static PSK (i.e. set by * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() or * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()). * This means that if you set a PSK callback using this * function, you don't need to set a PSK using * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() or * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()). * * \param conf The SSL configuration to register the callback with. * \param f_psk The callback for selecting and setting the PSK based * in the PSK identity chosen by the client. * \param p_psk A pointer to an opaque structure to be passed to * the callback, for example a PSK store. */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int (*f_psk)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_psk ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) #else #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /** * \brief Set the Diffie-Hellman public P and G values, * read as hexadecimal strings (server-side only) * (Default values: MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_[PG]) * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param dhm_P Diffie-Hellman-Merkle modulus * \param dhm_G Diffie-Hellman-Merkle generator * * \deprecated Superseded by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_bin. * * \return 0 if successful */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const char *dhm_P, const char *dhm_G ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ /** * \brief Set the Diffie-Hellman public P and G values * from big-endian binary presentations. * (Default values: MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_[PG]_BIN) * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param dhm_P Diffie-Hellman-Merkle modulus in big-endian binary form * \param P_len Length of DHM modulus * \param dhm_G Diffie-Hellman-Merkle generator in big-endian binary form * \param G_len Length of DHM generator * * \return 0 if successful */ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_bin( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const unsigned char *dhm_P, size_t P_len, const unsigned char *dhm_G, size_t G_len ); /** * \brief Set the Diffie-Hellman public P and G values, * read from existing context (server-side only) * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param dhm_ctx Diffie-Hellman-Merkle context * * \return 0 if successful */ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_ctx( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm_ctx ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) /** * \brief Set the minimum length for Diffie-Hellman parameters. * (Client-side only.) * (Default: 1024 bits.) * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param bitlen Minimum bit length of the DHM prime */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dhm_min_bitlen( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, unsigned int bitlen ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) /** * \brief Set the allowed curves in order of preference. * (Default: all defined curves.) * * On server: this only affects selection of the ECDHE curve; * the curves used for ECDH and ECDSA are determined by the * list of available certificates instead. * * On client: this affects the list of curves offered for any * use. The server can override our preference order. * * Both sides: limits the set of curves accepted for use in * ECDHE and in the peer's end-entity certificate. * * \note This has no influence on which curves are allowed inside the * certificate chains, see \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile() * for that. For the end-entity certificate however, the key * will be accepted only if it is allowed both by this list * and by the cert profile. * * \note This list should be ordered by decreasing preference * (preferred curve first). * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param curves Ordered list of allowed curves, * terminated by MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE. */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *curves ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) /** * \brief Set the allowed hashes for signatures during the handshake. * (Default: all available hashes except MD5.) * * \note This only affects which hashes are offered and can be used * for signatures during the handshake. Hashes for message * authentication and the TLS PRF are controlled by the * ciphersuite, see \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites(). Hashes * used for certificate signature are controlled by the * verification profile, see \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile(). * * \note This list should be ordered by decreasing preference * (preferred hash first). * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param hashes Ordered list of allowed signature hashes, * terminated by \c MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const int *hashes ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) /** * \brief Set or reset the hostname to check against the received * server certificate. It sets the ServerName TLS extension, * too, if that extension is enabled. (client-side only) * * \param ssl SSL context * \param hostname the server hostname, may be NULL to clear hostname * \note Maximum hostname length MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_HOST_NAME_LEN. * * \return 0 if successful, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED on * allocation failure, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA on * too long input hostname. * * Hostname set to the one provided on success (cleared * when NULL). On allocation failure hostname is cleared. * On too long input failure, old hostname is unchanged. */ int mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const char *hostname ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) /** * \brief Set own certificate and key for the current handshake * * \note Same as \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert() but for use within * the SNI callback. * * \param ssl SSL context * \param own_cert own public certificate chain * \param pk_key own private key * * \return 0 on success or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED */ int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_own_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_x509_crt *own_cert, mbedtls_pk_context *pk_key ); /** * \brief Set the data required to verify peer certificate for the * current handshake * * \note Same as \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain() but for use within * the SNI callback. * * \param ssl SSL context * \param ca_chain trusted CA chain (meaning all fully trusted top-level CAs) * \param ca_crl trusted CA CRLs */ void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain, mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl ); /** * \brief Set authmode for the current handshake. * * \note Same as \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode() but for use within * the SNI callback. * * \param ssl SSL context * \param authmode MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL or * MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED */ void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_authmode( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int authmode ); /** * \brief Set server side ServerName TLS extension callback * (optional, server-side only). * * If set, the ServerName callback is called whenever the * server receives a ServerName TLS extension from the client * during a handshake. The ServerName callback has the * following parameters: (void *parameter, mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * const unsigned char *hostname, size_t len). If a suitable * certificate is found, the callback must set the * certificate(s) and key(s) to use with \c * mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_own_cert() (can be called repeatedly), * and may optionally adjust the CA and associated CRL with \c * mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain() as well as the client * authentication mode with \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_authmode(), * then must return 0. If no matching name is found, the * callback must either set a default cert, or * return non-zero to abort the handshake at this point. * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param f_sni verification function * \param p_sni verification parameter */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int (*f_sni)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_sni ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) /** * \brief Set the EC J-PAKE password for current handshake. * * \note An internal copy is made, and destroyed as soon as the * handshake is completed, or when the SSL context is reset or * freed. * * \note The SSL context needs to be already set up. The right place * to call this function is between \c mbedtls_ssl_setup() or * \c mbedtls_ssl_reset() and \c mbedtls_ssl_handshake(). * * \param ssl SSL context * \param pw EC J-PAKE password (pre-shared secret) * \param pw_len length of pw in bytes * * \return 0 on success, or a negative error code. */ int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *pw, size_t pw_len ); #endif /*MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) /** * \brief Set the supported Application Layer Protocols. * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param protos Pointer to a NULL-terminated list of supported protocols, * in decreasing preference order. The pointer to the list is * recorded by the library for later reference as required, so * the lifetime of the table must be atleast as long as the * lifetime of the SSL configuration structure. * * \return 0 on success, or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA. */ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const char **protos ); /** * \brief Get the name of the negotiated Application Layer Protocol. * This function should be called after the handshake is * completed. * * \param ssl SSL context * * \return Protcol name, or NULL if no protocol was negotiated. */ const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_alpn_protocol( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) static inline const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string( mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile profile ) { switch( profile ) { case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80: return( "MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80" ); case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32: return( "MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32" ); case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80: return( "MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80" ); case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32: return( "MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32" ); default: break; } return( "" ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ /** * \brief Manage support for mki(master key id) value * in use_srtp extension. * MKI is an optional part of SRTP used for key management * and re-keying. See RFC3711 section 3.1 for details. * The default value is * #MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_UNSUPPORTED. * * \param conf The SSL configuration to manage mki support. * \param support_mki_value Enable or disable mki usage. Values are * #MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_UNSUPPORTED * or #MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED. */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_srtp_mki_value_supported( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int support_mki_value ); /** * \brief Set the supported DTLS-SRTP protection profiles. * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param profiles Pointer to a List of MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET terminated * supported protection profiles * in decreasing preference order. * The pointer to the list is recorded by the library * for later reference as required, so the lifetime * of the table must be at least as long as the lifetime * of the SSL configuration structure. * The list must not hold more than * MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH elements * (excluding the terminating MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET). * * \return 0 on success * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA when the list of * protection profiles is incorrect. */ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles ( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile *profiles ); /** * \brief Set the mki_value for the current DTLS-SRTP session. * * \param ssl SSL context to use. * \param mki_value The MKI value to set. * \param mki_len The length of the MKI value. * * \note This function is relevant on client side only. * The server discovers the mki value during handshake. * A mki value set on server side using this function * is ignored. * * \return 0 on success * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE */ int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_srtp_set_mki_value( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *mki_value, uint16_t mki_len ); /** * \brief Get the negotiated DTLS-SRTP informations: * Protection profile and MKI value. * * \warning This function must be called after the handshake is * completed. The value returned by this function must * not be trusted or acted upon before the handshake completes. * * \param ssl The SSL context to query. * \param dtls_srtp_info The negotiated DTLS-SRTP informations: * - Protection profile in use. * A direct mapping of the iana defined value for protection * profile on an uint16_t. http://www.iana.org/assignments/srtp-protection/srtp-protection.xhtml * #MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET if the use of SRTP was not negotiated * or peer's Hello packet was not parsed yet. * - mki size and value( if size is > 0 ). */ void mbedtls_ssl_get_dtls_srtp_negotiation_result( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info *dtls_srtp_info ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ /** * \brief Set the maximum supported version sent from the client side * and/or accepted at the server side * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION) * * \note This ignores ciphersuites from higher versions. * * \note With DTLS, use MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 for DTLS 1.0 and * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 for DTLS 1.2 * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param major Major version number (only MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 supported) * \param minor Minor version number (MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 and MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2, * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 supported) */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major, int minor ); /** * \brief Set the minimum accepted SSL/TLS protocol version * (Default: TLS 1.0) * * \note Input outside of the SSL_MAX_XXXXX_VERSION and * SSL_MIN_XXXXX_VERSION range is ignored. * * \note MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 (SSL v3) should be avoided. * * \note With DTLS, use MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 for DTLS 1.0 and * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 for DTLS 1.2 * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param major Major version number (only MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 supported) * \param minor Minor version number (MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 and MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2, * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 supported) */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major, int minor ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) /** * \brief Set the fallback flag (client-side only). * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_NOT_FALLBACK). * * \note Set to MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK when preparing a fallback * connection, that is a connection with max_version set to a * lower value than the value you're willing to use. Such * fallback connections are not recommended but are sometimes * necessary to interoperate with buggy (version-intolerant) * servers. * * \warning You should NOT set this to MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK for * non-fallback connections! This would appear to work for a * while, then cause failures when the server is upgraded to * support a newer TLS version. * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param fallback MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_NOT_FALLBACK or MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_fallback( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char fallback ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) /** * \brief Enable or disable Encrypt-then-MAC * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED) * * \note This should always be enabled, it is a security * improvement, and should not cause any interoperability * issue (used only if the peer supports it too). * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param etm MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED or MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_encrypt_then_mac( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char etm ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) /** * \brief Enable or disable Extended Master Secret negotiation. * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED) * * \note This should always be enabled, it is a security fix to the * protocol, and should not cause any interoperability issue * (used only if the peer supports it too). * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param ems MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED or MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_extended_master_secret( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char ems ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) /** * \brief Disable or enable support for RC4 * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED) * * \warning Use of RC4 in DTLS/TLS has been prohibited by RFC 7465 * for security reasons. Use at your own risk. * * \note This function is deprecated and will be removed in * a future version of the library. * RC4 is disabled by default at compile time and needs to be * actively enabled for use with legacy systems. * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param arc4 MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_ENABLED or MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_arc4_support( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char arc4 ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) /** * \brief Whether to send a list of acceptable CAs in * CertificateRequest messages. * (Default: do send) * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param cert_req_ca_list MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED or * MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_DISABLED */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_req_ca_list( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char cert_req_ca_list ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) /** * \brief Set the maximum fragment length to emit and/or negotiate. * (Typical: the smaller of #MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN and * #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, usually `2^14` bytes) * (Server: set maximum fragment length to emit, * usually negotiated by the client during handshake) * (Client: set maximum fragment length to emit *and* * negotiate with the server during handshake) * (Default: #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE) * * \note On the client side, the maximum fragment length extension * *will not* be used, unless the maximum fragment length has * been set via this function to a value different than * #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE. * * \note With TLS, this currently only affects ApplicationData (sent * with \c mbedtls_ssl_read()), not handshake messages. * With DTLS, this affects both ApplicationData and handshake. * * \note This sets the maximum length for a record's payload, * excluding record overhead that will be added to it, see * \c mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion(). * * \note For DTLS, it is also possible to set a limit for the total * size of daragrams passed to the transport layer, including * record overhead, see \c mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu(). * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param mfl_code Code for maximum fragment length (allowed values: * MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024, * MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096) * * \return 0 if successful or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA */ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, unsigned char mfl_code ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) /** * \brief Activate negotiation of truncated HMAC * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED) * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param truncate Enable or disable (MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED or * MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED) */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_truncated_hmac( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int truncate ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) /** * \brief Enable / Disable 1/n-1 record splitting * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED) * * \note Only affects SSLv3 and TLS 1.0, not higher versions. * Does not affect non-CBC ciphersuites in any version. * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param split MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED or * MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cbc_record_splitting( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char split ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) /** * \brief Enable / Disable session tickets (client only). * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED.) * * \note On server, use \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb(). * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param use_tickets Enable or disable (MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED or * MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED) */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int use_tickets ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) /** * \brief Enable / Disable renegotiation support for connection when * initiated by peer * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED) * * \warning It is recommended to always disable renegotation unless you * know you need it and you know what you're doing. In the * past, there have been several issues associated with * renegotiation or a poor understanding of its properties. * * \note Server-side, enabling renegotiation also makes the server * susceptible to a resource DoS by a malicious client. * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param renegotiation Enable or disable (MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED or * MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED) */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int renegotiation ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ /** * \brief Prevent or allow legacy renegotiation. * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION) * * MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION allows connections to * be established even if the peer does not support * secure renegotiation, but does not allow renegotiation * to take place if not secure. * (Interoperable and secure option) * * MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION allows renegotiations * with non-upgraded peers. Allowing legacy renegotiation * makes the connection vulnerable to specific man in the * middle attacks. (See RFC 5746) * (Most interoperable and least secure option) * * MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE breaks off connections * if peer does not support secure renegotiation. Results * in interoperability issues with non-upgraded peers * that do not support renegotiation altogether. * (Most secure option, interoperability issues) * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param allow_legacy Prevent or allow (SSL_NO_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION, * SSL_ALLOW_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION or * MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE) */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_legacy_renegotiation( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int allow_legacy ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) /** * \brief Enforce renegotiation requests. * (Default: enforced, max_records = 16) * * When we request a renegotiation, the peer can comply or * ignore the request. This function allows us to decide * whether to enforce our renegotiation requests by closing * the connection if the peer doesn't comply. * * However, records could already be in transit from the peer * when the request is emitted. In order to increase * reliability, we can accept a number of records before the * expected handshake records. * * The optimal value is highly dependent on the specific usage * scenario. * * \note With DTLS and server-initiated renegotiation, the * HelloRequest is retransmited every time mbedtls_ssl_read() times * out or receives Application Data, until: * - max_records records have beens seen, if it is >= 0, or * - the number of retransmits that would happen during an * actual handshake has been reached. * Please remember the request might be lost a few times * if you consider setting max_records to a really low value. * * \warning On client, the grace period can only happen during * mbedtls_ssl_read(), as opposed to mbedtls_ssl_write() and mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate() * which always behave as if max_record was 0. The reason is, * if we receive application data from the server, we need a * place to write it, which only happens during mbedtls_ssl_read(). * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param max_records Use MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ENFORCED if you don't want to * enforce renegotiation, or a non-negative value to enforce * it but allow for a grace period of max_records records. */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_enforced( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int max_records ); /** * \brief Set record counter threshold for periodic renegotiation. * (Default: 2^48 - 1) * * Renegotiation is automatically triggered when a record * counter (outgoing or incoming) crosses the defined * threshold. The default value is meant to prevent the * connection from being closed when the counter is about to * reached its maximal value (it is not allowed to wrap). * * Lower values can be used to enforce policies such as "keys * must be refreshed every N packets with cipher X". * * The renegotiation period can be disabled by setting * conf->disable_renegotiation to * MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED. * * \note When the configured transport is * MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM the maximum renegotiation * period is 2^48 - 1, and for MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM, * the maximum renegotiation period is 2^64 - 1. * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param period The threshold value: a big-endian 64-bit number. */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_period( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const unsigned char period[8] ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ /** * \brief Check if there is data already read from the * underlying transport but not yet processed. * * \param ssl SSL context * * \return 0 if nothing's pending, 1 otherwise. * * \note This is different in purpose and behaviour from * \c mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail in that it considers * any kind of unprocessed data, not only unread * application data. If \c mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes * returns a non-zero value, this function will * also signal pending data, but the converse does * not hold. For example, in DTLS there might be * further records waiting to be processed from * the current underlying transport's datagram. * * \note If this function returns 1 (data pending), this * does not imply that a subsequent call to * \c mbedtls_ssl_read will provide any data; * e.g., the unprocessed data might turn out * to be an alert or a handshake message. * * \note This function is useful in the following situation: * If the SSL/TLS module successfully returns from an * operation - e.g. a handshake or an application record * read - and you're awaiting incoming data next, you * must not immediately idle on the underlying transport * to have data ready, but you need to check the value * of this function first. The reason is that the desired * data might already be read but not yet processed. * If, in contrast, a previous call to the SSL/TLS module * returned MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, it is not necessary * to call this function, as the latter error code entails * that all internal data has been processed. * */ int mbedtls_ssl_check_pending( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); /** * \brief Return the number of application data bytes * remaining to be read from the current record. * * \param ssl SSL context * * \return How many bytes are available in the application * data record read buffer. * * \note When working over a datagram transport, this is * useful to detect the current datagram's boundary * in case \c mbedtls_ssl_read has written the maximal * amount of data fitting into the input buffer. * */ size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); /** * \brief Return the result of the certificate verification * * \param ssl The SSL context to use. * * \return \c 0 if the certificate verification was successful. * \return \c -1u if the result is not available. This may happen * e.g. if the handshake aborts early, or a verification * callback returned a fatal error. * \return A bitwise combination of \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_XXX * and \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_XXX failure flags; see x509.h. */ uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); /** * \brief Return the name of the current ciphersuite * * \param ssl SSL context * * \return a string containing the ciphersuite name */ const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); /** * \brief Return the current SSL version (SSLv3/TLSv1/etc) * * \param ssl SSL context * * \return a string containing the SSL version */ const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_version( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); /** * \brief Return the (maximum) number of bytes added by the record * layer: header + encryption/MAC overhead (inc. padding) * * \note This function is not available (always returns an error) * when record compression is enabled. * * \param ssl SSL context * * \return Current maximum record expansion in bytes, or * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if compression is * enabled, which makes expansion much less predictable */ int mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) /** * \brief Return the maximum fragment length (payload, in bytes) for * the output buffer. For the client, this is the configured * value. For the server, it is the minimum of two - the * configured value and the negotiated one. * * \sa mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len() * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_record_payload() * * \param ssl SSL context * * \return Current maximum fragment length for the output buffer. */ size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); /** * \brief Return the maximum fragment length (payload, in bytes) for * the input buffer. This is the negotiated maximum fragment * length, or, if there is none, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN. * If it is not defined either, the value is 2^14. This function * works as its predecessor, \c mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len(). * * \sa mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len() * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_record_payload() * * \param ssl SSL context * * \return Current maximum fragment length for the output buffer. */ size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) #else #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #endif /** * \brief This function is a deprecated approach to getting the max * fragment length. Its an alias for * \c mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len(), as the behaviour * is the same. See \c mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len() for * more detail. * * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len() * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len() * * \param ssl SSL context * * \return Current maximum fragment length for the output buffer. */ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ /** * \brief Return the current maximum outgoing record payload in bytes. * This takes into account the config.h setting \c * MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, the configured and negotiated * max fragment length extension if used, and for DTLS the * path MTU as configured and current record expansion. * * \note With DTLS, \c mbedtls_ssl_write() will return an error if * called with a larger length value. * With TLS, \c mbedtls_ssl_write() will fragment the input if * necessary and return the number of bytes written; it is up * to the caller to call \c mbedtls_ssl_write() again in * order to send the remaining bytes if any. * * \note This function is not available (always returns an error) * when record compression is enabled. * * \sa mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu() * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len() * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len() * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion() * * \param ssl SSL context * * \return Current maximum payload for an outgoing record, * or a negative error code. */ int mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) /** * \brief Return the peer certificate from the current connection. * * \param ssl The SSL context to use. This must be initialized and setup. * * \return The current peer certificate, if available. * The returned certificate is owned by the SSL context and * is valid only until the next call to the SSL API. * \return \c NULL if no peer certificate is available. This might * be because the chosen ciphersuite doesn't use CRTs * (PSK-based ciphersuites, for example), or because * #MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE has been disabled, * allowing the stack to free the peer's CRT to save memory. * * \note For one-time inspection of the peer's certificate during * the handshake, consider registering an X.509 CRT verification * callback through mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify() instead of calling * this function. Using mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify() also comes at * the benefit of allowing you to influence the verification * process, for example by masking expected and tolerated * verification failures. * * \warning You must not use the pointer returned by this function * after any further call to the SSL API, including * mbedtls_ssl_read() and mbedtls_ssl_write(); this is * because the pointer might change during renegotiation, * which happens transparently to the user. * If you want to use the certificate across API calls, * you must make a copy. */ const mbedtls_x509_crt *mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) /** * \brief Save session in order to resume it later (client-side only) * Session data is copied to presented session structure. * * * \param ssl SSL context * \param session session context * * \return 0 if successful, * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed, * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if used server-side or * arguments are otherwise invalid. * * \note Only the server certificate is copied, and not the full chain, * so you should not attempt to validate the certificate again * by calling \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() on it. * Instead, you should use the results from the verification * in the original handshake by calling \c mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result() * after loading the session again into a new SSL context * using \c mbedtls_ssl_set_session(). * * \note Once the session object is not needed anymore, you should * free it by calling \c mbedtls_ssl_session_free(). * * \sa mbedtls_ssl_set_session() */ int mbedtls_ssl_get_session( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ssl_session *session ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ /** * \brief Perform the SSL handshake * * \param ssl SSL context * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ or #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE * if the handshake is incomplete and waiting for data to * be available for reading from or writing to the underlying * transport - in this case you must call this function again * when the underlying transport is ready for the operation. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS if an asynchronous * operation is in progress (see * mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb()) - in this case you * must call this function again when the operation is ready. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS if a cryptographic * operation is in progress (see mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops()) - * in this case you must call this function again to complete * the handshake when you're done attending other tasks. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED if DTLS is in use * and the client did not demonstrate reachability yet - in * this case you must stop using the context (see below). * \return Another SSL error code - in this case you must stop using * the context (see below). * * \warning If this function returns something other than * \c 0, * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS or * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS, * you must stop using the SSL context for reading or writing, * and either free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() * on it before re-using it for a new connection; the current * connection must be closed. * * \note If DTLS is in use, then you may choose to handle * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED specially for logging * purposes, as it is an expected return value rather than an * actual error, but you still need to reset/free the context. * * \note Remarks regarding event-driven DTLS: * If the function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, no datagram * from the underlying transport layer is currently being processed, * and it is safe to idle until the timer or the underlying transport * signal a new event. This is not true for a successful handshake, * in which case the datagram of the underlying transport that is * currently being processed might or might not contain further * DTLS records. */ int mbedtls_ssl_handshake( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); /** * \brief Perform a single step of the SSL handshake * * \note The state of the context (ssl->state) will be at * the next state after this function returns \c 0. Do not * call this function if state is MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER. * * \param ssl SSL context * * \return See mbedtls_ssl_handshake(). * * \warning If this function returns something other than \c 0, * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS or * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS, you must stop using * the SSL context for reading or writing, and either free it * or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before * re-using it for a new connection; the current connection * must be closed. */ int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) /** * \brief Initiate an SSL renegotiation on the running connection. * Client: perform the renegotiation right now. * Server: request renegotiation, which will be performed * during the next call to mbedtls_ssl_read() if honored by * client. * * \param ssl SSL context * * \return 0 if successful, or any mbedtls_ssl_handshake() return * value except #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT that can't * happen during a renegotiation. * * \warning If this function returns something other than \c 0, * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS or * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS, you must stop using * the SSL context for reading or writing, and either free it * or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before * re-using it for a new connection; the current connection * must be closed. * */ int mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ /** * \brief Read at most 'len' application data bytes * * \param ssl SSL context * \param buf buffer that will hold the data * \param len maximum number of bytes to read * * \return The (positive) number of bytes read if successful. * \return \c 0 if the read end of the underlying transport was closed * without sending a CloseNotify beforehand, which might happen * because of various reasons (internal error of an underlying * stack, non-conformant peer not sending a CloseNotify and * such) - in this case you must stop using the context * (see below). * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY if the underlying * transport is still functional, but the peer has * acknowledged to not send anything anymore. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ or #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE * if the handshake is incomplete and waiting for data to * be available for reading from or writing to the underlying * transport - in this case you must call this function again * when the underlying transport is ready for the operation. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS if an asynchronous * operation is in progress (see * mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb()) - in this case you * must call this function again when the operation is ready. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS if a cryptographic * operation is in progress (see mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops()) - * in this case you must call this function again to complete * the handshake when you're done attending other tasks. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT if we're at the server * side of a DTLS connection and the client is initiating a * new connection using the same source port. See below. * \return Another SSL error code - in this case you must stop using * the context (see below). * * \warning If this function returns something other than * a positive value, * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS, * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS or * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT, * you must stop using the SSL context for reading or writing, * and either free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() * on it before re-using it for a new connection; the current * connection must be closed. * * \note When this function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT * (which can only happen server-side), it means that a client * is initiating a new connection using the same source port. * You can either treat that as a connection close and wait * for the client to resend a ClientHello, or directly * continue with \c mbedtls_ssl_handshake() with the same * context (as it has been reset internally). Either way, you * must make sure this is seen by the application as a new * connection: application state, if any, should be reset, and * most importantly the identity of the client must be checked * again. WARNING: not validating the identity of the client * again, or not transmitting the new identity to the * application layer, would allow authentication bypass! * * \note Remarks regarding event-driven DTLS: * - If the function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, no datagram * from the underlying transport layer is currently being processed, * and it is safe to idle until the timer or the underlying transport * signal a new event. * - This function may return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ even if data was * initially available on the underlying transport, as this data may have * been only e.g. duplicated messages or a renegotiation request. * Therefore, you must be prepared to receive MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ even * when reacting to an incoming-data event from the underlying transport. * - On success, the datagram of the underlying transport that is currently * being processed may contain further DTLS records. You should call * \c mbedtls_ssl_check_pending to check for remaining records. * */ int mbedtls_ssl_read( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ); /** * \brief Try to write exactly 'len' application data bytes * * \warning This function will do partial writes in some cases. If the * return value is non-negative but less than length, the * function must be called again with updated arguments: * buf + ret, len - ret (if ret is the return value) until * it returns a value equal to the last 'len' argument. * * \param ssl SSL context * \param buf buffer holding the data * \param len how many bytes must be written * * \return The (non-negative) number of bytes actually written if * successful (may be less than \p len). * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ or #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE * if the handshake is incomplete and waiting for data to * be available for reading from or writing to the underlying * transport - in this case you must call this function again * when the underlying transport is ready for the operation. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS if an asynchronous * operation is in progress (see * mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb()) - in this case you * must call this function again when the operation is ready. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS if a cryptographic * operation is in progress (see mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops()) - * in this case you must call this function again to complete * the handshake when you're done attending other tasks. * \return Another SSL error code - in this case you must stop using * the context (see below). * * \warning If this function returns something other than * a non-negative value, * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS or * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS, * you must stop using the SSL context for reading or writing, * and either free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() * on it before re-using it for a new connection; the current * connection must be closed. * * \note When this function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE/READ, * it must be called later with the *same* arguments, * until it returns a value greater that or equal to 0. When * the function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE there may be * some partial data in the output buffer, however this is not * yet sent. * * \note If the requested length is greater than the maximum * fragment length (either the built-in limit or the one set * or negotiated with the peer), then: * - with TLS, less bytes than requested are written. * - with DTLS, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA is returned. * \c mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len() may be used to * query the active maximum fragment length. * * \note Attempting to write 0 bytes will result in an empty TLS * application record being sent. */ int mbedtls_ssl_write( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ); /** * \brief Send an alert message * * \param ssl SSL context * \param level The alert level of the message * (MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING or MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL) * \param message The alert message (SSL_ALERT_MSG_*) * * \return 0 if successful, or a specific SSL error code. * * \note If this function returns something other than 0 or * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ/WRITE, you must stop using * the SSL context for reading or writing, and either free it or * call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before re-using it * for a new connection; the current connection must be closed. */ int mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char level, unsigned char message ); /** * \brief Notify the peer that the connection is being closed * * \param ssl SSL context * * \return 0 if successful, or a specific SSL error code. * * \note If this function returns something other than 0 or * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ/WRITE, you must stop using * the SSL context for reading or writing, and either free it or * call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before re-using it * for a new connection; the current connection must be closed. */ int mbedtls_ssl_close_notify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); /** * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL context and clear memory * * \param ssl SSL context */ void mbedtls_ssl_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) /** * \brief Save an active connection as serialized data in a buffer. * This allows the freeing or re-using of the SSL context * while still picking up the connection later in a way that * it entirely transparent to the peer. * * \see mbedtls_ssl_context_load() * * \note This feature is currently only available under certain * conditions, see the documentation of the return value * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA for details. * * \note When this function succeeds, it calls * mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on \p ssl which as a result is * no longer associated with the connection that has been * serialized. This avoids creating copies of the connection * state. You're then free to either re-use the context * structure for a different connection, or call * mbedtls_ssl_free() on it. See the documentation of * mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() for more details. * * \param ssl The SSL context to save. On success, it is no longer * associated with the connection that has been serialized. * \param buf The buffer to write the serialized data to. It must be a * writeable buffer of at least \p buf_len bytes, or may be \c * NULL if \p buf_len is \c 0. * \param buf_len The number of bytes available for writing in \p buf. * \param olen The size in bytes of the data that has been or would have * been written. It must point to a valid \c size_t. * * \note \p olen is updated to the correct value regardless of * whether \p buf_len was large enough. This makes it possible * to determine the necessary size by calling this function * with \p buf set to \c NULL and \p buf_len to \c 0. However, * the value of \p olen is only guaranteed to be correct when * the function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL or * \c 0. If the return value is different, then the value of * \p olen is undefined. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p buf is too small. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed * while reseting the context. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if a handshake is in * progress, or there is pending data for reading or sending, * or the connection does not use DTLS 1.2 with an AEAD * ciphersuite, or renegotiation is enabled. */ int mbedtls_ssl_context_save( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len, size_t *olen ); /** * \brief Load serialized connection data to an SSL context. * * \see mbedtls_ssl_context_save() * * \warning The same serialized data must never be loaded into more * that one context. In order to ensure that, after * successfully loading serialized data to an SSL context, you * should immediately destroy or invalidate all copies of the * serialized data that was loaded. Loading the same data in * more than one context would cause severe security failures * including but not limited to loss of confidentiality. * * \note Before calling this function, the SSL context must be * prepared in one of the two following ways. The first way is * to take a context freshly initialised with * mbedtls_ssl_init() and call mbedtls_ssl_setup() on it with * the same ::mbedtls_ssl_config structure that was used in * the original connection. The second way is to * call mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on a context that was * previously prepared as above but used in the meantime. * Either way, you must not use the context to perform a * handshake between calling mbedtls_ssl_setup() or * mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() and calling this function. You * may however call other setter functions in that time frame * as indicated in the note below. * * \note Before or after calling this function successfully, you * also need to configure some connection-specific callbacks * and settings before you can use the connection again * (unless they were already set before calling * mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() and the values are suitable for * the present connection). Specifically, you want to call * at least mbedtls_ssl_set_bio() and * mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb(). All other SSL setter functions * are not necessary to call, either because they're only used * in handshakes, or because the setting is already saved. You * might choose to call them anyway, for example in order to * share code between the cases of establishing a new * connection and the case of loading an already-established * connection. * * \note If you have new information about the path MTU, you want to * call mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu() after calling this function, as * otherwise this function would overwrite your * newly-configured value with the value that was active when * the context was saved. * * \note When this function returns an error code, it calls * mbedtls_ssl_free() on \p ssl. In this case, you need to * prepare the context with the usual sequence starting with a * call to mbedtls_ssl_init() if you want to use it again. * * \param ssl The SSL context structure to be populated. It must have * been prepared as described in the note above. * \param buf The buffer holding the serialized connection data. It must * be a readable buffer of at least \p len bytes. * \param len The size of the serialized data in bytes. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH if the serialized data * comes from a different Mbed TLS version or build. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if input data is invalid. */ int mbedtls_ssl_context_load( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */ /** * \brief Initialize an SSL configuration context * Just makes the context ready for * mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults() or mbedtls_ssl_config_free(). * * \note You need to call mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults() unless you * manually set all of the relevant fields yourself. * * \param conf SSL configuration context */ void mbedtls_ssl_config_init( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf ); /** * \brief Load reasonnable default SSL configuration values. * (You need to call mbedtls_ssl_config_init() first.) * * \param conf SSL configuration context * \param endpoint MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT or MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER * \param transport MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM for TLS, or * MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM for DTLS * \param preset a MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_XXX value * * \note See \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport() for notes on DTLS. * * \return 0 if successful, or * MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX_ALLOC_FAILED on memory allocation error. */ int mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int endpoint, int transport, int preset ); /** * \brief Free an SSL configuration context * * \param conf SSL configuration context */ void mbedtls_ssl_config_free( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf ); /** * \brief Initialize SSL session structure * * \param session SSL session */ void mbedtls_ssl_session_init( mbedtls_ssl_session *session ); /** * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL session including the * peer certificate and clear memory * * \note A session object can be freed even if the SSL context * that was used to retrieve the session is still in use. * * \param session SSL session */ void mbedtls_ssl_session_free( mbedtls_ssl_session *session ); /** * \brief TLS-PRF function for key derivation. * * \param prf The tls_prf type funtion type to be used. * \param secret Secret for the key derivation function. * \param slen Length of the secret. * \param label String label for the key derivation function, * terminated with null character. * \param random Random bytes. * \param rlen Length of the random bytes buffer. * \param dstbuf The buffer holding the derived key. * \param dlen Length of the output buffer. * * \return 0 on sucess. An SSL specific error on failure. */ int mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf( const mbedtls_tls_prf_types prf, const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, const char *label, const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen ); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* ssl.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/ssl_cache.h0000644000000000000000000001027513764415275015562 0ustar rootroot/** * \file ssl_cache.h * * \brief SSL session cache implementation */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_H #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) #include "mbedtls/threading.h" #endif /** * \name SECTION: Module settings * * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. * \{ */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT 86400 /*!< 1 day */ #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES 50 /*!< Maximum entries in cache */ #endif /* \} name SECTION: Module settings */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_cache_context mbedtls_ssl_cache_context; typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry; /** * \brief This structure is used for storing cache entries */ struct mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry { #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) mbedtls_time_t timestamp; /*!< entry timestamp */ #endif mbedtls_ssl_session session; /*!< entry session */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) mbedtls_x509_buf peer_cert; /*!< entry peer_cert */ #endif mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *next; /*!< chain pointer */ }; /** * \brief Cache context */ struct mbedtls_ssl_cache_context { mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *chain; /*!< start of the chain */ int timeout; /*!< cache entry timeout */ int max_entries; /*!< maximum entries */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; /*!< mutex */ #endif }; /** * \brief Initialize an SSL cache context * * \param cache SSL cache context */ void mbedtls_ssl_cache_init( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache ); /** * \brief Cache get callback implementation * (Thread-safe if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled) * * \param data SSL cache context * \param session session to retrieve entry for */ int mbedtls_ssl_cache_get( void *data, mbedtls_ssl_session *session ); /** * \brief Cache set callback implementation * (Thread-safe if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled) * * \param data SSL cache context * \param session session to store entry for */ int mbedtls_ssl_cache_set( void *data, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) /** * \brief Set the cache timeout * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT (1 day)) * * A timeout of 0 indicates no timeout. * * \param cache SSL cache context * \param timeout cache entry timeout in seconds */ void mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache, int timeout ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ /** * \brief Set the maximum number of cache entries * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES (50)) * * \param cache SSL cache context * \param max cache entry maximum */ void mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_max_entries( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache, int max ); /** * \brief Free referenced items in a cache context and clear memory * * \param cache SSL cache context */ void mbedtls_ssl_cache_free( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache ); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* ssl_cache.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h0000644000000000000000000006354113764415275017232 0ustar rootroot/** * \file ssl_ciphersuites.h * * \brief SSL Ciphersuites for mbed TLS */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES_H #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include "mbedtls/pk.h" #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" #include "mbedtls/md.h" #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* * Supported ciphersuites (Official IANA names) */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 0x01 /**< Weak! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x02 /**< Weak! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 0x04 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x05 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA 0x09 /**< Weak! Not in TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x0A #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA 0x15 /**< Weak! Not in TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x16 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x2C /**< Weak! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x2D /**< Weak! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x2E /**< Weak! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x2F #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x33 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x35 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x39 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 0x3B /**< Weak! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0x3C /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 0x3D /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA 0x41 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA 0x45 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0x67 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 0x6B /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x84 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x88 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x8A #define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x8B #define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x8C #define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x8D #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x8E #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x8F #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x90 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x91 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x92 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x93 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x94 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x95 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x9C /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x9D /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x9E /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x9F /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xA8 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xA9 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xAA /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xAB /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xAC /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xAD /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xAE #define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xAF #define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 0xB0 /**< Weak! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 0xB1 /**< Weak! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xB2 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xB3 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 0xB4 /**< Weak! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 0xB5 /**< Weak! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xB6 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xB7 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 0xB8 /**< Weak! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 0xB9 /**< Weak! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xBA /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xBE /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 0xC0 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 0xC4 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC001 /**< Weak! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0xC002 /**< Not in SSL3! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC003 /**< Not in SSL3! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC004 /**< Not in SSL3! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC005 /**< Not in SSL3! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC006 /**< Weak! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0xC007 /**< Not in SSL3! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC008 /**< Not in SSL3! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC009 /**< Not in SSL3! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC00A /**< Not in SSL3! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC00B /**< Weak! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0xC00C /**< Not in SSL3! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC00D /**< Not in SSL3! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC00E /**< Not in SSL3! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC00F /**< Not in SSL3! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC010 /**< Weak! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0xC011 /**< Not in SSL3! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC012 /**< Not in SSL3! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC013 /**< Not in SSL3! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC014 /**< Not in SSL3! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC023 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC024 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC025 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC026 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC027 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC028 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC029 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC02A /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC02B /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC02C /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC02D /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC02E /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC02F /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC030 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC031 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC032 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0xC033 /**< Not in SSL3! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC034 /**< Not in SSL3! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC035 /**< Not in SSL3! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC036 /**< Not in SSL3! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC037 /**< Not in SSL3! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC038 /**< Not in SSL3! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC039 /**< Weak! No SSL3! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 0xC03A /**< Weak! No SSL3! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 0xC03B /**< Weak! No SSL3! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC03C /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC03D /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC044 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC045 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC048 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC049 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC04A /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC04B /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC04C /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC04D /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC04E /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC04F /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC050 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC051 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC052 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC053 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC05C /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC05D /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC05E /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC05F /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC060 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC061 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC062 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC063 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC064 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC065 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC066 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC067 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC068 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC069 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC06A /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC06B /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC06C /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC06D /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC06E /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC06F /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC070 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC071 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC072 /**< Not in SSL3! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC073 /**< Not in SSL3! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC074 /**< Not in SSL3! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC075 /**< Not in SSL3! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC076 /**< Not in SSL3! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC077 /**< Not in SSL3! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC078 /**< Not in SSL3! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC079 /**< Not in SSL3! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC07A /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC07B /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC07C /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC07D /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC086 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC087 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC088 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC089 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC08A /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC08B /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC08C /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC08D /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC08E /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC08F /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC090 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC091 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC092 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC093 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC094 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC095 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC096 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC097 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC098 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC099 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC09A /**< Not in SSL3! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC09B /**< Not in SSL3! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM 0xC09C /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM 0xC09D /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM 0xC09E /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM 0xC09F /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 0xC0A0 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 0xC0A1 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 0xC0A2 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 0xC0A3 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM 0xC0A4 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM 0xC0A5 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM 0xC0A6 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM 0xC0A7 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 0xC0A8 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 0xC0A9 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 0xC0AA /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 0xC0AB /**< TLS 1.2 */ /* The last two are named with PSK_DHE in the RFC, which looks like a typo */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM 0xC0AC /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM 0xC0AD /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 0xC0AE /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 0xC0AF /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECJPAKE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 0xC0FF /**< experimental */ /* RFC 7905 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCA8 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCA9 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCAA /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCAB /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCAC /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCAD /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCAE /**< TLS 1.2 */ /* Reminder: update mbedtls_ssl_premaster_secret when adding a new key exchange. * Reminder: update MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__xxx below */ typedef enum { MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE = 0, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE, } mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t; /* Key exchanges using a certificate */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED #endif /* Key exchanges allowing client certificate requests */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED #endif /* Key exchanges involving server signature in ServerKeyExchange */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED #endif /* Key exchanges using ECDH */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED #endif /* Key exchanges that don't involve ephemeral keys */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED) #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED #endif /* Key exchanges that involve ephemeral keys */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED #endif /* Key exchanges using a PSK */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED #endif /* Key exchanges using DHE */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED #endif /* Key exchanges using ECDHE */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED #endif typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t; #define MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK 0x01 /**< Weak ciphersuite flag */ #define MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG 0x02 /**< Short authentication tag, eg for CCM_8 */ #define MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS 0x04 /**< Can't be used with DTLS */ /** * \brief This structure is used for storing ciphersuite information */ struct mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t { int id; const char * name; mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher; mbedtls_md_type_t mac; mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t key_exchange; int min_major_ver; int min_minor_ver; int max_major_ver; int max_minor_ver; unsigned char flags; }; const int *mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites( void ); const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_string( const char *ciphersuite_name ); const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( int ciphersuite_id ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ); mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ); #endif int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ); int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED) static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_has_pfs( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) { switch( info->key_exchange ) { case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK: case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK: case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE: return( 1 ); default: return( 0 ); } } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED) static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_no_pfs( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) { switch( info->key_exchange ) { case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK: case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: return( 1 ); default: return( 0 ); } } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED) static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdh( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) { switch( info->key_exchange ) { case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: return( 1 ); default: return( 0 ); } } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED */ static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) { switch( info->key_exchange ) { case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: return( 1 ); default: return( 0 ); } } static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) { switch( info->key_exchange ) { case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: return( 1 ); default: return( 0 ); } } #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED) static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_dhe( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) { switch( info->key_exchange ) { case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK: return( 1 ); default: return( 0 ); } } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED) */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED) static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdhe( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) { switch( info->key_exchange ) { case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK: return( 1 ); default: return( 0 ); } } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED) */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) { switch( info->key_exchange ) { case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: return( 1 ); default: return( 0 ); } } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* ssl_ciphersuites.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h0000644000000000000000000000621613764415275015770 0ustar rootroot/** * \file ssl_cookie.h * * \brief DTLS cookie callbacks implementation */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_H #define MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) #include "mbedtls/threading.h" #endif /** * \name SECTION: Module settings * * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. * \{ */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT #define MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT 60 /**< Default expiration delay of DTLS cookies, in seconds if HAVE_TIME, or in number of cookies issued */ #endif /* \} name SECTION: Module settings */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /** * \brief Context for the default cookie functions. */ typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx { mbedtls_md_context_t hmac_ctx; /*!< context for the HMAC portion */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) unsigned long serial; /*!< serial number for expiration */ #endif unsigned long timeout; /*!< timeout delay, in seconds if HAVE_TIME, or in number of tickets issued */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; #endif } mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx; /** * \brief Initialize cookie context */ void mbedtls_ssl_cookie_init( mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx ); /** * \brief Setup cookie context (generate keys) */ int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_setup( mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); /** * \brief Set expiration delay for cookies * (Default MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT) * * \param ctx Cookie contex * \param delay Delay, in seconds if HAVE_TIME, or in number of cookies * issued in the meantime. * 0 to disable expiration (NOT recommended) */ void mbedtls_ssl_cookie_set_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx, unsigned long delay ); /** * \brief Free cookie context */ void mbedtls_ssl_cookie_free( mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx ); /** * \brief Generate cookie, see \c mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t */ mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write; /** * \brief Verify cookie, see \c mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t */ mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check; #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* ssl_cookie.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h0000644000000000000000000015012213764415275016327 0ustar rootroot/** * \file ssl_internal.h * * \brief Internal functions shared by the SSL modules */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_INTERNAL_H #define MBEDTLS_SSL_INTERNAL_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) #include "psa/crypto.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) #include "mbedtls/md5.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) #include "mbedtls/sha1.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) #include "mbedtls/sha256.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) #include "mbedtls/sha512.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) #include "mbedtls/ecjpake.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) #include "psa/crypto.h" #include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) #define inline __inline #endif /* Determine minimum supported version */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 #else #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 #else #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 #else #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 /* Determine maximum supported version */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 #else #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 #else #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 #else #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ /* Shorthand for restartable ECC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED #endif #define MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS 1 /* In progress */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE 2 /* Done or aborted */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING 3 /* Requested (server only) */ /* * DTLS retransmission states, see RFC 6347 4.2.4 * * The SENDING state is merged in PREPARING for initial sends, * but is distinct for resends. * * Note: initial state is wrong for server, but is not used anyway. */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING 1 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING 2 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED 3 /* * Allow extra bytes for record, authentication and encryption overhead: * counter (8) + header (5) + IV(16) + MAC (16-48) + padding (0-256) * and allow for a maximum of 1024 of compression expansion if * enabled. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD 1024 #else #define MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD 0 #endif /* This macro determines whether CBC is supported. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \ ( defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) ) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC #endif /* This macro determines whether the CBC construct used in TLS 1.0-1.2 (as * opposed to the very different CBC construct used in SSLv3) is supported. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) && \ ( defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) ) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) /* Ciphersuites using HMAC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 48 /* SHA-384 used for HMAC */ #elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 32 /* SHA-256 used for HMAC */ #else #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 20 /* SHA-1 used for HMAC */ #endif #else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ /* AEAD ciphersuites: GCM and CCM use a 128 bits tag */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 16 #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD 256 #else #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD 0 #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY #else #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION 0 #endif #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD ( MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD + \ MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH + \ MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD + \ MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD + \ MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION \ ) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN ( MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + \ ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) ) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN ( MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + \ ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) ) /* The maximum number of buffered handshake messages. */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS 4 /* Maximum length we can advertise as our max content length for RFC 6066 max_fragment_length extension negotiation purposes (the lesser of both sizes, if they are unequal.) */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ADV_CONTENT_LEN ( \ (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) \ ? ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) \ : ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) \ ) /* Maximum size in bytes of list in sig-hash algorithm ext., RFC 5246 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_SIG_HASH_ALG_LIST_LEN 65534 /* Maximum size in bytes of list in supported elliptic curve ext., RFC 4492 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CURVE_LIST_LEN 65535 /* * Check that we obey the standard's message size bounds */ #if MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN > 16384 #error "Bad configuration - record content too large." #endif #if MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN #error "Bad configuration - incoming record content should not be larger than MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN." #endif #if MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN #error "Bad configuration - outgoing record content should not be larger than MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN." #endif #if MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN + 2048 #error "Bad configuration - incoming protected record payload too large." #endif #if MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN + 2048 #error "Bad configuration - outgoing protected record payload too large." #endif /* Calculate buffer sizes */ /* Note: Even though the TLS record header is only 5 bytes long, we're internally using 8 bytes to store the implicit sequence number. */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN 13 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \ ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN ) ) #else #define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \ ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN ) \ + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX ) ) #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \ ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN ) ) #else #define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \ ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN ) \ + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ) ) #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) static inline uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_buflen( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ctx ) { #if defined (MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) return (uint32_t) mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( ctx ) + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX; #else return (uint32_t) mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( ctx ) + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD; #endif } static inline uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_input_buflen( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ctx ) { #if defined (MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) return (uint32_t) mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len( ctx ) + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX; #else return (uint32_t) mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len( ctx ) + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD; #endif } #endif #ifdef MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT /* Compression buffer holds both IN and OUT buffers, so should be size of the larger */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_BUFFER_LEN ( \ ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN ) \ ? MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \ : MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \ ) #endif /* * TLS extension flags (for extensions with outgoing ServerHello content * that need it (e.g. for RENEGOTIATION_INFO the server already knows because * of state of the renegotiation flag, so no indicator is required) */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT (1 << 0) #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK (1 << 1) /** * \brief This function checks if the remaining size in a buffer is * greater or equal than a needed space. * * \param cur Pointer to the current position in the buffer. * \param end Pointer to one past the end of the buffer. * \param need Needed space in bytes. * * \return Zero if the needed space is available in the buffer, non-zero * otherwise. */ static inline int mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr( const uint8_t *cur, const uint8_t *end, size_t need ) { return( ( cur > end ) || ( need > (size_t)( end - cur ) ) ); } /** * \brief This macro checks if the remaining size in a buffer is * greater or equal than a needed space. If it is not the case, * it returns an SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL error. * * \param cur Pointer to the current position in the buffer. * \param end Pointer to one past the end of the buffer. * \param need Needed space in bytes. * */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( cur, end, need ) \ do { \ if( mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr( ( cur ), ( end ), ( need ) ) != 0 ) \ { \ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); \ } \ } while( 0 ) #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) /* * Abstraction for a grid of allowed signature-hash-algorithm pairs. */ struct mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t { /* At the moment, we only need to remember a single suitable * hash algorithm per signature algorithm. As long as that's * the case - and we don't need a general lookup function - * we can implement the sig-hash-set as a map from signatures * to hash algorithms. */ mbedtls_md_type_t rsa; mbedtls_md_type_t ecdsa; }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ typedef int mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, const char *label, const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen ); /* cipher.h exports the maximum IV, key and block length from * all ciphers enabled in the config, regardless of whether those * ciphers are actually usable in SSL/TLS. Notably, XTS is enabled * in the default configuration and uses 64 Byte keys, but it is * not used for record protection in SSL/TLS. * * In order to prevent unnecessary inflation of key structures, * we introduce SSL-specific variants of the max-{key,block,IV} * macros here which are meant to only take those ciphers into * account which can be negotiated in SSL/TLS. * * Since the current definitions of MBEDTLS_MAX_{KEY|BLOCK|IV}_LENGTH * in cipher.h are rough overapproximations of the real maxima, here * we content ourselves with replicating those overapproximations * for the maximum block and IV length, and excluding XTS from the * computation of the maximum key length. */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH 16 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH 16 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH 32 /** * \brief The data structure holding the cryptographic material (key and IV) * used for record protection in TLS 1.3. */ struct mbedtls_ssl_key_set { /*! The key for client->server records. */ unsigned char client_write_key[ MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH ]; /*! The key for server->client records. */ unsigned char server_write_key[ MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH ]; /*! The IV for client->server records. */ unsigned char client_write_iv[ MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH ]; /*! The IV for server->client records. */ unsigned char server_write_iv[ MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH ]; size_t key_len; /*!< The length of client_write_key and * server_write_key, in Bytes. */ size_t iv_len; /*!< The length of client_write_iv and * server_write_iv, in Bytes. */ }; typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_key_set mbedtls_ssl_key_set; /* * This structure contains the parameters only needed during handshake. */ struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params { /* * Handshake specific crypto variables */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t hash_algs; /*!< Set of suitable sig-hash pairs */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) mbedtls_dhm_context dhm_ctx; /*!< DHM key exchange */ #endif /* Adding guard for MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C to ensure no compile errors due * to guards also being in ssl_srv.c and ssl_cli.c. There is a gap * in functionality that access to ecdh_ctx structure is needed for * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C which does not seem correct. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) mbedtls_ecdh_context ecdh_ctx; /*!< ECDH key exchange */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) psa_key_type_t ecdh_psa_type; uint16_t ecdh_bits; psa_key_id_t ecdh_psa_privkey; unsigned char ecdh_psa_peerkey[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH]; size_t ecdh_psa_peerkey_len; #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) mbedtls_ecjpake_context ecjpake_ctx; /*!< EC J-PAKE key exchange */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) unsigned char *ecjpake_cache; /*!< Cache for ClientHello ext */ size_t ecjpake_cache_len; /*!< Length of cached data */ #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **curves; /*!< Supported elliptic curves */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) psa_key_id_t psk_opaque; /*!< Opaque PSK from the callback */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ unsigned char *psk; /*!< PSK from the callback */ size_t psk_len; /*!< Length of PSK from callback */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; /*!< chosen key/cert pair (server) */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) int sni_authmode; /*!< authmode from SNI callback */ mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *sni_key_cert; /*!< key/cert list from SNI */ mbedtls_x509_crt *sni_ca_chain; /*!< trusted CAs from SNI callback */ mbedtls_x509_crl *sni_ca_crl; /*!< trusted CAs CRLs from SNI */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) int ecrs_enabled; /*!< Handshake supports EC restart? */ mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx ecrs_ctx; /*!< restart context */ enum { /* this complements ssl->state with info on intra-state operations */ ssl_ecrs_none = 0, /*!< nothing going on (yet) */ ssl_ecrs_crt_verify, /*!< Certificate: crt_verify() */ ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing, /*!< ServerKeyExchange: pk_verify() */ ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret, /*!< ClientKeyExchange: ECDH step 2 */ ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign, /*!< CertificateVerify: pk_sign() */ } ecrs_state; /*!< current (or last) operation */ mbedtls_x509_crt *ecrs_peer_cert; /*!< The peer's CRT chain. */ size_t ecrs_n; /*!< place for saving a length */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) mbedtls_pk_context peer_pubkey; /*!< The public key from the peer. */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) unsigned int out_msg_seq; /*!< Outgoing handshake sequence number */ unsigned int in_msg_seq; /*!< Incoming handshake sequence number */ unsigned char *verify_cookie; /*!< Cli: HelloVerifyRequest cookie Srv: unused */ unsigned char verify_cookie_len; /*!< Cli: cookie length Srv: flag for sending a cookie */ uint32_t retransmit_timeout; /*!< Current value of timeout */ unsigned char retransmit_state; /*!< Retransmission state */ mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight; /*!< Current outgoing flight */ mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *cur_msg; /*!< Current message in flight */ unsigned char *cur_msg_p; /*!< Position in current message */ unsigned int in_flight_start_seq; /*!< Minimum message sequence in the flight being received */ mbedtls_ssl_transform *alt_transform_out; /*!< Alternative transform for resending messages */ unsigned char alt_out_ctr[8]; /*!< Alternative record epoch/counter for resending messages */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) /* The state of CID configuration in this handshake. */ uint8_t cid_in_use; /*!< This indicates whether the use of the CID extension * has been negotiated. Possible values are * #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED and * #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */ unsigned char peer_cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ]; /*! The peer's CID */ uint8_t peer_cid_len; /*!< The length of * \c peer_cid. */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ struct { size_t total_bytes_buffered; /*!< Cumulative size of heap allocated * buffers used for message buffering. */ uint8_t seen_ccs; /*!< Indicates if a CCS message has * been seen in the current flight. */ struct mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer { unsigned is_valid : 1; unsigned is_fragmented : 1; unsigned is_complete : 1; unsigned char *data; size_t data_len; } hs[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS]; struct { unsigned char *data; size_t len; unsigned epoch; } future_record; } buffering; uint16_t mtu; /*!< Handshake mtu, used to fragment outgoing messages */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ /* * Checksum contexts */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) mbedtls_md5_context fin_md5; mbedtls_sha1_context fin_sha1; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) psa_hash_operation_t fin_sha256_psa; #else mbedtls_sha256_context fin_sha256; #endif #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) psa_hash_operation_t fin_sha384_psa; #else mbedtls_sha512_context fin_sha512; #endif #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ void (*update_checksum)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); void (*calc_verify)(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *); void (*calc_finished)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int); mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf; mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t const *ciphersuite_info; size_t pmslen; /*!< premaster length */ unsigned char randbytes[64]; /*!< random bytes */ unsigned char premaster[MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE]; /*!< premaster secret */ int resume; /*!< session resume indicator*/ int max_major_ver; /*!< max. major version client*/ int max_minor_ver; /*!< max. minor version client*/ int cli_exts; /*!< client extension presence*/ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) int new_session_ticket; /*!< use NewSessionTicket? */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) int extended_ms; /*!< use Extended Master Secret? */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) unsigned int async_in_progress : 1; /*!< an asynchronous operation is in progress */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) /** Asynchronous operation context. This field is meant for use by the * asynchronous operation callbacks (mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_sign_start, * mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_decrypt_start, * mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_resume, mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_cancel). * The library does not use it internally. */ void *user_async_ctx; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ }; typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer; /* * Representation of decryption/encryption transformations on records * * There are the following general types of record transformations: * - Stream transformations (TLS versions <= 1.2 only) * Transformation adding a MAC and applying a stream-cipher * to the authenticated message. * - CBC block cipher transformations ([D]TLS versions <= 1.2 only) * In addition to the distinction of the order of encryption and * authentication, there's a fundamental difference between the * handling in SSL3 & TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2: For SSL3 * and TLS 1.0, the final IV after processing a record is used * as the IV for the next record. No explicit IV is contained * in an encrypted record. The IV for the first record is extracted * at key extraction time. In contrast, for TLS 1.1 and 1.2, no * IV is generated at key extraction time, but every encrypted * record is explicitly prefixed by the IV with which it was encrypted. * - AEAD transformations ([D]TLS versions >= 1.2 only) * These come in two fundamentally different versions, the first one * used in TLS 1.2, excluding ChaChaPoly ciphersuites, and the second * one used for ChaChaPoly ciphersuites in TLS 1.2 as well as for TLS 1.3. * In the first transformation, the IV to be used for a record is obtained * as the concatenation of an explicit, static 4-byte IV and the 8-byte * record sequence number, and explicitly prepending this sequence number * to the encrypted record. In contrast, in the second transformation * the IV is obtained by XOR'ing a static IV obtained at key extraction * time with the 8-byte record sequence number, without prepending the * latter to the encrypted record. * * Additionally, DTLS 1.2 + CID as well as TLS 1.3 use an inner plaintext * which allows to add flexible length padding and to hide a record's true * content type. * * In addition to type and version, the following parameters are relevant: * - The symmetric cipher algorithm to be used. * - The (static) encryption/decryption keys for the cipher. * - For stream/CBC, the type of message digest to be used. * - For stream/CBC, (static) encryption/decryption keys for the digest. * - For AEAD transformations, the size (potentially 0) of an explicit, * random initialization vector placed in encrypted records. * - For some transformations (currently AEAD and CBC in SSL3 and TLS 1.0) * an implicit IV. It may be static (e.g. AEAD) or dynamic (e.g. CBC) * and (if present) is combined with the explicit IV in a transformation- * dependent way (e.g. appending in TLS 1.2 and XOR'ing in TLS 1.3). * - For stream/CBC, a flag determining the order of encryption and MAC. * - The details of the transformation depend on the SSL/TLS version. * - The length of the authentication tag. * * Note: Except for CBC in SSL3 and TLS 1.0, these parameters are * constant across multiple encryption/decryption operations. * For CBC, the implicit IV needs to be updated after each * operation. * * The struct below refines this abstract view as follows: * - The cipher underlying the transformation is managed in * cipher contexts cipher_ctx_{enc/dec}, which must have the * same cipher type. The mode of these cipher contexts determines * the type of the transformation in the sense above: e.g., if * the type is MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC resp. MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM * then the transformation has type CBC resp. AEAD. * - The cipher keys are never stored explicitly but * are maintained within cipher_ctx_{enc/dec}. * - For stream/CBC transformations, the message digest contexts * used for the MAC's are stored in md_ctx_{enc/dec}. These contexts * are unused for AEAD transformations. * - For stream/CBC transformations and versions > SSL3, the * MAC keys are not stored explicitly but maintained within * md_ctx_{enc/dec}. * - For stream/CBC transformations and version SSL3, the MAC * keys are stored explicitly in mac_enc, mac_dec and have * a fixed size of 20 bytes. These fields are unused for * AEAD transformations or transformations >= TLS 1.0. * - For transformations using an implicit IV maintained within * the transformation context, its contents are stored within * iv_{enc/dec}. * - The value of ivlen indicates the length of the IV. * This is redundant in case of stream/CBC transformations * which always use 0 resp. the cipher's block length as the * IV length, but is needed for AEAD ciphers and may be * different from the underlying cipher's block length * in this case. * - The field fixed_ivlen is nonzero for AEAD transformations only * and indicates the length of the static part of the IV which is * constant throughout the communication, and which is stored in * the first fixed_ivlen bytes of the iv_{enc/dec} arrays. * Note: For CBC in SSL3 and TLS 1.0, the fields iv_{enc/dec} * still store IV's for continued use across multiple transformations, * so it is not true that fixed_ivlen == 0 means that iv_{enc/dec} are * not being used! * - minor_ver denotes the SSL/TLS version * - For stream/CBC transformations, maclen denotes the length of the * authentication tag, while taglen is unused and 0. * - For AEAD transformations, taglen denotes the length of the * authentication tag, while maclen is unused and 0. * - For CBC transformations, encrypt_then_mac determines the * order of encryption and authentication. This field is unused * in other transformations. * */ struct mbedtls_ssl_transform { /* * Session specific crypto layer */ size_t minlen; /*!< min. ciphertext length */ size_t ivlen; /*!< IV length */ size_t fixed_ivlen; /*!< Fixed part of IV (AEAD) */ size_t maclen; /*!< MAC(CBC) len */ size_t taglen; /*!< TAG(AEAD) len */ unsigned char iv_enc[16]; /*!< IV (encryption) */ unsigned char iv_dec[16]; /*!< IV (decryption) */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) /* Needed only for SSL v3.0 secret */ unsigned char mac_enc[20]; /*!< SSL v3.0 secret (enc) */ unsigned char mac_dec[20]; /*!< SSL v3.0 secret (dec) */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx_enc; /*!< MAC (encryption) */ mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx_dec; /*!< MAC (decryption) */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) int encrypt_then_mac; /*!< flag for EtM activation */ #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx_enc; /*!< encryption context */ mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx_dec; /*!< decryption context */ int minor_ver; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) uint8_t in_cid_len; uint8_t out_cid_len; unsigned char in_cid [ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ]; unsigned char out_cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ]; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ /* * Session specific compression layer */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) z_stream ctx_deflate; /*!< compression context */ z_stream ctx_inflate; /*!< decompression context */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) /* We need the Hello random bytes in order to re-derive keys from the * Master Secret and other session info, see ssl_populate_transform() */ unsigned char randbytes[64]; /*!< ServerHello.random+ClientHello.random */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */ }; /* * Return 1 if the transform uses an AEAD cipher, 0 otherwise. * Equivalently, return 0 if a separate MAC is used, 1 otherwise. */ static inline int mbedtls_ssl_transform_uses_aead( const mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) return( transform->maclen == 0 && transform->taglen != 0 ); #else (void) transform; return( 1 ); #endif } /* * Internal representation of record frames * * Instances come in two flavors: * (1) Encrypted * These always have data_offset = 0 * (2) Unencrypted * These have data_offset set to the amount of * pre-expansion during record protection. Concretely, * this is the length of the fixed part of the explicit IV * used for encryption, or 0 if no explicit IV is used * (e.g. for CBC in TLS 1.0, or stream ciphers). * * The reason for the data_offset in the unencrypted case * is to allow for in-place conversion of an unencrypted to * an encrypted record. If the offset wasn't included, the * encrypted content would need to be shifted afterwards to * make space for the fixed IV. * */ #if MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX #else #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX #endif typedef struct { uint8_t ctr[8]; /* In TLS: The implicit record sequence number. * In DTLS: The 2-byte epoch followed by * the 6-byte sequence number. * This is stored as a raw big endian byte array * as opposed to a uint64_t because we rarely * need to perform arithmetic on this, but do * need it as a Byte array for the purpose of * MAC computations. */ uint8_t type; /* The record content type. */ uint8_t ver[2]; /* SSL/TLS version as present on the wire. * Convert to internal presentation of versions * using mbedtls_ssl_read_version() and * mbedtls_ssl_write_version(). * Keep wire-format for MAC computations. */ unsigned char *buf; /* Memory buffer enclosing the record content */ size_t buf_len; /* Buffer length */ size_t data_offset; /* Offset of record content */ size_t data_len; /* Length of record content */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) uint8_t cid_len; /* Length of the CID (0 if not present) */ unsigned char cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX ]; /* The CID */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ } mbedtls_record; #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) /* * List of certificate + private key pairs */ struct mbedtls_ssl_key_cert { mbedtls_x509_crt *cert; /*!< cert */ mbedtls_pk_context *key; /*!< private key */ mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *next; /*!< next key/cert pair */ }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) /* * List of handshake messages kept around for resending */ struct mbedtls_ssl_flight_item { unsigned char *p; /*!< message, including handshake headers */ size_t len; /*!< length of p */ unsigned char type; /*!< type of the message: handshake or CCS */ mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *next; /*!< next handshake message(s) */ }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) /* Find an entry in a signature-hash set matching a given hash algorithm. */ mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg ); /* Add a signature-hash-pair to a signature-hash set */ void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_add( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ); /* Allow exactly one hash algorithm for each signature. */ void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ); /* Setup an empty signature-hash set */ static inline void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_init( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set ) { mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash( set, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ /** * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL transform context and clear * memory * * \param transform SSL transform context */ void mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ); /** * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL handshake context and clear * memory * * \param ssl SSL context */ void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); int mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); void mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); void mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); /** * \brief Update record layer * * This function roughly separates the implementation * of the logic of (D)TLS from the implementation * of the secure transport. * * \param ssl The SSL context to use. * \param update_hs_digest This indicates if the handshake digest * should be automatically updated in case * a handshake message is found. * * \return 0 or non-zero error code. * * \note A clarification on what is called 'record layer' here * is in order, as many sensible definitions are possible: * * The record layer takes as input an untrusted underlying * transport (stream or datagram) and transforms it into * a serially multiplexed, secure transport, which * conceptually provides the following: * * (1) Three datagram based, content-agnostic transports * for handshake, alert and CCS messages. * (2) One stream- or datagram-based transport * for application data. * (3) Functionality for changing the underlying transform * securing the contents. * * The interface to this functionality is given as follows: * * a Updating * [Currently implemented by mbedtls_ssl_read_record] * * Check if and on which of the four 'ports' data is pending: * Nothing, a controlling datagram of type (1), or application * data (2). In any case data is present, internal buffers * provide access to the data for the user to process it. * Consumption of type (1) datagrams is done automatically * on the next update, invalidating that the internal buffers * for previous datagrams, while consumption of application * data (2) is user-controlled. * * b Reading of application data * [Currently manual adaption of ssl->in_offt pointer] * * As mentioned in the last paragraph, consumption of data * is different from the automatic consumption of control * datagrams (1) because application data is treated as a stream. * * c Tracking availability of application data * [Currently manually through decreasing ssl->in_msglen] * * For efficiency and to retain datagram semantics for * application data in case of DTLS, the record layer * provides functionality for checking how much application * data is still available in the internal buffer. * * d Changing the transformation securing the communication. * * Given an opaque implementation of the record layer in the * above sense, it should be possible to implement the logic * of (D)TLS on top of it without the need to know anything * about the record layer's internals. This is done e.g. * in all the handshake handling functions, and in the * application data reading function mbedtls_ssl_read. * * \note The above tries to give a conceptual picture of the * record layer, but the current implementation deviates * from it in some places. For example, our implementation of * the update functionality through mbedtls_ssl_read_record * discards datagrams depending on the current state, which * wouldn't fall under the record layer's responsibility * following the above definition. * */ int mbedtls_ssl_read_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned update_hs_digest ); int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want ); int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); int mbedtls_ssl_write_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t force_flush ); int mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); int mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); int mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); int mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); int mbedtls_ssl_write_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); void mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) int mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t key_ex ); /** * Get the first defined PSK by order of precedence: * 1. handshake PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() in the PSK callback * 2. static PSK configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() * Return a code and update the pair (PSK, PSK length) passed to this function */ static inline int mbedtls_ssl_get_psk( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char **psk, size_t *psk_len ) { if( ssl->handshake->psk != NULL && ssl->handshake->psk_len > 0 ) { *psk = ssl->handshake->psk; *psk_len = ssl->handshake->psk_len; } else if( ssl->conf->psk != NULL && ssl->conf->psk_len > 0 ) { *psk = ssl->conf->psk; *psk_len = ssl->conf->psk_len; } else { *psk = NULL; *psk_len = 0; return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED ); } return( 0 ); } #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) /** * Get the first defined opaque PSK by order of precedence: * 1. handshake PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque() in the PSK * callback * 2. static PSK configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque() * Return an opaque PSK */ static inline psa_key_id_t mbedtls_ssl_get_opaque_psk( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( ssl->handshake->psk_opaque ) ) return( ssl->handshake->psk_opaque ); if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( ssl->conf->psk_opaque ) ) return( ssl->conf->psk_opaque ); return( MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk( mbedtls_pk_context *pk ); unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg( mbedtls_pk_type_t type ); mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( unsigned char sig ); #endif mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( unsigned char hash ); unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg( int md ); int mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int md ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id ); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) int mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_md_type_t md ); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) static inline mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value ( const uint16_t srtp_profile_value ) { switch( srtp_profile_value ) { case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80: case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32: case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80: case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32: return srtp_profile_value; default: break; } return( MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ); } #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) static inline mbedtls_pk_context *mbedtls_ssl_own_key( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; if( ssl->handshake != NULL && ssl->handshake->key_cert != NULL ) key_cert = ssl->handshake->key_cert; else key_cert = ssl->conf->key_cert; return( key_cert == NULL ? NULL : key_cert->key ); } static inline mbedtls_x509_crt *mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; if( ssl->handshake != NULL && ssl->handshake->key_cert != NULL ) key_cert = ssl->handshake->key_cert; else key_cert = ssl->conf->key_cert; return( key_cert == NULL ? NULL : key_cert->cert ); } /* * Check usage of a certificate wrt extensions: * keyUsage, extendedKeyUsage (later), and nSCertType (later). * * Warning: cert_endpoint is the endpoint of the cert (ie, of our peer when we * check a cert we received from them)! * * Return 0 if everything is OK, -1 if not. */ int mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite, int cert_endpoint, uint32_t *flags ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ void mbedtls_ssl_write_version( int major, int minor, int transport, unsigned char ver[2] ); void mbedtls_ssl_read_version( int *major, int *minor, int transport, const unsigned char ver[2] ); static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) ((void) ssl); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) { return( 13 ); } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ { return( 5 ); } } static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { return( (size_t) ( ssl->out_iv - ssl->out_hdr ) ); } static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) return( 12 ); #else ((void) ssl); #endif return( 4 ); } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) void mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); void mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); int mbedtls_ssl_resend( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); #endif /* Visible for testing purposes only */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ); void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); #endif int mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( mbedtls_ssl_session *dst, const mbedtls_ssl_session *src ); /* constant-time buffer comparison */ static inline int mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( const void *a, const void *b, size_t n ) { size_t i; volatile const unsigned char *A = (volatile const unsigned char *) a; volatile const unsigned char *B = (volatile const unsigned char *) b; volatile unsigned char diff = 0; for( i = 0; i < n; i++ ) { /* Read volatile data in order before computing diff. * This avoids IAR compiler warning: * 'the order of volatile accesses is undefined ..' */ unsigned char x = A[i], y = B[i]; diff |= x ^ y; } return( diff ); } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *output, unsigned char *data, size_t data_len ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \ MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) /* The hash buffer must have at least MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE bytes of length. */ int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *hash, size_t *hashlen, unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif void mbedtls_ssl_transform_init( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ); int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, mbedtls_record *rec, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, mbedtls_record *rec ); /* Length of the "epoch" field in the record header */ static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) return( 2 ); #else ((void) ssl); #endif return( 0 ); } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) int mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint32_t millisecs ); int mbedtls_ssl_check_timer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); void mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); void mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ); void mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); #endif void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) int mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); void mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); void mbedtls_ssl_flight_free( mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ #endif /* ssl_internal.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h0000644000000000000000000001043013764415275015773 0ustar rootroot/** * \file ssl_ticket.h * * \brief TLS server ticket callbacks implementation */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_H #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif /* * This implementation of the session ticket callbacks includes key * management, rotating the keys periodically in order to preserve forward * secrecy, when MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME is defined. */ #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) #include "mbedtls/threading.h" #endif #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /** * \brief Information for session ticket protection */ typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key { unsigned char name[4]; /*!< random key identifier */ uint32_t generation_time; /*!< key generation timestamp (seconds) */ mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx; /*!< context for auth enc/decryption */ } mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key; /** * \brief Context for session ticket handling functions */ typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context { mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key keys[2]; /*!< ticket protection keys */ unsigned char active; /*!< index of the currently active key */ uint32_t ticket_lifetime; /*!< lifetime of tickets in seconds */ /** Callback for getting (pseudo-)random numbers */ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t); void *p_rng; /*!< context for the RNG function */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; #endif } mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context; /** * \brief Initialize a ticket context. * (Just make it ready for mbedtls_ssl_ticket_setup() * or mbedtls_ssl_ticket_free().) * * \param ctx Context to be initialized */ void mbedtls_ssl_ticket_init( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx ); /** * \brief Prepare context to be actually used * * \param ctx Context to be set up * \param f_rng RNG callback function * \param p_rng RNG callback context * \param cipher AEAD cipher to use for ticket protection. * Recommended value: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM. * \param lifetime Tickets lifetime in seconds * Recommended value: 86400 (one day). * * \note It is highly recommended to select a cipher that is at * least as strong as the the strongest ciphersuite * supported. Usually that means a 256-bit key. * * \note The lifetime of the keys is twice the lifetime of tickets. * It is recommended to pick a reasonnable lifetime so as not * to negate the benefits of forward secrecy. * * \return 0 if successful, * or a specific MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX error code */ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_setup( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher, uint32_t lifetime ); /** * \brief Implementation of the ticket write callback * * \note See \c mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t for description */ mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write; /** * \brief Implementation of the ticket parse callback * * \note See \c mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse_t for description */ mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse_t mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse; /** * \brief Free a context's content and zeroize it. * * \param ctx Context to be cleaned up */ void mbedtls_ssl_ticket_free( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx ); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* ssl_ticket.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/threading.h0000644000000000000000000001044213764415275015577 0ustar rootroot/** * \file threading.h * * \brief Threading abstraction layer */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_THREADING_H #define MBEDTLS_THREADING_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is deprecated and should not be * used. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x001A /**< The selected feature is not available. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x001C /**< Bad input parameters to function. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR -0x001E /**< Locking / unlocking / free failed with error code. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD) #include typedef struct mbedtls_threading_mutex_t { pthread_mutex_t mutex; char is_valid; } mbedtls_threading_mutex_t; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT) /* You should define the mbedtls_threading_mutex_t type in your header */ #include "threading_alt.h" /** * \brief Set your alternate threading implementation function * pointers and initialize global mutexes. If used, this * function must be called once in the main thread before any * other mbed TLS function is called, and * mbedtls_threading_free_alt() must be called once in the main * thread after all other mbed TLS functions. * * \note mutex_init() and mutex_free() don't return a status code. * If mutex_init() fails, it should leave its argument (the * mutex) in a state such that mutex_lock() will fail when * called with this argument. * * \param mutex_init the init function implementation * \param mutex_free the free function implementation * \param mutex_lock the lock function implementation * \param mutex_unlock the unlock function implementation */ void mbedtls_threading_set_alt( void (*mutex_init)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t * ), void (*mutex_free)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t * ), int (*mutex_lock)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t * ), int (*mutex_unlock)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t * ) ); /** * \brief Free global mutexes. */ void mbedtls_threading_free_alt( void ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) /* * The function pointers for mutex_init, mutex_free, mutex_ and mutex_unlock * * All these functions are expected to work or the result will be undefined. */ extern void (*mbedtls_mutex_init)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex ); extern void (*mbedtls_mutex_free)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex ); extern int (*mbedtls_mutex_lock)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex ); extern int (*mbedtls_mutex_unlock)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex ); /* * Global mutexes */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) extern mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT) /* This mutex may or may not be used in the default definition of * mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r(), but in order to determine that, * we need to check POSIX features, hence modify _POSIX_C_SOURCE. * With the current approach, this declaration is orphaned, lacking * an accompanying definition, in case mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() * doesn't need it, but that's not a problem. */ extern mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex; #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE && !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* threading.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/timing.h0000644000000000000000000001102013764415275015112 0ustar rootroot/** * \file timing.h * * \brief Portable interface to timeouts and to the CPU cycle counter */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_TIMING_H #define MBEDTLS_TIMING_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT) // Regular implementation // /** * \brief timer structure */ struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time { unsigned char opaque[32]; }; /** * \brief Context for mbedtls_timing_set/get_delay() */ typedef struct mbedtls_timing_delay_context { struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time timer; uint32_t int_ms; uint32_t fin_ms; } mbedtls_timing_delay_context; #else /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT */ #include "timing_alt.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT */ extern volatile int mbedtls_timing_alarmed; /** * \brief Return the CPU cycle counter value * * \warning This is only a best effort! Do not rely on this! * In particular, it is known to be unreliable on virtual * machines. * * \note This value starts at an unspecified origin and * may wrap around. */ unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void ); /** * \brief Return the elapsed time in milliseconds * * \param val points to a timer structure * \param reset If 0, query the elapsed time. Otherwise (re)start the timer. * * \return Elapsed time since the previous reset in ms. When * restarting, this is always 0. * * \note To initialize a timer, call this function with reset=1. * * Determining the elapsed time and resetting the timer is not * atomic on all platforms, so after the sequence * `{ get_timer(1); ...; time1 = get_timer(1); ...; time2 = * get_timer(0) }` the value time1+time2 is only approximately * the delay since the first reset. */ unsigned long mbedtls_timing_get_timer( struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time *val, int reset ); /** * \brief Setup an alarm clock * * \param seconds delay before the "mbedtls_timing_alarmed" flag is set * (must be >=0) * * \warning Only one alarm at a time is supported. In a threaded * context, this means one for the whole process, not one per * thread. */ void mbedtls_set_alarm( int seconds ); /** * \brief Set a pair of delays to watch * (See \c mbedtls_timing_get_delay().) * * \param data Pointer to timing data. * Must point to a valid \c mbedtls_timing_delay_context struct. * \param int_ms First (intermediate) delay in milliseconds. * The effect if int_ms > fin_ms is unspecified. * \param fin_ms Second (final) delay in milliseconds. * Pass 0 to cancel the current delay. * * \note To set a single delay, either use \c mbedtls_timing_set_timer * directly or use this function with int_ms == fin_ms. */ void mbedtls_timing_set_delay( void *data, uint32_t int_ms, uint32_t fin_ms ); /** * \brief Get the status of delays * (Memory helper: number of delays passed.) * * \param data Pointer to timing data * Must point to a valid \c mbedtls_timing_delay_context struct. * * \return -1 if cancelled (fin_ms = 0), * 0 if none of the delays are passed, * 1 if only the intermediate delay is passed, * 2 if the final delay is passed. */ int mbedtls_timing_get_delay( void *data ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** * \brief Checkup routine * * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if a test failed */ int mbedtls_timing_self_test( int verbose ); #endif #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* timing.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/version.h0000644000000000000000000000636513764415275015330 0ustar rootroot/** * \file version.h * * \brief Run-time version information */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ /* * This set of compile-time defines and run-time variables can be used to * determine the version number of the mbed TLS library used. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_VERSION_H #define MBEDTLS_VERSION_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif /** * The version number x.y.z is split into three parts. * Major, Minor, Patchlevel */ #define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR 2 #define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR 25 #define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 0 /** * The single version number has the following structure: * MMNNPP00 * Major version | Minor version | Patch version */ #define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x02190000 #define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "2.25.0" #define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "mbed TLS 2.25.0" #if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C) #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /** * Get the version number. * * \return The constructed version number in the format * MMNNPP00 (Major, Minor, Patch). */ unsigned int mbedtls_version_get_number( void ); /** * Get the version string ("x.y.z"). * * \param string The string that will receive the value. * (Should be at least 9 bytes in size) */ void mbedtls_version_get_string( char *string ); /** * Get the full version string ("mbed TLS x.y.z"). * * \param string The string that will receive the value. The mbed TLS version * string will use 18 bytes AT MOST including a terminating * null byte. * (So the buffer should be at least 18 bytes to receive this * version string). */ void mbedtls_version_get_string_full( char *string ); /** * \brief Check if support for a feature was compiled into this * mbed TLS binary. This allows you to see at runtime if the * library was for instance compiled with or without * Multi-threading support. * * \note only checks against defines in the sections "System * support", "mbed TLS modules" and "mbed TLS feature * support" in config.h * * \param feature The string for the define to check (e.g. "MBEDTLS_AES_C") * * \return 0 if the feature is present, * -1 if the feature is not present and * -2 if support for feature checking as a whole was not * compiled in. */ int mbedtls_version_check_feature( const char *feature ); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_VERSION_C */ #endif /* version.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/x509.h0000644000000000000000000004132613764415275014344 0ustar rootroot/** * \file x509.h * * \brief X.509 generic defines and structures */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_X509_H #define MBEDTLS_X509_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" #include "mbedtls/pk.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) #include "mbedtls/rsa.h" #endif /** * \addtogroup x509_module * \{ */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA) /** * Maximum number of intermediate CAs in a verification chain. * That is, maximum length of the chain, excluding the end-entity certificate * and the trusted root certificate. * * Set this to a low value to prevent an adversary from making you waste * resources verifying an overlong certificate chain. */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA 8 #endif /** * \name X509 Error codes * \{ */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x2080 /**< Unavailable feature, e.g. RSA hashing/encryption combination. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_OID -0x2100 /**< Requested OID is unknown. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT -0x2180 /**< The CRT/CRL/CSR format is invalid, e.g. different type expected. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION -0x2200 /**< The CRT/CRL/CSR version element is invalid. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL -0x2280 /**< The serial tag or value is invalid. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG -0x2300 /**< The algorithm tag or value is invalid. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME -0x2380 /**< The name tag or value is invalid. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE -0x2400 /**< The date tag or value is invalid. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE -0x2480 /**< The signature tag or value invalid. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS -0x2500 /**< The extension tag or value is invalid. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION -0x2580 /**< CRT/CRL/CSR has an unsupported version number. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG -0x2600 /**< Signature algorithm (oid) is unsupported. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH -0x2680 /**< Signature algorithms do not match. (see \c ::mbedtls_x509_crt sig_oid) */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED -0x2700 /**< Certificate verification failed, e.g. CRL, CA or signature check failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_FORMAT -0x2780 /**< Format not recognized as DER or PEM. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x2800 /**< Input invalid. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED -0x2880 /**< Allocation of memory failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x2900 /**< Read/write of file failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x2980 /**< Destination buffer is too small. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR -0x3000 /**< A fatal error occurred, eg the chain is too long or the vrfy callback failed. */ /* \} name */ /** * \name X509 Verify codes * \{ */ /* Reminder: update x509_crt_verify_strings[] in library/x509_crt.c */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED 0x01 /**< The certificate validity has expired. */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED 0x02 /**< The certificate has been revoked (is on a CRL). */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH 0x04 /**< The certificate Common Name (CN) does not match with the expected CN. */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED 0x08 /**< The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA. */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED 0x10 /**< The CRL is not correctly signed by the trusted CA. */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED 0x20 /**< The CRL is expired. */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING 0x40 /**< Certificate was missing. */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY 0x80 /**< Certificate verification was skipped. */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER 0x0100 /**< Other reason (can be used by verify callback) */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE 0x0200 /**< The certificate validity starts in the future. */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE 0x0400 /**< The CRL is from the future */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE 0x0800 /**< Usage does not match the keyUsage extension. */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE 0x1000 /**< Usage does not match the extendedKeyUsage extension. */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE 0x2000 /**< Usage does not match the nsCertType extension. */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD 0x4000 /**< The certificate is signed with an unacceptable hash. */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK 0x8000 /**< The certificate is signed with an unacceptable PK alg (eg RSA vs ECDSA). */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY 0x010000 /**< The certificate is signed with an unacceptable key (eg bad curve, RSA too short). */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_MD 0x020000 /**< The CRL is signed with an unacceptable hash. */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_PK 0x040000 /**< The CRL is signed with an unacceptable PK alg (eg RSA vs ECDSA). */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_KEY 0x080000 /**< The CRL is signed with an unacceptable key (eg bad curve, RSA too short). */ /* \} name */ /* \} addtogroup x509_module */ /* * X.509 v3 Subject Alternative Name types. * otherName [0] OtherName, * rfc822Name [1] IA5String, * dNSName [2] IA5String, * x400Address [3] ORAddress, * directoryName [4] Name, * ediPartyName [5] EDIPartyName, * uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String, * iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING, * registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME 0 #define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_RFC822_NAME 1 #define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME 2 #define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_X400_ADDRESS_NAME 3 #define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DIRECTORY_NAME 4 #define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_EDI_PARTY_NAME 5 #define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_UNIFORM_RESOURCE_IDENTIFIER 6 #define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_IP_ADDRESS 7 #define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_REGISTERED_ID 8 /* * X.509 v3 Key Usage Extension flags * Reminder: update x509_info_key_usage() when adding new flags. */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE (0x80) /* bit 0 */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION (0x40) /* bit 1 */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT (0x20) /* bit 2 */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT (0x10) /* bit 3 */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT (0x08) /* bit 4 */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN (0x04) /* bit 5 */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN (0x02) /* bit 6 */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY (0x01) /* bit 7 */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY (0x8000) /* bit 8 */ /* * Netscape certificate types * (http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss/tech-notes/tn3.html) */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT (0x80) /* bit 0 */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER (0x40) /* bit 1 */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL (0x20) /* bit 2 */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING (0x10) /* bit 3 */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_RESERVED (0x08) /* bit 4 */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CA (0x04) /* bit 5 */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL_CA (0x02) /* bit 6 */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING_CA (0x01) /* bit 7 */ /* * X.509 extension types * * Comments refer to the status for using certificates. Status can be * different for writing certificates or reading CRLs or CSRs. * * Those are defined in oid.h as oid.c needs them in a data structure. Since * these were previously defined here, let's have aliases for compatibility. */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER #define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER #define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE #define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES #define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_POLICY_MAPPINGS MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_POLICY_MAPPINGS #define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME /* Supported (DNS) */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_ISSUER_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_ISSUER_ALT_NAME #define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS #define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS /* Supported */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS #define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS #define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE #define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS #define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY #define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_FRESHEST_CRL MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_FRESHEST_CRL #define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE /* * Storage format identifiers * Recognized formats: PEM and DER */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_DER 1 #define MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_PEM 2 #define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE 256 /**< Maximum value size of a DN entry */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /** * \addtogroup x509_module * \{ */ /** * \name Structures for parsing X.509 certificates, CRLs and CSRs * \{ */ /** * Type-length-value structure that allows for ASN1 using DER. */ typedef mbedtls_asn1_buf mbedtls_x509_buf; /** * Container for ASN1 bit strings. */ typedef mbedtls_asn1_bitstring mbedtls_x509_bitstring; /** * Container for ASN1 named information objects. * It allows for Relative Distinguished Names (e.g. cn=localhost,ou=code,etc.). */ typedef mbedtls_asn1_named_data mbedtls_x509_name; /** * Container for a sequence of ASN.1 items */ typedef mbedtls_asn1_sequence mbedtls_x509_sequence; /** Container for date and time (precision in seconds). */ typedef struct mbedtls_x509_time { int year, mon, day; /**< Date. */ int hour, min, sec; /**< Time. */ } mbedtls_x509_time; /** \} name Structures for parsing X.509 certificates, CRLs and CSRs */ /** \} addtogroup x509_module */ /** * \brief Store the certificate DN in printable form into buf; * no more than size characters will be written. * * \param buf Buffer to write to * \param size Maximum size of buffer * \param dn The X509 name to represent * * \return The length of the string written (not including the * terminated nul byte), or a negative error code. */ int mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_name *dn ); /** * \brief Store the certificate serial in printable form into buf; * no more than size characters will be written. * * \param buf Buffer to write to * \param size Maximum size of buffer * \param serial The X509 serial to represent * * \return The length of the string written (not including the * terminated nul byte), or a negative error code. */ int mbedtls_x509_serial_gets( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *serial ); /** * \brief Check a given mbedtls_x509_time against the system time * and tell if it's in the past. * * \note Intended usage is "if( is_past( valid_to ) ) ERROR". * Hence the return value of 1 if on internal errors. * * \param to mbedtls_x509_time to check * * \return 1 if the given time is in the past or an error occurred, * 0 otherwise. */ int mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( const mbedtls_x509_time *to ); /** * \brief Check a given mbedtls_x509_time against the system time * and tell if it's in the future. * * \note Intended usage is "if( is_future( valid_from ) ) ERROR". * Hence the return value of 1 if on internal errors. * * \param from mbedtls_x509_time to check * * \return 1 if the given time is in the future or an error occurred, * 0 otherwise. */ int mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( const mbedtls_x509_time *from ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** * \brief Checkup routine * * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed */ int mbedtls_x509_self_test( int verbose ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ /* * Internal module functions. You probably do not want to use these unless you * know you do. */ int mbedtls_x509_get_name( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_name *cur ); int mbedtls_x509_get_alg_null( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_buf *alg ); int mbedtls_x509_get_alg( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_buf *alg, mbedtls_x509_buf *params ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) int mbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_params( const mbedtls_x509_buf *params, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t *mgf_md, int *salt_len ); #endif int mbedtls_x509_get_sig( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_buf *sig ); int mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg( const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_oid, const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_params, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg, void **sig_opts ); int mbedtls_x509_get_time( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_time *t ); int mbedtls_x509_get_serial( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_buf *serial ); int mbedtls_x509_get_ext( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_buf *ext, int tag ); int mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_oid, mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const void *sig_opts ); int mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper( char *buf, size_t buf_size, const char *name ); int mbedtls_x509_string_to_names( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *name ); int mbedtls_x509_set_extension( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *oid, size_t oid_len, int critical, const unsigned char *val, size_t val_len ); int mbedtls_x509_write_extensions( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, mbedtls_asn1_named_data *first ); int mbedtls_x509_write_names( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, mbedtls_asn1_named_data *first ); int mbedtls_x509_write_sig( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, const char *oid, size_t oid_len, unsigned char *sig, size_t size ); #define MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF \ do { \ if( ret < 0 || (size_t) ret >= n ) \ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); \ \ n -= (size_t) ret; \ p += (size_t) ret; \ } while( 0 ) #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* x509.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/x509_crl.h0000644000000000000000000001217613764415275015205 0ustar rootroot/** * \file x509_crl.h * * \brief X.509 certificate revocation list parsing */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_H #define MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include "mbedtls/x509.h" #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /** * \addtogroup x509_module * \{ */ /** * \name Structures and functions for parsing CRLs * \{ */ /** * Certificate revocation list entry. * Contains the CA-specific serial numbers and revocation dates. */ typedef struct mbedtls_x509_crl_entry { mbedtls_x509_buf raw; mbedtls_x509_buf serial; mbedtls_x509_time revocation_date; mbedtls_x509_buf entry_ext; struct mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *next; } mbedtls_x509_crl_entry; /** * Certificate revocation list structure. * Every CRL may have multiple entries. */ typedef struct mbedtls_x509_crl { mbedtls_x509_buf raw; /**< The raw certificate data (DER). */ mbedtls_x509_buf tbs; /**< The raw certificate body (DER). The part that is To Be Signed. */ int version; /**< CRL version (1=v1, 2=v2) */ mbedtls_x509_buf sig_oid; /**< CRL signature type identifier */ mbedtls_x509_buf issuer_raw; /**< The raw issuer data (DER). */ mbedtls_x509_name issuer; /**< The parsed issuer data (named information object). */ mbedtls_x509_time this_update; mbedtls_x509_time next_update; mbedtls_x509_crl_entry entry; /**< The CRL entries containing the certificate revocation times for this CA. */ mbedtls_x509_buf crl_ext; mbedtls_x509_buf sig_oid2; mbedtls_x509_buf sig; mbedtls_md_type_t sig_md; /**< Internal representation of the MD algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 */ mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_pk; /**< Internal representation of the Public Key algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_PK_RSA */ void *sig_opts; /**< Signature options to be passed to mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(), e.g. for RSASSA-PSS */ struct mbedtls_x509_crl *next; } mbedtls_x509_crl; /** * \brief Parse a DER-encoded CRL and append it to the chained list * * \param chain points to the start of the chain * \param buf buffer holding the CRL data in DER format * \param buflen size of the buffer * (including the terminating null byte for PEM data) * * \return 0 if successful, or a specific X509 or PEM error code */ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); /** * \brief Parse one or more CRLs and append them to the chained list * * \note Multiple CRLs are accepted only if using PEM format * * \param chain points to the start of the chain * \param buf buffer holding the CRL data in PEM or DER format * \param buflen size of the buffer * (including the terminating null byte for PEM data) * * \return 0 if successful, or a specific X509 or PEM error code */ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) /** * \brief Load one or more CRLs and append them to the chained list * * \note Multiple CRLs are accepted only if using PEM format * * \param chain points to the start of the chain * \param path filename to read the CRLs from (in PEM or DER encoding) * * \return 0 if successful, or a specific X509 or PEM error code */ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_file( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const char *path ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ /** * \brief Returns an informational string about the CRL. * * \param buf Buffer to write to * \param size Maximum size of buffer * \param prefix A line prefix * \param crl The X509 CRL to represent * * \return The length of the string written (not including the * terminated nul byte), or a negative error code. */ int mbedtls_x509_crl_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, const mbedtls_x509_crl *crl ); /** * \brief Initialize a CRL (chain) * * \param crl CRL chain to initialize */ void mbedtls_x509_crl_init( mbedtls_x509_crl *crl ); /** * \brief Unallocate all CRL data * * \param crl CRL chain to free */ void mbedtls_x509_crl_free( mbedtls_x509_crl *crl ); /* \} name */ /* \} addtogroup x509_module */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* mbedtls_x509_crl.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h0000644000000000000000000013420013764415275015206 0ustar rootroot/** * \file x509_crt.h * * \brief X.509 certificate parsing and writing */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_H #define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include "mbedtls/x509.h" #include "mbedtls/x509_crl.h" #include "mbedtls/bignum.h" /** * \addtogroup x509_module * \{ */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /** * \name Structures and functions for parsing and writing X.509 certificates * \{ */ /** * Container for an X.509 certificate. The certificate may be chained. */ typedef struct mbedtls_x509_crt { int own_buffer; /**< Indicates if \c raw is owned * by the structure or not. */ mbedtls_x509_buf raw; /**< The raw certificate data (DER). */ mbedtls_x509_buf tbs; /**< The raw certificate body (DER). The part that is To Be Signed. */ int version; /**< The X.509 version. (1=v1, 2=v2, 3=v3) */ mbedtls_x509_buf serial; /**< Unique id for certificate issued by a specific CA. */ mbedtls_x509_buf sig_oid; /**< Signature algorithm, e.g. sha1RSA */ mbedtls_x509_buf issuer_raw; /**< The raw issuer data (DER). Used for quick comparison. */ mbedtls_x509_buf subject_raw; /**< The raw subject data (DER). Used for quick comparison. */ mbedtls_x509_name issuer; /**< The parsed issuer data (named information object). */ mbedtls_x509_name subject; /**< The parsed subject data (named information object). */ mbedtls_x509_time valid_from; /**< Start time of certificate validity. */ mbedtls_x509_time valid_to; /**< End time of certificate validity. */ mbedtls_x509_buf pk_raw; mbedtls_pk_context pk; /**< Container for the public key context. */ mbedtls_x509_buf issuer_id; /**< Optional X.509 v2/v3 issuer unique identifier. */ mbedtls_x509_buf subject_id; /**< Optional X.509 v2/v3 subject unique identifier. */ mbedtls_x509_buf v3_ext; /**< Optional X.509 v3 extensions. */ mbedtls_x509_sequence subject_alt_names; /**< Optional list of raw entries of Subject Alternative Names extension (currently only dNSName and OtherName are listed). */ mbedtls_x509_sequence certificate_policies; /**< Optional list of certificate policies (Only anyPolicy is printed and enforced, however the rest of the policies are still listed). */ int ext_types; /**< Bit string containing detected and parsed extensions */ int ca_istrue; /**< Optional Basic Constraint extension value: 1 if this certificate belongs to a CA, 0 otherwise. */ int max_pathlen; /**< Optional Basic Constraint extension value: The maximum path length to the root certificate. Path length is 1 higher than RFC 5280 'meaning', so 1+ */ unsigned int key_usage; /**< Optional key usage extension value: See the values in x509.h */ mbedtls_x509_sequence ext_key_usage; /**< Optional list of extended key usage OIDs. */ unsigned char ns_cert_type; /**< Optional Netscape certificate type extension value: See the values in x509.h */ mbedtls_x509_buf sig; /**< Signature: hash of the tbs part signed with the private key. */ mbedtls_md_type_t sig_md; /**< Internal representation of the MD algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 */ mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_pk; /**< Internal representation of the Public Key algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_PK_RSA */ void *sig_opts; /**< Signature options to be passed to mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(), e.g. for RSASSA-PSS */ struct mbedtls_x509_crt *next; /**< Next certificate in the CA-chain. */ } mbedtls_x509_crt; /** * From RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.6: * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE { * type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER, * value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id } */ typedef struct mbedtls_x509_san_other_name { /** * The type_id is an OID as deifned in RFC 5280. * To check the value of the type id, you should use * \p MBEDTLS_OID_CMP with a known OID mbedtls_x509_buf. */ mbedtls_x509_buf type_id; /**< The type id. */ union { /** * From RFC 4108 section 5: * HardwareModuleName ::= SEQUENCE { * hwType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, * hwSerialNum OCTET STRING } */ struct { mbedtls_x509_buf oid; /**< The object identifier. */ mbedtls_x509_buf val; /**< The named value. */ } hardware_module_name; } value; } mbedtls_x509_san_other_name; /** * A structure for holding the parsed Subject Alternative Name, according to type */ typedef struct mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name { int type; /**< The SAN type, value of MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_XXX. */ union { mbedtls_x509_san_other_name other_name; /**< The otherName supported type. */ mbedtls_x509_buf unstructured_name; /**< The buffer for the un constructed types. Only dnsName currently supported */ } san; /**< A union of the supported SAN types */ } mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name; /** * Build flag from an algorithm/curve identifier (pk, md, ecp) * Since 0 is always XXX_NONE, ignore it. */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( id ) ( 1 << ( (id) - 1 ) ) /** * Security profile for certificate verification. * * All lists are bitfields, built by ORing flags from MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(). */ typedef struct mbedtls_x509_crt_profile { uint32_t allowed_mds; /**< MDs for signatures */ uint32_t allowed_pks; /**< PK algs for signatures */ uint32_t allowed_curves; /**< Elliptic curves for ECDSA */ uint32_t rsa_min_bitlen; /**< Minimum size for RSA keys */ } mbedtls_x509_crt_profile; #define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_1 0 #define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_2 1 #define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3 2 #define MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN 32 #define MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN 15 #if !defined( MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN ) #define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN 512 #endif /** * Container for writing a certificate (CRT) */ typedef struct mbedtls_x509write_cert { int version; mbedtls_mpi serial; mbedtls_pk_context *subject_key; mbedtls_pk_context *issuer_key; mbedtls_asn1_named_data *subject; mbedtls_asn1_named_data *issuer; mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; char not_before[MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN + 1]; char not_after[MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN + 1]; mbedtls_asn1_named_data *extensions; } mbedtls_x509write_cert; /** * Item in a verification chain: cert and flags for it */ typedef struct { mbedtls_x509_crt *crt; uint32_t flags; } mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item; /** * Max size of verification chain: end-entity + intermediates + trusted root */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE ( MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA + 2 ) /** * Verification chain as built by \c mbedtls_crt_verify_chain() */ typedef struct { mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item items[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE]; unsigned len; #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) /* This stores the list of potential trusted signers obtained from * the CA callback used for the CRT verification, if configured. * We must track it somewhere because the callback passes its * ownership to the caller. */ mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca_cb_result; #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ } mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain; #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) /** * \brief Context for resuming X.509 verify operations */ typedef struct { /* for check_signature() */ mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx pk; /* for find_parent_in() */ mbedtls_x509_crt *parent; /* non-null iff parent_in in progress */ mbedtls_x509_crt *fallback_parent; int fallback_signature_is_good; /* for find_parent() */ int parent_is_trusted; /* -1 if find_parent is not in progress */ /* for verify_chain() */ enum { x509_crt_rs_none, x509_crt_rs_find_parent, } in_progress; /* none if no operation is in progress */ int self_cnt; mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain ver_chain; } mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx; #else /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ /* Now we can declare functions that take a pointer to that */ typedef void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx; #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) /** * Default security profile. Should provide a good balance between security * and compatibility with current deployments. */ extern const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default; /** * Expected next default profile. Recommended for new deployments. * Currently targets a 128-bit security level, except for RSA-2048. */ extern const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_next; /** * NSA Suite B profile. */ extern const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suiteb; /** * \brief Parse a single DER formatted certificate and add it * to the end of the provided chained list. * * \param chain The pointer to the start of the CRT chain to attach to. * When parsing the first CRT in a chain, this should point * to an instance of ::mbedtls_x509_crt initialized through * mbedtls_x509_crt_init(). * \param buf The buffer holding the DER encoded certificate. * \param buflen The size in Bytes of \p buf. * * \note This function makes an internal copy of the CRT buffer * \p buf. In particular, \p buf may be destroyed or reused * after this call returns. To avoid duplicating the CRT * buffer (at the cost of stricter lifetime constraints), * use mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy() instead. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); /** * \brief The type of certificate extension callbacks. * * Callbacks of this type are passed to and used by the * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb() routine when * it encounters either an unsupported extension or a * "certificate policies" extension containing any * unsupported certificate policies. * Future versions of the library may invoke the callback * in other cases, if and when the need arises. * * \param p_ctx An opaque context passed to the callback. * \param crt The certificate being parsed. * \param oid The OID of the extension. * \param critical Whether the extension is critical. * \param p Pointer to the start of the extension value * (the content of the OCTET STRING). * \param end End of extension value. * * \note The callback must fail and return a negative error code * if it can not parse or does not support the extension. * When the callback fails to parse a critical extension * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb() also fails. * When the callback fails to parse a non critical extension * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb() simply skips * the extension and continues parsing. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ typedef int (*mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t)( void *p_ctx, mbedtls_x509_crt const *crt, mbedtls_x509_buf const *oid, int critical, const unsigned char *p, const unsigned char *end ); /** * \brief Parse a single DER formatted certificate and add it * to the end of the provided chained list. * * \param chain The pointer to the start of the CRT chain to attach to. * When parsing the first CRT in a chain, this should point * to an instance of ::mbedtls_x509_crt initialized through * mbedtls_x509_crt_init(). * \param buf The buffer holding the DER encoded certificate. * \param buflen The size in Bytes of \p buf. * \param make_copy When not zero this function makes an internal copy of the * CRT buffer \p buf. In particular, \p buf may be destroyed * or reused after this call returns. * When zero this function avoids duplicating the CRT buffer * by taking temporary ownership thereof until the CRT * is destroyed (like mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy()) * \param cb A callback invoked for every unsupported certificate * extension. * \param p_ctx An opaque context passed to the callback. * * \note This call is functionally equivalent to * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(), and/or * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy() * but it calls the callback with every unsupported * certificate extension and additionally the * "certificate policies" extension if it contains any * unsupported certificate policies. * The callback must return a negative error code if it * does not know how to handle such an extension. * When the callback fails to parse a critical extension * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb() also fails. * When the callback fails to parse a non critical extension * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb() simply skips * the extension and continues parsing. * Future versions of the library may invoke the callback * in other cases, if and when the need arises. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen, int make_copy, mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb, void *p_ctx ); /** * \brief Parse a single DER formatted certificate and add it * to the end of the provided chained list. This is a * variant of mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der() which takes * temporary ownership of the CRT buffer until the CRT * is destroyed. * * \param chain The pointer to the start of the CRT chain to attach to. * When parsing the first CRT in a chain, this should point * to an instance of ::mbedtls_x509_crt initialized through * mbedtls_x509_crt_init(). * \param buf The address of the readable buffer holding the DER encoded * certificate to use. On success, this buffer must be * retained and not be changed for the liftetime of the * CRT chain \p chain, that is, until \p chain is destroyed * through a call to mbedtls_x509_crt_free(). * \param buflen The size in Bytes of \p buf. * * \note This call is functionally equivalent to * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(), but it avoids creating a * copy of the input buffer at the cost of stronger lifetime * constraints. This is useful in constrained environments * where duplication of the CRT cannot be tolerated. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); /** * \brief Parse one DER-encoded or one or more concatenated PEM-encoded * certificates and add them to the chained list. * * For CRTs in PEM encoding, the function parses permissively: * if at least one certificate can be parsed, the function * returns the number of certificates for which parsing failed * (hence \c 0 if all certificates were parsed successfully). * If no certificate could be parsed, the function returns * the first (negative) error encountered during parsing. * * PEM encoded certificates may be interleaved by other data * such as human readable descriptions of their content, as * long as the certificates are enclosed in the PEM specific * '-----{BEGIN/END} CERTIFICATE-----' delimiters. * * \param chain The chain to which to add the parsed certificates. * \param buf The buffer holding the certificate data in PEM or DER format. * For certificates in PEM encoding, this may be a concatenation * of multiple certificates; for DER encoding, the buffer must * comprise exactly one certificate. * \param buflen The size of \p buf, including the terminating \c NULL byte * in case of PEM encoded data. * * \return \c 0 if all certificates were parsed successfully. * \return The (positive) number of certificates that couldn't * be parsed if parsing was partly successful (see above). * \return A negative X509 or PEM error code otherwise. * */ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) /** * \brief Load one or more certificates and add them * to the chained list. Parses permissively. If some * certificates can be parsed, the result is the number * of failed certificates it encountered. If none complete * correctly, the first error is returned. * * \param chain points to the start of the chain * \param path filename to read the certificates from * * \return 0 if all certificates parsed successfully, a positive number * if partly successful or a specific X509 or PEM error code */ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path ); /** * \brief Load one or more certificate files from a path and add them * to the chained list. Parses permissively. If some * certificates can be parsed, the result is the number * of failed certificates it encountered. If none complete * correctly, the first error is returned. * * \param chain points to the start of the chain * \param path directory / folder to read the certificate files from * * \return 0 if all certificates parsed successfully, a positive number * if partly successful or a specific X509 or PEM error code */ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ /** * \brief This function parses an item in the SubjectAlternativeNames * extension. * * \param san_buf The buffer holding the raw data item of the subject * alternative name. * \param san The target structure to populate with the parsed presentation * of the subject alternative name encoded in \p san_raw. * * \note Only "dnsName" and "otherName" of type hardware_module_name * as defined in RFC 4180 is supported. * * \note This function should be called on a single raw data of * subject alternative name. For example, after successful * certificate parsing, one must iterate on every item in the * \p crt->subject_alt_names sequence, and pass it to * this function. * * \warning The target structure contains pointers to the raw data of the * parsed certificate, and its lifetime is restricted by the * lifetime of the certificate. * * \return \c 0 on success * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE for an unsupported * SAN type. * \return Another negative value for any other failure. */ int mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name( const mbedtls_x509_buf *san_buf, mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name *san ); /** * \brief Returns an informational string about the * certificate. * * \param buf Buffer to write to * \param size Maximum size of buffer * \param prefix A line prefix * \param crt The X509 certificate to represent * * \return The length of the string written (not including the * terminated nul byte), or a negative error code. */ int mbedtls_x509_crt_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt ); /** * \brief Returns an informational string about the * verification status of a certificate. * * \param buf Buffer to write to * \param size Maximum size of buffer * \param prefix A line prefix * \param flags Verification flags created by mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() * * \return The length of the string written (not including the * terminated nul byte), or a negative error code. */ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, uint32_t flags ); /** * \brief Verify a chain of certificates. * * The verify callback is a user-supplied callback that * can clear / modify / add flags for a certificate. If set, * the verification callback is called for each * certificate in the chain (from the trust-ca down to the * presented crt). The parameters for the callback are: * (void *parameter, mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, int certificate_depth, * int *flags). With the flags representing current flags for * that specific certificate and the certificate depth from * the bottom (Peer cert depth = 0). * * All flags left after returning from the callback * are also returned to the application. The function should * return 0 for anything (including invalid certificates) * other than fatal error, as a non-zero return code * immediately aborts the verification process. For fatal * errors, a specific error code should be used (different * from MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED which should not * be returned at this point), or MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR * can be used if no better code is available. * * \note In case verification failed, the results can be displayed * using \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info() * * \note Same as \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile() with the * default security profile. * * \note It is your responsibility to provide up-to-date CRLs for * all trusted CAs. If no CRL is provided for the CA that was * used to sign the certificate, CRL verification is skipped * silently, that is *without* setting any flag. * * \note The \c trust_ca list can contain two types of certificates: * (1) those of trusted root CAs, so that certificates * chaining up to those CAs will be trusted, and (2) * self-signed end-entity certificates to be trusted (for * specific peers you know) - in that case, the self-signed * certificate doesn't need to have the CA bit set. * * \param crt The certificate chain to be verified. * \param trust_ca The list of trusted CAs. * \param ca_crl The list of CRLs for trusted CAs. * \param cn The expected Common Name. This will be checked to be * present in the certificate's subjectAltNames extension or, * if this extension is absent, as a CN component in its * Subject name. Currently only DNS names are supported. This * may be \c NULL if the CN need not be verified. * \param flags The address at which to store the result of the verification. * If the verification couldn't be completed, the flag value is * set to (uint32_t) -1. * \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use. See the documentation * of mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() for more information. * \param p_vrfy The context to be passed to \p f_vrfy. * * \return \c 0 if the chain is valid with respect to the * passed CN, CAs, CRLs and security profile. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED in case the * certificate chain verification failed. In this case, * \c *flags will have one or more * \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_XXX * flags set. * \return Another negative error code in case of a fatal error * encountered during the verification process. */ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), void *p_vrfy ); /** * \brief Verify a chain of certificates with respect to * a configurable security profile. * * \note Same as \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify(), but with explicit * security profile. * * \note The restrictions on keys (RSA minimum size, allowed curves * for ECDSA) apply to all certificates: trusted root, * intermediate CAs if any, and end entity certificate. * * \param crt The certificate chain to be verified. * \param trust_ca The list of trusted CAs. * \param ca_crl The list of CRLs for trusted CAs. * \param profile The security profile to use for the verification. * \param cn The expected Common Name. This may be \c NULL if the * CN need not be verified. * \param flags The address at which to store the result of the verification. * If the verification couldn't be completed, the flag value is * set to (uint32_t) -1. * \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use. See the documentation * of mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() for more information. * \param p_vrfy The context to be passed to \p f_vrfy. * * \return \c 0 if the chain is valid with respect to the * passed CN, CAs, CRLs and security profile. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED in case the * certificate chain verification failed. In this case, * \c *flags will have one or more * \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_XXX * flags set. * \return Another negative error code in case of a fatal error * encountered during the verification process. */ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), void *p_vrfy ); /** * \brief Restartable version of \c mbedtls_crt_verify_with_profile() * * \note Performs the same job as \c mbedtls_crt_verify_with_profile() * but can return early and restart according to the limit * set with \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking. * * \param crt The certificate chain to be verified. * \param trust_ca The list of trusted CAs. * \param ca_crl The list of CRLs for trusted CAs. * \param profile The security profile to use for the verification. * \param cn The expected Common Name. This may be \c NULL if the * CN need not be verified. * \param flags The address at which to store the result of the verification. * If the verification couldn't be completed, the flag value is * set to (uint32_t) -1. * \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use. See the documentation * of mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() for more information. * \param p_vrfy The context to be passed to \p f_vrfy. * \param rs_ctx The restart context to use. This may be set to \c NULL * to disable restartable ECC. * * \return See \c mbedtls_crt_verify_with_profile(), or * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). */ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), void *p_vrfy, mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ); /** * \brief The type of trusted certificate callbacks. * * Callbacks of this type are passed to and used by the CRT * verification routine mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb() * when looking for trusted signers of a given certificate. * * On success, the callback returns a list of trusted * certificates to be considered as potential signers * for the input certificate. * * \param p_ctx An opaque context passed to the callback. * \param child The certificate for which to search a potential signer. * This will point to a readable certificate. * \param candidate_cas The address at which to store the address of the first * entry in the generated linked list of candidate signers. * This will not be \c NULL. * * \note The callback must only return a non-zero value on a * fatal error. If, in contrast, the search for a potential * signer completes without a single candidate, the * callback must return \c 0 and set \c *candidate_cas * to \c NULL. * * \return \c 0 on success. In this case, \c *candidate_cas points * to a heap-allocated linked list of instances of * ::mbedtls_x509_crt, and ownership of this list is passed * to the caller. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ typedef int (*mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t)( void *p_ctx, mbedtls_x509_crt const *child, mbedtls_x509_crt **candidate_cas ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) /** * \brief Version of \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile() which * uses a callback to acquire the list of trusted CA * certificates. * * \param crt The certificate chain to be verified. * \param f_ca_cb The callback to be used to query for potential signers * of a given child certificate. See the documentation of * ::mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t for more information. * \param p_ca_cb The opaque context to be passed to \p f_ca_cb. * \param profile The security profile for the verification. * \param cn The expected Common Name. This may be \c NULL if the * CN need not be verified. * \param flags The address at which to store the result of the verification. * If the verification couldn't be completed, the flag value is * set to (uint32_t) -1. * \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use. See the documentation * of mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() for more information. * \param p_vrfy The context to be passed to \p f_vrfy. * * \return See \c mbedtls_crt_verify_with_profile(). */ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb, void *p_ca_cb, const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), void *p_vrfy ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) /** * \brief Check usage of certificate against keyUsage extension. * * \param crt Leaf certificate used. * \param usage Intended usage(s) (eg MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT * before using the certificate to perform an RSA key * exchange). * * \note Except for decipherOnly and encipherOnly, a bit set in the * usage argument means this bit MUST be set in the * certificate. For decipherOnly and encipherOnly, it means * that bit MAY be set. * * \return 0 is these uses of the certificate are allowed, * MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the keyUsage extension * is present but does not match the usage argument. * * \note You should only call this function on leaf certificates, on * (intermediate) CAs the keyUsage extension is automatically * checked by \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify(). */ int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, unsigned int usage ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) /** * \brief Check usage of certificate against extendedKeyUsage. * * \param crt Leaf certificate used. * \param usage_oid Intended usage (eg MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH or * MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH). * \param usage_len Length of usage_oid (eg given by MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE()). * * \return 0 if this use of the certificate is allowed, * MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA if not. * * \note Usually only makes sense on leaf certificates. */ int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const char *usage_oid, size_t usage_len ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) /** * \brief Verify the certificate revocation status * * \param crt a certificate to be verified * \param crl the CRL to verify against * * \return 1 if the certificate is revoked, 0 otherwise * */ int mbedtls_x509_crt_is_revoked( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const mbedtls_x509_crl *crl ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C */ /** * \brief Initialize a certificate (chain) * * \param crt Certificate chain to initialize */ void mbedtls_x509_crt_init( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt ); /** * \brief Unallocate all certificate data * * \param crt Certificate chain to free */ void mbedtls_x509_crt_free( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) /** * \brief Initialize a restart context */ void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init( mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx ); /** * \brief Free the components of a restart context */ void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free( mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ /* \} name */ /* \} addtogroup x509_module */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C) /** * \brief Initialize a CRT writing context * * \param ctx CRT context to initialize */ void mbedtls_x509write_crt_init( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx ); /** * \brief Set the verion for a Certificate * Default: MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3 * * \param ctx CRT context to use * \param version version to set (MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_2 or * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3) */ void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_version( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, int version ); /** * \brief Set the serial number for a Certificate. * * \param ctx CRT context to use * \param serial serial number to set * * \return 0 if successful */ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, const mbedtls_mpi *serial ); /** * \brief Set the validity period for a Certificate * Timestamps should be in string format for UTC timezone * i.e. "YYYYMMDDhhmmss" * e.g. "20131231235959" for December 31st 2013 * at 23:59:59 * * \param ctx CRT context to use * \param not_before not_before timestamp * \param not_after not_after timestamp * * \return 0 if timestamp was parsed successfully, or * a specific error code */ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_validity( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, const char *not_before, const char *not_after ); /** * \brief Set the issuer name for a Certificate * Issuer names should contain a comma-separated list * of OID types and values: * e.g. "C=UK,O=ARM,CN=mbed TLS CA" * * \param ctx CRT context to use * \param issuer_name issuer name to set * * \return 0 if issuer name was parsed successfully, or * a specific error code */ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_name( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, const char *issuer_name ); /** * \brief Set the subject name for a Certificate * Subject names should contain a comma-separated list * of OID types and values: * e.g. "C=UK,O=ARM,CN=mbed TLS Server 1" * * \param ctx CRT context to use * \param subject_name subject name to set * * \return 0 if subject name was parsed successfully, or * a specific error code */ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_name( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, const char *subject_name ); /** * \brief Set the subject public key for the certificate * * \param ctx CRT context to use * \param key public key to include */ void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, mbedtls_pk_context *key ); /** * \brief Set the issuer key used for signing the certificate * * \param ctx CRT context to use * \param key private key to sign with */ void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_key( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, mbedtls_pk_context *key ); /** * \brief Set the MD algorithm to use for the signature * (e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1) * * \param ctx CRT context to use * \param md_alg MD algorithm to use */ void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_md_alg( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ); /** * \brief Generic function to add to or replace an extension in the * CRT * * \param ctx CRT context to use * \param oid OID of the extension * \param oid_len length of the OID * \param critical if the extension is critical (per the RFC's definition) * \param val value of the extension OCTET STRING * \param val_len length of the value data * * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED */ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, const char *oid, size_t oid_len, int critical, const unsigned char *val, size_t val_len ); /** * \brief Set the basicConstraints extension for a CRT * * \param ctx CRT context to use * \param is_ca is this a CA certificate * \param max_pathlen maximum length of certificate chains below this * certificate (only for CA certificates, -1 is * inlimited) * * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED */ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_basic_constraints( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, int is_ca, int max_pathlen ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) /** * \brief Set the subjectKeyIdentifier extension for a CRT * Requires that mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key() has been * called before * * \param ctx CRT context to use * * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED */ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key_identifier( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx ); /** * \brief Set the authorityKeyIdentifier extension for a CRT * Requires that mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_key() has been * called before * * \param ctx CRT context to use * * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED */ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_authority_key_identifier( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ /** * \brief Set the Key Usage Extension flags * (e.g. MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN) * * \param ctx CRT context to use * \param key_usage key usage flags to set * * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED */ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_usage( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, unsigned int key_usage ); /** * \brief Set the Netscape Cert Type flags * (e.g. MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT | MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL) * * \param ctx CRT context to use * \param ns_cert_type Netscape Cert Type flags to set * * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED */ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_ns_cert_type( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, unsigned char ns_cert_type ); /** * \brief Free the contents of a CRT write context * * \param ctx CRT context to free */ void mbedtls_x509write_crt_free( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx ); /** * \brief Write a built up certificate to a X509 DER structure * Note: data is written at the end of the buffer! Use the * return value to determine where you should start * using the buffer * * \param ctx certificate to write away * \param buf buffer to write to * \param size size of the buffer * \param f_rng RNG function (for signature, see note) * \param p_rng RNG parameter * * \return length of data written if successful, or a specific * error code * * \note f_rng may be NULL if RSA is used for signature and the * signature is made offline (otherwise f_rng is desirable * for countermeasures against timing attacks). * ECDSA signatures always require a non-NULL f_rng. */ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_der( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) /** * \brief Write a built up certificate to a X509 PEM string * * \param ctx certificate to write away * \param buf buffer to write to * \param size size of the buffer * \param f_rng RNG function (for signature, see note) * \param p_rng RNG parameter * * \return 0 if successful, or a specific error code * * \note f_rng may be NULL if RSA is used for signature and the * signature is made offline (otherwise f_rng is desirable * for countermeasures against timing attacks). * ECDSA signatures always require a non-NULL f_rng. */ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_pem( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* mbedtls_x509_crt.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/x509_csr.h0000644000000000000000000002422413764415275015211 0ustar rootroot/** * \file x509_csr.h * * \brief X.509 certificate signing request parsing and writing */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_H #define MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include "mbedtls/x509.h" #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /** * \addtogroup x509_module * \{ */ /** * \name Structures and functions for X.509 Certificate Signing Requests (CSR) * \{ */ /** * Certificate Signing Request (CSR) structure. */ typedef struct mbedtls_x509_csr { mbedtls_x509_buf raw; /**< The raw CSR data (DER). */ mbedtls_x509_buf cri; /**< The raw CertificateRequestInfo body (DER). */ int version; /**< CSR version (1=v1). */ mbedtls_x509_buf subject_raw; /**< The raw subject data (DER). */ mbedtls_x509_name subject; /**< The parsed subject data (named information object). */ mbedtls_pk_context pk; /**< Container for the public key context. */ mbedtls_x509_buf sig_oid; mbedtls_x509_buf sig; mbedtls_md_type_t sig_md; /**< Internal representation of the MD algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 */ mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_pk; /**< Internal representation of the Public Key algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_PK_RSA */ void *sig_opts; /**< Signature options to be passed to mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(), e.g. for RSASSA-PSS */ } mbedtls_x509_csr; /** * Container for writing a CSR */ typedef struct mbedtls_x509write_csr { mbedtls_pk_context *key; mbedtls_asn1_named_data *subject; mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; mbedtls_asn1_named_data *extensions; } mbedtls_x509write_csr; #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C) /** * \brief Load a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) in DER format * * \note CSR attributes (if any) are currently silently ignored. * * \param csr CSR context to fill * \param buf buffer holding the CRL data * \param buflen size of the buffer * * \return 0 if successful, or a specific X509 error code */ int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); /** * \brief Load a Certificate Signing Request (CSR), DER or PEM format * * \note See notes for \c mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der() * * \param csr CSR context to fill * \param buf buffer holding the CRL data * \param buflen size of the buffer * (including the terminating null byte for PEM data) * * \return 0 if successful, or a specific X509 or PEM error code */ int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) /** * \brief Load a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) * * \note See notes for \c mbedtls_x509_csr_parse() * * \param csr CSR context to fill * \param path filename to read the CSR from * * \return 0 if successful, or a specific X509 or PEM error code */ int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const char *path ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ /** * \brief Returns an informational string about the * CSR. * * \param buf Buffer to write to * \param size Maximum size of buffer * \param prefix A line prefix * \param csr The X509 CSR to represent * * \return The length of the string written (not including the * terminated nul byte), or a negative error code. */ int mbedtls_x509_csr_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, const mbedtls_x509_csr *csr ); /** * \brief Initialize a CSR * * \param csr CSR to initialize */ void mbedtls_x509_csr_init( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr ); /** * \brief Unallocate all CSR data * * \param csr CSR to free */ void mbedtls_x509_csr_free( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C */ /* \} name */ /* \} addtogroup x509_module */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C) /** * \brief Initialize a CSR context * * \param ctx CSR context to initialize */ void mbedtls_x509write_csr_init( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx ); /** * \brief Set the subject name for a CSR * Subject names should contain a comma-separated list * of OID types and values: * e.g. "C=UK,O=ARM,CN=mbed TLS Server 1" * * \param ctx CSR context to use * \param subject_name subject name to set * * \return 0 if subject name was parsed successfully, or * a specific error code */ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_subject_name( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, const char *subject_name ); /** * \brief Set the key for a CSR (public key will be included, * private key used to sign the CSR when writing it) * * \param ctx CSR context to use * \param key Asymetric key to include */ void mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, mbedtls_pk_context *key ); /** * \brief Set the MD algorithm to use for the signature * (e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1) * * \param ctx CSR context to use * \param md_alg MD algorithm to use */ void mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_md_alg( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ); /** * \brief Set the Key Usage Extension flags * (e.g. MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN) * * \param ctx CSR context to use * \param key_usage key usage flags to set * * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED * * \note The decipherOnly flag from the Key Usage * extension is represented by bit 8 (i.e. * 0x8000), which cannot typically be represented * in an unsigned char. Therefore, the flag * decipherOnly (i.e. * #MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY) cannot be set using this * function. */ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key_usage( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char key_usage ); /** * \brief Set the Netscape Cert Type flags * (e.g. MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT | MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL) * * \param ctx CSR context to use * \param ns_cert_type Netscape Cert Type flags to set * * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED */ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char ns_cert_type ); /** * \brief Generic function to add to or replace an extension in the * CSR * * \param ctx CSR context to use * \param oid OID of the extension * \param oid_len length of the OID * \param val value of the extension OCTET STRING * \param val_len length of the value data * * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED */ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, const char *oid, size_t oid_len, const unsigned char *val, size_t val_len ); /** * \brief Free the contents of a CSR context * * \param ctx CSR context to free */ void mbedtls_x509write_csr_free( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx ); /** * \brief Write a CSR (Certificate Signing Request) to a * DER structure * Note: data is written at the end of the buffer! Use the * return value to determine where you should start * using the buffer * * \param ctx CSR to write away * \param buf buffer to write to * \param size size of the buffer * \param f_rng RNG function (for signature, see note) * \param p_rng RNG parameter * * \return length of data written if successful, or a specific * error code * * \note f_rng may be NULL if RSA is used for signature and the * signature is made offline (otherwise f_rng is desirable * for countermeasures against timing attacks). * ECDSA signatures always require a non-NULL f_rng. */ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_der( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) /** * \brief Write a CSR (Certificate Signing Request) to a * PEM string * * \param ctx CSR to write away * \param buf buffer to write to * \param size size of the buffer * \param f_rng RNG function (for signature, see note) * \param p_rng RNG parameter * * \return 0 if successful, or a specific error code * * \note f_rng may be NULL if RSA is used for signature and the * signature is made offline (otherwise f_rng is desirable * for countermeasures against timing attacks). * ECDSA signatures always require a non-NULL f_rng. */ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_pem( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* mbedtls_x509_csr.h */ usr/include/mbedtls/xtea.h0000644000000000000000000000703513764415275014577 0ustar rootroot/** * \file xtea.h * * \brief XTEA block cipher (32-bit) */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_XTEA_H #define MBEDTLS_XTEA_H #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include #include #define MBEDTLS_XTEA_ENCRYPT 1 #define MBEDTLS_XTEA_DECRYPT 0 #define MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x0028 /**< The data input has an invalid length. */ /* MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0029 /**< XTEA hardware accelerator failed. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT) // Regular implementation // /** * \brief XTEA context structure */ typedef struct mbedtls_xtea_context { uint32_t k[4]; /*!< key */ } mbedtls_xtea_context; #else /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT */ #include "xtea_alt.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT */ /** * \brief Initialize XTEA context * * \param ctx XTEA context to be initialized */ void mbedtls_xtea_init( mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx ); /** * \brief Clear XTEA context * * \param ctx XTEA context to be cleared */ void mbedtls_xtea_free( mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx ); /** * \brief XTEA key schedule * * \param ctx XTEA context to be initialized * \param key the secret key */ void mbedtls_xtea_setup( mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[16] ); /** * \brief XTEA cipher function * * \param ctx XTEA context * \param mode MBEDTLS_XTEA_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_XTEA_DECRYPT * \param input 8-byte input block * \param output 8-byte output block * * \return 0 if successful */ int mbedtls_xtea_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx, int mode, const unsigned char input[8], unsigned char output[8] ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) /** * \brief XTEA CBC cipher function * * \param ctx XTEA context * \param mode MBEDTLS_XTEA_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_XTEA_DECRYPT * \param length the length of input, multiple of 8 * \param iv initialization vector for CBC mode * \param input input block * \param output output block * * \return 0 if successful, * MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH if the length % 8 != 0 */ int mbedtls_xtea_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, unsigned char iv[8], const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** * \brief Checkup routine * * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed */ int mbedtls_xtea_self_test( int verbose ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* xtea.h */ usr/include/psa/0000755000000000000000000000000013776116122012601 5ustar rootrootusr/include/psa/crypto.h0000644000000000000000000051771513764415275014322 0ustar rootroot/** * \file psa/crypto.h * \brief Platform Security Architecture cryptography module */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_H #define PSA_CRYPTO_H #include "crypto_platform.h" #include #ifdef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ /* This __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ block contains mock definitions for things that * must be defined in the crypto_platform.h header. These mock definitions * are present in this file as a convenience to generate pretty-printed * documentation that includes those definitions. */ /** \defgroup platform Implementation-specific definitions * @{ */ /**@}*/ #endif /* __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* The file "crypto_types.h" declares types that encode errors, * algorithms, key types, policies, etc. */ #include "crypto_types.h" /** \defgroup version API version * @{ */ /** * The major version of this implementation of the PSA Crypto API */ #define PSA_CRYPTO_API_VERSION_MAJOR 1 /** * The minor version of this implementation of the PSA Crypto API */ #define PSA_CRYPTO_API_VERSION_MINOR 0 /**@}*/ /* The file "crypto_values.h" declares macros to build and analyze values * of integral types defined in "crypto_types.h". */ #include "crypto_values.h" /** \defgroup initialization Library initialization * @{ */ /** * \brief Library initialization. * * Applications must call this function before calling any other * function in this module. * * Applications may call this function more than once. Once a call * succeeds, subsequent calls are guaranteed to succeed. * * If the application calls other functions before calling psa_crypto_init(), * the behavior is undefined. Implementations are encouraged to either perform * the operation as if the library had been initialized or to return * #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE or some other applicable error. In particular, * implementations should not return a success status if the lack of * initialization may have security implications, for example due to improper * seeding of the random number generator. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY */ psa_status_t psa_crypto_init(void); /**@}*/ /** \addtogroup attributes * @{ */ /** \def PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT * * This macro returns a suitable initializer for a key attribute structure * of type #psa_key_attributes_t. */ #ifdef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ /* This is an example definition for documentation purposes. * Implementations should define a suitable value in `crypto_struct.h`. */ #define PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT {0} #endif /** Return an initial value for a key attributes structure. */ static psa_key_attributes_t psa_key_attributes_init(void); /** Declare a key as persistent and set its key identifier. * * If the attribute structure currently declares the key as volatile (which * is the default content of an attribute structure), this function sets * the lifetime attribute to #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT. * * This function does not access storage, it merely stores the given * value in the structure. * The persistent key will be written to storage when the attribute * structure is passed to a key creation function such as * psa_import_key(), psa_generate_key(), * psa_key_derivation_output_key() or psa_copy_key(). * * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once. * * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. * \param key The persistent identifier for the key. */ static void psa_set_key_id( psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ); #ifdef MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER /** Set the owner identifier of a key. * * When key identifiers encode key owner identifiers, psa_set_key_id() does * not allow to define in key attributes the owner of volatile keys as * psa_set_key_id() enforces the key to be persistent. * * This function allows to set in key attributes the owner identifier of a * key. It is intended to be used for volatile keys. For persistent keys, * it is recommended to use the PSA Cryptography API psa_set_key_id() to define * the owner of a key. * * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. * \param owner_id The key owner identifier. */ static void mbedtls_set_key_owner_id( psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, mbedtls_key_owner_id_t owner_id ); #endif /** Set the location of a persistent key. * * To make a key persistent, you must give it a persistent key identifier * with psa_set_key_id(). By default, a key that has a persistent identifier * is stored in the default storage area identifier by * #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT. Call this function to choose a storage * area, or to explicitly declare the key as volatile. * * This function does not access storage, it merely stores the given * value in the structure. * The persistent key will be written to storage when the attribute * structure is passed to a key creation function such as * psa_import_key(), psa_generate_key(), * psa_key_derivation_output_key() or psa_copy_key(). * * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once. * * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. * \param lifetime The lifetime for the key. * If this is #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE, the * key will be volatile, and the key identifier * attribute is reset to 0. */ static void psa_set_key_lifetime(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime); /** Retrieve the key identifier from key attributes. * * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once. * * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. * * \return The persistent identifier stored in the attribute structure. * This value is unspecified if the attribute structure declares * the key as volatile. */ static mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_get_key_id( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); /** Retrieve the lifetime from key attributes. * * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once. * * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. * * \return The lifetime value stored in the attribute structure. */ static psa_key_lifetime_t psa_get_key_lifetime( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); /** Declare usage flags for a key. * * Usage flags are part of a key's usage policy. They encode what * kind of operations are permitted on the key. For more details, * refer to the documentation of the type #psa_key_usage_t. * * This function overwrites any usage flags * previously set in \p attributes. * * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once. * * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. * \param usage_flags The usage flags to write. */ static void psa_set_key_usage_flags(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, psa_key_usage_t usage_flags); /** Retrieve the usage flags from key attributes. * * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once. * * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. * * \return The usage flags stored in the attribute structure. */ static psa_key_usage_t psa_get_key_usage_flags( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); /** Declare the permitted algorithm policy for a key. * * The permitted algorithm policy of a key encodes which algorithm or * algorithms are permitted to be used with this key. The following * algorithm policies are supported: * - 0 does not allow any cryptographic operation with the key. The key * may be used for non-cryptographic actions such as exporting (if * permitted by the usage flags). * - An algorithm value permits this particular algorithm. * - An algorithm wildcard built from #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH allows the specified * signature scheme with any hash algorithm. * * This function overwrites any algorithm policy * previously set in \p attributes. * * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once. * * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. * \param alg The permitted algorithm policy to write. */ static void psa_set_key_algorithm(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, psa_algorithm_t alg); /** Retrieve the algorithm policy from key attributes. * * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once. * * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. * * \return The algorithm stored in the attribute structure. */ static psa_algorithm_t psa_get_key_algorithm( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); /** Declare the type of a key. * * This function overwrites any key type * previously set in \p attributes. * * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once. * * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. * \param type The key type to write. * If this is 0, the key type in \p attributes * becomes unspecified. */ static void psa_set_key_type(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, psa_key_type_t type); /** Declare the size of a key. * * This function overwrites any key size previously set in \p attributes. * * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once. * * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. * \param bits The key size in bits. * If this is 0, the key size in \p attributes * becomes unspecified. Keys of size 0 are * not supported. */ static void psa_set_key_bits(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, size_t bits); /** Retrieve the key type from key attributes. * * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once. * * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. * * \return The key type stored in the attribute structure. */ static psa_key_type_t psa_get_key_type(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); /** Retrieve the key size from key attributes. * * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once. * * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. * * \return The key size stored in the attribute structure, in bits. */ static size_t psa_get_key_bits(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); /** Retrieve the attributes of a key. * * This function first resets the attribute structure as with * psa_reset_key_attributes(). It then copies the attributes of * the given key into the given attribute structure. * * \note This function may allocate memory or other resources. * Once you have called this function on an attribute structure, * you must call psa_reset_key_attributes() to free these resources. * * \param[in] key Identifier of the key to query. * \param[in,out] attributes On success, the attributes of the key. * On failure, equivalent to a * freshly-initialized structure. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_get_key_attributes(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); /** Reset a key attribute structure to a freshly initialized state. * * You must initialize the attribute structure as described in the * documentation of the type #psa_key_attributes_t before calling this * function. Once the structure has been initialized, you may call this * function at any time. * * This function frees any auxiliary resources that the structure * may contain. * * \param[in,out] attributes The attribute structure to reset. */ void psa_reset_key_attributes(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); /**@}*/ /** \defgroup key_management Key management * @{ */ /** Remove non-essential copies of key material from memory. * * If the key identifier designates a volatile key, this functions does not do * anything and returns successfully. * * If the key identifier designates a persistent key, then this function will * free all resources associated with the key in volatile memory. The key * data in persistent storage is not affected and the key can still be used. * * \param key Identifier of the key to purge. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * The key material will have been removed from memory if it is not * currently required. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \p key is not a valid key identifier. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_purge_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key); /** Make a copy of a key. * * Copy key material from one location to another. * * This function is primarily useful to copy a key from one location * to another, since it populates a key using the material from * another key which may have a different lifetime. * * This function may be used to share a key with a different party, * subject to implementation-defined restrictions on key sharing. * * The policy on the source key must have the usage flag * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY set. * This flag is sufficient to permit the copy if the key has the lifetime * #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE or #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT. * Some secure elements do not provide a way to copy a key without * making it extractable from the secure element. If a key is located * in such a secure element, then the key must have both usage flags * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY and #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT in order to make * a copy of the key outside the secure element. * * The resulting key may only be used in a way that conforms to * both the policy of the original key and the policy specified in * the \p attributes parameter: * - The usage flags on the resulting key are the bitwise-and of the * usage flags on the source policy and the usage flags in \p attributes. * - If both allow the same algorithm or wildcard-based * algorithm policy, the resulting key has the same algorithm policy. * - If either of the policies allows an algorithm and the other policy * allows a wildcard-based algorithm policy that includes this algorithm, * the resulting key allows the same algorithm. * - If the policies do not allow any algorithm in common, this function * fails with the status #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT. * * The effect of this function on implementation-defined attributes is * implementation-defined. * * \param source_key The key to copy. It must allow the usage * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY. If a private or secret key is * being copied outside of a secure element it must * also allow #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT. * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the new key. * They are used as follows: * - The key type and size may be 0. If either is * nonzero, it must match the corresponding * attribute of the source key. * - The key location (the lifetime and, for * persistent keys, the key identifier) is * used directly. * - The policy constraints (usage flags and * algorithm policy) are combined from * the source key and \p attributes so that * both sets of restrictions apply, as * described in the documentation of this function. * \param[out] target_key On success, an identifier for the newly created * key. For persistent keys, this is the key * identifier defined in \p attributes. * \c 0 on failure. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE * \p source_key is invalid. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS * This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is * already a persistent key with the given identifier. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * The lifetime or identifier in \p attributes are invalid. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * The policy constraints on the source and specified in * \p attributes are incompatible. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \p attributes specifies a key type or key size * which does not match the attributes of the source key. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED * The source key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY usage flag. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED * The source key is not exportable and its lifetime does not * allow copying it to the target's lifetime. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_copy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t source_key, const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *target_key); /** * \brief Destroy a key. * * This function destroys a key from both volatile * memory and, if applicable, non-volatile storage. Implementations shall * make a best effort to ensure that that the key material cannot be recovered. * * This function also erases any metadata such as policies and frees * resources associated with the key. * * If a key is currently in use in a multipart operation, then destroying the * key will cause the multipart operation to fail. * * \param key Identifier of the key to erase. If this is \c 0, do nothing and * return #PSA_SUCCESS. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * \p key was a valid identifier and the key material that it * referred to has been erased. Alternatively, \p key is \c 0. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED * The key cannot be erased because it is * read-only, either due to a policy or due to physical restrictions. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE * \p key is not a valid identifier nor \c 0. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * There was an failure in communication with the cryptoprocessor. * The key material may still be present in the cryptoprocessor. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * The storage is corrupted. Implementations shall make a best effort * to erase key material even in this stage, however applications * should be aware that it may be impossible to guarantee that the * key material is not recoverable in such cases. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * An unexpected condition which is not a storage corruption or * a communication failure occurred. The cryptoprocessor may have * been compromised. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_destroy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key); /**@}*/ /** \defgroup import_export Key import and export * @{ */ /** * \brief Import a key in binary format. * * This function supports any output from psa_export_key(). Refer to the * documentation of psa_export_public_key() for the format of public keys * and to the documentation of psa_export_key() for the format for * other key types. * * The key data determines the key size. The attributes may optionally * specify a key size; in this case it must match the size determined * from the key data. A key size of 0 in \p attributes indicates that * the key size is solely determined by the key data. * * Implementations must reject an attempt to import a key of size 0. * * This specification supports a single format for each key type. * Implementations may support other formats as long as the standard * format is supported. Implementations that support other formats * should ensure that the formats are clearly unambiguous so as to * minimize the risk that an invalid input is accidentally interpreted * according to a different format. * * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the new key. * The key size is always determined from the * \p data buffer. * If the key size in \p attributes is nonzero, * it must be equal to the size from \p data. * \param[out] key On success, an identifier to the newly created key. * For persistent keys, this is the key identifier * defined in \p attributes. * \c 0 on failure. * \param[in] data Buffer containing the key data. The content of this * buffer is interpreted according to the type declared * in \p attributes. * All implementations must support at least the format * described in the documentation * of psa_export_key() or psa_export_public_key() for * the chosen type. Implementations may allow other * formats, but should be conservative: implementations * should err on the side of rejecting content if it * may be erroneous (e.g. wrong type or truncated data). * \param data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * If the key is persistent, the key material and the key's metadata * have been saved to persistent storage. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS * This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is * already a persistent key with the given identifier. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED * The key type or key size is not supported, either by the * implementation in general or in this particular persistent location. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * The key attributes, as a whole, are invalid. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * The key data is not correctly formatted. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * The size in \p attributes is nonzero and does not match the size * of the key data. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_import_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key); /** * \brief Export a key in binary format. * * The output of this function can be passed to psa_import_key() to * create an equivalent object. * * If the implementation of psa_import_key() supports other formats * beyond the format specified here, the output from psa_export_key() * must use the representation specified here, not the original * representation. * * For standard key types, the output format is as follows: * * - For symmetric keys (including MAC keys), the format is the * raw bytes of the key. * - For DES, the key data consists of 8 bytes. The parity bits must be * correct. * - For Triple-DES, the format is the concatenation of the * two or three DES keys. * - For RSA key pairs (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR), the format * is the non-encrypted DER encoding of the representation defined by * PKCS\#1 (RFC 8017) as `RSAPrivateKey`, version 0. * ``` * RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { * version INTEGER, -- must be 0 * modulus INTEGER, -- n * publicExponent INTEGER, -- e * privateExponent INTEGER, -- d * prime1 INTEGER, -- p * prime2 INTEGER, -- q * exponent1 INTEGER, -- d mod (p-1) * exponent2 INTEGER, -- d mod (q-1) * coefficient INTEGER, -- (inverse of q) mod p * } * ``` * - For elliptic curve key pairs (key types for which * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR is true), the format is * a representation of the private value as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string * where `m` is the bit size associated with the curve, i.e. the bit size * of the order of the curve's coordinate field. This byte string is * in little-endian order for Montgomery curves (curve types * `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_CURVEXXX`), and in big-endian order for Weierstrass * curves (curve types `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECTXXX`, `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECPXXX` * and `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_PXXX`). * For Weierstrass curves, this is the content of the `privateKey` field of * the `ECPrivateKey` format defined by RFC 5915. For Montgomery curves, * the format is defined by RFC 7748, and output is masked according to §5. * - For Diffie-Hellman key exchange key pairs (key types for which * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_KEY_PAIR is true), the * format is the representation of the private key `x` as a big-endian byte * string. The length of the byte string is the private key size in bytes * (leading zeroes are not stripped). * - For public keys (key types for which #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY is * true), the format is the same as for psa_export_public_key(). * * The policy on the key must have the usage flag #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT set. * * \param key Identifier of the key to export. It must allow the * usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT, unless it is a public * key. * \param[out] data Buffer where the key data is to be written. * \param data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes * that make up the key data. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED * The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT flag. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL * The size of the \p data buffer is too small. You can determine a * sufficient buffer size by calling * #PSA_KEY_EXPORT_MAX_SIZE(\c type, \c bits) * where \c type is the key type * and \c bits is the key size in bits. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_export_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length); /** * \brief Export a public key or the public part of a key pair in binary format. * * The output of this function can be passed to psa_import_key() to * create an object that is equivalent to the public key. * * This specification supports a single format for each key type. * Implementations may support other formats as long as the standard * format is supported. Implementations that support other formats * should ensure that the formats are clearly unambiguous so as to * minimize the risk that an invalid input is accidentally interpreted * according to a different format. * * For standard key types, the output format is as follows: * - For RSA public keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY), the DER encoding of * the representation defined by RFC 3279 §2.3.1 as `RSAPublicKey`. * ``` * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { * modulus INTEGER, -- n * publicExponent INTEGER } -- e * ``` * - For elliptic curve public keys (key types for which * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY is true), the format is the uncompressed * representation defined by SEC1 §2.3.3 as the content of an ECPoint. * Let `m` be the bit size associated with the curve, i.e. the bit size of * `q` for a curve over `F_q`. The representation consists of: * - The byte 0x04; * - `x_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian; * - `y_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian. * - For Diffie-Hellman key exchange public keys (key types for which * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_PUBLIC_KEY is true), * the format is the representation of the public key `y = g^x mod p` as a * big-endian byte string. The length of the byte string is the length of the * base prime `p` in bytes. * * Exporting a public key object or the public part of a key pair is * always permitted, regardless of the key's usage flags. * * \param key Identifier of the key to export. * \param[out] data Buffer where the key data is to be written. * \param data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes * that make up the key data. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * The key is neither a public key nor a key pair. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL * The size of the \p data buffer is too small. You can determine a * sufficient buffer size by calling * #PSA_KEY_EXPORT_MAX_SIZE(#PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(\c type), \c bits) * where \c type is the key type * and \c bits is the key size in bits. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_export_public_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length); /**@}*/ /** \defgroup hash Message digests * @{ */ /** Calculate the hash (digest) of a message. * * \note To verify the hash of a message against an * expected value, use psa_hash_compare() instead. * * \param alg The hash algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true). * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message to hash. * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. * \param[out] hash Buffer where the hash is to be written. * \param hash_size Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. * \param[out] hash_length On success, the number of bytes * that make up the hash value. This is always * #PSA_HASH_SIZE(\p alg). * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED * \p alg is not supported or is not a hash algorithm. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL * \p hash_size is too small * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_hash_compute(psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_size, size_t *hash_length); /** Calculate the hash (digest) of a message and compare it with a * reference value. * * \param alg The hash algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true). * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message to hash. * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. * \param[out] hash Buffer containing the expected hash value. * \param hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * The expected hash is identical to the actual hash of the input. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE * The hash of the message was calculated successfully, but it * differs from the expected hash. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED * \p alg is not supported or is not a hash algorithm. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \p input_length or \p hash_length do not match the hash size for \p alg * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_hash_compare(psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length); /** The type of the state data structure for multipart hash operations. * * Before calling any function on a hash operation object, the application must * initialize it by any of the following means: * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example: * \code * psa_hash_operation_t operation; * memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation)); * \endcode * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example: * \code * psa_hash_operation_t operation = {0}; * \endcode * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT, * for example: * \code * psa_hash_operation_t operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; * \endcode * - Assign the result of the function psa_hash_operation_init() * to the structure, for example: * \code * psa_hash_operation_t operation; * operation = psa_hash_operation_init(); * \endcode * * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not * make any assumptions about the content of this structure except * as directed by the documentation of a specific implementation. */ typedef struct psa_hash_operation_s psa_hash_operation_t; /** \def PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT * * This macro returns a suitable initializer for a hash operation object * of type #psa_hash_operation_t. */ #ifdef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ /* This is an example definition for documentation purposes. * Implementations should define a suitable value in `crypto_struct.h`. */ #define PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT {0} #endif /** Return an initial value for a hash operation object. */ static psa_hash_operation_t psa_hash_operation_init(void); /** Set up a multipart hash operation. * * The sequence of operations to calculate a hash (message digest) * is as follows: * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions * listed here. * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the * documentation for #psa_hash_operation_t, e.g. #PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT. * -# Call psa_hash_setup() to specify the algorithm. * -# Call psa_hash_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment * of the message each time. The hash that is calculated is the hash * of the concatenation of these messages in order. * -# To calculate the hash, call psa_hash_finish(). * To compare the hash with an expected value, call psa_hash_verify(). * * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_hash_setup(), the * operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_hash_abort(). The * application may call psa_hash_abort() at any time after the operation * has been initialized. * * After a successful call to psa_hash_setup(), the application must * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an * operation: * - A successful call to psa_hash_finish() or psa_hash_verify(). * - A call to psa_hash_abort(). * * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have * been initialized as per the documentation for * #psa_hash_operation_t and not yet in use. * \param alg The hash algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true). * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED * \p alg is not a supported hash algorithm. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \p alg is not a hash algorithm. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive). * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_hash_setup(psa_hash_operation_t *operation, psa_algorithm_t alg); /** Add a message fragment to a multipart hash operation. * * The application must call psa_hash_setup() before calling this function. * * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error * state and must be aborted by calling psa_hash_abort(). * * \param[in,out] operation Active hash operation. * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to hash. * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The operation state is not valid (it muct be active). * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_hash_update(psa_hash_operation_t *operation, const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length); /** Finish the calculation of the hash of a message. * * The application must call psa_hash_setup() before calling this function. * This function calculates the hash of the message formed by concatenating * the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_hash_update(). * * When this function returns successfuly, the operation becomes inactive. * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error * state and must be aborted by calling psa_hash_abort(). * * \warning Applications should not call this function if they expect * a specific value for the hash. Call psa_hash_verify() instead. * Beware that comparing integrity or authenticity data such as * hash values with a function such as \c memcmp is risky * because the time taken by the comparison may leak information * about the hashed data which could allow an attacker to guess * a valid hash and thereby bypass security controls. * * \param[in,out] operation Active hash operation. * \param[out] hash Buffer where the hash is to be written. * \param hash_size Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. * \param[out] hash_length On success, the number of bytes * that make up the hash value. This is always * #PSA_HASH_SIZE(\c alg) where \c alg is the * hash algorithm that is calculated. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The operation state is not valid (it must be active). * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL * The size of the \p hash buffer is too small. You can determine a * sufficient buffer size by calling #PSA_HASH_SIZE(\c alg) * where \c alg is the hash algorithm that is calculated. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_hash_finish(psa_hash_operation_t *operation, uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_size, size_t *hash_length); /** Finish the calculation of the hash of a message and compare it with * an expected value. * * The application must call psa_hash_setup() before calling this function. * This function calculates the hash of the message formed by concatenating * the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_hash_update(). It then * compares the calculated hash with the expected hash passed as a * parameter to this function. * * When this function returns successfuly, the operation becomes inactive. * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error * state and must be aborted by calling psa_hash_abort(). * * \note Implementations shall make the best effort to ensure that the * comparison between the actual hash and the expected hash is performed * in constant time. * * \param[in,out] operation Active hash operation. * \param[in] hash Buffer containing the expected hash value. * \param hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * The expected hash is identical to the actual hash of the message. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE * The hash of the message was calculated successfully, but it * differs from the expected hash. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The operation state is not valid (it must be active). * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_hash_verify(psa_hash_operation_t *operation, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length); /** Abort a hash operation. * * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object * can be reused for another operation by calling * psa_hash_setup() again. * * You may call this function any time after the operation object has * been initialized by one of the methods described in #psa_hash_operation_t. * * In particular, calling psa_hash_abort() after the operation has been * terminated by a call to psa_hash_abort(), psa_hash_finish() or * psa_hash_verify() is safe and has no effect. * * \param[in,out] operation Initialized hash operation. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_hash_abort(psa_hash_operation_t *operation); /** Clone a hash operation. * * This function copies the state of an ongoing hash operation to * a new operation object. In other words, this function is equivalent * to calling psa_hash_setup() on \p target_operation with the same * algorithm that \p source_operation was set up for, then * psa_hash_update() on \p target_operation with the same input that * that was passed to \p source_operation. After this function returns, the * two objects are independent, i.e. subsequent calls involving one of * the objects do not affect the other object. * * \param[in] source_operation The active hash operation to clone. * \param[in,out] target_operation The operation object to set up. * It must be initialized but not active. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The \p source_operation state is not valid (it must be active). * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The \p target_operation state is not valid (it must be inactive). * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_hash_clone(const psa_hash_operation_t *source_operation, psa_hash_operation_t *target_operation); /**@}*/ /** \defgroup MAC Message authentication codes * @{ */ /** Calculate the MAC (message authentication code) of a message. * * \note To verify the MAC of a message against an * expected value, use psa_mac_verify() instead. * Beware that comparing integrity or authenticity data such as * MAC values with a function such as \c memcmp is risky * because the time taken by the comparison may leak information * about the MAC value which could allow an attacker to guess * a valid MAC and thereby bypass security controls. * * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It * must allow the usage PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE. * \param alg The MAC algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true). * \param[in] input Buffer containing the input message. * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. * \param[out] mac Buffer where the MAC value is to be written. * \param mac_size Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes. * \param[out] mac_length On success, the number of bytes * that make up the MAC value. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED * \p alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL * \p mac_size is too small * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * The key could not be retrieved from storage. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_mac_compute(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, uint8_t *mac, size_t mac_size, size_t *mac_length); /** Calculate the MAC of a message and compare it with a reference value. * * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It * must allow the usage PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE. * \param alg The MAC algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true). * \param[in] input Buffer containing the input message. * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. * \param[out] mac Buffer containing the expected MAC value. * \param mac_length Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * The expected MAC is identical to the actual MAC of the input. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE * The MAC of the message was calculated successfully, but it * differs from the expected value. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED * \p alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * The key could not be retrieved from storage. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_mac_verify(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, const uint8_t *mac, size_t mac_length); /** The type of the state data structure for multipart MAC operations. * * Before calling any function on a MAC operation object, the application must * initialize it by any of the following means: * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example: * \code * psa_mac_operation_t operation; * memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation)); * \endcode * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example: * \code * psa_mac_operation_t operation = {0}; * \endcode * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT, * for example: * \code * psa_mac_operation_t operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; * \endcode * - Assign the result of the function psa_mac_operation_init() * to the structure, for example: * \code * psa_mac_operation_t operation; * operation = psa_mac_operation_init(); * \endcode * * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not * make any assumptions about the content of this structure except * as directed by the documentation of a specific implementation. */ typedef struct psa_mac_operation_s psa_mac_operation_t; /** \def PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT * * This macro returns a suitable initializer for a MAC operation object of type * #psa_mac_operation_t. */ #ifdef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ /* This is an example definition for documentation purposes. * Implementations should define a suitable value in `crypto_struct.h`. */ #define PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT {0} #endif /** Return an initial value for a MAC operation object. */ static psa_mac_operation_t psa_mac_operation_init(void); /** Set up a multipart MAC calculation operation. * * This function sets up the calculation of the MAC * (message authentication code) of a byte string. * To verify the MAC of a message against an * expected value, use psa_mac_verify_setup() instead. * * The sequence of operations to calculate a MAC is as follows: * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions * listed here. * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the * documentation for #psa_mac_operation_t, e.g. #PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT. * -# Call psa_mac_sign_setup() to specify the algorithm and key. * -# Call psa_mac_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment * of the message each time. The MAC that is calculated is the MAC * of the concatenation of these messages in order. * -# At the end of the message, call psa_mac_sign_finish() to finish * calculating the MAC value and retrieve it. * * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_mac_sign_setup(), the * operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_mac_abort(). The * application may call psa_mac_abort() at any time after the operation * has been initialized. * * After a successful call to psa_mac_sign_setup(), the application must * eventually terminate the operation through one of the following methods: * - A successful call to psa_mac_sign_finish(). * - A call to psa_mac_abort(). * * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have * been initialized as per the documentation for * #psa_mac_operation_t and not yet in use. * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It * must remain valid until the operation terminates. * It must allow the usage PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE. * \param alg The MAC algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true). * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED * \p alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * The key could not be retrieved from storage. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive). * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_setup(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_algorithm_t alg); /** Set up a multipart MAC verification operation. * * This function sets up the verification of the MAC * (message authentication code) of a byte string against an expected value. * * The sequence of operations to verify a MAC is as follows: * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions * listed here. * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the * documentation for #psa_mac_operation_t, e.g. #PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT. * -# Call psa_mac_verify_setup() to specify the algorithm and key. * -# Call psa_mac_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment * of the message each time. The MAC that is calculated is the MAC * of the concatenation of these messages in order. * -# At the end of the message, call psa_mac_verify_finish() to finish * calculating the actual MAC of the message and verify it against * the expected value. * * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_mac_verify_setup(), the * operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_mac_abort(). The * application may call psa_mac_abort() at any time after the operation * has been initialized. * * After a successful call to psa_mac_verify_setup(), the application must * eventually terminate the operation through one of the following methods: * - A successful call to psa_mac_verify_finish(). * - A call to psa_mac_abort(). * * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have * been initialized as per the documentation for * #psa_mac_operation_t and not yet in use. * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It * must remain valid until the operation terminates. * It must allow the usage * PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE. * \param alg The MAC algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true). * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \c key is not compatible with \c alg. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED * \c alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * The key could not be retrieved from storage * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive). * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_setup(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_algorithm_t alg); /** Add a message fragment to a multipart MAC operation. * * The application must call psa_mac_sign_setup() or psa_mac_verify_setup() * before calling this function. * * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error * state and must be aborted by calling psa_mac_abort(). * * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation. * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to add to * the MAC calculation. * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The operation state is not valid (it must be active). * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_mac_update(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length); /** Finish the calculation of the MAC of a message. * * The application must call psa_mac_sign_setup() before calling this function. * This function calculates the MAC of the message formed by concatenating * the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_mac_update(). * * When this function returns successfuly, the operation becomes inactive. * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error * state and must be aborted by calling psa_mac_abort(). * * \warning Applications should not call this function if they expect * a specific value for the MAC. Call psa_mac_verify_finish() instead. * Beware that comparing integrity or authenticity data such as * MAC values with a function such as \c memcmp is risky * because the time taken by the comparison may leak information * about the MAC value which could allow an attacker to guess * a valid MAC and thereby bypass security controls. * * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation. * \param[out] mac Buffer where the MAC value is to be written. * \param mac_size Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes. * \param[out] mac_length On success, the number of bytes * that make up the MAC value. This is always * #PSA_MAC_FINAL_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \c alg) * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and * bit-size respectively of the key and \c alg is the * MAC algorithm that is calculated. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active mac sign * operation). * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL * The size of the \p mac buffer is too small. You can determine a * sufficient buffer size by calling PSA_MAC_FINAL_SIZE(). * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_finish(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, uint8_t *mac, size_t mac_size, size_t *mac_length); /** Finish the calculation of the MAC of a message and compare it with * an expected value. * * The application must call psa_mac_verify_setup() before calling this function. * This function calculates the MAC of the message formed by concatenating * the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_mac_update(). It then * compares the calculated MAC with the expected MAC passed as a * parameter to this function. * * When this function returns successfuly, the operation becomes inactive. * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error * state and must be aborted by calling psa_mac_abort(). * * \note Implementations shall make the best effort to ensure that the * comparison between the actual MAC and the expected MAC is performed * in constant time. * * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation. * \param[in] mac Buffer containing the expected MAC value. * \param mac_length Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * The expected MAC is identical to the actual MAC of the message. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE * The MAC of the message was calculated successfully, but it * differs from the expected MAC. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active mac verify * operation). * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_finish(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, const uint8_t *mac, size_t mac_length); /** Abort a MAC operation. * * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object * can be reused for another operation by calling * psa_mac_sign_setup() or psa_mac_verify_setup() again. * * You may call this function any time after the operation object has * been initialized by one of the methods described in #psa_mac_operation_t. * * In particular, calling psa_mac_abort() after the operation has been * terminated by a call to psa_mac_abort(), psa_mac_sign_finish() or * psa_mac_verify_finish() is safe and has no effect. * * \param[in,out] operation Initialized MAC operation. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_mac_abort(psa_mac_operation_t *operation); /**@}*/ /** \defgroup cipher Symmetric ciphers * @{ */ /** Encrypt a message using a symmetric cipher. * * This function encrypts a message with a random IV (initialization * vector). Use the multipart operation interface with a * #psa_cipher_operation_t object to provide other forms of IV. * * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. * It must allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT. * \param alg The cipher algorithm to compute * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message to encrypt. * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. * The output contains the IV followed by * the ciphertext proper. * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes * that make up the output. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED * \p alg is not supported or is not a cipher algorithm. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_cipher_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length); /** Decrypt a message using a symmetric cipher. * * This function decrypts a message encrypted with a symmetric cipher. * * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. * It must remain valid until the operation * terminates. It must allow the usage * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT. * \param alg The cipher algorithm to compute * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message to decrypt. * This consists of the IV followed by the * ciphertext proper. * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. * \param[out] output Buffer where the plaintext is to be written. * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes * that make up the output. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED * \p alg is not supported or is not a cipher algorithm. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_cipher_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length); /** The type of the state data structure for multipart cipher operations. * * Before calling any function on a cipher operation object, the application * must initialize it by any of the following means: * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example: * \code * psa_cipher_operation_t operation; * memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation)); * \endcode * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example: * \code * psa_cipher_operation_t operation = {0}; * \endcode * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT, * for example: * \code * psa_cipher_operation_t operation = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; * \endcode * - Assign the result of the function psa_cipher_operation_init() * to the structure, for example: * \code * psa_cipher_operation_t operation; * operation = psa_cipher_operation_init(); * \endcode * * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not * make any assumptions about the content of this structure except * as directed by the documentation of a specific implementation. */ typedef struct psa_cipher_operation_s psa_cipher_operation_t; /** \def PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT * * This macro returns a suitable initializer for a cipher operation object of * type #psa_cipher_operation_t. */ #ifdef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ /* This is an example definition for documentation purposes. * Implementations should define a suitable value in `crypto_struct.h`. */ #define PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT {0} #endif /** Return an initial value for a cipher operation object. */ static psa_cipher_operation_t psa_cipher_operation_init(void); /** Set the key for a multipart symmetric encryption operation. * * The sequence of operations to encrypt a message with a symmetric cipher * is as follows: * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions * listed here. * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the * documentation for #psa_cipher_operation_t, e.g. * #PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT. * -# Call psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key. * -# Call either psa_cipher_generate_iv() or psa_cipher_set_iv() to * generate or set the IV (initialization vector). You should use * psa_cipher_generate_iv() unless the protocol you are implementing * requires a specific IV value. * -# Call psa_cipher_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment * of the message each time. * -# Call psa_cipher_finish(). * * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(), * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_cipher_abort(). The * application may call psa_cipher_abort() at any time after the operation * has been initialized. * * After a successful call to psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(), the application must * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an * operation: * - A successful call to psa_cipher_finish(). * - A call to psa_cipher_abort(). * * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have * been initialized as per the documentation for * #psa_cipher_operation_t and not yet in use. * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. * It must remain valid until the operation * terminates. It must allow the usage * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT. * \param alg The cipher algorithm to compute * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED * \p alg is not supported or is not a cipher algorithm. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive). * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_algorithm_t alg); /** Set the key for a multipart symmetric decryption operation. * * The sequence of operations to decrypt a message with a symmetric cipher * is as follows: * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions * listed here. * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the * documentation for #psa_cipher_operation_t, e.g. * #PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT. * -# Call psa_cipher_decrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key. * -# Call psa_cipher_set_iv() with the IV (initialization vector) for the * decryption. If the IV is prepended to the ciphertext, you can call * psa_cipher_update() on a buffer containing the IV followed by the * beginning of the message. * -# Call psa_cipher_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment * of the message each time. * -# Call psa_cipher_finish(). * * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(), * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_cipher_abort(). The * application may call psa_cipher_abort() at any time after the operation * has been initialized. * * After a successful call to psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(), the application must * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an * operation: * - A successful call to psa_cipher_finish(). * - A call to psa_cipher_abort(). * * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have * been initialized as per the documentation for * #psa_cipher_operation_t and not yet in use. * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. * It must remain valid until the operation * terminates. It must allow the usage * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT. * \param alg The cipher algorithm to compute * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED * \p alg is not supported or is not a cipher algorithm. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive). * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_algorithm_t alg); /** Generate an IV for a symmetric encryption operation. * * This function generates a random IV (initialization vector), nonce * or initial counter value for the encryption operation as appropriate * for the chosen algorithm, key type and key size. * * The application must call psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() before * calling this function. * * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error * state and must be aborted by calling psa_cipher_abort(). * * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation. * \param[out] iv Buffer where the generated IV is to be written. * \param iv_size Size of the \p iv buffer in bytes. * \param[out] iv_length On success, the number of bytes of the * generated IV. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, with no IV set). * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL * The size of the \p iv buffer is too small. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_cipher_generate_iv(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, uint8_t *iv, size_t iv_size, size_t *iv_length); /** Set the IV for a symmetric encryption or decryption operation. * * This function sets the IV (initialization vector), nonce * or initial counter value for the encryption or decryption operation. * * The application must call psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() before * calling this function. * * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error * state and must be aborted by calling psa_cipher_abort(). * * \note When encrypting, applications should use psa_cipher_generate_iv() * instead of this function, unless implementing a protocol that requires * a non-random IV. * * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation. * \param[in] iv Buffer containing the IV to use. * \param iv_length Size of the IV in bytes. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active cipher * encrypt operation, with no IV set). * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * The size of \p iv is not acceptable for the chosen algorithm, * or the chosen algorithm does not use an IV. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_cipher_set_iv(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, const uint8_t *iv, size_t iv_length); /** Encrypt or decrypt a message fragment in an active cipher operation. * * Before calling this function, you must: * 1. Call either psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() or psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(). * The choice of setup function determines whether this function * encrypts or decrypts its input. * 2. If the algorithm requires an IV, call psa_cipher_generate_iv() * (recommended when encrypting) or psa_cipher_set_iv(). * * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error * state and must be aborted by calling psa_cipher_abort(). * * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation. * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to * encrypt or decrypt. * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes * that make up the returned output. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, with an IV set * if required for the algorithm). * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_cipher_update(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length); /** Finish encrypting or decrypting a message in a cipher operation. * * The application must call psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() or * psa_cipher_decrypt_setup() before calling this function. The choice * of setup function determines whether this function encrypts or * decrypts its input. * * This function finishes the encryption or decryption of the message * formed by concatenating the inputs passed to preceding calls to * psa_cipher_update(). * * When this function returns successfuly, the operation becomes inactive. * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error * state and must be aborted by calling psa_cipher_abort(). * * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation. * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes * that make up the returned output. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * The total input size passed to this operation is not valid for * this particular algorithm. For example, the algorithm is a based * on block cipher and requires a whole number of blocks, but the * total input size is not a multiple of the block size. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING * This is a decryption operation for an algorithm that includes * padding, and the ciphertext does not contain valid padding. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, with an IV set * if required for the algorithm). * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_cipher_finish(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length); /** Abort a cipher operation. * * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object * can be reused for another operation by calling * psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() or psa_cipher_decrypt_setup() again. * * You may call this function any time after the operation object has * been initialized as described in #psa_cipher_operation_t. * * In particular, calling psa_cipher_abort() after the operation has been * terminated by a call to psa_cipher_abort() or psa_cipher_finish() * is safe and has no effect. * * \param[in,out] operation Initialized cipher operation. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_cipher_abort(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation); /**@}*/ /** \defgroup aead Authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) * @{ */ /** Process an authenticated encryption operation. * * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the * operation. It must allow the usage * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT. * \param alg The AEAD algorithm to compute * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). * \param[in] nonce Nonce or IV to use. * \param nonce_length Size of the \p nonce buffer in bytes. * \param[in] additional_data Additional data that will be authenticated * but not encrypted. * \param additional_data_length Size of \p additional_data in bytes. * \param[in] plaintext Data that will be authenticated and * encrypted. * \param plaintext_length Size of \p plaintext in bytes. * \param[out] ciphertext Output buffer for the authenticated and * encrypted data. The additional data is not * part of this output. For algorithms where the * encrypted data and the authentication tag * are defined as separate outputs, the * authentication tag is appended to the * encrypted data. * \param ciphertext_size Size of the \p ciphertext buffer in bytes. * This must be at least * #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p alg, * \p plaintext_length). * \param[out] ciphertext_length On success, the size of the output * in the \p ciphertext buffer. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED * \p alg is not supported or is not an AEAD algorithm. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL * \p ciphertext_size is too small * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_aead_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, const uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_length, uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_size, size_t *ciphertext_length); /** Process an authenticated decryption operation. * * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the * operation. It must allow the usage * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT. * \param alg The AEAD algorithm to compute * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). * \param[in] nonce Nonce or IV to use. * \param nonce_length Size of the \p nonce buffer in bytes. * \param[in] additional_data Additional data that has been authenticated * but not encrypted. * \param additional_data_length Size of \p additional_data in bytes. * \param[in] ciphertext Data that has been authenticated and * encrypted. For algorithms where the * encrypted data and the authentication tag * are defined as separate inputs, the buffer * must contain the encrypted data followed * by the authentication tag. * \param ciphertext_length Size of \p ciphertext in bytes. * \param[out] plaintext Output buffer for the decrypted data. * \param plaintext_size Size of the \p plaintext buffer in bytes. * This must be at least * #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p alg, * \p ciphertext_length). * \param[out] plaintext_length On success, the size of the output * in the \p plaintext buffer. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE * The ciphertext is not authentic. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED * \p alg is not supported or is not an AEAD algorithm. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL * \p plaintext_size or \p nonce_length is too small * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_aead_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_length, uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_size, size_t *plaintext_length); /** The type of the state data structure for multipart AEAD operations. * * Before calling any function on an AEAD operation object, the application * must initialize it by any of the following means: * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example: * \code * psa_aead_operation_t operation; * memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation)); * \endcode * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example: * \code * psa_aead_operation_t operation = {0}; * \endcode * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT, * for example: * \code * psa_aead_operation_t operation = PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT; * \endcode * - Assign the result of the function psa_aead_operation_init() * to the structure, for example: * \code * psa_aead_operation_t operation; * operation = psa_aead_operation_init(); * \endcode * * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not * make any assumptions about the content of this structure except * as directed by the documentation of a specific implementation. */ typedef struct psa_aead_operation_s psa_aead_operation_t; /** \def PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT * * This macro returns a suitable initializer for an AEAD operation object of * type #psa_aead_operation_t. */ #ifdef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ /* This is an example definition for documentation purposes. * Implementations should define a suitable value in `crypto_struct.h`. */ #define PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT {0} #endif /** Return an initial value for an AEAD operation object. */ static psa_aead_operation_t psa_aead_operation_init(void); /** Set the key for a multipart authenticated encryption operation. * * The sequence of operations to encrypt a message with authentication * is as follows: * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions * listed here. * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the * documentation for #psa_aead_operation_t, e.g. * #PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT. * -# Call psa_aead_encrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key. * -# If needed, call psa_aead_set_lengths() to specify the length of the * inputs to the subsequent calls to psa_aead_update_ad() and * psa_aead_update(). See the documentation of psa_aead_set_lengths() * for details. * -# Call either psa_aead_generate_nonce() or psa_aead_set_nonce() to * generate or set the nonce. You should use * psa_aead_generate_nonce() unless the protocol you are implementing * requires a specific nonce value. * -# Call psa_aead_update_ad() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment * of the non-encrypted additional authenticated data each time. * -# Call psa_aead_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment * of the message to encrypt each time. * -# Call psa_aead_finish(). * * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_aead_encrypt_setup(), * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_aead_abort(). The * application may call psa_aead_abort() at any time after the operation * has been initialized. * * After a successful call to psa_aead_encrypt_setup(), the application must * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an * operation: * - A successful call to psa_aead_finish(). * - A call to psa_aead_abort(). * * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have * been initialized as per the documentation for * #psa_aead_operation_t and not yet in use. * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. * It must remain valid until the operation * terminates. It must allow the usage * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT. * \param alg The AEAD algorithm to compute * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive). * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED * \p alg is not supported or is not an AEAD algorithm. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_aead_encrypt_setup(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_algorithm_t alg); /** Set the key for a multipart authenticated decryption operation. * * The sequence of operations to decrypt a message with authentication * is as follows: * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions * listed here. * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the * documentation for #psa_aead_operation_t, e.g. * #PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT. * -# Call psa_aead_decrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key. * -# If needed, call psa_aead_set_lengths() to specify the length of the * inputs to the subsequent calls to psa_aead_update_ad() and * psa_aead_update(). See the documentation of psa_aead_set_lengths() * for details. * -# Call psa_aead_set_nonce() with the nonce for the decryption. * -# Call psa_aead_update_ad() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment * of the non-encrypted additional authenticated data each time. * -# Call psa_aead_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment * of the ciphertext to decrypt each time. * -# Call psa_aead_verify(). * * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_aead_decrypt_setup(), * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_aead_abort(). The * application may call psa_aead_abort() at any time after the operation * has been initialized. * * After a successful call to psa_aead_decrypt_setup(), the application must * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an * operation: * - A successful call to psa_aead_verify(). * - A call to psa_aead_abort(). * * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have * been initialized as per the documentation for * #psa_aead_operation_t and not yet in use. * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. * It must remain valid until the operation * terminates. It must allow the usage * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT. * \param alg The AEAD algorithm to compute * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive). * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED * \p alg is not supported or is not an AEAD algorithm. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_aead_decrypt_setup(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_algorithm_t alg); /** Generate a random nonce for an authenticated encryption operation. * * This function generates a random nonce for the authenticated encryption * operation with an appropriate size for the chosen algorithm, key type * and key size. * * The application must call psa_aead_encrypt_setup() before * calling this function. * * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort(). * * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. * \param[out] nonce Buffer where the generated nonce is to be * written. * \param nonce_size Size of the \p nonce buffer in bytes. * \param[out] nonce_length On success, the number of bytes of the * generated nonce. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active aead encrypt * operation, with no nonce set). * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL * The size of the \p nonce buffer is too small. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_aead_generate_nonce(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_size, size_t *nonce_length); /** Set the nonce for an authenticated encryption or decryption operation. * * This function sets the nonce for the authenticated * encryption or decryption operation. * * The application must call psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or * psa_aead_decrypt_setup() before calling this function. * * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort(). * * \note When encrypting, applications should use psa_aead_generate_nonce() * instead of this function, unless implementing a protocol that requires * a non-random IV. * * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. * \param[in] nonce Buffer containing the nonce to use. * \param nonce_length Size of the nonce in bytes. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, with no nonce * set). * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * The size of \p nonce is not acceptable for the chosen algorithm. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_aead_set_nonce(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length); /** Declare the lengths of the message and additional data for AEAD. * * The application must call this function before calling * psa_aead_update_ad() or psa_aead_update() if the algorithm for * the operation requires it. If the algorithm does not require it, * calling this function is optional, but if this function is called * then the implementation must enforce the lengths. * * You may call this function before or after setting the nonce with * psa_aead_set_nonce() or psa_aead_generate_nonce(). * * - For #PSA_ALG_CCM, calling this function is required. * - For the other AEAD algorithms defined in this specification, calling * this function is not required. * - For vendor-defined algorithm, refer to the vendor documentation. * * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort(). * * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. * \param ad_length Size of the non-encrypted additional * authenticated data in bytes. * \param plaintext_length Size of the plaintext to encrypt in bytes. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, and * psa_aead_update_ad() and psa_aead_update() must not have been * called yet). * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * At least one of the lengths is not acceptable for the chosen * algorithm. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_aead_set_lengths(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, size_t ad_length, size_t plaintext_length); /** Pass additional data to an active AEAD operation. * * Additional data is authenticated, but not encrypted. * * You may call this function multiple times to pass successive fragments * of the additional data. You may not call this function after passing * data to encrypt or decrypt with psa_aead_update(). * * Before calling this function, you must: * 1. Call either psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or psa_aead_decrypt_setup(). * 2. Set the nonce with psa_aead_generate_nonce() or psa_aead_set_nonce(). * * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort(). * * \warning When decrypting, until psa_aead_verify() has returned #PSA_SUCCESS, * there is no guarantee that the input is valid. Therefore, until * you have called psa_aead_verify() and it has returned #PSA_SUCCESS, * treat the input as untrusted and prepare to undo any action that * depends on the input if psa_aead_verify() returns an error status. * * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. * \param[in] input Buffer containing the fragment of * additional data. * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, have a nonce * set, have lengths set if required by the algorithm, and * psa_aead_update() must not have been called yet). * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * The total input length overflows the additional data length that * was previously specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(). * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_aead_update_ad(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length); /** Encrypt or decrypt a message fragment in an active AEAD operation. * * Before calling this function, you must: * 1. Call either psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or psa_aead_decrypt_setup(). * The choice of setup function determines whether this function * encrypts or decrypts its input. * 2. Set the nonce with psa_aead_generate_nonce() or psa_aead_set_nonce(). * 3. Call psa_aead_update_ad() to pass all the additional data. * * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort(). * * \warning When decrypting, until psa_aead_verify() has returned #PSA_SUCCESS, * there is no guarantee that the input is valid. Therefore, until * you have called psa_aead_verify() and it has returned #PSA_SUCCESS: * - Do not use the output in any way other than storing it in a * confidential location. If you take any action that depends * on the tentative decrypted data, this action will need to be * undone if the input turns out not to be valid. Furthermore, * if an adversary can observe that this action took place * (for example through timing), they may be able to use this * fact as an oracle to decrypt any message encrypted with the * same key. * - In particular, do not copy the output anywhere but to a * memory or storage space that you have exclusive access to. * * This function does not require the input to be aligned to any * particular block boundary. If the implementation can only process * a whole block at a time, it must consume all the input provided, but * it may delay the end of the corresponding output until a subsequent * call to psa_aead_update(), psa_aead_finish() or psa_aead_verify() * provides sufficient input. The amount of data that can be delayed * in this way is bounded by #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE. * * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to * encrypt or decrypt. * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. * This must be at least * #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c alg, * \p input_length) where \c alg is the * algorithm that is being calculated. * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes * that make up the returned output. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, have a nonce * set, and have lengths set if required by the algorithm). * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. * You can determine a sufficient buffer size by calling * #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c alg, \p input_length) * where \c alg is the algorithm that is being calculated. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * The total length of input to psa_aead_update_ad() so far is * less than the additional data length that was previously * specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(). * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * The total input length overflows the plaintext length that * was previously specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(). * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_aead_update(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length); /** Finish encrypting a message in an AEAD operation. * * The operation must have been set up with psa_aead_encrypt_setup(). * * This function finishes the authentication of the additional data * formed by concatenating the inputs passed to preceding calls to * psa_aead_update_ad() with the plaintext formed by concatenating the * inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_aead_update(). * * This function has two output buffers: * - \p ciphertext contains trailing ciphertext that was buffered from * preceding calls to psa_aead_update(). * - \p tag contains the authentication tag. Its length is always * #PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(\c alg) where \c alg is the AEAD algorithm * that the operation performs. * * When this function returns successfuly, the operation becomes inactive. * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort(). * * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. * \param[out] ciphertext Buffer where the last part of the ciphertext * is to be written. * \param ciphertext_size Size of the \p ciphertext buffer in bytes. * This must be at least * #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c alg) where * \c alg is the algorithm that is being * calculated. * \param[out] ciphertext_length On success, the number of bytes of * returned ciphertext. * \param[out] tag Buffer where the authentication tag is * to be written. * \param tag_size Size of the \p tag buffer in bytes. * This must be at least * #PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(\c alg) where \c alg is * the algorithm that is being calculated. * \param[out] tag_length On success, the number of bytes * that make up the returned tag. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active encryption * operation with a nonce set). * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL * The size of the \p ciphertext or \p tag buffer is too small. * You can determine a sufficient buffer size for \p ciphertext by * calling #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c alg) * where \c alg is the algorithm that is being calculated. * You can determine a sufficient buffer size for \p tag by * calling #PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(\c alg). * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * The total length of input to psa_aead_update_ad() so far is * less than the additional data length that was previously * specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(). * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * The total length of input to psa_aead_update() so far is * less than the plaintext length that was previously * specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(). * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_aead_finish(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_size, size_t *ciphertext_length, uint8_t *tag, size_t tag_size, size_t *tag_length); /** Finish authenticating and decrypting a message in an AEAD operation. * * The operation must have been set up with psa_aead_decrypt_setup(). * * This function finishes the authenticated decryption of the message * components: * * - The additional data consisting of the concatenation of the inputs * passed to preceding calls to psa_aead_update_ad(). * - The ciphertext consisting of the concatenation of the inputs passed to * preceding calls to psa_aead_update(). * - The tag passed to this function call. * * If the authentication tag is correct, this function outputs any remaining * plaintext and reports success. If the authentication tag is not correct, * this function returns #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE. * * When this function returns successfuly, the operation becomes inactive. * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort(). * * \note Implementations shall make the best effort to ensure that the * comparison between the actual tag and the expected tag is performed * in constant time. * * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. * \param[out] plaintext Buffer where the last part of the plaintext * is to be written. This is the remaining data * from previous calls to psa_aead_update() * that could not be processed until the end * of the input. * \param plaintext_size Size of the \p plaintext buffer in bytes. * This must be at least * #PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c alg) where * \c alg is the algorithm that is being * calculated. * \param[out] plaintext_length On success, the number of bytes of * returned plaintext. * \param[in] tag Buffer containing the authentication tag. * \param tag_length Size of the \p tag buffer in bytes. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE * The calculations were successful, but the authentication tag is * not correct. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active decryption * operation with a nonce set). * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL * The size of the \p plaintext buffer is too small. * You can determine a sufficient buffer size for \p plaintext by * calling #PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c alg) * where \c alg is the algorithm that is being calculated. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * The total length of input to psa_aead_update_ad() so far is * less than the additional data length that was previously * specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(). * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * The total length of input to psa_aead_update() so far is * less than the plaintext length that was previously * specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(). * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_aead_verify(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_size, size_t *plaintext_length, const uint8_t *tag, size_t tag_length); /** Abort an AEAD operation. * * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object * can be reused for another operation by calling * psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or psa_aead_decrypt_setup() again. * * You may call this function any time after the operation object has * been initialized as described in #psa_aead_operation_t. * * In particular, calling psa_aead_abort() after the operation has been * terminated by a call to psa_aead_abort(), psa_aead_finish() or * psa_aead_verify() is safe and has no effect. * * \param[in,out] operation Initialized AEAD operation. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_aead_abort(psa_aead_operation_t *operation); /**@}*/ /** \defgroup asymmetric Asymmetric cryptography * @{ */ /** * \brief Sign a hash or short message with a private key. * * Note that to perform a hash-and-sign signature algorithm, you must * first calculate the hash by calling psa_hash_setup(), psa_hash_update() * and psa_hash_finish(). Then pass the resulting hash as the \p hash * parameter to this function. You can use #PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(\p alg) * to determine the hash algorithm to use. * * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. * It must be an asymmetric key pair. The key must * allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH. * \param alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with * the type of \p key. * \param[in] hash The hash or message to sign. * \param hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written. * \param signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes * that make up the returned signature value. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg) * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size * respectively of \p key. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_sign_hash(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length); /** * \brief Verify the signature a hash or short message using a public key. * * Note that to perform a hash-and-sign signature algorithm, you must * first calculate the hash by calling psa_hash_setup(), psa_hash_update() * and psa_hash_finish(). Then pass the resulting hash as the \p hash * parameter to this function. You can use #PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(\p alg) * to determine the hash algorithm to use. * * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It * must be a public key or an asymmetric key pair. The * key must allow the usage * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH. * \param alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with * the type of \p key. * \param[in] hash The hash or message whose signature is to be * verified. * \param hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. * \param[in] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify. * \param signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * The signature is valid. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE * The calculation was perfomed successfully, but the passed * signature is not a valid signature. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_verify_hash(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length); /** * \brief Encrypt a short message with a public key. * * \param key Identifer of the key to use for the operation. * It must be a public key or an asymmetric key * pair. It must allow the usage * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT. * \param alg An asymmetric encryption algorithm that is * compatible with the type of \p key. * \param[in] input The message to encrypt. * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. * \param[in] salt A salt or label, if supported by the * encryption algorithm. * If the algorithm does not support a * salt, pass \c NULL. * If the algorithm supports an optional * salt and you do not want to pass a salt, * pass \c NULL. * * - For #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, no salt is * supported. * \param salt_length Size of the \p salt buffer in bytes. * If \p salt is \c NULL, pass 0. * \param[out] output Buffer where the encrypted message is to * be written. * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes * that make up the returned output. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. You can * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling * #PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg) * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size * respectively of \p key. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_length, uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length); /** * \brief Decrypt a short message with a private key. * * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. * It must be an asymmetric key pair. It must * allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT. * \param alg An asymmetric encryption algorithm that is * compatible with the type of \p key. * \param[in] input The message to decrypt. * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. * \param[in] salt A salt or label, if supported by the * encryption algorithm. * If the algorithm does not support a * salt, pass \c NULL. * If the algorithm supports an optional * salt and you do not want to pass a salt, * pass \c NULL. * * - For #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, no salt is * supported. * \param salt_length Size of the \p salt buffer in bytes. * If \p salt is \c NULL, pass 0. * \param[out] output Buffer where the decrypted message is to * be written. * \param output_size Size of the \c output buffer in bytes. * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes * that make up the returned output. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. You can * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling * #PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg) * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size * respectively of \p key. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_length, uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length); /**@}*/ /** \defgroup key_derivation Key derivation and pseudorandom generation * @{ */ /** The type of the state data structure for key derivation operations. * * Before calling any function on a key derivation operation object, the * application must initialize it by any of the following means: * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example: * \code * psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation; * memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation)); * \endcode * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example: * \code * psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = {0}; * \endcode * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT, * for example: * \code * psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; * \endcode * - Assign the result of the function psa_key_derivation_operation_init() * to the structure, for example: * \code * psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation; * operation = psa_key_derivation_operation_init(); * \endcode * * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not * make any assumptions about the content of this structure except * as directed by the documentation of a specific implementation. */ typedef struct psa_key_derivation_s psa_key_derivation_operation_t; /** \def PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT * * This macro returns a suitable initializer for a key derivation operation * object of type #psa_key_derivation_operation_t. */ #ifdef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ /* This is an example definition for documentation purposes. * Implementations should define a suitable value in `crypto_struct.h`. */ #define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT {0} #endif /** Return an initial value for a key derivation operation object. */ static psa_key_derivation_operation_t psa_key_derivation_operation_init(void); /** Set up a key derivation operation. * * A key derivation algorithm takes some inputs and uses them to generate * a byte stream in a deterministic way. * This byte stream can be used to produce keys and other * cryptographic material. * * To derive a key: * -# Start with an initialized object of type #psa_key_derivation_operation_t. * -# Call psa_key_derivation_setup() to select the algorithm. * -# Provide the inputs for the key derivation by calling * psa_key_derivation_input_bytes() or psa_key_derivation_input_key() * as appropriate. Which inputs are needed, in what order, and whether * they may be keys and if so of what type depends on the algorithm. * -# Optionally set the operation's maximum capacity with * psa_key_derivation_set_capacity(). You may do this before, in the middle * of or after providing inputs. For some algorithms, this step is mandatory * because the output depends on the maximum capacity. * -# To derive a key, call psa_key_derivation_output_key(). * To derive a byte string for a different purpose, call * psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(). * Successive calls to these functions use successive output bytes * calculated by the key derivation algorithm. * -# Clean up the key derivation operation object with * psa_key_derivation_abort(). * * If this function returns an error, the key derivation operation object is * not changed. * * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_key_derivation_setup(), * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_key_derivation_abort(). * * Implementations must reject an attempt to derive a key of size 0. * * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object * to set up. It must * have been initialized but not set up yet. * \param alg The key derivation algorithm to compute * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(\p alg) is true). * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \c alg is not a key derivation algorithm. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED * \c alg is not supported or is not a key derivation algorithm. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive). * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_setup( psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, psa_algorithm_t alg); /** Retrieve the current capacity of a key derivation operation. * * The capacity of a key derivation is the maximum number of bytes that it can * return. When you get *N* bytes of output from a key derivation operation, * this reduces its capacity by *N*. * * \param[in] operation The operation to query. * \param[out] capacity On success, the capacity of the operation. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The operation state is not valid (it must be active). * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_get_capacity( const psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, size_t *capacity); /** Set the maximum capacity of a key derivation operation. * * The capacity of a key derivation operation is the maximum number of bytes * that the key derivation operation can return from this point onwards. * * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to modify. * \param capacity The new capacity of the operation. * It must be less or equal to the operation's * current capacity. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \p capacity is larger than the operation's current capacity. * In this case, the operation object remains valid and its capacity * remains unchanged. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The operation state is not valid (it must be active). * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_set_capacity( psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, size_t capacity); /** Use the maximum possible capacity for a key derivation operation. * * Use this value as the capacity argument when setting up a key derivation * to indicate that the operation should have the maximum possible capacity. * The value of the maximum possible capacity depends on the key derivation * algorithm. */ #define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_UNLIMITED_CAPACITY ((size_t)(-1)) /** Provide an input for key derivation or key agreement. * * Which inputs are required and in what order depends on the algorithm. * Refer to the documentation of each key derivation or key agreement * algorithm for information. * * This function passes direct inputs, which is usually correct for * non-secret inputs. To pass a secret input, which should be in a key * object, call psa_key_derivation_input_key() instead of this function. * Refer to the documentation of individual step types * (`PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_xxx` values of type ::psa_key_derivation_step_t) * for more information. * * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error * state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort(). * * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to use. * It must have been set up with * psa_key_derivation_setup() and must not * have produced any output yet. * \param step Which step the input data is for. * \param[in] data Input data to use. * \param data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \c step is not compatible with the operation's algorithm. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \c step does not allow direct inputs. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The operation state is not valid for this input \p step. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, psa_key_derivation_step_t step, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length); /** Provide an input for key derivation in the form of a key. * * Which inputs are required and in what order depends on the algorithm. * Refer to the documentation of each key derivation or key agreement * algorithm for information. * * This function obtains input from a key object, which is usually correct for * secret inputs or for non-secret personalization strings kept in the key * store. To pass a non-secret parameter which is not in the key store, * call psa_key_derivation_input_bytes() instead of this function. * Refer to the documentation of individual step types * (`PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_xxx` values of type ::psa_key_derivation_step_t) * for more information. * * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error * state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort(). * * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to use. * It must have been set up with * psa_key_derivation_setup() and must not * have produced any output yet. * \param step Which step the input data is for. * \param key Identifier of the key. It must have an * appropriate type for step and must allow the * usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \c step is not compatible with the operation's algorithm. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \c step does not allow key inputs of the given type * or does not allow key inputs at all. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The operation state is not valid for this input \p step. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_key( psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, psa_key_derivation_step_t step, mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key); /** Perform a key agreement and use the shared secret as input to a key * derivation. * * A key agreement algorithm takes two inputs: a private key \p private_key * a public key \p peer_key. * The result of this function is passed as input to a key derivation. * The output of this key derivation can be extracted by reading from the * resulting operation to produce keys and other cryptographic material. * * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error * state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort(). * * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to use. * It must have been set up with * psa_key_derivation_setup() with a * key agreement and derivation algorithm * \c alg (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(\c alg) is true * and #PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT(\c alg) * is false). * The operation must be ready for an * input of the type given by \p step. * \param step Which step the input data is for. * \param private_key Identifier of the private key to use. It must * allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE. * \param[in] peer_key Public key of the peer. The peer key must be in the * same format that psa_import_key() accepts for the * public key type corresponding to the type of * private_key. That is, this function performs the * equivalent of * #psa_import_key(..., * `peer_key`, `peer_key_length`) where * with key attributes indicating the public key * type corresponding to the type of `private_key`. * For example, for EC keys, this means that peer_key * is interpreted as a point on the curve that the * private key is on. The standard formats for public * keys are documented in the documentation of * psa_export_public_key(). * \param peer_key_length Size of \p peer_key in bytes. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The operation state is not valid for this key agreement \p step. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \c private_key is not compatible with \c alg, * or \p peer_key is not valid for \c alg or not compatible with * \c private_key. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED * \c alg is not supported or is not a key derivation algorithm. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \c step does not allow an input resulting from a key agreement. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_key_agreement( psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, psa_key_derivation_step_t step, mbedtls_svc_key_id_t private_key, const uint8_t *peer_key, size_t peer_key_length); /** Read some data from a key derivation operation. * * This function calculates output bytes from a key derivation algorithm and * return those bytes. * If you view the key derivation's output as a stream of bytes, this * function destructively reads the requested number of bytes from the * stream. * The operation's capacity decreases by the number of bytes read. * * If this function returns an error status other than * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA, the operation enters an error * state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort(). * * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to read from. * \param[out] output Buffer where the output will be written. * \param output_length Number of bytes to output. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA * The operation's capacity was less than * \p output_length bytes. Note that in this case, * no output is written to the output buffer. * The operation's capacity is set to 0, thus * subsequent calls to this function will not * succeed, even with a smaller output buffer. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The operation state is not valid (it must be active and completed * all required input steps). * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, uint8_t *output, size_t output_length); /** Derive a key from an ongoing key derivation operation. * * This function calculates output bytes from a key derivation algorithm * and uses those bytes to generate a key deterministically. * The key's location, usage policy, type and size are taken from * \p attributes. * * If you view the key derivation's output as a stream of bytes, this * function destructively reads as many bytes as required from the * stream. * The operation's capacity decreases by the number of bytes read. * * If this function returns an error status other than * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA, the operation enters an error * state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort(). * * How much output is produced and consumed from the operation, and how * the key is derived, depends on the key type: * * - For key types for which the key is an arbitrary sequence of bytes * of a given size, this function is functionally equivalent to * calling #psa_key_derivation_output_bytes * and passing the resulting output to #psa_import_key. * However, this function has a security benefit: * if the implementation provides an isolation boundary then * the key material is not exposed outside the isolation boundary. * As a consequence, for these key types, this function always consumes * exactly (\p bits / 8) bytes from the operation. * The following key types defined in this specification follow this scheme: * * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES; * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4; * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA; * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE; * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC. * * - For ECC keys on a Montgomery elliptic curve * (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(\c curve) where \c curve designates a * Montgomery curve), this function always draws a byte string whose * length is determined by the curve, and sets the mandatory bits * accordingly. That is: * * - Curve25519 (#PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY, 255 bits): draw a 32-byte * string and process it as specified in RFC 7748 §5. * - Curve448 (#PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY, 448 bits): draw a 56-byte * string and process it as specified in RFC 7748 §5. * * - For key types for which the key is represented by a single sequence of * \p bits bits with constraints as to which bit sequences are acceptable, * this function draws a byte string of length (\p bits / 8) bytes rounded * up to the nearest whole number of bytes. If the resulting byte string * is acceptable, it becomes the key, otherwise the drawn bytes are discarded. * This process is repeated until an acceptable byte string is drawn. * The byte string drawn from the operation is interpreted as specified * for the output produced by psa_export_key(). * The following key types defined in this specification follow this scheme: * * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES. * Force-set the parity bits, but discard forbidden weak keys. * For 2-key and 3-key triple-DES, the three keys are generated * successively (for example, for 3-key triple-DES, * if the first 8 bytes specify a weak key and the next 8 bytes do not, * discard the first 8 bytes, use the next 8 bytes as the first key, * and continue reading output from the operation to derive the other * two keys). * - Finite-field Diffie-Hellman keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(\c group) * where \c group designates any Diffie-Hellman group) and * ECC keys on a Weierstrass elliptic curve * (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(\c curve) where \c curve designates a * Weierstrass curve). * For these key types, interpret the byte string as integer * in big-endian order. Discard it if it is not in the range * [0, *N* - 2] where *N* is the boundary of the private key domain * (the prime *p* for Diffie-Hellman, the subprime *q* for DSA, * or the order of the curve's base point for ECC). * Add 1 to the resulting integer and use this as the private key *x*. * This method allows compliance to NIST standards, specifically * the methods titled "key-pair generation by testing candidates" * in NIST SP 800-56A §5.6.1.1.4 for Diffie-Hellman, * in FIPS 186-4 §B.1.2 for DSA, and * in NIST SP 800-56A §5.6.1.2.2 or * FIPS 186-4 §B.4.2 for elliptic curve keys. * * - For other key types, including #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR, * the way in which the operation output is consumed is * implementation-defined. * * In all cases, the data that is read is discarded from the operation. * The operation's capacity is decreased by the number of bytes read. * * For algorithms that take an input step #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, * the input to that step must be provided with psa_key_derivation_input_key(). * Future versions of this specification may include additional restrictions * on the derived key based on the attributes and strength of the secret key. * * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the new key. * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to read from. * \param[out] key On success, an identifier for the newly created * key. For persistent keys, this is the key * identifier defined in \p attributes. * \c 0 on failure. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * If the key is persistent, the key material and the key's metadata * have been saved to persistent storage. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS * This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is * already a persistent key with the given identifier. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA * There was not enough data to create the desired key. * Note that in this case, no output is written to the output buffer. * The operation's capacity is set to 0, thus subsequent calls to * this function will not succeed, even with a smaller output buffer. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED * The key type or key size is not supported, either by the * implementation in general or in this particular location. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * The provided key attributes are not valid for the operation. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED * The #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET input was not provided through * a key. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The operation state is not valid (it must be active and completed * all required input steps). * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_key( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key); /** Abort a key derivation operation. * * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the \c * operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object can be reused * for another operation by calling psa_key_derivation_setup() again. * * This function may be called at any time after the operation * object has been initialized as described in #psa_key_derivation_operation_t. * * In particular, it is valid to call psa_key_derivation_abort() twice, or to * call psa_key_derivation_abort() on an operation that has not been set up. * * \param[in,out] operation The operation to abort. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_abort( psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation); /** Perform a key agreement and return the raw shared secret. * * \warning The raw result of a key agreement algorithm such as finite-field * Diffie-Hellman or elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman has biases and should * not be used directly as key material. It should instead be passed as * input to a key derivation algorithm. To chain a key agreement with * a key derivation, use psa_key_derivation_key_agreement() and other * functions from the key derivation interface. * * \param alg The key agreement algorithm to compute * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT(\p alg) * is true). * \param private_key Identifier of the private key to use. It must * allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE. * \param[in] peer_key Public key of the peer. It must be * in the same format that psa_import_key() * accepts. The standard formats for public * keys are documented in the documentation * of psa_export_public_key(). * \param peer_key_length Size of \p peer_key in bytes. * \param[out] output Buffer where the decrypted message is to * be written. * \param output_size Size of the \c output buffer in bytes. * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes * that make up the returned output. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \p alg is not a key agreement algorithm * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \p private_key is not compatible with \p alg, * or \p peer_key is not valid for \p alg or not compatible with * \p private_key. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL * \p output_size is too small * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED * \p alg is not a supported key agreement algorithm. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_raw_key_agreement(psa_algorithm_t alg, mbedtls_svc_key_id_t private_key, const uint8_t *peer_key, size_t peer_key_length, uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length); /**@}*/ /** \defgroup random Random generation * @{ */ /** * \brief Generate random bytes. * * \warning This function **can** fail! Callers MUST check the return status * and MUST NOT use the content of the output buffer if the return * status is not #PSA_SUCCESS. * * \note To generate a key, use psa_generate_key() instead. * * \param[out] output Output buffer for the generated data. * \param output_size Number of bytes to generate and output. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_generate_random(uint8_t *output, size_t output_size); /** * \brief Generate a key or key pair. * * The key is generated randomly. * Its location, usage policy, type and size are taken from \p attributes. * * Implementations must reject an attempt to generate a key of size 0. * * The following type-specific considerations apply: * - For RSA keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR), * the public exponent is 65537. * The modulus is a product of two probabilistic primes * between 2^{n-1} and 2^n where n is the bit size specified in the * attributes. * * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the new key. * \param[out] key On success, an identifier for the newly created * key. For persistent keys, this is the key * identifier defined in \p attributes. * \c 0 on failure. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * If the key is persistent, the key material and the key's metadata * have been saved to persistent storage. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS * This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is * already a persistent key with the given identifier. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_generate_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key); /**@}*/ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif /* The file "crypto_sizes.h" contains definitions for size calculation * macros whose definitions are implementation-specific. */ #include "crypto_sizes.h" /* The file "crypto_struct.h" contains definitions for * implementation-specific structs that are declared above. */ #include "crypto_struct.h" /* The file "crypto_extra.h" contains vendor-specific definitions. This * can include vendor-defined algorithms, extra functions, etc. */ #include "crypto_extra.h" #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_H */ usr/include/psa/crypto_accel_driver.h0000644000000000000000000011406613764415275017014 0ustar rootroot/** * \file psa/crypto_accel_driver.h * \brief PSA cryptography accelerator driver module * * This header declares types and function signatures for cryptography * drivers that access key material directly. This is meant for * on-chip cryptography accelerators. * * This file is part of the PSA Crypto Driver Model, containing functions for * driver developers to implement to enable hardware to be called in a * standardized way by a PSA Cryptographic API implementation. The functions * comprising the driver model, which driver authors implement, are not * intended to be called by application developers. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_ACCEL_DRIVER_H #define PSA_CRYPTO_ACCEL_DRIVER_H #include "crypto_driver_common.h" #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /** \defgroup driver_digest Hardware-Accelerated Message Digests * * Generation and authentication of Message Digests (aka hashes) must be done * in parts using the following sequence: * - `psa_drv_hash_setup_t` * - `psa_drv_hash_update_t` * - `psa_drv_hash_update_t` * - ... * - `psa_drv_hash_finish_t` * * If a previously started Message Digest operation needs to be terminated * before the `psa_drv_hash_finish_t` operation is complete, it should be aborted * by the `psa_drv_hash_abort_t`. Failure to do so may result in allocated * resources not being freed or in other undefined behavior. */ /**@{*/ /** \brief The hardware-specific hash context structure * * The contents of this structure are implementation dependent and are * therefore not described here */ typedef struct psa_drv_hash_context_s psa_drv_hash_context_t; /** \brief The function prototype for the start operation of a hash (message * digest) operation * * Functions that implement this prototype should be named in the following * convention: * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c} * psa_drv_hash__setup * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * Where `ALGO` is the name of the underlying hash function * * \param[in,out] p_context A structure that will contain the * hardware-specific hash context * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS Success. */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_hash_setup_t)(psa_drv_hash_context_t *p_context); /** \brief The function prototype for the update operation of a hash (message * digest) operation * * Functions that implement this prototype should be named in the following * convention: * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c} * psa_drv_hash__update * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * Where `ALGO` is the name of the underlying algorithm * * \param[in,out] p_context A hardware-specific structure for the * previously-established hash operation to be * continued * \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the message to be appended * to the hash operation * \param[in] input_length The size in bytes of the input message buffer */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_hash_update_t)(psa_drv_hash_context_t *p_context, const uint8_t *p_input, size_t input_length); /** \brief The function prototype for the finish operation of a hash (message * digest) operation * * Functions that implement this prototype should be named in the following * convention: * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c} * psa_drv_hash__finish * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * Where `ALGO` is the name of the underlying algorithm * * \param[in,out] p_context A hardware-specific structure for the * previously started hash operation to be * fiinished * \param[out] p_output A buffer where the generated digest will be * placed * \param[in] output_size The size in bytes of the buffer that has been * allocated for the `p_output` buffer * \param[out] p_output_length The number of bytes placed in `p_output` after * success * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_hash_finish_t)(psa_drv_hash_context_t *p_context, uint8_t *p_output, size_t output_size, size_t *p_output_length); /** \brief The function prototype for the abort operation of a hash (message * digest) operation * * Functions that implement this prototype should be named in the following * convention: * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c} * psa_drv_hash__abort * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * Where `ALGO` is the name of the underlying algorithm * * \param[in,out] p_context A hardware-specific structure for the previously * started hash operation to be aborted */ typedef void (*psa_drv_hash_abort_t)(psa_drv_hash_context_t *p_context); /**@}*/ /** \defgroup accel_mac Hardware-Accelerated Message Authentication Code * Generation and authentication of Message Authentication Codes (MACs) using * cryptographic accelerators can be done either as a single function call (via the * `psa_drv_accel_mac_generate_t` or `psa_drv_accel_mac_verify_t` * functions), or in parts using the following sequence: * - `psa_drv_accel_mac_setup_t` * - `psa_drv_accel_mac_update_t` * - `psa_drv_accel_mac_update_t` * - ... * - `psa_drv_accel_mac_finish_t` or `psa_drv_accel_mac_finish_verify_t` * * If a previously started MAC operation needs to be terminated, it * should be done so by the `psa_drv_accel_mac_abort_t`. Failure to do so may * result in allocated resources not being freed or in other undefined * behavior. * */ /**@{*/ /** \brief The hardware-accelerator-specific MAC context structure * * The contents of this structure are implementation dependent and are * therefore not described here. */ typedef struct psa_drv_accel_mac_context_s psa_drv_accel_mac_context_t; /** \brief The function prototype for the setup operation of a * hardware-accelerated MAC operation * * Functions that implement this prototype should be named in the following * convention: * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c} * psa_drv_accel_mac___setup * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * Where `ALGO` is the name of the underlying primitive, and `MAC_VARIANT` * is the specific variant of a MAC operation (such as HMAC or CMAC) * * \param[in,out] p_context A structure that will contain the * hardware-specific MAC context * \param[in] p_key A buffer containing the cleartext key material * to be used in the operation * \param[in] key_length The size in bytes of the key material * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_accel_mac_setup_t)(psa_drv_accel_mac_context_t *p_context, const uint8_t *p_key, size_t key_length); /** \brief The function prototype for the update operation of a * hardware-accelerated MAC operation * * Functions that implement this prototype should be named in the following * convention: * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c} * psa_drv_accel_mac___update * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * Where `ALGO` is the name of the underlying algorithm, and `MAC_VARIANT` * is the specific variant of a MAC operation (such as HMAC or CMAC) * * \param[in,out] p_context A hardware-specific structure for the * previously-established MAC operation to be * continued * \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the message to be appended * to the MAC operation * \param[in] input_length The size in bytes of the input message buffer */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_accel_mac_update_t)(psa_drv_accel_mac_context_t *p_context, const uint8_t *p_input, size_t input_length); /** \brief The function prototype for the finish operation of a * hardware-accelerated MAC operation * * Functions that implement this prototype should be named in the following * convention: * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c} * psa_drv_accel_mac___finish * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * Where `ALGO` is the name of the underlying algorithm, and `MAC_VARIANT` is * the specific variant of a MAC operation (such as HMAC or CMAC) * * \param[in,out] p_context A hardware-specific structure for the * previously started MAC operation to be * finished * \param[out] p_mac A buffer where the generated MAC will be placed * \param[in] mac_length The size in bytes of the buffer that has been * allocated for the `p_mac` buffer * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_accel_mac_finish_t)(psa_drv_accel_mac_context_t *p_context, uint8_t *p_mac, size_t mac_length); /** \brief The function prototype for the finish and verify operation of a * hardware-accelerated MAC operation * * Functions that implement this prototype should be named in the following * convention: * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c} * psa_drv_accel_mac___finish_verify * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * Where `ALGO` is the name of the underlying algorithm, and `MAC_VARIANT` is * the specific variant of a MAC operation (such as HMAC or CMAC) * * \param[in,out] p_context A hardware-specific structure for the * previously started MAC operation to be * verified and finished * \param[in] p_mac A buffer containing the MAC that will be used * for verification * \param[in] mac_length The size in bytes of the data in the `p_mac` * buffer * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * The operation completed successfully and the comparison matched */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_accel_mac_finish_verify_t)(psa_drv_accel_mac_context_t *p_context, const uint8_t *p_mac, size_t mac_length); /** \brief The function prototype for the abort operation for a previously * started hardware-accelerated MAC operation * * Functions that implement this prototype should be named in the following * convention: * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c} * psa_drv_accel_mac___abort * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * Where `ALGO` is the name of the underlying algorithm, and `MAC_VARIANT` is * the specific variant of a MAC operation (such as HMAC or CMAC) * * \param[in,out] p_context A hardware-specific structure for the * previously started MAC operation to be * aborted * */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_accel_mac_abort_t)(psa_drv_accel_mac_context_t *p_context); /** \brief The function prototype for the one-shot operation of a * hardware-accelerated MAC operation * * Functions that implement this prototype should be named in the following * convention: * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c} * psa_drv_accel_mac__ * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * Where `ALGO` is the name of the underlying algorithm, and `MAC_VARIANT` is * the specific variant of a MAC operation (such as HMAC or CMAC) * * \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the data to be MACed * \param[in] input_length The length in bytes of the `p_input` data * \param[in] p_key A buffer containing the key material to be used * for the MAC operation * \param[in] key_length The length in bytes of the `p_key` data * \param[in] alg The algorithm to be performed * \param[out] p_mac The buffer where the resulting MAC will be placed * upon success * \param[in] mac_length The length in bytes of the `p_mac` buffer */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_accel_mac_t)(const uint8_t *p_input, size_t input_length, const uint8_t *p_key, size_t key_length, psa_algorithm_t alg, uint8_t *p_mac, size_t mac_length); /** \brief The function prototype for the one-shot hardware-accelerated MAC * Verify operation * * Functions that implement this prototype should be named in the following * convention: * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c} * psa_drv_accel_mac___verify * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * Where `ALGO` is the name of the underlying algorithm, and `MAC_VARIANT` is * the specific variant of a MAC operation (such as HMAC or CMAC) * * \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the data to be MACed * \param[in] input_length The length in bytes of the `p_input` data * \param[in] p_key A buffer containing the key material to be used * for the MAC operation * \param[in] key_length The length in bytes of the `p_key` data * \param[in] alg The algorithm to be performed * \param[in] p_mac The MAC data to be compared * \param[in] mac_length The length in bytes of the `p_mac` buffer * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * The operation completed successfully and the comparison matched */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_accel_mac_verify_t)(const uint8_t *p_input, size_t input_length, const uint8_t *p_key, size_t key_length, psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *p_mac, size_t mac_length); /**@}*/ /** \defgroup accel_cipher Hardware-Accelerated Block Ciphers * Encryption and Decryption using hardware-acceleration in block modes other * than ECB must be done in multiple parts, using the following flow: * - `psa_drv_accel_ciphersetup_t` * - `psa_drv_accel_cipher_set_iv_t` (optional depending upon block mode) * - `psa_drv_accel_cipher_update_t` * - `psa_drv_accel_cipher_update_t` * - ... * - `psa_drv_accel_cipher_finish_t` * * If a previously started hardware-accelerated Cipher operation needs to be * terminated, it should be done so by the `psa_drv_accel_cipher_abort_t`. * Failure to do so may result in allocated resources not being freed or in * other undefined behavior. */ /**@{*/ /** \brief The hardware-accelerator-specific cipher context structure * * The contents of this structure are implementation dependent and are * therefore not described here. */ typedef struct psa_drv_accel_cipher_context_s psa_drv_accel_cipher_context_t; /** \brief The function prototype for the setup operation of * hardware-accelerated block cipher operations. * Functions that implement this prototype should be named in the following * conventions: * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c} * psa_drv_accel_cipher_setup__ * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * Where * - `CIPHER_NAME` is the name of the underlying block cipher (i.e. AES or DES) * - `MODE` is the block mode of the cipher operation (i.e. CBC or CTR) * * For stream ciphers: * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c} * psa_drv_accel_cipher_setup_ * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * Where `CIPHER_NAME` is the name of a stream cipher (i.e. RC4) * * \param[in,out] p_context A structure that will contain the * hardware-specific cipher context * \param[in] direction Indicates if the operation is an encrypt or a * decrypt * \param[in] p_key_data A buffer containing the cleartext key material * to be used in the operation * \param[in] key_data_size The size in bytes of the key material * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_accel_cipher_setup_t)(psa_drv_accel_cipher_context_t *p_context, psa_encrypt_or_decrypt_t direction, const uint8_t *p_key_data, size_t key_data_size); /** \brief The function prototype for the set initialization vector operation * of hardware-accelerated block cipher operations * Functions that implement this prototype should be named in the following * convention: * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c} * psa_drv_accel_cipher_set_iv__ * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * Where * - `CIPHER_NAME` is the name of the underlying block cipher (i.e. AES or DES) * - `MODE` is the block mode of the cipher operation (i.e. CBC or CTR) * * \param[in,out] p_context A structure that contains the previously setup * hardware-specific cipher context * \param[in] p_iv A buffer containing the initialization vecotr * \param[in] iv_length The size in bytes of the contents of `p_iv` * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_accel_cipher_set_iv_t)(psa_drv_accel_cipher_context_t *p_context, const uint8_t *p_iv, size_t iv_length); /** \brief The function prototype for the update operation of * hardware-accelerated block cipher operations. * * Functions that implement this prototype should be named in the following * convention: * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c} * psa_drv_accel_cipher_update__ * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * Where * - `CIPHER_NAME` is the name of the underlying block cipher (i.e. AES or DES) * - `MODE` is the block mode of the cipher operation (i.e. CBC or CTR) * * \param[in,out] p_context A hardware-specific structure for the * previously started cipher operation * \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the data to be * encrypted or decrypted * \param[in] input_size The size in bytes of the `p_input` buffer * \param[out] p_output A caller-allocated buffer where the * generated output will be placed * \param[in] output_size The size in bytes of the `p_output` buffer * \param[out] p_output_length After completion, will contain the number * of bytes placed in the `p_output` buffer * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_accel_cipher_update_t)(psa_drv_accel_cipher_context_t *p_context, const uint8_t *p_input, size_t input_size, uint8_t *p_output, size_t output_size, size_t *p_output_length); /** \brief The function prototype for the finish operation of * hardware-accelerated block cipher operations. * * Functions that implement this prototype should be named in the following * convention: * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c} * psa_drv_accel_cipher_finish__ * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * Where * - `CIPHER_NAME` is the name of the underlying block cipher (i.e. AES or DES) * - `MODE` is the block mode of the cipher operation (i.e. CBC or CTR) * * \param[in,out] p_context A hardware-specific structure for the * previously started cipher operation * \param[out] p_output A caller-allocated buffer where the generated * output will be placed * \param[in] output_size The size in bytes of the `p_output` buffer * \param[out] p_output_length After completion, will contain the number of * bytes placed in the `p_output` buffer * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_accel_cipher_finish_t)(psa_drv_accel_cipher_context_t *p_context, uint8_t *p_output, size_t output_size, size_t *p_output_length); /** \brief The function prototype for the abort operation of * hardware-accelerated block cipher operations. * * Functions that implement the following prototype should be named in the * following convention: * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c} * psa_drv_accel_cipher_abort__ * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * Where * - `CIPHER_NAME` is the name of the underlying block cipher (i.e. AES or DES) * - `MODE` is the block mode of the cipher operation (i.e. CBC or CTR) * * \param[in,out] p_context A hardware-specific structure for the * previously started cipher operation * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_accel_cipher_abort_t)(psa_drv_accel_cipher_context_t *p_context); /**@}*/ /** \defgroup accel_aead Hardware-Accelerated Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data * * Hardware-accelerated Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD) * operations must be done in one function call. While this creates a burden * for implementers as there must be sufficient space in memory for the entire * message, it prevents decrypted data from being made available before the * authentication operation is complete and the data is known to be authentic. */ /**@{*/ /** \brief The function prototype for the hardware-accelerated authenticated * encryption operation. * * Functions that implement this prototype should be named in the following * convention: * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c} * psa_drv_accel_aead__encrypt * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * Where `ALGO` is the name of the AEAD algorithm * * \param[in] p_key A pointer to the key material * \param[in] key_length The size in bytes of the key material * \param[in] alg The AEAD algorithm to compute * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(`alg`) is true) * \param[in] nonce Nonce or IV to use * \param[in] nonce_length Size of the `nonce` buffer in bytes * \param[in] additional_data Additional data that will be MACed * but not encrypted. * \param[in] additional_data_length Size of `additional_data` in bytes * \param[in] plaintext Data that will be MACed and * encrypted. * \param[in] plaintext_length Size of `plaintext` in bytes * \param[out] ciphertext Output buffer for the authenticated and * encrypted data. The additional data is * not part of this output. For algorithms * where the encrypted data and the * authentication tag are defined as * separate outputs, the authentication * tag is appended to the encrypted data. * \param[in] ciphertext_size Size of the `ciphertext` buffer in * bytes * This must be at least * #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(`alg`, * `plaintext_length`). * \param[out] ciphertext_length On success, the size of the output in * the `ciphertext` buffer * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_accel_aead_encrypt_t)(const uint8_t *p_key, size_t key_length, psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, const uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_length, uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_size, size_t *ciphertext_length); /** \brief The function prototype for the hardware-accelerated authenticated * decryption operation. * * Functions that implement this prototype should be named in the following * convention: * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c} * psa_drv_accel_aead__decrypt * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * Where `ALGO` is the name of the AEAD algorithm * \param[in] p_key A pointer to the key material * \param[in] key_length The size in bytes of the key material * \param[in] alg The AEAD algorithm to compute * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(`alg`) is true) * \param[in] nonce Nonce or IV to use * \param[in] nonce_length Size of the `nonce` buffer in bytes * \param[in] additional_data Additional data that has been MACed * but not encrypted * \param[in] additional_data_length Size of `additional_data` in bytes * \param[in] ciphertext Data that has been MACed and * encrypted * For algorithms where the encrypted data * and the authentication tag are defined * as separate inputs, the buffer must * contain the encrypted data followed by * the authentication tag. * \param[in] ciphertext_length Size of `ciphertext` in bytes * \param[out] plaintext Output buffer for the decrypted data * \param[in] plaintext_size Size of the `plaintext` buffer in * bytes * This must be at least * #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(`alg`, * `ciphertext_length`). * \param[out] plaintext_length On success, the size of the output * in the \b plaintext buffer * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_accel_aead_decrypt_t)(const uint8_t *p_key, size_t key_length, psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_length, uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_size, size_t *plaintext_length); /**@}*/ /** \defgroup accel_asymmetric Hardware-Accelerated Asymmetric Cryptography * * Since the amount of data that can (or should) be encrypted or signed using * asymmetric keys is limited by the key size, hardware-accelerated asymmetric * key operations must be done in single function calls. */ /**@{*/ /** * \brief The function prototype for the hardware-accelerated asymmetric sign * operation. * * Functions that implement this prototype should be named in the following * convention: * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c} * psa_drv_accel_asymmetric__sign * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * Where `ALGO` is the name of the signing algorithm * * This function supports any asymmetric-key output from psa_export_key() as * the buffer in \p p_key. Refer to the documentation of \ref * psa_export_key() for the formats. * * \param[in] p_key A buffer containing the private key * material * \param[in] key_size The size in bytes of the `p_key` data * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible * with the type of `p_key` * \param[in] p_hash The hash or message to sign * \param[in] hash_length Size of the `p_hash` buffer in bytes * \param[out] p_signature Buffer where the signature is to be written * \param[in] signature_size Size of the `p_signature` buffer in bytes * \param[out] p_signature_length On success, the number of bytes * that make up the returned signature value * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_accel_asymmetric_sign_t)(const uint8_t *p_key, size_t key_size, psa_algorithm_t alg, psa_key_type_t key_type, const uint8_t *p_hash, size_t hash_length, uint8_t *p_signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *p_signature_length); /** * \brief The function prototype for the hardware-accelerated signature verify * operation * * Functions that implement this prototype should be named in the following * convention: * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c} * psa_drv_accel_asymmetric__verify * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * Where `ALGO` is the name of the signing algorithm * * This function supports any output from \ref psa_export_public_key() as the * buffer in \p p_key. Refer to the documentation of \ref * psa_export_public_key() for the format of public keys and to the * documentation of \ref psa_export_key() for the format for other key types. * * \param[in] p_key A buffer containing the public key material * \param[in] key_size The size in bytes of the `p_key` data * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with * the type of `key` * \param[in] p_hash The hash or message whose signature is to be * verified * \param[in] hash_length Size of the `p_hash` buffer in bytes * \param[in] p_signature Buffer containing the signature to verify * \param[in] signature_length Size of the `p_signature` buffer in bytes * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * The signature is valid. */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_accel_asymmetric_verify_t)(const uint8_t *p_key, size_t key_size, psa_algorithm_t alg, psa_key_type_t key_type, const uint8_t *p_hash, size_t hash_length, const uint8_t *p_signature, size_t signature_length); /** * \brief The function prototype for the hardware-accelerated asymmetric * encrypt operation * * Functions that implement this prototype should be named in the following * convention: * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c} * psa_drv_accel_asymmetric__encrypt * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * Where `ALGO` is the name of the encryption algorithm * * This function supports any output from \ref psa_export_public_key() as the * buffer in \p p_key. Refer to the documentation of \ref * psa_export_public_key() for the format of public keys and to the * documentation of \ref psa_export_key() for the format for other key types. * * \param[in] p_key A buffer containing the public key material * \param[in] key_size The size in bytes of the `p_key` data * \param[in] alg An asymmetric encryption algorithm that is * compatible with the type of `key` * \param[in] p_input The message to encrypt * \param[in] input_length Size of the `p_input` buffer in bytes * \param[in] p_salt A salt or label, if supported by the * encryption algorithm * If the algorithm does not support a * salt, pass `NULL` * If the algorithm supports an optional * salt and you do not want to pass a salt, * pass `NULL`. * For #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, no salt is * supported. * \param[in] salt_length Size of the `p_salt` buffer in bytes * If `p_salt` is `NULL`, pass 0. * \param[out] p_output Buffer where the encrypted message is to * be written * \param[in] output_size Size of the `p_output` buffer in bytes * \param[out] p_output_length On success, the number of bytes * that make up the returned output * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_accel_asymmetric_encrypt_t)(const uint8_t *p_key, size_t key_size, psa_algorithm_t alg, psa_key_type_t key_type, const uint8_t *p_input, size_t input_length, const uint8_t *p_salt, size_t salt_length, uint8_t *p_output, size_t output_size, size_t *p_output_length); /** * \brief The function prototype for the hardware=acce;erated asymmetric * decrypt operation * * Functions that implement this prototype should be named in the following * convention: * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c} * psa_drv_accel_asymmetric__decrypt * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * Where `ALGO` is the name of the encryption algorithm * * This function supports any asymmetric-key output from psa_export_key() as * the buffer in \p p_key. Refer to the documentation of \ref * psa_export_key() for the formats. * * \param[in] p_key A buffer containing the private key material * \param[in] key_size The size in bytes of the `p_key` data * \param[in] alg An asymmetric encryption algorithm that is * compatible with the type of `key` * \param[in] p_input The message to decrypt * \param[in] input_length Size of the `p_input` buffer in bytes * \param[in] p_salt A salt or label, if supported by the * encryption algorithm * If the algorithm does not support a * salt, pass `NULL`. * If the algorithm supports an optional * salt and you do not want to pass a salt, * pass `NULL`. * For #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, no salt is * supported * \param[in] salt_length Size of the `p_salt` buffer in bytes * If `p_salt` is `NULL`, pass 0 * \param[out] p_output Buffer where the decrypted message is to * be written * \param[in] output_size Size of the `p_output` buffer in bytes * \param[out] p_output_length On success, the number of bytes * that make up the returned output * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_accel_asymmetric_decrypt_t)(const uint8_t *p_key, size_t key_size, psa_algorithm_t alg, psa_key_type_t key_type, const uint8_t *p_input, size_t input_length, const uint8_t *p_salt, size_t salt_length, uint8_t *p_output, size_t output_size, size_t *p_output_length); /**@}*/ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCEL_DRIVER_H */ usr/include/psa/crypto_compat.h0000644000000000000000000003652613764415275015661 0ustar rootroot/** * \file psa/crypto_compat.h * * \brief PSA cryptography module: Backward compatibility aliases * * This header declares alternative names for macro and functions. * New application code should not use these names. * These names may be removed in a future version of Mbed Crypto. * * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must * include psa/crypto.h. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_COMPAT_H #define PSA_CRYPTO_COMPAT_H #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* * To support both openless APIs and psa_open_key() temporarily, define * psa_key_handle_t to be equal to mbedtls_svc_key_id_t. Do not mark the * type and its utility macros and functions deprecated yet. This will be done * in a subsequent phase. */ typedef mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_key_handle_t; #define PSA_KEY_HANDLE_INIT MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT /** Check wether an handle is null. * * \param handle Handle * * \return Non-zero if the handle is null, zero otherwise. */ static inline int psa_key_handle_is_null( psa_key_handle_t handle ) { return( mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( handle ) ); } #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) /* * Mechanism for declaring deprecated values */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) #else #define MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED #endif typedef MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED size_t mbedtls_deprecated_size_t; typedef MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED psa_status_t mbedtls_deprecated_psa_status_t; typedef MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED psa_key_usage_t mbedtls_deprecated_psa_key_usage_t; typedef MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED psa_ecc_family_t mbedtls_deprecated_psa_ecc_family_t; typedef MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED psa_dh_family_t mbedtls_deprecated_psa_dh_family_t; typedef MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED psa_ecc_family_t psa_ecc_curve_t; typedef MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED psa_dh_family_t psa_dh_group_t; typedef MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_deprecated_psa_algorithm_t; #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_GET_CURVE PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_GET_GROUP PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GET_FAMILY #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( type, value ) \ ( (mbedtls_deprecated_##type) ( value ) ) /* * Deprecated PSA Crypto error code definitions (PSA Crypto API <= 1.0 beta2) */ #define PSA_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ERROR \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_status_t, PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR ) #define PSA_ERROR_OCCUPIED_SLOT \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_status_t, PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS ) #define PSA_ERROR_EMPTY_SLOT \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_status_t, PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ) #define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_CAPACITY \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_status_t, PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA ) #define PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_status_t, PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ) /* * Deprecated PSA Crypto numerical encodings (PSA Crypto API <= 1.0 beta3) */ #define PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_key_usage_t, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ) #define PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_key_usage_t, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ) /* * Deprecated PSA Crypto size calculation macros (PSA Crypto API <= 1.0 beta3) */ #define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( size_t, PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE ) #define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, key_bits, alg ) \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( size_t, PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, key_bits, alg ) ) /* * Deprecated PSA Crypto function names (PSA Crypto API <= 1.0 beta3) */ MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED static inline psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_sign( psa_key_handle_t key, psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length ) { return psa_sign_hash( key, alg, hash, hash_length, signature, signature_size, signature_length ); } MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED static inline psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_verify( psa_key_handle_t key, psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ) { return psa_verify_hash( key, alg, hash, hash_length, signature, signature_length ); } /* * Size-specific elliptic curve families. */ #define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP160K1 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ) #define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP192K1 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ) #define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP224K1 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ) #define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256K1 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ) #define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP160R1 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ) #define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP192R1 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ) #define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP224R1 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ) #define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ) #define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP384R1 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ) #define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP521R1 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ) #define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP160R2 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2 ) #define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT163K1 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 ) #define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT233K1 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 ) #define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT239K1 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 ) #define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT283K1 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 ) #define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT409K1 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 ) #define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT571K1 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 ) #define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT163R1 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 ) #define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT193R1 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 ) #define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT233R1 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 ) #define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT283R1 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 ) #define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT409R1 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 ) #define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT571R1 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 ) #define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT163R2 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2 ) #define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT193R2 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2 ) #define PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P256R1 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 ) #define PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P384R1 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 ) #define PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P512R1 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 ) #define PSA_ECC_CURVE_CURVE25519 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY ) #define PSA_ECC_CURVE_CURVE448 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY ) /* * Curves that changed name due to PSA specification. */ #define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP_K1 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ) #define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP_R1 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ) #define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP_R2 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2 ) #define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT_K1 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 ) #define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT_R1 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 ) #define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT_R2 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2 ) #define PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 ) #define PSA_ECC_CURVE_MONTGOMERY \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY ) /* * Finite-field Diffie-Hellman families. */ #define PSA_DH_GROUP_FFDHE2048 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_dh_family_t, PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919 ) #define PSA_DH_GROUP_FFDHE3072 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_dh_family_t, PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919 ) #define PSA_DH_GROUP_FFDHE4096 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_dh_family_t, PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919 ) #define PSA_DH_GROUP_FFDHE6144 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_dh_family_t, PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919 ) #define PSA_DH_GROUP_FFDHE8192 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_dh_family_t, PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919 ) /* * Diffie-Hellman families that changed name due to PSA specification. */ #define PSA_DH_GROUP_RFC7919 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_dh_family_t, PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919 ) #define PSA_DH_GROUP_CUSTOM \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_dh_family_t, PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOM ) /* * Deprecated PSA Crypto stream cipher algorithms (PSA Crypto API <= 1.0 beta3) */ #define PSA_ALG_ARC4 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_algorithm_t, PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER ) #define PSA_ALG_CHACHA20 \ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_algorithm_t, PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER ) #endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ /** Open a handle to an existing persistent key. * * Open a handle to a persistent key. A key is persistent if it was created * with a lifetime other than #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE. A persistent key * always has a nonzero key identifier, set with psa_set_key_id() when * creating the key. Implementations may provide additional pre-provisioned * keys that can be opened with psa_open_key(). Such keys have an application * key identifier in the vendor range, as documented in the description of * #psa_key_id_t. * * The application must eventually close the handle with psa_close_key() or * psa_destroy_key() to release associated resources. If the application dies * without calling one of these functions, the implementation should perform * the equivalent of a call to psa_close_key(). * * Some implementations permit an application to open the same key multiple * times. If this is successful, each call to psa_open_key() will return a * different key handle. * * \note This API is not part of the PSA Cryptography API Release 1.0.0 * specification. It was defined in the 1.0 Beta 3 version of the * specification but was removed in the 1.0.0 released version. This API is * kept for the time being to not break applications relying on it. It is not * deprecated yet but will be in the near future. * * \note Applications that rely on opening a key multiple times will not be * portable to implementations that only permit a single key handle to be * opened. See also :ref:\`key-handles\`. * * * \param key The persistent identifier of the key. * \param[out] handle On success, a handle to the key. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. The application can now use the value of `*handle` * to access the key. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * The implementation does not have sufficient resources to open the * key. This can be due to reaching an implementation limit on the * number of open keys, the number of open key handles, or available * memory. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST * There is no persistent key with key identifier \p id. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \p id is not a valid persistent key identifier. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED * The specified key exists, but the application does not have the * permission to access it. Note that this specification does not * define any way to create such a key, but it may be possible * through implementation-specific means. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_open_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_key_handle_t *handle ); /** Close a key handle. * * If the handle designates a volatile key, this will destroy the key material * and free all associated resources, just like psa_destroy_key(). * * If this is the last open handle to a persistent key, then closing the handle * will free all resources associated with the key in volatile memory. The key * data in persistent storage is not affected and can be opened again later * with a call to psa_open_key(). * * Closing the key handle makes the handle invalid, and the key handle * must not be used again by the application. * * \note This API is not part of the PSA Cryptography API Release 1.0.0 * specification. It was defined in the 1.0 Beta 3 version of the * specification but was removed in the 1.0.0 released version. This API is * kept for the time being to not break applications relying on it. It is not * deprecated yet but will be in the near future. * * \note If the key handle was used to set up an active * :ref:\`multipart operation \`, then closing the * key handle can cause the multipart operation to fail. Applications should * maintain the key handle until after the multipart operation has finished. * * \param handle The key handle to close. * If this is \c 0, do nothing and return \c PSA_SUCCESS. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * \p handle was a valid handle or \c 0. It is now closed. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE * \p handle is not a valid handle nor \c 0. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_close_key(psa_key_handle_t handle); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_COMPAT_H */ usr/include/psa/crypto_config.h0000644000000000000000000000614013764415275015630 0ustar rootroot/** * \file psa/crypto_config.h * \brief PSA crypto configuration options (set of defines) * */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) /** * When #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is enabled in config.h, * this file determines which cryptographic mechanisms are enabled * through the PSA Cryptography API (\c psa_xxx() functions). * * To enable a cryptographic mechanism, uncomment the definition of * the corresponding \c PSA_WANT_xxx preprocessor symbol. * To disable a cryptographic mechanism, comment out the definition of * the corresponding \c PSA_WANT_xxx preprocessor symbol. * The names of cryptographic mechanisms correspond to values * defined in psa/crypto_values.h, with the prefix \c PSA_WANT_ instead * of \c PSA_. * * Note that many cryptographic mechanisms involve two symbols: one for * the key type (\c PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_xxx) and one for the algorithm * (\c PSA_WANT_ALG_xxx). Mechanisms with additional parameters may involve * additional symbols. */ #else /** * When \c MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is disabled in config.h, * this file is not used, and cryptographic mechanisms are supported * through the PSA API if and only if they are supported through the * mbedtls_xxx API. */ #endif /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H #define PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H #define PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS 1 #define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR 1 #define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1 #define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR 1 #define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1 #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H */ usr/include/psa/crypto_driver_common.h0000644000000000000000000000404513764415275017230 0ustar rootroot/** * \file psa/crypto_driver_common.h * \brief Definitions for all PSA crypto drivers * * This file contains common definitions shared by all PSA crypto drivers. * Do not include it directly: instead, include the header file(s) for * the type(s) of driver that you are implementing. For example, if * you are writing a driver for a chip that provides both a hardware * random generator and an accelerator for some cryptographic algorithms, * include `psa/crypto_entropy_driver.h` and `psa/crypto_accel_driver.h`. * * This file is part of the PSA Crypto Driver Model, containing functions for * driver developers to implement to enable hardware to be called in a * standardized way by a PSA Cryptographic API implementation. The functions * comprising the driver model, which driver authors implement, are not * intended to be called by application developers. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_COMMON_H #define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_COMMON_H #include #include /* Include type definitions (psa_status_t, psa_algorithm_t, * psa_key_type_t, etc.) and macros to build and analyze values * of these types. */ #include "crypto_types.h" #include "crypto_values.h" /** For encrypt-decrypt functions, whether the operation is an encryption * or a decryption. */ typedef enum { PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_DECRYPT, PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_ENCRYPT } psa_encrypt_or_decrypt_t; #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_COMMON_H */ usr/include/psa/crypto_entropy_driver.h0000644000000000000000000001026713764415275017443 0ustar rootroot/** * \file psa/crypto_entropy_driver.h * \brief PSA entropy source driver module * * This header declares types and function signatures for entropy sources. * * This file is part of the PSA Crypto Driver Model, containing functions for * driver developers to implement to enable hardware to be called in a * standardized way by a PSA Cryptographic API implementation. The functions * comprising the driver model, which driver authors implement, are not * intended to be called by application developers. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_ENTROPY_DRIVER_H #define PSA_CRYPTO_ENTROPY_DRIVER_H #include "crypto_driver_common.h" #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /** \defgroup driver_rng Entropy Generation */ /**@{*/ /** \brief Initialize an entropy driver * * * \param[in,out] p_context A hardware-specific structure * containing any context information for * the implementation * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_entropy_init_t)(void *p_context); /** \brief Get a specified number of bits from the entropy source * * It retrives `buffer_size` bytes of data from the entropy source. The entropy * source will always fill the provided buffer to its full size, however, most * entropy sources have biases, and the actual amount of entropy contained in * the buffer will be less than the number of bytes. * The driver will return the actual number of bytes of entropy placed in the * buffer in `p_received_entropy_bytes`. * A PSA Crypto API implementation will likely feed the output of this function * into a Digital Random Bit Generator (DRBG), and typically has a minimum * amount of entropy that it needs. * To accomplish this, the PSA Crypto implementation should be designed to call * this function multiple times until it has received the required amount of * entropy from the entropy source. * * \param[in,out] p_context A hardware-specific structure * containing any context information * for the implementation * \param[out] p_buffer A caller-allocated buffer for the * retrieved entropy to be placed in * \param[in] buffer_size The allocated size of `p_buffer` * \param[out] p_received_entropy_bits The amount of entropy (in bits) * actually provided in `p_buffer` * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_entropy_get_bits_t)(void *p_context, uint8_t *p_buffer, uint32_t buffer_size, uint32_t *p_received_entropy_bits); /** * \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to interface * to an entropy source * * PSA Crypto API implementations should populate instances of the table as * appropriate upon startup. * * If one of the functions is not implemented, it should be set to NULL. */ typedef struct { /** The driver-specific size of the entropy context */ const size_t context_size; /** Function that performs initialization for the entropy source */ psa_drv_entropy_init_t p_init; /** Function that performs the get_bits operation for the entropy source */ psa_drv_entropy_get_bits_t p_get_bits; } psa_drv_entropy_t; /**@}*/ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ENTROPY_DRIVER_H */ usr/include/psa/crypto_extra.h0000644000000000000000000006362313764415275015517 0ustar rootroot/** * \file psa/crypto_extra.h * * \brief PSA cryptography module: Mbed TLS vendor extensions * * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must * include psa/crypto.h. * * This file is reserved for vendor-specific definitions. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_EXTRA_H #define PSA_CRYPTO_EXTRA_H #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "crypto_compat.h" #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* UID for secure storage seed */ #define PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID 0xFFFFFF52 /** \addtogroup attributes * @{ */ /** \brief Declare the enrollment algorithm for a key. * * An operation on a key may indifferently use the algorithm set with * psa_set_key_algorithm() or with this function. * * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. * \param alg2 A second algorithm that the key may be used * for, in addition to the algorithm set with * psa_set_key_algorithm(). * * \warning Setting an enrollment algorithm is not recommended, because * using the same key with different algorithms can allow some * attacks based on arithmetic relations between different * computations made with the same key, or can escalate harmless * side channels into exploitable ones. Use this function only * if it is necessary to support a protocol for which it has been * verified that the usage of the key with multiple algorithms * is safe. */ static inline void psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm( psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, psa_algorithm_t alg2) { attributes->core.policy.alg2 = alg2; } /** Retrieve the enrollment algorithm policy from key attributes. * * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. * * \return The enrollment algorithm stored in the attribute structure. */ static inline psa_algorithm_t psa_get_key_enrollment_algorithm( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) { return( attributes->core.policy.alg2 ); } #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) /** Retrieve the slot number where a key is stored. * * A slot number is only defined for keys that are stored in a secure * element. * * This information is only useful if the secure element is not entirely * managed through the PSA Cryptography API. It is up to the secure * element driver to decide how PSA slot numbers map to any other interface * that the secure element may have. * * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. * \param[out] slot_number On success, the slot number containing the key. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * The key is located in a secure element, and \p *slot_number * indicates the slot number that contains it. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED * The caller is not permitted to query the slot number. * Mbed Crypto currently does not return this error. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * The key is not located in a secure element. */ psa_status_t psa_get_key_slot_number( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, psa_key_slot_number_t *slot_number ); /** Choose the slot number where a key is stored. * * This function declares a slot number in the specified attribute * structure. * * A slot number is only meaningful for keys that are stored in a secure * element. It is up to the secure element driver to decide how PSA slot * numbers map to any other interface that the secure element may have. * * \note Setting a slot number in key attributes for a key creation can * cause the following errors when creating the key: * - #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED if the selected secure element does * not support choosing a specific slot number. * - #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED if the caller is not permitted to * choose slot numbers in general or to choose this specific slot. * - #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT if the chosen slot number is not * valid in general or not valid for this specific key. * - #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS if there is already a key in the * selected slot. * * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. * \param slot_number The slot number to set. */ static inline void psa_set_key_slot_number( psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number ) { attributes->core.flags |= MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_FLAG_HAS_SLOT_NUMBER; attributes->slot_number = slot_number; } /** Remove the slot number attribute from a key attribute structure. * * This function undoes the action of psa_set_key_slot_number(). * * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. */ static inline void psa_clear_key_slot_number( psa_key_attributes_t *attributes ) { attributes->core.flags &= ~MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_FLAG_HAS_SLOT_NUMBER; } /** Register a key that is already present in a secure element. * * The key must be located in a secure element designated by the * lifetime field in \p attributes, in the slot set with * psa_set_key_slot_number() in the attribute structure. * This function makes the key available through the key identifier * specified in \p attributes. * * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the existing key. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * The key was successfully registered. * Note that depending on the design of the driver, this may or may * not guarantee that a key actually exists in the designated slot * and is compatible with the specified attributes. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS * There is already a key with the identifier specified in * \p attributes. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED * The secure element driver for the specified lifetime does not * support registering a key. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \p attributes specifies a lifetime which is not located * in a secure element. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * No slot number is specified in \p attributes, * or the specified slot number is not valid. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED * The caller is not authorized to register the specified key slot. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_register_se_key( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ /**@}*/ /** * \brief Library deinitialization. * * This function clears all data associated with the PSA layer, * including the whole key store. * * This is an Mbed TLS extension. */ void mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( void ); /** \brief Statistics about * resource consumption related to the PSA keystore. * * \note The content of this structure is not part of the stable API and ABI * of Mbed Crypto and may change arbitrarily from version to version. */ typedef struct mbedtls_psa_stats_s { /** Number of slots containing key material for a volatile key. */ size_t volatile_slots; /** Number of slots containing key material for a key which is in * internal persistent storage. */ size_t persistent_slots; /** Number of slots containing a reference to a key in a * secure element. */ size_t external_slots; /** Number of slots which are occupied, but do not contain * key material yet. */ size_t half_filled_slots; /** Number of slots that contain cache data. */ size_t cache_slots; /** Number of slots that are not used for anything. */ size_t empty_slots; /** Number of slots that are locked. */ size_t locked_slots; /** Largest key id value among open keys in internal persistent storage. */ psa_key_id_t max_open_internal_key_id; /** Largest key id value among open keys in secure elements. */ psa_key_id_t max_open_external_key_id; } mbedtls_psa_stats_t; /** \brief Get statistics about * resource consumption related to the PSA keystore. * * \note When Mbed Crypto is built as part of a service, with isolation * between the application and the keystore, the service may or * may not expose this function. */ void mbedtls_psa_get_stats( mbedtls_psa_stats_t *stats ); /** * \brief Inject an initial entropy seed for the random generator into * secure storage. * * This function injects data to be used as a seed for the random generator * used by the PSA Crypto implementation. On devices that lack a trusted * entropy source (preferably a hardware random number generator), * the Mbed PSA Crypto implementation uses this value to seed its * random generator. * * On devices without a trusted entropy source, this function must be * called exactly once in the lifetime of the device. On devices with * a trusted entropy source, calling this function is optional. * In all cases, this function may only be called before calling any * other function in the PSA Crypto API, including psa_crypto_init(). * * When this function returns successfully, it populates a file in * persistent storage. Once the file has been created, this function * can no longer succeed. * * If any error occurs, this function does not change the system state. * You can call this function again after correcting the reason for the * error if possible. * * \warning This function **can** fail! Callers MUST check the return status. * * \warning If you use this function, you should use it as part of a * factory provisioning process. The value of the injected seed * is critical to the security of the device. It must be * *secret*, *unpredictable* and (statistically) *unique per device*. * You should be generate it randomly using a cryptographically * secure random generator seeded from trusted entropy sources. * You should transmit it securely to the device and ensure * that its value is not leaked or stored anywhere beyond the * needs of transmitting it from the point of generation to * the call of this function, and erase all copies of the value * once this function returns. * * This is an Mbed TLS extension. * * \note This function is only available on the following platforms: * * If the compile-time option MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY is enabled. * Note that you must provide compatible implementations of * mbedtls_nv_seed_read and mbedtls_nv_seed_write. * * In a client-server integration of PSA Cryptography, on the client side, * if the server supports this feature. * \param[in] seed Buffer containing the seed value to inject. * \param[in] seed_size Size of the \p seed buffer. * The size of the seed in bytes must be greater * or equal to both #MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM * and #MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE. * It must be less or equal to * #MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * The seed value was injected successfully. The random generator * of the PSA Crypto implementation is now ready for use. * You may now call psa_crypto_init() and use the PSA Crypto * implementation. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \p seed_size is out of range. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * There was a failure reading or writing from storage. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED * The library has already been initialized. It is no longer * possible to call this function. */ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy(const uint8_t *seed, size_t seed_size); /** \addtogroup crypto_types * @{ */ /** DSA public key. * * The import and export format is the * representation of the public key `y = g^x mod p` as a big-endian byte * string. The length of the byte string is the length of the base prime `p` * in bytes. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY ((psa_key_type_t)0x4002) /** DSA key pair (private and public key). * * The import and export format is the * representation of the private key `x` as a big-endian byte string. The * length of the byte string is the private key size in bytes (leading zeroes * are not stripped). * * Determinstic DSA key derivation with psa_generate_derived_key follows * FIPS 186-4 §B.1.2: interpret the byte string as integer * in big-endian order. Discard it if it is not in the range * [0, *N* - 2] where *N* is the boundary of the private key domain * (the prime *p* for Diffie-Hellman, the subprime *q* for DSA, * or the order of the curve's base point for ECC). * Add 1 to the resulting integer and use this as the private key *x*. * */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_KEY_PAIR ((psa_key_type_t)0x7002) /** Whether a key type is an DSA key (pair or public-only). */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DSA(type) \ (PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY) #define PSA_ALG_DSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06000400) /** DSA signature with hashing. * * This is the signature scheme defined by FIPS 186-4, * with a random per-message secret number (*k*). * * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy. * * \return The corresponding DSA signature algorithm. * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported * hash algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_DSA(hash_alg) \ (PSA_ALG_DSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) #define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06000500) #define PSA_ALG_DSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG /** Deterministic DSA signature with hashing. * * This is the deterministic variant defined by RFC 6979 of * the signature scheme defined by FIPS 186-4. * * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy. * * \return The corresponding DSA signature algorithm. * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported * hash algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(hash_alg) \ (PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) #define PSA_ALG_IS_DSA(alg) \ (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK & ~PSA_ALG_DSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) == \ PSA_ALG_DSA_BASE) #define PSA_ALG_DSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg) \ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_DSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) != 0) #define PSA_ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(alg) \ (PSA_ALG_IS_DSA(alg) && PSA_ALG_DSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg)) #define PSA_ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_DSA(alg) \ (PSA_ALG_IS_DSA(alg) && !PSA_ALG_DSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg)) /* We need to expand the sample definition of this macro from * the API definition. */ #undef PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN #define PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) \ (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg) || \ PSA_ALG_IS_DSA(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg)) /**@}*/ /** \addtogroup attributes * @{ */ /** Custom Diffie-Hellman group. * * For keys of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(#PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOM) or * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(#PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOM), the group data comes * from domain parameters set by psa_set_key_domain_parameters(). */ #define PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOM ((psa_dh_family_t) 0x7e) /** * \brief Set domain parameters for a key. * * Some key types require additional domain parameters in addition to * the key type identifier and the key size. Use this function instead * of psa_set_key_type() when you need to specify domain parameters. * * The format for the required domain parameters varies based on the key type. * * - For RSA keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY or #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR), * the domain parameter data consists of the public exponent, * represented as a big-endian integer with no leading zeros. * This information is used when generating an RSA key pair. * When importing a key, the public exponent is read from the imported * key data and the exponent recorded in the attribute structure is ignored. * As an exception, the public exponent 65537 is represented by an empty * byte string. * - For DSA keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY or #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_KEY_PAIR), * the `Dss-Parms` format as defined by RFC 3279 §2.3.2. * ``` * Dss-Parms ::= SEQUENCE { * p INTEGER, * q INTEGER, * g INTEGER * } * ``` * - For Diffie-Hellman key exchange keys * (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(#PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOM) or * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(#PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOM)), the * `DomainParameters` format as defined by RFC 3279 §2.3.3. * ``` * DomainParameters ::= SEQUENCE { * p INTEGER, -- odd prime, p=jq +1 * g INTEGER, -- generator, g * q INTEGER, -- factor of p-1 * j INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- subgroup factor * validationParms ValidationParms OPTIONAL * } * ValidationParms ::= SEQUENCE { * seed BIT STRING, * pgenCounter INTEGER * } * ``` * * \note This function may allocate memory or other resources. * Once you have called this function on an attribute structure, * you must call psa_reset_key_attributes() to free these resources. * * \note This is an experimental extension to the interface. It may change * in future versions of the library. * * \param[in,out] attributes Attribute structure where the specified domain * parameters will be stored. * If this function fails, the content of * \p attributes is not modified. * \param type Key type (a \c PSA_KEY_TYPE_XXX value). * \param[in] data Buffer containing the key domain parameters. * The content of this buffer is interpreted * according to \p type as described above. * \param data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY */ psa_status_t psa_set_key_domain_parameters(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, psa_key_type_t type, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length); /** * \brief Get domain parameters for a key. * * Get the domain parameters for a key with this function, if any. The format * of the domain parameters written to \p data is specified in the * documentation for psa_set_key_domain_parameters(). * * \note This is an experimental extension to the interface. It may change * in future versions of the library. * * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. * \param[out] data On success, the key domain parameters. * \param data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. * The buffer is guaranteed to be large * enough if its size in bytes is at least * the value given by * PSA_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS_SIZE(). * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes * that make up the key domain parameters data. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL */ psa_status_t psa_get_key_domain_parameters( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length); /** Safe output buffer size for psa_get_key_domain_parameters(). * * This macro returns a compile-time constant if its arguments are * compile-time constants. * * \warning This function may call its arguments multiple times or * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain * side effects. * * \note This is an experimental extension to the interface. It may change * in future versions of the library. * * \param key_type A supported key type. * \param key_bits The size of the key in bits. * * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return * a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that * psa_get_key_domain_parameters() will not fail with * #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported * by the implementation, this macro shall return either a * sensible size or 0. * If the parameters are not valid, the * return value is unspecified. */ #define PSA_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS_SIZE(key_type, key_bits) \ (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(key_type) ? sizeof(int) : \ PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(key_type) ? PSA_DH_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS_SIZE(key_bits) : \ PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DSA(key_type) ? PSA_DSA_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS_SIZE(key_bits) : \ 0) #define PSA_DH_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS_SIZE(key_bits) \ (4 + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) + 5) * 3 /*without optional parts*/) #define PSA_DSA_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS_SIZE(key_bits) \ (4 + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) + 5) * 2 /*p, g*/ + 34 /*q*/) /**@}*/ /** \defgroup psa_tls_helpers TLS helper functions * @{ */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) #include /** Convert an ECC curve identifier from the Mbed TLS encoding to PSA. * * \note This function is provided solely for the convenience of * Mbed TLS and may be removed at any time without notice. * * \param grpid An Mbed TLS elliptic curve identifier * (`MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx`). * \param[out] bits On success, the bit size of the curve. * * \return The corresponding PSA elliptic curve identifier * (`PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx`). * \return \c 0 on failure (\p grpid is not recognized). */ static inline psa_ecc_family_t mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa( mbedtls_ecp_group_id grpid, size_t *bits ) { switch( grpid ) { case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1: *bits = 192; return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ); case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1: *bits = 224; return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ); case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1: *bits = 256; return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ); case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1: *bits = 384; return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ); case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1: *bits = 521; return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ); case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1: *bits = 256; return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 ); case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1: *bits = 384; return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 ); case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1: *bits = 512; return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 ); case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519: *bits = 255; return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY ); case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1: *bits = 192; return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ); case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1: *bits = 224; return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ); case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1: *bits = 256; return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ); case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448: *bits = 448; return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY ); default: *bits = 0; return( 0 ); } } /** Convert an ECC curve identifier from the PSA encoding to Mbed TLS. * * \note This function is provided solely for the convenience of * Mbed TLS and may be removed at any time without notice. * * \param curve A PSA elliptic curve identifier * (`PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx`). * \param byte_length The byte-length of a private key on \p curve. * * \return The corresponding Mbed TLS elliptic curve identifier * (`MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx`). * \return #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE if \c curve is not recognized. * \return #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE if \p byte_length is not * correct for \p curve. */ mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa( psa_ecc_family_t curve, size_t byte_length ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ /**@}*/ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_EXTRA_H */ usr/include/psa/crypto_platform.h0000644000000000000000000000531313764415275016210 0ustar rootroot/** * \file psa/crypto_platform.h * * \brief PSA cryptography module: Mbed TLS platform definitions * * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must * include psa/crypto.h. * * This file contains platform-dependent type definitions. * * In implementations with isolation between the application and the * cryptography module, implementers should take care to ensure that * the definitions that are exposed to applications match what the * module implements. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_H #define PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_H /* Include the Mbed TLS configuration file, the way Mbed TLS does it * in each of its header files. */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif /* Translate between classic MBEDTLS_xxx feature symbols and PSA_xxx * feature symbols. */ #include "mbedtls/config_psa.h" /* PSA requires several types which C99 provides in stdint.h. */ #include #if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) #define inline __inline #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) /* Building for the PSA Crypto service on a PSA platform, a key owner is a PSA * partition identifier. * * The function psa_its_identifier_of_slot() in psa_crypto_storage.c that * translates a key identifier to a key storage file name assumes that * mbedtls_key_owner_id_t is an 32 bits integer. This function thus needs * reworking if mbedtls_key_owner_id_t is not defined as a 32 bits integer * here anymore. */ typedef int32_t mbedtls_key_owner_id_t; /** Compare two key owner identifiers. * * \param id1 First key owner identifier. * \param id2 Second key owner identifier. * * \return Non-zero if the two key owner identifiers are equal, zero otherwise. */ static inline int mbedtls_key_owner_id_equal( mbedtls_key_owner_id_t id1, mbedtls_key_owner_id_t id2 ) { return( id1 == id2 ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */ #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_H */ usr/include/psa/crypto_se_driver.h0000644000000000000000000020306613764415275016353 0ustar rootroot/** * \file psa/crypto_se_driver.h * \brief PSA external cryptoprocessor driver module * * This header declares types and function signatures for cryptography * drivers that access key material via opaque references. * This is meant for cryptoprocessors that have a separate key storage from the * space in which the PSA Crypto implementation runs, typically secure * elements (SEs). * * This file is part of the PSA Crypto Driver HAL (hardware abstraction layer), * containing functions for driver developers to implement to enable hardware * to be called in a standardized way by a PSA Cryptography API * implementation. The functions comprising the driver HAL, which driver * authors implement, are not intended to be called by application developers. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_H #define PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_H #include "crypto_driver_common.h" #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /** \defgroup se_init Secure element driver initialization */ /**@{*/ /** \brief Driver context structure * * Driver functions receive a pointer to this structure. * Each registered driver has one instance of this structure. * * Implementations must include the fields specified here and * may include other fields. */ typedef struct { /** A read-only pointer to the driver's persistent data. * * Drivers typically use this persistent data to keep track of * which slot numbers are available. This is only a guideline: * drivers may use the persistent data for any purpose, keeping * in mind the restrictions on when the persistent data is saved * to storage: the persistent data is only saved after calling * certain functions that receive a writable pointer to the * persistent data. * * The core allocates a memory buffer for the persistent data. * The pointer is guaranteed to be suitably aligned for any data type, * like a pointer returned by `malloc` (but the core can use any * method to allocate the buffer, not necessarily `malloc`). * * The size of this buffer is in the \c persistent_data_size field of * this structure. * * Before the driver is initialized for the first time, the content of * the persistent data is all-bits-zero. After a driver upgrade, if the * size of the persistent data has increased, the original data is padded * on the right with zeros; if the size has decreased, the original data * is truncated to the new size. * * This pointer is to read-only data. Only a few driver functions are * allowed to modify the persistent data. These functions receive a * writable pointer. These functions are: * - psa_drv_se_t::p_init * - psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_allocate * - psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_destroy * * The PSA Cryptography core saves the persistent data from one * session to the next. It does this before returning from API functions * that call a driver method that is allowed to modify the persistent * data, specifically: * - psa_crypto_init() causes a call to psa_drv_se_t::p_init, and may call * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_destroy to complete an action * that was interrupted by a power failure. * - Key creation functions cause a call to * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_allocate, and may cause a call to * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_destroy in case an error occurs. * - psa_destroy_key() causes a call to * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_destroy. */ const void *const persistent_data; /** The size of \c persistent_data in bytes. * * This is always equal to the value of the `persistent_data_size` field * of the ::psa_drv_se_t structure when the driver is registered. */ const size_t persistent_data_size; /** Driver transient data. * * The core initializes this value to 0 and does not read or modify it * afterwards. The driver may store whatever it wants in this field. */ uintptr_t transient_data; } psa_drv_se_context_t; /** \brief A driver initialization function. * * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. * \param[in,out] persistent_data A pointer to the persistent data * that allows writing. * \param location The location value for which this driver * is registered. The driver will be invoked * for all keys whose lifetime is in this * location. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * The driver is operational. * The core will update the persistent data in storage. * \return * Any other return value prevents the driver from being used in * this session. * The core will NOT update the persistent data in storage. */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_init_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, void *persistent_data, psa_key_location_t location); #if defined(__DOXYGEN_ONLY__) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) /* Mbed Crypto with secure element support enabled defines this type in * crypto_types.h because it is also visible to applications through an * implementation-specific extension. * For the PSA Cryptography specification, this type is only visible * via crypto_se_driver.h. */ /** An internal designation of a key slot between the core part of the * PSA Crypto implementation and the driver. The meaning of this value * is driver-dependent. */ typedef uint64_t psa_key_slot_number_t; #endif /* __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ || !MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ /**@}*/ /** \defgroup se_mac Secure Element Message Authentication Codes * Generation and authentication of Message Authentication Codes (MACs) using * a secure element can be done either as a single function call (via the * `psa_drv_se_mac_generate_t` or `psa_drv_se_mac_verify_t` functions), or in * parts using the following sequence: * - `psa_drv_se_mac_setup_t` * - `psa_drv_se_mac_update_t` * - `psa_drv_se_mac_update_t` * - ... * - `psa_drv_se_mac_finish_t` or `psa_drv_se_mac_finish_verify_t` * * If a previously started secure element MAC operation needs to be terminated, * it should be done so by the `psa_drv_se_mac_abort_t`. Failure to do so may * result in allocated resources not being freed or in other undefined * behavior. */ /**@{*/ /** \brief A function that starts a secure element MAC operation for a PSA * Crypto Driver implementation * * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. * \param[in,out] op_context A structure that will contain the * hardware-specific MAC context * \param[in] key_slot The slot of the key to be used for the * operation * \param[in] algorithm The algorithm to be used to underly the MAC * operation * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_mac_setup_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, void *op_context, psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, psa_algorithm_t algorithm); /** \brief A function that continues a previously started secure element MAC * operation * * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure for the * previously-established MAC operation to be * updated * \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the message to be appended * to the MAC operation * \param[in] input_length The size in bytes of the input message buffer */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_mac_update_t)(void *op_context, const uint8_t *p_input, size_t input_length); /** \brief a function that completes a previously started secure element MAC * operation by returning the resulting MAC. * * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure for the * previously started MAC operation to be * finished * \param[out] p_mac A buffer where the generated MAC will be * placed * \param[in] mac_size The size in bytes of the buffer that has been * allocated for the `output` buffer * \param[out] p_mac_length After completion, will contain the number of * bytes placed in the `p_mac` buffer * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_mac_finish_t)(void *op_context, uint8_t *p_mac, size_t mac_size, size_t *p_mac_length); /** \brief A function that completes a previously started secure element MAC * operation by comparing the resulting MAC against a provided value * * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure for the previously * started MAC operation to be fiinished * \param[in] p_mac The MAC value against which the resulting MAC * will be compared against * \param[in] mac_length The size in bytes of the value stored in `p_mac` * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * The operation completed successfully and the MACs matched each * other * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE * The operation completed successfully, but the calculated MAC did * not match the provided MAC */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_mac_finish_verify_t)(void *op_context, const uint8_t *p_mac, size_t mac_length); /** \brief A function that aborts a previous started secure element MAC * operation * * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure for the previously * started MAC operation to be aborted */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_mac_abort_t)(void *op_context); /** \brief A function that performs a secure element MAC operation in one * command and returns the calculated MAC * * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. * \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the message to be MACed * \param[in] input_length The size in bytes of `p_input` * \param[in] key_slot The slot of the key to be used * \param[in] alg The algorithm to be used to underlie the MAC * operation * \param[out] p_mac A buffer where the generated MAC will be * placed * \param[in] mac_size The size in bytes of the `p_mac` buffer * \param[out] p_mac_length After completion, will contain the number of * bytes placed in the `output` buffer * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_mac_generate_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, const uint8_t *p_input, size_t input_length, psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, psa_algorithm_t alg, uint8_t *p_mac, size_t mac_size, size_t *p_mac_length); /** \brief A function that performs a secure element MAC operation in one * command and compares the resulting MAC against a provided value * * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. * \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the message to be MACed * \param[in] input_length The size in bytes of `input` * \param[in] key_slot The slot of the key to be used * \param[in] alg The algorithm to be used to underlie the MAC * operation * \param[in] p_mac The MAC value against which the resulting MAC will * be compared against * \param[in] mac_length The size in bytes of `mac` * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * The operation completed successfully and the MACs matched each * other * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE * The operation completed successfully, but the calculated MAC did * not match the provided MAC */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_mac_verify_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, const uint8_t *p_input, size_t input_length, psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *p_mac, size_t mac_length); /** \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to * perform secure element MAC operations * * PSA Crypto API implementations should populate the table as appropriate * upon startup. * * If one of the functions is not implemented (such as * `psa_drv_se_mac_generate_t`), it should be set to NULL. * * Driver implementers should ensure that they implement all of the functions * that make sense for their hardware, and that they provide a full solution * (for example, if they support `p_setup`, they should also support * `p_update` and at least one of `p_finish` or `p_finish_verify`). * */ typedef struct { /**The size in bytes of the hardware-specific secure element MAC context * structure */ size_t context_size; /** Function that performs a MAC setup operation */ psa_drv_se_mac_setup_t p_setup; /** Function that performs a MAC update operation */ psa_drv_se_mac_update_t p_update; /** Function that completes a MAC operation */ psa_drv_se_mac_finish_t p_finish; /** Function that completes a MAC operation with a verify check */ psa_drv_se_mac_finish_verify_t p_finish_verify; /** Function that aborts a previoustly started MAC operation */ psa_drv_se_mac_abort_t p_abort; /** Function that performs a MAC operation in one call */ psa_drv_se_mac_generate_t p_mac; /** Function that performs a MAC and verify operation in one call */ psa_drv_se_mac_verify_t p_mac_verify; } psa_drv_se_mac_t; /**@}*/ /** \defgroup se_cipher Secure Element Symmetric Ciphers * * Encryption and Decryption using secure element keys in block modes other * than ECB must be done in multiple parts, using the following flow: * - `psa_drv_se_cipher_setup_t` * - `psa_drv_se_cipher_set_iv_t` (optional depending upon block mode) * - `psa_drv_se_cipher_update_t` * - `psa_drv_se_cipher_update_t` * - ... * - `psa_drv_se_cipher_finish_t` * * If a previously started secure element Cipher operation needs to be * terminated, it should be done so by the `psa_drv_se_cipher_abort_t`. Failure * to do so may result in allocated resources not being freed or in other * undefined behavior. * * In situations where a PSA Cryptographic API implementation is using a block * mode not-supported by the underlying hardware or driver, it can construct * the block mode itself, while calling the `psa_drv_se_cipher_ecb_t` function * for the cipher operations. */ /**@{*/ /** \brief A function that provides the cipher setup function for a * secure element driver * * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. * \param[in,out] op_context A structure that will contain the * hardware-specific cipher context. * \param[in] key_slot The slot of the key to be used for the * operation * \param[in] algorithm The algorithm to be used in the cipher * operation * \param[in] direction Indicates whether the operation is an encrypt * or decrypt * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_cipher_setup_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, void *op_context, psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, psa_algorithm_t algorithm, psa_encrypt_or_decrypt_t direction); /** \brief A function that sets the initialization vector (if * necessary) for an secure element cipher operation * * Rationale: The `psa_se_cipher_*` operation in the PSA Cryptographic API has * two IV functions: one to set the IV, and one to generate it internally. The * generate function is not necessary for the drivers to implement as the PSA * Crypto implementation can do the generation using its RNG features. * * \param[in,out] op_context A structure that contains the previously set up * hardware-specific cipher context * \param[in] p_iv A buffer containing the initialization vector * \param[in] iv_length The size (in bytes) of the `p_iv` buffer * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_cipher_set_iv_t)(void *op_context, const uint8_t *p_iv, size_t iv_length); /** \brief A function that continues a previously started secure element cipher * operation * * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure for the * previously started cipher operation * \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the data to be * encrypted/decrypted * \param[in] input_size The size in bytes of the buffer pointed to * by `p_input` * \param[out] p_output The caller-allocated buffer where the * output will be placed * \param[in] output_size The allocated size in bytes of the * `p_output` buffer * \param[out] p_output_length After completion, will contain the number * of bytes placed in the `p_output` buffer * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_cipher_update_t)(void *op_context, const uint8_t *p_input, size_t input_size, uint8_t *p_output, size_t output_size, size_t *p_output_length); /** \brief A function that completes a previously started secure element cipher * operation * * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure for the * previously started cipher operation * \param[out] p_output The caller-allocated buffer where the output * will be placed * \param[in] output_size The allocated size in bytes of the `p_output` * buffer * \param[out] p_output_length After completion, will contain the number of * bytes placed in the `p_output` buffer * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_cipher_finish_t)(void *op_context, uint8_t *p_output, size_t output_size, size_t *p_output_length); /** \brief A function that aborts a previously started secure element cipher * operation * * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure for the * previously started cipher operation */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_cipher_abort_t)(void *op_context); /** \brief A function that performs the ECB block mode for secure element * cipher operations * * Note: this function should only be used with implementations that do not * provide a needed higher-level operation. * * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. * \param[in] key_slot The slot of the key to be used for the operation * \param[in] algorithm The algorithm to be used in the cipher operation * \param[in] direction Indicates whether the operation is an encrypt or * decrypt * \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the data to be * encrypted/decrypted * \param[in] input_size The size in bytes of the buffer pointed to by * `p_input` * \param[out] p_output The caller-allocated buffer where the output * will be placed * \param[in] output_size The allocated size in bytes of the `p_output` * buffer * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_cipher_ecb_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, psa_algorithm_t algorithm, psa_encrypt_or_decrypt_t direction, const uint8_t *p_input, size_t input_size, uint8_t *p_output, size_t output_size); /** * \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to implement * cipher operations using secure elements. * * PSA Crypto API implementations should populate instances of the table as * appropriate upon startup or at build time. * * If one of the functions is not implemented (such as * `psa_drv_se_cipher_ecb_t`), it should be set to NULL. */ typedef struct { /** The size in bytes of the hardware-specific secure element cipher * context structure */ size_t context_size; /** Function that performs a cipher setup operation */ psa_drv_se_cipher_setup_t p_setup; /** Function that sets a cipher IV (if necessary) */ psa_drv_se_cipher_set_iv_t p_set_iv; /** Function that performs a cipher update operation */ psa_drv_se_cipher_update_t p_update; /** Function that completes a cipher operation */ psa_drv_se_cipher_finish_t p_finish; /** Function that aborts a cipher operation */ psa_drv_se_cipher_abort_t p_abort; /** Function that performs ECB mode for a cipher operation * (Danger: ECB mode should not be used directly by clients of the PSA * Crypto Client API) */ psa_drv_se_cipher_ecb_t p_ecb; } psa_drv_se_cipher_t; /**@}*/ /** \defgroup se_asymmetric Secure Element Asymmetric Cryptography * * Since the amount of data that can (or should) be encrypted or signed using * asymmetric keys is limited by the key size, asymmetric key operations using * keys in a secure element must be done in single function calls. */ /**@{*/ /** * \brief A function that signs a hash or short message with a private key in * a secure element * * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. * \param[in] key_slot Key slot of an asymmetric key pair * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible * with the type of `key` * \param[in] p_hash The hash to sign * \param[in] hash_length Size of the `p_hash` buffer in bytes * \param[out] p_signature Buffer where the signature is to be written * \param[in] signature_size Size of the `p_signature` buffer in bytes * \param[out] p_signature_length On success, the number of bytes * that make up the returned signature value * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_asymmetric_sign_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *p_hash, size_t hash_length, uint8_t *p_signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *p_signature_length); /** * \brief A function that verifies the signature a hash or short message using * an asymmetric public key in a secure element * * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. * \param[in] key_slot Key slot of a public key or an asymmetric key * pair * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with * the type of `key` * \param[in] p_hash The hash whose signature is to be verified * \param[in] hash_length Size of the `p_hash` buffer in bytes * \param[in] p_signature Buffer containing the signature to verify * \param[in] signature_length Size of the `p_signature` buffer in bytes * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * The signature is valid. */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_asymmetric_verify_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *p_hash, size_t hash_length, const uint8_t *p_signature, size_t signature_length); /** * \brief A function that encrypts a short message with an asymmetric public * key in a secure element * * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. * \param[in] key_slot Key slot of a public key or an asymmetric key * pair * \param[in] alg An asymmetric encryption algorithm that is * compatible with the type of `key` * \param[in] p_input The message to encrypt * \param[in] input_length Size of the `p_input` buffer in bytes * \param[in] p_salt A salt or label, if supported by the * encryption algorithm * If the algorithm does not support a * salt, pass `NULL`. * If the algorithm supports an optional * salt and you do not want to pass a salt, * pass `NULL`. * For #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, no salt is * supported. * \param[in] salt_length Size of the `p_salt` buffer in bytes * If `p_salt` is `NULL`, pass 0. * \param[out] p_output Buffer where the encrypted message is to * be written * \param[in] output_size Size of the `p_output` buffer in bytes * \param[out] p_output_length On success, the number of bytes that make up * the returned output * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_asymmetric_encrypt_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *p_input, size_t input_length, const uint8_t *p_salt, size_t salt_length, uint8_t *p_output, size_t output_size, size_t *p_output_length); /** * \brief A function that decrypts a short message with an asymmetric private * key in a secure element. * * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. * \param[in] key_slot Key slot of an asymmetric key pair * \param[in] alg An asymmetric encryption algorithm that is * compatible with the type of `key` * \param[in] p_input The message to decrypt * \param[in] input_length Size of the `p_input` buffer in bytes * \param[in] p_salt A salt or label, if supported by the * encryption algorithm * If the algorithm does not support a * salt, pass `NULL`. * If the algorithm supports an optional * salt and you do not want to pass a salt, * pass `NULL`. * For #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, no salt is * supported. * \param[in] salt_length Size of the `p_salt` buffer in bytes * If `p_salt` is `NULL`, pass 0. * \param[out] p_output Buffer where the decrypted message is to * be written * \param[in] output_size Size of the `p_output` buffer in bytes * \param[out] p_output_length On success, the number of bytes * that make up the returned output * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_asymmetric_decrypt_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *p_input, size_t input_length, const uint8_t *p_salt, size_t salt_length, uint8_t *p_output, size_t output_size, size_t *p_output_length); /** * \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to implement * asymmetric cryptographic operations using secure elements. * * PSA Crypto API implementations should populate instances of the table as * appropriate upon startup or at build time. * * If one of the functions is not implemented, it should be set to NULL. */ typedef struct { /** Function that performs an asymmetric sign operation */ psa_drv_se_asymmetric_sign_t p_sign; /** Function that performs an asymmetric verify operation */ psa_drv_se_asymmetric_verify_t p_verify; /** Function that performs an asymmetric encrypt operation */ psa_drv_se_asymmetric_encrypt_t p_encrypt; /** Function that performs an asymmetric decrypt operation */ psa_drv_se_asymmetric_decrypt_t p_decrypt; } psa_drv_se_asymmetric_t; /**@}*/ /** \defgroup se_aead Secure Element Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data * Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD) operations with secure * elements must be done in one function call. While this creates a burden for * implementers as there must be sufficient space in memory for the entire * message, it prevents decrypted data from being made available before the * authentication operation is complete and the data is known to be authentic. */ /**@{*/ /** \brief A function that performs a secure element authenticated encryption * operation * * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. * \param[in] key_slot Slot containing the key to use. * \param[in] algorithm The AEAD algorithm to compute * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(`alg`) is true) * \param[in] p_nonce Nonce or IV to use * \param[in] nonce_length Size of the `p_nonce` buffer in bytes * \param[in] p_additional_data Additional data that will be * authenticated but not encrypted * \param[in] additional_data_length Size of `p_additional_data` in bytes * \param[in] p_plaintext Data that will be authenticated and * encrypted * \param[in] plaintext_length Size of `p_plaintext` in bytes * \param[out] p_ciphertext Output buffer for the authenticated and * encrypted data. The additional data is * not part of this output. For algorithms * where the encrypted data and the * authentication tag are defined as * separate outputs, the authentication * tag is appended to the encrypted data. * \param[in] ciphertext_size Size of the `p_ciphertext` buffer in * bytes * \param[out] p_ciphertext_length On success, the size of the output in * the `p_ciphertext` buffer * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_aead_encrypt_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, psa_algorithm_t algorithm, const uint8_t *p_nonce, size_t nonce_length, const uint8_t *p_additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, const uint8_t *p_plaintext, size_t plaintext_length, uint8_t *p_ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_size, size_t *p_ciphertext_length); /** A function that peforms a secure element authenticated decryption operation * * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. * \param[in] key_slot Slot containing the key to use * \param[in] algorithm The AEAD algorithm to compute * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(`alg`) is true) * \param[in] p_nonce Nonce or IV to use * \param[in] nonce_length Size of the `p_nonce` buffer in bytes * \param[in] p_additional_data Additional data that has been * authenticated but not encrypted * \param[in] additional_data_length Size of `p_additional_data` in bytes * \param[in] p_ciphertext Data that has been authenticated and * encrypted. * For algorithms where the encrypted data * and the authentication tag are defined * as separate inputs, the buffer must * contain the encrypted data followed by * the authentication tag. * \param[in] ciphertext_length Size of `p_ciphertext` in bytes * \param[out] p_plaintext Output buffer for the decrypted data * \param[in] plaintext_size Size of the `p_plaintext` buffer in * bytes * \param[out] p_plaintext_length On success, the size of the output in * the `p_plaintext` buffer * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_aead_decrypt_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, psa_algorithm_t algorithm, const uint8_t *p_nonce, size_t nonce_length, const uint8_t *p_additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, const uint8_t *p_ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_length, uint8_t *p_plaintext, size_t plaintext_size, size_t *p_plaintext_length); /** * \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to implement * secure element Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data operations * * PSA Crypto API implementations should populate instances of the table as * appropriate upon startup. * * If one of the functions is not implemented, it should be set to NULL. */ typedef struct { /** Function that performs the AEAD encrypt operation */ psa_drv_se_aead_encrypt_t p_encrypt; /** Function that performs the AEAD decrypt operation */ psa_drv_se_aead_decrypt_t p_decrypt; } psa_drv_se_aead_t; /**@}*/ /** \defgroup se_key_management Secure Element Key Management * Currently, key management is limited to importing keys in the clear, * destroying keys, and exporting keys in the clear. * Whether a key may be exported is determined by the key policies in place * on the key slot. */ /**@{*/ /** An enumeration indicating how a key is created. */ typedef enum { PSA_KEY_CREATION_IMPORT, /**< During psa_import_key() */ PSA_KEY_CREATION_GENERATE, /**< During psa_generate_key() */ PSA_KEY_CREATION_DERIVE, /**< During psa_key_derivation_output_key() */ PSA_KEY_CREATION_COPY, /**< During psa_copy_key() */ #ifndef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ /** A key is being registered with mbedtls_psa_register_se_key(). * * The core only passes this value to * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_validate_slot_number, not to * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_allocate. The call to * `p_validate_slot_number` is not followed by any other call to the * driver: the key is considered successfully registered if the call to * `p_validate_slot_number` succeeds, or if `p_validate_slot_number` is * null. * * With this creation method, the driver must return #PSA_SUCCESS if * the given attributes are compatible with the existing key in the slot, * and #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST if the driver can determine that there * is no key with the specified slot number. * * This is an Mbed Crypto extension. */ PSA_KEY_CREATION_REGISTER, #endif } psa_key_creation_method_t; /** \brief A function that allocates a slot for a key. * * To create a key in a specific slot in a secure element, the core * first calls this function to determine a valid slot number, * then calls a function to create the key material in that slot. * In nominal conditions (that is, if no error occurs), * the effect of a call to a key creation function in the PSA Cryptography * API with a lifetime that places the key in a secure element is the * following: * -# The core calls psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_allocate * (or in some implementations * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_validate_slot_number). The driver * selects (or validates) a suitable slot number given the key attributes * and the state of the secure element. * -# The core calls a key creation function in the driver. * * The key creation functions in the PSA Cryptography API are: * - psa_import_key(), which causes * a call to `p_allocate` with \p method = #PSA_KEY_CREATION_IMPORT * then a call to psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_import. * - psa_generate_key(), which causes * a call to `p_allocate` with \p method = #PSA_KEY_CREATION_GENERATE * then a call to psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_import. * - psa_key_derivation_output_key(), which causes * a call to `p_allocate` with \p method = #PSA_KEY_CREATION_DERIVE * then a call to psa_drv_se_key_derivation_t::p_derive. * - psa_copy_key(), which causes * a call to `p_allocate` with \p method = #PSA_KEY_CREATION_COPY * then a call to psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_export. * * In case of errors, other behaviors are possible. * - If the PSA Cryptography subsystem dies after the first step, * for example because the device has lost power abruptly, * the second step may never happen, or may happen after a reset * and re-initialization. Alternatively, after a reset and * re-initialization, the core may call * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_destroy on the slot number that * was allocated (or validated) instead of calling a key creation function. * - If an error occurs, the core may call * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_destroy on the slot number that * was allocated (or validated) instead of calling a key creation function. * * Errors and system resets also have an impact on the driver's persistent * data. If a reset happens before the overall key creation process is * completed (before or after the second step above), it is unspecified * whether the persistent data after the reset is identical to what it * was before or after the call to `p_allocate` (or `p_validate_slot_number`). * * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. * \param[in,out] persistent_data A pointer to the persistent data * that allows writing. * \param[in] attributes Attributes of the key. * \param method The way in which the key is being created. * \param[out] key_slot Slot where the key will be stored. * This must be a valid slot for a key of the * chosen type. It must be unoccupied. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * The core will record \c *key_slot as the key slot where the key * is stored and will update the persistent data in storage. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_allocate_key_t)( psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, void *persistent_data, const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, psa_key_creation_method_t method, psa_key_slot_number_t *key_slot); /** \brief A function that determines whether a slot number is valid * for a key. * * To create a key in a specific slot in a secure element, the core * first calls this function to validate the choice of slot number, * then calls a function to create the key material in that slot. * See the documentation of #psa_drv_se_allocate_key_t for more details. * * As of the PSA Cryptography API specification version 1.0, there is no way * for applications to trigger a call to this function. However some * implementations offer the capability to create or declare a key in * a specific slot via implementation-specific means, generally for the * sake of initial device provisioning or onboarding. Such a mechanism may * be added to a future version of the PSA Cryptography API specification. * * This function may update the driver's persistent data through * \p persistent_data. The core will save the updated persistent data at the * end of the key creation process. See the description of * ::psa_drv_se_allocate_key_t for more information. * * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. * \param[in,out] persistent_data A pointer to the persistent data * that allows writing. * \param[in] attributes Attributes of the key. * \param method The way in which the key is being created. * \param[in] key_slot Slot where the key is to be stored. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * The given slot number is valid for a key with the given * attributes. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * The given slot number is not valid for a key with the * given attributes. This includes the case where the slot * number is not valid at all. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS * There is already a key with the specified slot number. * Drivers may choose to return this error from the key * creation function instead. */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_validate_slot_number_t)( psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, void *persistent_data, const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, psa_key_creation_method_t method, psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot); /** \brief A function that imports a key into a secure element in binary format * * This function can support any output from psa_export_key(). Refer to the * documentation of psa_export_key() for the format for each key type. * * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. * \param key_slot Slot where the key will be stored. * This must be a valid slot for a key of the * chosen type. It must be unoccupied. * \param[in] attributes The key attributes, including the lifetime, * the key type and the usage policy. * Drivers should not access the key size stored * in the attributes: it may not match the * data passed in \p data. * Drivers can call psa_get_key_lifetime(), * psa_get_key_type(), * psa_get_key_usage_flags() and * psa_get_key_algorithm() to access this * information. * \param[in] data Buffer containing the key data. * \param[in] data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. * \param[out] bits On success, the key size in bits. The driver * must determine this value after parsing the * key according to the key type. * This value is not used if the function fails. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_import_key_t)( psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, size_t *bits); /** * \brief A function that destroys a secure element key and restore the slot to * its default state * * This function destroys the content of the key from a secure element. * Implementations shall make a best effort to ensure that any previous content * of the slot is unrecoverable. * * This function returns the specified slot to its default state. * * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. * \param[in,out] persistent_data A pointer to the persistent data * that allows writing. * \param key_slot The key slot to erase. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * The slot's content, if any, has been erased. */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_destroy_key_t)( psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, void *persistent_data, psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot); /** * \brief A function that exports a secure element key in binary format * * The output of this function can be passed to psa_import_key() to * create an equivalent object. * * If a key is created with `psa_import_key()` and then exported with * this function, it is not guaranteed that the resulting data is * identical: the implementation may choose a different representation * of the same key if the format permits it. * * This function should generate output in the same format that * `psa_export_key()` does. Refer to the * documentation of `psa_export_key()` for the format for each key type. * * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. * \param[in] key Slot whose content is to be exported. This must * be an occupied key slot. * \param[out] p_data Buffer where the key data is to be written. * \param[in] data_size Size of the `p_data` buffer in bytes. * \param[out] p_data_length On success, the number of bytes * that make up the key data. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_export_key_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, psa_key_slot_number_t key, uint8_t *p_data, size_t data_size, size_t *p_data_length); /** * \brief A function that generates a symmetric or asymmetric key on a secure * element * * If \p type is asymmetric (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC(\p type) = 1), * the driver may export the public key at the time of generation, * in the format documented for psa_export_public_key() by writing it * to the \p pubkey buffer. * This is optional, intended for secure elements that output the * public key at generation time and that cannot export the public key * later. Drivers that do not need this feature should leave * \p *pubkey_length set to 0 and should * implement the psa_drv_key_management_t::p_export_public function. * Some implementations do not support this feature, in which case * \p pubkey is \c NULL and \p pubkey_size is 0. * * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. * \param key_slot Slot where the key will be stored. * This must be a valid slot for a key of the * chosen type. It must be unoccupied. * \param[in] attributes The key attributes, including the lifetime, * the key type and size, and the usage policy. * Drivers can call psa_get_key_lifetime(), * psa_get_key_type(), psa_get_key_bits(), * psa_get_key_usage_flags() and * psa_get_key_algorithm() to access this * information. * \param[out] pubkey A buffer where the driver can write the * public key, when generating an asymmetric * key pair. * This is \c NULL when generating a symmetric * key or if the core does not support * exporting the public key at generation time. * \param pubkey_size The size of the `pubkey` buffer in bytes. * This is 0 when generating a symmetric * key or if the core does not support * exporting the public key at generation time. * \param[out] pubkey_length On entry, this is always 0. * On success, the number of bytes written to * \p pubkey. If this is 0 or unchanged on return, * the core will not read the \p pubkey buffer, * and will instead call the driver's * psa_drv_key_management_t::p_export_public * function to export the public key when needed. */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_generate_key_t)( psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, uint8_t *pubkey, size_t pubkey_size, size_t *pubkey_length); /** * \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to for secure * element key management * * PSA Crypto API implementations should populate instances of the table as * appropriate upon startup or at build time. * * If one of the functions is not implemented, it should be set to NULL. */ typedef struct { /** Function that allocates a slot for a key. */ psa_drv_se_allocate_key_t p_allocate; /** Function that checks the validity of a slot for a key. */ psa_drv_se_validate_slot_number_t p_validate_slot_number; /** Function that performs a key import operation */ psa_drv_se_import_key_t p_import; /** Function that performs a generation */ psa_drv_se_generate_key_t p_generate; /** Function that performs a key destroy operation */ psa_drv_se_destroy_key_t p_destroy; /** Function that performs a key export operation */ psa_drv_se_export_key_t p_export; /** Function that performs a public key export operation */ psa_drv_se_export_key_t p_export_public; } psa_drv_se_key_management_t; /**@}*/ /** \defgroup driver_derivation Secure Element Key Derivation and Agreement * Key derivation is the process of generating new key material using an * existing key and additional parameters, iterating through a basic * cryptographic function, such as a hash. * Key agreement is a part of cryptographic protocols that allows two parties * to agree on the same key value, but starting from different original key * material. * The flows are similar, and the PSA Crypto Driver Model uses the same functions * for both of the flows. * * There are two different final functions for the flows, * `psa_drv_se_key_derivation_derive` and `psa_drv_se_key_derivation_export`. * `psa_drv_se_key_derivation_derive` is used when the key material should be * placed in a slot on the hardware and not exposed to the caller. * `psa_drv_se_key_derivation_export` is used when the key material should be * returned to the PSA Cryptographic API implementation. * * Different key derivation algorithms require a different number of inputs. * Instead of having an API that takes as input variable length arrays, which * can be problemmatic to manage on embedded platforms, the inputs are passed * to the driver via a function, `psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral`, that * is called multiple times with different `collateral_id`s. Thus, for a key * derivation algorithm that required 3 paramter inputs, the flow would look * something like: * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c} * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_setup(kdf_algorithm, source_key, dest_key_size_bytes); * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral(kdf_algorithm_collateral_id_0, * p_collateral_0, * collateral_0_size); * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral(kdf_algorithm_collateral_id_1, * p_collateral_1, * collateral_1_size); * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral(kdf_algorithm_collateral_id_2, * p_collateral_2, * collateral_2_size); * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_derive(); * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * * key agreement example: * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c} * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_setup(alg, source_key. dest_key_size_bytes); * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral(DHE_PUBKEY, p_pubkey, pubkey_size); * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_export(p_session_key, * session_key_size, * &session_key_length); * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ */ /**@{*/ /** \brief A function that Sets up a secure element key derivation operation by * specifying the algorithm and the source key sot * * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure containing any * context information for the implementation * \param[in] kdf_alg The algorithm to be used for the key derivation * \param[in] source_key The key to be used as the source material for * the key derivation * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_key_derivation_setup_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, void *op_context, psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg, psa_key_slot_number_t source_key); /** \brief A function that provides collateral (parameters) needed for a secure * element key derivation or key agreement operation * * Since many key derivation algorithms require multiple parameters, it is * expeced that this function may be called multiple times for the same * operation, each with a different algorithm-specific `collateral_id` * * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure containing any * context information for the implementation * \param[in] collateral_id An ID for the collateral being provided * \param[in] p_collateral A buffer containing the collateral data * \param[in] collateral_size The size in bytes of the collateral * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral_t)(void *op_context, uint32_t collateral_id, const uint8_t *p_collateral, size_t collateral_size); /** \brief A function that performs the final secure element key derivation * step and place the generated key material in a slot * * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure containing any * context information for the implementation * \param[in] dest_key The slot where the generated key material * should be placed * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_key_derivation_derive_t)(void *op_context, psa_key_slot_number_t dest_key); /** \brief A function that performs the final step of a secure element key * agreement and place the generated key material in a buffer * * \param[out] p_output Buffer in which to place the generated key * material * \param[in] output_size The size in bytes of `p_output` * \param[out] p_output_length Upon success, contains the number of bytes of * key material placed in `p_output` * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS */ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_key_derivation_export_t)(void *op_context, uint8_t *p_output, size_t output_size, size_t *p_output_length); /** * \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to for secure * element key derivation and agreement * * PSA Crypto API implementations should populate instances of the table as * appropriate upon startup. * * If one of the functions is not implemented, it should be set to NULL. */ typedef struct { /** The driver-specific size of the key derivation context */ size_t context_size; /** Function that performs a key derivation setup */ psa_drv_se_key_derivation_setup_t p_setup; /** Function that sets key derivation collateral */ psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral_t p_collateral; /** Function that performs a final key derivation step */ psa_drv_se_key_derivation_derive_t p_derive; /** Function that perforsm a final key derivation or agreement and * exports the key */ psa_drv_se_key_derivation_export_t p_export; } psa_drv_se_key_derivation_t; /**@}*/ /** \defgroup se_registration Secure element driver registration */ /**@{*/ /** A structure containing pointers to all the entry points of a * secure element driver. * * Future versions of this specification may add extra substructures at * the end of this structure. */ typedef struct { /** The version of the driver HAL that this driver implements. * This is a protection against loading driver binaries built against * a different version of this specification. * Use #PSA_DRV_SE_HAL_VERSION. */ uint32_t hal_version; /** The size of the driver's persistent data in bytes. * * This can be 0 if the driver does not need persistent data. * * See the documentation of psa_drv_se_context_t::persistent_data * for more information about why and how a driver can use * persistent data. */ size_t persistent_data_size; /** The driver initialization function. * * This function is called once during the initialization of the * PSA Cryptography subsystem, before any other function of the * driver is called. If this function returns a failure status, * the driver will be unusable, at least until the next system reset. * * If this field is \c NULL, it is equivalent to a function that does * nothing and returns #PSA_SUCCESS. */ psa_drv_se_init_t p_init; const psa_drv_se_key_management_t *key_management; const psa_drv_se_mac_t *mac; const psa_drv_se_cipher_t *cipher; const psa_drv_se_aead_t *aead; const psa_drv_se_asymmetric_t *asymmetric; const psa_drv_se_key_derivation_t *derivation; } psa_drv_se_t; /** The current version of the secure element driver HAL. */ /* 0.0.0 patchlevel 5 */ #define PSA_DRV_SE_HAL_VERSION 0x00000005 /** Register an external cryptoprocessor (secure element) driver. * * This function is only intended to be used by driver code, not by * application code. In implementations with separation between the * PSA cryptography module and applications, this function should * only be available to callers that run in the same memory space as * the cryptography module, and should not be exposed to applications * running in a different memory space. * * This function may be called before psa_crypto_init(). It is * implementation-defined whether this function may be called * after psa_crypto_init(). * * \note Implementations store metadata about keys including the lifetime * value, which contains the driver's location indicator. Therefore, * from one instantiation of the PSA Cryptography * library to the next one, if there is a key in storage with a certain * lifetime value, you must always register the same driver (or an * updated version that communicates with the same secure element) * with the same location value. * * \param location The location value through which this driver will * be exposed to applications. * This driver will be used for all keys such that * `location == #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( lifetime )`. * The value #PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE is reserved * and may not be used for drivers. Implementations * may reserve other values. * \param[in] methods The method table of the driver. This structure must * remain valid for as long as the cryptography * module keeps running. It is typically a global * constant. * * \return #PSA_SUCCESS * The driver was successfully registered. Applications can now * use \p lifetime to access keys through the methods passed to * this function. * \return #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * This function was called after the initialization of the * cryptography module, and this implementation does not support * driver registration at this stage. * \return #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS * There is already a registered driver for this value of \p lifetime. * \return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \p lifetime is a reserved value. * \return #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED * `methods->hal_version` is not supported by this implementation. * \return #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * \return #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED */ psa_status_t psa_register_se_driver( psa_key_location_t location, const psa_drv_se_t *methods); /**@}*/ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_H */ usr/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h0000644000000000000000000010024513764415275015521 0ustar rootroot/** * \file psa/crypto_sizes.h * * \brief PSA cryptography module: Mbed TLS buffer size macros * * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must * include psa/crypto.h. * * This file contains the definitions of macros that are useful to * compute buffer sizes. The signatures and semantics of these macros * are standardized, but the definitions are not, because they depend on * the available algorithms and, in some cases, on permitted tolerances * on buffer sizes. * * In implementations with isolation between the application and the * cryptography module, implementers should take care to ensure that * the definitions that are exposed to applications match what the * module implements. * * Macros that compute sizes whose values do not depend on the * implementation are in crypto.h. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_SIZES_H #define PSA_CRYPTO_SIZES_H /* Include the Mbed TLS configuration file, the way Mbed TLS does it * in each of its header files. */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #define PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits) (((bits) + 7) / 8) #define PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(bytes) ((bytes) * 8) #define PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(block_size, length) \ (((length) + (block_size) - 1) / (block_size) * (block_size)) /** The size of the output of psa_hash_finish(), in bytes. * * This is also the hash size that psa_hash_verify() expects. * * \param alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true), or an HMAC algorithm * (#PSA_ALG_HMAC(\c hash_alg) where \c hash_alg is a * hash algorithm). * * \return The hash size for the specified hash algorithm. * If the hash algorithm is not recognized, return 0. * An implementation may return either 0 or the correct size * for a hash algorithm that it recognizes, but does not support. */ #define PSA_HASH_SIZE(alg) \ ( \ PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_MD2 ? 16 : \ PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_MD4 ? 16 : \ PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_MD5 ? 16 : \ PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 ? 20 : \ PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_1 ? 20 : \ PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_224 ? 28 : \ PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ? 32 : \ PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ? 48 : \ PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512 ? 64 : \ PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224 ? 28 : \ PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256 ? 32 : \ PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_224 ? 28 : \ PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_256 ? 32 : \ PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_384 ? 48 : \ PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_512 ? 64 : \ 0) /** \def PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE * * Maximum size of a hash. * * This macro must expand to a compile-time constant integer. This value * should be the maximum size of a hash supported by the implementation, * in bytes, and must be no smaller than this maximum. */ /* Note: for HMAC-SHA-3, the block size is 144 bytes for HMAC-SHA3-226, * 136 bytes for HMAC-SHA3-256, 104 bytes for SHA3-384, 72 bytes for * HMAC-SHA3-512. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) #define PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE 64 #define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128 #else #define PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE 32 #define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 64 #endif /** \def PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE * * Maximum size of a MAC. * * This macro must expand to a compile-time constant integer. This value * should be the maximum size of a MAC supported by the implementation, * in bytes, and must be no smaller than this maximum. */ /* All non-HMAC MACs have a maximum size that's smaller than the * minimum possible value of PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE in this implementation. */ /* Note that the encoding of truncated MAC algorithms limits this value * to 64 bytes. */ #define PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE /** The tag size for an AEAD algorithm, in bytes. * * \param alg An AEAD algorithm * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). * * \return The tag size for the specified algorithm. * If the AEAD algorithm does not have an identified * tag that can be distinguished from the rest of * the ciphertext, return 0. * If the AEAD algorithm is not recognized, return 0. * An implementation may return either 0 or a * correct size for an AEAD algorithm that it * recognizes, but does not support. */ #define PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(alg) \ (PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) ? \ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK) >> PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_OFFSET) : \ 0) /* The maximum size of an RSA key on this implementation, in bits. * This is a vendor-specific macro. * * Mbed TLS does not set a hard limit on the size of RSA keys: any key * whose parameters fit in a bignum is accepted. However large keys can * induce a large memory usage and long computation times. Unlike other * auxiliary macros in this file and in crypto.h, which reflect how the * library is configured, this macro defines how the library is * configured. This implementation refuses to import or generate an * RSA key whose size is larger than the value defined here. * * Note that an implementation may set different size limits for different * operations, and does not need to accept all key sizes up to the limit. */ #define PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS 4096 /* The maximum size of an ECC key on this implementation, in bits. * This is a vendor-specific macro. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) #define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 521 #elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) #define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 512 #elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) #define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 448 #elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) #define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 384 #elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) #define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 384 #elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) #define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 256 #elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) #define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 256 #elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) #define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 256 #elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) #define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 255 #elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) #define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 224 #elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) #define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 224 #elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) #define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 192 #elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) #define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 192 #else #define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 0 #endif /** \def PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_MAX_PSK_LEN * * This macro returns the maximum length of the PSK supported * by the TLS-1.2 PSK-to-MS key derivation. * * Quoting RFC 4279, Sect 5.3: * TLS implementations supporting these ciphersuites MUST support * arbitrary PSK identities up to 128 octets in length, and arbitrary * PSKs up to 64 octets in length. Supporting longer identities and * keys is RECOMMENDED. * * Therefore, no implementation should define a value smaller than 64 * for #PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_MAX_PSK_LEN. */ #define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_MAX_PSK_LEN 128 /** The maximum size of a block cipher supported by the implementation. */ #define PSA_MAX_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE 16 /** The size of the output of psa_mac_sign_finish(), in bytes. * * This is also the MAC size that psa_mac_verify_finish() expects. * * \param key_type The type of the MAC key. * \param key_bits The size of the MAC key in bits. * \param alg A MAC algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true). * * \return The MAC size for the specified algorithm with * the specified key parameters. * \return 0 if the MAC algorithm is not recognized. * \return Either 0 or the correct size for a MAC algorithm that * the implementation recognizes, but does not support. * \return Unspecified if the key parameters are not consistent * with the algorithm. */ #define PSA_MAC_FINAL_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg) \ ((alg) & PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK ? PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH(alg) : \ PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC(alg) ? PSA_HASH_SIZE(PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg)) : \ PSA_ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC(alg) ? PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE(key_type) : \ ((void)(key_type), (void)(key_bits), 0)) /** The maximum size of the output of psa_aead_encrypt(), in bytes. * * If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is * guaranteed that psa_aead_encrypt() will not fail due to an * insufficient buffer size. Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of * the ciphertext may be smaller. * * \param alg An AEAD algorithm * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). * \param plaintext_length Size of the plaintext in bytes. * * \return The AEAD ciphertext size for the specified * algorithm. * If the AEAD algorithm is not recognized, return 0. * An implementation may return either 0 or a * correct size for an AEAD algorithm that it * recognizes, but does not support. */ #define PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg, plaintext_length) \ (PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(alg) != 0 ? \ (plaintext_length) + PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(alg) : \ 0) /** The maximum size of the output of psa_aead_decrypt(), in bytes. * * If the size of the plaintext buffer is at least this large, it is * guaranteed that psa_aead_decrypt() will not fail due to an * insufficient buffer size. Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of * the plaintext may be smaller. * * \param alg An AEAD algorithm * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). * \param ciphertext_length Size of the plaintext in bytes. * * \return The AEAD ciphertext size for the specified * algorithm. * If the AEAD algorithm is not recognized, return 0. * An implementation may return either 0 or a * correct size for an AEAD algorithm that it * recognizes, but does not support. */ #define PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg, ciphertext_length) \ (PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(alg) != 0 ? \ (ciphertext_length) - PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(alg) : \ 0) /** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_aead_update(). * * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is * guaranteed that psa_aead_update() will not fail due to an * insufficient buffer size. The actual size of the output may be smaller * in any given call. * * \param alg An AEAD algorithm * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes. * * \return A sufficient output buffer size for the specified * algorithm. * If the AEAD algorithm is not recognized, return 0. * An implementation may return either 0 or a * correct size for an AEAD algorithm that it * recognizes, but does not support. */ /* For all the AEAD modes defined in this specification, it is possible * to emit output without delay. However, hardware may not always be * capable of this. So for modes based on a block cipher, allow the * implementation to delay the output until it has a full block. */ #define PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg, input_length) \ (PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) ? \ PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_MAX_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE, (input_length)) : \ (input_length)) /** A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for psa_aead_finish(). * * If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is * guaranteed that psa_aead_finish() will not fail due to an * insufficient ciphertext buffer size. The actual size of the output may * be smaller in any given call. * * \param alg An AEAD algorithm * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). * * \return A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for the * specified algorithm. * If the AEAD algorithm is not recognized, return 0. * An implementation may return either 0 or a * correct size for an AEAD algorithm that it * recognizes, but does not support. */ #define PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg) \ (PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) ? \ PSA_MAX_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE : \ 0) /** A sufficient plaintext buffer size for psa_aead_verify(). * * If the size of the plaintext buffer is at least this large, it is * guaranteed that psa_aead_verify() will not fail due to an * insufficient plaintext buffer size. The actual size of the output may * be smaller in any given call. * * \param alg An AEAD algorithm * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). * * \return A sufficient plaintext buffer size for the * specified algorithm. * If the AEAD algorithm is not recognized, return 0. * An implementation may return either 0 or a * correct size for an AEAD algorithm that it * recognizes, but does not support. */ #define PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg) \ (PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) ? \ PSA_MAX_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE : \ 0) #define PSA_RSA_MINIMUM_PADDING_SIZE(alg) \ (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg) ? \ 2 * PSA_HASH_SIZE(PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_GET_HASH(alg)) + 1 : \ 11 /*PKCS#1v1.5*/) /** * \brief ECDSA signature size for a given curve bit size * * \param curve_bits Curve size in bits. * \return Signature size in bytes. * * \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its argument is one. */ #define PSA_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE(curve_bits) \ (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(curve_bits) * 2) /** Sufficient signature buffer size for psa_sign_hash(). * * This macro returns a sufficient buffer size for a signature using a key * of the specified type and size, with the specified algorithm. * Note that the actual size of the signature may be smaller * (some algorithms produce a variable-size signature). * * \warning This function may call its arguments multiple times or * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain * side effects. * * \param key_type An asymmetric key type (this may indifferently be a * key pair type or a public key type). * \param key_bits The size of the key in bits. * \param alg The signature algorithm. * * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return * a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that * psa_sign_hash() will not fail with * #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported * by the implementation, this macro shall return either a * sensible size or 0. * If the parameters are not valid, the * return value is unspecified. */ #define PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg) \ (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(key_type) ? ((void)alg, PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits)) : \ PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(key_type) ? PSA_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE(key_bits) : \ ((void)alg, 0)) #define PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE \ PSA_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) /** \def PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE * * Maximum size of an asymmetric signature. * * This macro must expand to a compile-time constant integer. This value * should be the maximum size of a signature supported by the implementation, * in bytes, and must be no smaller than this maximum. */ #define PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE \ (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) > PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE ? \ PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) : \ PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE) /** Sufficient output buffer size for psa_asymmetric_encrypt(). * * This macro returns a sufficient buffer size for a ciphertext produced using * a key of the specified type and size, with the specified algorithm. * Note that the actual size of the ciphertext may be smaller, depending * on the algorithm. * * \warning This function may call its arguments multiple times or * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain * side effects. * * \param key_type An asymmetric key type (this may indifferently be a * key pair type or a public key type). * \param key_bits The size of the key in bits. * \param alg The asymmetric encryption algorithm. * * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return * a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that * psa_asymmetric_encrypt() will not fail with * #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported * by the implementation, this macro shall return either a * sensible size or 0. * If the parameters are not valid, the * return value is unspecified. */ #define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg) \ (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(key_type) ? \ ((void)alg, PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits)) : \ 0) /** Sufficient output buffer size for psa_asymmetric_decrypt(). * * This macro returns a sufficient buffer size for a plaintext produced using * a key of the specified type and size, with the specified algorithm. * Note that the actual size of the plaintext may be smaller, depending * on the algorithm. * * \warning This function may call its arguments multiple times or * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain * side effects. * * \param key_type An asymmetric key type (this may indifferently be a * key pair type or a public key type). * \param key_bits The size of the key in bits. * \param alg The asymmetric encryption algorithm. * * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return * a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that * psa_asymmetric_decrypt() will not fail with * #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported * by the implementation, this macro shall return either a * sensible size or 0. * If the parameters are not valid, the * return value is unspecified. */ #define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg) \ (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(key_type) ? \ PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) - PSA_RSA_MINIMUM_PADDING_SIZE(alg) : \ 0) /* Maximum size of the ASN.1 encoding of an INTEGER with the specified * number of bits. * * This definition assumes that bits <= 2^19 - 9 so that the length field * is at most 3 bytes. The length of the encoding is the length of the * bit string padded to a whole number of bytes plus: * - 1 type byte; * - 1 to 3 length bytes; * - 0 to 1 bytes of leading 0 due to the sign bit. */ #define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE(bits) \ ((bits) / 8 + 5) /* Maximum size of the export encoding of an RSA public key. * Assumes that the public exponent is less than 2^32. * * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { * modulus INTEGER, -- n * publicExponent INTEGER } -- e * * - 4 bytes of SEQUENCE overhead; * - n : INTEGER; * - 7 bytes for the public exponent. */ #define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \ (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) + 11) /* Maximum size of the export encoding of an RSA key pair. * Assumes thatthe public exponent is less than 2^32 and that the size * difference between the two primes is at most 1 bit. * * RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { * version Version, -- 0 * modulus INTEGER, -- N-bit * publicExponent INTEGER, -- 32-bit * privateExponent INTEGER, -- N-bit * prime1 INTEGER, -- N/2-bit * prime2 INTEGER, -- N/2-bit * exponent1 INTEGER, -- N/2-bit * exponent2 INTEGER, -- N/2-bit * coefficient INTEGER, -- N/2-bit * } * * - 4 bytes of SEQUENCE overhead; * - 3 bytes of version; * - 7 half-size INTEGERs plus 2 full-size INTEGERs, * overapproximated as 9 half-size INTEGERS; * - 7 bytes for the public exponent. */ #define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \ (9 * PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE((key_bits) / 2 + 1) + 14) /* Maximum size of the export encoding of a DSA public key. * * SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { * algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, * subjectPublicKey BIT STRING } -- contains DSAPublicKey * AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { * algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER, * parameters Dss-Parms } -- SEQUENCE of 3 INTEGERs * DSAPublicKey ::= INTEGER -- public key, Y * * - 3 * 4 bytes of SEQUENCE overhead; * - 1 + 1 + 7 bytes of algorithm (DSA OID); * - 4 bytes of BIT STRING overhead; * - 3 full-size INTEGERs (p, g, y); * - 1 + 1 + 32 bytes for 1 sub-size INTEGER (q <= 256 bits). */ #define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \ (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) * 3 + 59) /* Maximum size of the export encoding of a DSA key pair. * * DSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { * version Version, -- 0 * prime INTEGER, -- p * subprime INTEGER, -- q * generator INTEGER, -- g * public INTEGER, -- y * private INTEGER, -- x * } * * - 4 bytes of SEQUENCE overhead; * - 3 bytes of version; * - 3 full-size INTEGERs (p, g, y); * - 2 * (1 + 1 + 32) bytes for 2 sub-size INTEGERs (q, x <= 256 bits). */ #define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_DSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \ (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) * 3 + 75) /* Maximum size of the export encoding of an ECC public key. * * The representation of an ECC public key is: * - The byte 0x04; * - `x_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian; * - `y_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian; * - where m is the bit size associated with the curve. * * - 1 byte + 2 * point size. */ #define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \ (2 * PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) + 1) /* Maximum size of the export encoding of an ECC key pair. * * An ECC key pair is represented by the secret value. */ #define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \ (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits)) /** Sufficient output buffer size for psa_export_key() or psa_export_public_key(). * * This macro returns a compile-time constant if its arguments are * compile-time constants. * * \warning This function may call its arguments multiple times or * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain * side effects. * * The following code illustrates how to allocate enough memory to export * a key by querying the key type and size at runtime. * \code{c} * psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; * psa_status_t status; * status = psa_get_key_attributes(key, &attributes); * if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) handle_error(...); * psa_key_type_t key_type = psa_get_key_type(&attributes); * size_t key_bits = psa_get_key_bits(&attributes); * size_t buffer_size = PSA_KEY_EXPORT_MAX_SIZE(key_type, key_bits); * psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); * uint8_t *buffer = malloc(buffer_size); * if (buffer == NULL) handle_error(...); * size_t buffer_length; * status = psa_export_key(key, buffer, buffer_size, &buffer_length); * if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) handle_error(...); * \endcode * * For psa_export_public_key(), calculate the buffer size from the * public key type. You can use the macro #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR * to convert a key pair type to the corresponding public key type. * \code{c} * psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; * psa_status_t status; * status = psa_get_key_attributes(key, &attributes); * if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) handle_error(...); * psa_key_type_t key_type = psa_get_key_type(&attributes); * psa_key_type_t public_key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(key_type); * size_t key_bits = psa_get_key_bits(&attributes); * size_t buffer_size = PSA_KEY_EXPORT_MAX_SIZE(public_key_type, key_bits); * psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); * uint8_t *buffer = malloc(buffer_size); * if (buffer == NULL) handle_error(...); * size_t buffer_length; * status = psa_export_public_key(key, buffer, buffer_size, &buffer_length); * if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) handle_error(...); * \endcode * * \param key_type A supported key type. * \param key_bits The size of the key in bits. * * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return * a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that * psa_sign_hash() will not fail with * #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported * by the implementation, this macro shall return either a * sensible size or 0. * If the parameters are not valid, the * return value is unspecified. */ #define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_MAX_SIZE(key_type, key_bits) \ (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED(key_type) ? PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) : \ (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_KEY_PAIR ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_DSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(key_type) ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(key_type) ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ 0) /** The default nonce size for an AEAD algorithm, in bytes. * * This macro can be used to allocate a buffer of sufficient size to * store the nonce output from #psa_aead_generate_nonce(). * * See also #PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE. * * \note This is not the maximum size of nonce supported as input to #psa_aead_set_nonce(), * #psa_aead_encrypt() or #psa_aead_decrypt(), just the default size that is generated by * #psa_aead_generate_nonce(). * * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain * side effects. * * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm \p alg. * * \param alg An AEAD algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). * * \return The default nonce size for the specified key type and algorithm. * If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not recognized, * or the parameters are incompatible, return 0. * An implementation can return either 0 or a correct size for a key type * and AEAD algorithm that it recognizes, but does not support. */ #define PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) \ (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE(key_type) == 16 && \ (PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH(alg) == PSA_ALG_CCM || \ PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH(alg) == PSA_ALG_GCM) ? 12 : \ (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 && \ PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH(alg) == PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ? 12 : \ 0) /** The maximum default nonce size among all supported pairs of key types and AEAD algorithms, in bytes. * * This is equal to or greater than any value that #PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH() may return. * * \note This is not the maximum size of nonce supported as input to #psa_aead_set_nonce(), * #psa_aead_encrypt() or #psa_aead_decrypt(), just the largest size that may be generated by * #psa_aead_generate_nonce(). */ #define PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE 12 /** The default IV size for a cipher algorithm, in bytes. * * The IV that is generated as part of a call to #psa_cipher_encrypt() is always * the default IV length for the algorithm. * * This macro can be used to allocate a buffer of sufficient size to * store the IV output from #psa_cipher_generate_iv() when using * a multi-part cipher operation. * * See also #PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE. * * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain * side effects. * * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm \p alg. * * \param alg A cipher algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). * * \return The default IV size for the specified key type and algorithm. * If the algorithm does not use an IV, return 0. * If the key type or cipher algorithm is not recognized, * or the parameters are incompatible, return 0. * An implementation can return either 0 or a correct size for a key type * and cipher algorithm that it recognizes, but does not support. */ #define PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(key_type, alg) \ (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE(key_type) > 1 && \ ((alg) == PSA_ALG_CTR || \ (alg) == PSA_ALG_CFB || \ (alg) == PSA_ALG_OFB || \ (alg) == PSA_ALG_XTS || \ (alg) == PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING || \ (alg) == PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) ? PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE(key_type) : \ (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 && \ (alg) == PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER ? 12 : \ 0) /** The maximum IV size for all supported cipher algorithms, in bytes. * * See also #PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(). */ #define PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE 16 #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SIZES_H */ usr/include/psa/crypto_struct.h0000644000000000000000000003531413764415275015714 0ustar rootroot/** * \file psa/crypto_struct.h * * \brief PSA cryptography module: Mbed TLS structured type implementations * * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must * include psa/crypto.h. * * This file contains the definitions of some data structures with * implementation-specific definitions. * * In implementations with isolation between the application and the * cryptography module, it is expected that the front-end and the back-end * would have different versions of this file. * *

Design notes about multipart operation structures

* * Each multipart operation structure contains a `psa_algorithm_t alg` * field which indicates which specific algorithm the structure is for. * When the structure is not in use, `alg` is 0. Most of the structure * consists of a union which is discriminated by `alg`. * * Note that when `alg` is 0, the content of other fields is undefined. * In particular, it is not guaranteed that a freshly-initialized structure * is all-zero: we initialize structures to something like `{0, 0}`, which * is only guaranteed to initializes the first member of the union; * GCC and Clang initialize the whole structure to 0 (at the time of writing), * but MSVC and CompCert don't. * * In Mbed Crypto, multipart operation structures live independently from * the key. This allows Mbed Crypto to free the key objects when destroying * a key slot. If a multipart operation needs to remember the key after * the setup function returns, the operation structure needs to contain a * copy of the key. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_STRUCT_H #define PSA_CRYPTO_STRUCT_H #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* Include the Mbed TLS configuration file, the way Mbed TLS does it * in each of its header files. */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) #include "mbedtls/config.h" #else #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE #endif #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" #include "mbedtls/cmac.h" #include "mbedtls/gcm.h" #include "mbedtls/md.h" #include "mbedtls/md2.h" #include "mbedtls/md4.h" #include "mbedtls/md5.h" #include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h" #include "mbedtls/sha1.h" #include "mbedtls/sha256.h" #include "mbedtls/sha512.h" typedef struct { /** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the * operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping * drivers halfway through the operation is not supported. * ID values are auto-generated in psa_driver_wrappers.h */ unsigned int id; /** Context structure for the assigned driver, when id is not zero. */ void* ctx; } psa_operation_driver_context_t; struct psa_hash_operation_s { psa_algorithm_t alg; union { unsigned dummy; /* Make the union non-empty even with no supported algorithms. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) mbedtls_md2_context md2; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) mbedtls_md4_context md4; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) mbedtls_md5_context md5; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) mbedtls_ripemd160_context ripemd160; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) mbedtls_sha1_context sha1; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) mbedtls_sha256_context sha256; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) mbedtls_sha512_context sha512; #endif } ctx; }; #define PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT {0, {0}} static inline struct psa_hash_operation_s psa_hash_operation_init( void ) { const struct psa_hash_operation_s v = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; return( v ); } #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) typedef struct { /** The hash context. */ struct psa_hash_operation_s hash_ctx; /** The HMAC part of the context. */ uint8_t opad[PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE]; } psa_hmac_internal_data; #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ struct psa_mac_operation_s { psa_algorithm_t alg; unsigned int key_set : 1; unsigned int iv_required : 1; unsigned int iv_set : 1; unsigned int has_input : 1; unsigned int is_sign : 1; uint8_t mac_size; union { unsigned dummy; /* Make the union non-empty even with no supported algorithms. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) psa_hmac_internal_data hmac; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) mbedtls_cipher_context_t cmac; #endif } ctx; }; #define PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, {0}} static inline struct psa_mac_operation_s psa_mac_operation_init( void ) { const struct psa_mac_operation_s v = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; return( v ); } struct psa_cipher_operation_s { psa_algorithm_t alg; unsigned int key_set : 1; unsigned int iv_required : 1; unsigned int iv_set : 1; unsigned int mbedtls_in_use : 1; /* Indicates mbed TLS is handling the operation. */ uint8_t iv_size; uint8_t block_size; union { unsigned dummy; /* Enable easier initializing of the union. */ mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher; psa_operation_driver_context_t driver; } ctx; }; #define PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, {0}} static inline struct psa_cipher_operation_s psa_cipher_operation_init( void ) { const struct psa_cipher_operation_s v = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; return( v ); } struct psa_aead_operation_s { psa_algorithm_t alg; unsigned int key_set : 1; unsigned int iv_set : 1; uint8_t iv_size; uint8_t block_size; union { unsigned dummy; /* Enable easier initializing of the union. */ mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher; } ctx; }; #define PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, {0}} static inline struct psa_aead_operation_s psa_aead_operation_init( void ) { const struct psa_aead_operation_s v = PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT; return( v ); } #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) typedef struct { uint8_t *info; size_t info_length; psa_hmac_internal_data hmac; uint8_t prk[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; uint8_t output_block[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; #if PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE > 0xff #error "PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE does not fit in uint8_t" #endif uint8_t offset_in_block; uint8_t block_number; unsigned int state : 2; unsigned int info_set : 1; } psa_hkdf_key_derivation_t; #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) typedef enum { TLS12_PRF_STATE_INIT, /* no input provided */ TLS12_PRF_STATE_SEED_SET, /* seed has been set */ TLS12_PRF_STATE_KEY_SET, /* key has been set */ TLS12_PRF_STATE_LABEL_SET, /* label has been set */ TLS12_PRF_STATE_OUTPUT /* output has been started */ } psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_state_t; typedef struct psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_s { #if PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE > 0xff #error "PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE does not fit in uint8_t" #endif /* Indicates how many bytes in the current HMAC block have * not yet been read by the user. */ uint8_t left_in_block; /* The 1-based number of the block. */ uint8_t block_number; psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_state_t state; uint8_t *seed; size_t seed_length; uint8_t *label; size_t label_length; psa_hmac_internal_data hmac; uint8_t Ai[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; /* `HMAC_hash( prk, A(i) + seed )` in the notation of RFC 5246, Sect. 5. */ uint8_t output_block[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; } psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t; #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ struct psa_key_derivation_s { psa_algorithm_t alg; unsigned int can_output_key : 1; size_t capacity; union { /* Make the union non-empty even with no supported algorithms. */ uint8_t dummy; #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) psa_hkdf_key_derivation_t hkdf; psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t tls12_prf; #endif } ctx; }; /* This only zeroes out the first byte in the union, the rest is unspecified. */ #define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT {0, 0, 0, {0}} static inline struct psa_key_derivation_s psa_key_derivation_operation_init( void ) { const struct psa_key_derivation_s v = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; return( v ); } struct psa_key_policy_s { psa_key_usage_t usage; psa_algorithm_t alg; psa_algorithm_t alg2; }; typedef struct psa_key_policy_s psa_key_policy_t; #define PSA_KEY_POLICY_INIT {0, 0, 0} static inline struct psa_key_policy_s psa_key_policy_init( void ) { const struct psa_key_policy_s v = PSA_KEY_POLICY_INIT; return( v ); } /* The type used internally for key sizes. * Public interfaces use size_t, but internally we use a smaller type. */ typedef uint16_t psa_key_bits_t; /* The maximum value of the type used to represent bit-sizes. * This is used to mark an invalid key size. */ #define PSA_KEY_BITS_TOO_LARGE ( (psa_key_bits_t) ( -1 ) ) /* The maximum size of a key in bits. * Currently defined as the maximum that can be represented, rounded down * to a whole number of bytes. * This is an uncast value so that it can be used in preprocessor * conditionals. */ #define PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS 0xfff8 /** A mask of flags that can be stored in key attributes. * * This type is also used internally to store flags in slots. Internal * flags are defined in library/psa_crypto_core.h. Internal flags may have * the same value as external flags if they are properly handled during * key creation and in psa_get_key_attributes. */ typedef uint16_t psa_key_attributes_flag_t; #define MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_FLAG_HAS_SLOT_NUMBER \ ( (psa_key_attributes_flag_t) 0x0001 ) /* A mask of key attribute flags used externally only. * Only meant for internal checks inside the library. */ #define MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_EXTERNAL_ONLY ( \ MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_FLAG_HAS_SLOT_NUMBER | \ 0 ) /* A mask of key attribute flags used both internally and externally. * Currently there aren't any. */ #define MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_DUAL_USE ( \ 0 ) typedef struct { psa_key_type_t type; psa_key_bits_t bits; psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime; mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id; psa_key_policy_t policy; psa_key_attributes_flag_t flags; } psa_core_key_attributes_t; #define PSA_CORE_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT {PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE, 0, PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE, MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT, PSA_KEY_POLICY_INIT, 0} struct psa_key_attributes_s { psa_core_key_attributes_t core; #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number; #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ void *domain_parameters; size_t domain_parameters_size; }; #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) #define PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT {PSA_CORE_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT, 0, NULL, 0} #else #define PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT {PSA_CORE_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT, NULL, 0} #endif static inline struct psa_key_attributes_s psa_key_attributes_init( void ) { const struct psa_key_attributes_s v = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; return( v ); } static inline void psa_set_key_id( psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ) { psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = attributes->core.lifetime; attributes->core.id = key; if( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( lifetime ) ) { attributes->core.lifetime = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT, PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( lifetime ) ); } } static inline mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_get_key_id( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) { return( attributes->core.id ); } #ifdef MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER static inline void mbedtls_set_key_owner_id( psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, mbedtls_key_owner_id_t owner ) { attributes->core.id.owner = owner; } #endif static inline void psa_set_key_lifetime(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime) { attributes->core.lifetime = lifetime; if( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( lifetime ) ) { #ifdef MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER attributes->core.id.key_id = 0; #else attributes->core.id = 0; #endif } } static inline psa_key_lifetime_t psa_get_key_lifetime( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) { return( attributes->core.lifetime ); } static inline void psa_set_key_usage_flags(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, psa_key_usage_t usage_flags) { attributes->core.policy.usage = usage_flags; } static inline psa_key_usage_t psa_get_key_usage_flags( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) { return( attributes->core.policy.usage ); } static inline void psa_set_key_algorithm(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, psa_algorithm_t alg) { attributes->core.policy.alg = alg; } static inline psa_algorithm_t psa_get_key_algorithm( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) { return( attributes->core.policy.alg ); } /* This function is declared in crypto_extra.h, which comes after this * header file, but we need the function here, so repeat the declaration. */ psa_status_t psa_set_key_domain_parameters(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, psa_key_type_t type, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length); static inline void psa_set_key_type(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, psa_key_type_t type) { if( attributes->domain_parameters == NULL ) { /* Common case: quick path */ attributes->core.type = type; } else { /* Call the bigger function to free the old domain paramteres. * Ignore any errors which may arise due to type requiring * non-default domain parameters, since this function can't * report errors. */ (void) psa_set_key_domain_parameters( attributes, type, NULL, 0 ); } } static inline psa_key_type_t psa_get_key_type( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) { return( attributes->core.type ); } static inline void psa_set_key_bits(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, size_t bits) { if( bits > PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS ) attributes->core.bits = PSA_KEY_BITS_TOO_LARGE; else attributes->core.bits = (psa_key_bits_t) bits; } static inline size_t psa_get_key_bits( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) { return( attributes->core.bits ); } #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_STRUCT_H */ usr/include/psa/crypto_types.h0000644000000000000000000003727213764415275015541 0ustar rootroot/** * \file psa/crypto_types.h * * \brief PSA cryptography module: type aliases. * * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must * include psa/crypto.h. Drivers must include the appropriate driver * header file. * * This file contains portable definitions of integral types for properties * of cryptographic keys, designations of cryptographic algorithms, and * error codes returned by the library. * * This header file does not declare any function. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_TYPES_H #define PSA_CRYPTO_TYPES_H #include "crypto_platform.h" #include /** \defgroup error Error codes * @{ */ /** * \brief Function return status. * * This is either #PSA_SUCCESS (which is zero), indicating success, * or a small negative value indicating that an error occurred. Errors are * encoded as one of the \c PSA_ERROR_xxx values defined here. */ /* If #PSA_SUCCESS is already defined, it means that #psa_status_t * is also defined in an external header, so prevent its multiple * definition. */ #ifndef PSA_SUCCESS typedef int32_t psa_status_t; #endif /**@}*/ /** \defgroup crypto_types Key and algorithm types * @{ */ /** \brief Encoding of a key type. */ typedef uint16_t psa_key_type_t; /** The type of PSA elliptic curve family identifiers. * * The curve identifier is required to create an ECC key using the * PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR() or PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY() * macros. * * Values defined by this standard will never be in the range 0x80-0xff. * Vendors who define additional families must use an encoding in this range. */ typedef uint8_t psa_ecc_family_t; /** The type of PSA Diffie-Hellman group family identifiers. * * The group identifier is required to create an Diffie-Hellman key using the * PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR() or PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY() * macros. * * Values defined by this standard will never be in the range 0x80-0xff. * Vendors who define additional families must use an encoding in this range. */ typedef uint8_t psa_dh_family_t; /** \brief Encoding of a cryptographic algorithm. * * For algorithms that can be applied to multiple key types, this type * does not encode the key type. For example, for symmetric ciphers * based on a block cipher, #psa_algorithm_t encodes the block cipher * mode and the padding mode while the block cipher itself is encoded * via #psa_key_type_t. */ typedef uint32_t psa_algorithm_t; /**@}*/ /** \defgroup key_lifetimes Key lifetimes * @{ */ /** Encoding of key lifetimes. * * The lifetime of a key indicates where it is stored and what system actions * may create and destroy it. * * Lifetime values have the following structure: * - Bits 0-7 (#PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(\c lifetime)): * persistence level. This value indicates what device management * actions can cause it to be destroyed. In particular, it indicates * whether the key is _volatile_ or _persistent_. * See ::psa_key_persistence_t for more information. * - Bits 8-31 (#PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(\c lifetime)): * location indicator. This value indicates where the key is stored * and where operations on the key are performed. * See ::psa_key_location_t for more information. * * Volatile keys are automatically destroyed when the application instance * terminates or on a power reset of the device. Persistent keys are * preserved until the application explicitly destroys them or until an * implementation-specific device management event occurs (for example, * a factory reset). * * Persistent keys have a key identifier of type #mbedtls_svc_key_id_t. * This identifier remains valid throughout the lifetime of the key, * even if the application instance that created the key terminates. * The application can call psa_open_key() to open a persistent key that * it created previously. * * This specification defines two basic lifetime values: * - Keys with the lifetime #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE are volatile. * All implementations should support this lifetime. * - Keys with the lifetime #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT are persistent. * All implementations that have access to persistent storage with * appropriate security guarantees should support this lifetime. */ typedef uint32_t psa_key_lifetime_t; /** Encoding of key persistence levels. * * What distinguishes different persistence levels is what device management * events may cause keys to be destroyed. _Volatile_ keys are destroyed * by a power reset. Persistent keys may be destroyed by events such as * a transfer of ownership or a factory reset. What management events * actually affect persistent keys at different levels is outside the * scope of the PSA Cryptography specification. * * This specification defines the following values of persistence levels: * - \c 0 = #PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE: volatile key. * A volatile key is automatically destroyed by the implementation when * the application instance terminates. In particular, a volatile key * is automatically destroyed on a power reset of the device. * - \c 1 = #PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT: * persistent key with a default lifetime. * Implementations should support this value if they support persistent * keys at all. * Applications should use this value if they have no specific needs that * are only met by implementation-specific features. * - \c 2-127: persistent key with a PSA-specified lifetime. * The PSA Cryptography specification does not define the meaning of these * values, but other PSA specifications may do so. * - \c 128-254: persistent key with a vendor-specified lifetime. * No PSA specification will define the meaning of these values, so * implementations may choose the meaning freely. * As a guideline, higher persistence levels should cause a key to survive * more management events than lower levels. * - \c 255 = #PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY: * read-only or write-once key. * A key with this persistence level cannot be destroyed. * Implementations that support such keys may either allow their creation * through the PSA Cryptography API, preferably only to applications with * the appropriate privilege, or only expose keys created through * implementation-specific means such as a factory ROM engraving process. * Note that keys that are read-only due to policy restrictions * rather than due to physical limitations should not have this * persistence levels. * * \note Key persistence levels are 8-bit values. Key management * interfaces operate on lifetimes (type ::psa_key_lifetime_t) which * encode the persistence as the lower 8 bits of a 32-bit value. */ typedef uint8_t psa_key_persistence_t; /** Encoding of key location indicators. * * If an implementation of this API can make calls to external * cryptoprocessors such as secure elements, the location of a key * indicates which secure element performs the operations on the key. * If an implementation offers multiple physical locations for persistent * storage, the location indicator reflects at which physical location * the key is stored. * * This specification defines the following values of location indicators: * - \c 0: primary local storage. * All implementations should support this value. * The primary local storage is typically the same storage area that * contains the key metadata. * - \c 1: primary secure element. * Implementations should support this value if there is a secure element * attached to the operating environment. * As a guideline, secure elements may provide higher resistance against * side channel and physical attacks than the primary local storage, but may * have restrictions on supported key types, sizes, policies and operations * and may have different performance characteristics. * - \c 2-0x7fffff: other locations defined by a PSA specification. * The PSA Cryptography API does not currently assign any meaning to these * locations, but future versions of this specification or other PSA * specifications may do so. * - \c 0x800000-0xffffff: vendor-defined locations. * No PSA specification will assign a meaning to locations in this range. * * \note Key location indicators are 24-bit values. Key management * interfaces operate on lifetimes (type ::psa_key_lifetime_t) which * encode the location as the upper 24 bits of a 32-bit value. */ typedef uint32_t psa_key_location_t; /** Encoding of identifiers of persistent keys. * * - Applications may freely choose key identifiers in the range * #PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN to #PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX. * - Implementations may define additional key identifiers in the range * #PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN to #PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX. * - 0 is reserved as an invalid key identifier. * - Key identifiers outside these ranges are reserved for future use. */ typedef uint32_t psa_key_id_t; #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) typedef psa_key_id_t mbedtls_svc_key_id_t; #else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */ /* Implementation-specific: The Mbed Cryptography library can be built as * part of a multi-client service that exposes the PSA Cryptograpy API in each * client and encodes the client identity in the key identifier argument of * functions such as psa_open_key(). */ typedef struct { psa_key_id_t key_id; mbedtls_key_owner_id_t owner; } mbedtls_svc_key_id_t; #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */ /**@}*/ /** \defgroup policy Key policies * @{ */ /** \brief Encoding of permitted usage on a key. */ typedef uint32_t psa_key_usage_t; /**@}*/ /** \defgroup attributes Key attributes * @{ */ /** The type of a structure containing key attributes. * * This is an opaque structure that can represent the metadata of a key * object. Metadata that can be stored in attributes includes: * - The location of the key in storage, indicated by its key identifier * and its lifetime. * - The key's policy, comprising usage flags and a specification of * the permitted algorithm(s). * - Information about the key itself: the key type and its size. * - Implementations may define additional attributes. * * The actual key material is not considered an attribute of a key. * Key attributes do not contain information that is generally considered * highly confidential. * * An attribute structure can be a simple data structure where each function * `psa_set_key_xxx` sets a field and the corresponding function * `psa_get_key_xxx` retrieves the value of the corresponding field. * However, implementations may report values that are equivalent to the * original one, but have a different encoding. For example, an * implementation may use a more compact representation for types where * many bit-patterns are invalid or not supported, and store all values * that it does not support as a special marker value. In such an * implementation, after setting an invalid value, the corresponding * get function returns an invalid value which may not be the one that * was originally stored. * * An attribute structure may contain references to auxiliary resources, * for example pointers to allocated memory or indirect references to * pre-calculated values. In order to free such resources, the application * must call psa_reset_key_attributes(). As an exception, calling * psa_reset_key_attributes() on an attribute structure is optional if * the structure has only been modified by the following functions * since it was initialized or last reset with psa_reset_key_attributes(): * - psa_set_key_id() * - psa_set_key_lifetime() * - psa_set_key_type() * - psa_set_key_bits() * - psa_set_key_usage_flags() * - psa_set_key_algorithm() * * Before calling any function on a key attribute structure, the application * must initialize it by any of the following means: * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example: * \code * psa_key_attributes_t attributes; * memset(&attributes, 0, sizeof(attributes)); * \endcode * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example: * \code * psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {0}; * \endcode * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT, * for example: * \code * psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; * \endcode * - Assign the result of the function psa_key_attributes_init() * to the structure, for example: * \code * psa_key_attributes_t attributes; * attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); * \endcode * * A freshly initialized attribute structure contains the following * values: * * - lifetime: #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE. * - key identifier: 0 (which is not a valid key identifier). * - type: \c 0 (meaning that the type is unspecified). * - key size: \c 0 (meaning that the size is unspecified). * - usage flags: \c 0 (which allows no usage except exporting a public key). * - algorithm: \c 0 (which allows no cryptographic usage, but allows * exporting). * * A typical sequence to create a key is as follows: * -# Create and initialize an attribute structure. * -# If the key is persistent, call psa_set_key_id(). * Also call psa_set_key_lifetime() to place the key in a non-default * location. * -# Set the key policy with psa_set_key_usage_flags() and * psa_set_key_algorithm(). * -# Set the key type with psa_set_key_type(). * Skip this step if copying an existing key with psa_copy_key(). * -# When generating a random key with psa_generate_key() or deriving a key * with psa_key_derivation_output_key(), set the desired key size with * psa_set_key_bits(). * -# Call a key creation function: psa_import_key(), psa_generate_key(), * psa_key_derivation_output_key() or psa_copy_key(). This function reads * the attribute structure, creates a key with these attributes, and * outputs a key identifier to the newly created key. * -# The attribute structure is now no longer necessary. * You may call psa_reset_key_attributes(), although this is optional * with the workflow presented here because the attributes currently * defined in this specification do not require any additional resources * beyond the structure itself. * * A typical sequence to query a key's attributes is as follows: * -# Call psa_get_key_attributes(). * -# Call `psa_get_key_xxx` functions to retrieve the attribute(s) that * you are interested in. * -# Call psa_reset_key_attributes() to free any resources that may be * used by the attribute structure. * * Once a key has been created, it is impossible to change its attributes. */ typedef struct psa_key_attributes_s psa_key_attributes_t; #ifndef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) /* Mbed Crypto defines this type in crypto_types.h because it is also * visible to applications through an implementation-specific extension. * For the PSA Cryptography specification, this type is only visible * via crypto_se_driver.h. */ typedef uint64_t psa_key_slot_number_t; #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ #endif /* !__DOXYGEN_ONLY__ */ /**@}*/ /** \defgroup derivation Key derivation * @{ */ /** \brief Encoding of the step of a key derivation. */ typedef uint16_t psa_key_derivation_step_t; /**@}*/ #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_TYPES_H */ usr/include/psa/crypto_values.h0000644000000000000000000023553213764415275015673 0ustar rootroot/** * \file psa/crypto_values.h * * \brief PSA cryptography module: macros to build and analyze integer values. * * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must * include psa/crypto.h. Drivers must include the appropriate driver * header file. * * This file contains portable definitions of macros to build and analyze * values of integral types that encode properties of cryptographic keys, * designations of cryptographic algorithms, and error codes returned by * the library. * * This header file only defines preprocessor macros. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_VALUES_H #define PSA_CRYPTO_VALUES_H /** \defgroup error Error codes * @{ */ /* PSA error codes */ /** The action was completed successfully. */ #define PSA_SUCCESS ((psa_status_t)0) /** An error occurred that does not correspond to any defined * failure cause. * * Implementations may use this error code if none of the other standard * error codes are applicable. */ #define PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR ((psa_status_t)-132) /** The requested operation or a parameter is not supported * by this implementation. * * Implementations should return this error code when an enumeration * parameter such as a key type, algorithm, etc. is not recognized. * If a combination of parameters is recognized and identified as * not valid, return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT instead. */ #define PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ((psa_status_t)-134) /** The requested action is denied by a policy. * * Implementations should return this error code when the parameters * are recognized as valid and supported, and a policy explicitly * denies the requested operation. * * If a subset of the parameters of a function call identify a * forbidden operation, and another subset of the parameters are * not valid or not supported, it is unspecified whether the function * returns #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED, #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED or * #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT. */ #define PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ((psa_status_t)-133) /** An output buffer is too small. * * Applications can call the \c PSA_xxx_SIZE macro listed in the function * description to determine a sufficient buffer size. * * Implementations should preferably return this error code only * in cases when performing the operation with a larger output * buffer would succeed. However implementations may return this * error if a function has invalid or unsupported parameters in addition * to the parameters that determine the necessary output buffer size. */ #define PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ((psa_status_t)-138) /** Asking for an item that already exists * * Implementations should return this error, when attempting * to write an item (like a key) that already exists. */ #define PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS ((psa_status_t)-139) /** Asking for an item that doesn't exist * * Implementations should return this error, if a requested item (like * a key) does not exist. */ #define PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ((psa_status_t)-140) /** The requested action cannot be performed in the current state. * * Multipart operations return this error when one of the * functions is called out of sequence. Refer to the function * descriptions for permitted sequencing of functions. * * Implementations shall not return this error code to indicate * that a key either exists or not, * but shall instead return #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS or #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST * as applicable. * * Implementations shall not return this error code to indicate that a * key identifier is invalid, but shall return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE * instead. */ #define PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ((psa_status_t)-137) /** The parameters passed to the function are invalid. * * Implementations may return this error any time a parameter or * combination of parameters are recognized as invalid. * * Implementations shall not return this error code to indicate that a * key identifier is invalid, but shall return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE * instead. */ #define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ((psa_status_t)-135) /** There is not enough runtime memory. * * If the action is carried out across multiple security realms, this * error can refer to available memory in any of the security realms. */ #define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ((psa_status_t)-141) /** There is not enough persistent storage. * * Functions that modify the key storage return this error code if * there is insufficient storage space on the host media. In addition, * many functions that do not otherwise access storage may return this * error code if the implementation requires a mandatory log entry for * the requested action and the log storage space is full. */ #define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE ((psa_status_t)-142) /** There was a communication failure inside the implementation. * * This can indicate a communication failure between the application * and an external cryptoprocessor or between the cryptoprocessor and * an external volatile or persistent memory. A communication failure * may be transient or permanent depending on the cause. * * \warning If a function returns this error, it is undetermined * whether the requested action has completed or not. Implementations * should return #PSA_SUCCESS on successful completion whenever * possible, however functions may return #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * if the requested action was completed successfully in an external * cryptoprocessor but there was a breakdown of communication before * the cryptoprocessor could report the status to the application. */ #define PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE ((psa_status_t)-145) /** There was a storage failure that may have led to data loss. * * This error indicates that some persistent storage is corrupted. * It should not be used for a corruption of volatile memory * (use #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED), for a communication error * between the cryptoprocessor and its external storage (use * #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE), or when the storage is * in a valid state but is full (use #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE). * * Note that a storage failure does not indicate that any data that was * previously read is invalid. However this previously read data may no * longer be readable from storage. * * When a storage failure occurs, it is no longer possible to ensure * the global integrity of the keystore. Depending on the global * integrity guarantees offered by the implementation, access to other * data may or may not fail even if the data is still readable but * its integrity cannot be guaranteed. * * Implementations should only use this error code to report a * permanent storage corruption. However application writers should * keep in mind that transient errors while reading the storage may be * reported using this error code. */ #define PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE ((psa_status_t)-146) /** A hardware failure was detected. * * A hardware failure may be transient or permanent depending on the * cause. */ #define PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ((psa_status_t)-147) /** A tampering attempt was detected. * * If an application receives this error code, there is no guarantee * that previously accessed or computed data was correct and remains * confidential. Applications should not perform any security function * and should enter a safe failure state. * * Implementations may return this error code if they detect an invalid * state that cannot happen during normal operation and that indicates * that the implementation's security guarantees no longer hold. Depending * on the implementation architecture and on its security and safety goals, * the implementation may forcibly terminate the application. * * This error code is intended as a last resort when a security breach * is detected and it is unsure whether the keystore data is still * protected. Implementations shall only return this error code * to report an alarm from a tampering detector, to indicate that * the confidentiality of stored data can no longer be guaranteed, * or to indicate that the integrity of previously returned data is now * considered compromised. Implementations shall not use this error code * to indicate a hardware failure that merely makes it impossible to * perform the requested operation (use #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE, * #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE, #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE, * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY or other applicable error code * instead). * * This error indicates an attack against the application. Implementations * shall not return this error code as a consequence of the behavior of * the application itself. */ #define PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ((psa_status_t)-151) /** There is not enough entropy to generate random data needed * for the requested action. * * This error indicates a failure of a hardware random generator. * Application writers should note that this error can be returned not * only by functions whose purpose is to generate random data, such * as key, IV or nonce generation, but also by functions that execute * an algorithm with a randomized result, as well as functions that * use randomization of intermediate computations as a countermeasure * to certain attacks. * * Implementations should avoid returning this error after psa_crypto_init() * has succeeded. Implementations should generate sufficient * entropy during initialization and subsequently use a cryptographically * secure pseudorandom generator (PRNG). However implementations may return * this error at any time if a policy requires the PRNG to be reseeded * during normal operation. */ #define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ((psa_status_t)-148) /** The signature, MAC or hash is incorrect. * * Verification functions return this error if the verification * calculations completed successfully, and the value to be verified * was determined to be incorrect. * * If the value to verify has an invalid size, implementations may return * either #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT or #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE. */ #define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ((psa_status_t)-149) /** The decrypted padding is incorrect. * * \warning In some protocols, when decrypting data, it is essential that * the behavior of the application does not depend on whether the padding * is correct, down to precise timing. Applications should prefer * protocols that use authenticated encryption rather than plain * encryption. If the application must perform a decryption of * unauthenticated data, the application writer should take care not * to reveal whether the padding is invalid. * * Implementations should strive to make valid and invalid padding * as close as possible to indistinguishable to an external observer. * In particular, the timing of a decryption operation should not * depend on the validity of the padding. */ #define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING ((psa_status_t)-150) /** Return this error when there's insufficient data when attempting * to read from a resource. */ #define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA ((psa_status_t)-143) /** The key identifier is not valid. See also :ref:\`key-handles\`. */ #define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE ((psa_status_t)-136) /**@}*/ /** \defgroup crypto_types Key and algorithm types * @{ */ /** An invalid key type value. * * Zero is not the encoding of any key type. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE ((psa_key_type_t)0x0000) /** Vendor-defined key type flag. * * Key types defined by this standard will never have the * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG bit set. Vendors who define additional key types * must use an encoding with the #PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG bit set and should * respect the bitwise structure used by standard encodings whenever practical. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG ((psa_key_type_t)0x8000) #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK ((psa_key_type_t)0x7000) #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_RAW ((psa_key_type_t)0x1000) #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC ((psa_key_type_t)0x2000) #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_PUBLIC_KEY ((psa_key_type_t)0x4000) #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_KEY_PAIR ((psa_key_type_t)0x7000) #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR ((psa_key_type_t)0x3000) /** Whether a key type is vendor-defined. * * See also #PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_VENDOR_DEFINED(type) \ (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG) != 0) /** Whether a key type is an unstructured array of bytes. * * This encompasses both symmetric keys and non-key data. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED(type) \ (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_RAW || \ ((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC) /** Whether a key type is asymmetric: either a key pair or a public key. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC(type) \ (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK \ & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR) == \ PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_PUBLIC_KEY) /** Whether a key type is the public part of a key pair. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \ (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_PUBLIC_KEY) /** Whether a key type is a key pair containing a private part and a public * part. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type) \ (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_KEY_PAIR) /** The key pair type corresponding to a public key type. * * You may also pass a key pair type as \p type, it will be left unchanged. * * \param type A public key type or key pair type. * * \return The corresponding key pair type. * If \p type is not a public key or a key pair, * the return value is undefined. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_KEY_PAIR_OF_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \ ((type) | PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR) /** The public key type corresponding to a key pair type. * * You may also pass a key pair type as \p type, it will be left unchanged. * * \param type A public key type or key pair type. * * \return The corresponding public key type. * If \p type is not a public key or a key pair, * the return value is undefined. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) \ ((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR) /** Raw data. * * A "key" of this type cannot be used for any cryptographic operation. * Applications may use this type to store arbitrary data in the keystore. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA ((psa_key_type_t)0x1001) /** HMAC key. * * The key policy determines which underlying hash algorithm the key can be * used for. * * HMAC keys should generally have the same size as the underlying hash. * This size can be calculated with #PSA_HASH_SIZE(\c alg) where * \c alg is the HMAC algorithm or the underlying hash algorithm. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC ((psa_key_type_t)0x1100) /** A secret for key derivation. * * The key policy determines which key derivation algorithm the key * can be used for. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE ((psa_key_type_t)0x1200) /** Key for a cipher, AEAD or MAC algorithm based on the AES block cipher. * * The size of the key can be 16 bytes (AES-128), 24 bytes (AES-192) or * 32 bytes (AES-256). */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES ((psa_key_type_t)0x2400) /** Key for a cipher or MAC algorithm based on DES or 3DES (Triple-DES). * * The size of the key can be 8 bytes (single DES), 16 bytes (2-key 3DES) or * 24 bytes (3-key 3DES). * * Note that single DES and 2-key 3DES are weak and strongly * deprecated and should only be used to decrypt legacy data. 3-key 3DES * is weak and deprecated and should only be used in legacy protocols. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES ((psa_key_type_t)0x2301) /** Key for a cipher, AEAD or MAC algorithm based on the * Camellia block cipher. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA ((psa_key_type_t)0x2403) /** Key for the RC4 stream cipher. * * Note that RC4 is weak and deprecated and should only be used in * legacy protocols. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 ((psa_key_type_t)0x2002) /** Key for the ChaCha20 stream cipher or the Chacha20-Poly1305 AEAD algorithm. * * ChaCha20 and the ChaCha20_Poly1305 construction are defined in RFC 7539. * * Implementations must support 12-byte nonces, may support 8-byte nonces, * and should reject other sizes. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 ((psa_key_type_t)0x2004) /** RSA public key. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY ((psa_key_type_t)0x4001) /** RSA key pair (private and public key). */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR ((psa_key_type_t)0x7001) /** Whether a key type is an RSA key (pair or public-only). */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type) \ (PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE ((psa_key_type_t)0x4100) #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASE ((psa_key_type_t)0x7100) #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK ((psa_key_type_t)0x00ff) /** Elliptic curve key pair. * * \param curve A value of type ::psa_ecc_family_t that * identifies the ECC curve to be used. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(curve) \ (PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASE | (curve)) /** Elliptic curve public key. * * \param curve A value of type ::psa_ecc_family_t that * identifies the ECC curve to be used. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(curve) \ (PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE | (curve)) /** Whether a key type is an elliptic curve key (pair or public-only). */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type) \ ((PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) & \ ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE) /** Whether a key type is an elliptic curve key pair. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(type) \ (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) == \ PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASE) /** Whether a key type is an elliptic curve public key. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \ (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) == \ PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE) /** Extract the curve from an elliptic curve key type. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(type) \ ((psa_ecc_family_t) (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type) ? \ ((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) : \ 0)) /** SEC Koblitz curves over prime fields. * * This family comprises the following curves: * secp192k1, secp224k1, secp256k1. * They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_, * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_. * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf */ #define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x17) /** SEC random curves over prime fields. * * This family comprises the following curves: * secp192k1, secp224r1, secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1. * They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_, * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_. * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf */ #define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x12) /* SECP160R2 (SEC2 v1, obsolete) */ #define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x1b) /** SEC Koblitz curves over binary fields. * * This family comprises the following curves: * sect163k1, sect233k1, sect239k1, sect283k1, sect409k1, sect571k1. * They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_, * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_. * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf */ #define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x27) /** SEC random curves over binary fields. * * This family comprises the following curves: * sect163r1, sect233r1, sect283r1, sect409r1, sect571r1. * They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_, * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_. * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf */ #define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x22) /** SEC additional random curves over binary fields. * * This family comprises the following curve: * sect163r2. * It is defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_, * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_. * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf */ #define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x2b) /** Brainpool P random curves. * * This family comprises the following curves: * brainpoolP160r1, brainpoolP192r1, brainpoolP224r1, brainpoolP256r1, * brainpoolP320r1, brainpoolP384r1, brainpoolP512r1. * It is defined in RFC 5639. */ #define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x30) /** Curve25519 and Curve448. * * This family comprises the following Montgomery curves: * - 255-bit: Bernstein et al., * _Curve25519: new Diffie-Hellman speed records_, LNCS 3958, 2006. * The algorithm #PSA_ALG_ECDH performs X25519 when used with this curve. * - 448-bit: Hamburg, * _Ed448-Goldilocks, a new elliptic curve_, NIST ECC Workshop, 2015. * The algorithm #PSA_ALG_ECDH performs X448 when used with this curve. */ #define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x41) #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE ((psa_key_type_t)0x4200) #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASE ((psa_key_type_t)0x7200) #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK ((psa_key_type_t)0x00ff) /** Diffie-Hellman key pair. * * \param group A value of type ::psa_dh_family_t that identifies the * Diffie-Hellman group to be used. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(group) \ (PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASE | (group)) /** Diffie-Hellman public key. * * \param group A value of type ::psa_dh_family_t that identifies the * Diffie-Hellman group to be used. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(group) \ (PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE | (group)) /** Whether a key type is a Diffie-Hellman key (pair or public-only). */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type) \ ((PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) & \ ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE) /** Whether a key type is a Diffie-Hellman key pair. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_KEY_PAIR(type) \ (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) == \ PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASE) /** Whether a key type is a Diffie-Hellman public key. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \ (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) == \ PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE) /** Extract the group from a Diffie-Hellman key type. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GET_FAMILY(type) \ ((psa_dh_family_t) (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type) ? \ ((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) : \ 0)) /** Diffie-Hellman groups defined in RFC 7919 Appendix A. * * This family includes groups with the following key sizes (in bits): * 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192. A given implementation may support * all of these sizes or only a subset. */ #define PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919 ((psa_dh_family_t) 0x03) #define PSA_GET_KEY_TYPE_BLOCK_SIZE_EXPONENT(type) \ (((type) >> 8) & 7) /** The block size of a block cipher. * * \param type A cipher key type (value of type #psa_key_type_t). * * \return The block size for a block cipher, or 1 for a stream cipher. * The return value is undefined if \p type is not a supported * cipher key type. * * \note It is possible to build stream cipher algorithms on top of a block * cipher, for example CTR mode (#PSA_ALG_CTR). * This macro only takes the key type into account, so it cannot be * used to determine the size of the data that #psa_cipher_update() * might buffer for future processing in general. * * \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its argument is one. * * \warning This macro may evaluate its argument multiple times. */ #define PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE(type) \ (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC ? \ 1u << PSA_GET_KEY_TYPE_BLOCK_SIZE_EXPONENT(type) : \ 0u) /** Vendor-defined algorithm flag. * * Algorithms defined by this standard will never have the #PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG * bit set. Vendors who define additional algorithms must use an encoding with * the #PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG bit set and should respect the bitwise structure * used by standard encodings whenever practical. */ #define PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t)0x80000000) #define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t)0x7f000000) #define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000000) #define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MAC ((psa_algorithm_t)0x03000000) #define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04000000) #define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_AEAD ((psa_algorithm_t)0x05000000) #define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_SIGN ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06000000) #define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION ((psa_algorithm_t)0x07000000) #define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION ((psa_algorithm_t)0x08000000) #define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT ((psa_algorithm_t)0x09000000) /** Whether an algorithm is vendor-defined. * * See also #PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_DEFINED(alg) \ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG) != 0) /** Whether the specified algorithm is a hash algorithm. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \p alg is a hash algorithm, 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported * algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(alg) \ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH) /** Whether the specified algorithm is a MAC algorithm. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \p alg is a MAC algorithm, 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported * algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg) \ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MAC) /** Whether the specified algorithm is a symmetric cipher algorithm. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \p alg is a symmetric cipher algorithm, 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported * algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) \ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER) /** Whether the specified algorithm is an authenticated encryption * with associated data (AEAD) algorithm. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \p alg is an AEAD algorithm, 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported * algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) \ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_AEAD) /** Whether the specified algorithm is an asymmetric signature algorithm, * also known as public-key signature algorithm. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \p alg is an asymmetric signature algorithm, 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported * algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN(alg) \ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_SIGN) /** Whether the specified algorithm is an asymmetric encryption algorithm, * also known as public-key encryption algorithm. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \p alg is an asymmetric encryption algorithm, 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported * algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION(alg) \ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION) /** Whether the specified algorithm is a key agreement algorithm. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \p alg is a key agreement algorithm, 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported * algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) \ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT) /** Whether the specified algorithm is a key derivation algorithm. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \p alg is a key derivation algorithm, 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported * algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg) \ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION) #define PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t)0x000000ff) /** MD2 */ #define PSA_ALG_MD2 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000001) /** MD4 */ #define PSA_ALG_MD4 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000002) /** MD5 */ #define PSA_ALG_MD5 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000003) /** PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 */ #define PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000004) /** SHA1 */ #define PSA_ALG_SHA_1 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000005) /** SHA2-224 */ #define PSA_ALG_SHA_224 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000008) /** SHA2-256 */ #define PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000009) /** SHA2-384 */ #define PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x0200000a) /** SHA2-512 */ #define PSA_ALG_SHA_512 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x0200000b) /** SHA2-512/224 */ #define PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x0200000c) /** SHA2-512/256 */ #define PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x0200000d) /** SHA3-224 */ #define PSA_ALG_SHA3_224 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000010) /** SHA3-256 */ #define PSA_ALG_SHA3_256 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000011) /** SHA3-384 */ #define PSA_ALG_SHA3_384 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000012) /** SHA3-512 */ #define PSA_ALG_SHA3_512 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000013) /** In a hash-and-sign algorithm policy, allow any hash algorithm. * * This value may be used to form the algorithm usage field of a policy * for a signature algorithm that is parametrized by a hash. The key * may then be used to perform operations using the same signature * algorithm parametrized with any supported hash. * * That is, suppose that `PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE` is one of the following macros: * - #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN, #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS, * - #PSA_ALG_ECDSA, #PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA. * Then you may create and use a key as follows: * - Set the key usage field using #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH, for example: * ``` * psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH); // or VERIFY * psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH)); * ``` * - Import or generate key material. * - Call psa_sign_hash() or psa_verify_hash(), passing * an algorithm built from `PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE` and a specific hash. Each * call to sign or verify a message may use a different hash. * ``` * psa_sign_hash(key, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), ...); * psa_sign_hash(key, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_SHA_512), ...); * psa_sign_hash(key, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_SHA3_256), ...); * ``` * * This value may not be used to build other algorithms that are * parametrized over a hash. For any valid use of this macro to build * an algorithm \c alg, #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(\c alg) is true. * * This value may not be used to build an algorithm specification to * perform an operation. It is only valid to build policies. */ #define PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ((psa_algorithm_t)0x020000ff) #define PSA_ALG_MAC_SUBCATEGORY_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t)0x00c00000) #define PSA_ALG_HMAC_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x03800000) /** Macro to build an HMAC algorithm. * * For example, #PSA_ALG_HMAC(#PSA_ALG_SHA_256) is HMAC-SHA-256. * * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). * * \return The corresponding HMAC algorithm. * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported * hash algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_HMAC(hash_alg) \ (PSA_ALG_HMAC_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) #define PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(hmac_alg) \ (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hmac_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) /** Whether the specified algorithm is an HMAC algorithm. * * HMAC is a family of MAC algorithms that are based on a hash function. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \p alg is an HMAC algorithm, 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported * algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC(alg) \ (((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_MAC_SUBCATEGORY_MASK)) == \ PSA_ALG_HMAC_BASE) /* In the encoding of a MAC algorithm, the bits corresponding to * PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK encode the length to which the MAC is * truncated. As an exception, the value 0 means the untruncated algorithm, * whatever its length is. The length is encoded in 6 bits, so it can * reach up to 63; the largest MAC is 64 bytes so its trivial truncation * to full length is correctly encoded as 0 and any non-trivial truncation * is correctly encoded as a value between 1 and 63. */ #define PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t)0x003f0000) #define PSA_MAC_TRUNCATION_OFFSET 16 /** Macro to build a truncated MAC algorithm. * * A truncated MAC algorithm is identical to the corresponding MAC * algorithm except that the MAC value for the truncated algorithm * consists of only the first \p mac_length bytes of the MAC value * for the untruncated algorithm. * * \note This macro may allow constructing algorithm identifiers that * are not valid, either because the specified length is larger * than the untruncated MAC or because the specified length is * smaller than permitted by the implementation. * * \note It is implementation-defined whether a truncated MAC that * is truncated to the same length as the MAC of the untruncated * algorithm is considered identical to the untruncated algorithm * for policy comparison purposes. * * \param mac_alg A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type * #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) * is true). This may be a truncated or untruncated * MAC algorithm. * \param mac_length Desired length of the truncated MAC in bytes. * This must be at most the full length of the MAC * and must be at least an implementation-specified * minimum. The implementation-specified minimum * shall not be zero. * * \return The corresponding MAC algorithm with the specified * length. * \return Unspecified if \p alg is not a supported * MAC algorithm or if \p mac_length is too small or * too large for the specified MAC algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(mac_alg, mac_length) \ (((mac_alg) & ~PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK) | \ ((mac_length) << PSA_MAC_TRUNCATION_OFFSET & PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK)) /** Macro to build the base MAC algorithm corresponding to a truncated * MAC algorithm. * * \param mac_alg A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type * #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) * is true). This may be a truncated or untruncated * MAC algorithm. * * \return The corresponding base MAC algorithm. * \return Unspecified if \p alg is not a supported * MAC algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC(mac_alg) \ ((mac_alg) & ~PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK) /** Length to which a MAC algorithm is truncated. * * \param mac_alg A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type * #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) * is true). * * \return Length of the truncated MAC in bytes. * \return 0 if \p alg is a non-truncated MAC algorithm. * \return Unspecified if \p alg is not a supported * MAC algorithm. */ #define PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH(mac_alg) \ (((mac_alg) & PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK) >> PSA_MAC_TRUNCATION_OFFSET) #define PSA_ALG_CIPHER_MAC_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x03c00000) /** The CBC-MAC construction over a block cipher * * \warning CBC-MAC is insecure in many cases. * A more secure mode, such as #PSA_ALG_CMAC, is recommended. */ #define PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC ((psa_algorithm_t)0x03c00100) /** The CMAC construction over a block cipher */ #define PSA_ALG_CMAC ((psa_algorithm_t)0x03c00200) /** Whether the specified algorithm is a MAC algorithm based on a block cipher. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \p alg is a MAC algorithm based on a block cipher, 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported * algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC(alg) \ (((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_MAC_SUBCATEGORY_MASK)) == \ PSA_ALG_CIPHER_MAC_BASE) #define PSA_ALG_CIPHER_STREAM_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t)0x00800000) #define PSA_ALG_CIPHER_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t)0x00400000) /** Whether the specified algorithm is a stream cipher. * * A stream cipher is a symmetric cipher that encrypts or decrypts messages * by applying a bitwise-xor with a stream of bytes that is generated * from a key. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \p alg is a stream cipher algorithm, 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported * algorithm identifier or if it is not a symmetric cipher algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER(alg) \ (((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_CIPHER_STREAM_FLAG)) == \ (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER | PSA_ALG_CIPHER_STREAM_FLAG)) /** The stream cipher mode of a stream cipher algorithm. * * The underlying stream cipher is determined by the key type. * - To use ChaCha20, use a key type of #PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20. * - To use ARC4, use a key type of #PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4. */ #define PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04800100) /** The CTR stream cipher mode. * * CTR is a stream cipher which is built from a block cipher. * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. * For example, to use AES-128-CTR, use this algorithm with * a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES and a length of 128 bits (16 bytes). */ #define PSA_ALG_CTR ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04c01000) /** The CFB stream cipher mode. * * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. */ #define PSA_ALG_CFB ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04c01100) /** The OFB stream cipher mode. * * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. */ #define PSA_ALG_OFB ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04c01200) /** The XTS cipher mode. * * XTS is a cipher mode which is built from a block cipher. It requires at * least one full block of input, but beyond this minimum the input * does not need to be a whole number of blocks. */ #define PSA_ALG_XTS ((psa_algorithm_t)0x0440ff00) /** The Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode of a block cipher, with no padding. * * \warning ECB mode does not protect the confidentiality of the encrypted data * except in extremely narrow circumstances. It is recommended that applications * only use ECB if they need to construct an operating mode that the * implementation does not provide. Implementations are encouraged to provide * the modes that applications need in preference to supporting direct access * to ECB. * * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. * * This symmetric cipher mode can only be used with messages whose lengths are a * multiple of the block size of the chosen block cipher. * * ECB mode does not accept an initialization vector (IV). When using a * multi-part cipher operation with this algorithm, psa_cipher_generate_iv() * and psa_cipher_set_iv() must not be called. */ #define PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04404400) /** The CBC block cipher chaining mode, with no padding. * * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. * * This symmetric cipher mode can only be used with messages whose lengths * are whole number of blocks for the chosen block cipher. */ #define PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04404000) /** The CBC block cipher chaining mode with PKCS#7 padding. * * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. * * This is the padding method defined by PKCS#7 (RFC 2315) §10.3. */ #define PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04404100) #define PSA_ALG_AEAD_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t)0x00400000) /** Whether the specified algorithm is an AEAD mode on a block cipher. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \p alg is an AEAD algorithm which is an AEAD mode based on * a block cipher, 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported * algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) \ (((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_AEAD_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG)) == \ (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_AEAD | PSA_ALG_AEAD_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG)) /** The CCM authenticated encryption algorithm. * * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. */ #define PSA_ALG_CCM ((psa_algorithm_t)0x05500100) /** The GCM authenticated encryption algorithm. * * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. */ #define PSA_ALG_GCM ((psa_algorithm_t)0x05500200) /** The Chacha20-Poly1305 AEAD algorithm. * * The ChaCha20_Poly1305 construction is defined in RFC 7539. * * Implementations must support 12-byte nonces, may support 8-byte nonces, * and should reject other sizes. * * Implementations must support 16-byte tags and should reject other sizes. */ #define PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x05100500) /* In the encoding of a AEAD algorithm, the bits corresponding to * PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK encode the length of the AEAD tag. * The constants for default lengths follow this encoding. */ #define PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t)0x003f0000) #define PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_OFFSET 16 /** Macro to build a shortened AEAD algorithm. * * A shortened AEAD algorithm is similar to the corresponding AEAD * algorithm, but has an authentication tag that consists of fewer bytes. * Depending on the algorithm, the tag length may affect the calculation * of the ciphertext. * * \param aead_alg An AEAD algorithm identifier (value of type * #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) * is true). * \param tag_length Desired length of the authentication tag in bytes. * * \return The corresponding AEAD algorithm with the specified * length. * \return Unspecified if \p alg is not a supported * AEAD algorithm or if \p tag_length is not valid * for the specified AEAD algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_TAG_LENGTH(aead_alg, tag_length) \ (((aead_alg) & ~PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK) | \ ((tag_length) << PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_OFFSET & \ PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK)) /** Calculate the corresponding AEAD algorithm with the default tag length. * * \param aead_alg An AEAD algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). * * \return The corresponding AEAD algorithm with the default * tag length for that algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH(aead_alg) \ ( \ PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH_CASE(aead_alg, PSA_ALG_CCM) \ PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH_CASE(aead_alg, PSA_ALG_GCM) \ PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH_CASE(aead_alg, PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) \ 0) #define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH_CASE(aead_alg, ref) \ PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_TAG_LENGTH(aead_alg, 0) == \ PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_TAG_LENGTH(ref, 0) ? \ ref : #define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06000200) /** RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature with hashing. * * This is the signature scheme defined by RFC 8017 * (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications) under the name * RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5. * * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy. * * \return The corresponding RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature algorithm. * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported * hash algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(hash_alg) \ (PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) /** Raw PKCS#1 v1.5 signature. * * The input to this algorithm is the DigestInfo structure used by * RFC 8017 (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications), §9.2 * steps 3–6. */ #define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE #define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg) \ (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE) #define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06000300) /** RSA PSS signature with hashing. * * This is the signature scheme defined by RFC 8017 * (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications) under the name * RSASSA-PSS, with the message generation function MGF1, and with * a salt length equal to the length of the hash. The specified * hash algorithm is used to hash the input message, to create the * salted hash, and for the mask generation. * * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy. * * \return The corresponding RSA PSS signature algorithm. * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported * hash algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(hash_alg) \ (PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) #define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg) \ (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_BASE) #define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06000600) /** ECDSA signature with hashing. * * This is the ECDSA signature scheme defined by ANSI X9.62, * with a random per-message secret number (*k*). * * The representation of the signature as a byte string consists of * the concatentation of the signature values *r* and *s*. Each of * *r* and *s* is encoded as an *N*-octet string, where *N* is the length * of the base point of the curve in octets. Each value is represented * in big-endian order (most significant octet first). * * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy. * * \return The corresponding ECDSA signature algorithm. * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported * hash algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_ECDSA(hash_alg) \ (PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) /** ECDSA signature without hashing. * * This is the same signature scheme as #PSA_ALG_ECDSA(), but * without specifying a hash algorithm. This algorithm may only be * used to sign or verify a sequence of bytes that should be an * already-calculated hash. Note that the input is padded with * zeros on the left or truncated on the left as required to fit * the curve size. */ #define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE #define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06000700) /** Deterministic ECDSA signature with hashing. * * This is the deterministic ECDSA signature scheme defined by RFC 6979. * * The representation of a signature is the same as with #PSA_ALG_ECDSA(). * * Note that when this algorithm is used for verification, signatures * made with randomized ECDSA (#PSA_ALG_ECDSA(\p hash_alg)) with the * same private key are accepted. In other words, * #PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(\p hash_alg) differs from * #PSA_ALG_ECDSA(\p hash_alg) only for signature, not for verification. * * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy. * * \return The corresponding deterministic ECDSA signature * algorithm. * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported * hash algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(hash_alg) \ (PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) #define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t)0x00000100) #define PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) \ (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK & ~PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) == \ PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE) #define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg) \ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) != 0) #define PSA_ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(alg) \ (PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) && PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg)) #define PSA_ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_ECDSA(alg) \ (PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) && !PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg)) /** Whether the specified algorithm is a hash-and-sign algorithm. * * Hash-and-sign algorithms are asymmetric (public-key) signature algorithms * structured in two parts: first the calculation of a hash in a way that * does not depend on the key, then the calculation of a signature from the * hash value and the key. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \p alg is a hash-and-sign algorithm, 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported * algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) \ (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg) || \ PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg)) /** Get the hash used by a hash-and-sign signature algorithm. * * A hash-and-sign algorithm is a signature algorithm which is * composed of two phases: first a hashing phase which does not use * the key and produces a hash of the input message, then a signing * phase which only uses the hash and the key and not the message * itself. * * \param alg A signature algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN(\p alg) is true). * * \return The underlying hash algorithm if \p alg is a hash-and-sign * algorithm. * \return 0 if \p alg is a signature algorithm that does not * follow the hash-and-sign structure. * \return Unspecified if \p alg is not a signature algorithm or * if it is not supported by the implementation. */ #define PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg) \ (PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) ? \ ((alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == 0 ? /*"raw" algorithm*/ 0 : \ ((alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH : \ 0) /** RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption. */ #define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT ((psa_algorithm_t)0x07000200) #define PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x07000300) /** RSA OAEP encryption. * * This is the encryption scheme defined by RFC 8017 * (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications) under the name * RSAES-OAEP, with the message generation function MGF1. * * \param hash_alg The hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true) to use * for MGF1. * * \return The corresponding RSA OAEP encryption algorithm. * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported * hash algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(hash_alg) \ (PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) #define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg) \ (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_BASE) #define PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_GET_HASH(alg) \ (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg) ? \ ((alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH : \ 0) #define PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x08000100) /** Macro to build an HKDF algorithm. * * For example, `PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA256)` is HKDF using HMAC-SHA-256. * * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs: * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT is the salt used in the "extract" step. * It is optional; if omitted, the derivation uses an empty salt. * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the secret key used in the "extract" step. * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO is the info string used in the "expand" step. * You must pass #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT before #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET. * You may pass #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO at any time after steup and before * starting to generate output. * * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). * * \return The corresponding HKDF algorithm. * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported * hash algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_HKDF(hash_alg) \ (PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) /** Whether the specified algorithm is an HKDF algorithm. * * HKDF is a family of key derivation algorithms that are based on a hash * function and the HMAC construction. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \c alg is an HKDF algorithm, 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported * key derivation algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF(alg) \ (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE) #define PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH(hkdf_alg) \ (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hkdf_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) #define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x08000200) /** Macro to build a TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm. * * TLS 1.2 uses a custom pseudorandom function (PRF) for key schedule, * specified in Section 5 of RFC 5246. It is based on HMAC and can be * used with either SHA-256 or SHA-384. * * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs, which must be * passed in the order given here: * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED is the seed. * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the secret key. * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL is the label. * * For the application to TLS-1.2 key expansion, the seed is the * concatenation of ServerHello.Random + ClientHello.Random, * and the label is "key expansion". * * For example, `PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA256)` represents the * TLS 1.2 PRF using HMAC-SHA-256. * * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). * * \return The corresponding TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm. * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported * hash algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(hash_alg) \ (PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) /** Whether the specified algorithm is a TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \c alg is a TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm, 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported * key derivation algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(alg) \ (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_BASE) #define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_GET_HASH(hkdf_alg) \ (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hkdf_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) #define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x08000300) /** Macro to build a TLS-1.2 PSK-to-MasterSecret algorithm. * * In a pure-PSK handshake in TLS 1.2, the master secret is derived * from the PreSharedKey (PSK) through the application of padding * (RFC 4279, Section 2) and the TLS-1.2 PRF (RFC 5246, Section 5). * The latter is based on HMAC and can be used with either SHA-256 * or SHA-384. * * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs, which must be * passed in the order given here: * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED is the seed. * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the secret key. * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL is the label. * * For the application to TLS-1.2, the seed (which is * forwarded to the TLS-1.2 PRF) is the concatenation of the * ClientHello.Random + ServerHello.Random, * and the label is "master secret" or "extended master secret". * * For example, `PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA256)` represents the * TLS-1.2 PSK to MasterSecret derivation PRF using HMAC-SHA-256. * * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). * * \return The corresponding TLS-1.2 PSK to MS algorithm. * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported * hash algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(hash_alg) \ (PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) /** Whether the specified algorithm is a TLS-1.2 PSK to MS algorithm. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \c alg is a TLS-1.2 PSK to MS algorithm, 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported * key derivation algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(alg) \ (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_BASE) #define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_GET_HASH(hkdf_alg) \ (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hkdf_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) #define PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t)0xfe00ffff) #define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t)0xffff0000) /** Macro to build a combined algorithm that chains a key agreement with * a key derivation. * * \param ka_alg A key agreement algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such * that #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(\p ka_alg) is true). * \param kdf_alg A key derivation algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such * that #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(\p kdf_alg) is true). * * \return The corresponding key agreement and derivation * algorithm. * \return Unspecified if \p ka_alg is not a supported * key agreement algorithm or \p kdf_alg is not a * supported key derivation algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(ka_alg, kdf_alg) \ ((ka_alg) | (kdf_alg)) #define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF(alg) \ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION) #define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg) \ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT) /** Whether the specified algorithm is a raw key agreement algorithm. * * A raw key agreement algorithm is one that does not specify * a key derivation function. * Usually, raw key agreement algorithms are constructed directly with * a \c PSA_ALG_xxx macro while non-raw key agreement algorithms are * constructed with #PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(). * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \p alg is a raw key agreement algorithm, 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported * algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) \ (PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) && \ PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF(alg) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION) #define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION_OR_AGREEMENT(alg) \ ((PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg))) /** The finite-field Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement algorithm. * * The shared secret produced by key agreement is * `g^{ab}` in big-endian format. * It is `ceiling(m / 8)` bytes long where `m` is the size of the prime `p` * in bits. */ #define PSA_ALG_FFDH ((psa_algorithm_t)0x09010000) /** Whether the specified algorithm is a finite field Diffie-Hellman algorithm. * * This includes the raw finite field Diffie-Hellman algorithm as well as * finite-field Diffie-Hellman followed by any supporter key derivation * algorithm. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \c alg is a finite field Diffie-Hellman algorithm, 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported * key agreement algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_FFDH(alg) \ (PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg) == PSA_ALG_FFDH) /** The elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement algorithm. * * The shared secret produced by key agreement is the x-coordinate of * the shared secret point. It is always `ceiling(m / 8)` bytes long where * `m` is the bit size associated with the curve, i.e. the bit size of the * order of the curve's coordinate field. When `m` is not a multiple of 8, * the byte containing the most significant bit of the shared secret * is padded with zero bits. The byte order is either little-endian * or big-endian depending on the curve type. * * - For Montgomery curves (curve types `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_CURVEXXX`), * the shared secret is the x-coordinate of `d_A Q_B = d_B Q_A` * in little-endian byte order. * The bit size is 448 for Curve448 and 255 for Curve25519. * - For Weierstrass curves over prime fields (curve types * `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECPXXX` and `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_PXXX`), * the shared secret is the x-coordinate of `d_A Q_B = d_B Q_A` * in big-endian byte order. * The bit size is `m = ceiling(log_2(p))` for the field `F_p`. * - For Weierstrass curves over binary fields (curve types * `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECTXXX`), * the shared secret is the x-coordinate of `d_A Q_B = d_B Q_A` * in big-endian byte order. * The bit size is `m` for the field `F_{2^m}`. */ #define PSA_ALG_ECDH ((psa_algorithm_t)0x09020000) /** Whether the specified algorithm is an elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman * algorithm. * * This includes the raw elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm as well as * elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman followed by any supporter key derivation * algorithm. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \c alg is an elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm, * 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported * key agreement algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_ECDH(alg) \ (PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg) == PSA_ALG_ECDH) /** Whether the specified algorithm encoding is a wildcard. * * Wildcard values may only be used to set the usage algorithm field in * a policy, not to perform an operation. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \c alg is a wildcard algorithm encoding. * \return 0 if \c alg is a non-wildcard algorithm encoding (suitable for * an operation). * \return This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported * algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_WILDCARD(alg) \ (PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) ? \ PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH : \ (alg) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) /**@}*/ /** \defgroup key_lifetimes Key lifetimes * @{ */ /** The default lifetime for volatile keys. * * A volatile key only exists as long as the identifier to it is not destroyed. * The key material is guaranteed to be erased on a power reset. * * A key with this lifetime is typically stored in the RAM area of the * PSA Crypto subsystem. However this is an implementation choice. * If an implementation stores data about the key in a non-volatile memory, * it must release all the resources associated with the key and erase the * key material if the calling application terminates. */ #define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE ((psa_key_lifetime_t)0x00000000) /** The default lifetime for persistent keys. * * A persistent key remains in storage until it is explicitly destroyed or * until the corresponding storage area is wiped. This specification does * not define any mechanism to wipe a storage area, but implementations may * provide their own mechanism (for example to perform a factory reset, * to prepare for device refurbishment, or to uninstall an application). * * This lifetime value is the default storage area for the calling * application. Implementations may offer other storage areas designated * by other lifetime values as implementation-specific extensions. * See ::psa_key_lifetime_t for more information. */ #define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT ((psa_key_lifetime_t)0x00000001) /** The persistence level of volatile keys. * * See ::psa_key_persistence_t for more information. */ #define PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE ((psa_key_persistence_t)0x00) /** The default persistence level for persistent keys. * * See ::psa_key_persistence_t for more information. */ #define PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT ((psa_key_persistence_t)0x01) /** A persistence level indicating that a key is never destroyed. * * See ::psa_key_persistence_t for more information. */ #define PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY ((psa_key_persistence_t)0xff) #define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(lifetime) \ ((psa_key_persistence_t)((lifetime) & 0x000000ff)) #define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(lifetime) \ ((psa_key_location_t)((lifetime) >> 8)) /** Whether a key lifetime indicates that the key is volatile. * * A volatile key is automatically destroyed by the implementation when * the application instance terminates. In particular, a volatile key * is automatically destroyed on a power reset of the device. * * A key that is not volatile is persistent. Persistent keys are * preserved until the application explicitly destroys them or until an * implementation-specific device management event occurs (for example, * a factory reset). * * \param lifetime The lifetime value to query (value of type * ::psa_key_lifetime_t). * * \return \c 1 if the key is volatile, otherwise \c 0. */ #define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(lifetime) \ (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(lifetime) == \ PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE) /** Construct a lifetime from a persistence level and a location. * * \param persistence The persistence level * (value of type ::psa_key_persistence_t). * \param location The location indicator * (value of type ::psa_key_location_t). * * \return The constructed lifetime value. */ #define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(persistence, location) \ ((location) << 8 | (persistence)) /** The local storage area for persistent keys. * * This storage area is available on all systems that can store persistent * keys without delegating the storage to a third-party cryptoprocessor. * * See ::psa_key_location_t for more information. */ #define PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE ((psa_key_location_t)0x000000) #define PSA_KEY_LOCATION_VENDOR_FLAG ((psa_key_location_t)0x800000) /** The minimum value for a key identifier chosen by the application. */ #define PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN ((psa_key_id_t)0x00000001) /** The maximum value for a key identifier chosen by the application. */ #define PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX ((psa_key_id_t)0x3fffffff) /** The minimum value for a key identifier chosen by the implementation. */ #define PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN ((psa_key_id_t)0x40000000) /** The maximum value for a key identifier chosen by the implementation. */ #define PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX ((psa_key_id_t)0x7fffffff) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) #define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT ( (psa_key_id_t)0 ) #define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( id ) ( id ) #define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_OWNER_ID( id ) ( 0 ) /** Utility to initialize a key identifier at runtime. * * \param unused Unused parameter. * \param key_id Identifier of the key. */ static inline mbedtls_svc_key_id_t mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( unsigned int unused, psa_key_id_t key_id ) { (void)unused; return( key_id ); } /** Compare two key identifiers. * * \param id1 First key identifier. * \param id2 Second key identifier. * * \return Non-zero if the two key identifier are equal, zero otherwise. */ static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id1, mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id2 ) { return( id1 == id2 ); } /** Check whether a key identifier is null. * * \param key Key identifier. * * \return Non-zero if the key identifier is null, zero otherwise. */ static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ) { return( key == 0 ); } #else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */ #define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT ( (mbedtls_svc_key_id_t){ 0, 0 } ) #define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( id ) ( ( id ).key_id ) #define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_OWNER_ID( id ) ( ( id ).owner ) /** Utility to initialize a key identifier at runtime. * * \param owner_id Identifier of the key owner. * \param key_id Identifier of the key. */ static inline mbedtls_svc_key_id_t mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( mbedtls_key_owner_id_t owner_id, psa_key_id_t key_id ) { return( (mbedtls_svc_key_id_t){ .key_id = key_id, .owner = owner_id } ); } /** Compare two key identifiers. * * \param id1 First key identifier. * \param id2 Second key identifier. * * \return Non-zero if the two key identifier are equal, zero otherwise. */ static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id1, mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id2 ) { return( ( id1.key_id == id2.key_id ) && mbedtls_key_owner_id_equal( id1.owner, id2.owner ) ); } /** Check whether a key identifier is null. * * \param key Key identifier. * * \return Non-zero if the key identifier is null, zero otherwise. */ static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ) { return( ( key.key_id == 0 ) && ( key.owner == 0 ) ); } #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */ /**@}*/ /** \defgroup policy Key policies * @{ */ /** Whether the key may be exported. * * A public key or the public part of a key pair may always be exported * regardless of the value of this permission flag. * * If a key does not have export permission, implementations shall not * allow the key to be exported in plain form from the cryptoprocessor, * whether through psa_export_key() or through a proprietary interface. * The key may however be exportable in a wrapped form, i.e. in a form * where it is encrypted by another key. */ #define PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000001) /** Whether the key may be copied. * * This flag allows the use of psa_copy_key() to make a copy of the key * with the same policy or a more restrictive policy. * * For lifetimes for which the key is located in a secure element which * enforce the non-exportability of keys, copying a key outside the secure * element also requires the usage flag #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT. * Copying the key inside the secure element is permitted with just * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY if the secure element supports it. * For keys with the lifetime #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE or * #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT, the usage flag #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY * is sufficient to permit the copy. */ #define PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000002) /** Whether the key may be used to encrypt a message. * * This flag allows the key to be used for a symmetric encryption operation, * for an AEAD encryption-and-authentication operation, * or for an asymmetric encryption operation, * if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy. * * For a key pair, this concerns the public key. */ #define PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000100) /** Whether the key may be used to decrypt a message. * * This flag allows the key to be used for a symmetric decryption operation, * for an AEAD decryption-and-verification operation, * or for an asymmetric decryption operation, * if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy. * * For a key pair, this concerns the private key. */ #define PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000200) /** Whether the key may be used to sign a message. * * This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC calculation operation * or for an asymmetric signature operation, * if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy. * * For a key pair, this concerns the private key. */ #define PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00001000) /** Whether the key may be used to verify a message signature. * * This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC verification operation * or for an asymmetric signature verification operation, * if otherwise permitted by by the key's type and policy. * * For a key pair, this concerns the public key. */ #define PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00002000) /** Whether the key may be used to derive other keys. */ #define PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00004000) /**@}*/ /** \defgroup derivation Key derivation * @{ */ /** A secret input for key derivation. * * This should be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE * (passed to psa_key_derivation_input_key()) * or the shared secret resulting from a key agreement * (obtained via psa_key_derivation_key_agreement()). * * The secret can also be a direct input (passed to * key_derivation_input_bytes()). In this case, the derivation operation * may not be used to derive keys: the operation will only allow * psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(), not psa_key_derivation_output_key(). */ #define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET ((psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0101) /** A label for key derivation. * * This should be a direct input. * It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA. */ #define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL ((psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0201) /** A salt for key derivation. * * This should be a direct input. * It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA. */ #define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT ((psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0202) /** An information string for key derivation. * * This should be a direct input. * It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA. */ #define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO ((psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0203) /** A seed for key derivation. * * This should be a direct input. * It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA. */ #define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED ((psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0204) /**@}*/ #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_VALUES_H */ usr/lib64/0000755000000000000000000000000013776116123011314 5ustar rootrootusr/lib64/libmbedcrypto.a0000644000000000000000000256536213776116114014340 0ustar rootroot! / 1610128460 0 0 0 18198 ` HzHzHzHzHzHzHzHzHzHzHzHzHzHzHzHzHzHzHzHzFFFFF2222222222222222JJJfffffffff3333333333RfRfRfRfRfRfRfRfRfRfRfRfRfRfRfRfRfRfRfRfRf""$V$V$V$V$V$V$V$V$V$V$V$V$V$V$V$V$V$V$V_2_2_2_2_2_2_2_2_2_2_2**************RRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRR~vvvvv222222222222222EEEEEEEEEEEEEEmnmnmnmnmnmnmnmnmnmnmnmnmnmnmnmnmn$:$:$:=v=v=v\2\2\2\2\2\2JJȦȦ                    ' ' ' ' 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 hJ hJ hJ hJ hJ hJ hJ hJ hJ hJ hJ hJ hJ hJ hJ hJ hJ hJ hJ hJ hJ hJ hJ hJ hJ hJ hJ hJ hJ hJ hJ . . . . . 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 _J _J _J _J _J _J _J _J _J _J _J _J _J _J n n n R . . . . . .mbedtls_aes_initmbedtls_aes_freembedtls_aes_xts_initmbedtls_aes_xts_freembedtls_aes_setkey_encmbedtls_aes_setkey_decmbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_encmbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_decmbedtls_internal_aes_encryptmbedtls_aes_encryptmbedtls_internal_aes_decryptmbedtls_aes_decryptmbedtls_aes_crypt_ecbmbedtls_aes_crypt_cbcmbedtls_aes_crypt_xtsmbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb8mbedtls_aes_crypt_ofbmbedtls_aes_crypt_ctrmbedtls_aes_self_testmbedtls_aesni_has_supportmbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecbmbedtls_aesni_gcm_multmbedtls_aesni_inverse_keymbedtls_aesni_setkey_encmbedtls_arc4_initmbedtls_arc4_freembedtls_arc4_setupmbedtls_arc4_cryptmbedtls_arc4_self_testmbedtls_asn1_get_lenmbedtls_asn1_get_tagmbedtls_asn1_get_boolmbedtls_asn1_get_intmbedtls_asn1_get_enummbedtls_asn1_get_mpimbedtls_asn1_get_bitstringmbedtls_asn1_traverse_sequence_ofmbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_nullmbedtls_asn1_sequence_freembedtls_asn1_get_sequence_ofmbedtls_asn1_get_algmbedtls_asn1_get_alg_nullmbedtls_asn1_free_named_datambedtls_asn1_free_named_data_listmbedtls_asn1_find_named_datambedtls_asn1_write_lenmbedtls_asn1_write_tagmbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffermbedtls_asn1_write_mpimbedtls_asn1_write_nullmbedtls_asn1_write_oidmbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifiermbedtls_asn1_write_boolmbedtls_asn1_write_intmbedtls_asn1_write_enummbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_stringmbedtls_asn1_write_utf8_stringmbedtls_asn1_write_printable_stringmbedtls_asn1_write_ia5_stringmbedtls_asn1_write_bitstringmbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstringmbedtls_asn1_write_octet_stringmbedtls_asn1_store_named_datambedtls_base64_encodembedtls_base64_decodembedtls_base64_self_testmbedtls_mpi_initmbedtls_mpi_freembedtls_mpi_growmbedtls_mpi_shrinkmbedtls_mpi_copymbedtls_mpi_swapmbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assignmbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swapmbedtls_mpi_lsetmbedtls_mpi_get_bitmbedtls_mpi_set_bitmbedtls_mpi_lsbmbedtls_mpi_bitlenmbedtls_mpi_sizembedtls_mpi_read_binary_lembedtls_mpi_read_binarymbedtls_mpi_write_binary_lembedtls_mpi_write_binarymbedtls_mpi_shift_lmbedtls_mpi_shift_rmbedtls_mpi_cmp_absmbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpimbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ctmbedtls_mpi_cmp_intmbedtls_mpi_add_absmbedtls_mpi_sub_absmbedtls_mpi_add_mpimbedtls_mpi_sub_mpimbedtls_mpi_add_intmbedtls_mpi_sub_intmbedtls_mpi_mul_mpimbedtls_mpi_mul_intmbedtls_mpi_read_stringmbedtls_mpi_read_filembedtls_mpi_div_mpimbedtls_mpi_div_intmbedtls_mpi_mod_mpimbedtls_mpi_mod_intmbedtls_mpi_write_stringmbedtls_mpi_write_filembedtls_mpi_exp_modmbedtls_mpi_gcdmbedtls_mpi_fill_randommbedtls_mpi_inv_modmbedtls_mpi_is_prime_extmbedtls_mpi_is_primembedtls_mpi_gen_primembedtls_mpi_self_testmbedtls_blowfish_initmbedtls_blowfish_freembedtls_blowfish_setkeymbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecbmbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cbcmbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cfb64mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ctrmbedtls_camellia_initmbedtls_camellia_freembedtls_camellia_setkey_encmbedtls_camellia_setkey_decmbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecbmbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbcmbedtls_camellia_crypt_cfb128mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctrmbedtls_camellia_self_testmbedtls_ccm_initmbedtls_ccm_setkeymbedtls_ccm_freembedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tagmbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tagmbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decryptmbedtls_ccm_auth_decryptmbedtls_ccm_self_testmbedtls_chacha20_initmbedtls_chacha20_freembedtls_chacha20_setkeymbedtls_chacha20_startsmbedtls_chacha20_updatembedtls_chacha20_cryptmbedtls_chacha20_self_testmbedtls_chachapoly_initmbedtls_chachapoly_freembedtls_chachapoly_setkeymbedtls_chachapoly_startsmbedtls_chachapoly_update_aadmbedtls_chachapoly_updatembedtls_chachapoly_finishmbedtls_chachapoly_encrypt_and_tagmbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decryptmbedtls_chachapoly_self_testmbedtls_cipher_listmbedtls_cipher_info_from_typembedtls_cipher_info_from_stringmbedtls_cipher_info_from_valuesmbedtls_cipher_initmbedtls_cipher_freembedtls_cipher_setkeymbedtls_cipher_set_ivmbedtls_cipher_resetmbedtls_cipher_update_admbedtls_cipher_updatembedtls_cipher_finishmbedtls_cipher_set_padding_modembedtls_cipher_setupmbedtls_cipher_write_tagmbedtls_cipher_check_tagmbedtls_cipher_cryptmbedtls_cipher_auth_encryptmbedtls_cipher_auth_decryptmbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_extmbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_extmbedtls_cipher_supportedmbedtls_cipher_definitionsmbedtls_ctr_drbg_initmbedtls_ctr_drbg_freembedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistancembedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_lenmbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_lenmbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_reseed_intervalmbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_retmbedtls_ctr_drbg_updatembedtls_ctr_drbg_reseedmbedtls_ctr_drbg_seedmbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_addmbedtls_ctr_drbg_randommbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_filembedtls_ctr_drbg_update_seed_filembedtls_ctr_drbg_self_testmbedtls_des_initmbedtls_des_freembedtls_des3_initmbedtls_des3_freembedtls_des_key_set_paritymbedtls_des_key_check_key_paritymbedtls_des_key_check_weakmbedtls_des_setkeymbedtls_des_setkey_encmbedtls_des_setkey_decmbedtls_des3_set2key_encmbedtls_des3_set2key_decmbedtls_des3_set3key_encmbedtls_des3_set3key_decmbedtls_des_crypt_ecbmbedtls_des_crypt_cbcmbedtls_des3_crypt_ecbmbedtls_des3_crypt_cbcmbedtls_des_self_testmbedtls_dhm_initmbedtls_dhm_read_p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form_setupmbedtls_platform_teardownmbedtls_platform_zeroizembedtls_platform_gmtime_rmbedtls_poly1305_initmbedtls_poly1305_freembedtls_poly1305_startsmbedtls_poly1305_updatembedtls_poly1305_finishmbedtls_poly1305_macmbedtls_poly1305_self_testmbedtls_to_psa_errormbedtls_ecc_group_of_psapsa_copy_key_material_into_slotpsa_wipe_key_slotpsa_destroy_keypsa_reset_key_attributespsa_set_key_domain_parameterspsa_get_key_domain_parameterspsa_get_key_attributespsa_export_keypsa_export_public_keypsa_import_keypsa_copy_keypsa_hash_abortpsa_hash_setuppsa_hash_updatepsa_hash_finishpsa_hash_verifypsa_hash_computepsa_hash_comparepsa_hash_clonepsa_mac_abortpsa_mac_sign_setuppsa_mac_verify_setuppsa_mac_updatepsa_mac_sign_finishpsa_mac_verify_finishpsa_sign_hashpsa_verify_hashpsa_asymmetric_encryptpsa_asymmetric_decryptpsa_cipher_abortpsa_cipher_encrypt_setuppsa_cipher_decrypt_setuppsa_cipher_set_ivpsa_cipher_generate_ivpsa_cipher_updatepsa_cipher_finishpsa_aead_encryptpsa_aead_decryptpsa_key_derivation_abortpsa_key_derivation_get_capacitypsa_key_derivation_set_capacitypsa_key_derivation_output_bytespsa_key_derivation_output_keypsa_key_derivation_setuppsa_key_derivation_input_bytespsa_key_derivation_input_keypsa_key_derivation_key_agreementpsa_generate_randompsa_raw_key_agreementpsa_generate_keymbedtls_psa_crypto_configure_entropy_sourcesmbedtls_psa_crypto_freepsa_crypto_initpsa_driver_wrapper_sign_hashpsa_driver_wrapper_verify_hashpsa_driver_wrapper_generate_keypsa_driver_wrapper_validate_keypsa_driver_wrapper_export_public_keypsa_driver_wrapper_cipher_encryptpsa_driver_wrapper_cipher_decryptpsa_driver_wrapper_cipher_encrypt_setuppsa_driver_wrapper_cipher_decrypt_setuppsa_driver_wrapper_cipher_generate_ivpsa_driver_wrapper_cipher_set_ivpsa_driver_wrapper_cipher_updatepsa_driver_wrapper_cipher_finishpsa_driver_wrapper_cipher_abortpsa_validate_key_idpsa_initialize_key_slotspsa_wipe_all_key_slotspsa_get_empty_key_slotpsa_get_and_lock_key_slotpsa_unlock_key_slotpsa_validate_key_locationpsa_validate_key_persistencepsa_open_keypsa_close_keypsa_purge_keymbedtls_psa_get_statspsa_is_key_present_in_storagepsa_destroy_persistent_keypsa_format_key_data_for_storagepsa_parse_key_data_from_storagepsa_save_persistent_keypsa_free_persistent_key_datapsa_load_persistent_keypsa_its_get_infopsa_its_getpsa_its_setpsa_its_removembedtls_ripemd160_initmbedtls_ripemd160_freembedtls_ripemd160_clonembedtls_ripemd160_starts_retmbedtls_ripemd160_startsmbedtls_internal_ripemd160_processmbedtls_ripemd160_processmbedtls_ripemd160_update_retmbedtls_ripemd160_updatembedtls_ripemd160_finish_retmbedtls_ripemd160_finishmbedtls_ripemd160_retmbedtls_ripemd160mbedtls_ripemd160_self_testmbedtls_rsa_importmbedtls_rsa_import_rawmbedtls_rsa_completembedtls_rsa_export_rawmbedtls_rsa_exportmbedtls_rsa_export_crtmbedtls_rsa_set_paddingmbedtls_rsa_initmbedtls_rsa_get_lenmbedtls_rsa_check_pubkeymbedtls_rsa_check_privkeymbedtls_rsa_check_pub_privmbedtls_rsa_publicmbedtls_rsa_privatembedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encryptmbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encryptmbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encryptmbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decryptmbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decryptmbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decryptmbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_signmbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_signmbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_signmbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_extmbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verifymbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verifymbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verifymbedtls_rsa_freembedtls_rsa_gen_keymbedtls_rsa_copymbedtls_rsa_self_testmbedtls_rsa_deduce_primesmbedtls_rsa_deduce_private_exponentmbedtls_rsa_validate_crtmbedtls_rsa_validate_paramsmbedtls_rsa_deduce_crtmbedtls_sha1_initmbedtls_sha1_freembedtls_sha1_clonembedtls_sha1_starts_retmbedtls_sha1_startsmbedtls_internal_sha1_processmbedtls_sha1_processmbedtls_sha1_update_retmbedtls_sha1_updatembedtls_sha1_finish_retmbedtls_sha1_finishmbedtls_sha1_retmbedtls_sha1mbedtls_sha1_self_testmbedtls_sha256_initmbedtls_sha256_freembedtls_sha256_clonembedtls_sha256_starts_retmbedtls_sha256_startsmbedtls_internal_sha256_processmbedtls_sha256_processmbedtls_sha256_update_retmbedtls_sha256_updatembedtls_sha256_finish_retmbedtls_sha256_finishmbedtls_sha256_retmbedtls_sha256mbedtls_sha256_self_testmbedtls_sha512_initmbedtls_sha512_freembedtls_sha512_clonembedtls_sha512_starts_retmbedtls_sha512_startsmbedtls_internal_sha512_processmbedtls_sha512_processmbedtls_sha512_update_retmbedtls_sha512_updatembedtls_sha512_finish_retmbedtls_sha512_finishmbedtls_sha512_retmbedtls_sha512mbedtls_sha512_self_testmbedtls_threading_readdir_mutexmbedtls_mutex_unlockmbedtls_mutex_lockmbedtls_mutex_freembedtls_mutex_initmbedtls_timing_alarmedmbedtls_timing_hardclockmbedtls_timing_get_timermbedtls_set_alarmmbedtls_timing_set_delaymbedtls_timing_get_delaymbedtls_timing_self_testmbedtls_version_get_numbermbedtls_version_get_stringmbedtls_version_get_string_fullmbedtls_version_check_featurembedtls_xtea_initmbedtls_xtea_freembedtls_xtea_setupmbedtls_xtea_crypt_ecbmbedtls_xtea_crypt_cbcmbedtls_xtea_self_test// 228 ` entropy_poll.c.o/ memory_buffer_alloc.c.o/ platform_util.c.o/ psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c.o/ psa_crypto_se.c.o/ psa_crypto_slot_management.c.o/ psa_crypto_storage.c.o/ psa_its_file.c.o/ rsa_internal.c.o/ version_features.c.o/ aes.c.o/ 1610128458 0 0 100644 22416 ` ELF>S@@AW1AVAUATUSHD$DŽ$!@Hc%LEǍ H11HuH Hy(ƃEHH9ucL$L LA+HlD- AۍAD DDC  ɉȍ  11D11ȃcA1HA4HHu$c1ҹcL-L%D$$H-HLLD$$L L5D$$D$1/f.|$4:HcΉHiɁH )))Hc|t$HcAHiɁAH D)AAA)D)HcLt$1HcAHiɁAH D)AAA)D)Hc3|T$HcʉHiɁH )))HcҋT1׉ARK٬*~yK~̈́]8`Og@ :ȏj*OqGn[&g{SZ@k.@=~s*-WoEQ0F\ R$EO+A{l7+~(Ҧ O<sdR+ybR,k{`=q+s}w5,;a- ;?.- 34IШ&zut 1b=Uqk.@=~s*-WoEQ0F\ R$EO+A{l7+~(Ҧ O<sdR+ybR,k{`=q+s}w5,;a- ^ Z(h={f:ҭ{/Eỏ͈7Sspnsɯ]xNuhƭ|{H၏)uW1L,ڍsE_)u*׃8AV1y̓]0!cmDAj9?N\!^\i\p\z\ / B > > \ \ \' \ \ \ \ \ \!>;{\\\ \\ \\$\\;?IMIIGIII^IIII 8R+Y,f-mRA'.S ,)+0/;Rn>u'.S ,+0-RH'>''\1MI1S9>'|A'<_KrT2S3+'2S.S , + 4( RY '< > '< '0!O!2!S!+!,"5 "R'"'@"'\">k"'\r"'"'|"U"P"V&#<J#+Q#,\#6c#R}#'#'#D#'<#'$LI$2R$S$=$T$T$3"%'<W%Ui%Cz%'%'<%2%S%.%S%2%S&T&T#&T;89@ > AaEG@GTExJ lP0d@   l`p<0P0.symtab.strtab.shstrtab.rela.text.data.bss.rodata.str1.1.rodata.rodata.cst16.comment.note.GNU-stack.rela.eh_frame @>&@x@ &~&,&`" 12&@ ' H.V0 ._3.t8.o@@Q 3( 8 ;zPS~aesni.c.o/ 1610128457 0 0 100644 3112 ` ELF>( @@ u&S1 #=[Ð1#=@IЋHWAoo fHto f8Huo f8o f8Huo f81ILL$HLT$1fALA LA HHuHL$AoAo fofofof:Df:Df:Df:Dffofsfsfffofofsfsfs?fs?fofsfsfsffffofofofs?fs>fs9fffsffofofofsfsfsfffofofofs?fs>fs9fffsfffHD$HWHHH9uÐHHcHoLAGL9sMLHf.of8HHH9rH)HAHHPHHIHHHAof.HHHto-fpffsffsffsfHf:f:f:f:f:f: f:@f:Ȁ{f:pf:6e1oHoN_fpffsffsffsfHf:fpҪffsffsffsfHf:f:f:f:uf:jf: _f:@T1f.oH~NfHGfpUffsffsffsfHfpffsffHf:f:f:f:f:f: wf:@lf:рa1GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0zRx <KcB8`Lo`vtm <.@`Fo]vwmaesni.cdone.1c.0mbedtls_aesni_has_supportmbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecbmbedtls_aesni_gcm_multmbedtls_aesni_inverse_keymbedtls_aesni_setkey_enc"4 <@Pdx.symtab.strtab.shstrtab.rela.text.data.bss.comment.note.GNU-stack.rela.eh_frame @@x &=,@10@:SOXJ@Px h  HYarc4.c.o/ 1610128457 0 0 100644 3456 ` ELF> @@ HHH1HLJHH)HÐHt ff.@SIALWH1@DHH=uLH1E18ȃL2HDDLZ@0H9tA9wL[ff.DDGIHtqATIH1UHSHfDAIDHBDHD"D!D23D5HI9u[1]E EBA\D1DGfDAWL=AVL5AUAATAUSHH8Hl$ HHD$H$HD$HD$Eu|KLHHD$H $HT$HHD$H9EuZIIHIuEuSHH8D[]A\A]A^A_fDDH=1nf.H=f E1랐Eu AH=Av ARC4 test #%d: failedpasseduŖtKyA7]:#Eg#Eg#EgGCC: (GNU) 10.2.0zRx /0DA,`QJD LCIIH7BII H(D0A8N 8D0A(B BBBG  @# 05:?/Q0cyPp7arc4.carc4_test_ptarc4_test_keyarc4_test_ct.LC0.LC2.LC1mbedtls_arc4_initmbedtls_arc4_free_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_mbedtls_platform_zeroizembedtls_arc4_setupmbedtls_arc4_cryptmbedtls_arc4_self_testprintfputsputcharu ~ < !F Mc hy; 40HPdp.symtab.strtab.shstrtab.rela.text.data.bss.rodata.str1.1.rodata.comment.note.GNU-stack.rela.eh_frame @@h &,12 @XH0hQ{fa@ x Xp   paria.c.o/ 1610128457 0 0 100644 912 ` ELF>P@@ GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0aria.c.symtab.strtab.shstrtab.text.data.bss.comment.note.GNU-stack@!@'@,0@5SX Easn1parse.c.o/ 1610128458 0 0 100644 5992 ` ELF>h@@ AVAUIATIUSLwHI~t2 IFHtLhL`(HC1[]A\A]A^ÐLḖ@HHIH)Hx$HHHIH)H91AAA|u2AtdAuNHPHHfIHDAu"H~|PHHʉIHff.HtJPHHIHPH~*PHHHH HH HHIHf.HII)M~ DA9uHHDøff.UAHSDHHHT$AHD$HH y@HHHHD$tn tHwjuxdHL$EHAHD$Ht3H1H<HtH HH)UHL$HH9uHD[]@EAUHSHHHT$uH|$u!H1ɀ:HMHH[]DHѺHѺ UHSHHHT$uHT$H3HHT$HH[]fATIUHSHu:H Ht7HQHHU2@s@w&HrHL9HsHUE[]A\øAWIAVAUATIU͹0SH(Lt$DD$ LDL$ D$ I$HD$HI9L9r}@HI$L9smHBI$D*D!@8u~LLLu\D$ HL$I$D!:D$ uH|$`tH|$hAT$`u,I$HL$HI$L9rD$ H([]A\A]A^A_@D$ f.D$ D$ ff.UHSHHu HHt&HHHU:uHHUH[]Ht;USHHfHݾ H[HHHuH[]ff.@HfE1E1H $HT$BPHPPH(DAUIATIUH͹0SHH(HT$HI)MHD$HHIA$IT$uNHIT$IT$HL9tGHLH߉EHHUuHHUHUL9HEH([]A\A]HD$ D$ ۸fH(fH$HD$u$tuH|$EH(øfHt+UHHH}(H@]ff.@USHH/Ht)HHE0HHHH+HuH[]fATIUSHt1HH@Md$0MtI9\$uI|$HHuL[]A\GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0zRx 8\BBE D(C0w (A BBBB Xl4(AGJ0 DAE (OAIG0o AAF   $>AIG0jAA,(hBID G ABA HXBEB B(D0H8F` 8A0A(B BBBE (OAIG m AAH (AFAG gAAI;D e(H0I8BED I(GP (A ABBD XGD0{ A t1F^$>AAD uAA(EBDA zAB \%9OV`k4O  >Ph +OK0Afa;G10> pE'asn1parse.casn1_get_sequence_of_cbasn1_get_tagged_int_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_callocmbedtls_asn1_get_lenmbedtls_asn1_get_tagmbedtls_asn1_get_boolmbedtls_asn1_get_intmbedtls_asn1_get_enummbedtls_asn1_get_mpimbedtls_mpi_read_binarymbedtls_asn1_get_bitstringmbedtls_asn1_traverse_sequence_ofmbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_nullmbedtls_asn1_sequence_freembedtls_platform_zeroizembedtls_asn1_get_sequence_ofmbedtls_asn1_get_algmbedtls_asn1_get_alg_nullmbedtls_asn1_free_named_datambedtls_asn1_free_named_data_listmbedtls_asn1_find_named_datamemcmp)   ' ;c  L  PX  Q S[  \`p,P\0 \x0p.symtab.strtab.shstrtab.rela.text.data.bss.comment.note.GNU-stack.rela.eh_frame @@@ &,10:OJ@X     .Yasn1write.c.o/ 1610128457 0 0 100644 7224 ` ELF>8@@ Hw*HHH)HHHHPHw7HHH)HTHHHPHHPH@fDHvgHHHH)HHHHPHHHHHHHHHHHHPHHPH@@HHH)HHHHPHHHHHPHHPH@fDH9wtHHH)H~_HHHPHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHPHHPH@ø@HHH)H~HHHPøff.AVAAUATI1UHSHHH^HMP~*HHEHL)HA[D]A\A]A^fDHE8yHL)H~HPH^HU@HLHLcExDLHxLD,[]DA\A]A^A@HH?H9r5IHSHH)H9rH)HLH8[fD[Ðf.AVIAUIATUHHSHuL9HHL)H9H)HLHuAąu?A>u HE8x@HLHLcExLHx6IA[D]A\A]A^@HL)H~HPHHU@AAAU1IATUHAąxLHAąDHD]A\A]DAUIATUHSHAąx3HcLHHLcExLHxIAHD[]A\A]Aff.AWIAVIAUIATUHSHMuqAHc؅xLLLLHLcEx3LLHHLcEx0LHx$IAHD[]A\A]A^A_@LAAUATUHHH)H~LHHHIHڈPAąxLHFd DHD]A\A]AfVfD FfDAVIAUATUHSHLAąx1LcLHLLcExLHxMA[D]A\A]A^ÐAff.IHѺ IHѺIHѺAVAUIHHQATUHHSHEHHHH)L9HLwL)L9L@HwHLELLHXLcExLHx_MA[D]A\A]A^DٺLO"T>LEPLH)HEHEHHEL@vfDA[]DA\A]A^ÐAIIIHt%HIHHHL)Htt.LLLAuFHuIuLLLff.AUIATUHSHAąx3HcLHHLcExLHxIAHD[]A\A]Aff.AWAVMAUIATUHSHHL?H<$MMMd$0MM;l$uI|$LHuMtbM9t$ u+HtI|$(LHHL[]A\A]A^A_@LHHI|$(I\$(Mt$ 릐I|$(ID$(@IHtvMl$LID$HtRLHHMt$ MuH$M|$0L 1LHD$LD$HID$(uLLE1 GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0zRx 0$LDBEB F(D0t (D BBBG T (A EBBA FR_ G FB<BEE A(G0} (D BBBE (;BGA lBB8$eBEA D(D0C (D ABBD H`BEE E(A0D8D@d 8D0A(B BBBE ,gBBA U BBA   <eBEB A(D0F (D BBBB DXlLBBL A(G0p (D BBBF L (A EBBB u8eBEA D(D0C (D ABBD H mBBE E(A0D8GPd 8D0A(B BBBE  #:$QgF;ep$g< S ke 0@ @u-eM0mkryasn1write.casn1_write_tagged_intmbedtls_asn1_write_lenmbedtls_asn1_write_tag_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffermemcpymbedtls_asn1_write_mpimbedtls_mpi_sizembedtls_mpi_write_binarymbedtls_asn1_write_nullmbedtls_asn1_write_oidmbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifiermbedtls_asn1_write_boolmbedtls_asn1_write_intmbedtls_asn1_write_enummbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_stringmbedtls_asn1_write_utf8_stringmbedtls_asn1_write_printable_stringmbedtls_asn1_write_ia5_stringmbedtls_asn1_write_bitstringmbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstringmbedtls_asn1_write_octet_stringmbedtls_asn1_store_named_datamemcmpcallocfreef |  6Z r    ) A   @ W            !!  -  E  r  ! !,<} 4H(dpH\ p0@@$0.symtab.strtab.shstrtab.rela.text.data.bss.comment.note.GNU-stack.rela.eh_frame @ @ & , 10 : O hJ@ X 0  ~Ybase64.c.o/ 1610128458 0 0 100644 5240 ` ELF>@@IM\LIHATHUH1SHHHH, H?I9HH9lHH9NMELH1HWHHDOAA0McF$ DfAADHc NAA?<HcVBVHHH9wHI9w'HL)I1[]A\HI9wD0HcHVF=FHr=@H1fD0Hc<Hc8VHVIUIDATUHSMIHE1E11L%1fD< u HI9wL9tkL4H)Ht @ W@ t;\@='@IA4;Et ?-IHI9yIM"LIKIH@HDHHPL)MH9MN 1Mؿ1LH$DHsHL9t^< vAE1<@A?HD) Hu1tljAA@tpHAPIL9uM)[LE1]A\DAAw!@@| Hxt[]A\H[HE1]A\I1HEIATSHLd$H\$A@H LHXHH=AXL⾀HH urHHH3SH3H uXHHH3SH3CH u=HHH3S(H3C H u"HHH3S8H3C0H uE1fAHĘD[A\@H=1Ld$H\$L⾀A@H HXHH=H=1L⾀HAXH HHH3SH3H ujHHH3SH3CH uOHHH3S(H3C H u4HHH3S8H3C0H uH=E1DH=AHĘD[A\ Base64 encoding test: failedpassed passed Base64 decoding test: JEhuVodiWr2/F9mixBcaAZTtjx4Rs9cJDLbpEG8i7hPKswcFdsn6MWwINP+Nwmw4AEPpVJevUEvRQbqVMVoLlw==$HnVbZ٢ o"ʳv1l4l8CTPKA1Z >?456789:;<=@  !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0zRx <WKF  ABI HP D\ BAD  GBF q ABA I KBA 48BAG DBE )DB  @(`@8Y  HMR W\r 8base64.cbase64_enc_mapbase64_dec_mapbase64_test_decbase64_test_enc.LC0.LC3.LC2.LC1mbedtls_base64_encodembedtls_base64_decodembedtls_base64_self_test_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_memcmpprintfputs} (    \, 1Q Va dh \{ t l  |   \0 5DKc hw d~ \ t l  |   `.symtab.strtab.shstrtab.rela.text.data.bss.rodata.str1.1.rodata.str1.8.rodata.comment.note.GNU-stack.rela.eh_frame @@0  &X,X12X(@2 O` W0`up@H p  ` 8bignum.c.o/ 1610128458 0 0 100644 39104 ` ELF>@@ISHHIlM1IM1HHHHLHHHHHHHHLHHHHHHHHLHHHHHHHHLHHHHHHHHLHHHHHHHHLHHHHHHHHLHHHHHHHHLHHHHHHHHLHHHHHHHHLHHHHHHHHLHHHHHHHHLHHHHHHHHLHHHHHHHHLHHHHHHHHLHHHHHHHHLHHHHIAIIM1HHHHLHHHHHHHHLHHHHHHHHLHHHHHHHHLHHHHHHHHLHHHHHHHHLHHHHHHHHLHHHHHHHHLHHHHMt-DM1HHHHLHHHHIu1HHHHu[D1fAWAVAUIATI1ULSHH8I@IxHL$ HLuImI9l$HIFD$Lt$(HD$HQHE1HD$HLIISIt$H|$LL>LHMM>LLD$L|$ IuLHILLD$HD$MFIH9uLt$(II{LIMLLMI$ME11I1H9@H)II4H9HH)IHHH9uI$HKH)I$D)1Hc@HI4HIHHHH9uH8[]A\A]A^A_fHD$(HH8[]A\A]A^A_HGHGfHtCSHHHtHCH4H{HCHC[@H'AV1AUATUHSLgHI9r []A\A]A^ÐHIHtBLuMt&ILHLLLH}H]1Lm[]A\A]A^ø똸ff.H' AVAUATUHSLgI9LHHWHtzH<tHH9HHCHIHLuHLLLJ4H}H]1Lm[]A\A]A^ff[]A\A]A^HHEƾHHIHtLuMti뗸H9AUATIUHSHHFHHtdHV fDHtRH<tHXHUA$EH9sLHHuL,H}It$L1H[]A\A]fA$HUEH9rH}L,H)1HL@1DH1[]A\A]ff.ooHGHVHWHFÐATAUHSHvHAt [D]A\EL]AHKE AA)EAЉHEHt3LcE1fDH4IH1LMH@[]A\ff.AUIATIUHA?SHHHHULHH9I?vKHUH9s.HMHDHtHHHfHHHPH9uHHtH}H1MtBH;]sfDLL$H$ u H$@t:LLLL$L$Ht$LHL$pLL$L$SH|$L$L$4H$L$BLLL$LLLL$Ht$LHL$HT$Ht$HL$1LL$L$HLLL$L$z1LL$L$xvDLLLL$L$5HT$LLL$HT$Ht$BHLLL$L$HLL$L$yH|$(LL$f.AUIATIUS1H(HGH$HD$HGHHD$ttHtcHu1H([]A\A]DHHttH([]A\A]@HcLLHH([]A\A]@fHH(AWHFAVAUATUSHhHt$T$H=VHD$@IIAHHD$(HL1LA?HLHAAHwAHQfDL$HHD$H+D$Mt$HD$ HHLLuRHd3IEJ940vHT$H9T$HHHHD$HHDLtH|$(D$D$Hh[]A\A]A^A_HT$AH8AH}%AHAHQAHA HAHHEA A(Ht$ LIEf.HH|$8LHHD$8H!HH|$(LLd$(LMc?fD LLnLLVL'uLuHHLLuHHLLuAHmAH]ZA HGHEA A0LLfAWAVAUATUSHHl$ |$Ld$@HLl$`L$LH$L$LLHLH$HHD$HHAtlD$HDD$LLLHLH|$DD$HD[]A\A]A^A_HLAuHLAVLHLA=HLAT$LL3LHHLHLH|$HLLHt$HE1LLHLHLLLmLHLWHLALL%HD$HD$HD$LHc0AHD$HHcpAHLHAHD$HHcpAD$D$HD$ u|$^H=DD$DH=1DD$HLLLHLH|$DD$ 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I9eHt$LL|$(H$Mg0HHھLupo$IAWM9uLD$H|$H|$0 HLD$fH\$`Ll$0H\$LD$H|$H|$0 HLH|$(0D$HX[]A\A]A^A_øAWfAVAULo(ATIUSHH8H$D$ID$ A<WAHuLLLAƅuTIHD$0I9uHHHL$00HHH9uHLAƅu oL$ A $H0H8D[]A\A]A^A_ff.fAWAVAUATIUSHHWHIHH)L9L)H)L9HH10HIHHHPHL{MtHPLHHMMtMu^LHHAąt)HHĈD[]A\A]A^A_HHAąuCDJ|=LLMAAHHH1HLJxHHH)HHBHXB ' Ht[UHXSHHHHH{(H߾HC 'HCHH[]fDff.@wff.Hwff.HHuHww1f.f.w ff.AUATE1UH0HuH0D]A\A]fIHLAąuLH`AL0H0D]A\A]HHGff.1 fAWL(fAVIAUMATIUHLSHH($D$HMLHHPHuSLcuHE0Ex:HLuLLLH}H([]A\A]A^A_fDE1LcuEyH/wLqIAWAVIAUATUSHXHLIfHD$ IHH$H΋G D$ D$0D$@9G G2HHk(Ll$AMtufD<W҈HuLHھHuHILIFƃsmtAUAII)uH4$HEuCH<$0D$ LD$ HX[]A\A]A^A_IUIMHIILILLH)I)ƒz1ɉ΃M1L79r_MH,$Ll$HYHHAfDAUAALALALfAL)fHAWLXAVIAUIATUHLAąu-E11LLHLAHDE]DA\A]A^A_f.AUATIHH5UHHtfILHLAąu$HLH=DELHHD]A\A]Aff.@AWAVIAUIH5ATLUHHL|$HHLH|$HIHMu5ALHHD]A\A]A^A_fDHuHLLLLAEuLLA럐A~Aff.fATUSHHl$H HH1HAHH HH5tAHĠD[]A\þHILHuǺLHuI$IT$H3H3H uHH HH1HAHH HH52LH11HLHHT$H$H3H3H HE1H= DH=1 HH1HAHH HH5t)H=AHĠD[]A\HILHuLHuI$IT$H3H3H u+H=H=1H HH1HAHH HH5LH11HLHwbrb CTR_DRBG (PR = TRUE) : failedpassed CTR_DRBG (PR = FALSE): T0=~>|o!4V)5cY#TB!\ f_?Ti)ϭHlZM^+1XTuyXۇ>V!|h8 ^VJLF=w~N .]D jTo pInbRmQX;7_F">E"c1ikWGO7ɘ 1MUZ^䓒#V,JnhGCC: (GNU) 10.2.0zRx $2AJD ^CALDBBB B(A0A8Gu 8A0A(B BBBA DBFB F(D0A8Gp8D0A(B BBBH8BBB B(D0A8G 8D0A(B BBBH (O(<aFHJ ~AAh|6<]BBD DPI  DBBC t DBB H BJE E(D0G8G`_ 8A0A(B BBBG LlBBE B(A0A8D) 8A0A(B BBBD 8fIIE E(A0}(E BBB0BBN Gg  DBBA @,BBE L(D0Gu 0D(B BBBG HpuBAA Ik  DABA   DABI  2'3@C\8}0` @@ ' . #:PazO`a670\@]x f  @FMT v| uctr_drbg.cctr_drbg_self_test_entropytest_offsetblock_cipher_dfctr_drbg_update_internalmbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed_internalnonce_pers_prentropy_source_prresult_prnonce_pers_noprentropy_source_noprresult_nopr.LC0.LC1.LC4.LC2.LC3.LC5_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_memcpymbedtls_aes_initmbedtls_aes_setkey_encmbedtls_aes_crypt_ecbmbedtls_aes_freembedtls_platform_zeroizembedtls_ctr_drbg_initmbedtls_mutex_initmbedtls_ctr_drbg_freembedtls_mutex_freembedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistancembedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_lenmbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_lenmbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_reseed_intervalmbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_retmbedtls_ctr_drbg_updatembedtls_ctr_drbg_reseedmbedtls_ctr_drbg_seedmbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_addmbedtls_ctr_drbg_randommbedtls_mutex_lockmbedtls_mutex_unlockmbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_filefopenfwritefclosembedtls_ctr_drbg_update_seed_filefreadferrormbedtls_ctr_drbg_self_testputsputcharprintf%v &!5!B!O!p !!!!!E!!D*#{*% !*#!:,S!! *0 . *1- : 3U /q 4 ! 5  3 7! 7B !J 5l 8x 5 * ! 2 "  ' ( ,' |3 -\ &l / /   $ "  ' (  < - /) ,A /Y ` t $  : ;  <  ' ( , | - :,&</P/d k:<"'(<-/,'/* H@,@`l0@$p  0 t .symtab.strtab.shstrtab.rela.text.data.bss.rodata.str1.1.rodata.comment.note.GNU-stack.rela.eh_frame @E@ &,12H@ H0Qfa@(   H*pdes.c.o/ 1610128458 0 0 100644 15008 ` ELF>6@@HHH1HGpHH)HHt ff.@HHH1HLJpHH)HÐHt ff.@HOHDHGH9uHwH D:uHH9u1Df.HHHH;tHH9u1f.SFLȉ1%11ȉ111ȉAщAA4AA C 4AAG AD AAAG AD AAAG ED AAAG AD AAALA  щA4C 4AAAAG AD AA AG AD AAAG ED A AAAG AD  1 D  AȉAAAAA%$ AD AAAD AAAD AAAD AAAD AA A D AAAD AAD DAD AA AD AA AA D AAAD AAAD AAAD EAD AAA D AA AD EAD AAAD AAAD AAAD AAD؁% AAA %A A %A %A  %A % A %A %A %D AAD AD AAAAA D AAAD AA D AD AAAD AAA D DAD D AAAD DHHt:AA$   0[ff.ATIUHHSHIt$HHH1ft xHHrt |r px Hp|pprrHu[]A\ATIUHHSHIt$HIt$H11DxL|LLxL|HHHu[]A\DH1HSHHHCxHs8@HHOH PWOP H9u1[ÐUHHHHjHﾀHĀ1]fUHHHHH7HﾀHĀ1]ff.@UHHHHHﾀHĀ1]fUHHHHHWHﾀHĀ1]ff.@AWLLAVL AUL-ATL%UH-SDHNADHT$1H\$H1A1D11D1AAA1A3333BD1L11111⪪11AHAD3w1EA??ALC3 AAA?B3LAA?A?B3 A3 D?A3 DAA??A3 C3 Dw1ΉA13ODEA??TC3T1DAA??3C3?A3?A3??A3A3H9|$H\$1⪪11Ή111։133331ȍ1111ȉ1с1ʉS1ȉ1[]A\A]A^A_ff.@AWAVMAUATIUHSLHt\M,HtBHLHM>1DA0HHuIM<$HM9uH1[]A\A]A^A_HtM,1fDAA2HHuHHHHHCII$L9u렸AWLL AVLAUL-ATL%UH-SDHvHAHT$DH|$1H\$H1A1D11D1AAA1A3333BD1L1Ɖ1с111᪪11fDAHAD3w1EA??AtC34AAA?B3tAA?A?C34A34D?34DAA??A34C34Dw1A13wDEA??LC3L1DAA??A3C3?A3?3??A3A3H9|$Ht$H|$HHt$fAHAD3w1EA??AtC34AAA?B3tAA?A?C34A34D?34DAA??A34C34Dw1A13wDEA??LC3L1DAA??A3C3?A3?3??A3A3H9|$Ht$H|$HƀHt$f.AHAD3w1EA??AtC34AAA?B3tAA?A?C34A34D?34DAA??A34C34Dw1A13wDEA??LC3L1DAA??A3C3?A3?3??A3A3H9|$H\$1ց檪11ʉ1Ɓ11։133331ȍ1111ȉ1с1ʉS1ȉ1[]A\A]A^A_AWAVMAUATIUHSLHt\M,HtBHLHM>1DA0HHuIM<$HM9uH1[]A\A]A^A_HtM,1fDAA2HHuHHHHHCII$L9u렸AWAVE1AUATUSH(Ll$ |$L|$LL$LDDT$D$Et3H HUHDH=k813HNow is tH5HD$A)H DHcHLdfLtLLtLuD $HcEHHH9D$||$AAt$D$ Lt$D$ L$t3H HUHDH=k813H4VxH5HD$HNow is tHD$D$ HHcHLLLLLH4VxdL$$I܉"LHD$Ld$t2IMMLtH<$HD$Ld$uHcHHD$L$$H;DD$AEMLLH(D[]A\A]A^A_LdfLt!MML1tLuHcHHH9D$oT$D$ D$ D$E1V GLLZLHHL$H9 |$zH=iH=eLL IH=decenc DES%c-ECB-%3d (%s): failedpassed DES%c-CBC-%3d (%s): mHM`vfPdvXHe_xגT%uH՗&sMŵB7dAobo7+ReY8ZepVhi#Eg#EgEg#  #%&)*,/12478;=>@CEFIJLOQRTWX[]^abdghkmnpsuvyz|@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@                              @ @@@ @ @@ @@ @@@ @@ @@@ @@@@ @ @ @@@@ @@@@@ @ @ @@@@ @@ @@ @ @@ @@@ @@@@ @ @@ @@@@@ @@ @@ B@@@BB@@@@BBB@BBB@B@@B@BBBB@B@@@                                GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0zRx )0D/Xl)66rAp(BDG |AB(BDG ABDK4?A}P.AJ_Cp1AM_C.AJ_C1AM_C@ABPI I(H0H80A(B BBBTKBE B(D0D8G@T 8C0A(B BBBA O@l`BPI I(H0H8"0A(B BBBTKBE B(D0D8G@T 8C0A(B BBBA OPBBE B(A0A8G 8D0A(B BBBA `' @+@/<`I`M`Q`U`Y`]`a`e` ix0Pp  -&)0/P/AS)n66Pr?P.1.61O0Ae {` `des.codd_parity_tableweak_key_tableLHsRHsdes3_set2keydes3_set3keySB2SB5SB3SB8SB7SB6SB4SB1des3_test_keysdes3_test_ecb_decdes3_test_cbc_encdes3_test_cbc_decdes3_test_ecb_enc.LC1.LC0.LC2.LC5.LC4.LC3mbedtls_des_initmbedtls_des_free_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_mbedtls_platform_zeroizembedtls_des3_initmbedtls_des3_freembedtls_des_key_set_paritymbedtls_des_key_check_key_paritymbedtls_des_key_check_weakmbedtls_des_setkeymbedtls_des_setkey_encmbedtls_des_setkey_decmbedtls_des3_set2key_encmbedtls_des3_set2key_decmbedtls_des3_set3key_encmbedtls_des3_set3key_decmbedtls_des_crypt_ecbmbedtls_des_crypt_cbcmbedtls_des3_crypt_ecbmbedtls_des3_crypt_cbcmbedtls_des_self_testprintfputcharputs\\W,,q,,,,,o&&&&5\<\E\N\W\_\\\ 3< 3e \l \u \~ \ \ \ \ \ 5|5#' !82H\1t35 ,8=ev2/0-146,N$V(s246L9/0!--lO T:` e:r..9!:;&&n l{! $(, 40HP\pP` 8TPt0 p`  .symtab.strtab.shstrtab.rela.text.data.bss.rodata.str1.1.rela.rodata.comment.note.GNU-stack.rela.eh_frame @@p+ &,12DE@` @@P3  M0VkXf@p4 # # (h6udhm.c.o/ 1610128458 0 0 100644 11848 ` ELF>*@@ UHHSHH6H)H~HHH)Huf9/HuH]H[]DH-1[]@fAWIAVIAUATUH@HLl$ HLHAąt!HLH@D]A\A]A^A_úLLAąuHLxLL~AAVA AUIATIUHSHHLLHHt@Hu(HHyAtH~1[]A\A]A^øHHH1HLJHH)HÐAWAVIAUIATUHoSHHH AątHD[]A\A]A^A_@H{ LLAąuL{hLLLAąuHL&AąuHHfAWAVMAUMATIUHoSHHc1H8HT$HL$D$ M|$8LLHLt!_LCHLy܃l$=HLnuMt$ Ml$PHLM$LLHL4HLHLHD$(HHIHD$L@LLD$HL$LD$LfIfHL$(IhLD$ HHHL$uZHL$LD$ LLLt fInfAHu+DHL$ffAJT=H+T$HI$ -1H8[]A\A]A^A_ø글ff.AUIATUHoSHHHAątHA5[D]A\A]H{ LAąuHHHD[]A\A]@Ht+H9r&HHhEHff.AWAVAUATUSH(HT$LD$HHIH9HoLc1MHD$ Lk8HT$LLLt@LuwHLyl$tuHLuH{PHs HLLH|$u/H|$Hu#Ht$H|$Lt -2H([]A\A]A^A_ø글ff.AWAVAUATUSHxHL$LL$H9LoLwhHHLLMtHx[]A\A]A^A_L|$0LMJHD$PHHD$LHC8LHLD$(HD$ ttLD$(Ht$ Lu&LLLL$DH|$D$D$LD$D$Hx-3[]A\A]A^A_fLLLL$(LL$(LLLLL$uLL$LLLpLLLLSLLL=DLL$zfDLL'LHS8LLLLLHLHHD$HLD$D$Hx[]A\A]A^A_HL$LLLLL$(HL$H|$LL{kLL$(LHT$LLGLLL1LLLHT$LLLLLHT$ LLLLH|$D$D$LL$(LLLLLLLHT$ LLLLqLLL[LLLF@fDLL _ff.Ht{UHHHHHHH}hH}PH}8H} H}H]ff.@AWAVAUATUHSHHhLl$ HT$LHt$Ht |3L|$HT$H޹0LH\$Dt+LEHhD[]A\A]A^A_H\$LuH\$LLHAątmA3@HE1E1HHD$HLPH5AXZEALH]HU HLAąyH9\$tLD$@LL$L$LHLL$ALEu8H9\$tALAzfDHt$(H\$ Ht$@E@LLHEHt$QfDAVAUIHH5ATUSHIĺ1HLHH11LsLLHHHLHھLH9uRH5HDHLHLDLHLAH[D]A\A]A^fLHAHALALAATUSHHHu4H5HE1AHHD[]A\H=1H5HAąuH=fH=A-----END DH PARAMETERS----------BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----rb-----BEGIN DHM parameter load: failedpassed -----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS----- MIGHAoGBAJ419DBEOgmQTzo5qXl5fQcN9TN455wkOL7052HzxxRVMyhYmwQcgJvh 1sa18fyfR9OiVEMYglOpkqVoGLN7qd5aQNNi5W7/C+VBdHTBJcGZJyyP5B3qcz32 9mLJKudlVudV0Qxk5qUJaPZ/xupz0NyoVpviuiBOI1gNi8ovSXWzAgEC -----END DH PARAMETERS----- GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0zRx 4gAGD | AAF D FAE @TBEE B(A0Dp@ 0D(B BBBA <BHE D(D0c (A BBBA /HBBE E(A0E8J@P 8D0A(B BBBE H8BBE E(D0E8Lp 8A0A(B BBBA HlBEA E(J0P (H DBBI b(D ABB6NXH"BBB B(A0A8D` 8A0A(B BBBA |4BBB B(A0A8Dw 8A0A(B BBBA  8F0A(B BBBC  8A0A(B BBBA FuXBBB B(A0D8Gf 8D0A(B BBBI tYPA<,(BBO A(A0 (D BBBC 4lBAA I{  DABA gp'8 PUZ:_=dIign`s %9M/^v`Pl6"0*>Rf w   ($*06=CJQ gndhm.cdhm_read_bignumdhm_check_rangedhm_random_belowmbedtls_test_dhm_params.LC0.LC1.LC2.LC3.LC4.LC6.LC5_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_mbedtls_mpi_read_binarymbedtls_mpi_initmbedtls_mpi_lsetmbedtls_mpi_freembedtls_mpi_sub_intmbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpimbedtls_mpi_sizembedtls_mpi_fill_randommbedtls_mpi_shift_rmbedtls_mpi_cmp_intmbedtls_dhm_initmbedtls_dhm_read_paramsmbedtls_dhm_make_paramsmbedtls_mpi_exp_modmbedtls_mpi_write_binarymbedtls_dhm_set_groupmbedtls_mpi_copymbedtls_dhm_read_publicmbedtls_dhm_make_publicmbedtls_dhm_calc_secretmbedtls_mpi_mul_mpimbedtls_mpi_mod_mpimbedtls_mpi_inv_modmbedtls_dhm_freembedtls_platform_zeroizembedtls_dhm_parse_dhmmbedtls_pem_initmbedtls_asn1_get_tagmbedtls_pem_freembedtls_asn1_get_mpimbedtls_pem_read_buffermbedtls_dhm_parse_dhmfilefopenfseekftellcallocfreadfclosestrstrmbedtls_dhm_self_testprintfputs8.?YhU%#HS`$$$h&&@g#$&"Uu*+*+&#5$A*+,* +1 #? ^ *t + # * + 1 = I U a j s |    0 1 2X 3   4 2 - 3  3 9 2t  2  6 7 8 7 9" :/ ;6 C <X /f .n = ; . = ; ;   / -#*?6 >/LQ@cn@ . Xp<`P80  0 p .symtab.strtab.shstrtab.rela.text.data.bss.rodata.str1.1.rodata.comment.note.GNU-stack.rela.eh_frame @t@ &,12o@@ H0;QNfPa@)P   sX*pecdh.c.o/ 1610128458 0 0 100644 6200 ` ELF>8@@ f.AVMAUIATIUHSHLHu HHMPLMjILHZY[]A\A]A^ÐAWIAVIAUIATIUSLHhHl$LL$HHLLjLL$LIHZYAąt!HHhD[]A\A]A^A_HuHLA@ASHHHHXHHHHPǃ[Hu HfDHtkSHHHHPHHHHXH[f.ff.@AWAVAUATUSHHDLIHIHLLMHtH[]A\A]A^A_fHLHHuH$MHL$DLHI)LuHT$H$IUH[]A\A]A^A_f.fATIUHSHHH+H|$ tH[]A\Dt$ HuHHXLHI+ $H[]A\ff.ATAUHSH6tK9uwAtPEulHHt[]A\HH[]A\fuAuHHX[]A\f.fAWAVAUATUSHHDtiLIHIHLLMHtH[]A\A]A^A_fDHMIL[DLH]A\A]A^A_뼐UHSHHHHt$HT$HXuHT$H)H9ںEH[]ff.fHAVAUATUHSHLHIIHXHLt []A\A]A^LI9rKH1HHHHHLLt []A\A]A^[]A\A]A^땸GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0zRx D0OBEE D(D0V8L@O8A0A(A BBBXxBEE E(D0A8GVHTAS 8D0A(B BBBH iAgDM G  qF[`(BBB B(A0A8DPE 8A0A(B BBBC K 8A0A(B BBBK <bBDD G0U  AABF m AAB@BDD r ABA O ABN ^ ABO `BBB B(A0A8D@A 8A0A(B BBBG D 8J0J(B BBBH $tCADJ0qAAtKBB A(D0y (A BBBD | (A BBBE A (A BBBH GO4Jb~`i'p:Qqctb.PFWpCecdh.cmbedtls_ecdh_can_dombedtls_ecdh_gen_public_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkeymbedtls_ecp_mul_restartablembedtls_ecdh_compute_sharedmbedtls_ecp_point_initmbedtls_ecp_point_freembedtls_ecp_is_zerombedtls_mpi_copymbedtls_ecdh_initmbedtls_ecp_group_initmbedtls_mpi_initmbedtls_ecdh_setupmbedtls_ecp_group_loadmbedtls_ecdh_freembedtls_mpi_freembedtls_ecp_group_freembedtls_ecdh_make_paramsmbedtls_ecp_tls_write_groupmbedtls_ecp_tls_write_pointmbedtls_ecdh_read_paramsmbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group_idmbedtls_ecp_tls_read_pointmbedtls_ecdh_get_paramsmbedtls_ecp_copymbedtls_ecdh_make_publicmbedtls_ecdh_read_publicmbedtls_ecdh_calc_secretmbedtls_mpi_sizembedtls_ecp_get_typembedtls_mpi_write_binarymbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le. P  )5AMYuW }5!3  ,%Q&!ql'y( 4|`p,Px.symtab.strtab.shstrtab.rela.text.data.bss.comment.note.GNU-stack.rela.eh_frame @@ &,10:OJ@     Yecdsa.c.o/ 1610128459 0 0 100644 10784 ` ELF>&@@ AVIAUATIHSHHHLHHHH9HFHAŅuUfz 7Ng~0Pp)hSj  $P 2` Op @d{   \.ecdsa.cderive_mpiecdsa_verify_restartable.constprop.0ecdsa_sign_restartable.constprop.0ecdsa_sign_det_restartable.isra.0.LC0_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_mbedtls_mpi_read_binarymbedtls_mpi_shift_rmbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpimbedtls_mpi_sub_mpimbedtls_ecdsa_can_dombedtls_ecp_point_initmbedtls_mpi_initmbedtls_mpi_cmp_intmbedtls_ecp_point_freembedtls_mpi_freembedtls_mpi_inv_modmbedtls_mpi_mul_mpimbedtls_mpi_mod_mpimbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartablembedtls_ecp_is_zerombedtls_ecp_gen_privkeymbedtls_ecp_mul_restartablembedtls_mpi_add_mpimbedtls_md_info_from_typembedtls_hmac_drbg_initmbedtls_mpi_write_binarymbedtls_hmac_drbg_freembedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_bufmbedtls_hmac_drbg_randommbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_retmbedtls_ecdsa_signmbedtls_ecdsa_sign_detmbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_extmbedtls_ecdsa_verifymbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartablembedtls_asn1_write_mpimbedtls_asn1_write_lenmbedtls_asn1_write_tagmemcpymbedtls_ecdsa_write_signaturembedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_detmbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartablembedtls_asn1_get_tagmbedtls_asn1_get_mpimbedtls_ecdsa_read_signaturembedtls_ecdsa_genkeymbedtls_ecp_group_loadmbedtls_ecp_gen_keypairmbedtls_ecdsa_initmbedtls_ecp_keypair_initmbedtls_ecdsa_freembedtls_ecp_keypair_freembedtls_ecdsa_from_keypairmbedtls_ecp_group_copymbedtls_mpi_copymbedtls_ecp_copy4]s/7?GOW{9Og~Qt>R`~< Yt!"#$#0%\ &"% '*&$$  Y -o - . / 0 ,; 1   4 5   5~ 8 ? @ </ Ad 3 9 ; = | P@0P p 4  P ` 4p l   .symtab.strtab.shstrtab.rela.text.data.bss.rodata.str1.1.comment.note.GNU-stack.rela.eh_frame @< @ &| ,| 12| @0 I ^ Y@$ X0  ?x&hecjpake.c.o/ 1610128458 0 0 100644 912 ` ELF>P@@ GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0ecjpake.c.symtab.strtab.shstrtab.text.data.bss.comment.note.GNU-stack@!@'@,0@5SX   Eecp.c.o/ 1610128459 0 0 100644 43576 ` ELF>8@@ff.AWAVAUIATIUHHP8HBwPILHILAąuHLLLAHLHPD]A\A]A^A_DAIff.fATUHSHHHIHHI9HHAąt,kf.1HtDHHHuPExHHx+f.HHHuHHyD[]A\A[]DA\D13Af[HV]HA\AUATIUHSHH(ILIt$HLAąu!1H1LH!ALH(D[]A\A]ÐAWIAVAULnATEUAHSA?1HH<$DD$ L$ u+YfIwDLu)IH8\$ t0E1A8LHADtH[]A\A]A^A_DD|$ H<$HH[]AA\A]AA^A_ATUHSHHHHHAąt%)1HtHHHuxD[]A\f.A[]DA\DATIUHHHHHtH]A\fLHuHH]A\ÐATUHSHHHAąt%@HHHuHHyD[]A\A[]DA\ff.fAWAVAULn0ATI1UHLHPuHP]A\A]A^A_DL|$Lt$0LLHULLuLLLt)LD$ LD$ HP]A\A]A^A_HLuLLLHuHLuILHLLuHLnLLLHPHL^=LH#ff.AWAVAUATIUSHHt$(HT$ HhL|$ LHD$IHHKLHHHD$8Hl$0f.LIL9uH|$@L|$`H|$LH$HH$Hl$(Lt$HELHp0HD$AŅu`HL$ HHmHHD$+fLL5AŅu5HHH;l$HELILHP0AŅtH|$LH<$Hl$0fHHH9uH|$HĨD[]A\A]A^A_H6HĨ[]A\A]A^A_Hl$HD$8IT$H|$HtAŅ^HT$ HL$8IHt$(HHD L4HHRDHt$LH<$LLH<$LxI>H$HHH|$TH|$L?IH$HHxHH|$H|$LzILHHxHH|$H|$L>It$I>HIIt$HxD$IHIHx0HD$toHHHt$HLuNLLu?IHt$HHP0HuH|$LuH^LAlAf.AWAVIAUIATIUSI\$H8HL|$Ht$LHhD$ HLLHLtLHLy܃l$L~H\$LHHuDLHu5H0LHHHuLHauHLD$D$H8[]A\A]A^A_øff.@AWAVIAUATIUSI\$HhHLl$ L|$@Ht$LHhHL$LHD$ HL$LHLt*LHLy܃l$"L~H\$LHk0HHLHFLLLHLLLHHHumLHu^LLLHuDLLu5HLHHHuLHuHLD$LD$Hh[]A\A]A^A_øAWAVIAUATUSHHHHl$ H|$Ll$@HHt$Ld$`L$LLLH{0eLLLtCHD$LLLD$HĨ[]A\A]A^A_fH\$LHuLHHHt"f.HHHgHHyHD$1H HHD$IFLHHHD$Ht$LLHt$fHLLHLyLLLHt$LhLHtofHLLWHLyLLL2Ht$LLHtfHLLHLyHHLH\$LHLLLHHLLLHpLLLHrWHLLH>LLLH@%HT$IN0LH LHH\$LHH{LH0LHfIv0LHH\$LHY~LLLHHt![fDHLL?HLyLLLt-@1Lt!HLL$xLLLHt$LLHHfDHHJHHHtkfDIv0LHNHt$L9LLLHHt$LHT$LLHHt$LLHHHfDHHbHHHtfDHtHfDH1ɋtH5HHuHHHff.Su PHt 9u[1[@Su PHt f9Xu[D1[@ATSHHtDHIąu1AD$It#I|$HuHL[A\E1HL[A\fH`tHx1DSHH{H{0[@SHHGH{ H{8H{PHHǃHǃǃHǃHǃHǃHǃHǃHǃ[ÐSHHH[ff.Ht#SHH{H{0[HUHSHu]HHt7Ht(1DHHH<H9HwHH[]HH} H}8H}PHnff.@Ht+SHHH[fff.@UHSHHt H[]@HuH{uHHu0H{0[]ff.AWAVAUATMUHSHHL$ H|$L$LHT$L$LD$LL$ LLMHLt:LD$LLD$H[]A\A]A^A_HLuHuHC01HHD$(uH{HD$HhDHLL`HLyHL$ HT$LH|$2H|$Lt$@HL$HD$0H$HD$PL$H|$0Ht$0H|$Ht$@HDDAHt$PH|$(D'L$L$LL$0H$HHD$8LH$HHD$HLH$PHHD$XH$pHHD$pH$HHD$`H$HHD$hHT$(HLt#HLLHLyH|$8LLHt$H|$8lHT$(HLHt,K1Lt!HLL$$xH|$HLLHt$H|$HHT$HHt$8LHt01Lt!HLL$0xHT$PHt$@H|$XuH\$xH\$XfHHHHHyHT$PHt$@H|$pH\$xH\$xH\$p$1Ht!HHHc$pxHt$pH|$`LH\$xHt$H|$`Ht$XH|$hLHHt$H|$hpHT$hHt$`H|$@HLH\$xH\$@HHHHHyHT$@H|$H\$xHHHL$hHT$`Ht$PH|$@HT$PH|$HHHL$PH$H|$HqHL$HHT$8HH|$Ru~H|$Ht$(LHW 8udHT$(Ht$HHuNH\$xH\$(HHHHHyHL$(H|$LH\$xHLD$xH|$8LH|$HLH|$XH|$pH|$`H|$hD$xu8Ht$@DHu$Ht$PH|$(DHl$0@Lt$@L$L$dfDHD$Ht$LHHPHD$H0HLl$ HD$ Ld$HL$ HHT$Lt$@LL$L$HHl$(HHHHHLqHH\$x}ff.f6fSHt[@H{uH{01[f.AWAVAUATLb0UHSH(HH|$LHt$(1HT$0HH}@t2Lm01LH}@tLL|$@Ll$`LL$H$LLH$HHD$H$HHD$ H$HHD$HLLLtXLD$LLH|$H|$ H|$HD$H([]A\A]A^A_Ht$LuLLLHyHt$LdHLLHFHt$Lq1HULLHHl$LH:HT$0LLHHt.D1LtHLLT$@xHD$0LLHHHD$8HD$Hh)D1LtHLLLD$`x1LuX1L,HT$0Ht$(H|$ Ht$0H|$(H([]A\A]A^A_$LLHHl$HHLLLHHLLd$LLHL\HLLd$DHL$0LLHH!LLLH;Ld$ LLHLLLLHDHL$LLH)LLLHLLLHgwHT$HL$8HHJZHL$Ht$LH=Hl$(LH%Ht$H}HHH0H|$(AWAVMAUIATUSHHH$Ht$(HHT$LD$HLL$PHD$MHshI}HH=/HD$8DH|$8D$\ADHD8T$XT$1HHD$0D$XHHHD$`HH ID$HD$ HLtLIHM9uLHADžMcLd$0Ll$0E1MuvfDIM9cL1ҾI@ΉH L|HuLHHtuLLH6tAH|$H;HD$ HHLdHHHI9uHEubHĨD[]A\A]A^A_DHLt$Ht$HPLHgLt$PAHHHD$HEH|$H|$(@HsPLAHH=AAT$EAAHT$8H9EADT$XT$HT$8HDH1HHD$0HHsLd$pLLH$HHD$ 1LL|$1LLLL|$AADžu LLl$ HT$LADžH|$ LH|$H;D$HD$ fDH|$8H9HD$AHD$\HD$0HD$8D$Xf1ELL‰D$\ADžVLl$0L$1LL|$@IUML|$`Lt$8HD$Hl$hH\$8LL|$1fLLMHL9uHD$HD$HL9uHl$hH\$81Ht$`H|$@H|$0@DFDHA1"DE҃AD ʈVA1A!DD H9uLt$ LLLLd$0HHLd$@L$XE$Ht$(cADžt$H|$ )DD$\XLt$(I~0ADžuHL$PHT$HLHiADžuD|$XLl$ XfDLLHED$DHLHLLLHIL9d$@uH|$ T$\Ht$(H ADžMLt$(HL$PHHT$HLADž(HL1H|$AH;pfHD$AHD$XHD$0HD$8(H$t$1ҸH|$@HH HLHL@8rHt$@HADžD$hDd$hO,INt-N|-Kt=LLH[IHIud$hD$h:D$rHL$@Ht$ HUHHTHHHH9wHD$ |$HHt$@HPHFJADžD$\(HD$`HHAgH|$AH;QH|$AI}LAąuHI}0[]A\A]A^A_DHuBHL[]A\A]A^A_@H41LAą%fDAA f.Hv2HLHL DEtHI9wKLHL@fMt3UILM@SHHu HUHH[]DfHvJHHPH8u;HPSHHHHxHx Ht1[Dø[UHHH|$ u t$ HH]ATIUHS?HHt.HEIvPS@C1[]A\Ð󸀰fAWAVAUATUHSHH~0HHHAH1HLe1LLkHLzLLgIL|$ LLLLLAąt"LLHHD[]A\A]A^A_HLAąuHHLHAąuHLAąuHH{0,HS LLAątoLLLAąULLyHLLAą-HLDAąHS8LLHAąt\fDHIHHHI9DADLLLAąLLyLLAąDEpfAsDLLAąt4B@1LLLLAąD$ xUHSHHtBHHxpHHy]1H[]@1HuBHu1HHH;uH=uHt랐fAWMAVIAUIATUHSLHHt$HAątHD[]A\A]A^A_DLHAąuHAt;HuHt$HMIL[LH]A\A]A^A_Ht$MILLHAątdHjHAWE1AVMAUIATIULSHH(IH|$ HHHAt$D$ (H(D[]A\A]A^A_fDE1E1LHLLAuHAH$HHD$HHD$fJTHHHHE1E1LHLLH $H9 uyHt$H;5ukH|$H9=u]IIoT$ AH=D$D$DH=1D$D$fADAAVIHAUIATIUHSLu[LH]A\A]A^DHLt-HLLE1SE1HLZY[]A\A]A^fDLHuH1Ht[IvHH]A\A]A^AWMAVAUIATIUHSHHhLD$Lt$LLHLL$HAąt#LHhD[]A\A]A^A_fHT$LLHL$AąuLLLHAąuLHAfDAHjHAWAVAUIATIUHSHH(HHIH$ItD@HHLHLHADžtH(D[]A\A]A^A_DALuH$D$D$ HH$LHLHADžuH4$HI+ADžul$ HT$IHADž]Hx|$u@HMHpI9LHADž11HADž1ҾHADžI1ҾHAL)HADžtfAnDAWMAVIAUILATILULHSLHtH[]A\A]A^A_HMIL[LLH]A\A]A^A_IMHwPIHLATIUHSHHt[]A\HIL[HH]A\AWAVIAUIATUHSHHAątHD[]A\A]A^A_@Hu t.HLALfDI L LLt AfD11Lu1ҾLu1ҾLu1ҾLuLuH LLLoLHWfADAUAATIUHSHHu; t Ht?HD[]A\A]DIvBHLHAŅuHuHHLH[]A\A]AAWAVAUATUSHh%H;LHHLL(H(LH@H@HHD$Lt$Hl$`LHHHHKPE1E1HLHADžt(LHHhD[]A\A]A^A_LLuH|$(LtAHt$H|$@ADžtAAWHAVAUATUSH8HD$0HH$0HD$8HHL$HD$@HLd$HD$HHL$HD$PHHD$XHHD$`HHD$hHHD$pHHD$xHH$HH$LLLHADžu~LADžu.E1E1LLH$HHH$ADžHLLLH8D[]A\A]A^A_H=1LADžEytDH=1HLLL uL$LL$01LLHLL$RLL$AufMLLH13ADž HL HADžL$LL$`LLHA@Ey"HLLL&fDE1E1LLH$HHH$ADžL$LL$0LLHLL$TLL$AdH=1LL$LL$MLLHADžt[gHLH=1 HADžfailed (%u) 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test #1 (constant op_count, base point G): ECP SW test #2 (constant op_count, other point): Unexpected error, return code = %08X ECP Montgomery test (constant op_count):       GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0zRx @0BBB E(D0GP 0D(B BBBF @tBAD  ABH D AEF aEE4oBBD D(JPO(D ABB\BEB F(D0G8JP\ 8A0A(B BBBF N8D0A(F BFB4PkBAD K ABK DAE0OBDP M ABJ [AB4cBAD F ABH DAEXTBBB F(F0JM 0A(B BBBF [ 0A(B BBBD dPBBB B(D0A8Gn 8D0A(B BBBA J 8A0A(B BBBL H!BBE E(D0A8Ip 8A0A(B BBBA LBBE B(D0A8I 8A0A(B BBBA HTBBE B(A0A8J 8A0A(B BBBJ e\H,A_ H C,Aa F C0 ^BAD { DBH GDB@TAVpA"A\)FV0JDD P IAL x1F\0DADG M AAE UIAHHBBB B(D0D8J 8A0A(B BBBI 6AR E YdBBB B(E0D8G= 8A0A(B BBBA  8A0A(B BBBE L0BBE E(A0A8J 8D0A(B BBBF DT0LADG o AAC DFA4DBDC M ABG \AB`[BEE I(A0D8GPO 8D0A(B BBBC { 8A0A(B BBBK xhBBB B(A0A8D@ 8D0A(B BBBH c 8J0A(B BBBJ J 8D0A(B BBBI >(>FLG WAAF $]ZpFFFH(AG ^A(hNBDD q ABB HBBB B(A0D8P 8D0A(B BBBA (ADG E AAE ` BEE E(A0D8GPX 8D0A(B BBBF { 8J0G(B BBBL p DB IH BEE E(I0D8G`G 8D0A(B BBBG h BHE D(I0M (G BBBJ W8J@O8A0A (A BBBG b(K BBBHD BEB E(D0D8GL 8D0A(B BBBJ  DB IH BBB E(D0D8G`S 8D0A(B BBBF \ mBEE H(G0G8G@M 8A0A(B BBBH D8J0J(B BBBX 4l @BDF P ABA NKBH [BBE E(A0F8I@P 8D0A(B BBBE H BHD D(G0` (D ABBF p (N ABBE H< HBBB B(A0A8G 8D0A(B BBBD P BIB B(A0A8IQ 8D0A(B BBBH %.oB RkfPOzXcTpP ! 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DZ7"ʇ*ȅ*.9VZPAn-k>/1Q%cʹQ7h@^1kW3+|J玛BO˜E93-}w@cGB,kK`'><;S̰evU:5Z=*\\E)>4~DdGZuC"L#c7!\ր24"VJ2k U#C9 'ؿ׷DPV2A 1(Ҵk6ޙHyws$kcx+ C |0F޸I0$r瀜!dGCC: (GNU) 10.2.0zRx <SFA G$ DBBCH<\4SEDpDBEHpR DBD 0SEG DBC XLBDB B(A0A8J 8A0A(B BBBK  4"HL\BKB B(A0A8J> 8A0A(B BBBK LwBKB B(A0A8G 8D0A(B BBBB LBKB B(A0A8J 8A0A(B BBBJ 0LBFG P DBK DB8 BBA D(F`k (A ABBH 4(@50ETY"hm0|Pw  @  `     * 7 C` O [@ h u000@00`HHHH@H   '@ 9 L` _0q000@00@@@@@@@(@;GS_@kx`      h` @     #(( -CWkr 0AYj}ecp_curves.cecp_mod_p448ecp_mod_p255ecp_mod_p521ecp_mod_koblitzecp_mod_p256k1Rp.3ecp_mod_p224k1Rp.2ecp_mod_p192k1Rp.1ecp_mod_p384ecp_mod_p224ecp_mod_p256ecp_mod_p192secp192r1_psecp192r1_bsecp192r1_nsecp192r1_gxsecp192r1_gyone.0secp224r1_psecp224r1_bsecp224r1_nsecp224r1_gxsecp224r1_gysecp256r1_psecp256r1_bsecp256r1_nsecp256r1_gxsecp256r1_gysecp384r1_psecp384r1_bsecp384r1_nsecp384r1_gxsecp384r1_gysecp521r1_psecp521r1_bsecp521r1_nsecp521r1_gxsecp521r1_gybrainpoolP256r1_pbrainpoolP256r1_abrainpoolP256r1_bbrainpoolP256r1_nbrainpoolP256r1_gxbrainpoolP256r1_gybrainpoolP384r1_pbrainpoolP384r1_abrainpoolP384r1_bbrainpoolP384r1_nbrainpoolP384r1_gxbrainpoolP384r1_gybrainpoolP512r1_pbrainpoolP512r1_abrainpoolP512r1_bbrainpoolP512r1_nbrainpoolP512r1_gxbrainpoolP512r1_gysecp192k1_psecp192k1_asecp192k1_bsecp192k1_nsecp192k1_gxsecp192k1_gysecp224k1_psecp224k1_asecp224k1_bsecp224k1_nsecp224k1_gxsecp224k1_gysecp256k1_psecp256k1_asecp256k1_bsecp256k1_nsecp256k1_gxsecp256k1_gy.LC2.LC0.LC3.LC1_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_mbedtls_mpi_add_mpimbedtls_mpi_shift_rmemsetmbedtls_mpi_shift_lmbedtls_mpi_set_bitmbedtls_mpi_mul_intmbedtls_mpi_add_absmbedtls_mpi_mul_mpimemcpymbedtls_mpi_growmbedtls_mpi_sub_absmbedtls_ecp_group_loadmbedtls_ecp_group_freembedtls_mpi_initmbedtls_mpi_read_stringmbedtls_mpi_freembedtls_mpi_bitlenmbedtls_mpi_lsetmbedtls_mpi_sub_intmbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi\3]b\^\_\]`ab]bvcbd.c@b]] @e fPemfemfel^hiVjkh  + 6< | \ ll  + 6 D O | \ <  `k|v<\ $/<<|\3EP|[i<t|< <$|Wjh <|"\X |c dn \y  < !m*!_B!nW!_o!n!l!m!m!k!`!X!j "o("kE"mZ"_r"n"l"Y"j"`"m"m#k   XL $(,0p 4 `@0$8L0`PP.symtab.strtab.shstrtab.rela.text.data.bss.rodata.str1.1.rodata.str1.8.rela.rodata.comment.note.GNU-stack.rela.eh_frame @#@A &`# ,#12# @2#aT$ O@MP \0.e.z.u@HO  1 [ (<hPentropy.c.o/ 1610128459 0 0 100644 8264 ` ELF>@@ UHH;*SHHH]H1[]f.AWIAVAAUIATUSHHXH@Hl$D$ADt$Mwu1LAąu AHt$LAąt H@HXD[]A\A]A^A_ÐLHLADHl$1LHHAąu@HA@TfAWAVAUATUSHH|$Lt$ HD$1E1L|$Lt$ H f.HD$AH(D;}Z{ H{LHD$D躀LAąu1HL$HtH|$LDsuOHD$HC@t,LHĨD[]A\A]A^A_f.AAff.SHHHH{H ǃ[AWIAVIAUIATUHSHHHHDD$ AąuU\HcЋL$ HHLLLHHDEHD[]A\A]A^A_AULHHGHGHLJH)1HHLEH}HA1H5 HH5]E11ff.HAWLAVIAUIATUHLAąu-LLHALAHDE]DA\A]A^A_f.HAULATUHLAąu,t+HAHLDED]A\A]AؐAWAVAUATUSHhHt$H@HLIILAŅEI @Et|L+AŅusEE~OABME11HH|LHH;PB΃xuIH(H9utI?wSuAH\$ AH\$ @HHLDEHhD[]A\A]A^A_H\$ fILD$HH|$D$ D$0D$@D$PAŅuH|$H|$H|$1AŅeH|$@HAŅH1Hھ@HAŅ+ALD$~HHDII(I9uH|$LHAff.AUATIHH5UH@HtaIL@HLAąu"H@LH@DEL@HH@D]A\A]AAWAVAUIATIH5ULSHHH1HHI11HHHLHHGHH9t5HALHD[]A\A]A^A_DLHLHALEuLLAADAVfAUATUSH$D$D$ D$0D$@D$PD$`D$puvH$HHt!HAHD[]A\A]A^E11ҹHH5OuI@HLuH=1H$HHt)HH=A aE11ҹHH5uI@HLuAD@LHAŅu?Ht$@LHfD HHH9uIufDHH9t>uH5DHtH=%E1wbrb ENTROPY test: failedpassedGCC: (GNU) 10.2.0zRx $&ALG MCAHDBEE E(A0A8Gg 8D0A(B BBBB HBBB B(A0A8G 8D0A(B BBBK @A~HBEE E(A0H8JPn 8D0A(B BBBA DA8`fIIE E(A0}(E BBB(_IIA  BBA HBBB B(A0A8D 8D0A(B BBBA 0BBN D`b  DBBA HHBBB E(K0D8G 8D0A(B BBBF DBFB A(A0I \ 0D(A BBBA  & 0/NSX]bg} @  `;Ncxf _ 8?_els  entropy.centropy_dummy_sourceentropy_updateentropy_gather_internal.part.0.LC0.LC1.LC2.LC3.LC4_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_memsetmbedtls_sha512_starts_retmbedtls_sha512_update_retmbedtls_platform_zeroizembedtls_sha512_retmbedtls_entropy_freembedtls_mutex_freembedtls_sha512_freembedtls_entropy_add_sourcembedtls_mutex_lockmbedtls_mutex_unlockmbedtls_entropy_initmbedtls_mutex_initmbedtls_sha512_initmbedtls_platform_entropy_pollmbedtls_hardclock_pollmbedtls_entropy_update_manualmbedtls_entropy_gathermbedtls_entropy_funcmbedtls_sha512_finish_retmemcpymbedtls_entropy_write_seed_filefopenfwritefclosembedtls_entropy_update_seed_filefseekftellfreadmbedtls_entropy_self_testprintfputsputcharu$*9T**U*j|* *!**#*Z**mt*% *q& ($)*1 B(],h-w,.*"* 'lt#" 0#   1 2> U "t $    1 H0 `Hd L  .symtab.strtab.shstrtab.rela.text.data.bss.rodata.str1.1.comment.note.GNU-stack.rela.eh_frame @ @ &= ,= 12= %@0b Iu ^x Y@  P   h/0 1610128459 0 0 100644 2336 ` ELF>@@ AU1>ATI1UHSHHyc8&uvI$H5H=IHtSHHHھLH9u3I$1H[]A\A]DHI$H1[]A\A]D@ATIUHSHHHv I$H[1]A\rb/dev/urandomGCC: (GNU) 10.2.0zRx LBIF D(G0` (A ABBF J (C ABBF ,l1BDD aCB8NVgmsz1entropy_poll.c.LC0.LC1mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_syscall__errno_locationfopenfreadfclosembedtls_hardclock_pollmbedtls_timing_hardclock &:A Fan p.symtab.strtab.shstrtab.rela.text.data.bss.rodata.str1.1.comment.note.GNU-stack.rela.eh_frame @@p &!,!12!@01ID^HY@H0   xherror.c.o/ 1610128459 0 0 100644 36880 ` ELF>@@1)ǁL 1s H=HC;HEHK~LHl 6HvtFH{t1~xH~t ~6HtuHÁ~HHEH}tr}HHEDHytbHzt#{HHEH@\HBC~xBHHEH8H;H<~m=HHEHAAHHEH?~A?HHEH;`<HHEH>6>HHEH: ~`:HHE@H3H5~A5HHEH99HHEH4m4HHEH2C3HHEHc GHhHjHklUHÁKHHEHD~mEHHEHyWzHHEHx-~AxHHEHCDHHEHwwHHEÐHqHtHuz~AvHHEH|N|HHEHt$uHHEHs~^sHHEfHoHp~AqHHEHrrHHEHo]pHHEHn3nHHEH#GH(H/H00u\HH12HHEHmdmHHEÁ/HHEH.#.HHEH&H'(HHEHH!H"j~A#HHEH)>)HHEH!"HHEH~^ HHEfHH~AHHEHwHHEHMHHEH#~mHHEH&'HHEH%~A%HHEHHHEH$w$HHEÁkHHEHi6jHHEf.HeHggHHEHRH`Hbz~AbHHEHhNiHHEHa$aHHEH_~^`HHEfHOHQ~AQHHEHR^HHEHO]PHHEHN3~mNHHEHffHHEHd~AeHHEHMMHHEHcdHHEÐHHHÉ1)ǁGtwuwHHcH@1HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHDHu f.AVAUI1ATIULS1)ʼnAAtLHHt2I)Iw []A\A]A^ÐI|L1IHMlHHtZ[L]LA\HA]1A^fDHHtQHLL1wRr@[D]LLA\HA]1A^fHLL1CIPHER - Input data contains invalid padding and is rejectedSSL - An encrypted DTLS-frame with an unexpected CID was receivedCIPHER - Failed to allocate memorySSL - Unknown identity received (eg, PSK identity)SSL - Internal-only message signaling that a message arrived earlyCIPHER - The context is invalid. For example, because it was freedX509 - A fatal error occurred, eg the chain is too long or the vrfy callback failedECP - Invalid private or public keyDHM - Making of the public value failedDHM - Making of the DHM parameters failedDHM - The ASN.1 data is not formatted correctlyDHM - Reading of the public values failedPK - PK hardware accelerator failedDHM - DHM hardware accelerator failedDHM - Allocation of memory failedDHM - Calculation of the DHM secret failedDHM - Read or write of file failedMD - Bad input parameters to functionMD - Opening or reading of file failedECP - Memory allocation failedECP - The buffer is too small to write toECP - Generation of random value, such as ephemeral key, failedECP - The signature is not validECP - The ECP hardware accelerator failedRSA - The implementation does not offer the requested operation, for example, because of security violations or lack of functionalityECP - The buffer contains a valid signature followed by more dataECP - Bad input parameters to functionECP - The requested feature is not available, for example, the requested curve is not supportedMD - The selected feature is not availableCIPHER - Authentication failed (for AEAD modes)SSL - An operation failed due to an unexpected version or configurationPEM - Failed to allocate memoryPEM - No PEM header or footer foundPEM - Unsupported key encryption algorithmPEM - PEM string is not as expectedPKCS12 - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryptionPEM - Unavailable feature, e.g. hashing/encryption combinationPEM - Private key password can't be emptyPEM - RSA IV is not in hex-formatPEM - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryptionPK - Bad input parameters to functionRSA - Bad input parameters to functionPK - Read/write of file failedPK - Type mismatch, eg attempt to encrypt with an ECDSA keyPKCS5 - Bad input parameters to functionPK - Private key password can't be emptyPK - The algorithm tag or value is invalidPK - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryptionPK - Key algorithm is unsupported (only RSA and EC are supported)DHM - Setting the modulus and generator failedPK - Unavailable feature, e.g. RSA disabled for RSA keyPK - The pubkey tag or value is invalid (only RSA and EC are supported)PK - The buffer contains a valid signature followed by more dataPK - Elliptic curve is unsupported (only NIST curves are supported)X509 - Requested OID is unknownPKCS12 - PBE ASN.1 data not as expectedPKCS12 - Bad input parameters to functionX509 - The name tag or value is invalidX509 - Destination buffer is too smallRSA - The private key operation failedRSA - Key failed to pass the validity check of the libraryRSA - Input data contains invalid padding and is rejectedRSA - Something failed during generation of a keyRSA - The random generator failed to generate non-zerosRSA - The PKCS#1 verification failedRSA - RSA hardware accelerator failedRSA - The output buffer for decryption is not large enoughRSA - The public key operation failedSSL - Handshake protocol not within min/max boundariesSSL - A cryptographic operation is in progress. Try again laterSSL - No CA Chain is set, but required to operateSSL - An unknown cipher was receivedSSL - An invalid SSL record was receivedSSL - No RNG was provided to the SSL moduleSSL - The connection indicated an EOFSSL - Bad input parameters to functionSSL - The own certificate is not set, but needed by the serverSSL - No client certification received from the client, but required by the authentication modeSSL - The server has no ciphersuites in common with the clientSSL - Our own certificate(s) is/are too large to send in an SSL messageSSL - Unexpected message at ServerHello in renegotiationSSL - Verification of our peer failedSSL - An unexpected message was received from our peerSSL - Processing of the ClientHello handshake message failedSSL - A fatal alert message was received from our peerSSL - Processing of the ServerHelloDone handshake message failedSSL - Processing of the CertificateRequest handshake message failedSSL - Processing of the ServerHello handshake message failedSSL - The peer notified us that the connection is going to be closedSSL - Processing of the Certificate handshake message failedSSL - The own private key or pre-shared key is not set, but neededSSL - Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed in DHM / ECDH Calculate SecretSSL - Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failedSSL - Processing of the ChangeCipherSpec handshake message failedSSL - Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed in DHM / ECDH Read PublicSSL - Processing of the ServerKeyExchange handshake message failedSSL - Hardware acceleration function returned with errorSSL - Processing of the CertificateVerify handshake message failedSSL - Memory allocation failedSSL - The requested feature is not availableSSL - Verification of the message MAC failedSSL - Session ticket has expiredSSL - Processing of the compression / decompression failedSSL - Public key type mismatch (eg, asked for RSA key exchange and presented EC key)SSL - Processing of the NewSessionTicket handshake message failedECP - Operation in progress, call again with the same parameters to continueSSL - A counter would wrap (eg, too many messages exchanged)SSL - A buffer is too small to receive or write a messageSSL - Internal error (eg, unexpected failure in lower-level module)SSL - The client initiated a reconnect from the same portSSL - No data of requested type currently available on underlying transportSSL - DTLS client must retry for hello verificationSSL - Connection requires a write callSSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable (eg, no suitable certificate, see debug messages)CIPHER - Decryption of block requires a full blockSSL - The alert message received indicates a non-fatal errorSSL - The asynchronous operation is not completed yetSSL - Couldn't set the hash for verifying CertificateVerifySSL - Record header looks valid but is not expectedCIPHER - Cipher hardware accelerator failedSSL - Internal-only message signaling that further message-processing should be doneSSL - Invalid value in SSL configCIPHER - The selected feature is not availableSSL - Hardware acceleration function skipped / left alone dataMD - MD hardware accelerator failedPKCS12 - Feature not available, e.g. unsupported encryption schemePEM - Bad input parameters to functionX509 - The serial tag or value is invalidX509 - The CRT/CRL/CSR format is invalid, e.g. different type expectedX509 - Unavailable feature, e.g. RSA hashing/encryption combinationX509 - The CRT/CRL/CSR version element is invalidDHM - Reading of the DHM parameters failedX509 - The extension tag or value is invalidX509 - The date tag or value is invalidX509 - Signature algorithm (oid) is unsupportedX509 - The signature tag or value invalidX509 - Allocation of memory failedX509 - Format not recognized as DER or PEMX509 - Signature algorithms do not match. (see \c ::mbedtls_x509_crt sig_oid)X509 - CRT/CRL/CSR has an unsupported version numberX509 - Certificate verification failed, e.g. CRL, CA or signature check failedX509 - The algorithm tag or value is invalidPKCS5 - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryptionX509 - Read/write of file failedPKCS5 - Requested encryption or digest alg not availableMD - Failed to allocate memorySSL - Processing of the Finished handshake message failedAES - Feature not available. For example, an unsupported AES key sizeAES - AES hardware accelerator failedARC4 - ARC4 hardware accelerator failedASN1 - Out of data when parsing an ASN1 data structureASN1 - ASN1 tag was of an unexpected valueASN1 - Error when trying to determine the length or invalid lengthASN1 - Actual length differs from expected lengthASN1 - Memory allocation failedASN1 - Buffer too small when writing ASN.1 data structureBASE64 - Output buffer too smallBASE64 - Invalid character in inputBIGNUM - An error occurred while reading from or writing to a fileBIGNUM - Bad input parameters to functionBIGNUM - There is an invalid character in the digit stringBIGNUM - The buffer is too small to write toBIGNUM - The input arguments are negative or result in illegal outputBIGNUM - The input argument for division is zero, which is not allowedBIGNUM - The input arguments are not acceptableBIGNUM - Memory allocation failedBLOWFISH - Invalid data input lengthBLOWFISH - Blowfish hardware accelerator failedCAMELLIA - Invalid data input lengthCAMELLIA - Camellia hardware accelerator failedCCM - Bad input parameters to the functionCCM - Authenticated decryption failedCCM - CCM hardware accelerator failedCHACHA20 - Invalid input parameter(s)CHACHA20 - Feature not available. For example, s part of the API is not implementedCHACHA20 - Chacha20 hardware accelerator failedCHACHAPOLY - The requested operation is not permitted in the current stateCHACHAPOLY - Authenticated decryption failed: data was not authenticCTR_DRBG - The entropy source failedCTR_DRBG - The requested random buffer length is too bigCTR_DRBG - The input (entropy + additional data) is too largeCTR_DRBG - Read or write error in fileDES - The data input has an invalid lengthDES - DES hardware accelerator failedENTROPY - Critical entropy source failureENTROPY - No more sources can be addedENTROPY - No sources have been added to pollENTROPY - No strong sources have been added to pollENTROPY - Read/write error in fileERROR - This is a bug in the libraryGCM - Authenticated decryption failedGCM - GCM hardware accelerator failedGCM - Bad input parameters to functionXTEA - XTEA hardware accelerator failedHMAC_DRBG - Too many random requested in single callHMAC_DRBG - Input too large (Entropy + additional)HMAC_DRBG - Read/write error in fileHMAC_DRBG - The entropy source failedMD5 - MD5 hardware accelerator failedNET - The connection to the given server / port failedNET - Binding of the socket failedNET - Could not listen on the socketNET - Could not accept the incoming connectionNET - Reading information from the socket failedNET - Sending information through the socket failedNET - Connection was reset by peerNET - Failed to get an IP address for the given hostnameNET - Buffer is too small to hold the dataNET - The context is invalid, eg because it was free()edNET - Polling the net context failedOID - output buffer is too smallPADLOCK - Input data should be alignedPLATFORM - Hardware accelerator failedPLATFORM - The requested feature is not supported by the platformPOLY1305 - Invalid input parameter(s)POLY1305 - Feature not available. For example, s part of the API is not implementedPOLY1305 - Poly1305 hardware accelerator failedRIPEMD160 - RIPEMD160 hardware accelerator failedSHA1 - SHA-1 hardware accelerator failedSHA1 - SHA-1 input data was malformedSHA256 - SHA-256 hardware accelerator failedSHA256 - SHA-256 input data was malformedSHA512 - SHA-512 hardware accelerator failedSHA512 - SHA-512 input data was malformedTHREADING - The selected feature is not availableTHREADING - Bad input parameters to functionTHREADING - Locking / unlocking / free failed with error codeXTEA - The data input has an invalid lengthAES - Invalid data input lengthCIPHER - Bad input parametersPK - Unsupported key versionDHM - Bad input parametersX509 - Input invalidPKCS5 - Unexpected ASN.1 dataPK - Memory allocation failedPK - Invalid key tag or valueSSL - The operation timed outAES - Invalid key lengthAES - Invalid input dataASN1 - Data is invalidBLOWFISH - Bad input dataCAMELLIA - Bad input dataERROR - Generic errorNET - Failed to open a socketNET - Input invalidOID - OID is not foundUNKNOWN ERROR CODE (%04X)%s : GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0zRx  0 lD8RBG D(F0B (A BBBB o (D EIDK y (D HIDN   `  !@'-3H:A8H OUx\b@hou {     h P  PX   X( @%,H3@ 9?EK QWx ] cHiov8|PXhhh0 xkx;  @8 %,P 3:AVGXM SZa( h8 nuX| p (@X 0HP ` &-29(@GLQpW@\bh ovh}`h0 0//(/--x)" p"8"!%!,!3.:8.A.H 'O&V&]H&dx,k &rP,y,+++(-`+,(+,v(P)()((/'P/' .h'h(!8((./x-6+=D"K"R*Y0`p%gH%n8!uF| x0H00`!$%,)))%$%$%P$P-$*#*#$x*+h#2@*9 #@`GN0U\c j  8error.c.LC55.LC64.LC72.LC24.LC26.LC77.LC92.LC100.LC105.LC103.LC154.LC98.LC104.LC90.LC93.LC102.LC42.LC65.LC74.LC13.LC52.LC49.LC69.LC66.LC68.LC44.LC67.LC48.LC46.LC43.LC41.LC54.LC47.LC11.LC14.LC50.LC53.LC51.LC15.LC17.LC9.LC16.LC30.LC126.LC118.LC113.LC115.LC112.LC70.LC25.LC94.LC96.LC88.LC95.LC71.LC73.LC89.LC91.LC107.LC80.LC83.LC97.LC99.LC101.LC84.LC86.LC78.LC85.LC109.LC106.LC82.LC79.LC81.LC131.LC76.LC111.LC75.LC59.LC144.LC63.LC7.LC60.LC10.LC12.LC110.LC108.LC45.LC150.LC152.LC142.LC145.LC61.LC36.LC56.LC135.LC149.LC151.LC62.LC136.LC138.LC58.LC137.LC34.LC37.LC134.LC57.LC133.LC38.LC40.LC32.LC39.LC146.LC148.LC140.LC147.LC33.LC35.LC141.LC143.LC87.LC120.LC114.LC128.LC125.LC116.LC19.LC130.LC0.LC121.LC119.LC117.LC1.LC3.LC31.LC2.LC21.LC18.LC153.LC132.LC129.LC27.LC29.LC23.LC28.LC124.LC122.LC5.LC123.LC22.LC20.LC6.LC127.LC139.LC4.LC8.LC240.LC238.LC236.LC230.LC229.LC203.LC166.LC165.LC164.LC163.LC162.LC161.LC160.LC233.LC232.LC231.LC190.LC188.LC189.LC187.LC221.LC186.LC220.LC219.LC218.LC217.LC225.LC216.LC224.LC215.LC223.LC214.LC222.LC213.LC199.LC201.LC198.LC200.LC197.LC194.LC239.LC193.LC237.LC192.LC235.LC191.LC196.LC195.LC234.LC228.LC212.LC226.LC168.LC167.LC207.LC244.LC182.LC181.LC158.LC180.LC157.LC156.LC243.LC242.LC241.LC159.LC178.LC179.LC177.LC206.LC205.LC204.LC185.LC176.LC184.LC175.LC183.LC174.LC227.LC173.LC211.LC172.LC210.LC171.LC209.LC170.LC208.LC169.LC202.LC155.LC245.LC248.LC247.LC246mbedtls_high_level_strerrmbedtls_low_level_strerrmbedtls_strerror_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_memsetstrlensnprintf6 O h   *J[p= I!g"s#$%&'()*#+<,\-h./01234 5%6>7]8p9|:;<=>?@A(BFCSDlEFGHIJKL%M3NLOlPxQRSTUVWX5YNZi[q\]^_`abc,dPecf|ghijkl m n5 oC p\ q| r s t u v w x y& z2 {R |^ }| ~       @ S l        % 3 L l x        " B N l x        &.6>FNV^fnv~&.6>FNV^fnv~&.6>FNV^fnv~! Q[ b{       $(,048<@{DwHsLoPkTDXk\g`cd_h[l\p[tdx[|l;_K_[WSOKGCCC?;73/+'#   $(,04$8<,@DHLPTX\`PdhXlp`tdxh|lt| 4 H.symtab.strtab.shstrtab.rela.text.data.bss.rodata.str1.8.rodata.str1.1.rela.rodata.comment.note.GNU-stack.rela.eh_frame @@gx &H,H12H1@2PCT0EO@0 \0GeGz Gu@@H G `gcm.c.o/ 1610128459 0 0 100644 13648 ` ELF>1@@AUATIUHSHHAD$L AHHHLXH΃I4lfDHCIIIIP@@ GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0havege.c.symtab.strtab.shstrtab.text.data.bss.comment.note.GNU-stack@!@'@,0@5SX   Ehkdf.c.o/ 1610128459 0 0 100644 3456 ` ELF>@ @@ ATfIUHHXD$D$ D$0D$@HtLHHX]A\Hu+LL$L$HtLL$L$Ht$DfAWAVAUATUSHHt$(L$HT$HL$LD$ MIMH;\$HH|$t1LHHHH$H=Hl$PLt$pHLHD$'@@ UIHHSHHI4HHH1[]ff.HHH1HLJHHH)HHBl'H AWIAVAUIATUSHHhH?HT$MAMD$Ll$ Lc\LHHLHHLHuvLHugL$QT$D8sVHuJHLHu8Ht$Hu"AgHT$LHOL@D$D$Hh[]A\A]A^A_A ff.fAWAAVIAUATIUSHHHW`HЅtHRHILH=H10HHHH{xSpLk`Et LH{xJt-HSputHC`HIMtMu@LHHAąuCXLHHĈD[]A\A]A^A_@J|-LLMAAff.AVIAUIATIԺUHSt[]A\A]A^DLH]HHuLHs(u[tC"JL qs"NԿ'F4ջI_ȤYy4|ݥyWf!Fs:5![[Ď3t՛19`Hі% <%ʸ-Tspz%^KNj+F\ q@\DDɫX>O>[dHiZBMB`^@M{YTuiQGCC: (GNU) 10.2.0zRx $2AJD ^CADHLX3BEB E(A0A8G 8A0A(B BBBD HBEE B(D0A8J 8D0A(B BBBE LBEE I(D0J (A BBBF ~ (J BBBJ X`l.BEE J(D0D8GPM 8A0A(B BBBD  8J0F(B BBBN H BBB E(D0D8GP> 8A0A(B BBBF 8XfIIE E(A0}(E BBB(YFHJ vAA0BBN Gg  DBBA @BBE L(D0Gu 0D(B BBBG 88BBA A(NX (D ABBK  2)5K8VP``(mP y~(!/@H3&=Tj.$ F0l@0fY +18?bho hmac_drbg.chmac_drbg_self_test_entropytest_offsethmac_drbg_reseed_coreentropy_prresult_prentropy_noprresult_nopr.LC0.LC1.LC4.LC2.LC3.LC5_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_memcpymbedtls_hmac_drbg_initmbedtls_mutex_initmbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_retmbedtls_md_get_sizembedtls_md_hmac_finishmbedtls_md_hmac_startsmbedtls_md_hmac_updatembedtls_md_hmac_resetmbedtls_platform_zeroizembedtls_hmac_drbg_updatembedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_bufmbedtls_md_setupmbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseedmbedtls_hmac_drbg_seedmbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistancembedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_lenmbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_reseed_intervalmbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_addmbedtls_hmac_drbg_randommbedtls_mutex_lockmbedtls_mutex_unlockmbedtls_hmac_drbg_freembedtls_mutex_freembedtls_md_freembedtls_hmac_drbg_write_seed_filefopenfwritefclosembedtls_hmac_drbg_update_seed_filefreadferrormbedtls_hmac_drbg_self_testmbedtls_md_info_from_typememcmpputsputcharprintf%t*"? Qg!z! $(6B$$?g% &53*,k*x*-*/0!* 25+Q3h4u!26 6" !* 4L 7X 4f v ! 1 9    &< 'L +` +p  x : . .   \  & % + +  & :9 .A .P U ;_ <s z =   &  ; ' + +   :# ( ;/ 6 => N  \_ h &| % + + H@\ \p 0@\0< .symtab.strtab.shstrtab.rela.text.data.bss.rodata.str1.1.rodata.comment.note.GNU-stack.rela.eh_frame @ @ & , 12 K@` 8 H0Qfpa@%    8'pmd.c.o/ 1610128459 0 0 100644 15640 ` ELF>X8@@H|HHcH@HHHHHHH1DHHH5€ H5H€H5H€H5H€tH5H€H5H€H5H€HǹH5tH1DfDfD fDfDfDfDfDfHGHUHHHtkHHt0@w HHcHH}H}HtHEp HcH}H]]fDH}DH}DH}DH}DHHHHHHH9Ht}@HHvHHcHfD1H@1H@1H@1H@1H@밸멸ff.HpATUHSHLFH7HHGHGAHHcHHEHHEu?1[]A\lHEHHEts HEHuHf.\HEHHtdgXHEHHt<?\HEHHt ÐfDHtuHHtm@wbHHHcH@1ffD1HtPHHtH@w=H HHcH@DHtPHHtH@w=HHHcH@DIHHHG|H HcH1LfDLLLL1LfDLff.fAWAVAUATIUH HHH5IHHIL|$ LL1LAąt2LHLH D]A\A]A^A_ÐLAątLLAąuHLHHuHAqLLA^ApAef.AWAVAUATUSHHHIH7IHHoHN IHH9s[HADžLLLADžHLADžI6InIDn N fDHT AH66666666H}IHEHHD I)AADHI6H\\\\\\\\N  1Mt!A 0LA 0 HI9uLADžuIHLP AǾ@HHHD[]A\A]A^A_uvE\E6AK66fBLI6;fHzHHHHD H)H7D\&\\fD E6666BD6666I6\\\\D \\\\A:HtH?tHtff.HAVIAUATUSH@HHH_Ht{IHDh LtH@[]A\A]A^LuIALHP uILLP uHL땸ff.HtRATUHHH?t;LgMt2t H]A\ÐHELHP H]A\fDиAWAVAUATUSH8LL$HLt$IHILHMLLAąt!LH8D[]A\A]A^A_LHLAąuLHLAąuHt$LAAff.HtPHHtH@w=HHHcH@DHt G fD1ff.fHt G1ff.fHt H1 MD5RIPEMD160SHA1SHASHA224SHA256SHA384SHA512rb@0 @@@ @@GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0zRx 0DjX(lJq E A G @0Dg E K E K E K E K E zRx  0KAD t ABI zRx  $ ` t[[@BBB B(D0Go 0D(B BBBB L)BBB B(A0A8DY 8D0A(B BBBD X&HlKEB A(A0Dpp 0A(A BBBH W<]GAG \ ABB R ABK GHBBB B(A0A8DpM 8D0A(B BBBH D[Xl  .   DINSX]b%g,l3 r ` P @ 0  ( <jXh x.AYk|@ P %BYq[0[/Ic{@'-4:A`)X &o  ]  [@] q @ md.csupported_digestsmbedtls_md_clone.coldmbedtls_md_setup.cold.LC0.LC1.LC2.LC3.LC4.LC5.LC6.LC7.LC10mbedtls_md_listmbedtls_md_info_from_type_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_mbedtls_md5_infombedtls_ripemd160_infombedtls_sha1_infombedtls_sha224_infombedtls_sha512_infombedtls_sha256_infombedtls_sha384_infombedtls_md_info_from_stringmbedtls_md_initmbedtls_md_freembedtls_md5_freembedtls_platform_zeroizembedtls_sha512_freembedtls_sha256_freembedtls_sha1_freembedtls_ripemd160_freembedtls_md_clonembedtls_sha512_clonembedtls_sha256_clonembedtls_sha1_clonembedtls_ripemd160_clonembedtls_md5_clonembedtls_md_setupcallocmbedtls_sha512_initmbedtls_sha256_initmbedtls_ripemd160_initmbedtls_md5_initmbedtls_sha1_initmbedtls_md_init_ctxmbedtls_md_startsmbedtls_sha512_starts_retmbedtls_ripemd160_starts_retmbedtls_md5_starts_retmbedtls_sha1_starts_retmbedtls_sha256_starts_retmbedtls_md_updatembedtls_sha512_update_retmbedtls_sha256_update_retmbedtls_sha1_update_retmbedtls_ripemd160_update_retmbedtls_md5_update_retmbedtls_md_finishmbedtls_sha512_finish_retmbedtls_sha256_finish_retmbedtls_sha1_finish_retmbedtls_ripemd160_finish_retmbedtls_md5_finish_retmbedtls_mdmbedtls_sha512_retmbedtls_ripemd160_retmbedtls_md5_retmbedtls_sha1_retmbedtls_sha256_retmbedtls_md_filefopenfclosefreadferrormbedtls_md_hmac_startsmbedtls_md_hmac_updatembedtls_md_hmac_finishmbedtls_md_hmac_resetmbedtls_md_hmacmbedtls_md_processmbedtls_internal_sha512_processmbedtls_internal_sha256_processmbedtls_internal_sha1_processmbedtls_internal_ripemd160_processmbedtls_internal_md5_processmbedtls_md_get_sizembedtls_md_get_typembedtls_md_get_name3*C*S*c*s** *!)HgLa%j&'&()*+54Q-a.q/01P#384[3p53$3637 38klKbjS#2'T$:@ U!V4F:@F : @ ' F :6 @L @[ F : #$ 23 $Z Wo X Y '.F2;<=>??;A BCD!EaGiHqIyJKMNOP QQ)M @ @ ] ^ _ ` a0Th X` $(,048<t@hDlH`LdPTX\X`\d(h,lptx| 0tptpt0       S?,% 0@P` 4H\p P d@xP0@ `\ p   H \ p @ .symtab.strtab.shstrtab.rela.text.data.bss.rela.rodata.rodata.str1.1.rela.text.unlikely.rela.data.rel.ro.local.comment.note.GNU-stack.rela.eh_frame @S @@#p & , 6  1@.>26RM@40fpa@4 y0@p5@(x  7md2.c.o/ 1610128459 0 0 100644 912 ` ELF>P@@ GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0md2.c.symtab.strtab.shstrtab.text.data.bss.comment.note.GNU-stack@!@'@,0@5SX Emd4.c.o/ 1610128459 0 0 100644 912 ` ELF>P@@ GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0md4.c.symtab.strtab.shstrtab.text.data.bss.comment.note.GNU-stack@!@'@,0@5SX Emd5.c.o/ 1610128459 0 0 100644 8200 ` ELF>@@ HHH1HGHHH)XHHt Xff.@ooNOoV W o^0_0of@g@HFPHGPff.H#EgHHGHܺvT2HG1f.ff.AWIAVAUATUSHxD6DND^ nDnDV(Dt$ D~FDL$$^~ D\$,N$D|$($D$0l$4\$\$8Dl$<|$|$@L$ L$DDT$HDf4^0V,D|$A@AHDd$Dd$TDf8v' 11ƉA011AD|$ 11׉A79D|$11щ 11A?|D|$11ƉAeV 11ljAD")Dt$11A5*C  1ЉA<# 1΍ 9  1ǍY[e$ 1ωA D\$  1A2}DT$ 1ЉA9]DL$  1A O~o 1A,  1ωAC 1A3N  1Љ;~S\$ 1։ʍ 5:  1A*D|$  ׉T$`1A7ӆ  ωL$l1 ljD$h1H|$ APt$dAPAp A@AHAp PA@AHHx1[]A\A]A^A_ff.HAVAUATIUHSHӺ@AA?D)؉AsGEL9MD$MŃHEIuIHIEJD5KD5I)DM)r1I< H<9rLLuL)LE1H?w1H1[]A\A]A^@H?whH@H@H?vHLt[]A\A]A^f.~EAEmBD5fCD5\DKT,؃s7dM VLfL1G@1HEHzHHHLHLH)H)Ճ1҉уLD L9r1EAEBD5CD5M LL1ff.fff.ATLgUHSH?HDL8wS81)ʃruHHDHHHH)ƒ1ƃH<19r{fD@)t1҉у9rLHt1[]A\@t8t01fL'f.fCID$0AD$AD$ CLH߉ ȉSPCTuSUSuS US US US uSUSUSUSu SU SU SU Su SUSU[]A\DRDff.AWIAVIAUIATUH`HHHAąt HH`D]A\A]A^A_LLHAąuLHAff.ff.AWL=AVAAUATE1USHHIu\fLLLAąuaIEIUH3H3SH uGt H=HIQItIHN$ItDH=1Au6HD[]A\A]A^A_@u E1 @H= MD5 test #%d: passedfailedُ B~ u1Ùiw&aPPaabcmessage digestabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz012345678912345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0zRx )0D4X&lH`BEB B(A0A8DB8C0A(B BBBdKBB D(D0 (A BBBE f (A BBBK xC0H8\BED  ABE  ABH @uBEE E(A0Df 0D(B BBBH LBIH B(D0C8KP 8D0A(B BBBE 7p!8 16;@)Q0bxP4&`0@P (` ? R ub n md5.cmd5_test_bufmd5_test_summd5_test_buflen.LC1.LC0.LC2mbedtls_md5_initmbedtls_md5_free_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_mbedtls_platform_zeroizembedtls_md5_clonembedtls_md5_starts_retmbedtls_md5_startsmbedtls_internal_md5_processmbedtls_md5_processmbedtls_md5_update_retmbedtls_md5_updatembedtls_md5_finish_retmbedtls_md5_finishmbedtls_md5_retmbedtls_md5mbedtls_md5_self_testputsprintfputchar5  l - 5 D j |          |0  7 !v "   ;1Q    40HP\p0@LP ``     .symtab.strtab.shstrtab.rela.text.data.bss.rodata.str1.1.rodata.comment.note.GNU-stack.rela.eh_frame @ @@ & , 12 @ H0Q fPa@P `H  p/18 1610128459 0 0 100644 928 ` ELF>`@@ GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0memory_buffer_alloc.c.symtab.strtab.shstrtab.text.data.bss.comment.note.GNU-stack@!@'@,0@5SX Enist_kw.c.o/ 1610128459 0 0 100644 912 ` ELF>P@@ GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0nist_kw.c.symtab.strtab.shstrtab.text.data.bss.comment.note.GNU-stack@!@'@,0@5SX   Eoid.c.o/ 1610128459 0 0 100644 20392 ` ELF>hK@@Ht{AUIATUHSHHLgH=fH{(H(Ht3HCI9uIuLuHS HUH[]A\A]H[]A\A]øf.Ht{AUIATUHSHHLgH=fH{(H(Ht3HCI9uIuLuڋS UH[]A\A]fH[]A\A]øf.Ht{AUIATUHSHHLgH=fH{ H Ht3HCI9uIuLuHSHUH[]A\A]H[]A\A]øf.AHtHtDf.HG8U uHE1HDHt{AU IATUHSHHLgH=fH{(H(Ht3HCI9uIuLuHSHUH[]A\A]H[]A\A]øf.HtyAV IAUATIUHSHLoH=H{(H(Ht3HCI9uIvLuڋS A$S$U[]A\A]A^@[]A\A]A^øff.IIȹHHDHP(H(Ht#H$9u9p uH@II1f.f.Ht{AU IATUHSHHLgH=fH{(H(Ht3HCI9uIuLuڋS UH[]A\A]fH[]A\A]øf.IHHHDHP(H(HtH 9uH@IH1fHt{AUIATUHSHHLgH=fH{(H(Ht3HCI9uIuLuڋS UH[]A\A]fH[]A\A]øf.IHHHDHP(H(HtH 9uH@IH1fHt{AUIATUHSHHLgH=fH{(H(Ht3HCI9uIuLuڋS UH[]A\A]fH[]A\A]øf.Ht{AUIATUHSHHLgH=fH{(H(Ht3HCI9uIuLuڋS UH[]A\A]fH[]A\A]øf.IHHHDHP(H(HtH 9uH@IH1fHt{AUIATUHSHHLgH=fH{(H(Ht3HCI9uIuLuڋS UH[]A\A]fH[]A\A]øf.HtyAV IAUATIUHSHLoH=H{(H(Ht3HCI9uIvLuڋS A$S$U[]A\A]A^@[]A\A]A^øff.AVAUIATUHSHzu[]D)A\A]A^DHBIHI A ȍ f A)1EHcH9I)II|$vIt$1DI9\$ruUHDƒфx1HLLx&HL9sI)II9\$#It$1D[]A\A]A^UU+Any Policy*H *H *H=+*H *H *H  %d.%d.%uPBE with SHA1 and 3-Key 3DES*H  PBE with SHA1 and 2-Key 3DEShmacSHA1HMAC-SHA-1*H hmacSHA224HMAC-SHA-224*H  hmacSHA256HMAC-SHA-256*H  hmacSHA384HMAC-SHA-384*H  hmacSHA512HMAC-SHA-512id-md5MD5+id-sha1SHA-1`Heid-sha224SHA-224`Heid-sha256SHA-256`Heid-sha384SHA-384`Heid-sha512SHA-512+$id-ripemd160RIPEMD-160desCBCDES-CBC*H des-ede3-cbcDES-EDE3-CBCsecp192r1secp224r1*H=secp256r1secp384r1secp521r1secp192k1secp224k1secp256k1+$brainpoolP256r1brainpool256r1+$ brainpoolP384r1brainpool384r1+$ brainpoolP512r1brainpool512r1rsaEncryptionRSA*H=id-ecPublicKeyGeneric EC key+ id-ecDHEC key for ECDHmd5WithRSAEncryptionRSA with MD5*H sha-1WithRSAEncryptionRSA with SHA1*H sha224WithRSAEncryptionRSA with SHA-224*H  sha256WithRSAEncryptionRSA with SHA-256*H  sha384WithRSAEncryptionRSA with SHA-384*H  sha512WithRSAEncryptionRSA with SHA-512+*H=ecdsa-with-SHA1ECDSA with SHA1*H=ecdsa-with-SHA224ECDSA with SHA224*H=ecdsa-with-SHA256ECDSA with SHA256*H=ecdsa-with-SHA384ECDSA with SHA384*H=ecdsa-with-SHA512ECDSA with SHA512*H  RSASSA-PSSid-kp-serverAuthTLS Web Server Authentication+id-kp-clientAuthTLS Web Client Authentication+id-kp-codeSigningCode Signing+id-kp-emailProtectionE-mail Protection+id-kp-timeStampingTime Stamping+ id-kp-OCSPSigningOCSP Signing+%id-kp-wisun-fan-deviceid-ce-basicConstraintsBasic ConstraintsUid-ce-keyUsageKey UsageU%id-ce-extKeyUsageExtended Key UsageUid-ce-subjectAltNameSubject Alt Name`HBid-netscape-certtypeNetscape Certificate TypeU id-ce-certificatePoliciesCertificate Policiesid-at-commonNameCommon NameCNUid-at-countryNameCountryCUid-at-localityLocalityLUid-at-stateStateSTU id-at-organizationNameOrganizationOU id-at-organizationalUnitNameOrg UnitOU*H  emailAddressE-mail addressUid-at-serialNumberSerial numberserialNumberUid-at-postalAddressPostal addresspostalAddressUid-at-postalCodePostal codepostalCodeUid-at-surNameSurnameSNU*id-at-givenNameGiven nameGNU+id-at-initialsInitialsinitialsU,id-at-generationQualifierGeneration qualifiergenerationQualifierU id-at-titleTitletitleU.id-at-dnQualifierDistinguished Name qualifierdnQualifierUAid-at-pseudonymPseudonympseudonym &,did-domainComponentDomain componentDCU-id-at-uniqueIdentifierUnique IdentifieruniqueIdentifierpbeWithSHAAnd3-KeyTripleDES-CBCpbeWithSHAAnd2-KeyTripleDES-CBCWi-SUN Alliance Field Area Network (FAN) % #     !%                 +!+"+#++ + GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0zRx LGJA D(K0A (A ABBH D(F ABBALlGJA D(K0 (A ABBJ D(F ABBALGJA D(K0A (A ABBH D(F ABBA =L GJA D(K0A (A ABBH D(F ABBAPpGJB D(D0I (A BBBE A(F BBBAVLGJA D(K0 (A ABBJ D(F ABBA(NL<GJA D(K0 (A ABBJ D(F ABBANLGJA D(K0 (A ABBJ D(F ABBALGJA D(K0 (A ABBJ D(F ABBA@NLTGJA D(K0 (A ABBJ D(F ABBAPGJB D(D0I (A BBBE A(F BBBAHBBE A(D0J (A EBBF (F BBB  '90E P@\xk@vx   &09?HQ\b 4 W=|VpNPN:0UlPN0oid.coid_x520_attr_typeoid_x509_extoid_ext_key_usageoid_sig_algoid_pk_algoid_ecp_grpoid_cipher_algoid_md_algoid_md_hmacoid_pkcs12_pbe_alg.LC0.LC1.LC2.LC3.LC4.LC5.LC6.LC7.LC8.LC9.LC10.LC11.LC12mbedtls_oid_get_attr_short_name_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_memcmpmbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_typembedtls_oid_get_extended_key_usagembedtls_oid_get_certificate_policiesmbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg_descmbedtls_oid_get_sig_algmbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_sig_algmbedtls_oid_get_pk_algmbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_pk_algmbedtls_oid_get_ec_grpmbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_ec_grpmbedtls_oid_get_cipher_algmbedtls_oid_get_md_algmbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_mdmbedtls_oid_get_md_hmacmbedtls_oid_get_pkcs12_pbe_algmbedtls_oid_get_numeric_stringsnprintf (N%%9Hn% >%%%% i<x%<IX~%|%[|e|%NY~% 6!6Qf(8 @H  "0+86?CJNT\blv~ 08HX`p9@0P"X"hx,,6??II SS] ]0@gHgXhqpq{ &08HX`p.4<Lanx (8HP`p x%6@Xixow(8@P`h x'9KUU`q 08@PX`px )<JSer|@   ( 8 @ P ` h x    , 6 K e i  0 8 @ H X ` h p            * 7 9 = Z c f p( }0 p8 H P X ` p x        # 1 9 < @ P [ ^  b  q z (  8  @  H  P  `  h  p  x     % ) 9 C M X k |       p $tp,@P0DPX0.symtab.strtab.shstrtab.rela.text.data.bss.rodata.str1.1.rodata.str1.8.rela.data.rel.ro.local.rodata.comment.note.GNU-stack.rela.eh_frame @@.P& , 12 @2iT@@ O@X2g!$o0!x!!@@8I %(#  +Jpadlock.c.o/ 1610128459 0 0 100644 912 ` ELF>P@@ GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0padlock.c.symtab.strtab.shstrtab.text.data.bss.comment.note.GNU-stack@!@'@,0@5SX   Epem.c.o/ 1610128459 0 0 100644 8776 ` ELF>@@ AWAVAUIATMUHSHLt$ H|$H\$LH4$LADžt,LH߾HĈD[]A\A]A^A_fLHLADžuLLADžuHLADžuH<$HD$oD$LADžjHLADžOLHLADž6LLADžHLADžH$HJH HCHD$HPȃsR Ht$NLfLfH$H|$HH|$HD$HGHtHtHwHHHH)H)ȃR1҉уLL9r7 Ht$NLL ff.AWAVIAUIATIUSHHL|$0LD$Hl$LLD$LLHAąt-LHHĸD[]A\A]A^A_HLAąuIILL1LAAWAAVAUIATIUSHhLt$@HL$Hl$ LLD$LL$LD$LLHL$Ht1LD$LHD$Hh[]A\A]A^A_@BHLuHT$MML1LfHGAWAVAUATUSHLD$LL$HHHIIHIH<LHIH%I9LIA< u AFI< u AFI< LMfL uPH uPH HH$H)HLL)HD$D$M9ML|$ 11M)LLMNLl$ LHHMLLLHA…D$mH|$c|$%D$!QhHt$ Hv}0u }HHAHe: 4,ENCI3T$HProc-TypI3$H A|$RYPTfA|$EDAFIV< u AFIV< OHJLH)H;H: DES-EDH3qHDEK-InfoH3BH u yE3-CH: DES-CBH3qHDEK-InfoH3H u fyC,HDEK-InfoH9AfDHt$ H+HsHD[]A\A]A^A_LL$LD$H|$0HHL$ DT$DT$AEsHE@Ht$ HD$HDT$ArfDLD$HL$H|$0HHT$ DT$DT$ADLL$LD$H|$0HHL$ DT$ZDT$ASDHD$ L|$@DT$Ll$0LLt$(HD$LD$LLHL$(DT$At,LDT$LDT$LLDT$AuHT$IIL1LDT$AHH HDEK-InfoH9 y: AEfy S-HH: AES-12H3QHDEK-InfoH3H u y8-CBlH: AES-19H3QHDEK-InfoH3H u y2-CBzH: AES-25H3QHDEK-InfoH3H jy6-CB]fyC,QD$HQLH)Hf1Ht$0D$0'0HHHHDHHH>H t:Dx@ v̍x@w 7H@x@WH@H6< uAH< uD$La@LL$LD$H|$0HHL$ DT$DT$ADH: DES-CBH3yHDEK-InfoH31H fyC, HJLH)HHD$01Ht$0(f0HHHHDHHH>Ht:D x@ v̍x@w 7H@x@woWHHJ#LD$!H)H HDEK-InfoH9y: AEfy S-cAaDAQDAADfyBCy,HJLH)H~HD$01Ht$0.0HHHHDHHH>Ht:D x@ v̍x@w 7H@x@KWH@HJ(LD$%H)H AifyC,D$@y: AE%fy S-,fyC,zD$A Ht$ HHAAUHH?HtHuH}H}H]ff.AWIAVAUI1ATMIUH1SHLH8HT$(LL$HT$LHIHt$(HT$IHHHDLLH;D$HE1LILADžLLLHLHT$(M,HtZLA@fDH@LHFƒ$tAM)ILH)HHT$(Li HuHHLHHH\$pHT$1II}AEHL)HH)LH8D[]A\A]A^A_@HT$Ht$Ht$HT$HIAfDHMEIIIMHtIt LL)I)1AKK9rAMtAt ftfAt H\$pAHProc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTEDDEK-Info: DES-EDE3-CBC,DEK-Info: DES-CBC,DEK-Info: AES-128-CBC,DEK-Info: AES-192-CBC,DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,DEK-Info: AES-GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0zRx H$BBB E(D0D8GF 8D0A(B BBBC HhBBE E(D0A8JR 8D0A(B BBBD HBEB E(D0A8G_ 8A0A(B BBBE L BBB B(A0A8G 8D0A(B BBBH d5AoHUBEB G(G0F8JpO 8D0A(B BBBE $0#3IZq $5F]s  5' U@Vpem.cpem_pbkdf1pem_des3_decryptpem_aes_decrypt_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_mbedtls_md5_initmbedtls_md5_starts_retmbedtls_md5_freembedtls_platform_zeroizembedtls_md5_update_retmbedtls_md5_finish_retmemcpymbedtls_des3_initmbedtls_des3_freembedtls_des3_set3key_decmbedtls_des3_crypt_cbcmbedtls_aes_initmbedtls_aes_freembedtls_aes_setkey_decmbedtls_aes_crypt_cbcmbedtls_pem_initmbedtls_pem_read_bufferstrstrstrlenmbedtls_base64_decodecallocmbedtls_des_initmbedtls_des_freembedtls_des_setkey_decmbedtls_des_crypt_cbcmbedtls_pem_freembedtls_pem_write_buffermbedtls_base64_encodememset1 9HUz0`?JwM ! "" "#$%;&  "  " "7 )? J  )   '5=f*n"!  l0h  .symtab.strtab.shstrtab.rela.text.data.bss.rodata.str1.1.comment.note.GNU-stack.rela.eh_frame @U@p &,12@0+I>^@Y@   ]hpk.c.o/ 1610128459 0 0 100644 5576 ` ELF>@@ HHGHt+UHHHtHPPH]f.ff.@t;wt,uH1u H1fDHHHt2UHSHH?uHVHHEHtH]1H[]øøff.H?uZAWIAVIAUATIULSHHL-AUHHCHt/L+L8LpL`Hh1H[]A\A]A^A_fDøHtHHt H@1DHHtqAVMAUMATIUSHHt%H@ HtFH{M[ML]A\A]A^HHt H뿸[]A\A]A^øÐHjHAWAVAUATIUSHHL|$PHT$XHtkHMMHt5H@(HtfH{HT$XMML|$PHL[]A\A]A^A_HT$HHtHT$H른H[]A\A]A^A_øHjt$(t$(H(HHtH@0Ht H฀øff.fHHtH@8Ht H฀øff.fHHt3HHt+HH@Ht(8tH9uHvH:tøøfHtHHt H`@1DAWAVAUATUHLSHH}LD$PL|$XIHLD$AMH$H$LD$t+MHMLD[H]A\A]A^A_EI9MHHHI9LD$H}E11APAD$EPA$PHT$R1H AątHD[]A\A]A^A_HHHI9ǸDGfAAAHHtH@XHtHH1HøøfHHt HHtHBHt HHt1invalid PKGCC: (GNU) 10.2.0zRx 01F[LH4`DFDD _ AAA GF \mHEE B(D0D8G@l8A0A(B BBBGF@X JEE D(C0Y (I BBBE b (A BBBA GhDB I`BBB B(D0A8DPC 8F0A(B BBBE o 8A0A(B BBBA DB D(D0I##0GDpXPBBB B(A0G8DPV 8J0D(B BBBH MXI`EhFpKPK 8D0A(B BBBD .UL 1+AZPHtDm`/I]o##@GP%.60JPpk.c.LC0mbedtls_pk_initmbedtls_pk_free_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_mbedtls_platform_zeroizembedtls_pk_info_from_typembedtls_eckey_infombedtls_ecdsa_infombedtls_rsa_infombedtls_eckeydh_infombedtls_pk_setupmbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_altmbedtls_rsa_alt_infombedtls_pk_can_dombedtls_pk_verify_restartablembedtls_md_info_from_typembedtls_md_get_sizembedtls_pk_verifymbedtls_pk_sign_restartablembedtls_pk_signmbedtls_pk_decryptmbedtls_pk_encryptmbedtls_pk_check_pairmbedtls_pk_get_bitlenmbedtls_pk_verify_extmbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_extmbedtls_pk_debugmbedtls_pk_get_namembedtls_pk_get_typed*z****^ " 32 1 4PPd`l  4@H\0P.symtab.strtab.shstrtab.rela.text.data.bss.rodata.str1.1.comment.note.GNU-stack.rela.eh_frame @c@ &,12 @0I^Y@p   ` ^ hpk_wrap.c.o/ 1610128459 0 0 100644 10840 ` ELF>X&@@ ff.HHFHGH(HFHFHF H~(ff.1@HHHHFH~1@11HHH?PHHf.AWAVIAUAATUSHHt$PHT$XHt$H$H9wWHMH?HMSI$H=w9L|$XH$AELt$PHt$HCH;H[]A\A]A^A_@H[]A\A]A^A_@AWMAVIAUIATMUHSHHH?SH9u-HCH;HM[M]LLA\A]A^A_DH[]A\A]A^A_@UHH]ff. ATIHt 11HLA\Dff.HHHff.AWIAVIAUIATMUHSLHHt$PHT$XHt$H$I$H9w/Ll$PH$MMHt$HH1[]A\A]A^A_H[]A\A]A^A_ff.AWMAVIAUIATMUHSHHHt$PHT$XHt$H$H9u;L|$XH$MMLt$PHt$HH[]A\A]A^A_H[]A\A]A^A_@AWIAVMAUMATIUHSHHt$PHT$Xu H9wIHHT$H4$Ll$XEAIHT$HL|$PH4$H[]A\A]A^A_H[]A\A]A^A_ff.AWMAVIAUATMUHSHHL$HL$Iu H9wDM9wOAWA11AVA1HZYu M9BH[]A\A]A^A_ffUHH]ff.ATXIHtHLA\fff.ATXIHtHLA\fUHH]ff.ff.AWMAVIAUIATIUSLHxHl$t$ HLHAątHHxD[]A\A]A^A_$LMI$LHt$AXZHHHLM=tHøAWAVMAUIATIUHSLHhILLLAąt#LHhD[]A\A]A^A_fDILLHLA=uAf.U HH]fAWAVAUIATUSHH(H>VLHHHH9foH;I$D$SHH=L|$ A E11AW1AVH;SLAątH(D[]A\A]A^A_fDLHH9r'AWA E11AV11LLuH9vAArsa.Nrsa.Eeckey.QRSA-altECDSAEC_DHECRSA****************GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0zRx 04D Xl   GJ\BGE E(A0A8DP_ 8A0A(B BBBF D8F0A(B BBB\4lBEE E(D0D8G@V 8D0D(M BBBG D8F0A(B BBBAL+BhDI\ BEE E(D0D8GPy 8F0A(B BBBH D8F0A(B BBB\lBEE E(D0D8GPz 8D0F(B BBBL D8F0A(B BBB\BEE E(D0D8FPQ 8A0A(B BBBF D8F0A(B BBBT,BEE B(D0D8FPgXI`NXAPS 8A0A(B BBBH AL'Bd'BdALXBEE E(D0A8Jr 8D0A(B BBBA GPSAx(D\ A HBBE E(D0D8Jl 8D0A(B BBBG AQdBBB E(A0A8J]IIN 8D0A(B BBBG RMO  4 ` -p>J Y f ul 0+`p $2PBR'c@tP'@(p     (R9@Ql1DWu```` ``pk_wrap.crsa_can_dorsa_debugeckey_can_doeckey_get_bitleneckey_debugeckeydh_can_doecdsa_can_dorsa_alt_can_dorsa_alt_get_bitlenrsa_alt_sign_wraprsa_alt_decrypt_wraprsa_free_wraprsa_alt_alloc_wraprsa_alloc_wraprsa_check_pair_wraprsa_get_bitlenrsa_encrypt_wraprsa_decrypt_wraprsa_sign_wraprsa_verify_wrapeckey_free_wrapeckey_alloc_wrapeckey_check_pairecdsa_alloc_wrapecdsa_free_wrapecdsa_sign_wrapeckey_sign_wrapecdsa_verify_wrapeckey_verify_wraprsa_alt_free_wraprsa_alt_check_pair.LC0.LC1.LC2.LC3_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_mbedtls_rsa_freecallocmbedtls_rsa_initmbedtls_rsa_check_pub_privmbedtls_rsa_get_lenmbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encryptmbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decryptmbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_signmbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verifymbedtls_ecp_keypair_freembedtls_ecp_keypair_initmbedtls_ecp_check_pub_privmbedtls_ecdsa_initmbedtls_ecdsa_freembedtls_ecdsa_write_signaturembedtls_ecdsa_from_keypairmbedtls_ecdsa_read_signaturembedtls_platform_zeroizembedtls_rsa_alt_infombedtls_ecdsa_infombedtls_eckeydh_infombedtls_eckey_infombedtls_rsa_info#)@*+/=1Q2u44T44r4891-:]1m<=<?=2>Q@<?=@ AD4],480+1a356+70A;0>0(0@ H Phppx@@P"p@((0p8`@pH`@hpx+pP `0 4 H`\pp8 0`pp 0P@P  |@p .symtab.strtab.shstrtab.rela.text.data.bss.rodata.str1.1.rela.data.rel.ro.local.rodata.cst16.comment.note.GNU-stack.rela.eh_frame @@ &O,O12O/E @@  X` f0p o  `@" . '%pkcs12.c.o/ 1610128459 0 0 100644 6400 ` ELF>@@ AWAVIAUATUSHH@I@H|$ Ht$LL$tHg$IMHHyLd$@L1HLtHĨ[]A\A]A^A_@H$H$H|$0HH!HHHHH4$HHH$ HD$HLL$DI9HIFtACHH)uH$H4$HD$HI9HIFŃetAHH)uH|$Lt$`L$ 0Hc$HD$8LMIHLL<$Ht$0LLHt$LLHt$LLuHLbHD$8HKALl$(ILIDHL9LHLLtMMLl$(H|$$H|$L@LL$ILOMIHILHLHL)I)ƒ1AȃOO9reILWMIHILHLHL)I)ƒHD$1AȃKK9rHD$fDLLl$(HD$H9HFÃ3tUH|$ +HD$ H)D$H$M&`tMA IH)tFH9HHFÃrHMIyHI Ht It LHIH)H)HH)uH$ fuHAtVATuH$Ht$1DHA|ȈHuH$Ht$1DHA|ȈHuHt$ HUHH~HLHHLH)HH H)HfDAALL`AALLMA t At f.ALfLfDALfLfDMIt fAt FUH|$ ‹LLMI1H|$ LfLAWAVAUATUSHht$LD$D$,HLt$PH1HL HufHHu1}0HD$@ID$0fH}0I׹HT$8MH|$H|$t-tBHh[]A\A]A^A_HEHT$,LHD$@HD$8HEuL;e1Ht@AATFHH9uHL|LLD$4LPjD$,PLL$XLD$`H|$8H bH$SH$DHLLD$4PjD$,PLL$XLD$`H$H$H DAWAVMAUIATIULSH8L|$ HL$H\$LjLAjHL$IؾLZYuCHLLHLH$pH߉D$LD$H8[]A\A]A^A_ff.@AWAAVAUATIUSHt$LD$LL$HD$(H4XIŋ@Hl$@IDLPAALt$8AVHL$HT$ ZYtH[]A\A]A^A_L|$`LLLuL$HLt2 HD$LLD$fDAULLuLuLl$(H$LH$H$MuH$LLHt$(E\GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0zRx HBBE B(A0A8Gu 8A0A(B BBBE thBBB B(A0A8G 8A0A(B BBBD OSBEXjKBEcXBBE E(D0D8GYKVAN8A0A(B BBB\<|BEB B(F0A8G}TPAK 8A0A(B BBBH  #=Sm} !6Vh{|$:Oepkcs12.cpkcs12_pbe_derive_key_ivmbedtls_pkcs12_derivation_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_mbedtls_md_info_from_typembedtls_md_initmbedtls_md_setupmbedtls_md_get_sizembedtls_md_startsmbedtls_md_updatembedtls_md_finishmbedtls_mdmbedtls_platform_zeroizembedtls_md_freembedtls_asn1_get_tagmbedtls_asn1_get_intmbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_sha1_rc4_128mbedtls_arc4_initmbedtls_arc4_setupmbedtls_arc4_cryptmbedtls_arc4_freembedtls_pkcs12_pbembedtls_cipher_info_from_typembedtls_cipher_initmbedtls_cipher_setupmbedtls_cipher_setkeymbedtls_cipher_freembedtls_cipher_set_ivmbedtls_cipher_resetmbedtls_cipher_updatembedtls_cipher_finishT m z "r1  (>OW! , F  [ h p ! " # $ % l@.symtab.strtab.shstrtab.rela.text.data.bss.comment.note.GNU-stack.rela.eh_frame @ @H &< ,< 10< :O OP J@@`    x{Ypkcs5.c.o/ 1610128459 0 0 100644 7808 ` ELF>@@ AWAVAUATIUHSHHH?HL$LD$DL$1LHHfL$D$?D$($L$Hl$@HD$C@@ AU0ATIUHSHHLl$Lu)HD$I$H9LHLt-;H[]A\A]fDHI4$E1E1j1HjjjjHT$8H0HD$I$LH޹LuHE1E11t$11HA4$jjjH0u?HD$I$Hu*HuI9$C@5fD%ff.ATUHHAąu1HDDHD]A\f.ATfUHSHH HAILt-:H []A\fDHLu'}u܋tuH{EH []A\ø봸ff.AWAVAUATIUHSH(?hL|$ Lt$LLmHT$LLl$LmLD$H$ 0LLHH$ Ht$HLHH$ uHD$8*HL-=wH$ HHÅ!L$(CHH3HH$H9$uH$H9$uH|$(LuH$@H|$@uH$XH|$XrH$H$UH$pH|$p;H$H$1H$1H$AA9@HD$LJH$$T$L$$H([]A\A]A^A_@Ht$A$t$t9Lfx=xHHLHD$HD$(HH$H<$H$H;\$F0HLL/H$ HD$HHLHH$ Ht$H|$@aHHLH$ HD$9H$ Ht$H|$XHHLH$ HD$u H$ HD$H;\$^HLLLD$pH$ HT$LLLD$=LD$HD$LD$<H<$HH@H;$ HD$LD$HpLHD$H$0HcH$H$LLH$ HHD$HH$8 $LLLff.AW0AVAUATUHSHXLd$ Ll$(Ht$(HLLt-=HX[]A\A]A^A_DLt$ Lt$(HT$LLuɃ|$LLLuHT$ Ht$(LLÅufHD$ HD$(HD$(L9tmLLLÅu0L9t$(tDLLLÅHt"HHE1E1HMPLH$LH}HD$(HT$ HH]L$0t 04HT$8HLHD$(HD$@HD$8HD$(H9 H|$0HHD$D$ADH\$ H\$(LLHHT$(HD$ 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PRIVATE KEY----------BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----------END RSA PUBLIC KEY----------END PUBLIC KEY----------BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----------BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----------BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----------END ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY----------BEGIN ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY----------BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0zRx d2BGD D(G@C (A ABBG DHLPGXB`BhBpN@lHLPKXB`BhBpI@$6BAG eDB@BED G@c  AABG q  AABA LBBB B(D0D8Gb 8A0A(B BBBE H@BGB B(A0D8Dj 8A0A(B BBBF XBBB D(D0Gz 0A(A BBBI s 0A(A BBBE @{BGB B(A0Gr 0A(B BBBH ,BBB B(A0A8DB 8A0A(B BBBF JUA~JUAlJDDV8BLA A(G0 (A ABBF HBGB B(A0D8Gpd 8D0A(B BBBF 8KBE E(D0D8G0 8A0A(B BBBH HeGB{MXBMWAeMWA[ 8A0A(B BBBE pH4BBE A(J@b(D BBBl06BBB B(A0A8D[ 8D0A(B BBBJ DZRAKZA WAJ0JA 2@61?Oe | {  ,J g@h #8Od}-DXl1Qj{/Obw}0->W^P6zWpkparse.cpk_get_rsapubkeyasn1_get_nonzero_mpipk_get_pk_algpk_use_ecparamspk_parse_key_sec1_derpk_parse_key_pkcs1_derpk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_derpk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der.LC3.LC4.LC5.LC6.LC7.LC8.LC10.LC9.LC11.LC12.LC14.LC13.LC15.LC16_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_mbedtls_asn1_get_tagmbedtls_rsa_import_rawmbedtls_rsa_completembedtls_rsa_check_pubkeymbedtls_asn1_get_mpimbedtls_mpi_cmp_intmbedtls_asn1_get_algmbedtls_oid_get_pk_algmbedtls_ecp_group_initmbedtls_asn1_get_intmbedtls_ecp_group_freembedtls_ecp_grp_id_listmbedtls_ecp_group_loadmbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpimbedtls_mpi_get_bitmbedtls_oid_get_ec_grpmbedtls_mpi_bitlenmbedtls_mpi_read_binarymbedtls_ecp_point_read_binarymbedtls_mpi_sizembedtls_mpi_lsetmbedtls_ecp_keypair_freembedtls_ecp_mulmbedtls_ecp_check_privkeymbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_nullmbedtls_ecp_check_pubkeymbedtls_mpi_initmbedtls_mpi_freembedtls_rsa_freembedtls_rsa_importmbedtls_mpi_copymbedtls_pk_info_from_typembedtls_pk_setupmbedtls_pk_freembedtls_oid_get_pkcs12_pbe_algmbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_sha1_rc4_128mbedtls_pkcs12_pbembedtls_pk_load_filefopenfseekftellcallocfreadfclosestrstrmbedtls_platform_zeroizembedtls_pk_parse_subpubkeymbedtls_pk_parse_keymbedtls_pem_initmemcpymbedtls_pk_initmbedtls_pem_read_buffermbedtls_pem_freembedtls_pk_parse_keyfilestrlenmbedtls_pk_parse_public_keymbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile!!J!"!"#$K%\&'(>)[*!!+ ),C+M-......///D+Z+g+{+0-%19!d!2!2!!!K34255%'1b+t++!*(!E2r!!678H ! 6 9 3 6N : ; ! *$ %4 <W =v & > % & > % & >- %? &\ >r % & > ? ?( ?8 #H $_ < < ! *=!V@jABO!'!C,DEF(HCIKJdIvKLMNMOP MMZ!9@AB3:S K%TFONP^BfUBU@ABU@AIPVVVVY`hV@ABWB@AGYR$O.P~SW@AVWUBuQVW@A6BXQcWGZOP @D  00<4P.symtab.strtab.shstrtab.rela.text.data.bss.rodata.str1.1.rodata.str1.8.comment.note.GNU-stack.rela.eh_frame @@/ &','12'@2O0Xmh@AP !  @*0Cwpkwrite.c.o/ 1610128459 0 0 100644 8056 ` ELF>@@ ATAUHHSHH1HLd$HL$HD$Mu,H}H9r5HHT$H)H9r%H)LH}D$HĠ[]A\fDfAVAUATIUHHSHH0t.HHSLH.H0[]A\A]A^ÐLkLt$1LME1111LtULD$ D$ xHLHxH0LHHHcHӅIH0[]A\A]A^fLLHxNE1E111LLHcyLLHxHLHif.LD$ D$ ff.AWAVAUATUSHHHHLl$(HHHT$(HLLcEHT$(HH)HHBMt$HLHD$(BLLcEHLADžHA1LD$8LT$0LLDHL$0HT$8IHLMIcHHLLHHLcEx0HLxfLD$HHD[]A\A]A^A_DD$HCLD$8LT$0LLLD$8LT$LT$LD$DL$tHc؅-AAHL$8HT$0HLLD$LT$DL$LD$LT$DL$ANff.fAWAVAUATUSHHHHHHT$ *HLkLd$ HLLADžHT$ HHH)HHJHXHLHL$ BHADžHLHcЅ IcHLHHHADž]HLD$Lt$0A}Ht$(LHHLHHD$D$HLD$ILLLHILLL$LL$AuLLHLLL$ALLEHLxlIcHcL$HHHHcT$LHHT$IcHHcL$HHHHADžx+0HLxMcHILfAHĈD[]A\A]A^A_LkLt$01LL11LADžtoLExLd$ 1HLADžxHHLHHADžv0HL[McHLHKLd$ LHLADž1L1LHcADžVLHLADžH11LLHADžLHLADž\LcE1L1L1E1LADžLHLADžLcE11LL1E1LADžLHLADžLcE111L1MLADžbLHLADžLcM11L1E1LADž$LHLADžxfLcE111LLE1LADžLHLADžx+LcLLAkLVHL$0HT$(HLfDD|$)fDADADD|$D|$E@ATIԺ&UHSH@HD$H\$Hx2HHcMIHD$H)H5PH&H=ZYH@[]A\fAVIAUIպ/ATUHSH@HD$H\$HAąxOLtYLu\H5H=HIcMIHD$H)PH/AXZH@D[]A\A]A^@H5H=A-----END PUBLIC KEY----- -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- -----END EC PRIVATE KEY----- -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- -----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----- GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0zRx 0BGG SR  AABG TPRBBB D(G0G`n 0A(A BBBB u 0A(A BBBC LBBB B(A0A8D' 8D0A(B BBBF L\BBB B(A0A8G9 8D0A(B BBBI <HnBID G^YTAG AABPBEJ A(D0G,I,R-P,A,G 0D(A BBBE   #(6-H27 <RqxR:X\4K@ ng 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key validation: failedpassed PKCS#1 data sign : passed PKCS#1 sig. verify: passed PKCS#1 decryption : passed PKCS#1 encryption : "3 GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0zRx HBFB E(A0D8G8A0A(B BBBHh&BBE B(D0D8DPp 8D0A(B BBBD (;FEG [CAGHBEA 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HG@HOHGHGH1ff.AWAVAUATUSHoGHD$@H|$8LT$PHD$0H$L$oW )$$o_0$og@$~HHH0H8H ~H ~H(H ~H H ~HH ~HH ~HH HBH9uHD$0LLHFpH~HHHHHHH1HH1HFHF@HHHHHHH1H1HHFxI9uH$H$Im^HL|$(IIO?L$L|$ L$IYH/;ML|$H$I8H[V9Ie#D7qL|$IHIۉ۵L<$H$I"(ט/BL$H$CIT$M<$I@Ml$Il$H$IT$HT$IT$HT$IT$HT$ IT$HT$(LLHHH1LHH1HH1L!H1IzHI LIHK 9MMII!HL1MIL1MI M!M IHILHH1H!H1HHHH1HHH1LIrHHLILL!HMH1LHH1LL H!H LH1HLL!HLL1HLHH1LHH1LHHHHHHHH1HHH1LH!MBH L!H HL1HHH!HHHH1H!LIII1HHL1IHHIH4$HIL1IIL1II M!I HILH1ILL!IB HL!L1Mr(HLHH1LHH1H7Ht$LHHLHIH1LHH1HL H!H LHLHHHL1L!H1ILHH1LHH1IHt$H!IZ0LIH<2HIHL1IIL1MI I!I HILL1IHH!HL1HHHH1HHH1HHT$ LH4LHHH1LHH1HL L!L!MZ8I@H LH1HH!HHL1HHIHHHH1HHH1HHLMHl$(H1HI!IHH1LH H!L HH L\L9EH$HL$81HT$HH$L$L$H$H$L$H$L$Hl$@f.LL\HH@uH|$0H1[]A\A]A^A_f.ff.HgAVAUATIUHSHHAAD)HHAsHGEtL9rzMD$PDLHUHyHHHJT5JT1H)H)HLLu L)LE1Hw8f.Hu{1[]A\A]A^HwhHÀHHvHLt[]A\A]A^f.xUjBD5fBD1YKT,P؃s7u|lM ^LfL1O1HEHzHHHHLHLH)H)1HEBD5BD1M LL1ff.@ff.ATLgPUHSHHDPLpp)ʃHxHHDHH) 1HHHCLHHHH=HH HHHHFSUSUHSH(USUHSHUHSHUHSHUHSUSUSU HSH(U SU HSHU HSHU HSHUHSUS'US&UHS H(US$UHS HUHS HUHS HUHS US/US.UHS(H(US,UHS(HUHS(HUHS(HUHS(US7U S6U!HS0H(U"S4U#HS0HU$HS0HU%HS0HU&HS0U'S?U(S>U)HS8H(U*SHSHU?[]A\@`T1ftH1)ʃsRLHuI|$L1HCPID$hHH)pHfHHDHHHH)ƒr1ƃH<19rDs1fLgDnDD4Dff.AWIAVIAUIATAUHHHDHAątHHD]A\A]A^A_LLHAąuLHAff.AWAVAUATUSH8|$HHl$PIL=E1HDt$E1HH![D)AAƅDHA\HcHHHHkqHH4A#H\$HHALHD)HcA%L$u|AI@A)T$E1HDD$LDD$H8D[]A\A]A^A_@SH=1D)H=D$ DD$ jfD}LHaaaaaaaaH @LHAtD$9H=DD$DD$ DD$DD$A뷃|$AH=DD$DD$Buffer allocation failed SHA-%d test #%d: passedfailedu?E^=iP',2c`ZC[퀆+#X4% 3 3G=/ǂGS;;/U~-ft`9 qdtnN1 JHRyrpL*[8뮗=ݯ5azAsI A1N~ KUӚ!*'O6<#EMD#d<*OLuڌ(?wyrP(I3ĵC:)&T^[K H= idN.BǼc; D(V2sD~ LC,w\,I.Npabcabcdefghbcdefghicdefghijdefghijkefghijklfghijklmghijklmnhijklmnoijklmnopjklmnopqklmnopqrlmnopqrsmnopqrstnopqrstu"(ט/Be#D7q/;Mۉ۵8H[V9YO?m^BؾopE[N1$} Uo{t]r;ހ5%ܛ&itJi%O8GՌƝew̡ $u+Yo,-ntJAܩ\SڈvfRQ>2-m1?!'Y= % GoQcpn g))/F '&&\8!.*Zm,M߳ 8ScTs ew< jvG.;5,rdL迢0BKfpK0TQlReU$* qW5ѻ2pjҸSAQl7LwH'Hᵼ4cZų 9ˊAJNscwOʜ[o.h]t`/CocxrxȄ9dnj(c#齂lPyƲ+SrxqƜa&>'!Ǹ}xnO}orgȢ}c ?G5 q}#w($@{2 ˾L*~e)Y:o_XGJDlGCC: (GNU) 10.2.0zRx /0DX lHFBBB B(A0A8G(8C0A(B BBBdKGB D(D0 (A BBBA n (A BBBK pC0H,\ BED  ABE @}BEE E(D0Gl 0D(B BBBD P]BGB B(A0A8G8 8D0A(B BBBE   /S ?D-I4NS/g0{P F`&p@P V` pp}]vsha512.cKsha512_test_sumsha512_test_buflensha512_test_buf.LC1.LC2.LC3.LC0mbedtls_sha512_initmbedtls_sha512_free_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_mbedtls_platform_zeroizembedtls_sha512_clonembedtls_sha512_starts_retmbedtls_sha512_startsmbedtls_internal_sha512_processmbedtls_sha512_processmbedtls_sha512_update_retmbedtls_sha512_updatembedtls_sha512_finish_retmbedtls_sha512_finishmbedtls_sha512_retmbedtls_sha512mbedtls_sha512_self_testcallocmemcmpprintfputsputcharc < |>U   0"H S | #FN${ %&&+'U_&;aQ q 40HP\p`pLP `` p.symtab.strtab.shstrtab.rela.text.data.bss.rodata.str1.1.rodata.comment.note.GNU-stack.rela.eh_frame @m@ &,12;@ H0QfHa@0#P   $pthreading.c.o/ 1610128460 0 0 100644 2728 ` ELF>(@@ Ht#(SHu [C([DHt(tHuHf.fHt(tHuHf.fHtS1HC([GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0zRx  )JF H JF@7OMT\7OMTx!FQI )*07Gp7f! 0 2Ethreading.cthreading_mutex_free_pthreadthreading_mutex_lock_pthreadthreading_mutex_unlock_pthreadthreading_mutex_init_pthread_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_pthread_mutex_destroypthread_mutex_lockpthread_mutex_unlockpthread_mutex_initmbedtls_threading_readdir_mutexmbedtls_mutex_unlockmbedtls_mutex_lockmbedtls_mutex_freembedtls_mutex_init@p0 D0`p|.symtab.strtab.shstrtab.rela.text.data.bss.rela.data.rel.local.comment.note.GNU-stack.rela.eh_frame @@` & 0 ,P6P 1@` F0pOd_@X` (  @Xntiming.c.o/ 1610128460 0 0 100644 6488 ` ELF>@@ HH51H H fDUHHt1H1]DH1H$Ht$HS㥛 H+EH+uHHiHH?]HHH)HfUH5XSHH-EuEH[]Éw W$uDfDG$t1S1HS$AH9v S E1H9AD[fDADff.AWAVAUATUSH5Ll$@LHft1LIHH=v&fAHĸD[]A\A]A^A_L$ E1LH\$`H I1HH=WvLLd$HD$t|nH=1hL1h E1A1H=1L1LA@H=H=1HE1 fDI1HH=+vLLd$HD$Aă3fH=1jL1jE1A1H=1H$H1HA1LIDLH=H1Y^HH$ @H$1HH=vH$LHD$ HD$ H=1hLE1h A11H=1LL1A1LILDH=H1XZOH=H=1I11LHH$ fDH$1HH=vH$LHD$(HD$(tAHE1II1HHtLd$0HD$0L)AHHHHHHH)HH$HD$HE1I fDI1HL9rLd$8HD$81L)IH;$r:H;D$w3IIuE1H= E1Au8E1H=H=H=1A TIMING tests note: will take some time! TIMING test #1 (set_alarm / get_timer): cycles=%lu ratio=%lu millisecs=%lu secs=%lu hardfail=%d a=%lu b=%lu elapsed(hires)=%lu elapsed(ctx)=%lu status(ctx)=%d TIMING test #2 (set/get_delay ): TIMING test #3 (hardclock / get_timer): failed at line %d passedfailed (ignored)GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0zRx 0 $DgAG O CF iO$l@AHK iAABHiG|BBB B(A0C8Gd 8D0A(B BBBD  Jr G[AvKRA  `$0).38=BXov 0g@BPtiming.csighandler.LC2.LC3.LC0.LC1.LC4.LC5.LC6.LC8.LC7_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_mbedtls_timing_alarmedsignalmbedtls_timing_hardclockmbedtls_timing_get_timergettimeofdaymbedtls_set_alarmmbedtls_timing_set_delaymbedtls_timing_get_delaymbedtls_timing_self_testprintfputsputchar*?V*y* "<T [|    ( /J Qan{ & -5BO\f{ &6J !# ,1 8? 4 H0pP.symtab.strtab.shstrtab.rela.text.data.bss.rodata.str1.8.rodata.str1.1.comment.note.GNU-stack.rela.eh_frame @S@  &,12;@2+O0Xm@h@ X 0   &`wversion.c.o/ 1610128460 0 0 100644 1704 ` ELF>h@@ f..02.25fGGff.fombed TLS 2.25.0GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0zRx 0D  +F0 version.c.LC0mbedtls_version_get_numbermbedtls_version_get_stringmbedtls_version_get_string_full4 4H0.symtab.strtab.shstrtab.rela.text.data.bss.rodata.cst16.comment.note.GNU-stack.rela.eh_frame @<@ &|,|1?0H]XX@H 8  8fg/205 1610128460 0 0 100644 10144 ` ELF>#@@HtGUHH=SHHfH{HHtHuH[]H[]øMBEDTLS_HAVE_ASMMBEDTLS_HAVE_TIMEMBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATEMBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBCMBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFBMBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTRMBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFBMBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTSMBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROSMBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIMMBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXTMBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTICMBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDEDMBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMYMBEDTLS_GENPRIMEMBEDTLS_FS_IOMBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORTMBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21MBEDTLS_SELF_TESTMBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKINGMBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MACMBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSVMBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATIONMBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLSMBEDTLS_SSL_ALPNMBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAYMBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFYMBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMITMBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETSMBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYSMBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMACMBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREADMBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURESMBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGEMBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORTMBEDTLS_AESNI_CMBEDTLS_AES_CMBEDTLS_ARC4_CMBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_CMBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_CMBEDTLS_BASE64_CMBEDTLS_BIGNUM_CMBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_CMBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_CMBEDTLS_CCM_CMBEDTLS_CERTS_CMBEDTLS_CHACHA20_CMBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_CMBEDTLS_CIPHER_CMBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_CMBEDTLS_DEBUG_CMBEDTLS_DES_CMBEDTLS_DHM_CMBEDTLS_ECDH_CMBEDTLS_ECDSA_CMBEDTLS_ECP_CMBEDTLS_ENTROPY_CMBEDTLS_ERROR_CMBEDTLS_GCM_CMBEDTLS_HKDF_CMBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_CMBEDTLS_MD_CMBEDTLS_MD5_CMBEDTLS_NET_CMBEDTLS_OID_CMBEDTLS_PADLOCK_CMBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_CMBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_CMBEDTLS_PK_CMBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_CMBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_CMBEDTLS_PKCS5_CMBEDTLS_PKCS12_CMBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CMBEDTLS_POLY1305_CMBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CMBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_CMBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_CMBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_CMBEDTLS_RSA_CMBEDTLS_SHA1_CMBEDTLS_SHA256_CMBEDTLS_SHA512_CMBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_CMBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_CMBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_CMBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_CMBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CMBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_CMBEDTLS_THREADING_CMBEDTLS_TIMING_CMBEDTLS_VERSION_CMBEDTLS_X509_USE_CMBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_CMBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_CMBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_CMBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_CMBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_CMBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_CMBEDTLS_XTEA_CMBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROSMBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LENMBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITESMBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITESMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGESMBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATIONMBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRETMBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATEMBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTINGMBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTHMBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSEMBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATIONMBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGEMBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORTGCC: (GNU) 10.2.0zRx 4RFKK a AAA DFAAx   "R@Vversion_features.cfeatures.LC0mbedtls_version_check_feature_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_strcmp  1#: R(j08@HP(X`Phxpx@h @h(P x(08@;HXPuX`hpx @h8Ri 8((0P8k@HPPXx`hpx'8I\o}$2D T(b0q8@HPX`hpx)9J]p  5J\n (08@HPX+`Dh] .symtab.strtab.shstrtab.rela.text.data.bss.rodata.str1.1.rodata.str1.8.rela.data.rel.ro.local.comment.note.GNU-stack.rela.eh_frame @R@`H &,12l@2 Tx O@P g0p+0P@"   ]#xtea.c.o/ 1610128460 0 0 100644 3976 ` ELF> @@ fHt ff.@f1L L L ȉHHuHЋII@ 7ȃtd@A AA<D1ρGa1)΃AA1AT0HHuHM}IL9uH1[]A\A]A^A_M$Ht1fDAA2THHuHHDHHHIIEL9u떸ff.AWAAVL5AUATAUSHH(Hl$Ll$HEutHLHJHD$LLHHD$H9u|EuWIIHIuEuPHH(D[]A\A]A^A_fDDH=1vf.H=f E1롐Eu AH=Ay XTEA test #%d: failedpassedI}ra,-tCAAAAAAAAA9#7Z-AAAAAAAAABCDEFGHAAAAAAAAZ[n'HABCDEFGHAAAAAAAAp"]nNvU   GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0zRx 0D9XTlKEE E(A0D8G@R 8C0A(B BBBD VLBHI B(D0A8K`w 8D0A(B BBBG `0#@0 05:?Qcy09p`Pxtea.cxtea_test_keyxtea_test_ctxtea_test_pt.LC0.LC2.LC1mbedtls_xtea_initmbedtls_xtea_free_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_mbedtls_platform_zeroizembedtls_xtea_setupmbedtls_xtea_crypt_ecbmbedtls_xtea_crypt_cbcmbedtls_xtea_self_testprintfputsputchar$] |m  4 # (9S^ 4H0\pp`P.symtab.strtab.shstrtab.rela.text.data.bss.rodata.str1.1.rodata.comment.note.GNU-stack.rela.eh_frame @g@p  &,12 @ H0Qfa@   p pusr/lib64/libmbedcrypto.so.2.25.00000644000000000000000000150330013776116123015243 0ustar rootrootELF>-@@@8@  ((AQQ=nm}}PtdtttQtdRtdAQQ0.0. 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__gmon_start___ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable_ITM_registerTMCloneTable__cxa_finalizembedtls_aes_initmbedtls_aes_freembedtls_platform_zeroizembedtls_aes_xts_initmbedtls_aes_xts_freembedtls_aes_setkey_encmbedtls_aesni_has_supportmbedtls_aesni_setkey_encmbedtls_aes_setkey_decmbedtls_aesni_inverse_keymbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_encmbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_decmbedtls_internal_aes_encryptmbedtls_aes_encryptmbedtls_internal_aes_decryptmbedtls_aes_decryptmbedtls_aes_crypt_ecbmbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecbmbedtls_aes_crypt_cbcmbedtls_aes_crypt_xtsmbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb8mbedtls_aes_crypt_ofbmbedtls_aes_crypt_ctrmbedtls_aes_self_testputsputcharmemcpymemcmpmbedtls_aesni_gcm_multmbedtls_arc4_initmbedtls_arc4_freembedtls_arc4_setupmbedtls_arc4_cryptmbedtls_arc4_self_testcallocmbedtls_asn1_get_lenmbedtls_asn1_get_tagmbedtls_asn1_get_boolmbedtls_asn1_get_intmbedtls_asn1_get_enummbedtls_asn1_get_mpimbedtls_mpi_read_binarymbedtls_asn1_get_bitstringmbedtls_asn1_traverse_sequence_ofmbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_nullmbedtls_asn1_sequence_freembedtls_asn1_get_sequence_ofmbedtls_asn1_get_algmbedtls_asn1_get_alg_nullmbedtls_asn1_free_named_datambedtls_asn1_free_named_data_listmbedtls_asn1_find_named_datambedtls_asn1_write_lenmbedtls_asn1_write_tagmbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffermbedtls_asn1_write_mpimbedtls_mpi_sizembedtls_mpi_write_binarymbedtls_asn1_write_nullmbedtls_asn1_write_oidmbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifiermbedtls_asn1_write_boolmbedtls_asn1_write_intmbedtls_asn1_write_enummbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_stringmbedtls_asn1_write_utf8_stringmbedtls_asn1_write_printable_stringmbedtls_asn1_write_ia5_stringmbedtls_asn1_write_bitstringmbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstringmbedtls_asn1_write_octet_stringmbedtls_asn1_store_named_datambedtls_base64_encodembedtls_base64_decodembedtls_base64_self_testmemsetmbedtls_mpi_initmbedtls_mpi_freembedtls_mpi_growmbedtls_mpi_shrinkmbedtls_mpi_copymbedtls_mpi_swapmbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assignmbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swapmbedtls_mpi_lsetmbedtls_mpi_get_bitmbedtls_mpi_set_bitmbedtls_mpi_lsbmbedtls_mpi_bitlenmbedtls_mpi_read_binary_lembedtls_mpi_write_binary_lembedtls_mpi_shift_lmbedtls_mpi_shift_rmbedtls_mpi_cmp_absmbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpimbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ctmbedtls_mpi_cmp_intmbedtls_mpi_add_absmbedtls_mpi_sub_absmbedtls_mpi_add_mpimbedtls_mpi_sub_mpimbedtls_mpi_add_intmbedtls_mpi_sub_intmbedtls_mpi_mul_mpimbedtls_mpi_mul_intmbedtls_mpi_read_stringstrlenmbedtls_mpi_read_filefgetsmbedtls_mpi_div_mpimbedtls_mpi_div_intmbedtls_mpi_mod_mpimbedtls_mpi_mod_intmbedtls_mpi_write_stringmemmovembedtls_mpi_write_filefwritembedtls_mpi_exp_modmbedtls_mpi_gcdmbedtls_mpi_fill_randommbedtls_mpi_inv_modmbedtls_mpi_is_prime_extmbedtls_mpi_is_primembedtls_mpi_gen_primembedtls_mpi_self_testmbedtls_blowfish_initmbedtls_blowfish_freembedtls_blowfish_setkeymbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecbmbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cbcmbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cfb64mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ctrmbedtls_camellia_initmbedtls_camellia_freembedtls_camellia_setkey_encmbedtls_camellia_setkey_decmbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecbmbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbcmbedtls_camellia_crypt_cfb128mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctrmbedtls_camellia_self_testmbedtls_cipher_updatembedtls_ccm_initmbedtls_ccm_setkeymbedtls_cipher_info_from_valuesmbedtls_cipher_freembedtls_cipher_setupmbedtls_cipher_setkeymbedtls_ccm_freembedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tagmbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tagmbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decryptmbedtls_ccm_auth_decryptmbedtls_ccm_self_testmbedtls_chacha20_initmbedtls_chacha20_freembedtls_chacha20_setkeymbedtls_chacha20_startsmbedtls_chacha20_updatembedtls_chacha20_cryptmbedtls_chacha20_self_testmbedtls_chachapoly_initmbedtls_poly1305_initmbedtls_chachapoly_freembedtls_poly1305_freembedtls_chachapoly_setkeymbedtls_chachapoly_startsmbedtls_poly1305_startsmbedtls_chachapoly_update_aadmbedtls_poly1305_updatembedtls_chachapoly_updatembedtls_chachapoly_finishmbedtls_poly1305_finishmbedtls_chachapoly_encrypt_and_tagmbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decryptmbedtls_chachapoly_self_testmbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tagmbedtls_gcm_auth_decryptmbedtls_cipher_listmbedtls_cipher_supportedmbedtls_cipher_definitionsmbedtls_cipher_info_from_typembedtls_cipher_info_from_stringstrcmpmbedtls_cipher_initmbedtls_cipher_set_ivmbedtls_cipher_resetmbedtls_cipher_update_admbedtls_gcm_startsmbedtls_gcm_updatembedtls_cipher_finishmbedtls_cipher_set_padding_modembedtls_cipher_write_tagmbedtls_gcm_finishmbedtls_cipher_check_tagmbedtls_cipher_cryptmbedtls_cipher_auth_encryptmbedtls_cipher_auth_decryptmbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_extmbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_extmbedtls_des3_freembedtls_des3_initmbedtls_des3_set3key_decmbedtls_des3_set3key_encmbedtls_des3_crypt_cbcmbedtls_des3_crypt_ecbmbedtls_des3_set2key_decmbedtls_des3_set2key_encmbedtls_des_freembedtls_des_initmbedtls_des_setkey_decmbedtls_des_setkey_encmbedtls_des_crypt_cbcmbedtls_des_crypt_ecbmbedtls_gcm_freembedtls_gcm_initmbedtls_gcm_setkeymbedtls_ctr_drbg_initmbedtls_mutex_initmbedtls_ctr_drbg_freembedtls_mutex_freembedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistancembedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entrop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HG@HOHGHGH1ff.AWAVAUATUSHoGHD$@H|$8LT$PHD$0H$L$oW )$$o_0$og@$~HHH0H8H ~H ~H(H ~H H ~HH ~HH ~HH HBH9uHD$0LLHFpH~HHHHHHH1HH1HFHF@HHHHHHH1H1HHFxI9uH$H$Im^HL|$(IIO?L$L|$ L$IYH/;ML|$H$I8H[V9Ie#D7qL|$IHIۉ۵L<$H$I"(ט/BL$H$CIT$M<$I@Ml$Il$H$IT$HT$IT$HT$IT$HT$ IT$HT$(LLHHH1LHH1HH1L!H1IzHI LIHK 9MMII!HL1MIL1MI M!M IHILHH1H!H1HHHH1HHH1LIrHHLILL!HMH1LHH1LL H!H LH1HLL!HLL1HLHH1LHH1LHHHHHHHH1HHH1LH!MBH L!H HL1HHH!HHHH1H!LIII1HHL1IHHIH4$HIL1IIL1II M!I HILH1ILL!IB HL!L1Mr(HLHH1LHH1H7Ht$LHHLHIH1LHH1HL H!H LHLHHHL1L!H1ILHH1LHH1IHt$H!IZ0LIH<2HIHL1IIL1MI I!I HILL1IHH!HL1HHHH1HHH1HHT$ LH4LHHH1LHH1HL L!L!MZ8I@H LH1HH!HHL1HHIHHHH1HHH1HHLMHl$(H1HI!IHH1LH H!L HH L\L9EH$HL$81HT$HH$L$L$H$H$L$H$L$Hl$@f.LL\HH@uH|$0NH1[]A\A]A^A_f.[ff.HgAVAUATIUHSHHAAD)HHAsHGEtL9rzMD$PDLHUHyHHHJT5JT1H)H)HLL轔u L)LE1Hw8f.Hu{1[]A\A]A^HwhHÀHHvHLgt[]A\A]A^f.xUjBD5fBD1YKT,P؃s7u|lM ^LfL1O1HEHzHHHHLHLH)H)1HEBD5BD1M LL1ff.@{ff.ATLgPUHSHHDPLpp)ʃHxHHDHH) 1HHHCLHHHH=HH HHHHǒFSUSUHSH(USUHSHUHSHUHSHUHSUSUSU HSH(U SU HSHU HSHU HSHUHSUS'US&UHS H(US$UHS HUHS HUHS HUHS US/US.UHS(H(US,UHS(HUHS(HUHS(HUHS(US7U S6U!HS0H(U"S4U#HS0HU$HS0HU%HS0HU&HS0U'S?U(S>U)HS8H(U*SHSHU?[]A\@`T1ftH1)ʃsRLHuI|$L1HCPID$hHH)pHfHHDHHHH)ƒr1ƃH<19rDs1fLgDnDD4D;ff.AWIAVIAUIATAUHHHنDHNAątH_HD]A\A]A^A_LLHAąuLH踆A[ff.AWAVAUATUSH8|$,HHl$PIL=E1H)Dt$E1HH![D)AAƅDHoA\HcHHHHkqHH4A#H\$HH˅ALHD)HcgA%L$u|AI@A)T$E1HDD$ցL~DD$H8D[]A\A]A^A_@SH=1D)H= D$ hDD$ jfD}LHaaaaaaaaH @LH߁AtD$9H=BDD$DD$ DD$A~DD$A뷃|$AH=DD$DD$Ht#(SHu [cC([DHt(tH,uHf.fHt(tHS$AH9v S E1H9AD[fDADff.AWAVAUATUSH5Ll$@LӖHjft1L谖IHH=v&fAHĸD[]A\A]A^A_L$ E1LH\$`.HA I1H*H=WvLLd$HD$蠒t|nH=#1hL1h E1A1H= 1蹀LQ1LA@H=|H=1膀HE1耕 fDI1HjH=+vLLd$HD$Aă3fH=O1 jL1jE1A1H=R1H$H{1HAޔ1LIєDLH=\H1Y^H覔H$ @H$1H艔H=vH$LHD$ HD$ H=y17hLE1h A11H=v1L觐L1A 1LILDH=H1~XZOH=w1AT0HHuHM}IL9uH1[]A\A]A^A_M$Ht1fDAA2THHuHHDH(wHHIIEL9u떸ff.AWAAVL5AUATAUSHoH(Hl$Ll$HYEutHLHJHD$sLLHvHD$H9u|EuWIIHIuEuPH|H(D[]A\A]A^A_fDDH=1/yvf.H=tf E1r롐Eu AH=A^tyfIHHuI9vHHHI1@H9v 11fDHH?A…uIH9r 11I9w1ҸLMu 1IH1HHHHHHfDS@MHHcIH)ˉIII IHHLHH IIHII9rDHH9sI9t H1[@HF1[HHdecenc AES-ECB-%3u (%s): skippedpassed AES-CBC-%3u (%s): AES-CFB128-%3u (%s): AES-OFB-%3u (%s): AES-CTR-128 (%s): AES-XTS-128 (%s): 3333333333|h웟ݦC테e/.T^jn93@8ot(Ӕ3kYz .IҒL~ !S!"zDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" $ ]Oy-au&Qry Aӈ.FW0ߑA(H/FRrE@+mx6՚\S%/Single block msg   !"#0lT;YH {'w?JhRgKvUw~$xC2Scv^P na);?.- 34IRK٬*~yK~̈́]8`Og@ :ȏj*OqGn[&g{SZ@k.@=~s*-WoEQ0F\ R$EO+A{l7+~(Ҧ O<sdR+ybR,k{`=q+s}w5,;a- ;?.- 34IШ&zut 1b=Uqk.@=~s*-WoEQ0F\ R$EO+A{l7+~(Ҧ O<sdR+ybR,k{`=q+s}w5,;a- ^ Z(h={f:ҭ{/Eỏ͈7Sspnsɯ]xNuhƭ|{H၏)uW1L,ڍsE_)u*׃8AV1y̓]0!cmDAj?456789:;<=@  !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/0123456789ABCDEF%s%s MPI test #1 (mul_mpi): MPI test #2 (div_mpi): MPI test #4 (inv_mod): failed at %d MPI test #5 (simple gcd): MPI test #3 (exp_mod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 error, return code = %08X 003A0AAEDD7E784FC07D8F9EC6E3BFD5C3DBA76456363A10869622EAC2DD84ECC5B8A74DAC4D09E03B5E0BE779F2DF6136E139AEA55215609D2816998ED020BBBD96C37890F65171D948E9BC7CBAA4D9325D24D6A3C12710F10A09FA08AB87256567336059E52CAE22925474705F39A946613F26162223DF488E9CD48CC132C7A0AC93C701B001B092E4E5B9F73BCD27B9EE50D0657C77F374E903CDFA4C642ad -P  %)+/5;=CGIOSYaegkmq %379=KQ[]agou{  #-39;AKQWY_eikw)+57;=GUY[_mqsw 1Ѭߘr/Ḗ~&jE|,G$l iciNWqX~=t XrX͋qJT{YZ90`*#`(yA8۸y:`l>w'K1/x`\`U%U攫UbHW@cj9U*4\̴ATr|*oc]ũ+1t>\3֯\$lS2zw(H;Kkē!(f a!`|H2]]]u#&܈e>#Ŭom9BD . 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T_~}=b7w-_h)5ǡޖXxWcr"ÃF T0.SHُ(1mX4a(s<|J]d]B> EꫪOlOBBǵj;Oe!AyMjGKPb=bF&[$ti GV[ Htb#*BXU >ap?#r3A~_;"lY7|`t˧@n2w΄PU5ai Z .zD4Egɞs͈Uy_g@Cge48>q(= m!>J=+hZ=@&L4)i Av.khq$j 3ԷCaP.9FE$tO!@MpE/f m1'A9UG%ښ ʫ%xP()Sچ, mbhiHפh'?Oz|Ϊ_7әxB*k@5 ٫9N;VmK1f&tn:2C[Ah xN جV@E'H::SU kKмgUXc)3VJ*%1?~^|1)p/'\,(H"m?H܆AyG@n]Q_2Տd5A4x{%`*`lc´2Of#k>3b $;" r(-Exb}doITH}'>AcG t.no:7`L knU{7,gm;e' )̒9 i{f} ϑ^و/$[Qy{;v.97yY̗&-1.Bh;+jLu.x7BjQ满PcKkؽ%=YBD n *Ngd_ڈ鿾dW{x`M``FѰ8Ew63kBqA_^;Z4ٷ,Q+:Ֆ}}>(-}|%rZLZq)GW;()f(.y_xU`uD^mm%adâW<'*:m?!cf&(3uU4V<wQ( gQ̫_QM08bX7 z{>d!Q2Ow~㶨F=)iSHd$m-if! FEdlX [@X̻k~jEY:D 5>ʹrdfGof,ҏ"W##v215VbuZ6ns҈bIPLVq z2E{Sb%ҽ5iq"|˶+v>S@`8G% 8vFšw``u N˅؍芰z~L\HjiԐ\-% ?2aN[wߏWr:j?$.Dsp"8 1).lN!(Ew8fTl 4)P|ɵՄ? Gy CAMELLIA-ECB-%3d (%s): CAMELLIA-CBC-%3d (%s): CAMELLIA-CTR-128 (%s):  $Нša |v ?Ǎ|weD+1ܧ,tS`Hu/MsK+\sO-]ΘPSingle block msg   !"#0lT;YH {'w?JhRgKvUw~$xC2Scv^P na)IK6 1g)x@ťߵHPϋZcXcbT>T*H0Zġ@YU!ϓ]ZLBd.7Y46؄hIϣ_+JM, g7>6sPK@p+!P`U)}30 k.@=~s*-WoEQ0F\ R+~(Ҧ O<sdR+ybR,k{`=q+s}w5,;a- gg18TisWVHC8?<# !" '$%& :;89ABC@+()*p,W#kEO|>^ 9]ZQlt+4vm:2Sz$`ibTdu ݇͐sRƁoc駟)/xqԫr6*<@ӻCw'5 A!Ne0_G=VM f- L~1Xa"DP}[H?\J3g&7;K.ynYjF%BU Ih8({Ǟ8Avٓ`r«uWɢҐ'IC\>gn/ Se꣮-k+6ņM3fX: xB&a?;Ԙ ,oN y"Y=tT0~(UhP1*p2ib$EsmJ.%H{οq)ldcK_F7^G[Z|`4Mrzؚ5aZ$V@c 3h oSb.(t½6"8d9,0Dek#HQҠUAC/<+ȥ G͵~)!f;Ť7Lnv-ޖ&}\O?yRm^i1 όuJWEsYlTxpIPw*[=p,'W5 A#kE!ONe|>0_^ 9G]=ZQVlM f̰-t+ 𱄙L4~vm1X:a2S"Dϲõz$`iPР}bT[dHuۊ ?ݔ\J3sgR&7;oKc.yn)/YxjFq%BrU 6I*h<8@({Cwǀf;̐zXLs7/OTSo'h-V³ CCM: setup failed CCM-AES #%u: qb[M%]ҡQ_bw=Y=Oz͗ av٤BHCQ !"#$%&'()*+,-./01234567 @ABCDEFGHIJKLMNO ChaCha20 test %u failed (output)vୠ=@]jS(6̋w AY|QWHw$?J7jCÇie}/O7l>spA`]OOW,KyU*r)7pGßV1^% @B'KKD ؁/BRyPBwsةG)AheU*vM^ZIrb&fBKm-C7%IJߴl9if(5U;l\{5Ԟ+qͬc9^(25|o!4V)5cY#TB!\ f_?Ti)ϭHlZM^+1XTuyXۇ>V!|h8 ^VJLF=w~N .]D jTo pInbRmQX;7_F">E"c1ikWGO7ɘ 1MUZ^䓒#V,Jnh DES%c-ECB-%3d (%s): DES%c-CBC-%3d (%s): ^WU|UoUbUHTSWVVVGV~UmHM`vfPdvXHe_xגT%uH՗&sMŵB7dAobo7+ReY8ZepVhi#Eg#EgEg#  #%&)*,/12478;=>@CEFIJLOQRTWX[]^abdghkmnpsuvyz|@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@                              @ @@@ @ @@ @@ @@@ @@ @@@ @@@@ @ @ @@@@ @@@@@ @ @ @@@@ @@ @@ @ @@ @@@ @@@@ @ @@ @@@@@ @@ @@ B@@@BB@@@@BBB@BBB@B@@B@BBBB@B@@@                                -----END DH PARAMETERS----------BEGIN DH PARAMETERS----------BEGIN DHM parameter load: -----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS----- MIGHAoGBAJ419DBEOgmQTzo5qXl5fQcN9TN455wkOL7052HzxxRVMyhYmwQcgJvh 1sa18fyfR9OiVEMYglOpkqVoGLN7qd5aQNNi5W7/C+VBdHTBJcGZJyyP5B3qcz32 9mLJKudlVudV0Qxk5qUJaPZ/xupz0NyoVpviuiBOI1gNi8ovSXWzAgEC -----END DH PARAMETERS----- BLINDING CONTEXTfailed (%u) secp521r1brainpoolP512r1secp384r1brainpoolP384r1secp256r1secp256k1brainpoolP256r1secp224r1secp224k1secp192r1secp192k1x25519x448000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE26F2FC170F69466A74DEFD8C5EA6F389A38B8BC81E767753B15AA5569E1782E30ABE7D254000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000007FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF55555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555540000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000005C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C305715ECCE24583F7A7023C24164390586842E816D7280A49EF6DF4EAE6B280BF841A2B017516F6D254E1F002BCCBADD54BE30F8CEC737A0E912B4963B6BA7446055555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555507FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF8 ECP SW test #1 (constant op_count, base point G): ECP SW test #2 (constant op_count, other point): ECP Montgomery test (constant op_count): 01DB4298AA14DEF9DEA2F79CD65812631A5CF5D3ED8335DC163BB124B65129C96FDE933D8D723A70AADC873D6D54A7BB0DxX`Xi]ӱGaA&LA\>Up3pʜcɳ03?۸ݪ:xT/+Ѯc'K[^H_JIܲ[{$ "xϩ2cV]8}" "5h^j@GPm|_}{hPx; b;ٵp텓jL.2!Zd.ؽ䮁#c (^P@g>ʔwM+Ț. :%Z]-cA4=ʔwM+Ț. :%Z]-cA4=˔L#Eq2;`10xH:XV`(Ƃ-/(怣*ͮBhƛM}q3pʜcɳ03?۸ݪee2;k:ϧ%lnVT q/AP~o](m8S<&ABw!FF()OdX) bRϕ\ uGⲇF64& O~Gk?:EhdLP:ە9|b>.}/|DT9&("Ǩ&("Ǩ:PJe'O  r< =Ƃ{S1Gq)Ӭ#ڱVT q/AP~o](m8VHaz9q f>Wi/T\T-EwaF5~Tb2ΚSD:#'޹/HK,W~˹ҋk\)|׻ٵ0DKJl\&ٵ0DKJl\&UzA0uW0,u Z}wSnH ( &#;nr f>WAA6Ќ^ҿ;HܮGTH]eģ&w:H[Y(- ΕbU~fy/vqʄaamUKYʂB4~\e~upgi(0ߙM3[EmtjFi&/^و@4cA(Vm//}lѥ4}&WO7 d8oGɵ;Х Hk/QPfџv@rp<5a?P@&^r,f>'hDWID},_\;xj)9f1~~BjH3ި'(Yw^K=Mk`(!?9dB#f>?PkE4,=s5;R{~Q9V 񎑉[rڢ@!a>Qs)jzH X-7Mc_|Cz~α` 1|()ܒ]o,&J6 vr8^T:l)U]U8*TAYb;nt DZ7"ʇ*ȅ*.9VZPAn-k>/1Q%cʹQ7h@^1kW3+|J玛BO˜E93-}w@cGB,kK`'><;S̰evU:5Z=*\\E)>4~DdGZuC"L#c7!\ր24"VJ2k U#C9 'ؿ׷DPV2A 1(Ҵk6ޙHyws$kcx+ C |0F޸I0$r瀜!d ENTROPY test: /dev/urandomCIPHER - Input data contains invalid padding and is rejectedSSL - An encrypted DTLS-frame with an unexpected CID was receivedCIPHER - Failed to allocate memorySSL - Unknown identity received (eg, PSK identity)SSL - Internal-only message signaling that a message arrived earlyCIPHER - The context is invalid. For example, because it was freedX509 - A fatal error occurred, eg the chain is too long or the vrfy callback failedECP - Invalid private or public keyDHM - Making of the public value failedDHM - Making of the DHM parameters failedDHM - The ASN.1 data is not formatted correctlyDHM - Reading of the public values failedPK - PK hardware accelerator failedDHM - DHM hardware accelerator failedDHM - Allocation of memory failedDHM - Calculation of the DHM secret failedDHM - Read or write of file failedMD - Bad input parameters to functionMD - Opening or reading of file failedECP - Memory allocation failedECP - The buffer is too small to write toECP - Generation of random value, such as ephemeral key, failedECP - The signature is not validECP - The ECP hardware accelerator failedRSA - The implementation does not offer the requested operation, for example, because of security violations or lack of functionalityECP - The buffer contains a valid signature followed by more dataECP - Bad input parameters to functionECP - The requested feature is not available, for example, the requested curve is not supportedMD - The selected feature is not availableCIPHER - Authentication failed (for AEAD modes)SSL - An operation failed due to an unexpected version or configurationPEM - Failed to allocate memoryPEM - No PEM header or footer foundPEM - Unsupported key encryption algorithmPEM - PEM string is not as expectedPKCS12 - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryptionPEM - Unavailable feature, e.g. hashing/encryption combinationPEM - Private key password can't be emptyPEM - RSA IV is not in hex-formatPEM - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryptionPK - Bad input parameters to functionRSA - Bad input parameters to functionPK - Read/write of file failedPK - Type mismatch, eg attempt to encrypt with an ECDSA keyPKCS5 - Bad input parameters to functionPK - Private key password can't be emptyPK - The algorithm tag or value is invalidPK - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryptionPK - Key algorithm is unsupported (only RSA and EC are supported)DHM - Setting the modulus and generator failedPK - Unavailable feature, e.g. RSA disabled for RSA keyPK - The pubkey tag or value is invalid (only RSA and EC are supported)PK - The buffer contains a valid signature followed by more dataPK - Elliptic curve is unsupported (only NIST curves are supported)X509 - Requested OID is unknownPKCS12 - PBE ASN.1 data not as expectedPKCS12 - Bad input parameters to functionX509 - The name tag or value is invalidX509 - Destination buffer is too smallRSA - The private key operation failedRSA - Key failed to pass the validity check of the libraryRSA - Input data contains invalid padding and is rejectedRSA - Something failed during generation of a keyRSA - The random generator failed to generate non-zerosRSA - The PKCS#1 verification failedRSA - RSA hardware accelerator failedRSA - The output buffer for decryption is not large enoughRSA - The public key operation failedSSL - Handshake protocol not within min/max boundariesSSL - A cryptographic operation is in progress. Try again laterSSL - No CA Chain is set, but required to operateSSL - An unknown cipher was receivedSSL - An invalid SSL record was receivedSSL - No RNG was provided to the SSL moduleSSL - The connection indicated an EOFSSL - Bad input parameters to functionSSL - The own certificate is not set, but needed by the serverSSL - No client certification received from the client, but required by the authentication modeSSL - The server has no ciphersuites in common with the clientSSL - Our own certificate(s) is/are too large to send in an SSL messageSSL - Unexpected message at ServerHello in renegotiationSSL - Verification of our peer failedSSL - An unexpected message was received from our peerSSL - Processing of the ClientHello handshake message failedSSL - A fatal alert message was received from our peerSSL - Processing of the ServerHelloDone handshake message failedSSL - Processing of the CertificateRequest handshake message failedSSL - Processing of the ServerHello handshake message failedSSL - The peer notified us that the connection is going to be closedSSL - Processing of the Certificate handshake message failedSSL - The own private key or pre-shared key is not set, but neededSSL - Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed in DHM / ECDH Calculate SecretSSL - Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failedSSL - Processing of the ChangeCipherSpec handshake message failedSSL - Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed in DHM / ECDH Read PublicSSL - Processing of the ServerKeyExchange handshake message failedSSL - Hardware acceleration function returned with errorSSL - Processing of the CertificateVerify handshake message failedSSL - Memory allocation failedSSL - The requested feature is not availableSSL - Verification of the message MAC failedSSL - Session ticket has expiredSSL - Processing of the compression / decompression failedSSL - Public key type mismatch (eg, asked for RSA key exchange and presented EC key)SSL - Processing of the NewSessionTicket handshake message failedECP - Operation in progress, call again with the same parameters to continueSSL - A counter would wrap (eg, too many messages exchanged)SSL - A buffer is too small to receive or write a messageSSL - Internal error (eg, unexpected failure in lower-level module)SSL - The client initiated a reconnect from the same portSSL - No data of requested type currently available on underlying transportSSL - DTLS client must retry for hello verificationSSL - Connection requires a write callSSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable (eg, no suitable certificate, see debug messages)CIPHER - Decryption of block requires a full blockSSL - The alert message received indicates a non-fatal errorSSL - The asynchronous operation is not completed yetSSL - Couldn't set the hash for verifying CertificateVerifySSL - Record header looks valid but is not expectedCIPHER - Cipher hardware accelerator failedSSL - Internal-only message signaling that further message-processing should be doneSSL - Invalid value in SSL configCIPHER - The selected feature is not availableSSL - Hardware acceleration function skipped / left alone dataMD - MD hardware accelerator failedPKCS12 - Feature not available, e.g. unsupported encryption schemePEM - Bad input parameters to functionX509 - The serial tag or value is invalidX509 - The CRT/CRL/CSR format is invalid, e.g. different type expectedX509 - Unavailable feature, e.g. RSA hashing/encryption combinationX509 - The CRT/CRL/CSR version element is invalidDHM - Reading of the DHM parameters failedX509 - The extension tag or value is invalidX509 - The date tag or value is invalidX509 - Signature algorithm (oid) is unsupportedX509 - The signature tag or value invalidX509 - Allocation of memory failedX509 - Format not recognized as DER or PEMX509 - Signature algorithms do not match. (see \c ::mbedtls_x509_crt sig_oid)X509 - CRT/CRL/CSR has an unsupported version numberX509 - Certificate verification failed, e.g. CRL, CA or signature check failedX509 - The algorithm tag or value is invalidPKCS5 - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryptionX509 - Read/write of file failedPKCS5 - Requested encryption or digest alg not availableMD - Failed to allocate memorySSL - Processing of the Finished handshake message failedAES - Feature not available. For example, an unsupported AES key sizeAES - AES hardware accelerator failedARC4 - ARC4 hardware accelerator failedASN1 - Out of data when parsing an ASN1 data structureASN1 - ASN1 tag was of an unexpected valueASN1 - Error when trying to determine the length or invalid lengthASN1 - Actual length differs from expected lengthASN1 - Memory allocation failedASN1 - Buffer too small when writing ASN.1 data structureBASE64 - Output buffer too smallBASE64 - Invalid character in inputBIGNUM - An error occurred while reading from or writing to a fileBIGNUM - Bad input parameters to functionBIGNUM - There is an invalid character in the digit stringBIGNUM - The buffer is too small to write toBIGNUM - The input arguments are negative or result in illegal outputBIGNUM - The input argument for division is zero, which is not allowedBIGNUM - The input arguments are not acceptableBIGNUM - Memory allocation failedBLOWFISH - Invalid data input lengthBLOWFISH - Blowfish hardware accelerator failedCAMELLIA - Invalid data input lengthCAMELLIA - Camellia hardware accelerator failedCCM - Bad input parameters to the functionCCM - Authenticated decryption failedCCM - CCM hardware accelerator failedCHACHA20 - Invalid input parameter(s)CHACHA20 - Feature not available. For example, s part of the API is not implementedCHACHA20 - Chacha20 hardware accelerator failedCHACHAPOLY - The requested operation is not permitted in the current stateCHACHAPOLY - Authenticated decryption failed: data was not authenticCTR_DRBG - The entropy source failedCTR_DRBG - The requested random buffer length is too bigCTR_DRBG - The input (entropy + additional data) is too largeCTR_DRBG - Read or write error in fileDES - The data input has an invalid lengthDES - DES hardware accelerator failedENTROPY - Critical entropy source failureENTROPY - No more sources can be addedENTROPY - No sources have been added to pollENTROPY - No strong sources have been added to pollENTROPY - Read/write error in fileERROR - This is a bug in the libraryGCM - Authenticated decryption failedGCM - GCM hardware accelerator failedGCM - Bad input parameters to functionXTEA - XTEA hardware accelerator failedHMAC_DRBG - Too many random requested in single callHMAC_DRBG - Input too large (Entropy + additional)HMAC_DRBG - Read/write error in fileHMAC_DRBG - The entropy source failedMD5 - MD5 hardware accelerator failedNET - The connection to the given server / port failedNET - Binding of the socket failedNET - Could not listen on the socketNET - Could not accept the incoming connectionNET - Reading information from the socket failedNET - Sending information through the socket failedNET - Connection was reset by peerNET - Failed to get an IP address for the given hostnameNET - Buffer is too small to hold the dataNET - The context is invalid, eg because it was free()edNET - Polling the net context failedOID - output buffer is too smallPADLOCK - Input data should be alignedPLATFORM - Hardware accelerator failedPLATFORM - The requested feature is not supported by the platformPOLY1305 - Invalid input parameter(s)POLY1305 - Feature not available. For example, s part of the API is not implementedPOLY1305 - Poly1305 hardware accelerator failedRIPEMD160 - RIPEMD160 hardware accelerator failedSHA1 - SHA-1 hardware accelerator failedSHA1 - SHA-1 input data was malformedSHA256 - SHA-256 hardware accelerator failedSHA256 - SHA-256 input data was malformedSHA512 - SHA-512 hardware accelerator failedSHA512 - SHA-512 input data was malformedTHREADING - The selected feature is not availableTHREADING - Bad input parameters to functionTHREADING - Locking / unlocking / free failed with error codeXTEA - The data input has an invalid lengthAES - Invalid data input lengthCIPHER - Bad input parametersPK - Unsupported key versionDHM - Bad input parametersX509 - Input invalidPKCS5 - Unexpected ASN.1 dataPK - Memory allocation failedPK - Invalid key tag or valueSSL - The operation timed outAES - Invalid key lengthAES - Invalid input dataASN1 - Data is invalidBLOWFISH - Bad input dataCAMELLIA - Bad input dataERROR - Generic errorNET - Failed to open a socketNET - Input invalidOID - OID is not foundUNKNOWN ERROR CODE (%04X)wog_WOG?7/'ߩǪשϩǩwog_WOG?7/'ߨרϨǨwog_WOG?7/' AES-GCM-%3d #%d (%s): AES-GCM-%3d #%d split (%s): X~0a6WEZnG,:gWM\*'d,Z+[O2!۔ZG6;VJaŮ F*<P3sKW$5/9'Xu$Xs6MgJ%IG7Um'aeb:$ O̤ 53f)%VvSE6csȧk&[Ԋ4qP"plvnNh߈S-U:3}F^EI.JfȵZ`(¹qxB!wt$Kr!Ԝ!/,5~#).!Tf}jZ 9j =XG?YB!wt$Kr!Ԝ!/,5~#).!Tf}jZ 9j =Xa5;L(Jw*GUi*qO7f{lt#si$+ uDԉkBI?EIbV3?â&*<~,䩤<ܲԌ|o(uҬL4$|A&~C9 <Ać*'Wلb }w=D%aJ?GD/$'V9 <Ać*'Wلb }w=D%aJ?GD/$'T$n%2Mfc.OG(PpW)ߚGueA:G?b~h$C"JL qs"NԿ'F4ջI_ȤYy4|ݥyWf!Fs:5![[Ď3t՛19`Hі% <%ʸ-Tspz%^KNj+F\ q@\DDɫX>O>[dHiZBMB`^@M{YTuiQ0P`p@DX8((HĿĿ\(08HP ||tt,Paabcmessage digestabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz012345678912345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890UU+Any Policy*H *H *H=+*H *H *H  %d.%d.%uPBE with SHA1 and 3-Key 3DES*H  PBE with SHA1 and 2-Key 3DEShmacSHA1HMAC-SHA-1*H hmacSHA224HMAC-SHA-224*H  hmacSHA256HMAC-SHA-256*H  hmacSHA384HMAC-SHA-384*H  hmacSHA512HMAC-SHA-512id-md5+id-sha1`Heid-sha224`Heid-sha256`Heid-sha384`Heid-sha512+$id-ripemd160RIPEMD-160desCBC*H des-ede3-cbc*H=+$brainpool256r1+$ brainpool384r1+$ brainpool512r1rsaEncryptionRSA*H=id-ecPublicKeyGeneric EC key+ id-ecDHEC key for ECDHmd5WithRSAEncryptionRSA with MD5*H sha-1WithRSAEncryptionRSA with SHA1*H sha224WithRSAEncryptionRSA with SHA-224*H  sha256WithRSAEncryptionRSA with SHA-256*H  sha384WithRSAEncryptionRSA with SHA-384*H  sha512WithRSAEncryptionRSA with SHA-512+*H=ecdsa-with-SHA1ECDSA with SHA1*H=ecdsa-with-SHA224ECDSA with SHA224*H=ecdsa-with-SHA256ECDSA with SHA256*H=ecdsa-with-SHA384ECDSA with SHA384*H=ecdsa-with-SHA512ECDSA with SHA512*H  RSASSA-PSSid-kp-serverAuthTLS Web Server Authentication+id-kp-clientAuthTLS Web Client Authentication+id-kp-codeSigningCode Signing+id-kp-emailProtectionE-mail Protection+id-kp-timeStampingTime Stamping+ id-kp-OCSPSigningOCSP Signing+%id-kp-wisun-fan-deviceid-ce-basicConstraintsBasic ConstraintsUid-ce-keyUsageU%id-ce-extKeyUsageExtended Key UsageUid-ce-subjectAltNameSubject Alt Name`HBid-netscape-certtypeNetscape Certificate TypeU id-ce-certificatePoliciesCertificate Policiesid-at-commonNameCommon NameCNUid-at-countryNameCountryUid-at-localityLocalityLUid-at-stateStateU id-at-organizationNameOrganizationU id-at-organizationalUnitNameOrg UnitOU*H  emailAddressE-mail addressUid-at-serialNumberSerial numberUid-at-postalAddressPostal addressUid-at-postalCodePostal codeUid-at-surNameSurnameSNU*id-at-givenNameGiven nameGNU+id-at-initialsInitialsU,id-at-generationQualifierGeneration qualifierU id-at-titleTitleU.id-at-dnQualifierDistinguished Name qualifierUAid-at-pseudonymPseudonym &,did-domainComponentDomain componentDCU-id-at-uniqueIdentifierUnique IdentifierpbeWithSHAAnd3-KeyTripleDES-CBCpbeWithSHAAnd2-KeyTripleDES-CBCWi-SUN Alliance Field Area Network (FAN)+!+"+#++ + Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTEDDEK-Info: DES-EDE3-CBC,DEK-Info: DES-CBC,DEK-Info: AES-128-CBC,DEK-Info: AES-192-CBC,DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,DEK-Info: AES-invalid PKrsa.Nrsa.Eeckey.QRSA-altECDSAEC_DHEC*****************H  PBKDF2 (SHA1) #%d: `q$`/7lM-o*AމWKyeHI&!e)=.O6bJ)Lp8VjUH 74%saltsaltsaltsaltSALTsaltSALTsaltSALTsaltSALTsaltsalt$passwordpasswordpasswordpasswordPASSWORDpasswordpassword *H=*H  *H  -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----------END EC PRIVATE KEY----------END PRIVATE KEY----------BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----------END RSA PUBLIC KEY----------END PUBLIC KEY----------BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----------BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----------BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----------END ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY----------BEGIN ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY----------BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY----------END PUBLIC KEY----- -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- -----END EC PRIVATE KEY----- -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- -----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----- Poly1305 test %u failed (mac)0Q6+ 'EAf~a|bCryptographic Forum Research Group'Twas brillig, and the slithy toves Did gyre and gimble in the wabe: All mimsy were the borogoves, And the mome raths outgrabe.־xWUm3DRB JAI@Uӊ3G9@+ \ pu..p...`.P.@.0.///////|/l/30000000003040303000000000000000000010300000000000000000003003303303033303030303030303000000000003030003133100000030000030 4g@L?<>d?|??? @$@<@T@???tLDL\Lڮ4{܃ZF]zJưZ ]Ir#_!Y_6'i,V[(epS8J l'b+ n1d:q0yQu.EW=K92Paabcmessage 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key validation: PKCS#1 data sign : passed PKCS#1 sig. verify: passed PKCS#1 decryption : passed PKCS#1 encryption : "3  %)+/5;=CGIOSYaegkmq SHA-1 test #%d: >6Gj>%qxPl؝>D;nJQ)Fp4<ڤ+ۭ'1e4o8abcabcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopqBuffer allocation failed SHA-%d test #%d: # }"4"BwU*你lu8Q'v]]PE\RR%% yFU ػaK?BXHNgxAA@]"#aza$ja8& >`9gH m9,8abcabcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq/BD7q۵[V9Y?^[1$} Ut]rހܛtiGƝ̡ $o,-tJܩ\ڈvRQ>m1'Y GQcg)) '8!.m,M 8STs e jv.,r迢KfpK£Ql$օ5pjl7LwH'4 9JNOʜ[o.htocxxȄnjlPxqu?E^=iP',2c`ZC[퀆+#X4% 3 3G=/ǂGS;;/U~-ft`9 qdtnN1 JHRyrpL*[8뮗=ݯ5azAsI A1N~ KUӚ!*'O6<#EMD#d<*OLuڌ(?wyrP(I3ĵC:)&T^[K H= idN.BǼc; D(V2sD~ LC,w\,I.Npabcabcdefghbcdefghicdefghijdefghijkefghijklfghijklmghijklmnhijklmnoijklmnopjklmnopqklmnopqrlmnopqrsmnopqrstnopqrstu"(ט/Be#D7q/;Mۉ۵8H[V9YO?m^BؾopE[N1$} Uo{t]r;ހ5%ܛ&itJi%O8GՌƝew̡ $u+Yo,-ntJAܩ\SڈvfRQ>2-m1?!'Y= % GoQcpn g))/F '&&\8!.*Zm,M߳ 8ScTs ew< jvG.;5,rdL迢0BKfpK0TQlReU$* qW5ѻ2pjҸSAQl7LwH'Hᵼ4cZų 9ˊAJNscwOʜ[o.h]t`/CocxrxȄ9dnj(c#齂lPyƲ+SrxqƜa&>'!Ǹ}xnO}orgȢ}c ?G5 q}#w($@{2 ˾L*~e)Y:o_XGJDl TIMING tests note: will take some time! TIMING test #1 (set_alarm / get_timer): cycles=%lu ratio=%lu millisecs=%lu secs=%lu hardfail=%d a=%lu b=%lu elapsed(hires)=%lu elapsed(ctx)=%lu status(ctx)=%d TIMING test #2 (set/get_delay ): TIMING test #3 (hardclock / get_timer): failed at line %d failed (ignored)mbed TLS 2.25.0MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASMMBEDTLS_HAVE_TIMEMBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATEMBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBCMBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFBMBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTRMBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFBMBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTSMBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROSMBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIMMBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXTMBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTICMBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDEDMBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMYMBEDTLS_GENPRIMEMBEDTLS_FS_IOMBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORTMBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21MBEDTLS_SELF_TESTMBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKINGMBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MACMBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSVMBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATIONMBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLSMBEDTLS_SSL_ALPNMBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAYMBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFYMBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMITMBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETSMBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYSMBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMACMBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREADMBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURESMBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGEMBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORTMBEDTLS_AESNI_CMBEDTLS_AES_CMBEDTLS_ARC4_CMBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_CMBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_CMBEDTLS_BASE64_CMBEDTLS_BIGNUM_CMBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_CMBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_CMBEDTLS_CCM_CMBEDTLS_CERTS_CMBEDTLS_CHACHA20_CMBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_CMBEDTLS_CIPHER_CMBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_CMBEDTLS_DEBUG_CMBEDTLS_DES_CMBEDTLS_DHM_CMBEDTLS_ECDH_CMBEDTLS_ECDSA_CMBEDTLS_ECP_CMBEDTLS_ENTROPY_CMBEDTLS_ERROR_CMBEDTLS_GCM_CMBEDTLS_HKDF_CMBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_CMBEDTLS_MD_CMBEDTLS_MD5_CMBEDTLS_NET_CMBEDTLS_OID_CMBEDTLS_PADLOCK_CMBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_CMBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_CMBEDTLS_PK_CMBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_CMBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_CMBEDTLS_PKCS5_CMBEDTLS_PKCS12_CMBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CMBEDTLS_POLY1305_CMBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CMBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_CMBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_CMBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_CMBEDTLS_RSA_CMBEDTLS_SHA1_CMBEDTLS_SHA256_CMBEDTLS_SHA512_CMBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_CMBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_CMBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_CMBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_CMBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CMBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_CMBEDTLS_THREADING_CMBEDTLS_TIMING_CMBEDTLS_VERSION_CMBEDTLS_X509_USE_CMBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_CMBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_CMBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_CMBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_CMBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_CMBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_CMBEDTLS_XTEA_CMBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROSMBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LENMBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITESMBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITESMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLEDMBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGESMBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATIONMBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRETMBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATEMBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTINGMBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTHMBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSEMBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATIONMBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGEMBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT XTEA test #%d: I}ra,-tCAAAAAAAAA9#7Z-AAAAAAAAABCDEFGHAAAAAAAAZ[n'HABCDEFGHAAAAAAAAp"]nNvU   ;W@иAָupu l@p0dP l 0<00@00 0 ! $!@8!T!`!! 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10.2.0.shstrtab.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.plt.got.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.data.rel.ro.dynamic.got.plt.data.bss.comment od hh@0W0W>%of2o0AHH@DKB+UP  `[--0d--qj p xttQAQAQA8+ }m_~np~ `P1 0Pbusr/lib64/libmbedtls.a0000644000000000000000000117767213776116116013626 0ustar rootroot! / 1610128462 0 0 0 6484 ` 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L1LHA/LALLHA;LLHeA-LLH=IEpI`H@HD$@HBI`HT$@PIELt$@Hh8HX0I`L`IEpHxLIIHIEpLHxAƅ IEp{LLHLH@IEpLL|HLHXIUIEpLJ8LB0HxHH$Aƅ IEpLLHL ALLHALLHHHHH8H4HHHD!AsIEI LLI |<HHHH L HH)LL$8RHEAXAYƍPt  HT$0HH)H HHH)HT$0fH9HHT$0u /IL|$0HD$IE|<AEMII GHD$D$LL$0HCI9A)ILL$0fH)I9 L1LHA2L:L1LHAEI *ADž,HH}[HT$@1ɾLAƅMCHhI` @IEpH* HH HI`E1ALCHD$8ALLHA LLHLE LH(LL L1LHAE HA&H91A LLHHU#H LHWKT&HJT H)H)DHAULHIljMAƅMO1LL+ H|$IEht$IٹG LHLp 1N|%(D$Dt$ HEgAfAfEDAnH9=A#Etf#wH5HcH L1LHfDH)IHCHl L1LHAR1 LLHIE~LECIEpǀ$ p1 LLHIE}EUEEIEpǀ( 1 LHLIUALPMAAWHHfH9AwHHt$H9M4$M5IGHD$Mt$IMLH9D$uHT$H|$LuME1 LLHIE}E]EE}IEhǀ1x LLHIE}{ErIEhǀ1 LLHEAWЃA9IGH8HHH9wIMpLLD1H1j LLHIE|ftAufA8GL1LHA(LDA31] LLHAE XIEH<HGI9 AGH9 D$8H IGIMLDDHHt$8D1 T$8L9uT$8 D$@IMD?9HHt$@1 T$@I9uD$@n D$^,L1LHA(LA LLHL|H HcH<H\$H94Ld1L=t^Hl$LLd$DHMLDLHPH1ZYI9wHl$IuI HD$H\$|HDHD$ALLHL1LHA(LhA A ADžEƒPv IEpHt$0HHAsLE1IEHHAwLLHIEHHHD$8A1HT$PLXL\$8~ALLHB@ALLHHD$@L>1LHL?1LHHĈL[]A\A]A^A_KS L1LHA2LgADt$ IEL |0< A} ( L1LHIUpHRHLHT$@H@ I`HHXTI`HL$@LIEHL$@M`Lp0Lx8IEpHL$IHxHL$MMHIEpLHxAƅuKHL1LHA2L IEpHt$0HHxAIEpIUHptL HI9LHM LLHIEpLLN HLH(IEpLLO HLHpEAS L1LHA&ALLHL1LHA2LHT$@HLAƅ8A} i|$^L IHL1(LA<L1LHA2LLd$LAW UHLLL)XZ|$ L|$@HLLHD$8$LARMLLt$@2 HIEhA[[L`hMIht$LWILLjLD$@HL$Ht$AXAYÅ3LAAٹ\ LLHALLHD$A9@ M;`IxLLHL$(LD$ LD$ HL$(_AE LAƅLALHPLARLAWLVQkRHP1H0FLOL1LHA2LU#WCT&BT L1LHA2L parse hello verify requestserver versionbad server versioncookiealloc failed (%d bytes)<= parse hello verify requestshould never happenECDH curve: %sf_rngcertificate key type mismatchmbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt=> write client hellono RNG providedssl_generate_randomclient hello, random bytesclient hello, session idno verify cookie to sendclient hello, cookieadding FALLBACK_SCSVssl_write_hostname_extssl_write_renegotiation_extssl_write_truncated_hmac_extssl_write_extended_ms_extssl_write_alpn_extssl_write_session_ticket_extmbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit<= write client helloanoclient state: %d=> parse server hellombedtls_ssl_read_recordbad server hello messagereceived hello verify request<= parse server helloserver hello, versionserver hello, random bytesserver hello, session idmbedtls_ssl_derive_keys%s session has been resumedfound renegotiation extensionpoint format selected: %dno point format in commonfound alpn extensionnon-matching ALPN extension=> parse server key exchangeserver key not ECDH capablembedtls_ecdh_get_paramsssl_get_ecdh_params_from_certserver key exchangembedtls_dhm_read_paramsDHM prime too short: %d < %dDHM: P DHM: G DHM: GYServer used HashAlgorithm %dsignatureparameters hashmbedtls_pk_verify<= parse server key exchange=> parse certificate requestgot %s certificate request<= parse certificate request=> parse server hello donebad server hello done message<= parse server hello done=> write client key exchangembedtls_dhm_make_publicDHM: X DHM: GXmbedtls_dhm_calc_secretDHM: K mbedtls_ecdh_make_publicmbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret<= write client key exchange=> write certificate verifymbedtls_pk_sign<= write certificate verify=> parse new session ticketticket length: %dticket alloc failed<= parse new session tickethandshake: doneinvalid state %dmbedtls_ecdh_read_params/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/library/ssl_cli.cincoming HelloVerifyRequest message is too shortcookie length does not match incoming message sizebuffer too small for encrypted pmsconfigured max major version is invalid, consider using mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults()client hello, max version: [%d:%d]client hello, current time: %luclient hello, session id len.: %dclient hello, add ciphersuite: %#04x (%s)client hello, got %d ciphersuites (excluding SCSVs)adding EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSVclient hello, compress len.: %dclient hello, compress alg.: %dclient hello, compress alg.: %d %dclient hello, adding server name extension: %sclient hello, adding renegotiation extensionclient hello, adding signature_algorithms extensionlength in bytes of sig-hash-alg extension too bigssl_write_signature_algorithms_extclient hello, adding supported_elliptic_curves extensioninvalid curve in ssl configurationmalformed supported_elliptic_curves extension in configclient hello, adding supported_point_formats extensionssl_write_supported_elliptic_curves_extssl_write_supported_point_formats_extclient hello, adding max_fragment_length extensionssl_write_max_fragment_length_extclient hello, adding truncated_hmac extensionclient hello, adding encrypt_then_mac extensionssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_extclient hello, adding extended_master_secret extensionclient hello, adding alpn extensionclient hello, adding session ticket extensionsending session ticket of length %dclient hello, total extension length: %dmbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msgrenegotiation requested, but not honored by servernon-handshake message during renegotiationserver version out of bounds - min: [%d:%d], server: [%d:%d], max: [%d:%d]server hello, current time: %luserver hello, bad compression: %dciphersuite info for %04x not foundserver hello, session id len.: %dserver hello, chosen ciphersuite: %04xserver hello, compress alg.: %dserver hello, chosen ciphersuite: %sserver hello, total extension length: %dnon-matching renegotiation infonon-zero length renegotiation infofound max_fragment_length extensionnon-matching max fragment length extensionfound truncated_hmac extensionnon-matching truncated HMAC extensionfound encrypt_then_mac extensionnon-matching encrypt-then-MAC extensionfound extended_master_secret extensionnon-matching extended master secret extensionfound session_ticket extensionnon-matching session ticket extensionfound supported_point_formats extensionALPN extension: no matching protocolunknown extension found: %d (ignoring)legacy renegotiation, breaking off handshakerenegotiation_info extension missing (secure)legacy renegotiation not allowedrenegotiation_info extension present (legacy)<= skip parse server key exchangebad server certificate (ECDH curve)bad server key exchange messageserver key exchange message must not be skippedbad server key exchange message (psk_identity_hint length)bad server key exchange message (ECDHE curve)Server used unsupported HashAlgorithm %dserver used unsupported SignatureAlgorithm %dserver used HashAlgorithm %d that was not offeredServer used SignatureAlgorithm %d<= skip parse certificate requestbad certificate request messageSupported Signature Algorithm found: %d,%dpsk identity too long or SSL buffer too shortpsk identity or DHM size too long or SSL buffer too shortmbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster<= skip write certificate verifygot no private key for certificatebad new session ticket messageticket in use, discarding session idGCC: (GNU) 10.2.0zRx dBUG B(A0D8DPWXM`XAPdXL`AXAPq 8A0A(B BBBF (BAG ~ DBB BBBB B(D0D8GPXF`IXAPR 8A0A(B BBBD y 8A0A(B BBBE o 8A0A(B BBBG 8SZCP}\ BPN B(A0D8D`\hZpShE``h~pJhA`zhHpjhB`G 8D0A(B BBBA hDpmhA`h\pVhB`hIpbhA`4BBB B(A0A8G 8D0A(B BBBA G 8D0A(B BBBL  8D0A(B BBBL G 8D0A(B BBBL  8D0A(B BBBL  8D0A(B BBBL  8D0A(B BBBL G 8D0A(B BBBL gEBAPME[bvFBkNdAXQB ^LAO 8D0A(B BBBE F_AtQ\AiKUB NDFFHK PTA *GB_x   @_-8pG}(Pp3 L(!H'-3(9?eEKQzWh]ci@ou{p HEx) `(``  !q'-4p;#B` IxPW^ce&lsz6[@][ PpN6 ) 1\ !J(&/>60<XB I O U\p b( h` ov|j   H  ` 8 &p-3 : AG M8 S Z `H f mt { 8 0 p G   -29Tv)Abg04Rk7Rk 2 C [ s       * H o   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H AA EAH@kIHH\$1H)H;D$ED$D$(E,RLHhDL$ H1HEpHLkHHD$0HD$(D$@A1HEp_AXHt4HhHt(HpH)HD$8HD$8HǀhHL$ ALH+uH9D$LLd$H\$8H\$ Lt$ ID1ALLHI~p觮H+I9sIHLLHAPhD$HPDL$H1H L1LHLdH)HHHHHLHLHHDž ZYDL-H@At?LE$HIEHL2AHP1A[A^uA$<I$BJR Ѓ Lc=@1LHLHHMHM$AULHL LHLI$DžbH1LHAYAZ6DHEHt$h|BHH9HHVLL$pLHHuxA]A^HLH\$XAŅ D$X8t.HD˹=HPLH1A[[HAH$LLL$pHL$AYAZH|$x1}' ((HE|@HH׉Hрm HE1|HH9wʄ^ HZ @H1LHAƅLH1LHgH1HLHMEHH+H)H9HLHH]pHDžHHhHHpH)HǃhbH1LHHHDžHDžLbH1HDžHDžAƄ$ZH1E$LHHE|}ulH ^Hx MH1HLHULM]LMMHH8LLLLH<A<$A|$A|$A|$A|$A|$AT$;HHH9E\AHLELH16@A,HHLHU|4AFE %ptEE9%HDžLHDžHH1|$XZH1DLHAfH]pH |$XHhHLL$hH)I91HDLHAHHt$pLL$pLHLd$xLpL扃xHhHY^H;Ht$`LL"PLRPHH1LH1LHAYAZfDHE|`HH:H1LHA DH1LHAAHLHLqH1AHLH\$8Lt$ LHH1LL$H1HLLd$LHKvIDHHHL12I1fJHfrBHJfJ JJ MDEHLHHC1ɨHHHHD$RLhDL$ T$ LH\$H)Ѓt4I9|HII)Կ …uLHDt2K AHI)̹H)8D ׃u@8LH<3HHL$H]HHHH9F8t1KvIQ ЈArHLfDAHAH1LHyHH1LHH1LHAAHLHeRLHhH1_AXHD$t04 )9u}H1LHAHDžLHDžMH޿AD)AD IugH1HLHU|LH1LHALH1A\AE HLHEnHLH}E1ɹ HLH H1LHHAŅtZE HLHWA) H1LHAnHLHAfATL1UHHHHAą1HLHHHExHEhHEPHE|uPHHHE1LHHHD]A\fHffuLHHAf.AHLHHD]A\fH1LHA H-HAUATUHSHH?J1IHӹELHHE|t&HHEpHt H=tI}7HHoL-WfDH}H^HE|t } WHHHHtHЃ)HTHu tF} THUdBUU91L&L1MHHHUH|9u HHH H9 |L1HHHE|H[]A\A]1HHEHXf9w}@<iH=G?D$ AL/H=D$ ArLHHD$ H[]A\A]H  HD$ ALL01HLHEdH2H[]A\A]fDD$ AgLLE @H9HFLHH)HHHH1kHLHf.=1fD11HLHa@L7HH11HDžDž,CD$ ALH6=ID$ AL1HLHrecord counter limit reached: renegotiate/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/library/ssl_msg.cno transform provided to encrypt_bufbad record structure provided to encrypt_bufbefore encrypt: output payloadRecord content %u too large, maximum %dBuffer provided for encrypted record not large enoughbefore encrypt: msglen = %d, including %d bytes of paddingbefore encrypt: msglen = %d, including 0 bytes of paddingNo PRNG provided to encrypt_record routinebefore encrypt: msglen = %d, including %d bytes of IV and %d bytes of paddingbad record structure provided to decrypt_bufmsglen (%d) < explicit_iv_len (%d) msglen (%d) < max( ivlen(%d), maclen (%d) + 1 ) ( + expl IV )msglen (%d) %% ivlen (%d) != 0update timeout value to %d millisecsBad usage of mbedtls_ssl_set_bio() or mbedtls_ssl_set_bio()message length: %d, out_left: %df_send returned %d bytes but only %lu bytes were sentssl_check_pending: record held back for processingssl_check_pending: more records within current datagramssl_check_pending: more handshake messages within current recordssl_check_pending: application data record is being processedssl_check_pending: nothing pendingbefore compression: msglen = %d, before compression: output payloadfailed to perform compression (%d)after compression: msglen = %d, after compression: output payloadoutput record: msgtype = %d, version = [%d:%d], msglen = %doutgoing message counter would wrapssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagramStill %u bytes available in current datagram=> mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmitinitialise flight transmissionswap epochs to send finished messagefragmenting handshake message (%u > %u)<= mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmitrequesting more data than fitsnext record in same datagram, offset: %dmbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_requestf_recv returned %d bytes but only %lu were requestedhandshake message too short: %dhandshake message: msglen = %d, type = %d, hslen = %dreceived future handshake message of sequence number %u (next %u)received message from last flight, message_seq = %d, start_of_flight = %ddropping out-of-sequence message: message_seq = %d, expected = %dfound fragmented DTLS handshake messageTLS handshake fragmentation not supportedinvalid CCS message, content: %02xdropping ChangeCipherSpec outside handshakereceived out-of-order ChangeCipherSpec - rememberinvalid alert message, len: %dgot an alert message, type: [%d:%d]is a fatal alert message (msg %d)is a SSLv3 no renegotiation alertdropping unexpected ApplicationDataRecord too large: size %u, maximum %uDTLS handshake message too large: size %u, maximum %umbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msgsend alert level=%u message=%umbedtls_ssl_send_alert_messagembedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payloadfragment larger than the (negotiated) maximum fragment length: %d > %ddatagram of length %u too small to hold DTLS record header of length %uinput record: msgtype = %d, version = [%d:%d], msglen = %dDatagram of length %u too small to contain record of advertised length %u.record from another epoch: expected %d, received %dCCS not seen in the current flightInjecting buffered CCS messageFuture message with sequence number %u %s buffered.Next handshake message has been buffered - loadBuffered handshake message (incl. header)Next handshake message %u not or only partially buffferedBuffered record not from current epoch.Found buffered record from current epoch - loadBuffering of future epoch record of size %u would exceed the compile-time limit %u (already %u bytes buffered) -- ignore possible client reconnect from the same portno cookie callbacks, can't check reconnect validitydiscarding unexpected record (header)discarding invalid record (header)more than one record within datagramrecord type after decrypt (before %d): %dinvalid zero-length message type: %dreceived four consecutive empty messages, possible DoS attackincoming message counter would wrapdiscarding invalid record (mac)before decompression: msglen = %d, before decompression: input payloadfailed to perform decompression (%d)after decompression: msglen = %d, after decompression: input payloadIgnore future HS message with sequence number %u, buffering window %u - %uBuffering HS message with sequence number %u, offset %u Buffering of future message of size %u would exceed the compile-time limit %u (already %u bytes buffered) -- ignore Buffering of future message of size %u would exceed the compile-time limit %u (already %u bytes buffered) -- attempt to make space by freeing buffered future messages Attempt to free buffered messages to have %u bytes availableEnough space available after freeing future epoch recordFree buffering slot %d to make space for reassembly of next handshake messageEnough space available after freeing buffered HS messagesReassembly of next message of size %u (%u with bitmap) would exceed the compile-time limit %u (already %u bytes buffered) -- fail initialize reassembly, total length = %dFragment header mismatch - ignoreadding fragment, offset = %d, length = %dmbedtls_ssl_handle_message_typecookie is valid, resetting contextbad change cipher spec messageswitching to new transform spec for inbound datahandshake received (not HelloRequest)handshake received (not ClientHello)mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiationrefusing renegotiation, sending alertrenegotiation requested, but not honored by clientignoring non-fatal non-closure alertset_timer to %d mstimer expired=> encrypt bufcomputed macshould never happenmbedtls_cipher_cryptIV used (internal)IV used (transmitted)additional data used for AEADmbedtls_cipher_auth_encryptafter encrypt: tagusing encrypt then macMAC'd meta-data<= encrypt buf=> decrypt bufmsglen (%d) < taglen (%d) IV usedTAG usedmbedtls_cipher_auth_decryptmessage macexpected macmessage mac does not matchmbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac<= decrypt buf=> flush output<= flush outputssl->f_sendskip swap epochsswap epochs=> write record=> compress bufssl_compress_buf<= compress bufssl_encrypt_bufoutput record sent to networkmbedtls_ssl_flush_output<= write recordhandshake headermbedtls_ssl_write_record=> mbedtls_ssl_resend<= mbedtls_ssl_resend=> fetch inputin_left: %d, nb_want: %d<= fetch inputtimer has expiredf_recv_timeout: %u msssl->f_recv(_timeout)timeouthandshake timeoutmtu autoreduction to %d bytesmbedtls_ssl_resendinvalid handshake headerinvalid CCS message, len: %dis a close notify message=> write handshake message=> ssl_flight_appendmessage appended to flightalloc %d bytes failed<= ssl_flight_appendssl_flight_appendssl_write_record<= write handshake message=> write change cipher spec<= write change cipher spec=> send alert message<= send alert message=> write close notify<= write close notify=> writessl_check_ctr_renegotiatembedtls_ssl_handshake<= writeunknown record type %umajor version mismatchminor version mismatchinput record headerConsider record for bufferingreplayed record=> mbedtls_ssl_check_recordrecord bufferssl_parse_record_headermbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf<= mbedtls_ssl_check_recordfullypartiallynot yet => read recordremaining content in record=> ssl_load_buffered_messsage<= ssl_load_buffered_message=> ssl_load_buffered_record<= ssl_load_buffered_recordmbedtls_ssl_fetch_inputBuffer record from epoch %uBuffered recordssl_check_client_reconnectssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookiesending HelloVerifyRequestresetinput record from networkssl_decrypt_bufinput payload after decryptbad message lengthtoo many records with bad MAC=> decompress bufssl_decompress_buf<= decompress bufssl_get_next_record=> ssl_buffer_messageRemember CCS message<= ssl_buffer_messagemessage %scompletereuse previously read message<= read record=> parse change cipher specmbedtls_ssl_read_recordDTLS epoch would wrap<= parse change cipher spec=> readreceived handshake messagebad application data message<= readGCC: (GNU) 10.2.0zRx ZH0BBB A(A0 (D BBBI A(C BBB4|qFEE L ABA MAB(aLNZ ]DB TMTGCh8 BDB E(A0I8Q_LdBCzAEGAfBCQP_NB 8A0A(B BBBD RT[KBHsAKNWD_ADQXF BPJ E(A0K8G.EFDiDSKIAQN 8A0A(B BBBA \FA/I_FG^FAl JL sO@DhDuB QE w JL (9FAG cAAE$uA^ A T$DAAG xAAlhBOP V(L0c(A M ABI Y ABD D(M0`(D A ABG c ABA (A K bHe\XAy F x$B H g A d|hLBBA D(D0i (A ABBD Z (A AEBA aFN<8BBB A(A0q (A BBBH xAg H T+?BPI B(A0D8KcELKLKAc 8A0A(B BBBE o 8A0A(B BBBG FcBQFJAdXJBPN B(A0D8D@ 8D0A(B BBBJ HPHHA@HMPZHE@$aBOS vDBBPI J(A0D8D@{HNP^HG@ 8D0A(B BBBI DHNPfHB@QHNP}HB@FHNPJHA@}HMPaHA@\x AG g(I0M(B (N0^(A w AH V AA (M0W(F w(M0W(G ,AS D \d OAO I `|BUF D(D@HIPwHA@ (A ABBH cHQPXHG@ZHQPZHG@0lBOS ] DBI gDBDBAA ~(H0](A k ABJ g ABF 0JG a AE L DE GL0 3BDD G0E  AABF   AABE Y8K@\8F0\ BNO H(G0 (D BBBG g (D BBBG g (D BBBG  : CBEB B(A0D8DPXz`GXC``hEp\PHXN`^XFPL 8A0A(B BBBA u 8C0A(B BBBG XJ`^XFPWXK`L oBPJ H(K0G`IhHpbhA`z 0D(B BBBH t ~BPP B(A0D8G| 8D0A(B BBBG kKATTBbEEPKIwAA\IBqRkBxIcBqM\ADTbBU]AF`BQFJAvrALQAuAzB QJ TTB4T BOS  DBJ w DBC l KBA D(D@# (A ABBA  (A ABBH  (A ABBG  Z%`? q^n C3GC  0!0fy =!@'-Q38>ChHN<TDZ`!flMrpxi~v@` 0x [yK &X,2;88>D0J*PVh\bhntz AW/mh8uh (    X  ' . 5 <CX J0 QX_#f8mit{  S~ (   6H h  LoU  #*18 ?F` MT1[obWi?pw~  'H CpX( 0 h  &-4 ;B0I P W^els&zW@|[whX9 8")i0`7p>EXLSZ# ahm oW v? }  p(H  0aFT^p8 v& >^r`9 u8  \ d   `    `e X9 0U Po @   !a    "0 "R p#+l #?  )J 0.a .  P5  p8: i p;|  @ A B B = EO e F:~ PJo K~    @hissl_msg.cssl_hs_is_proper_fragmentssl_check_ctr_renegotiatessl_buffering_free_slot.isra.0ssl_swap_epochsssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagramssl_write_realssl_parse_record_header.LC1.LC2.LC3.LC4.LC5.LC8.LC11.LC10.LC15.LC16.LC17.LC18.LC20.LC25.LC22.LC12.LC23.LC24.LC13.LC19.LC14.LC7.LC21.LC9.LC6.LC26.LC30.LC31.LC39.LC29.LC38.LC32.LC28.LC34.LC35.LC27.LC33.LC37.LC36.LC40.LC41.LC44.LC45.LC43.LC46.LC42.LC48.LC47.LC50.LC51.LC52.LC53.LC49.LC54.LC64.LC65.LC70.LC69.LC63.LC55.LC56.LC57.LC60.LC61.LC62.LC68.LC66.LC58.LC59.LC67.LC71.LC75.LC72.LC73.LC74.LC76.LC77.LC78.LC79.LC80.LC83.LC84.LC86.LC87.LC85.LC88.LC92.LC90.LC91.LC82.LC93.LC81.LC89.LC95.LC98.LC100.LC101.LC94.LC99.LC96.LC97.LC107.LC110.LC105.LC111.LC104.LC106.LC102.LC103.LC108.LC109.LC112.LC115.LC116.LC118.LC121.LC120.LC113.LC114.LC117.LC119.LC122.LC124.LC123.LC125.LC126.LC127.LC128.LC130.LC129.LC131.LC132.LC133.LC136.LC135.LC134.LC141.LC142.LC144.LC145.LC146.LC138.LC139.LC137.LC140.LC143.LC147.LC148.LC151.LC150.LC149.LC156.LC152.LC158.LC159.LC160.LC166.LC167.LC169.LC174.LC180.LC220.LC170.LC201.LC202.LC206.LC208.LC209.LC210.LC211.LC213.LC204.LC157.LC153.LC162.LC163.LC164.LC183.LC185.LC186.LC203.LC168.LC161.LC165.LC175.LC177.LC178.LC182.LC190.LC219.LC193.LC194.LC195.LC198.LC199.LC200.LC216.LC155.LC154.LC217.LC184.LC192.LC187.LC172.LC173.LC205.LC189.LC191.LC212.LC214.LC218.LC207.LC215.LC196.LC197.LC171.LC181.LC188.LC221.LC179.LC176.LC222.LC225.LC227.LC226.LC223.LC224.LC228.LC229.LC234.LC230.LC232.LC233.LC231.LC237.LC235.LC236_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_memcmpmbedtls_debug_print_msgmbedtls_ssl_renegotiatembedtls_platform_zeroizembedtls_ssl_set_timermbedtls_ssl_check_timermbedtls_ssl_encrypt_bufmbedtls_debug_print_bufmbedtls_md_hmac_updatembedtls_md_hmac_finishmbedtls_md_hmac_resetmemcpymbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_extmbedtls_cipher_cryptmbedtls_debug_print_retmbedtls_ssl_decrypt_bufmbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_extmbedtls_md_get_typembedtls_md_get_sizembedtls_md_initmbedtls_md_setupmbedtls_md_freembedtls_md_updatembedtls_md_clonembedtls_md_finishmbedtls_md_startsmbedtls_ssl_flight_freembedtls_ssl_send_flight_completedmbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_statusmemmovembedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_resetmbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_checkmbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_updatembedtls_ssl_update_out_pointersmbedtls_ssl_flush_outputmbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointersmbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointersmbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_availmbedtls_ssl_check_pendingmbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansionmbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_lenmbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtumbedtls_ssl_transform_freedeflateEndinflateEndmbedtls_cipher_freembedtls_ssl_buffering_freembedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completedmbedtls_ssl_write_versionmbedtls_ssl_write_recorddeflatembedtls_ssl_flight_transmitmbedtls_ssl_resendmbedtls_ssl_fetch_inputmbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_requestmbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_recordmbedtls_ssl_handle_message_typembedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transformmbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msgcallocmbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_specmbedtls_ssl_send_alert_messagembedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failurembedtls_ssl_close_notifymbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payloadmbedtls_ssl_writembedtls_ssl_handshakembedtls_ssl_read_versionmbedtls_ssl_check_recordmbedtls_ssl_read_recordinflatememsetmbedtls_ssl_session_reset_intmbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_specmbedtls_ssl_readmbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation3`mMTY     % ?NS  Gls| ;BWn  2H !"    5  @  H  [      #     O $V c    % &  % ' /  F (_ d x   ) *    ) > X n +}   ,    <-CH *k.t y/ 0GZ8Oa mr1%!"7>N e p x 23J z%45   6  @7GL|89&:Gy;"<=,Q<[y>?"5@FK"yABCD   E& +     )4!*g!(!,!-!.!.!!?""""%#//##F##$1$1$a%*%G%%%&H &(&"&I&&&#&J&K ''I'LP'j'' 'M'''N''#(3H(O_(s((P(((Q((( (()R#)-)H)SO)T)n)T)))U)))V)W) **#* 9+2+X;,M,c, ,Y,,-Z!-&-O-[d-n--\---#-]. .$.5.^D.U.].4g._v...`..L/ad/i//b//c//,0d3080d0bp000a00a0I1N1`1dg1q111a1112d2>2>Z2_22e222f22227 3g33i3p3hz33833353i334j4)4F44k444 445l5 15m85C55n556o66656i67J7p[7`77q777r7777s7"8t)8.8C8uP8_888v 9S9wZ9_99x9998D:yK:P:r:zy:~::::{:::|:}:;%;~,;6;H;\;a;z;;;F<M<R<w<~<<<<<<< *=1=6=L=S=X== ==B>>2?????? 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AHUpHH9wHĘD[]A\A]A^A_fLMtLMvH7HH HE1HLw@1LHH1D$kLBHHD$>LH|tTATIUHSHHHHHHt%HLH1[]A\fDøHHHf.AWAVAUATUSHxDOAHpHvL5H1HAąZHE|cDMAH DHcHfHEp$ 1HLHLL$(LD$0H`DžhH`HEHuhH@H HD$(H`HJH`JH`bH`BHD$0H`HHJH`B H HpHEpǀ$ L%AąHH1HxD[]A\A]A^A_HEpH|Af.H1LHAfDA{DHiH1LHE8fHxH[]A\A]A^A_f.HxH[]A\A]A^A_f.HEp=HLHH1Cg k LAHH1E@HEpHLHH1HAąHEHH |L, <HHH H4Ht$0t:J Sz z [ 1LHqAąfDHAąbELHHxH[]A\A]A^A_f.HxH[]A\A]A^A_f.1HLHH`HDžpDžhHEE|r HAąZHE|tHLifHEpH HLHH`H$1HEpEuHE|C L HEp6HLHHD$ H1K F H੢3 LHfDHxH[]A\A]A^A_f.1 HHLHE|tHMpHx0H`u}HKCHHDKL HP11L HIȉC1HHEHs Hx8P0A]A^AąiHEpoKLKHHL AoQHj HEpAYAZD E DE LehEu?I|$t7HUHB@Ht*HzPLЅN HUpHEh Iąg E1I$HEp$ HEh$HMHp H@ A Hy8Q0AąlHEhLk'LH@C&HEhHPHpHEhMHLe L`H1HMHAVf MLHMl$HEpA_L ZLH HHɹg LD1E1HEh@A$HEh@AD$HEh@ AD$HEhxLn HIH1HEhHLp HDH 1ID$AH$HEhOttE1 HLHAHEhAFHEhOt=IDEt61HLHAHEhOt=It/u xHtxHt xHEp( t=Ut61q HLHAHEpOt=I$ t2 H1LHA#Ot=IHEhxH& H/ H1LHfAHI~HH@HD$HBHAVAFBAFHBHAFBAFHL|$1MLHﹶ HMtDL,$ffAD$MH`I)HDžhLpL AuDHxH[]A\A]A^A_:f.EEW HEhHxh1HAąE{H:kHE|<HEhHL`hHH MIh}Lk L(AL|$@H L94H\ HcJ+H9HEpH $HT$(HHt$0H $LILLDMAą HLfD H`HD$HD$fxHXL` @@}HD$ HUE1~HEpHHH$E1EH@H$H4$LfL9gEL)IUH9SfA$ML$LHLG|7HHu AUIN$(LHH`Y^Ht S8fDEH`L+d$HDžhLpH\$ H`H\$H`DL AZf.HEpLHDžpAEPu7H`HDžp@HpH`HHHpAEE1<HpH`LHD$(L)I}AEmAAE1LH1 HE1H\$0LLHD$($HHAą HIٹ Ht$0LH}A\A_7HEpHUHHHHxHH`Hpr8Dr0HLDHL$8LL$0AZA[AąHD$ H`H|DžhH ELAąGAHLH5HxH[]A\A]A^A_fA DH)HEpHHNHEpAHDHLHUHEpLJ8LB0LHHLHEpAHQHLHHD$0HEH HEpHhH7HHvHDHCHH[9uHH LHLH1X HHH]p0HAą HEH]p@Ht$0HpLH8L@0HH)H`AąsHD$0E1ɹq HHpHL`HIHpHEpLAEOHD$0HEHH(}HHHEpHxAąF HELpL`Lp8HX0HEpHxLHL$0MHHEpIHxAą HpL`HL1 HIHD$0HpHEpLH@HEpHL2 HLHHEpHL3 HLH(HEpHL4 HLHXAEL+ HHHEpǀ HEhLpE HAąET HLHAHLHHEpHWHHGHHEpH=HH-HRHHr1A HLHAHLH+AHLHA!HLHA HLHHD$0L9 <Aƅ}HH4bHD$@AL|$0LDH|ƅ$LRHC1LIHt$0LHAą L"L;l$0p HUHEpLJ8LB0HxHH$(HEp0HLHLQHoHEpHEp 1 HLHA fAFOt=I H1LHAML$ fE\$Du E@AAD$ fET$ML+<$MWHELA?J E1IMuK4t8HHT$HT$uMuCD,K4C\,CD,IAIuIHD$DIffHIFHD$IFHD$\HpHHHLHqHp HpH`HHHpHL$( Hut$(L`LpHD$0H`HpAXAYHEHHHUHHDAHLH& H1LH H1LHH`HL HHHD$01HEHL$0u}|H HjLL$@HLH\$@HMHCHD$@HZ^Hs H8LLkLl$0LHHMELHt$0Aą<HD$0HMHL L)HCPHD$@H`HDžhH)HpEA_AXEcHE|tHÅL CLI H1LHAHDžpAZHLH1l HLHDEALH$H$AE1$L|$0fH@E1@@(A HLHLfAT H1LHAHt$0LHAąOLdL;l$0;sHAąArHLH{H1HHt$0LHnAąKHt$0LHAąsHAąAHLH H1LHH\$0LEHT$(MHHAąZeAD$HLHDAD$AD$ HHHIILLImA' HLHtH}pAA H1LHAA HLHLt$0LHLAą3LLH:Aą#LL;l$0sHAąAHLHA] HLHAHLHHt$0LHAąHt$0HEpLH)HAHEpAHHLsHAąAHLHHHH1LHAAg HLH|AHLHL H1AH]W H1LHAOt=IE HLHAHLHHpDHPH`HpIDA$HpHPH`HpIA$tA^HLHYAE1AHLH#AHLHA HLHAHLHLLdH1AHmALHAܹ HBAHLH H1LHAL HH;ALMHHAAL@HHAlLL H1LHAL~LmL\AL@L HHALAL,bad client key exchange message/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/library/ssl_srv.cclient hello v3, message type: %dclient hello v3, message len.: %dclient hello v3, protocol version: [%d:%d]client hello v3, handshake type: %dclient hello v3, handshake len.: %dbad client hello message_seq: %d (expected %d)ClientHello fragmentation not supportedclient only supports ssl smaller than minimum [%d:%d] < [%d:%d]non-matching renegotiation infonon-zero length renegotiation infofound signature_algorithms extensionclient hello v3, signature_algorithm ext unknown sig alg encoding %dclient hello v3, signature_algorithm ext: unknown hash alg encoding %dclient hello v3, signature_algorithm ext: match sig %d and hash %dclient hello v3, signature_algorithm ext: hash alg %d not supportedfound supported elliptic curves extensionfound supported point formats extensionfound max fragment length extensionfound truncated hmac extensionfound encrypt then mac extensionfound extended master secret extensionfound session ticket extensionticket rejected: renegotiatingsession successfully restored from ticketunknown extension found: %d (ignoring)received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO received RENEGOTIATION SCSV during renegotiationlegacy renegotiation, breaking off handshakerenegotiation_info extension missing (secure)legacy renegotiation not allowedrenegotiation_info extension present (legacy)trying ciphersuite: %#04x (%s)ciphersuite mismatch: no common elliptic curveciphersuite mismatch: no pre-shared keyciphersuite mismatch: no suitable hash algorithm for signature algorithm %dciphersuite requires certificatecandidate certificate chain, certificatecertificate mismatch: key typecertificate mismatch: (extended) key usage extensioncertificate not preferred: sha-2 with pre-TLS 1.2 clientselected certificate chain, certificateciphersuite mismatch: no suitable certificategot ciphersuites in common, but none of them usableclient hello v3, signature_algorithm ext: %dno hash algorithm for signature algorithm %d - should not happencertificate mismatch: elliptic curveclient hello was not authenticatedmbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msgserver hello, chosen version: [%d:%d]server hello, current time: %lusession successfully restored from cacheserver hello, session id len.: %dserver hello, chosen ciphersuite: %sserver hello, compress alg.: 0x%02Xserver hello, secure renegotiation extensionserver hello, max_fragment_length extensionserver hello, adding truncated hmac extensionserver hello, adding encrypt then mac extensionserver hello, adding extended master secret extensionserver hello, adding session ticket extensionserver hello, supported_point_formats extensionserver hello, adding alpn extensionserver hello, total extension length: %d<= skip write server key exchangepick hash algorithm %d for signing<= write server key exchange (pending)<= skip write certificate requestskipping CAs: buffer too shortmbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premasterssl_parse_parse_encrypted_pms_secret<= skip parse certificate verifybad certificate verify messagepeer not adhering to requested sig_alg for verify messagesig_alg doesn't match cert keymbedtls_dhm_read_publicDHM: GY=> parse client hellombedtls_ssl_fetch_inputrecord headerbad client hello messagereplayed record, discardingrecord contentsclient hello, versionclient hello, random bytesclient hello, session idclient hello, cookiecookie verification failedcookie verification passedcookie verification skippedclient hello, ciphersuitelistclient hello, compressionclient hello extensionsfound ServerName extensionparse ServerName extensionssl_sni_wrapperfound renegotiation extensionpoint format selected: %dticket length: %dticket is not authenticticket is expiredmbedtls_ssl_ticket_parsefound alpn extensionreceived FALLBACK_SCSVinapropriate fallbackshould never happenciphersuite mismatch: versionciphersuite mismatch: rc4server has no certificateselected ciphersuite: %sgot no ciphersuites in common<= parse client hellogot no pre-shared keyUnknown PSK identitygot no RSA private keyanoserver state: %d=> write server hello<= write server hello=> write hello verify requestserver versioninconsistent cookie callbacksf_cookie_writecookie sentmbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit<= write hello verify requestno RNG providedserver hello, random bytesmbedtls_ssl_derive_keysserver hello, session id%s session has been resumed=> write server key exchangeserver key not ECDH capablembedtls_ecdh_get_paramsno DH parameters setmbedtls_dhm_set_groupmbedtls_dhm_make_paramsDHM: X DHM: P DHM: G DHM: GXno matching curve for ECDHEECDHE curve: %smbedtls_ecp_group_loadmbedtls_ecdh_make_paramsparameters hashgot no private keymbedtls_pk_signmy signature<= write server key exchange=> write certificate requestrequested DN<= write certificate request=> write server hello done<= write server hello done=> parse client key exchangembedtls_ssl_read_recordssl_parse_client_dh_publicbad client key exchangembedtls_dhm_calc_secretDHM: K mbedtls_ecdh_read_publicmbedtls_ecdh_calc_secretssl_parse_client_psk_identityssl_parse_encrypted_pms<= parse client key exchange=> parse certificate verifymbedtls_pk_verify<= parse certificate verify=> write new session ticketmbedtls_ssl_ticket_write<= write new session tickethandshake: doneinvalid state %dH% GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0zRx 8BBD D(D0o (D ABBH @XH!BPN B(A0D8GNIoAD\nA 8A0A(B BBBA KSrBMVB@N~B\NMEgMaA][BgG{DM\AG`BmCfDJMFFP<PTB<BGD D0y  AABB 8L@k8F0\BBB J(A0D8JCOA 8D0A(B BBBJ 4<mNDD @ABGF t8&BBB B(A0A8D 8D0A(B BBBI  8D0A(B BBBO D 8D0A(B BBBO  8D0A(B BBBO D 8D0A(B BBBO  8D0A(B BBBO q\SB_nKBHkMV 8D0A(B BBBO PJgAO^BEFYB 8D0A(B BBBG NhBJwAShyD$zRx ,  &H!=P"[$ s     NXu6\6Rp &@, 2`8>DJuPV\0bhnPtzxX0hT2\ h@"(.4J:@FhLRX8^6djhpv(|8jG| s8   H # *17>D K R@ Yp ` g nh u |+ V h ? c@p8  I"(. 4H:pAWH` OTVl] dk ry9%&  9 #x X X *BZr7Pi 2Rs)Gi&mK`' '8&- F f       * H f k       = V p        . M e   ssl_srv.cssl_parse_client_dh_publicssl_parse_client_hellossl_parse_client_psk_identityssl_parse_encrypted_pmsmbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step.cold.LC3.LC1.LC0.LC2.LC4.LC6.LC7.LC9.LC10.LC11.LC5.LC8.LC12.LC13.LC14.LC17.LC19.LC20.LC21.LC22.LC24.LC25.LC26.LC27.LC54.LC46.LC47.LC48.LC52.LC45.LC44.LC53.LC34.LC37.LC35.LC40.LC41.LC39.LC43.LC42.LC28.LC29.LC31.LC38.LC36.LC16.LC55.LC56.LC64.LC66.LC70.LC72.LC74.LC75.LC76.LC77.LC83.LC23.LC49.LC51.LC65.LC79.LC73.LC78.LC69.LC71.LC68.LC67.LC84.LC30.LC50.LC57.LC62.LC60.LC32.LC18.LC81.LC80.LC63.LC82.LC33.LC15.LC61.LC59.LC58.LC85.LC86.LC87.LC90.LC171.LC173.LC175.LC174.LC164.LC165.LC151.LC163.LC149.LC150.LC144.LC145.LC122.LC125.LC91.LC103.LC104.LC105.LC108.LC109.LC88.LC110.LC89.LC111.LC112.LC114.LC115.LC117.LC118.LC120.LC121.LC93.LC170.LC147.LC148.LC137.LC138.LC143.LC99.LC134.LC129.LC130.LC131.LC132.LC106.LC107.LC124.LC152.LC172.LC154.LC156.LC119.LC113.LC142.LC169.LC92.LC94.LC95.LC98.LC101.LC126.LC146.LC100.LC127.LC141.LC133.LC160.LC128.LC97.LC135.LC153.LC139.LC136.LC162.LC116.LC159.LC161.LC140.LC166.LC123.LC158.LC157.LC102.LC167.LC168.LC96.LC155_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_mbedtls_dhm_read_publicmbedtls_debug_print_mpimbedtls_debug_print_msgmbedtls_debug_print_retmbedtls_debug_print_bufmbedtls_ssl_read_versionmbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_checkmbedtls_ssl_fetch_inputmbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_updatememcpymbedtls_ssl_send_alert_messagembedtls_ssl_session_initmbedtls_ssl_session_freembedtls_platform_zeroizembedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hashmbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hashmbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_addmbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sigcallocmbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_idstrlenmemcmpmbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_idmbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecmbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_pskmbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_algmbedtls_debug_print_crtmbedtls_pk_can_dombedtls_ssl_check_cert_usagembedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hashmbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_algmbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_findmbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completedmbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_algmbedtls_pk_get_bitlenmbedtls_pk_decryptmbedtls_ssl_write_versionmbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_idmbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_cookiesmbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_stepmbedtls_ssl_flush_outputmbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msgmbedtls_ssl_flight_transmitmbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapupmbedtls_ssl_write_finishedmbedtls_ssl_parse_finishedmbedtls_ssl_read_recordmbedtls_ssl_derive_keysmbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_specmbedtls_ssl_parse_certificatembedtls_ssl_write_certificatetimembedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_namembedtls_cipher_info_from_typembedtls_pk_verifymbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_statusmbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tlsmbedtls_pk_signmbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_specmbedtls_ecdh_read_publicmbedtls_debug_printf_ecdhmbedtls_ecdh_calc_secretmbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completedmbedtls_ecdh_setupmbedtls_ecdh_make_paramsmbedtls_dhm_set_groupmbedtls_mpi_sizembedtls_dhm_make_paramsmbedtls_ecdh_get_paramsmbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_mdmbedtls_dhm_calc_secretmbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premastermbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_algC]iw/Q]>$4+3{;GLl 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H1LHAHEh1@pu*u+(HHEhDHpEV H1LHEtWEH1 LHHEHxhL@plD+fDHEh HLHLhh1[ H1LHMfAtAt EE1DIpH0(HEh HHLHp1ELDDHEhLHHpHE|҃ H1LH@A HLHXH1HHL$1 HLHEIT$u MAjAND1 HLHLL$HE`LL$L@hLLL$HD$HMIPI9IxLD$LD$LL$LLL$HD$HxhHD$LL$HH@hL H1AH2HLLL L땹H1LHA H% H1LHA1HD-,҃0Ah H1LHAPH+fubtEt(tDHGpHH1HGpH H1HGpHeH1fAWAVIAUATUHSHHLd$L|$pHt$LLL7HEp@LHAŅLHLAŅ[Ht$LAŅLAŅ`HEp@LHAŅLHLAŅHt$LHAŅ8LLKfDARHLHLLPHHD[]A\A]A^A_fDALHAŹLHA\HLHkAWHLH;AbHLH AtHLHAhHLHAnHLH{AWMAVIAUIATUHDSHH(HIHHLIE1IL1LLLAąu`HEp@LHAąLLLAąHLAąLA@AHLHLPHH(D[]A\A]A^A_fALHAĹHAHLHsAHLHCAHLH+,client finishedserver finished=> calc finished tls sha256finished sha2 statecalc finished result<= calc finished=> calc verify sha256calculated verify result<= calc verify=> calc finished tls sha384finished sha512 state=> calc verify sha384=> calc finished tlsfinished md5 statefinished sha1 state=> calc verify tlscipher info for %d not foundkey expansionprfciphersuite = %smaster secretrandom byteskey blockmbedtls_md_setupshould never happenmbedtls_cipher_setupmbedtls_cipher_setkeyInitializing zlib states1.2.11=> write hello request<= write hello requestextended master secret=> derive keysssl_set_handshake_prfspremaster secretssl_populate_transformAllocating compression bufferalloc(%d bytes) failed<= derive keysssl_compute_mastermbedtls_dhm_calc_secretDHM: K mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret=> write certificate<= skip write certificategot no certificate to sendown certificate<= write certificate=> write finishedDTLS epoch would wrapmbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit<= write finished=> parse finishedmbedtls_ssl_read_recordbad finished message<= parse finishedunknownunknown (DTLS)SSLv3.0DTLSv1.0DTLSv1.2TLSv1.0TLSv1.1TLSv1.2=> handshake<= handshake=> handshake wrapupcache did not store session<= handshake wrapup=> free<= freecontext to loadInitial handshake isn't overHandshake isn't completedOnly DTLS is supportedOnly version 1.2 supportedsaved context=> renegotiatembedtls_ssl_handshake<= renegotiate++=> parse certificate<= skip parse certificatebad certificate messagepeer certificate<= parse certificatex509_verify_certgot no CA chain mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_dermbedtls_md5_starts_retmbedtls_md5_update_retmbedtls_md5_finish_retmbedtls_sha1_starts_retmbedtls_sha1_update_retmbedtls_sha1_finish_retmbedtls_md_startsmbedtls_md_updatembedtls_md_finish/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/library/ssl_tls.cciphersuite info for %d not foundmbedtls_md info for %d not foundkeylen: %u, minlen: %u, ivlen: %u, maclen: %umbedtls_cipher_set_padding_modeFailed to initialize compressionmbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msgno premaster (session resumed)session hash for extended master secretno longer retransmitting hello requestcertificate too large, %d > %dswitching to new transform spec for outbound dataMTU too low for record expansionYou must use mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb() for DTLS=> handshake wrapup: final free<= handshake wrapup: final freeskip freeing handshake and transformalloc() of ssl sub-contexts failedSerialised structures aren't readyThere is pending incoming dataThere is pending outgoing dataOnly AEAD ciphersuites supportedRenegotiation must not be enabledmbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiationTLSv1 client has no certificateCheck that peer CRT hasn't changed during renegotiationnew server cert during renegotiationUse context-specific verification callbackUse configuration-specific verification callbackbad certificate (EC key curve)bad certificate (usage extensions)! Certificate verification flags %xCertificate verification flags clearPerform mbedtls-based computation of digest of ServerKeyExchangeڢ!h4b)Ngt ;"QJy4:C0+ m_7O5mmQE䅵vb^~LB7k \8kZ$|KI(fQ[=|cH6UӚi?$_e]#ܣbV R)pmg 5NJtl!|2^F.6;w,']oLR+X9I|j&rZhGCC: (GNU) 10.2.0zRx 0LD)BBE D(A0! 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zTLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256TLS-PSK-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHATLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHATLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCMTLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCMTLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHATLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHATLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHATLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHATLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHATLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHATLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHATLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHATLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA256TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHATLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHATLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHATLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA256TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHATLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHATLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHATLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHATLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHATLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHATLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHATLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHATLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHATLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384TLS-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256TLS-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384TLS-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256TLS-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHATLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHATLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHATLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHATLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHATLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHATLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-RC4-128-SHATLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHATLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHATLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHAunknownTLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCMTLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCMTLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHATLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHATLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCMTLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCMTLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8TLS-RSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHATLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-MD5TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHATLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHATLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHATLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHATLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CCMTLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CCMTLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8TLS-PSK-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHATLS-PSK-WITH-RC4-128-SHATLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CCMTLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CCMTLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-RC4-128-SHATLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-RC4-128-SHA,0$(k 9}sw]aSIME+/#'g 3|rvE\`RHLD86mqg75lpf=52*.&{yu_cQKO=</1)-%zAxt^bPJN<oinhkejd4 3  ;:9-; .,=> parse hello verify requestbad server versionalloc failed (%d bytes)<= parse hello verify requestshould never happenECDH curve: %sf_rngcertificate key type mismatchmbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt=> write client hellono RNG providedssl_generate_randomclient hello, random bytesclient hello, session idno verify cookie to sendclient hello, cookieadding FALLBACK_SCSVssl_write_hostname_extssl_write_renegotiation_extssl_write_truncated_hmac_extssl_write_extended_ms_extssl_write_alpn_extssl_write_session_ticket_extmbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit<= write client hellonoclient state: %d=> parse server hellombedtls_ssl_read_recordbad server hello messagereceived hello verify request<= parse server helloserver hello, versionserver hello, random bytesserver hello, session idmbedtls_ssl_derive_keys%s session has been resumedfound renegotiation extensionpoint format selected: %dno point format in commonfound alpn extensionnon-matching ALPN extension=> parse server key exchangeserver key not ECDH capablembedtls_ecdh_get_paramsssl_get_ecdh_params_from_certmbedtls_dhm_read_paramsDHM prime too short: %d < %dDHM: P DHM: G DHM: GYServer used HashAlgorithm %dparameters hashmbedtls_pk_verify<= parse server key exchange=> parse certificate requestgot %s certificate request<= parse certificate request=> parse server hello donebad server hello done message<= parse server hello done=> write client key exchangembedtls_dhm_make_publicDHM: X DHM: GXmbedtls_dhm_calc_secretDHM: K mbedtls_ecdh_make_publicmbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret<= write client key exchange=> write certificate verifymbedtls_pk_sign<= write certificate verify=> parse new session ticketticket length: %dticket alloc failed<= parse new session tickethandshake: doneinvalid state %dmbedtls_ecdh_read_params/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/library/ssl_cli.cincoming HelloVerifyRequest message is too shortcookie length does not match incoming message sizebuffer too small for encrypted pmsconfigured max major version is invalid, consider using mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults()client hello, max version: [%d:%d]client hello, current time: %luclient hello, session id len.: %dclient hello, add ciphersuite: %#04x (%s)client hello, got %d ciphersuites (excluding SCSVs)adding EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSVclient hello, compress len.: %dclient hello, compress alg.: %dclient hello, compress alg.: %d %dclient hello, adding server name extension: %sclient hello, adding renegotiation extensionclient hello, adding signature_algorithms extensionlength in bytes of sig-hash-alg extension too bigssl_write_signature_algorithms_extclient hello, adding supported_elliptic_curves extensioninvalid curve in ssl configurationmalformed supported_elliptic_curves extension in configclient hello, adding supported_point_formats extensionssl_write_supported_elliptic_curves_extssl_write_supported_point_formats_extclient hello, adding max_fragment_length extensionssl_write_max_fragment_length_extclient hello, adding truncated_hmac extensionclient hello, adding encrypt_then_mac extensionssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_extclient hello, adding extended_master_secret extensionclient hello, adding alpn extensionclient hello, adding session ticket extensionsending session ticket of length %dclient hello, total extension length: %dmbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msgrenegotiation requested, but not honored by servernon-handshake message during renegotiationserver version out of bounds - min: [%d:%d], server: [%d:%d], max: [%d:%d]server hello, current time: %luserver hello, bad compression: %dciphersuite info for %04x not foundserver hello, session id len.: %dserver hello, chosen ciphersuite: %04xserver hello, compress alg.: %dserver hello, chosen ciphersuite: %sserver hello, total extension length: %dnon-matching renegotiation infonon-zero length renegotiation infofound max_fragment_length extensionnon-matching max fragment length extensionfound truncated_hmac extensionnon-matching truncated HMAC extensionfound encrypt_then_mac extensionnon-matching encrypt-then-MAC extensionfound extended_master_secret extensionnon-matching extended master secret extensionfound session_ticket extensionnon-matching session ticket extensionfound supported_point_formats extensionALPN extension: no matching protocolunknown extension found: %d (ignoring)legacy renegotiation, breaking off handshakerenegotiation_info extension missing (secure)legacy renegotiation not allowedrenegotiation_info extension present (legacy)<= skip parse server key exchangebad server certificate (ECDH curve)bad server key exchange messageserver key exchange message must not be skippedbad server key exchange message (psk_identity_hint length)bad server key exchange message (ECDHE curve)Server used unsupported HashAlgorithm %dserver used unsupported SignatureAlgorithm %dserver used HashAlgorithm %d that was not offeredServer used SignatureAlgorithm %d<= skip parse certificate requestbad certificate request messageSupported Signature Algorithm found: %d,%dpsk identity too long or SSL buffer too shortpsk identity or DHM size too long or SSL buffer too shortmbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster<= skip write certificate verifygot no private key for certificatebad new session ticket messageticket in use, discarding session idxeHmgihmpijljhhj8nhm8m8ne~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~c8~~~~~~~~~~~~record counter limit reached: renegotiate/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/library/ssl_msg.cno transform provided to encrypt_bufbad record structure provided to encrypt_bufbefore encrypt: output payloadRecord content %u too large, maximum %dBuffer provided for encrypted record not large enoughbefore encrypt: msglen = %d, including %d bytes of paddingbefore encrypt: msglen = %d, including 0 bytes of paddingNo PRNG provided to encrypt_record routinebefore encrypt: msglen = %d, including %d bytes of IV and %d bytes of paddingbad record structure provided to decrypt_bufmsglen (%d) < explicit_iv_len (%d) msglen (%d) < max( ivlen(%d), maclen (%d) + 1 ) ( + expl IV )msglen (%d) %% ivlen (%d) != 0update timeout value to %d millisecsBad usage of mbedtls_ssl_set_bio() or mbedtls_ssl_set_bio()message length: %d, out_left: %df_send returned %d bytes but only %lu bytes were sentssl_check_pending: record held back for processingssl_check_pending: more records within current datagramssl_check_pending: more handshake messages within current recordssl_check_pending: application data record is being processedssl_check_pending: nothing pendingbefore compression: msglen = %d, before compression: output payloadfailed to perform compression (%d)after compression: msglen = %d, after compression: output payloadoutput record: msgtype = %d, version = [%d:%d], msglen = %doutgoing message counter would wrapssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagramStill %u bytes available in current datagram=> mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmitinitialise flight transmissionswap epochs to send finished messagefragmenting handshake message (%u > %u)<= mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmitrequesting more data than fitsnext record in same datagram, offset: %dmbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_requestf_recv returned %d bytes but only %lu were requestedhandshake message too short: %dhandshake message: msglen = %d, type = %d, hslen = %dreceived future handshake message of sequence number %u (next %u)received message from last flight, message_seq = %d, start_of_flight = %ddropping out-of-sequence message: message_seq = %d, expected = %dfound fragmented DTLS handshake messageTLS handshake fragmentation not supportedinvalid CCS message, content: %02xdropping ChangeCipherSpec outside handshakereceived out-of-order ChangeCipherSpec - rememberinvalid alert message, len: %dgot an alert message, type: [%d:%d]is a fatal alert message (msg %d)is a SSLv3 no renegotiation alertdropping unexpected ApplicationDataRecord too large: size %u, maximum %uDTLS handshake message too large: size %u, maximum %usend alert level=%u message=%umbedtls_ssl_send_alert_messagembedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payloadfragment larger than the (negotiated) maximum fragment length: %d > %ddatagram of length %u too small to hold DTLS record header of length %uinput record: msgtype = %d, version = [%d:%d], msglen = %dDatagram of length %u too small to contain record of advertised length %u.record from another epoch: expected %d, received %dCCS not seen in the current flightInjecting buffered CCS messageFuture message with sequence number %u %s buffered.Next handshake message has been buffered - loadBuffered handshake message (incl. header)Next handshake message %u not or only partially buffferedBuffered record not from current epoch.Found buffered record from current epoch - loadBuffering of future epoch record of size %u would exceed the compile-time limit %u (already %u bytes buffered) -- ignore possible client reconnect from the same portno cookie callbacks, can't check reconnect validitydiscarding unexpected record (header)discarding invalid record (header)more than one record within datagramrecord type after decrypt (before %d): %dinvalid zero-length message type: %dreceived four consecutive empty messages, possible DoS attackincoming message counter would wrapdiscarding invalid record (mac)before decompression: msglen = %d, before decompression: input payloadfailed to perform decompression (%d)after decompression: msglen = %d, after decompression: input payloadIgnore future HS message with sequence number %u, buffering window %u - %uBuffering HS message with sequence number %u, offset %u Buffering of future message of size %u would exceed the compile-time limit %u (already %u bytes buffered) -- ignore Buffering of future message of size %u would exceed the compile-time limit %u (already %u bytes buffered) -- attempt to make space by freeing buffered future messages Attempt to free buffered messages to have %u bytes availableEnough space available after freeing future epoch recordFree buffering slot %d to make space for reassembly of next handshake messageEnough space available after freeing buffered HS messagesReassembly of next message of size %u (%u with bitmap) would exceed the compile-time limit %u (already %u bytes buffered) -- fail initialize reassembly, total length = %dFragment header mismatch - ignoreadding fragment, offset = %d, length = %dmbedtls_ssl_handle_message_typecookie is valid, resetting contextbad change cipher spec messageswitching to new transform spec for inbound datahandshake received (not HelloRequest)handshake received (not ClientHello)mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiationrefusing renegotiation, sending alertrenegotiation requested, but not honored by clientignoring non-fatal non-closure alertset_timer to %d mstimer expired=> encrypt bufcomputed macmbedtls_cipher_cryptIV used (internal)IV used (transmitted)additional data used for AEADmbedtls_cipher_auth_encryptafter encrypt: tagusing encrypt then macMAC'd meta-data<= encrypt buf=> decrypt bufmsglen (%d) < taglen (%d) IV usedTAG usedmbedtls_cipher_auth_decryptmessage macexpected macmessage mac does not matchmbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac<= decrypt buf=> flush output<= flush outputssl->f_sendskip swap epochs=> write record=> compress bufssl_compress_buf<= compress bufssl_encrypt_bufoutput record sent to networkmbedtls_ssl_flush_output<= write recordmbedtls_ssl_write_record=> mbedtls_ssl_resend<= mbedtls_ssl_resend=> fetch inputin_left: %d, nb_want: %d<= fetch inputtimer has expiredf_recv_timeout: %u msssl->f_recv(_timeout)handshake timeoutmtu autoreduction to %d bytesinvalid handshake headerinvalid CCS message, len: %dis a close notify message=> write handshake message=> ssl_flight_appendmessage appended to flightalloc %d bytes failed<= ssl_flight_append<= write handshake message=> write change cipher spec<= write change cipher spec=> send alert message<= send alert message=> write close notify<= write close notify=> writessl_check_ctr_renegotiatembedtls_ssl_handshake<= writeunknown record type %umajor version mismatchminor version mismatchinput record headerConsider record for bufferingreplayed record=> mbedtls_ssl_check_recordrecord bufferssl_parse_record_headermbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf<= mbedtls_ssl_check_recordfullypartiallynot yet => read recordremaining content in record=> ssl_load_buffered_messsage<= ssl_load_buffered_message=> ssl_load_buffered_record<= ssl_load_buffered_recordmbedtls_ssl_fetch_inputBuffer record from epoch %uBuffered recordssl_check_client_reconnectssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookiesending HelloVerifyRequestresetinput record from networkinput payload after decryptbad message lengthtoo many records with bad MAC=> decompress bufssl_decompress_buf<= decompress bufssl_get_next_record=> ssl_buffer_messageRemember CCS message<= ssl_buffer_messagemessage %scompletereuse previously read message<= read record=> parse change cipher specDTLS epoch would wrap<= parse change cipher spec=> readreceived handshake messagebad application data message<= readbad client key exchange message/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/library/ssl_srv.cclient hello v3, message type: %dclient hello v3, message len.: %dclient hello v3, protocol version: [%d:%d]client hello v3, handshake type: %dclient hello v3, handshake len.: %dbad client hello message_seq: %d (expected %d)ClientHello fragmentation not supportedclient only supports ssl smaller than minimum [%d:%d] < [%d:%d]found signature_algorithms extensionclient hello v3, signature_algorithm ext unknown sig alg encoding %dclient hello v3, signature_algorithm ext: unknown hash alg encoding %dclient hello v3, signature_algorithm ext: match sig %d and hash %dclient hello v3, signature_algorithm ext: hash alg %d not supportedfound supported elliptic curves extensionfound supported point formats extensionfound max fragment length extensionfound truncated hmac extensionfound encrypt then mac extensionfound extended master secret extensionfound session ticket extensionticket rejected: renegotiatingsession successfully restored from ticketreceived TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO received RENEGOTIATION SCSV during renegotiationtrying ciphersuite: %#04x (%s)ciphersuite mismatch: no common elliptic curveciphersuite mismatch: no pre-shared keyciphersuite mismatch: no suitable hash algorithm for signature algorithm %dciphersuite requires certificatecandidate certificate chain, certificatecertificate mismatch: key typecertificate mismatch: (extended) key usage extensioncertificate not preferred: sha-2 with pre-TLS 1.2 clientselected certificate chain, certificateciphersuite mismatch: no suitable certificategot ciphersuites in common, but none of them usableclient hello v3, signature_algorithm ext: %dno hash algorithm for signature algorithm %d - should not happencertificate mismatch: elliptic curveclient hello was not authenticatedserver hello, chosen version: [%d:%d]session successfully restored from cacheserver hello, compress alg.: 0x%02Xserver hello, secure renegotiation extensionserver hello, max_fragment_length extensionserver hello, adding truncated hmac extensionserver hello, adding encrypt then mac extensionserver hello, adding extended master secret extensionserver hello, adding session ticket extensionserver hello, supported_point_formats extensionserver hello, adding alpn extension<= skip write server key exchangepick hash algorithm %d for signing<= write server key exchange (pending)<= skip write certificate requestskipping CAs: buffer too shortssl_parse_parse_encrypted_pms_secret<= skip parse certificate verifybad certificate verify messagepeer not adhering to requested sig_alg for verify messagesig_alg doesn't match cert keymbedtls_dhm_read_public=> parse client hellobad client hello messagereplayed record, discardingrecord contentsclient hello, versioncookie verification failedcookie verification passedcookie verification skippedclient hello, ciphersuitelistclient hello, compressionclient hello extensionsfound ServerName extensionparse ServerName extensionssl_sni_wrapperticket is not authenticticket is expiredmbedtls_ssl_ticket_parsereceived FALLBACK_SCSVinapropriate fallbackciphersuite mismatch: versionciphersuite mismatch: rc4server has no certificateselected ciphersuite: %sgot no ciphersuites in common<= parse client hellogot no pre-shared keyUnknown PSK identitygot no RSA private keyserver state: %d=> write server hello<= write server hello=> write hello verify requestinconsistent cookie callbacksf_cookie_writecookie sent<= write hello verify request=> write server key exchangeno DH parameters setmbedtls_dhm_set_groupmbedtls_dhm_make_paramsno matching curve for ECDHEECDHE curve: %smbedtls_ecp_group_loadmbedtls_ecdh_make_paramsgot no private keymy signature<= write server key exchange=> write certificate requestrequested DN<= write certificate request=> write server hello done<= write server hello done=> parse client key exchangessl_parse_client_dh_publicbad client key exchangembedtls_ecdh_read_publicssl_parse_client_psk_identityssl_parse_encrypted_pms<= parse client key exchange=> parse certificate verify<= parse certificate verify=> write new session ticketmbedtls_ssl_ticket_write<= write new session ticket8X  XXclient finishedserver finished=> calc finished tls sha256finished sha2 statecalc finished result<= calc finished=> calc verify sha256calculated verify result<= calc verify=> calc finished tls sha384finished sha512 state=> calc verify sha384=> calc finished tlsfinished md5 statefinished sha1 state=> calc verify tlscipher info for %d not foundkey expansionprfciphersuite = %skey blockmbedtls_md_setupmbedtls_cipher_setupmbedtls_cipher_setkeyInitializing zlib states1.2.11=> write hello request<= write hello requestextended master secret=> derive keysssl_set_handshake_prfspremaster secretssl_populate_transformAllocating compression bufferalloc(%d bytes) failed<= derive keysssl_compute_master=> write certificate<= skip write certificategot no certificate to sendown certificate<= write certificate=> write finished<= write finished=> parse finishedbad finished message<= parse finishedunknown (DTLS)SSLv3.0DTLSv1.0DTLSv1.2TLSv1.1=> handshake<= handshake=> handshake wrapupcache did not store session<= handshake wrapup=> free<= freecontext to loadInitial handshake isn't overHandshake isn't completedOnly DTLS is supportedOnly version 1.2 supportedsaved context=> renegotiate<= renegotiate++=> parse certificate<= skip parse certificatebad certificate messagepeer certificate<= parse certificatex509_verify_certgot no CA chain mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_dermbedtls_md5_starts_retmbedtls_md5_update_retmbedtls_md5_finish_retmbedtls_sha1_starts_retmbedtls_sha1_update_retmbedtls_sha1_finish_retmbedtls_md_startsmbedtls_md_updatembedtls_md_finish/tmp/build/tmp-mbedtls/mbedtls-2.25.0/library/ssl_tls.cciphersuite info for %d not foundmbedtls_md info for %d not foundkeylen: %u, minlen: %u, ivlen: %u, maclen: %umbedtls_cipher_set_padding_modeFailed to initialize compressionno premaster (session resumed)session hash for extended master secretno longer retransmitting hello requestcertificate too large, %d > %dswitching to new transform spec for outbound dataMTU too low for record expansionYou must use mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb() for DTLS=> handshake wrapup: final free<= handshake wrapup: final freeskip freeing handshake and transformalloc() of ssl sub-contexts failedSerialised structures aren't readyThere is pending incoming dataThere is pending outgoing dataOnly AEAD ciphersuites supportedRenegotiation must not be enabledTLSv1 client has no certificateCheck that peer CRT hasn't changed during renegotiationnew server cert during renegotiationUse context-specific verification callbackUse configuration-specific verification callbackbad certificate (EC key curve)bad certificate (usage extensions)! 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&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&OOOOOn>n>n>n>n>n>>>>>>>))))))))))))))))))RRRRRRRRRRmbedtls_test_cas_pem_lenmbedtls_test_cas_pemmbedtls_test_cas_der_lenmbedtls_test_cas_dermbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_dermbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_dermbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_dermbedtls_test_cas_lenmbedtls_test_casmbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ecmbedtls_test_cli_crt_lenmbedtls_test_cli_pwd_lenmbedtls_test_cli_key_lenmbedtls_test_srv_crt_lenmbedtls_test_srv_pwd_lenmbedtls_test_srv_key_lenmbedtls_test_ca_crt_lenmbedtls_test_ca_pwd_lenmbedtls_test_ca_key_lenmbedtls_test_cli_crtmbedtls_test_cli_pwdmbedtls_test_cli_keymbedtls_test_srv_crtmbedtls_test_srv_pwdmbedtls_test_srv_keymbedtls_test_ca_crtmbedtls_test_ca_pwdmbedtls_test_ca_keymbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_lenmbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_lenmbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsambedtls_test_ca_crt_rsambedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_lenmbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec_lenmbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_lenmbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_lenmbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa_lenmbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_lenmbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_lenmbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_lenmbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_lenmbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_lenmbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_lenmbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_lenmbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_lenmbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_lenmbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_lenmbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_lenmbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_lenmbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_lenmbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_lenmbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_lenmbedtls_test_cli_crt_ecmbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ecmbedtls_test_cli_key_ecmbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsambedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsambedtls_test_cli_key_rsambedtls_test_srv_crt_ecmbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ecmbedtls_test_srv_key_ecmbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsambedtls_test_srv_key_rsambedtls_test_ca_pwd_ecmbedtls_test_ca_key_ecmbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsambedtls_test_ca_key_rsambedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_der_lenmbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_der_lenmbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_der_lenmbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_der_lenmbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_pem_lenmbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa_pem_lenmbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_pem_lenmbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec_pem_lenmbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_pem_lenmbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_pem_lenmbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_dermbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_dermbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_dermbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_dermbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_pemmbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa_pemmbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_pemmbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec_pemmbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_pemmbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_pemmbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_der_lenmbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_der_lenmbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_der_lenmbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_der_lenmbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_der_lenmbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_der_lenmbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_der_lenmbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_pem_lenmbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_pem_lenmbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_pem_lenmbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_pem_lenmbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_pem_lenmbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_pem_lenmbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_pem_lenmbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_dermbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_dermbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_dermbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_dermbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_dermbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_pemmbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_pemmbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_pemmbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_pemmbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_pemmbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_pemmbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_pemmbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_der_lenmbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_der_lenmbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_der_lenmbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_der_lenmbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_der_lenmbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_der_lenmbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_der_lenmbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_pem_lenmbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_pem_lenmbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_pem_lenmbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_pem_lenmbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_pem_lenmbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_pem_lenmbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_pem_lenmbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_dermbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_dermbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_pemmbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_pemmbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_pemmbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_pemmbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_pemmbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_pemmbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_pemmbedtls_x509_get_serialmbedtls_x509_get_alg_nullmbedtls_x509_get_algmbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_paramsmbedtls_x509_get_namembedtls_x509_get_timembedtls_x509_get_sigmbedtls_x509_get_sig_algmbedtls_x509_get_extmbedtls_x509_dn_getsmbedtls_x509_serial_getsmbedtls_x509_sig_alg_getsmbedtls_x509_key_size_helpermbedtls_x509_time_is_pastmbedtls_x509_time_is_futurembedtls_x509_self_testmbedtls_x509_string_to_namesmbedtls_x509_set_extensionmbedtls_x509_write_namesmbedtls_x509_write_sigmbedtls_x509_write_extensionsmbedtls_x509_crl_infombedtls_x509_crl_initmbedtls_x509_crl_freembedtls_x509_crl_parse_dermbedtls_x509_crl_parsembedtls_x509_crl_parse_filembedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_namembedtls_x509_crt_infombedtls_x509_crt_verify_infombedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usagembedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usagembedtls_x509_crt_is_revokedmbedtls_x509_crt_verifymbedtls_x509_crt_profile_defaultmbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profilembedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartablembedtls_x509_crt_initmbedtls_x509_crt_freembedtls_x509_crt_parse_dermbedtls_x509_crt_parsembedtls_x509_crt_parse_filembedtls_x509_crt_parse_pathmbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopymbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cbmbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suitebmbedtls_x509_crt_profile_nextmbedtls_x509_csr_infombedtls_x509_csr_initmbedtls_x509_csr_freembedtls_x509_csr_parse_dermbedtls_x509_csr_parsembedtls_x509_csr_parse_filembedtls_x509write_crt_initmbedtls_x509write_crt_freembedtls_x509write_crt_set_versionmbedtls_x509write_crt_set_md_algmbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_keymbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_keymbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_namembedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_namembedtls_x509write_crt_set_serialmbedtls_x509write_crt_set_validitymbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extensionmbedtls_x509write_crt_set_basic_constraintsmbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key_identifiermbedtls_x509write_crt_set_authority_key_identifiermbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_usagembedtls_x509write_crt_set_ns_cert_typembedtls_x509write_crt_dermbedtls_x509write_crt_pemmbedtls_x509write_csr_initmbedtls_x509write_csr_freembedtls_x509write_csr_set_md_algmbedtls_x509write_csr_set_keymbedtls_x509write_csr_set_subject_namembedtls_x509write_csr_set_extensionmbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key_usagembedtls_x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_typembedtls_x509write_csr_dermbedtls_x509write_csr_pem// 38 ` x509write_crt.c.o/ x509write_csr.c.o/ certs.c.o/ 1610128460 0 0 100644 63976 ` ELF>h@@ w -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIDQTCCAimgAwIBAgIBAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN MTkwMjEwMTQ0NDAwWhcNMjkwMjEwMTQ0NDAwWjA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwggEiMA0G CSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDA3zf8F7vglp0/ht6WMn1EpRagzSHx mdTs6st8GFgIlKXsm8WL3xoemTiZhx57wI053zhdcHgH057Zk+i5clHFzqMwUqny 50BwFMtEonILwuVA+T7lpg6z+exKY8C4KQB0nFc7qKUEkHHxvYPZP9al4jwqj+8n YMPGn8u67GB9t+aEMr5P+1gmIgNb1LTV+/Xjli5wwOQuvfwu7uJBVcA0Ln0kcmnL R7EUQIN9Z/SG9jGr8XmksrUuEvmEF/Bibyc+E1ixVA0hmnM3oTDPb5Lc9un8rNsu KNF+AksjoBXyOGVkCeoMbo4bF6BxyLObyavpw/LPh5aPgAIynplYb6LVAgMBAAGj UDBOMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wHQYDVR0OBBYEFLRa5KWz3tJS9rnVppUP6z68x/3/ MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFLRa5KWz3tJS9rnVppUP6z68x/3/MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUA A4IBAQA4qFSCth2q22uJIdE4KGHJsJjVEfw2/xn+MkTvCMfxVrvmRvqCtjE4tKDl 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BxJNe1GZH3pW6SAvGDQpl9sG7uu/vTFP+lCxukmzxB0DrrDcvorEkKMom7ZCCRvW KZsZ6YeH2Z81BauRj218kQKBgQCUV/DgKP2985xDTT79N08jUo3hTP5MVYCCuj/+ UeEw1TvZcx3LJby7P6Xad6a1/BqveaGyFKIfEFIaBUBItk801sDDpDaYc4gL00Xc 7lFuBHOZkxJYlss5QrGpuOEl9ZwUt5IrFLBdYaKqNHzNVC1pCPfb/JyH6Dr2HUxq gxUwAQKBgQCcU6G2L8AG9d9c0UpOyL1tMvFe5Ttw0KjlQVdsh1MP6yigYo9DYuwu bHFVW2r0dBTqegP2/KTOxKzaHfC1qf0RGDsUoJCNJrd1cwoCLG8P2EF4w3OBrKqv 8u4ytY0F+Vlanj5lm3TaoHSVF1+NWPyOTiwevIECGKwSxvlki4fDAA== -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIICHzCCAaWgAwIBAgIBCTAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjA+MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G A1UEChMIUG9sYXJTU0wxHDAaBgNVBAMTE1BvbGFyc3NsIFRlc3QgRUMgQ0EwHhcN MTMwOTI0MTU1MjA0WhcNMjMwOTIyMTU1MjA0WjA0MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G A1UEChMIUG9sYXJTU0wxEjAQBgNVBAMTCWxvY2FsaG9zdDBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEG CCqGSM49AwEHA0IABDfMVtl2CR5acj7HWS3/IG7ufPkGkXTQrRS192giWWKSTuUA 2CMR/+ov0jRdXRa9iojCa3cNVc2KKg76Aci07f+jgZ0wgZowCQYDVR0TBAIwADAd BgNVHQ4EFgQUUGGlj9QH2deCAQzlZX+MY0anE74wbgYDVR0jBGcwZYAUnW0gJEkB 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MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEAwU2j3efNHdEE10lyuJmsDnjkOjxKzzoTFtBa5M2jAIin7h5r lqdStJDvLXJ6PiSa/LY0rCT1d+AmZIycsCh9odrqjObJHJa8/sEEUrM21KP64bF2 2JDBYbRmUjaiJlOqq3ReB30Zgtsq2B+g2Q0cLUlm91slc0boC4pPaQy1AJDh2oIQ Zn2uVCuLZXmRoeJhw81ASQjuaAzxi4bSRr/QuKoRAx5/VqgaHkQYDw+Fi9qLRF7i GMZiL8dmjfpd2H3zJ4kpAcWQDj8n8TDISg7v1t7HxydrxwU9esQCPJodPg/oNJhb y3NLUpbYEaIsgIhpOVrTD7DeWS8Rx/fqEgEwlwIDAQABAoIBAQCXR0S8EIHFGORZ ++AtOg6eENxD+xVs0f1IeGz57Tjo3QnXX7VBZNdj+p1ECvhCE/G7XnkgU5hLZX+G Z0jkz/tqJOI0vRSdLBbipHnWouyBQ4e/A1yIJdlBtqXxJ1KE/ituHRbNc4j4kL8Z /r6pvwnTI0PSx2Eqs048YdS92LT6qAv4flbNDxMn2uY7s4ycS4Q8w1JXnCeaAnYm WYI5wxO+bvRELR2Mcz5DmVnL8jRyml6l6582bSv5oufReFIbyPZbQWlXgYnpu6He GTc7E1zKYQGG/9+DQUl/1vQuCPqQwny0tQoX2w5tdYpdMdVm+zkLtbajzdTviJJa TWzL6lt5AoGBAN86+SVeJDcmQJcv4Eq6UhtRr4QGMiQMz0Sod6ettYxYzMgxtw28 CIrgpozCc+UaZJLo7UxvC6an85r1b2nKPCLQFaggJ0H4Q0J/sZOhBIXaoBzWxveK nupceKdVxGsFi8CDy86DBfiyFivfBj+47BbaQzPBj7C4rK7UlLjab2rDAoGBAN2u AM2gchoFiu4v1HFL8D7lweEpi6ZnMJjnEu/dEgGQJFjwdpLnPbsj4c75odQ4Gz8g sw9lao9VVzbusoRE/JGI4aTdO0pATXyG7eG1Qu+5Yc1YGXcCrliA2xM9xx+d7f+s mPzN+WIEg5GJDYZDjAzHG5BNvi/FfM1C9dOtjv2dAoGAF0t5KmwbjWHBhcVqO4Ic BVvN3BIlc1ue2YRXEDlxY5b0r8N4XceMgKmW18OHApZxfl8uPDauWZLXOgl4uepv whZC3EuWrSyyICNhLY21Ah7hbIEBPF3L3ZsOwC+UErL+dXWLdB56Jgy3gZaBeW7b vDrEnocJbqCm7IukhXHOBK8CgYEAwqdHB0hqyNSzIOGY7v9abzB6pUdA3BZiQvEs 3LjHVd4HPJ2x0N8CgrBIWOE0q8+0hSMmeE96WW/7jD3fPWwCR5zlXknxBQsfv0gP 3BC5PR0Qdypz+d+9zfMf625kyit4T/hzwhDveZUzHnk1Cf+IG7Q+TOEnLnWAWBED ISOWmrUCgYAFEmRxgwAc/u+D6t0syCwAYh6POtscq9Y0i9GyWk89NzgC4NdwwbBH 4AgahOxIxXx2gxJnq3yfkJfIjwf0s2DyP0kY2y6Ua1OeomPeY9mrIS4tCuDQ6LrE TB6l9VGoxJL4fyHnZb8L5gGvnB1bbD8cL6YPaDiOhcRseC9vBiEuVg== -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIICBDCCAYigAwIBAgIJAMFD4n5iQ8zoMAwGCCqGSM49BAMCBQAwPjELMAkGA1UE BhMCTkwxETAPBgNVBAoMCFBvbGFyU1NMMRwwGgYDVQQDDBNQb2xhcnNzbCBUZXN0 IEVDIENBMB4XDTE5MDIxMDE0NDQwMFoXDTI5MDIxMDE0NDQwMFowPjELMAkGA1UE BhMCTkwxETAPBgNVBAoMCFBvbGFyU1NMMRwwGgYDVQQDDBNQb2xhcnNzbCBUZXN0 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NWqiX9GyusBZjezaCaHabjDLU0qQ -----END CERTIFICATE----- -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIDQTCCAimgAwIBAgIBAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN MTkwMjEwMTQ0NDAwWhcNMjkwMjEwMTQ0NDAwWjA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwggEiMA0G CSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDA3zf8F7vglp0/ht6WMn1EpRagzSHx mdTs6st8GFgIlKXsm8WL3xoemTiZhx57wI053zhdcHgH057Zk+i5clHFzqMwUqny 50BwFMtEonILwuVA+T7lpg6z+exKY8C4KQB0nFc7qKUEkHHxvYPZP9al4jwqj+8n YMPGn8u67GB9t+aEMr5P+1gmIgNb1LTV+/Xjli5wwOQuvfwu7uJBVcA0Ln0kcmnL R7EUQIN9Z/SG9jGr8XmksrUuEvmEF/Bibyc+E1ixVA0hmnM3oTDPb5Lc9un8rNsu KNF+AksjoBXyOGVkCeoMbo4bF6BxyLObyavpw/LPh5aPgAIynplYb6LVAgMBAAGj UDBOMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wHQYDVR0OBBYEFLRa5KWz3tJS9rnVppUP6z68x/3/ MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFLRa5KWz3tJS9rnVppUP6z68x/3/MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUA A4IBAQA4qFSCth2q22uJIdE4KGHJsJjVEfw2/xn+MkTvCMfxVrvmRvqCtjE4tKDl oK4MxFOek07oDZwvtAT9ijn1hHftTNS7RH9zd/fxNpfcHnMZXVC4w4DNA1fSANtW 5sY1JB5Je9jScrsLSS+mAjyv0Ow3Hb2Bix8wu7xNNrV5fIf7Ubm+wt6SqEBxu3Kb +EfObAT4huf3czznhH3C17ed6NSbXwoXfby7stWUDeRJv08RaFOykf/Aae7bY5PL yTVrkAnikMntJ9YI+hNNYt3inqq11A5cN0+rVTst8UKCxzQ4GpvroSwPKTFkbMw4 /anT1dVxr/BtwJfiESoK3/4CeXR1 -----END CERTIFICATE----- PolarSSLTest-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED DEK-Info: DES-EDE3-CBC,A8A95B05D5B7206B 9Qd9GeArejl1GDVh2lLV1bHt0cPtfbh5h/5zVpAVaFpqtSPMrElp50Rntn9et+JA 7VOyboR+Iy2t/HU4WvA687k3Bppe9GwKHjHhtl//8xFKwZr3Xb5yO5JUP8AUctQq Nb8CLlZyuUC+52REAAthdWgsX+7dJO4yabzUcQ22Tp9JSD0hiL43BlkWYUNK3dAo PZlmiptjnzVTjg1MxsBSydZinWOLBV8/JQgxSPo2yD4uEfig28qbvQ2wNIn0pnAb GxnSAOazkongEGfvcjIIs+LZN9gXFhxcOh6kc4Q/c99B7QWETwLLkYgZ+z1a9VY9 gEU7CwCxYCD+h9hY6FPmsK0/lC4O7aeRKpYq00rPPxs6i7phiexg6ax6yTMmArQq QmK3TAsJm8V/J5AWpLEV6jAFgRGymGGHnof0DXzVWZidrcZJWTNuGEX90nB3ee2w PXJEFWKoD3K3aFcSLdHYr3mLGxP7H9ThQai9VsycxZKS5kwvBKQ//YMrmFfwPk8x vTeY4KZMaUrveEel5tWZC94RSMKgxR6cyE1nBXyTQnDOGbfpNNgBKxyKbINWoOJU WJZAwlsQn+QzCDwpri7+sV1mS3gBE6UY7aQmnmiiaC2V3Hbphxct/en5QsfDOt1X JczSfpRWLlbPznZg8OQh/VgCMA58N5DjOzTIK7sJJ5r+94ZBTCpgAMbF588f0NTR KCe4yrxGJR7X02M4nvD4IwOlpsQ8xQxZtOSgXv4LkxvdU9XJJKWZ/XNKJeWztxSe Z1vdTc2YfsDBA2SEv33vxHx2g1vqtw8SjDRT2RaQSS0QuSaMJimdOX6mTOCBKk1J 9Q5mXTrER+/LnK0jEmXsBXWA5bqqVZIyahXSx4VYZ7l7w/PHiUDtDgyRhMMKi4n2 iQvQcWSQTjrpnlJbca1/DkpRt3YwrvJwdqb8asZU2VrNETh5x0QVefDRLFiVpif/ tUaeAe/P1F8OkS7OIZDs1SUbv/sD2vMbhNkUoCms3/PvNtdnvgL4F0zhaDpKCmlT P8vx49E7v5CyRNmED9zZg4o3wmMqrQO93PtTug3Eu9oVx1zPQM1NVMyBa2+f29DL 1nuTCeXdo9+ni45xx+jAI4DCwrRdhJ9uzZyC6962H37H6D+5naNvClFR1s6li1Gb nqPoiy/OBsEx9CaDGcqQBp5Wme/3XW+6z1ISOx+igwNTVCT14mHdBMbya0eIKft5 X+GnwtgEMyCYyyWuUct8g4RzErcY9+yW9Om5Hzpx4zOuW4NPZgPDTgK+t2RSL/Yq rE1njrgeGYcVeG3f+OftH4s6fPbq7t1A5ZgUscbLMBqr9tK+OqygR4EgKBPsH6Cz L6zlv/2RV0qAHvVuDJcIDIgwY5rJtINEm32rhOeFNJwZS5MNIC1czXZx5//ugX7l I4sy5nbVhwSjtAk8Xg5dZbdTZ6mIrb7xqH+fdakZor1khG7bC2uIwibD3cSl2XkR wN48lslbHnqqagr6Xm1nNOSVl8C/6kbJEsMpLhAezfRtGwvOucoaE+WbeUNolGde P/eQiddSf0brnpiLJRh7qZrl9XuqYdpUqnoEdMAfotDOID8OtV7gt8a48ad8VPW2 -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- Cy0?0'0  *H  0;1 0 UNL10U PolarSSL10U PolarSSL Test CA0 190210144406Z 290210144406Z0<1 0 UNL10U PolarSSL10U PolarSSL Client 20"0  *H 0 t̹yE`}k3 0  *H  ^'o).Pb)a]7 ډũ irN~td49d\aME<IGM\bV/3F"weXtO' gc-{ٍ'"6ƸK?5AIO}?Gh3DY 2Y_n" ybK\4in;@U$>%pt+‚ 8w&ʟuweq5OC0-?Fa0A27co0t̹yE`}k3 l^k)^jҥrŞk7^Kwg0Ah@Ӝ*"x)d[/xdJk>PzYU/缗"ͤˊeEz)Мab1k3-e(6nT =Q,BR:rtM{QzV /4)뿽1OPIܾĐ(B )采ٟ5m|W(CM>7O#RLLU?Q0;s%?wyR@HO4ä6s EQnsX9B%+]a4|T-i:Lj0S/\JNȽm2^;pШAWlS(bCb.lqU[jtzĬ;&us ,oAxs2YZ>etڠt_XN,d0w dgdNM"z8d2a* *H=DBW宱sӬSUS4.c% ߘ\`6pKEl\p00c 0 *H=0>1 0 UNL10U PolarSSL10U PolarSSL Test EC CA0 190210144400Z 290210144400Z0A1 0 UNL10U PolarSSL10U PolarSSL Test Client 20Y0*H=*H=BW宱sӬSUS4.c% ߘ\`6pKEl\pǣM0K0 U00Uz_d];;&?0U#0m $I?+x~$6|0 *H=h0e1ʦ{2WTC?PJmQb3(9_Β$%h q."05r={m:3i_2r@z:ec覸d9#kd-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIDPzCCAiegAwIBAgIBBDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN MTkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WhcNMjkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WjA8MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGjAYBgNVBAMMEVBvbGFyU1NMIENsaWVudCAyMIIBIjAN BgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAyHTEzLn5tXnpRdkUYLB9u5Pyax6f M60Nj4o8VmXl3ETZzGaFB9X4J7BKNdBjngpuG7fa8H6r7gwQk4ZJGDTzqCrSV/Uu 1C93KYRhTYJQj6eVSHD1bk2y1RPD0hrt5kPqQhTrdOrA7R/UV06p86jt0uDBMHEw MjDV0/YI0FZPRo7yX/k9Z5GIMC5Cst99++UMd//sMcB4j7/Cf8qtbCHWjdmLao5v 4Jv4EFbMs44TFeY0BGbH7vk2DmqV9gmaBmf0ZXH4yqSxJeD+PIs1BGe64E92hfx/ /DZrtenNLQNiTrM9AM+vdqBpVoNq0qjU51Bx5rU2BXcFbXvI5MT9TNUhXwIDAQAB o00wSzAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMB0GA1UdDgQWBBRxoQBzckAvVHZeM/xSj7zx3WtGITAf BgNVHSMEGDAWgBS0WuSls97SUva51aaVD+s+vMf9/zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOC AQEAXidv1d4pLlBiKWED95rMycBdgDcgyNqJxakFkRfRyA2y1mlyTn7uBXRkNLY5 ZFzK82GCjk2Q2OD4RZSCPAJJqLpHHU34t71ciffvy2KK81YvrxczRhMAE64i+qna yP3Td2XuWJR05PVPoSemsNELs9gWttdnYy3ce+EY2Y0n7Rsi7982EeLIAA7H6ca4 2Es/NUH//JZJT32OP0doMxeDRA+vplkKqTLLWf7dX26LIriBkBaRCgR5Yv9LBPFc 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-----END EC PRIVATE KEY----- -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIB3zCCAWOgAwIBAgIBDTAMBggqhkjOPQQDAgUAMD4xCzAJBgNVBAYTAk5MMREw DwYDVQQKDAhQb2xhclNTTDEcMBoGA1UEAwwTUG9sYXJTU0wgVGVzdCBFQyBDQTAe Fw0xOTAyMTAxNDQ0MDBaFw0yOTAyMTAxNDQ0MDBaMEExCzAJBgNVBAYTAk5MMREw DwYDVQQKDAhQb2xhclNTTDEfMB0GA1UEAwwWUG9sYXJTU0wgVGVzdCBDbGllbnQg MjBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABFflrrFz39Osu5O4gf8Sru7mU6zO VVP2NA7MLuNjJQvfmOLzXGA2lsDVGBRw5X+f1UtFGOWwbNVc+JaPh3Cj5MejTTBL MAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwHQYDVR0OBBYEFHoAX4Zk/OBd5REQO7LmO8QmP8/iMB8GA1Ud IwQYMBaAFJ1tICRJAT8ry3i1Gbx+JMnb+zZ8MAwGCCqGSM49BAMCBQADaAAwZQIx AMqme4DKMldUlplDET9Q6Eptre7uUWKhsLOF+zPkKDlfzpIkJYEFgcloDHGYw80u IgIwNftyPXsabTqMM7iEHgVpX/GRozKklY9yQI/5eoA6gGW7Y+imuGR/oao5ySOb a9Vk -----END CERTIFICATE----- ;;y#-0700  *H  0;1 0 UNL10U PolarSSL10U PolarSSL Test CA0 190210144406Z 290210144406Z041 0 UNL10U PolarSSL10U localhost0"0  *H 0 MIrx:$4$w&d(}R6ԣvؐafR6&St^}* -If[%sF Oi ڂf}T+eya@Ih FиVDڋD^b/f]}')Ő?'0J'k=z<>4[sKR,i9ZY/0M0K0 U00Ud`PM`dMC0U#0Z䥳Rզ>0  *H  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CERTIFICATE----- MIIDNzCCAh+gAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN MTkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WhcNMjkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WjA0MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxEjAQBgNVBAMMCWxvY2FsaG9zdDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcN AQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMFNo93nzR3RBNdJcriZrA545Do8Ss86ExbQWuTN owCIp+4ea5anUrSQ7y1yej4kmvy2NKwk9XfgJmSMnLAofaHa6ozmyRyWvP7BBFKz NtSj+uGxdtiQwWG0ZlI2oiZTqqt0Xgd9GYLbKtgfoNkNHC1JZvdbJXNG6AuKT2kM tQCQ4dqCEGZ9rlQri2V5kaHiYcPNQEkI7mgM8YuG0ka/0LiqEQMef1aoGh5EGA8P hYvai0Re4hjGYi/HZo36Xdh98yeJKQHFkA4/J/EwyEoO79bex8cna8cFPXrEAjya HT4P6DSYW8tzS1KW2BGiLICIaTla0w+w3lkvEcf36hIBMJcCAwEAAaNNMEswCQYD VR0TBAIwADAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUpQXoZLjc32APUBJNYKhkr02LQ5MwHwYDVR0jBBgw FoAUtFrkpbPe0lL2udWmlQ/rPrzH/f8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAC465FJh Pqel7zJngHIHJrqj/wVAxGAFOTF396XKATGAp+HRCqJ81Ry60CNK1jDzk8dv6M6U HoS7RIFiM/9rXQCbJfiPD5xMTejZp5n5UYHAmxsxDaazfA5FuBhkfokKK6jD4Eq9 1C94xGKb6X4/VkaPF7cqoBBw/bHxawXc0UEPjqayiBpCYU/rJoVZgLqFVP7Px3sv 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fՑ|֏Kv+h0plN5>X !8ĻEo[NXk55iH Qk]KCH,\1I M }+"ħ>fW,>tvot21t"¨C# Ddgҏi)%Pu)>kYGն_cD?:OMFTt g؉eLX*G7U9Ou:Ef|e#k^flo8.iqk"r :pKޫ/Q*uX@'p1H !4LW!+ͧ v"5D?%)}y1첿4;xZ3>⁂5cčLwq[mx,yJyp4Vqh3E0;ҟ*8sxuKˆJIfJf<W3_u]4er"AОi8tpCPmsȧĝ] ՟yT·l=}-xZ3* mbBнJ ԩ޿,čye"ӷIlM"`:8l4|@xS#ꠚ`ȏ) K13[[WsHz刑*KЋ>w/G~Q eއ $ү(; I h@Ã484 Am\B29i>a6Gm.*4d0N&A6S|9BP(2m78 "͕MoCe/ i 00qW38]m)vEׇo#D d{v煕tѤ^+"db+4A7X/V)CKNnWS39XR9 #_$bH),-ˆRj!ݸnXiA)ô_uGo)UiS; f`300 C~bC0 *H=0>1 0 UNL10U PolarSSL10U Polarssl Test EC CA0 190210144400Z 290210144400Z0>1 0 UNL10U PolarSSL10U Polarssl Test EC CA0v0*H=+"b+4A7X/V)CKNnWS39XR9 #_$bH),-ˆRj!ݸnXiA)ô_uGo)UiS; f`3P0N0 U00Um $I?+x~$6|0U#0m $I?+x~$6|0 *H=h0e0Qʮ0ptZ,w♏}&Eӊh?MT1O;)({Gx 1Y0^?9T{`[Q.eB-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIDQTCCAimgAwIBAgIBAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN MTkwMjEwMTQ0NDAwWhcNMjkwMjEwMTQ0NDAwWjA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwggEiMA0G 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4,ENCRYPTED DEK-Info: DES-EDE3-CBC,307EAB469933D64E IxbrRmKcAzctJqPdTQLA4SWyBYYGYJVkYEna+F7Pa5t5Yg/gKADrFKcm6B72e7DG ihExtZI648s0zdYw6qSJ74vrPSuWDe5qm93BqsfVH9svtCzWHW0pm1p0KTBCFfUq UsuWTITwJImcnlAs1gaRZ3sAWm7cOUidL0fo2G0fYUFNcYoCSLffCFTEHBuPnagb a77x/sY1Bvii8S9/XhDTb6pTMx06wzrm -----END EC PRIVATE KEY----- -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIICBDCCAYigAwIBAgIJAMFD4n5iQ8zoMAwGCCqGSM49BAMCBQAwPjELMAkGA1UE BhMCTkwxETAPBgNVBAoMCFBvbGFyU1NMMRwwGgYDVQQDDBNQb2xhcnNzbCBUZXN0 IEVDIENBMB4XDTE5MDIxMDE0NDQwMFoXDTI5MDIxMDE0NDQwMFowPjELMAkGA1UE BhMCTkwxETAPBgNVBAoMCFBvbGFyU1NMMRwwGgYDVQQDDBNQb2xhcnNzbCBUZXN0 IEVDIENBMHYwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEACIDYgAEw9orNEE3WC+HVv78ibopQ0tO 4G7DDldTMzlY1FK0kZU5CyPfXxckYkj8GpUpziwth8KIUoCv1mqrId240xxuWLjK 6LJpjvNBrSnDtF91p0dv1RkpVWmaUzsgtGYWYDMeo1AwTjAMBgNVHRMEBTADAQH/ MB0GA1UdDgQWBBSdbSAkSQE/K8t4tRm8fiTJ2/s2fDAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBSdbSAk SQE/K8t4tRm8fiTJ2/s2fDAMBggqhkjOPQQDAgUAA2gAMGUCMFHKrjAPpHB0BN1a LH8TwcJ3vh0AxeKZj30mRdOKBmg/jLS3rU3g8VQBHpn8sOTTBwIxANxPO5AerimZ 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HD$8DT$DETPH\$0H#TH\$0H#C|$Ld$HnD$(ALD$@HD$ M4fDI$L(ÅEtA|$8~&E$ELIc$~T$+T$H9PHHD$HU(Hu0LH|$HD$I$hTHHT$^TPM1HX@HLL$ HT$_AXEtKtGM$`MH|$ |$(D$(L`E1I$8I$ n|$t'HLT$Eu |$7HL$8D$@u D$@I$hH|$0HtL$@HL$8D$@HD$PHDl$XII$Hl$(l$DLd$ MIHAt$0hI|$hHSH|$ A$OHL$0#A$HL$0#AIT$ It$(LHI\H|$0LM$xI$LA EL\$HT$EL\$MA$I$A$DASHT$RLZYI$I$A EEH|$(LAEEM$Mz l$@Ld$ Dl$XHD$8\$@Dl$DLHHD$8D$D$X#H|$ t M$`MLd$ \$@k\$@Ld$ DHHwH|$HkLeH\$H@H`HL;cuHsH}Lu֋D$\ $$Dt$L|$`H\$pL$EfLILd$hAFAHD$pMt I4$H$HىAՅD$pA IuHD$`8%Hh[]A\A]A^A_ÉLd$ Dl$X D$@sLd$HiA$/I}HL$xHT$p5 IEHHL$xHT$pIHAEIMIUH$I9L9L9V0HHLL$0HLL$LMH$0H$H9U DE 0HLLu\H$0H$H$CLt$(H\$ALt$(H\$ALt$(H\$ALt$(DEJ$Au[HD$HtQLD$PHT$XILH|$ Ѕ$H\$AkIELt$(tF$AA%`0HLLIdžAu/H;$MHLLAtDtEEOPLHLAuAt AdžH;$IHLAuH;$RA=AIEH9H\$AIAHLm HLHuIdžAAA%EAB$+H$!ILLAuI H\$A]ff.fHtHtE1E1fDf.AWAVAUATUSHHHHHIIH|H5HHIaD$E1H\$ Ll$D$HHHE1AUHE1HH5ZYta==D$EHHD[]A\A]A^A_@HHLHL[]A\A]A^A_@HT$(Ht$ LL+t$Hl$H߉D$ D$ t=tiEDDD$ D$IVH߉D$ D$ L+t$Hl$EDDD$Dd$0fDA"ADADUHHH HT$Ht$u3HT$Ht$HHt$H|$D$ H|$D$ H ]fAWAVIHAUIATUSHHL=HHH$LAąHHt{L@L1HH=HH޿t~D$%=uLHAT$HAąDHHuHHLDEHĘD[]A\A]A^A_@AAHAff.HtHtE1E11ff.Ht Httruefalse, ???%scert. version : %d %sserial number : %sissuer name : %ssubject name : %ssigned using : %s%-18s: %d bits %sbasic constraints : CA=%s, max_pathlen=%d %ssubject alt name : %s %s %s otherName : %s dNSName : %scert. type : %sSSL Client%sSSL Server%sEmail%sObject Signing%sReserved%sSSL CA%sEmail CA%sObject Signing CA %skey usage : %sDigital Signature%sNon Repudiation%sKey Encipherment%sData Encipherment%sKey Agreement%sKey Cert Sign%sCRL Sign%sEncipher Only%sDecipher Only %sext key usage : %s%s %scertificate policies : %s%s U-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----------END CERTIFICATE-----%s/%sThe CRL is expiredCertificate was missingThe CRL is from the future Certificate is uninitialised! %sissued on : %04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d %sexpires on : %04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d %s hardware module name : %s hardware type : %s hardware serial number : The certificate validity has expired%sUnknown reason (this should not happen) The certificate has been revoked (is on a CRL)The certificate Common Name (CN) does not match with the expected CNThe certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CAThe CRL is not correctly signed by the trusted CACertificate verification was skippedOther reason (can be used by verify callback)The certificate validity starts in the futureUsage does not match the keyUsage extensionUsage does not match the extendedKeyUsage extensionUsage does not match the nsCertType extensionThe certificate is signed with an unacceptable hash.The certificate is signed with an unacceptable PK alg (eg RSA vs ECDSA).The certificate is signed with an unacceptable key (eg bad curve, RSA too short).The CRL is signed with an unacceptable hash.The CRL is signed with an unacceptable PK alg (eg RSA vs ECDSA).The CRL is signed with an unacceptable key (eg bad curve, RSA too short). @ @` GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0zRx 4wADJ z AAE W AAG <T%BBB A(D0 (D BBBG 8BDA  ABF A FBG `BBA A(GH (A ABBE D (F ABBA  (A ABBG t4 BBB B(A0D8GtIII[rIII[ 8A0A(B BBBF `BQE E(D0H8KPT 8A0A(E BBBK D 8F0A(B BBBE F\$SED A(K0w (A ABBK P (C ABBH D(F ABBA0YADK } AAA DCApBBB E(A0D8GFPBBFIA 8A0A(B BBBA ,!DDB VL`t/@KBD D(D0t (A ABBE TL3BEE E(A0D8I 8D0A(B BBBE &p0BBB B(A0A8DzHZAs 8D0A(B BBBE D 8J0A(B BBBI WAJ0JAHBBBH E(A0A8G 8D0A(B BBBE &$ w#%1CP[ 3   -D\ Xt{ v #)0/5 ;AGMSY^_eUkbqjw{}#3>NH@ /6=av  'LSrFY3Oi}! 2 /HP^inu,AWu@1&p1 $5P3WQf3B5& 054 T x509_crt.cx509_profile_check_keyx509_name_cmpx509_crt_check_cnx509_crt_verify_stringsx509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb.constprop.0.isra.0mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal.part.0.LC6.LC7.LC8.LC9.LC10.LC11.LC12.LC13.LC0.LC14.LC1.LC45.LC3.LC2.LC44.LC4.LC5.LC16.LC18.LC17.LC24.LC23.LC19.LC20.LC21.LC22.LC46.LC33.LC43.LC15.LC26.LC27.LC28.LC29.LC30.LC31.LC32.LC34.LC35.LC36.LC37.LC38.LC39.LC40.LC41.LC42.LC25.LC47.LC48.LC49.LC51.LC52.LC53_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_mbedtls_pk_get_typembedtls_pk_get_bitlenmemcmpstrlenmbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_namembedtls_asn1_get_tagmbedtls_platform_zeroizembedtls_x509_crt_infosnprintfmbedtls_x509_serial_getsmbedtls_x509_dn_getsmbedtls_x509_sig_alg_getsmbedtls_pk_get_namembedtls_x509_key_size_helpermbedtls_oid_get_certificate_policiesmemcpymbedtls_oid_get_numeric_stringmbedtls_oid_get_extended_key_usagembedtls_x509_crt_verify_infombedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usagembedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usagembedtls_x509_crt_is_revokedmbedtls_x509_time_is_pastmbedtls_x509_time_is_futurembedtls_md_info_from_typembedtls_md_get_sizembedtls_mdmbedtls_pk_can_dombedtls_pk_verify_extmbedtls_x509_crt_verifymbedtls_x509_crt_profile_defaultmbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profilembedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartablembedtls_x509_crt_initmbedtls_x509_crt_freembedtls_pk_freecallocmbedtls_asn1_get_intmbedtls_x509_get_serialmbedtls_x509_get_algmbedtls_x509_get_sig_algmbedtls_x509_get_namembedtls_pk_parse_subpubkeymbedtls_x509_get_sigmbedtls_x509_get_timembedtls_x509_get_extmbedtls_asn1_get_boolmbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_typembedtls_asn1_get_lenmbedtls_asn1_get_bitstringmbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_ofmbedtls_x509_crt_parse_dermbedtls_x509_crt_parsestrstrmbedtls_pem_initmbedtls_pem_read_buffermbedtls_pem_freembedtls_x509_crt_parse_filembedtls_pk_load_filembedtls_x509_crt_parse_pathopendirmbedtls_threading_readdir_mutexmbedtls_mutex_lockreaddir__xstatclosedirmbedtls_mutex_unlockmbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopymbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cbmbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suitebmbedtls_x509_crt_profile_nextHTIJJKdMMM.MqMNP5@PjQPRP"RBPP"PcSTUIP 8ALPP  PE VP  e !j P " P # P+ LN $` %k P  & P= W` 'k P ( P ) P X9 *D P + P , P h -s P   P Y (.3P]/hP0P1P2(PH]3hP4P5P6 P@U7`P8P9P: P@U;`P<P=P> Pu?P@A PBPCJJKHz^_[`abcAd^_[`b`ad^_]J*fxklNlNlNl8N@lhNplNNlNl M%!Mk!M!j!l!m!i#"nH"oz"p"q"M#rO#M#M#r#sb$p$J$J$t%j;%jc%m%W%j&u;&uj&j&M'j+'v'M(M^(w(M(xE)M)j)MO*L*m*yK+z+zZ,j,j-Mz-m-M .MU.M/M/w/n0n0N0l 1{1C1~12D2C22|22f3|3}3N3l33*3* 4&4E.4PI4i4444*4x2|  p( 8 H (Xhx `      P    `( 8  X8(0Pdx P @14p1P335(05.symtab.strtab.shstrtab.rela.text.data.bss.rodata.str1.1.rodata.str1.8.rela.data.rel.ro.local.rodata.comment.note.GNU-stack.rela.eh_frame @F5@Z&5,5125$@28"T=P O@sg0?0o0`?xs?x?8@`u D G 0Rrpwx509_csr.c.o/ 1610128461 0 0 100644 6776 ` ELF>@@ AW1AVAUIATIUHSHH(DA0HHqHL9fMHHLI)H1L>HL93I)HHUPLHHL9 I)HL1HLHHcL9I)HLDHLHLcM9LHl$LLD$HHtH([]A\A]A^A_fDLD$M)LJ<;ILAH1Lx&HL9sH(I)D[D)]A\A]A^A_H([]A\A]A^A_@HHH1HLJHH)HÐHATIHUSI$I$Ht+f.Hݾ@H[0HHHuI|$HtIt$I|$[L]A\ff.@AWfAVAUATIUH@HMD$ HD$0bIHVHLLd$HD$HbLHLl$HMfHl$LIFIĹ0HLHD$LH)H;T$rIF(L0LHAą`L|$L|$IV0HLI+F(LIF TAF0HD$0LLAF0HIFHAąHt$IVPHt$HHD$I+FHLHIF@ILLHAąMnLd$ MnHMLLHD$LHD$IILLMILHuUL9l$t*f.LLA$H@]A\A]A^A_f-"LD$ D$ H@]A\A]A^A_fDLLL넸zf.AWAVAUIUSH@HMIHB|.HL|$ LHLE1H\$ H5E1HSH^_=t#tOLD$ D$ H@[]A]A^A_fHHE1E1SHH5LZYufDHT$(Ht$ LLD$ D$ =uLHLH@[]A]A^A_@UHHH HT$Ht$u3HT$Ht$HHt$H|$D$ H|$D$ H ]%sCSR version : %d %ssubject name : %ssigned using : %s%-14s: %d bits -----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST----------BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST----------END NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST----------BEGIN NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0zRx xBDB E(D0D8G`# 8A0A(B BBBG } 8G0D(B BBBH D8F0A(B BBB/,KKA iDGXBFB B(D0Dp@ 0A(B BBBC h 0A(B BBBG p8BBB D(A0Dp@xYMxAp_ 0A(A BBBC DxJWxApE 0A(A BBBE WAJ0JA )= (%*P/x4J`i~/ 4OV]rp#;LWhx509_csr.c.LC0.LC1.LC2.LC3.LC5.LC4.LC6.LC7mbedtls_x509_csr_info_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_snprintfmbedtls_x509_dn_getsmbedtls_x509_sig_alg_getsmbedtls_pk_get_namembedtls_x509_key_size_helpermbedtls_pk_get_bitlenmbedtls_x509_csr_initmbedtls_x509_csr_freembedtls_pk_freembedtls_platform_zeroizembedtls_x509_csr_parse_dercallocmemcpymbedtls_asn1_get_tagmbedtls_asn1_get_intmbedtls_x509_get_namembedtls_pk_parse_subpubkeymbedtls_x509_get_algmbedtls_x509_get_sig_algmbedtls_x509_get_sigmbedtls_x509_csr_parsembedtls_pem_initmbedtls_pem_read_buffermbedtls_pem_freembedtls_x509_csr_parse_filembedtls_pk_load_file& +K ^ #3\p z@Hak !,"a"#"$%+"e&'( 3BQ* +,!(0+NZ,s.)| <p.symtab.strtab.shstrtab.rela.text.data.bss.rodata.str1.1.rodata.str1.8.comment.note.GNU-stack.rela.eh_frame @@ &','12'P@2xO0X+m0h@  h  `}w/0 1610128461 0 0 100644 10392 ` ELF>X%@@ AUIATUHSH:2uz0teLHAąx8HcLHHLcExLHxIHLAHD[]A\A]z4H AąxHcLHHAąxLHHcЅx IcHHAfDSHH1HGHHG`HH)pHH{[fUHHH}0H}8H}hHp]f.7ff.fw@ff.Hw ff.Hw(ff.H0H8HATIUHSHHHuELHu7H{DHH{TLCRZ1CbZ[]A\fDfHhAVAUATUHSH HD$ D$HD$HD$H\$Lt$HLALcxoHLAąxXHILHLLcEx=0HLxkMH1ɺN H5HL)LC AH D[]A\A]A^f.E1H\$Lt$널E1H\$Lt$UfDH A[D]A\A]A^DAAWAVAUATUHSH8HU Lt$H$$HD$L1Ll$HLLAąx(HcL$HLH)LAątH8D[]A\A]A^A_LLL|$AąxȺLLHcЅx-Ic1H5HLLL)MAA|AWAVAUATUHSH8HU(Lt$H$$HD$L1Ll$HLLAąx(HcL$HLH)LAątH8D[]A\A]A^A_LLL|$AąxȺLLHcЅxeIcLLL|LLcEx0LLxCMH1ɺN 8H5HL)MAQDADA4uhU HHLD$ft$H|$HT$LH|$x)Pw>LD$LcȹHH5H]f.fUHH @t$ H|$HT$ Ht$H|$PwLD$Lc1ɺ H5HH ]fAWAVAUMATIUHSHHH(HL$HD$PH\$Xu%I|$( At$@HL$PHT$HADžXHD$A<$`HT$XI|$ HH)ADž$IT$0Lt$XHHLH)D$XHD$ADžIT$THL4IT$DHLD$$HcL$$HHLHHHL$(D$$0HLD$8IT$8HLsHT$HD$A|t6Ap   ,gBDD L ABG L T`8BBB A(D0DP 0D(A BBBK l 0D(D BBBF HBGB B(A0D8Gj 8D0A(B BBBH HHBGB B(A0D8Gj 8D0A(B BBBH $PIL RAHP xWAL0HA\BBB E(D0D8P  K ` A  8D0A(B BBBH 0MADG0M8U@W8A0DAA-27< AFK5Pf> 6 ,E`gp  = ^og@ P8 #;lHpW6Pb*2Ig Mx509write_crt.cx509_write_time.constprop.0.LC0.LC1.LC2.LC3.LC4.LC5.LC6_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffermbedtls_asn1_write_lenmbedtls_asn1_write_tagmbedtls_x509write_crt_initmbedtls_mpi_initmbedtls_x509write_crt_freembedtls_mpi_freembedtls_asn1_free_named_data_listmbedtls_platform_zeroizembedtls_x509write_crt_set_versionmbedtls_x509write_crt_set_md_algmbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_keymbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_keymbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_namembedtls_x509_string_to_namesmbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_namembedtls_x509write_crt_set_serialmbedtls_mpi_copymbedtls_x509write_crt_set_validitystrlenstrncpymbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extensionmbedtls_x509_set_extensionmbedtls_x509write_crt_set_basic_constraintsmbedtls_asn1_write_intmbedtls_asn1_write_boolmbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key_identifiermbedtls_pk_write_pubkeymbedtls_sha1_retmbedtls_x509write_crt_set_authority_key_identifiermbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_usagembedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstringmbedtls_x509write_crt_set_ns_cert_typembedtls_x509write_crt_dermbedtls_pk_can_dombedtls_oid_get_oid_by_sig_algmbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_dermbedtls_x509_write_namesmbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifiermbedtls_asn1_write_mpimbedtls_md_info_from_typembedtls_mdmbedtls_pk_signmemmovembedtls_x509_write_sigmbedtls_x509_write_extensionsmbedtls_x509write_crt_pemmbedtls_pem_write_buffer'?W)2;D%%&&*+ '-.9Pc |'-.9Pm '1: ?'1 ' 44M567 'C7a%w89* + ` {  : ; <# =P >o =   ?  ; V  3   AR  #E( \x `p  P@dPT|p .symtab.strtab.shstrtab.rela.text.data.bss.rodata.str1.1.comment.note.GNU-stack.rela.eh_frame @ @h &] ,] 12] R@0 I ^ (Y@(# 0   $h/19 1610128461 0 0 100644 6408 ` ELF>@@ fG@UHHH}H ]ff.wff.H7ff.HMHI1ff.@UHH @t$ H|$HT$ Ht$H|$PwHL$LcHH5H ]ff.UHH @t$ H|$HT$ Ht$H|$PwHL$Lc HH5H ]ff.AWAVAUIATUHSHHHL$LD$HIULt$HIHHDLHD$@HD$HD$HÅSmE1LHLÅ2HLHT$HI}HD$(H)IUHHLH)D$HHD$ A1HLD$,HcLcL$,HHIHcT$(LLHT$ LL<LÅ0HLrA}LcHH\$HML|$`IHLLHÅ1Aut$LMI}t$1LL$hXZI} I}AuHL$@HT$8ÅHt$HLHLl$PHD$LL$XJt5HL$@HT$8MLHD$PÅxqH|$PLHL)H|$PLcHLMLÅx?L0HAŅXHT$PLc1HMH)C\5LHĨ[]A\A]A^A_@LcHLLÅxɺ0HLLcHHLMILÅx1HLA HLD$(Hx`LcHHLMLc|$(MILÅ-0HLx!LcHMIffDUHSHHHD$x1HHcHIHD$H)IPHH5H=ZYH[]U`HB*H  -----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0zRx  0$A^L`t UAL0FAUAL0FA\ BBB J(A0I8J{NOA 8C0A(B BBBE 4<VADG0V8U@W8A0DAA  %(* E$`v@P` 4pXsUUP  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M/|BӭKy*laj;[%s[لW9qcx]njÇq~_.<6Y: xoBK, #a-l<]ݛ/uutz& ynۼ:Ğ n실q§GHjԳ Zo0zG@bB,ܸU<HX4ϴ#&xOzYo==lG^I H=w*s߽nd+xOsy3y5 >L'.uX!#dq,,b:4ѲZO=78pGH|vg|ȏ`?I.kScc٫!.- LQĒ!e [l?/h8lx/o!.V0w * vpY- n|tЭh"YbN#/4]]kw U͊*ȴ00 0 *H=0>1 0 UNL10U PolarSSL10UPolarssl Test EC CA0 130924155204Z 230922155204Z041 0 UNL10U PolarSSL10U localhost0Y0*H=*H=B7Vv Zr>Y- n|tЭh"YbN#/4]]kw U͊*ȴ00 U00UPaׂ ecF0nU#g0em $I?+x~$6|B@0>1 0 UNL10U PolarSSL10UPolarssl Test EC CA C~bC0 *H=h0e1,\צۢd Na1ǫssT ]м/!)5>90!6] '%;5%Y^|f{Os!R*-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIDNzCCAh+gAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN MTkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WhcNMjkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WjA0MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxEjAQBgNVBAMMCWxvY2FsaG9zdDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcN AQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMFNo93nzR3RBNdJcriZrA545Do8Ss86ExbQWuTN owCIp+4ea5anUrSQ7y1yej4kmvy2NKwk9XfgJmSMnLAofaHa6ozmyRyWvP7BBFKz NtSj+uGxdtiQwWG0ZlI2oiZTqqt0Xgd9GYLbKtgfoNkNHC1JZvdbJXNG6AuKT2kM 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'Mb➪\7OU;-B48,)1dl8qm* ytu0A0)0  *H 0;1 0 UNL10U PolarSSL10U PolarSSL Test CA0 110212144400Z 210212144400Z0;1 0 UNL10U PolarSSL10U PolarSSL Test CA0"0  *H 0 7?ޖ2}D!|Xŋ8{98]pxӞٓrQΣ0R@pDr @>Jc)tW;q?֥<*'`Ɵ˺`}2OX&"[Դ.p..AU4.}$riG@}g1y.bo'>XT !s70o.(~K#8ed nqȳɫχ2XoP0N0 U00UZ䥳Rզ>0U#0Z䥳Rզ>0  *H s= []SՀR3'$W/ѲP'/ѾSw84|2 */8縘}Poglܶos9<#Mu*vJ$>Qget*eK6j]Q|K6:ERi&H7.^S4446zg4@Hnӯ0M!ըǖ>SX<^q^p5j_ѲY n0SJ07?ޖ2}D!|Xŋ8{98]pxӞٓrQΣ0R@pDr @>Jc)tW;q?֥<*'`Ɵ˺`}2OX&"[Դ.p..AU4.}$riG@}g1y.bo'>XT !s70o.(~K#8ed nqȳɫχ2Xo?4o77Ecu5w*[w~ѷ˩ZZ8h*,238r՜N& fՑ|֏Kv+h0plN5>X !8ĻEo[NXk55iH Qk]KCH,\1I M }+"ħ>fW,>tvot21t"¨C# Ddgҏi)%Pu)>kYGն_cD?:OMFTt g؉eLX*G7U9Ou:Ef|e#k^flo8.iqk"r :pKޫ/Q*uX@'p1H !4LW!+ͧ v"5D?%)}y1첿4;xZ3>⁂5cčLwq[mx,yJyp4Vqh3E0;ҟ*8sxuKˆJIfJf<W3_u]4er"AОi8tpCPmsȧĝ] ՟yT·l=}-xZ3* mbBнJ ԩ޿,čye"ӷIlM"`:8l4|@xS#ꠚ`ȏ) K13[[WsHz刑*KЋ>w/G~Q eއ $ү(; I h@Ã484 Am\B29i>a6Gm.*4d0N&A6S|9BP(2m78 "͕MoCe/ i 00qW38]m)vEׇo#D d{v煕tѤ^+"db+4A7X/V)CKNnWS39XR9 #_$bH),-ˆRj!ݸnXiA)ô_uGo)UiS; f`300 C~bC0 *H=0>1 0 UNL10U PolarSSL10U Polarssl Test EC CA0 190210144400Z 290210144400Z0>1 0 UNL10U PolarSSL10U Polarssl Test EC CA0v0*H=+"b+4A7X/V)CKNnWS39XR9 #_$bH),-ˆRj!ݸnXiA)ô_uGo)UiS; f`3P0N0 U00Um $I?+x~$6|0U#0m $I?+x~$6|0 *H=h0e0Qʮ0ptZ,w♏}&Eӊh?MT1O;)({Gx 1Y0^?9T{`[Q.eB-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIDQTCCAimgAwIBAgIBAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN MTkwMjEwMTQ0NDAwWhcNMjkwMjEwMTQ0NDAwWjA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwggEiMA0G CSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDA3zf8F7vglp0/ht6WMn1EpRagzSHx mdTs6st8GFgIlKXsm8WL3xoemTiZhx57wI053zhdcHgH057Zk+i5clHFzqMwUqny 50BwFMtEonILwuVA+T7lpg6z+exKY8C4KQB0nFc7qKUEkHHxvYPZP9al4jwqj+8n YMPGn8u67GB9t+aEMr5P+1gmIgNb1LTV+/Xjli5wwOQuvfwu7uJBVcA0Ln0kcmnL R7EUQIN9Z/SG9jGr8XmksrUuEvmEF/Bibyc+E1ixVA0hmnM3oTDPb5Lc9un8rNsu KNF+AksjoBXyOGVkCeoMbo4bF6BxyLObyavpw/LPh5aPgAIynplYb6LVAgMBAAGj UDBOMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wHQYDVR0OBBYEFLRa5KWz3tJS9rnVppUP6z68x/3/ 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R7EUQIN9Z/SG9jGr8XmksrUuEvmEF/Bibyc+E1ixVA0hmnM3oTDPb5Lc9un8rNsu KNF+AksjoBXyOGVkCeoMbo4bF6BxyLObyavpw/LPh5aPgAIynplYb6LVAgMBAAGj UDBOMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wHQYDVR0OBBYEFLRa5KWz3tJS9rnVppUP6z68x/3/ MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFLRa5KWz3tJS9rnVppUP6z68x/3/MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUA A4IBAQABE3OEPfEd/bcJW5ZdU3/VgPNS4tMzh8gnJP/V2FcvFtGylMpQq6YnEBYI yBHAL4DRvlMY5rnXGBp3ODR8MpqHC6AquRTCLzjS57iYff//4QFQqW9n92zctspv czkaPKgjqo1No3Uq0Xaz10rcxyTUPrf5wNVRZ2V0KvllvAAVSzbI4mpdUXztjhST S5A2BeWQAAOr0zq1F7TSRVJpJs7jmB2ai/igkh1IAjcuwV6VwlP+sbw0gjQ0NpGM iHpnlzRAi/tIbtOvMIGOBU2TIfax/5jq1agUx5aPmT5TWAiJPOOP6l5xXnDwxeYS NWqiX9GyusBZjezaCaHabjDLU0qQ -----END CERTIFICATE----- PolarSSLTest-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED DEK-Info: DES-EDE3-CBC,A8A95B05D5B7206B 9Qd9GeArejl1GDVh2lLV1bHt0cPtfbh5h/5zVpAVaFpqtSPMrElp50Rntn9et+JA 7VOyboR+Iy2t/HU4WvA687k3Bppe9GwKHjHhtl//8xFKwZr3Xb5yO5JUP8AUctQq Nb8CLlZyuUC+52REAAthdWgsX+7dJO4yabzUcQ22Tp9JSD0hiL43BlkWYUNK3dAo PZlmiptjnzVTjg1MxsBSydZinWOLBV8/JQgxSPo2yD4uEfig28qbvQ2wNIn0pnAb GxnSAOazkongEGfvcjIIs+LZN9gXFhxcOh6kc4Q/c99B7QWETwLLkYgZ+z1a9VY9 gEU7CwCxYCD+h9hY6FPmsK0/lC4O7aeRKpYq00rPPxs6i7phiexg6ax6yTMmArQq QmK3TAsJm8V/J5AWpLEV6jAFgRGymGGHnof0DXzVWZidrcZJWTNuGEX90nB3ee2w PXJEFWKoD3K3aFcSLdHYr3mLGxP7H9ThQai9VsycxZKS5kwvBKQ//YMrmFfwPk8x vTeY4KZMaUrveEel5tWZC94RSMKgxR6cyE1nBXyTQnDOGbfpNNgBKxyKbINWoOJU WJZAwlsQn+QzCDwpri7+sV1mS3gBE6UY7aQmnmiiaC2V3Hbphxct/en5QsfDOt1X JczSfpRWLlbPznZg8OQh/VgCMA58N5DjOzTIK7sJJ5r+94ZBTCpgAMbF588f0NTR KCe4yrxGJR7X02M4nvD4IwOlpsQ8xQxZtOSgXv4LkxvdU9XJJKWZ/XNKJeWztxSe Z1vdTc2YfsDBA2SEv33vxHx2g1vqtw8SjDRT2RaQSS0QuSaMJimdOX6mTOCBKk1J 9Q5mXTrER+/LnK0jEmXsBXWA5bqqVZIyahXSx4VYZ7l7w/PHiUDtDgyRhMMKi4n2 iQvQcWSQTjrpnlJbca1/DkpRt3YwrvJwdqb8asZU2VrNETh5x0QVefDRLFiVpif/ tUaeAe/P1F8OkS7OIZDs1SUbv/sD2vMbhNkUoCms3/PvNtdnvgL4F0zhaDpKCmlT P8vx49E7v5CyRNmED9zZg4o3wmMqrQO93PtTug3Eu9oVx1zPQM1NVMyBa2+f29DL 1nuTCeXdo9+ni45xx+jAI4DCwrRdhJ9uzZyC6962H37H6D+5naNvClFR1s6li1Gb nqPoiy/OBsEx9CaDGcqQBp5Wme/3XW+6z1ISOx+igwNTVCT14mHdBMbya0eIKft5 X+GnwtgEMyCYyyWuUct8g4RzErcY9+yW9Om5Hzpx4zOuW4NPZgPDTgK+t2RSL/Yq rE1njrgeGYcVeG3f+OftH4s6fPbq7t1A5ZgUscbLMBqr9tK+OqygR4EgKBPsH6Cz L6zlv/2RV0qAHvVuDJcIDIgwY5rJtINEm32rhOeFNJwZS5MNIC1czXZx5//ugX7l I4sy5nbVhwSjtAk8Xg5dZbdTZ6mIrb7xqH+fdakZor1khG7bC2uIwibD3cSl2XkR wN48lslbHnqqagr6Xm1nNOSVl8C/6kbJEsMpLhAezfRtGwvOucoaE+WbeUNolGde P/eQiddSf0brnpiLJRh7qZrl9XuqYdpUqnoEdMAfotDOID8OtV7gt8a48ad8VPW2 -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- PolarSSLTest-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----- Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED DEK-Info: DES-EDE3-CBC,307EAB469933D64E IxbrRmKcAzctJqPdTQLA4SWyBYYGYJVkYEna+F7Pa5t5Yg/gKADrFKcm6B72e7DG ihExtZI648s0zdYw6qSJ74vrPSuWDe5qm93BqsfVH9svtCzWHW0pm1p0KTBCFfUq UsuWTITwJImcnlAs1gaRZ3sAWm7cOUidL0fo2G0fYUFNcYoCSLffCFTEHBuPnagb a77x/sY1Bvii8S9/XhDTb6pTMx06wzrm -----END EC PRIVATE KEY----- -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIICBDCCAYigAwIBAgIJAMFD4n5iQ8zoMAwGCCqGSM49BAMCBQAwPjELMAkGA1UE BhMCTkwxETAPBgNVBAoMCFBvbGFyU1NMMRwwGgYDVQQDDBNQb2xhcnNzbCBUZXN0 IEVDIENBMB4XDTE5MDIxMDE0NDQwMFoXDTI5MDIxMDE0NDQwMFowPjELMAkGA1UE BhMCTkwxETAPBgNVBAoMCFBvbGFyU1NMMRwwGgYDVQQDDBNQb2xhcnNzbCBUZXN0 IEVDIENBMHYwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEACIDYgAEw9orNEE3WC+HVv78ibopQ0tO 4G7DDldTMzlY1FK0kZU5CyPfXxckYkj8GpUpziwth8KIUoCv1mqrId240xxuWLjK 6LJpjvNBrSnDtF91p0dv1RkpVWmaUzsgtGYWYDMeo1AwTjAMBgNVHRMEBTADAQH/ MB0GA1UdDgQWBBSdbSAkSQE/K8t4tRm8fiTJ2/s2fDAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBSdbSAk SQE/K8t4tRm8fiTJ2/s2fDAMBggqhkjOPQQDAgUAA2gAMGUCMFHKrjAPpHB0BN1a LH8TwcJ3vh0AxeKZj30mRdOKBmg/jLS3rU3g8VQBHpn8sOTTBwIxANxPO5AerimZ hCjMe0d4CTHf1gFZMF70+IqEP+o5VHsIp2Cqvflb0VGWFC5l9a4cQg== -----END CERTIFICATE----- *H  + , %s=??=%02X%s....??? (%s, MGF1-%s, 0x%02X)%s key size X.509 certificate load: failedpassed ռռ ռ ռռ ռ ռpassed X.509 signature verify: CNUcommonNameUcountryNameOU organizationNameLUlocalityR*H  OUU organizationalUnitNameSTUstateOrProvinceNameemailAddressserialNumberUpostalAddressUpostalCodeUdnQualifierU.titleU surNameUSNgivenNameU*GNinitialsU+pseudonymUAgenerationQualifierU,domainComponent &,dDC%sCRL version : %d %sissuer name : %sRevoked certificates: %sserial number: %ssigned using : -----END X509 CRL----------BEGIN X509 CRL----- %sthis update : %04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d %snext update : %04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d revocation date: %04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02dtruefalse%scert. version : %d %sserial number : %sissuer name : %ssubject name : %ssigned using : %s%-18s: %d bits %sbasic constraints : CA=%s, max_pathlen=%d %ssubject alt name : %s %s %s otherName : %s dNSName : %scert. type : %sSSL Client%sSSL Server%sEmail%sObject Signing%sReserved%sSSL CA%sEmail CA%sObject Signing CA %skey usage : %sDigital Signature%sNon Repudiation%sKey Encipherment%sData Encipherment%sKey Agreement%sKey Cert Sign%sCRL Sign%sEncipher Only%sDecipher Only %sext key usage : %s%s %scertificate policies : %s%s -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----------END CERTIFICATE-----%s/%sThe CRL is expiredCertificate was missingThe CRL is from the future Certificate is uninitialised! %sissued on : %04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d %sexpires on : %04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d %s hardware module name : %s hardware type : %s hardware serial number : The certificate validity has expired%sUnknown reason (this should not happen) The certificate has been revoked (is on a CRL)The certificate Common Name (CN) does not match with the expected CNThe certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CAThe CRL is not correctly signed by the trusted CACertificate verification was skippedOther reason (can be used by verify callback)The certificate validity starts in the futureUsage does not match the keyUsage extensionUsage does not match the extendedKeyUsage extensionUsage does not match the nsCertType extensionThe certificate is signed with an unacceptable hash.The certificate is signed with an unacceptable PK alg (eg RSA vs ECDSA).The certificate is signed with an unacceptable key (eg bad curve, RSA too short).The CRL is signed with an unacceptable hash.The CRL is signed with an unacceptable PK alg (eg RSA vs ECDSA).The CRL is signed with an unacceptable key (eg bad curve, RSA too short).` %sCSR version : %d %ssubject name : %s%-14s: %d bits -----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST----------BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST----------END NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST----------BEGIN NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----UUU#U`HB-----END CERTIFICATE----- -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- *H  -----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- ;XНХ(`<Ц`Ppp0P@@Lж@Dl PDP( p \ @  PP p p `h @ @@ t p 0D`Pt`  @ P 0` Dp X l    0 p Dp P$@P`p$8XPx`zRx $0FJ w?;*3$"D\ pbAI`O AA 4hvAGD E AAE D FAE DTDTd]BB B(A0A8G  8A0A(B BBBF Pxd8BEE B(G0A8D` 8A0A(B BBBF  8F0A(B BBBA D 8F0A(B BBBA L<BBA A(J@T (D ABBC < (G DBBE @0wBAG D0~  AABH D  FABK xtȫLBH D(G0G@o 0A(A BBBA D 0F(A BBBG u0A(A BBBKP@<LwBDK G0M  FABB B AABL0BIE B(A0A8G 8A0A(B BBBA `=BEB B(A0A8GP 8F0A(B BBBE p 8A0A(E BBBA HȮBBEE E(G0A8G`S 8A0A(B BBBC 0̯0A^ J F$Pܯ5BAG@gAB$x5BAG@gABX BBA G b  DBBJ g I T A  G S A LPBBE B(A0A8J 8A0A(B BBBB (LCBDH j ABA Hx`BBB E(A0D8DP* 8D0A(B BBBE HBBE B(A0D8DP 8D0A(B BBBE HBBB B(A0A8DPq 8D0A(B BBBD \ BDE B(D0D8DPXN`GhGpKPwXN`GhGpKPXV`OhEpKP 8C0A(B BBBA D8F0A(B BBB/≮KED A(D0(A ABBAL@GBBB B(A0A8GZ 8A0A(B BBBK X%BBB B(A0A8Dz 8D0A(B BBBK DMZAWAJ0JA4 wADJ z AAE W AAG <D%BBB A(D0 (D BBBG 8BDA  ABF A FBG `BBA A(GH (A ABBE D (F ABBA  (A ABBG t$ x BBB B(A0D8GtIII[rIII[ 8A0A(B BBBF ` BQE E(D0H8KPT 8A0A(E BBBK D 8F0A(B BBBE  lF\ SED A(K0w (A ABBK P (C ABBH D(F ABBA0t YADK } AAA DCAp $BBB E(A0D8GFPBBFIA 8A0A(B BBBA  !DDB V< P d /@x KBD D(D0t (A ABBE TL 3BEE E(A0D8I 8D0A(B BBBE  &p BBB B(A0A8DzHZAs 8D0A(B BBBE D 8J0A(B BBBI  WAJ0JAH BBBH E(A0A8G 8D0A(B BBBE  & x, BDB E(D0D8G`# 8A0A(B BBBG } 8G0D(B BBBH D8F0A(B BBB 4/, PKKA iDGX BFB B(D0Dp@ 0A(B BBBC h 0A(B BBBG pHDBBB D(A0Dp@xYMxAp_ 0A(A BBBC DxJWxApE 0A(A BBBE WAJ0JA80BEA D(D0^ (D ABBI >A|46ApPdx   ,gBDD L ABG  @ T <8BBB A(D0DP 0D(A BBBK l 0D(D BBBF Hx$BGB B(A0D8Gj 8D0A(B BBBH HHBGB B(A0D8Gj 8D0A(B BBBH $IL RAHP 8DWAL0HA\XBBB E(D0D8P  K ` A  8D0A(B BBBH 0$MADG0M8U@W8A0DAA@ <$A^P0LDH XDlPUAL0FAUAL0FA\ BBB J(A0I8J{NOA 8C0A(B BBBE 0 VADG0V8U@W8A0DAAhg   ̵е ̵ܵ޵ ޵     ,/ 3/ G T ae sw        ɶ Ͷ ׶ ۶ ؼP @3Ƚ KP @ pȿ@Wat~ ` o%   HRXH o(HooEoX6`F`V`f`v`````````aa&a6aFaVafavaaaaaaaaabb&b6bFbVbfbvbbbbbbbbbcc&c6cFcVcfcvcccccccccdd&d6dFdVdfdvdddddddddee&e6eFeVefeveeeeeeeeeff&f6fFfVfffvfffffffffgg&g6gFg@m@  GCC: (GNU) 10.2.0.shstrtab.gnu.hash.dynsym.dynstr.gnu.version.gnu.version_r.rela.dyn.rela.plt.init.plt.got.text.fini.rodata.eh_frame_hdr.eh_frame.init_array.fini_array.data.rel.ro.dynamic.got.plt.data.bss.comment o  P%%%oEE\2o(H(H0AXHXH KBHRHR U``P ` `0[PgPgd`g`guj pM xPP  @ _` hh0hz